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Encyclopaedia   Preventing Election-related Violence   Factors that may trigger electoral violence   External factors  
Conflict relating to changing power dynamics

The balance of power in a country can be affected by transitional political processes such as: implementation of peace agreements; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes; social or legal reforms benefiting or marginalizing groups of citizens; international trade agreements; and other factors.

Deficiencies in the institutional arrangements in place to address heightened tensions during transitional periods, especially within a post-conflict environment, are likely to produce election-related violence.[1] The biggest risk is that such institutional deficiencies will increase the inherent tensions that any electoral competition generates.[2] The timing of any major political process plays a significant role: for example, an early election in combination with a weak DDR process creates fertile ground for election-related violence.[3]

Empirical cases:

  • Burundi presidential, legislative and communal elections 2010. Since 1993 Burundi has suffered from a protracted civil war that has at different times shifted the balance of power between the two main ethnic groups (majority Hutus and minority Tutsis). The country has had to deal with the assassination of a succession of presidents, military coups, a change of the constitution and various attempts at power-sharing and peace agreements. In 2009, a new transition period and DDR process began that had a clear impact on the 2010 elections.[4] By then the country was dealing with the early stages of a turbulent DDR process. In addition, state institutions lacked the experience and capacity to provide democratic channels to address related grievances. Major election-related incidents included a boycott by many political parties, grenade attacks, restrictions on participation, as well as allegations of physical abuse and torture.[5]
    Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); social and political exclusion (external); the presence of non-state armed groups (external); grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external); provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); rejection of the election results (internal).[6]
  • Timor-Leste presidential and legislative elections 2007. Violence recorded during the 2007 elections was perpetrated by and against different political party supporters, mainly during the post-electoral period. There were 162 alleged incidents of this nature including two deaths, approximately 100 injuries and 7,000 families displaced.[7]
    Inter-related factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external);[8] the presence of non-state armed actors (external);[9] provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); inadequate electoral security arrangements (internal).[10]



[1] Sisk, Timothy D., ‘Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence’, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Colorado, 2007, p. 7; and Ndulo, Muna and Lulo, Sara, ‘Free and Fair Elections, Violence and Conflict’, Harvard ILJ Online (Harvard College), 51 (2010), pp. 160, 165.

[2] Keane, John, The Life and Death of Democracy (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2009); UNDP Democratic Governance Group Bureau for Development Policy, Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming, pp. 11–14, available at <http://

www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/electoral_systemsandprocesses/elections-and-conflict-prevention-guide.html>, accessed 2 May 2018 ; and Pastor, Robert A., ‘The Role of Electoral Administration in Democratic Transitions: Implications for Policy and Research’, Democratization, 6/4 (1999), pp. 11–14, available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510349908403630>, accessed 2 May 2018

[3] Fischer, Jeff, Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention, IFES White Paper (Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2002), p. 7, available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan019255.pdf>, accessed 1 July 2011.

[4] GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Burundi Civil War’ (no date), available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/burundi.htm>, accessed 21 July 2011; and Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project (RULAC), ‘Burundi: Current Conflicts’, Geneva, 2011, available at <http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/current_conflict.php?id_state=38>, accessed 21 July 2011.

[5] EL Abdellaoui, Jamila, ‘2010 Elections Burundi’s Next Test’, Institute for Security Studies, 22 October 2009, available at <http://reliefweb.int/node/330150>, accessed 4 July 2011; International Crisis Group, ‘Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse’, Africa Report no. 169 (7 February 2011), p. i, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/burundi/169%20Burundi%20-%20From%20Electoral%20Boycott%20to%20Political%20Impasse%20ENGLISH.pdf>, accessed 4 July 2011; and Amnesty International, ‘Burundi Must Investigate Those Accused of Torturing Opposition Politicians’, 23 August 2010, available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/burundi-must-investigate-those-accused-torturing-opposition-politicians-2010-08-23>, accessed 4 July 2010.

[6] International Crisis Group, ‘Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse’; and GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Burundi Civil War’.

[7] Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment, Electoral Violence in Timor-Leste, pp. 3–5.

[8] Cutter, ‘Timor Leste Conflict Assessment’.

[9] International Crisis Group, ‘Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary Elections’, Asia Briefing no. 65 (13 June 2007), p. 7, available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/timor-leste/timor-leste-s-parliamentary-elections>, accessed 2 May 2018

[10] Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment, Electoral Violence in Timor-Leste, pp. 3–5.