The official election results are announced by the leadership of an EMB. To safeguard electoral integrity, the results must be managed professionally and transparently. Also, at the time when the election results are announced, there should be no cases that could influence the election outcome still pending judicial resolution. In practice, unofficial announcements often precede the official announcement. In addition to an EMB, political parties and other observer groups may publish their preliminary results and estimates. Such reporting can differ in accuracy and in some cases be based on unverified facts, even rumours. Contradictory and sensationalistic statements may deepen mistrust and feed the perception that elections are rigged. If the margin of victory is narrow, complaints are not resolved professionally, and the winner takes all power, losing parties may resort to violence to prevent the results being implemented or secure a power-sharing agreement. To prevent election-related violence, an EMB must ensure that the management of election results is transparent and that complaints are resolved effectively and professionally before the final results are announced. Security sector agencies must ensure that they act on signs of impending electoral violence and protect vulnerable individuals, groups and facilities. Other state and non-state actors can work at the grassroots level and with the key political actors to promote peace between different groups and peaceful implementation of the election results, especially if it involves the transition of power. 

 A.        Improved electoral management and justice

Following voting day and the completion of the count, an EMB will face pressures from politicians, the media, and the public to announce the final election results as soon as possible. Before doing so, it must ensure that the results are accurate. This may include obtaining original log forms and consolidated reports from each polling station/region. Electoral complaints that could influence the election outcome must also be resolved. Due to the large number of polling stations and the geographical distance between central office and remote regions, shipping the necessary documentation to the central EMB office may take time. Also, the timelines for resolving electoral disputes may be prolonged due to specific legal remedies. If the time between voting day and the announcement of the results is longer than expected, or the announcement is delayed, an EMB must be able to demonstrate that results and complaints are being managed professionally and in a way that leaves no room for malpractice. Transparency and openness to collaboration with other stakeholders, such as political parties and CSOs, will help an EMB to promote its integrity and credibility of election results.

• Manage the election results in a professional and transparent way to ensure that the credibility of the results is protected

An EMB must have a safe and secure means for the transmission of election results. These may include electronic transmission and shipment of a hard copy. An electronic transmission system should be established and tested in advance, including alternative methods of data transmission. In addition to conveying the election results to the central EMB, locally generated results should be made available to all electoral monitors, including political party and other domestic and international observers. It is good practice to ask observers to co-sign result the forms and to issue them a copy of the forms. Sensitive electoral materials, primarily ballot papers, must be kept safely to ensure that they can be inspected and recounted when necessary.

Automating elections reduces conflicts and tensions surrounding the 2010 elections in the Philippines. Election-related violence in the Philippines, especially the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), is a common and deeply rooted issue. During the 2007 national and local elections, due to manual procedures, it took days and weeks for local-level results to be announced and months for the national results to be announced. In 2010, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) decided that the national and local elections would be automated through the use of precinct count optical scanners (PCOSs). By the close of voting, all ballot papers were scanned. The PCOSs tabulated the results and transmitted them electronically to the higher canvassing bodies. Hard copies of the results were also delivered to those concerned. As a result, local-level results were compiled within just a few hours and within 72 hours the national results were almost final. In Sulu province, there were fewer incidents of election-related violence during the 2010 elections than in earlier elections ‘as a result of the significantly decreased human involvement in the counting of votes and canvassing of election results, and the unprecedented speed with which the results were arrived at’.^[1]

Transparent management of the election result helps the credibility of electoral processes during the 2006 elections in Bolivia. In 2005, Bolivia experienced violent protests in which the formation of an assembly to draft a new constitution which would grant more autonomy to the Bolivian provinces was demanded.^[2] The election of a constituent assembly and a referendum on regional autonomy took place in 2006. Although they were organized in a tense environment, the Election Commission of Bolivia delivered an election that was regarded as credible and genuine.^[3] The transmission of results was handled to the satisfaction of the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission (EOM). For example, the EU-EOM observed that ‘provisions of copies of the results forms from the polling stations to the party agents helped the political organizations to monitor the process. Furthermore, the EU-EOM final report explains that ‘electoral authorities placed scanned copies of the result forms from all polling stations on the internet, which further increased the credibility of the counting process. In terms of the result announcement, the EU-EOM mentions the following: ‘The low number of official complaints, together with the general efficiency of the electoral authorities, made possible an exceptionally fast processing of the results. While the legally established deadline for finalizing the counting of the votes was July 27, the CNE was able to give the official proclamation of the results already on July 12, more rapidly than ever before in the electoral history of Bolivia.’^[4]

• Ensure that complaints, in particular those with the potential to affect the overall election results, are resolved before the final results are announce 

During the polling and counting processes, electoral actors may submit a large number of complaints. The bulk of complaints may relate to occurrences at the polling and counting locations and include systemic problems, for example, inaccuracies in the electoral registers or a lack of sufficient sensitive and non-sensitive electoral materials; the performance or actions of polling and counting officials, observers and voters (e.g. the management of polling and counting processes and compliance with relevant procedures); and serious breaches of the electoral rules and regulations that can impact electoral outcomes, such as ballot stuffing and falsification of the election results. In addition, electoral complaints may relate to incidents outside the polling and counting locations, such as violation of a ‘no-campaigning period’, vote buying, intimidation of electorates and other electoral stakeholders, and so on. An EMB must work closely with the security, prosecution and judiciary agencies to ensure that all complaints are processed in an effective and timely way. In particular, an EMB must ensure that the complaint log forms from the polling and counting locations are examined by the relevant instances. If malpractice is suspected, an investigation should be initiated, and the perpetrators sanctioned. Where evidence or indications exist that electoral manipulation has affected the election results, a recount or a repeat of the polling can be imposed to ensure that the credibility of the election results is preserved. 

Mexican electoral authorities investigate allegations of fraud and perform a partial recount before the official result announcement in 2006. In 2006, street protests broke out for several months after one presidential candidate, who had lost by a narrow margin, rejected the election results.^[5] During the 2012 general elections, the margin between the winning and the next candidate was 6 per cent, and one losing presidential candidate rejected the preliminary results published by the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE). Moreover, a full recount was demanded. Allegations included vote buying, through giving away supermarket food coupons; manipulating opinion polls; and paying broadcasters to favour one candidate. The fraud allegations triggered peaceful demonstrations in Mexico City.^[6] Soon after polling day, the IFE decided to recount the votes at more than half of the country’s 143,000 polling stations. The Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPFJ), after considering all legal challenges to the results, dismissed appeals calling for an annulment of the vote, finding insufficient evidence of vote buying.^[7] The official election results were declared by the TEPFJ and the IFE approximately two months after polling day. Although the IFE had found some irregularities during the recount, these were not significant to change the results. The IFE regarded the recount as an ‘exercise in openness and transparency’.^[8] .. 

• Collaborate with election observation groups, including domestic and international election observation missions, and the media in respect to the publication of unofficial and official preliminary and final results

Well-organized electoral observers, including political party and domestic observers, will be able to cover most, rarely all, polling and counting locations. Transparent voting and counting processes will allow observers to get results from different counting locations and compile the overall results in parallel with the election administrators. In some situations, observers may publish unofficial results even before an EMB is in a position to do so. However, these results may be prone to mistakes and misleading, sometimes intentionally. For example, if these results are compiled wrongly or presented only partially, or if they ignore electoral complaints, they may be misleading. On the other hand, when observers manage the results accurately and impartially, they may be an important reference point for an EMB. An EMB should therefore collaborate closely with election observation groups and the media to ensure that results can be cross-checked and that disputed results are verified before being presented to the public. An EMB should discourage publication of incomplete or disputed results that may raise unrealistic expectations and tensions and lead to conflicts and violence. If such results are announced, an EMB should react to make the public aware and inform it about the status of the official results.

The Ugandan election authority regulates publication of the final election results to prevent misunderstandings and faulty reporting during the 2011 elections. During the run-up to the 2011 general elections, which witnessed some election-related violence,^[9] one presidential candidate issued a statement that he and his campaign team would announce the results immediately after polling day in order to ‘forestall rigging’.^[10] In 2006, the same candidate had rejected the election results, calling for a recount after losing to an incumbent candidate.^[11] However, the announcement of the results in 2011 was regulated by the Ugandan Electoral Commission, which released a set of rules for media coverage. The code of conduct was developed by the Commission with the help of the Independent Media Council of Uganda and the UN High Commission on Human Rights. It emphasizes the importance of free and fair media coverage and points out that only the Electoral Commission has the right to announce the final results. This specific provision aimed to prevent misunderstandings and faulty reporting. Accordingly, the media are allowed to cover different polling stations and present the result from the specific station but are not allowed to announce the final results.^[12] Prior to the launching of the Code of Conduct, the African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME) published guidelines for media coverage through a participatory process to which the Ugandan Election Commission was a party.^[13]

• Communicate preliminary results and announce the final election results in a clear way

Following the voting and counting processes, political actors, journalists and the broader public will expect an announcement of election results in a short period of time. However, publication of the preliminary and final results is a sensitive process that, especially in conflict-prone societies, can generate disputes and conflict. When providing preliminary results for general elections, an EMB must ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, these draw on a proper sample. For example, it should reflect the ratio between rural and urban communities as well as the geographical, social and other diversities that determine political alignments. The broader public, journalists and political analysts should be able to understand these details. Use of the geo-spatial tools for data presentation may be helpful. Preliminary results should be published periodically and an EMB should avail itself of press conferences to provide comments and explanations. If any serious complaints, which could impact on the final results, are being considered, an EMB should keep the public informed about this fact. When an EMB publishes the final results, these should be presented in a clear and concise way. If the final results include seat allocation, the background information on candidates’ electoral unit, the number of votes and the method for converting number of votes into number of seats should be available and explained.

Transparent and well-organized result management by the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) ensures clear communication of results to electoral stakeholders and the public. Elections in South Africa are organized in an environment characterized by some social tensions and conflicts. Conflict sensitivity is an important aspect of electoral management. Ahead of the 2009 national and provincial elections, certain areas of KwaZulu-Natal province experienced some election-related violence during the pre-election phase.^[14] During the phase of election results announcement, the IEC organized a display of the results information on leader boards at the IEC national and provincial results centres, as well as on the IEC’s website. In this respect, nine Result Operation Centers (ROCs) were established throughout the country. The national ROC in Pretoria was established to allow the IEC and other interested stakeholders, including the media and political parties, to monitor the various processes leading up to election day and the results announcements.^[15] Furthermore, on a regular basis, the ROCs used Global Information System (GIS) mapping technology to display the results in a visually simplified manner which rendered the results information discernible. The IEC also published several of the maps through international and national broadcasting networks.^[16] The IEC is legally bound to declare the results within one week of an election. The 2009 results were published after three days and included information on the allocation of seats to the political parties contesting the election. Within seven days after election day, the IEC designated seats to the respective party candidates, and published the names of the designated representatives.^[17] All objections relating to election results were dealt by the IEC before the final results were announced. According to the Electoral Act, the IEC informs objectors, and any other party involved, about its decisions relating to objections. Objectors can appeal to the Electoral Court, but this does not delay announcement of the final election results. In 2009, the IEC received 25 objections, most of which were rejected as not being objections contemplated in terms of the Electoral Act.

B.         Improved electoral security

The announcement of the final election results will reveal the electoral ‘winners and losers’. In some situations, political competitors will have a good sense of who is expected to win elections even before the final results are announced. In other cases, the margin of victory may be narrow and it may be hard to predict the winner before all ballot papers are processed and electoral disputes are resolved. Due to the high political stakes and anxieties, the period around the announcement of the election results may be prone to conflicts and incidents. If rigging of the result is suspected—regardless of whether these suspicions are grounded or not—losing parties, their supporters and the broader citizenry can initiate demonstrations. It should be kept in mind that candidates who have personal motives to obstruct verification and implementation of the election results may manipulate citizens. Some incentives to instigate violence may include a determination to remain in elected office, secure a power sharing deal, force a repeat of the elections, undermine electoral processes and institutions, and so on. During the period of the announcement of the election results, security sector agencies must focus on detecting signs of impending violence in order to prevent and mitigate violent incidents before they escalate into a large-scale violence. In particular, SSAs should focus on the protection of electoral actors, vulnerable groups and electoral facilities. In doing so, they must maintain impartiality and refrain from the excessive use of force. Close collaboration with other actors and civil society groups will increase the chances of such situations being peacefully resolved.

• Monitor indicators of impending violence relating to announcement of election results

During the period of election result verification, security sector agencies should collect information that may give an early indication of impending violence. Such information may include early and ungrounded announcements of electoral victory; threats made by prominent political stakeholders against political opponents and their supporters, electoral actors and vulnerable groups; rejection of the results prior to or after the announcement; claims that the elections have been rigged; verbal conflicts between political stakeholders; cases of intimidation; and so on. The risks identified may be many, but good intelligence will assist in planning scenarios for the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence and in ensuring that SSAs deploy rationally.

Security is heightened before the Egyptian 2012 presidential election result announcement. The 2012 Egyptian presidential election was the first such after the 2011 revolution. There was a run-off between two candidates, both of whom had declared victory before the results were officially announced by the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC). As a result, violent protests from candidates’ supporters were feared. To respond to increased risks, Egyptian security forces deployed 3,000 police and military officers to safeguard key political and economic sites throughout the country before the election results were officially announced by the SPEC. Enhanced security was provided to all public institutions and the Suez Canal.^[18]

• Ensure that vulnerable individuals and groups, such as women and minorities, are protected

Experience from different contexts when the announcement of election results has triggered outbreaks of violence shows that election-related violence is often directed against marginalized and vulnerable groups. Women and girls, men and boys are sexually abused; ethnic and religious minorities are maltreated, killed and expelled from their homes and their property and places of worship are destroyed. In case of such concerns, SSAs should demonstrate determination to protect vulnerable groups. Practical actions may include public statements in this regard, swift investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators of incidents, and the deployment of standing security capacities to guard vulnerable communities.

• Ensure that security sector interventions are not used to suppress political liberties and the free expression of opinion

In conflict-prone societies, security sector personnel will often receive additional training to ensure that they deploy sensitively when protecting electoral processes. However, in many cases, incumbent officials and elites have used security sector agencies to suppress opposition and stop citizens from protesting against perceived electoral manipulation. Very often, police interventions against citizens have resulted in excessive use of force. If disturbances do happen relating to the election results, the SSAs must remain professional and politically impartial and act in accordance with the professional code of conduct. The force should not be used to suppress political liberties and the free expression of opinion. When this is a concern, senior officials must take measures to reinforce understanding of these principles within all agencies. On the other hand, security agencies must demonstrate resoluteness in prosecuting those who provoke violent conflict and instigate violent incidents.

• Cooperate with other actors to ensure a multi-layered approach in addressing risks related to the announcement of election results

The deployment of security sector agencies in resolving electoral disputes may help in separating hostile communities and providing physical security to vulnerable groups and facilities. However, this will not address the root causes of conflict, nor will it help bridge different positions. The engagement of SSAs will prevent violence escalation and create space for peace-building efforts. Security sector agencies therefore need to maintain close collaboration with other state and non-state actors and reputable individuals and groups that can help in mediating conflicts and reaching peaceful settlements.

C.         Improved infrastructure for peace

It is well established that the announcement of election results, particularly in conflict-prone societies where the election winner takes all power, or where electoral processes lack credibility, may increase tensions and trigger violent outbreaks. Different actors may have different incentives to resort to violent means in order to derail the implementation of election results. If citizens’ groups and losing political parties fear that the election results have been rigged, they may initiate protests. These protests may turn violent or attract violent responses from the security sector agencies. Incumbent candidates who lose an election may rig the election results and clamp down on their political opponents using the state security agencies. The opposition parties may resort to violent tactics in an attempt to secure favourable power-sharing deals. There are many possible scenarios that may lead to outbreaks of violence during the electoral phase in which election results are announced. Non-state and state actors which form infrastructures for peace may be important and are sometimes the only force that has the legitimacy and capacity to engage with different actors and promote non-violent resolution of disputes surrounding election results.

• Build scenarios for engagement in addressing tensions relating to the election results

Non-state and state actors that promote peace and the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes may be well positioned to engage in deflating tensions and mediating conflicts arising from disputed election results. Those familiar with electoral processes and the dynamics of structural conflicts in a given country will be able to make reasonably accurate predictions about the reactions of political actors and citizens with respect to different electoral outcomes. Methodological consistency in the assessment and analysis of multiple risks will ensure that predictions are even more accurate. This analysis will help create different scenarios for action. The aim is to ensure that relevant non-state and state actors are prepared to engage in reducing tensions. Coordination will ensure that the engagement is timely and comprehensive and that it reaches all communities. Efforts should focus on protecting marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women. Scenarios need to be periodically revised and modified to reflect the most recent developments.

Scenario planning ahead of the Iraqi 2005 National Assembly elections. During the run-up to the 2005 Iraqi National Assembly elections, incidents of election-related violence were recorded throughout the country. These included assassinations of political party candidates and campaign workers.^[19] This was the first election since the 2003 occupation by the US-led Multi-National Force. In the context of preparations for the 2005 elections, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) organized three scenario planning workshops, two in 2004 and one in early 2005. Workshops, each involving approximately 20 Iraq experts, were designed to explore alternative election outcomes using multiple-scenario analysis. This included scenarios relating to the actions of various groups and leaders based on the performance of an EMB; the final voter turnout; or the election results. The participants identified risks in respect to so-called ‘undesirable’ election outcomes, which might increase the likelihood of election-related violence, and perceptions that the elections were unfair. A working group was also tasked with recommending strategies and actions ‘to ward off’ certain outcomes or ‘at least ameliorate their effects’.^[20] The experts concluded that ‘win–lose’ scenarios were less important than the Iraqi people’s perception of the transparency, legitimacy and fairness of the electoral process.

• Uphold peace forums that involve diverse stakeholders at national and sub-national level throughout the period of the announcement of the election results

The period surrounding the announcement of election results may see polarization and increased mistrust between the main stakeholders, including political actors, an EMB, security sector agencies, communities and so on. If the margin of victory is expected to be narrow and tensions are on the rise, civil society organizations and other non-state and state actors should engage in the promotion of peace and trust building. Among other things, they can organize discussion forums where all relevant stakeholders can express and discuss their concerns and seek commonly accepted solutions. In addition, these forums may serve as a joint platform for inviting supporters of all political parties and the broader public to abstain from violence, regardless of the electoral outcomes. Peace forums should be established at the national and sub-national levels.

National and sub-national peace efforts by civil society help mitigate the outbreak of election-related violence following the Kenyan 2007 general election result announcement. The election-related violence that broke out in Kenya in 2007–2008 was triggered by the announcement of the presidential election results and aggravated when the president was sworn in later on the same day.^[21] During a two-month period, 1,500 Kenyans lost their lives, 3,000 women were raped, businesses were ransacked and set on fire, and over 300,000 people were internally displaced.^[22] During this time, a group of five influential Kenyans, calling themselves Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), started to plead for dialogue and negotiations among the political leadership. Through this initiative, working committees were formed attracting a wide range of skilled and influential volunteers to reflect, analyse, strategize and act to mitigate violence. This included the launch of the Citizens’ Agenda for Peace which influenced the formal mediation efforts, led by Kofi Annan, that helped in reaching a power-sharing agreement between the opposing sides. The CCP also facilitated the international mediation process by initiating the visit of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, briefing eminent persons, and interacting with the Kofi Annan mediation through a CCP High Level Dialogue Committee and Technical Committee. The CCP also worked with the Internal Security Ministry to set up peacekeeping in the city of Nairobi at a time when riots threatened to engulf the city. This also led to the creation of the Nairobi Peace Forum and the establishment of District Peace Committees.^[23]

• Coordinate peace-building efforts with security sector agencies

Various non-state and state organizations have mandates, knowledge and skills to promote peaceful conflict resolution through conflict mediation, reconciliation projects, facilitation of negotiations and so on. During the period in which election results are announced, inter-communal tensions can be on the rise. Organizations within the existing peace infrastructure at the grassroots level may therefore be well positioned to engage in the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence. In particular, these non-state and state actors should collaborate closely with security sector agencies to ensure that their efforts are coordinated. As SSAs focus on efforts to separate hostile communities, provide security to vulnerable groups, and apprehend and prosecute those who perpetrate violence, peace-building organizations can focus on deflating tensions and addressing the root causes of conflicts.
A Women’s Situation Room is set up to provide early warning and response during the Kenyan 2013 general elections. Due to the high level of violence directed against women during the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–2008,^[24] the women’s movement of Kenya, with the support of UN Women and the UNDP, set up a Women’s Situation Room (WSR) ahead of the 2013 general elections. The WSR was mandated to monitor, verify, analyse and respond to incidents of election-related violence. The WSR deployed 500 field observers. In addition, a team of telephone operators was established to receive incident reports from Kenyan citizens via a toll-free number. In total, the WSR received over 500 incident reports, many of which included the post-election period. Once verified, the information was passed on to a group of local and international ‘eminent women’ who sought intervention from the decision makers within the police, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) or political parties. ‘Through its early warning and early response mechanism, the women’s situation room managed to resolve all cases it received before they escalated to bigger problems.’^[25] 
The media enhance collaboration with the police during the 2012 general elections in Ghana. To promote responsible reporting before, during and after the 2012 general elections, the Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association (GIBA) developed a Code of Ethics handbook to be used by journalists. The GIBA also provided 400 copies of the handbook to the Ghana Police Service in order to help the police to understand ‘the ethical guidelines of private media practitioners with regards to maintaining peace’. The aim was also to reinforce the partnership between the GIBA and the Ghana Police Service. The police committed themselves to disseminate the handbook among all commanders and various departments to serve as a ‘guide in the discharge of their duties during the elections’.^[26] 

[1]     Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, ‘PERV: Preventing Election-related Violence’, 2011, <http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/ 6631~v~Preventing_Election_Related_Violence__Sulu_Mindanao_.pdf>, accessed 8 May 2018.

[2]     BBC News, ‘Bolivian Protesters Reject Offer’, 3 June 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4608111.stm>, accessed on 17 September 2018

[3]     European Union Election Observation Mission to Bolivia, September 2006, pp. 2, 5, available at <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/BO/reports/bolivia-constituent-assembly-election-and>, accessed 8 February 2013.

[4]     Ibid., pp. 29–30.

[5]     Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), ‘Mexico’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador: 2006 versus 2012 and Beyond’, 5 September 2012, p. 2, available at <http://csis.org/files/publication/120905_Grayson_AMLO_HemFocus.pdf>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[6]     ‘Mexicans Protest against Peña Nieto’s Election Win’, The Guardian, 8 July 2012, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/08/mexicans-protest-pena-nieto-election>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[7]     Congressional Research Service, ‘Mexico’s 2012 Elections’, 4 September 2012, pp. 2, 9, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42548.pdf>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[8]     BBC World, ‘Mexico Faces Partial Recount in Presidential Election’, 5 July 2012, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-18717146>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[9]     BBC News, ‘Uganda Election: Amnesty International Violence Concern’, 11 February 2011, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12428969>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[10]   Natabaalo, G., ‘Electoral Body Issues Rules for Media During Elections’, African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), 12 May 2012, <http://acme-ug.org/2011/02/09/electoral- body-issues-rules-for-media-during-elections/>, accessed 8 May 2018

[11]   BBC, ‘Ugandan Court Rejects Poll Protest’, 6 April 2006, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4882594.stm>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[12]   African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), ‘Electoral Body Issues Rules’.

[13]   African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), ‘Guidelines for Media Coverage of Elections in Uganda’ (no date), available at <http://www.google.se/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facme-ug.org%2Findex.php%3Foption%3Dcom_docman%26task%3Ddoc_download%26gid%3D19%26Itemid%3D&ei=2AUaUbS_GuSC4ASX5oH4Cw&usg=AFQjCNHSg1MFKj0Dn8DaCpX8mFiZI1DZ7g&sig2=M4YLJxHTon8KI-QdOUGzuQ&bvm=bv.42261806,d.bGE>, accessed 12 February 2013.

[14]   Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) Election Observation Mission, ‘South Africa National and Provincial Elections, 22 April 2009’, 2010, pp. 24–5, available at <http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/sou2009eom.pdf>, accessed 6 February 2013.

[15]   Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), ‘National and Provincial Elections’, 22 April 2009, pp. 64–5, available at <http://www.elections.org.za/content/Dynamic.aspx?id=1344&name=Elections&LeftMenuId=100&BreadCrumbId=220>, accessed 6 February 2013.

[16]   Ibid., p. 61.

[17]   Ibid., p. 99.

[18]   Ahramonline, ‘Heightened Security as Egypt Awaits Election Results’, 20 June 2012, available at <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/45696/Egypt/Politics-/Heightened-security-as-Egypt-awaits-election-resul.aspx>, accessed 14 February 2013.

[19]   US Department of State, ‘U.S. Envoy to Iraq Condemns Pre-election Violence, Fraud’, 9 December 2005, <https://wfile.ait.org.tw/wf-archive/2005/051212/epf111.htm>, accessed 8 May 2018

[20]   Schwartz, A., ‘Iraq Election Scenarios: Anticipating Alternative Futures’, Special Report No. 142, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), July 2005, <https://www.usip.org/ publications/2005/07/iraq-election-scenarios-anticipating-alternative-futures>, accessed 13 February 2013

[21]   Citizens in Action, ‘Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis of Kenya – 2008’, January 2010, p. iv, available at <http://humanitarianismafrica.typepad.com/files/citizens-in-action-ccp.pdf>, accessed 13 February 2013.

[22]   Roberts, Mara J., Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya (Charlottesville, Va.: New Dominion Philanthropy Metrics, 2009), available at <http://www.ndpmetrics.com/papers/Kenya_Conflict_2007.pdf>, accessed 13 February 2013.

[23]   Citizens in Action, ‘Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis’, pp. iv–xi.

[24]   Roberts, Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya; and Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA), The General Elections in Kenya 2007, Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est, No. 38 (Nairobi), 2008.

[25]   ‘Women’s Situation Room: A Unique Type of Response Mechanism in Elections’, UN Kenya Newsletter, March 2013, available at <http://www.unicnairobi.org/newsletter/UNNewsletter_March2013.pdf>, accessed 8 April 2013.

[26]   ‘GIBA Gives 400 Copies of Code of Ethics Handbook to Police’, Ghana Business News, 16 October 2012, available at <http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2012/10/16/giba-gives-400-copies-of-code-of-ethics-handbook-to-police/>, accessed 7 January 2013.