The electoral cycle approach underlines the cyclical nature of electoral processes. It reiterates that elections are not isolated events, but interlinked processes. Therefore, following the announcement of election results, electoral stakeholders should initiate evaluations of the past electoral cycle in order to identify areas that need improvement. This is also true for security sector agencies and organizations that form national infrastructures for peace.
The length of the post-election period may differ from country to country. In most cases, if national and local elections are organized together, elections usually take place every four to five years; if they are held separately, a country may have elections every two years. In any case, it is useful to engage in the post-electoral evaluation shortly after the final election results have been announced. Such an evaluation will benefit from stakeholders’ feedback, while memories are fresh, and provide sufficient time to address process weaknesses and structural causes of election-related tensions and violence before the next election. In addition, it will provide important reference points to inform the discussion in the first phase of the next electoral cycle, when the legal and institutional framework is revised.
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Table 8. The post-electoral phase |
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A. Improved electoral management and justice |
B. Improved electoral security |
C. Improved infrastructure for peace |
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A. Improved electoral management and justice
Electoral processes are complex and dynamic. Even the most successful elections will face challenges and experience problems. Following the announcement of the election results, an EMB should initiate an evaluation of the processes. The evaluation should focus on internal processes and achievements relating to the implementation of the overall institutional mandate, and include details, such as the performance of individual departments, sub-national offices and short-term personnel, communication challenges, finances and so on. Evaluation should identify both successes and unfulfilled objectives. This will help the promotion of good practices and identifying areas where legal and institutional reforms and human capacity building are needed. Furthermore, an EMB should assess how it managed its relationship with external stakeholders, such as the security sector agencies, political parties, civil society and international observer groups, media and the citizens, in order to identify needs and spaces for improvement.
The electoral legal framework may require periodic updating and improvement to ensure that it provides solid ground rules for the conduct of credible elections. The post-electoral period is a proper time for an EMB to reflect on this. On the one hand, memories are fresh. On the other, an EMB does not face immediate operational deadlines, so it has sufficient time to analyse and understand the practical effects of different laws, rules and regulations. In particular, an EMB can examine the extent to which implementation, or lack of implementation, of specific items of legislation or rules and regulations has generated tension or triggered violence. An EMB should document such cases and use them to initiate and inform legal reforms during the initial phase of the subsequent electoral cycle.
The Honduras EMB, the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), conducts evaluation of the 2012 primary elections. Ahead of the 2012 primary elections in Honduras, the first since the presidential coup in 2009, several incidents of election-related violence directed against political party candidates were recorded.[1] During the post-election period, the TSE, with the assistance of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), conducted an evaluation of the electoral process. Using the SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis, the TSE assessed its administrative performance as well as identifying opportunities and challenges ahead of the 2013 general elections. In general, the evaluation found the TSE’s current organizational structure to be ‘obtuse and outdated’. Some of the specific challenges and threats identified included ‘uncontrolled variables’ such as electoral legal and institutional reform, budgetary restrictions and political interference. The evaluation included recommendations that the TSE could implement to improve its overall performance.[2] In addition, the evaluation was designed to provide input to the planning for the 2013 general elections.
Post-election evaluation leads to amendments to the electoral law in South Africa. In South Africa it is standard practice for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to evaluate its performance following a general election. An evaluation session is also conducted with political parties represented on the National Political Party Liaison Committee. Ahead of the 2009 national and provincial elections in South Africa, the Constitutional Court ruled that the law on voting abroad was unconstitutional in limiting the franchise to registered South African citizens who were temporarily abroad. During the post-2009 election evaluation, the electoral law was aligned with the 2009 Constitutional Court ruling, allowing citizens to register and vote from abroad. Legislative amendments were shared with members of the National Party Liaison Committee in an effort to obtain the buy-in of political parties before the proposed changes were debated in the Parliament. Should parties remain dissatisfied, the legislation may be referred to the Constitutional Court for a final decision.[3]
There are three main organizational models of an EMB: (a) independent, (b) governmental and (c) mixed.[4] Any of these models may be appropriate for a given country depending on several factors that include the particular circumstances and needs of the country at the time. The actual structure of each of three main models may vary further. Some key variables relate to organizational leadership, executive powers, the design of operational competences, the hierarchy of national and sub-national structures, electoral dispute resolution capacities and so on. Some of these may be detailed in the electoral legal framework and result from specific mandates. However, some decisions may be made internally. An EMB may face different challenges from one electoral cycle to another. It is therefore important to periodically assess and adjust the internal organizational structures to ensure that an EMB can deal with all challenges effectively. To address challenges relating to increased risks and incidents of election-related violence, an EMB should strengthen its capacity to understand and analyse internal and external risks and manage conflicts that threaten to develop into violence. The capacity to collaborate on and coordinate electoral security issues with external organizations should also be developed. The post-election phase will allow time for an EMB to assess and plan these important institutional reforms.
An EMB cooperates closely with the police and judiciary to prosecute perpetrators of electoral offences following the 2011 general elections in Nigeria. The Nigerian elections in 1999, 2003 and 2007 were marked by widespread election-related violence.[5] However, no evidence exists that a single person was prosecuted for an election offence during that time. Following the 2011 general elections, which also witnessed several incidents of election-related violence, the Independent National Election Commission (INEC), with the support of the Nigerian police and the judiciary, started arresting and prosecuting electoral offenders. The INEC also worked together with the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) to facilitate the prosecution at minimal cost.[6] Although the INEC has prosecuted ‘more offenders than any other EMB in the history of Nigeria’, the INEC Chairman stated that the process was slow considering the number of cases still pending before various courts. He also suggested the establishment of a separate agency to handle election offences due to the INEC’s lack of capacity, in terms of funds and manpower, to manage elections and prosecute electoral offenders at the same time.
Electoral management and dispute resolution bodies need continuous development of their professional competencies. This is particularly important for bodies which are not organized as permanent and independent structures, and organizations that face a high staff turnover. In addition, the adoption of new electoral management routines and systems, including IT solutions, will increase the need for capacity building. The post-election period will allow an EMB to focus on assessing the capacity-building needs and identifying training for relevant staff at all levels. National EMBs can benefit from international training programmes. For example, the BRIDGE training curriculum is the most prominent course offered by a number of electoral support providers to national EMBs. Some prominent EMBs, such as the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) of Mexico and the Election Commission of India (ECI), also have training centres through which they promote peer-to-peer training programmes, including specialized electoral security courses. However, it is important to ensure that the capacity building is not limited to the institutional leadership and that there are internal mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge.
The Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa introduces a performance assessment system and training scheme following the 2006 municipal elections. Following the 2006 municipal elections, which saw widespread protests before election day,[7] the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) established an internal performance assessment system. All members of staff were trained and assessed in terms of key result areas and key performance indicators. In general, the system allowed the IEC to ‘reward meritorious performance and to identify skills development needs’. From early 2006 until early 2007, 107 IEC staff members were provided with internal or external skills development and training in various areas which included project management, supply chain management, certificates in IT and Geographic Information Systems.[8]
Throughout the electoral cycle, an EMB will engage with numerous stakeholders, including security sector agencies, political parties, civil society and international observer groups, the media and citizens. The nature of this engagement may vary from constructive collaboration and coordination to less successful engagements, even conflict situations. During the post-election period, an EMB should analyse how it engaged with other electoral stakeholders and identify successful and less successful practices. This evaluation can be conducted in collaboration with relevant organizations. Inter-agency discussions and workshops can be organized to help in identifying good practices that can be promoted and further strengthened, as well as areas where collaboration needs to be built.
B. Improved electoral security
The engagement of security sector agencies during elections, in particular in post-conflict or conflict-prone societies, requires increased collaboration between SSAs and electoral management bodies. Furthermore, interactions with political parties and the media on matters related to electoral security may be needed. The fulfilment of the SSAs’ mandates—to create a safe environment for the conduct of peaceful elections—may depend on their capacity to uphold their credibility in the eyes of these actors and general public. During the post-election period, security sector agencies should critically evaluate their engagement in order to identify internal and external challenges (and successes) that affect the fulfilment of their electoral mandates. These findings will inform the plans for capacity building geared towards the next electoral cycle. They will also point to areas where collaboration with relevant electoral stakeholders can be improved.
During different phases of the electoral cycle, security sector agencies will engage in different ways. They may be focused on providing security to electoral officials, registrants and voters, prominent political party candidates and other vulnerable individuals and groups. They will also provide security to electoral events and safeguard electoral materials and facilities. In the course of implementation of their electoral security mandates, SSAs may face different internal and external challenges. Post-electoral evaluation will allow identification of the main challenges and successes. These may relate to the specific phases of the electoral cycle, specific geographic regions, or specific electoral stakeholders.
Assessment for enhanced electoral security in 2013 and 2016.[9] The Philippines have been plagued by a long history of electoral violence. Since the revolution in 1986, all elections have been overshadowed by conflicts resulting from rivalries between political clans, the proliferation of weapons and the lack of a robust party system. Although such complex risk factors cannot be easily overcome, the elections in 2010 showed that adequate measures can effectively reduce electoral violence. To counter electoral violence in the forthcoming electoral cycles in 2013 and 2016, USAID commissioned a study to analyze the phenomenon of election-related violence and the level of electoral security administration capacity in the Philippines in 2012. The analysis implemented the methodology of the ‘Electoral Security Framework’, “a toolkit to profile electoral conflict as well as to plan and program for preventing, managing or mediating these conflicts”. It entailed an assessment of the political context, the stakeholders, and the history of electoral violence. Building upon that, strategies and specific programmatic steps are devised taking into account planning considerations, such as the limits of local capacities or donor priorities and constraints.
National and local government elections may be held in different years. In some contexts, elections for local, provincial and federal authorities may take place in different years. If by-elections and primary elections are hotly contested, security sector agencies may have additional electoral security responsibilities. It is therefore important that SSAs maintain collaboration with all relevant electoral stakeholders, even throughout the period when election-related activities are not taking place on the ground. The period following the announcement of election results may be used to hold bilateral and multilateral meetings between electoral stakeholders in order to discuss successes and challenges relating to collaboration and coordination during the different phases of the electoral cycle.
C. Improved infrastructure for peace
When elections are organized in societies that face high levels of violence, there is a likelihood that existing violence will spill over into electoral processes and affect electoral actors, events, materials and facilities. International IDEA has mapped ten structural factors, identified by different researchers, which have triggered or contributed to triggering election-related violence in different electoral contexts. These factors include:
There is a broad academic and practitioners’ literature that elaborates strategies for addressing these structural factors of conflict. Strengthening of the state and non-state actors, which constitute national infrastructures for peace, to address structural causes of conflict is a long-term process that will ultimately contribute to the narrower efforts focused on the organization of peaceful elections. Specific action points relating to addressing the structural factors of social conflict remain outside of the scope of this Guide. The broader literature should be consulted in this respect.
[1] ‘Will Honduras Have Free and Fair Elections?’, Aljazeera, 20 November 2012, available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestoryamericas/2012/11/2012112051713508222.html>, accessed 8 April 2013.
[2] International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), ‘Honduras Evaluates Election Performance, Plans for General Elections in November’, 21 March 2013, available at <http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Articles/2013/Honduras-Evaluates-Election-Performance-Plans-for-General-Elections-in-November.aspx>, accessed 8 April 2013.
[3] Contribution from the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) by Mosotho Moepya, Chief Electoral Officer of the IEC, and Stuart Murphy, Manager, Delimitation and Voting of the IEC, 30 April 2013.
[4] International IDEA, Electoral Management during Transition: Challenges and Opportunities (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2012), p. 8.
[5] International Crisis Group, Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis’, Africa Report No. 123, 28 March 2007, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-s-elections-avoiding- political-crisis>, accessed 8 May 2018
[6] ‘INEC to Prosecute 1 m Voters’, Vanguard, 16 April 2012, available at <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/inec-to-prosecute-1-m-voters>, accessed 8 January 2013.
[7] Think Africa Press, ‘The Impact of Service Delivery on South Africa’s Local Government Elections’, 8 April 2011
[8] Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), Annual Report 2007, March 2007 p. 34, available at <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=93212>, accessed 18 April 2013.
[9] Creative Associates International/USAID (2012): Electoral Security Assessment Philippines. – Available at < HYPERLINK "http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2003/01/Creative-Philippines-Electoral-Security-Assessment-Final.pdf> accessed: 20.01.2017.
