Voting Operations

The prime focus of electoral management and its most publicly visible activity is to organize and operate facilities that will provide an opportunity for all eligible persons to participate, through voting, in the choice of their representatives in their institutions of governance.

As voting is generally a geographically dispersed activity which often has to be organized and implemented within very tight time frames, providing a cost-effective voting service for all eligible voters whilst maintaining high standards of integrity, security and professionalism is a major challenge to electoral management bodies.

The Voting Operations Encyclopaedia topic deals with the essential business of recording votes. It focuses on the secrecy of and accesses (freedom and opportunity) to voting. Voting Operations considers issues relating to electoral legislation and management, administrative regulations, technology and shared responsibility for such operations.

 

Introduction

Overview

Aims

The prime focus of electoral management and its most publicly visible activity is to organize and operate facilities that will provide an opportunity for all eligible persons to participate, through voting, in the choice of their representatives in their institutions of governance.

As voting is generally a geographically dispersed activity which often has to be organized and implemented within very tight time frames, providing a cost-effective voting service for all eligible voters whilst maintaining high standards of integrity, security and professionalism is a major challenge to electoral management bodies.

Key Issues

In any electoral environment there are similar key issues for which effective solutions have to be found, if voting operations are to promote public confidence in the integrity and professionalism of electoral management, and acceptance of election results. Significant amongst these are:

What are the administrative considerations that, along with legal frameworks, provide the basis for an electoral management body's planning of voting operations? As a highly complex combination of processes, voting operations require careful planning and trials of proposed solutions before implementation.

What are appropriate methods of providing voter information that will reach the various sectors of the voting population and stimulate participation in voting. As genuine participation rises, so can perceptions of election legitimacy.

Voter information programmes play a major role in encouraging participation through providing accessible information on where, when and how to vote. Special attention may need to be paid to methods for informing sectors of the population, such as minority cultural or language groups, the young or first time voters, the aged, or those in remote areas who may not have access to mainstream information sources.

What are the most suitable Voting Preparations? What range and mix of facilities for voting, from voting at the local voting station through special provisions for voting in a particular manner, for example, by mail, absentee, before general election day or, in particular locations, in remote areas or institutions, provides all eligible voters the opportunity to vote in a cost-effective manner?

What are effective means for determining the location of Voting Sites, and ensuring that they are designed to promote voter service and properly provisioned, through implementation of effective Logistics strategies?

Promoting accessibility and efficiency of voting processes, through identification of appropriate sites for and capacities of voting stations, is a major ingredient in implementing a successful election.

What are appropriate types, designs, and quantities of election Materials And Equipment Voting is a massive information transfer exercise, which demands effective materials and equipment solutions to ensure that information is transferred accurately, on time, and by means that are readily understood.

Complexity of materials or inappropriate reliance on technology, can have a significant negative effect on the effectiveness with which information is transferred and processed.

What are the ways to ensure that voting stations are manned by sufficient, well-trained staff. National elections are often the most extensive recruitment and training exercise undertaken in a country (See Recruitment and Training of Voting Station Staff )

Staff costs are generally a significant proportion of overall election costs and a major area where attention to effective procedures can result in cost savings.

Training of voting operations staff is often an overlooked but vital factor in ensuring that voting procedures are properly and efficiently implemented.

What are cost-effective means of ensuring that voting operations have a high level of integrity, in materials production and handling, voting procedures and in providing an appropriate level of security for all aspects of the electoral process, Adequate measures to deter voting fraud, and to enable participants in the election process--voters, officials, political activists and candidates--can participate without fear of intimidation or harm are to election integrity.

How to implement work practices and procedures for voting hours operations that will provide a high service level to voters when they turn out to vote, in a cost-effective manner? Different election systems will place different procedural requirements on voting station activities. However there are basic elements in providing service to voters that transcend system differences:

• maintaining an orderly, speedy flow of voters through the voting station;
• conducting accurate checks that voters are eligible to vote;
• issuing and accurately accounting for voting material;
• assisting voters who need further information or assistance to vote;
• strictly maintaining voting secrecy;
• addressing complaints and objections from voters and party and candidate representatives.

What is the role of party and candidate agents and the functions of independent election observation in monitoring voting operations processes to provide an external check that these are implemented fairly and with integrity? With increased use of independent observation as a method of evaluating election processes and validating elections it is important that observer activity is undertaken from a sound basis.

What are the best ways to ensure that there is continuous improvement in voting operations management, through careful assessment and evaluation of voting operations and their frameworks, policies and practices?

The objective of this topic area is to provide some guidance as to the considerations and alternatives with regard to these and subsidiary issues.

Service Provision

Implementing voting operations is similar to managing a high volume, complex production process. A large number and variety of inputs from many different sources have to be melded into a high quality product on an immutable date.

Electoral administrators will be under great pressure to produce by the required date, the core value of voting operations--providing a cost-effective "service" to voters to enable them to exercise their democratic right to vote freely and fairly--is the most important consideration.

Solutions Appropriate to the Environment

Legal frameworks, administrative procedures and work practices for voting operations are highly environment specific, a product of both cultural and physical characteristics and administrative and infrastructure capacities.

Good practices or cost-effective solutions for voting operations in a specific environment may not be appropriate for translation to other environments.

These few examples illustrate this important point:

• systems based on high levels of technology may be effective (and expected by the voting public) in highly developed environments, yet provide ineffective solutions where there is insufficient local support or an insufficient infrastructure base to sustain their operations;
• low cost disposable voting equipment may be effective in dry weather, low security risk environments, but inappropriate for use in wet/humid environments or high security risk situations;
• extreme involvement of state security forces in voting operations security may be appropriate in high risk situations where security forces are accepted by the voting public as non-partisan, yet be highly inappropriate where there is little assessed security risk to voting operations, or where these forces have a history of politically partisan activity.

Hence this Voting Operations topic area focuses more on the available alternatives, and the factors that require careful consideration in determining what are good, cost-effective solutions for a particular environment.

It attempts to identify those good or essential practices for maintaining voting operations integrity that can be translated into any environment.

Context of Voting Operations

Each election takes place in a context that is affected by political, social, historical and cultural factors. Administrative and cost factors also impact upon the electoral process, and specifications of these will differ depending on electoral systems, countries and geographical regions.

Historical Overview

Public Decision-Making: Public representation has been part of early systems for community decisions making. This took place through choosing persons to represent the views of populations (and later to act as bodies of governance). This public representation relied on simple means, such as a show of hands, in ancient Greece by the dropping of ceramic tiles in assigned positions, and in some Asian and Pacific societies through structured group discussion leading to community consensus.

The viability of this form of public representation is inappropiate in extensive and diverse contemporary societies.

Individual Focus

From the later stages of the nineteenth century societies became increasingly individualist. The gradual spread of the secret ballot, in order to protect the views of individuals in societies, brought about more formalised voting processes and with them needs for more formal, accountable administrative structures for voting and the provision of a wider range of voting materials. This need was heightened by parallel moves towards the gradual widening of eligibility for participation in voting to embrace all sectors of societies.

Mass Voting

Mass voting brought with it a requirement for more complex organisation and administration, not only in the provision of facilities (voting sites, materials, staffing) to enable people to vote, but in the accountability processes required to ensure that voting involving large numbers of voters was managed in a fashion that provided integrity of processes, equitable outcomes, and the opportunity for all eligible persons to participate freely.

Responsibilities

The increasing potential participants in voting processes, complexity of voting processes, and numbers and powers of widely-elected institutions, gradually resulted in a change in perceived responsibilities towards participation in voting.

Voting operations  evolved from a simple community based process into a process that required structured organization, planning, administration and implementation. Consistency of product, product variety and product information availability became paramount needs.

One of the great challenges currently facing voting operations administrators is to ensure that this requirement for consistency does not impede the ability to provide service to voters, recognizing them as individuals, living in widely divergent communities.

Contemporary Voting Concerns

Current concerns of voting operations remain focused on the dual requirements for voting secrecy and providing freedom and opportunity for all persons (subject to reasonable limitations on the basis of such criteria as age and residence) to vote, though in changing contexts.

The gradual introduction of technology into voting processes--through production of up- to-date voters' lists and the use of machines and particularly computers for voting--opens up more efficient and potentially more accountable and accurate ways of recording votes. It brings with it a new set of challenges regarding protection of voting secrecy where votes are recorded by electronic means, possibilities of manipulating systems for recording votes, and making these new technologies accessible to and understandable by all potential voters.

Social and Political Context

Appropriateness for Environment: The social and political environment has a fundamental impact upon the voting operations processes and the electoral system they serve. Effective processes will be specific to the given environment. Migrating procedures or transferring systems or practices that work in one country to another environment, with insufficient analysis of their relevance to or impact on the social environment or their acceptance by local populations, may result in ineffective operations. It is critical that voting operations processes:

• include sufficient control measures for voters and candidates to be assured of the integrity of the election;

• are capable of being understood by all election participants;

• are appropriate for the human skills and technological capacities available.

Physical and social geography conditions, including transport infrastructure, weather, accessibility, size of geographic area, population size and distribution, and skill levels of human resources available will have a large influence on appropriate methods for implementing voting processes.

Political and legal environment

Each society is governed by a regulatory and legal system that determines the limitations and extent of administrative and legal procedures. This applies to electoral processes where each country’s legal system establishes a framework for the conduct of elections and the role and functions of the electoral management body.

Each action or function undertaken by the electoral management body must be conducted in accordance with the regulatory or legal framework. 

Security

Security levels provided both to voters and voting materials must be proportionate to the perceived and actual risks inherent in the electoral process. Each environment needs to be subject to security risk analysis to determine appropriate security strategies.

Fraud Prevention

Appropriate methods for preventing fraud will vary according to the risks in each political environment, and the levels of trust in the society at large. More intensive, costly and cumbersome measures will generally need to be taken to ensure election integrity in societies emerging from civil conflict. But at the very least, the election authorities should:

• ensure the integrity of ballots

• check voters eligibility to vote when they attend a voting station,

• protect election materials in general from theft or manipulation,

• provide effective and appropriate penalties for infringements of electoral legislation, regulations and codes of conduct

Literacy

Literacy levels need to be considered when developing materials, information programmes and recruitment and training processes for staff.

Cultural Differences

Voting operations may be simpler to implement in broadly homogeneous societies with a single standard language and common cultural expectations. Where societies contain a mixture of nationalities, cultures, and particularly language groups, providing a consistent level of service to all voters can become more complex. Materials, procedures and providing services should include information services and materials in different community languages

If cultural practices compete with democratic electoral processes a compromise may need to be established that respects traditional and cultural norms and practices and provides for them within the country’s electoral operations and practices.

Information Base

Voting operations is an information-intensive activity. In societies where administrative records of past electoral activities are not available, or not of good quality, it will be more challenging to target services appropriately and deliver cost-effectiveness in voting processes.

Post-Conflict Environments

Post-conflict environments require specific considerations. Measures to protect the integrity of voting will generally need to be more intensive to ensure that that the public has faith in the transparency, reliability and security of all processes associated with voting.

There are other organisational issues affecting voting operations that may be relevant. The electoral, legal and procedural framework in post-conflict and other transitional environments may still be in a fluid state during the election period and subject to continuing negotiation between political interests.

Development of contingency plans to meet potential framework changes becomes a very important part of voting operations planning in such environments.

Administrative Considerations

A number of important factors will shape the effective administration of voting operations. It is important to recognise that effective responses to these issues will be environment specific.

There is no one model that will be most effective in any situation, for reasons of resource availability, cultural environment, stages of technological development and the like.

Basic administrative considerations include:

• the goals and objectives of each task within the process of voting operations;

• the administrative structures, actions and time frames determined by legal and electoral management system frameworks.

• within any such restraints, a cost-effective administrative structure to ensure election integrity and service delivery;

• a calendar for effective delivery of election services;

• the resources that are required for effective planning and implementation of voting operations services to achieve the objectives within the expected time frames, and how they can best be acquired, managed and maintained;

•which organisations are to be involved in delivering voting operations services and what are their responsibilities.

• how information necessary for provision of voting operations services is best managed;

•how the performance of the administrative structures in implementing voting operations activities is to be administratively monitored and evaluated;

• The contingency structures required in case of management failure or changes in the environment.

There will be special factors relevant to these considerations in developing countries.

Administrative Structures

The focus of voting operations activity is at a local level, and effective administration structures will mirror this by providing focal points at the local level.

What is important under all administrative arrangements is that a core body of voting operations skills and knowledge is maintained and developed. Even where electoral management bodies are not permanent, programmes of regular skill revision and enhancement will give some readiness assurance, and prove more reliable and often less costly than recruiting and training new networks of voting operations administrative staff for each election.

Resource Acquisition and Maintenance

Voting operations is a complex resourcing and administration process; high speed, high volume, geographically dispersed, demanding quality and accuracy and with diverse inputs.  It will require:

• timely arrival of inputs--ballots, forms, and equipment so that processes continue smoothly, yet not so early to create additional costs;

• intensive logistics support;

• careful planning of simultaneous and sequential interdependent tasks;

• a large workforce of varying basic skill levels that needs to be trained to perform specific tasks accurately and quickly;

• a market that has to be "sold" through voter information how and where to use the product and be convinced of the product's consistent quality (integrity, impartiality, service).

Planning of resource acquisition needs across the whole election cycle, commencing with thorough reviews of performance immediately on completion of an election to determine significant needs for the next election, will give greater assurance of readiness.

Time Frames

Major voting operations time frames, such as periods from announcement of election to voting day period for nomination of candidates, will generally be determined by legislation.

Management of Information

An important component of good voting operations administration is effective information management and analysis. This may be aided, or merely complicated, by the use of technology.

Performance Monitoring

Without continual monitoring of the quality and progressive completion of voting operations tasks, it is not possible to determine whether objectives are being met and responsibilities effectively discharged.

There is a particular need for intensive monitoring in the few days before and on voting day as this is a period of critical activity with little time to redress errors. Monitoring programmes should be built into the administration of all voting operations tasks to allow early identification of any deficiencies and their rectification.

At the completion of voting operations, internal and/or independent evaluation of performance of relevant activities is essential if future improvement is to be attained.

Participation History

Participation History as a Planning Tool

An analysis of expected voter participation rates underpins cost-effective and service-oriented implementation of voting operations activities, location of voting sites, effective allocation of all resources, and targeting of voter information services.

Analysis of past trends is a necessary factor in voting operations planning.

In some societies, however, analysis of the past may not be a reliable guide. This would be in situations where:

• there have been significant changes to the electoral system or voter eligibility rules;

• there have been major dislocations of population;

• there is uncertainty about or widespread distaste for the current political environment;

• undemocratic regimes are being disassembled.

• there is an emergence from a conflict situation.

In these cases, supplementation by current research on attitudes to voting in similar situations is useful. However, great emphasis on quantities and flexibility in contingency resources will generally be needed in such circumstances.

Compulsory Systems

Electoral systems with elements of compulsion to participate with regard to registering as a voter (either as a separate registration or de facto from compulsory registration on a civil register) or to attending to vote, will require different methods from voluntary systems both in resourcing of voting operations and voter information focus.

Human Rights

Redressing Past Discrimination

The human rights environment, contemporary and historical, will affect the freedom and fairness of voting processes and the population's willingness to participate in an election.

Societies in which discrimination or intimidation in any form (regarding political belief, nationality, culture, gender, language, religion, physical capacities) has previously been prevalent, present special challenges for the organisation of voting operations, especially regarding the following:

The legal framework: Best practice requires that laws are reviewed and amended to repeal or suspend those that may be discriminatory or impinge on the fairness or freedom of voting processes.

Election administration: May require special action to ensure representation for groups previously excluded from administrative power or positions. Given the large numbers of staff that will generally be required as voting station officials, voting operations employment policies can assist in breaking down past discriminatory employment practices, and promote equal opportunities of employment for women and other previously discriminated against groups.

Voter information: Will need to specifically address groups who may have been denied or discouraged from voting participation.

Election integrity and the professionalism and independence of the electoral management body, where past practice has not given this priority.

Post Conflict Environments

Where elections mark the emergence of societies from periods of conflict or a breakdown in the rule of law, legal frameworks for election processes will need careful attention. Such situations can often give rise to the imposition of states of emergency which, if allowed to stand, may restrict the rights of persons to vote, be nominated as candidates or campaign for election.

To allow free participation, electoral law should generally take precedence over such emergency powers. It is common practice in Bills of Rights that voting rights are considered non-derogable.

Security

Security is important to ensure that human rights are protected in the voting operations environment. Sufficient security to guarantee that voters may vote freely and without fear of current or future intimidation is a basic precept of a free and fair election.

Voting stations should be safe from intimidation of voters by security forces, political candidates, voting station officials, senior bureaucrats, or private employers. Employment of persons with power over local communities as voting station staff is unwise.

Allowing an excessive or intimidating security force presence in voting stations can exacerbate an already tense political situation. An excessive security presence must be weighted against the need for effective protection of all those participating in the electoral process.

Where police and military forces are perceived as aligned with specific political forces, additional strategies (including the use of international forces) may need to be employed to ensure security and integrity of voting material, the safety of voters and candidates, and to ensure that all participants enjoy equal protection.

In cultures where the public bearing of arms is common, measures will need to be taken to keep voting stations and their surrounding areas free of armed persons who mamay intimidate voters and officials.

International Intervention

International intervention in the election process could occur through:

• a request by the host government in situations where financial or operational knowledge resources are insufficient to conduct an election of acceptable quality;

• the negotiated imposition by elements of the international community of an election as a conflict resolution mechanism following internal conflict or international conflict.

Political Context

Voting operations for elections that take place following international intervention will be subject to particular potential environmental considerations:

Heightened international scrutiny: That is likely to be focused on election activity.

The mandate of international bodies: Whether conducting, assisting with or observing election processes, this needs to be clearly defined. Whether the mandate is organisational, supervisory, advisory or observation will impact on how and where decisions are made during voting operations and on the attitudes and cooperation of local election administrators and voting station staff.

The roles, reporting structures, and chains of command of the various international and local organisations need to be clearly understood by all participants. Best practice requires that final decision making rests with the electoral management body, as does control over financial decision-making.

It would generally be preferable if local ownership of voting operations can be maintained, and international assistance used to develop sustainable systems, transfer skills and monitor implementation.

The structure of international assistance: How and where it is recruited and financed, and what particular societal values it attempts to impose in the host country?

The presence of international bodies may create the impression that elections will be free and fair. In many environments it may not be possible to fulfil all societal groups' expectations in this regard, which may create further post-election problems.

Particular care needs to be taken when international organisations with some management role in an election, either through organisation or de facto supervision of election processes, are also charged with passing judgment on the freedom and fairness of these same processes.

Awareness of the limitations of international assistance will assist electoral administrators in ensuring realistic expectations.

International Imposition of Elections

Where international intervention has imposed an election solution, particularly following a period of intense conflict, there are other potential environmental factors that will need to be considered:

• an intense polarisation between elements or communities within the society, often between former powerful elements and newly enfranchised voters or institutions attempting to enhance levels of freedom and fairness in elections (with a potential for active or passive resistance from existing state agencies in preparing an equitable voting environment;

• heightened security risks, to both personal safety and the integrity of voting, that may require intensive precautions;

• an imposition of a new voting system or the extension of the right to vote that will require concentration of resources on information campaigns;

• a resource base that is insufficient for voting requirements either through neglect or devastation.

Legislative and Regulatory Framework

Legislation often determines the service and integrity principles and broad outcomes within which voting operations are to be administered.

It governs the administrative structures and functions which must be implemented during voting operations for an election to retain validity. It goes beyond principles and outcomes and defines minutely (often in regulations) each operation that must be undertaken and each form and system to be used by election administrators.

Such a comprehensive approach can be necessary to ensure that integrity, equity and other voting operations principles (see Guiding Principles of Voting Operations) are actually implemented in practice, particularly for transitional elections, or in societies racked by extreme political division.

Incorporating the details of voting operations procedures and practices in legislation may assist in preserving election integrity.

However it comes with some negative factors:

• there can be a lack of flexibility for election administrators to increase the appropriateness or effectiveness of voting operations procedures, forms or systems when these are all determined legislatively;
• conversely, legislatures may continually amend the details of voting operations in legislation and thus make administrators' planning and implementation functions much more difficult.

The greater the integrity, stability and professionalism of the election management body, the less the need for minutely detailed legislation on voting operations procedures and practices.

Electoral System

The electoral system defined in legislation will affect the administrative needs for voting operations.

For example:

• Qualifications and disqualifications for voter registration will affect the total number and distribution of registered voters, and hence voting site numbers and locations;
• Whether the system requires representatives to be elected from individual electoral districts, by proportional representation from a single all-encompassing electoral unit, or some combination, will affect the location and functions of central and regional or local voting operations administrative centres;
• Whether the electoral system requires elections to be held in one round or more than one round, on one day or multiple days affects quantities and time periods for which resources will be required, as will any requirements for support of candidate nominations by large numbers of qualified persons and methods of determining ballot paper positions for candidates;
• Whether voting requires single or multiple ballots, a single voter mark or multiple preferential marks will affect voter throughput and hence voting station staffing, number of voting locations and the types of mechanical or electronic voting systems that could be implemented;
• Legislatively prescribed ballot formats or allowable voting machines will determine paper stock supply needs and potential sources and time frames for ballot printing or equipment sourcing and investment requirements;
• Whether election dates are fixed or irregular will affect voting operations planning cycles, particularly in regard to development and introduction of new systems and procedures.

The electoral system elements of legislation may also affect the administrative structure for voting operations by defining the delegation of powers requiring appointment of specific bodies or persons to undertake certain tasks, such as electoral district managers (returning officers), voting station managers or election committees, and voting dispute resolution tribunals.

Provision of Voting Facilities

If provision for special voting facilities, such as absentee, advance, mail, mobile or out-of-country voting, are mandated by legislation, the complexity of voting operations planning, supply, logistics and training will be intensified. Such extension of accessibility will come at a financial cost.

Planning, supply and training lead times may be longer, the range of materials and logistics requirements will be increased and voting operations administrations will require a higher number of core skilled staff.

Time frames

Deadlines imposed by legislation provide inflexible time frames within which voting operations tasks must be completed. In regard to such issues as candidate nomination, availability of materials for advance voting or hours of voting, they are the focus of voting operations planning and a significant determinant of materials supply deadlines and staffing resource requirements.

Where legislative deadlines are unrealistic, voting operations administrators will need to determine what sacrifices in quality have to be made or additional costs incurred to meet them.

Terms of Legislature

Where representative bodies are not elected for fixed terms, electoral management bodies have to be in a state of readiness at all times to conduct an election. This will have a significant effect on planning cycles and may restrict the ability to introduce new systems or procedures, particularly within the last fifteen months of a government's term.

In fixed term systems, the voting operations planning and implementation cycle can be more secure and is more conducive to continuous improvement of services.

Transitional Elections

While in stable systems minimum time periods between election announcement and voting day are usually properly defined in legislation, in transitional environments this may not be the case. There will often be pressure for fast resolution of conflicts through conducting voting at the earliest possible date. In such circumstances an early election may compromise the ability to hold an election of acceptable integrity.

The time needed to conduct an acceptable election will vary (particularly according to whether new voters' registers have to be compiled). However, in most transitional situations it would be unreasonable to expect election administrators to conduct an election of acceptable quality without a period of at least five to six months between finalisation of the new principles, or legislative framework, for elections and voting day.

Timing of Legislative Change

The legal framework must be settled for voting arrangements to be planned effectively. Lead times for intensive organisation of voting operations (which, depending on the stability and capacities of the environment, could be between three and six months prior to the planned election date) mean that any significant or continuing legislative change during this period can have a negative effect on voting operations performance (see "Readiness" principle in Guiding Principles of Voting Operations).

Administrative Regulations

Generally, setting the more detailed voting operations parameters through administrative regulation will provide greater flexibility and opportunity for input and advice from the electoral management body. Administrative regulations can be seen as translating the principles of voting operations into standards that must be consistently achieved, though methods and detailed procedures may differ, throughout the area in which elections for a representative body are held.

Regulations governing such areas as maximum or minimum size of voting stations, materials required at voting stations, locations of ballot paper counts, and qualifications for electoral officers will set standards that voting operations administrators must adhere to in planning and resourcing.

However, it is important that a balance, appropriate for the environment, is achieved between necessary prescription and allowing sufficient flexibility for the electoral management body to initiate improvements and respond to technological or environmental changes.

For instance, where it is essential that information is collected in exactly the same manner at all voting locations, such as receipting and reconciliation of ballot material, the relevant form content could also be prescribed in regulations.

To extend this prescription of content to form design or method of data collection may unnecessarily inhibit improvements.

The Electoral Management Structure and the Delivery of Voting Operations

The administrative structure for voting operations needs to effectively translate defined accountabilities for election management, which would normally and properly be defined in legislation or regulations, into task and activity management.

The nature of the electoral management body and the specific social and cultural context of the country will have a significant impact on choices of cost-effective measures for conducting voting.

There is typically a very short time frame between election announcement and voting day in which to deliver voting services. The simpler the organisational structure for the management of voting, the more likely the delivery of quality, consistent service to all voters. Some significant organisational structure issues for voting operations are dealt with below.

Independence of Electoral Management Body

Independent electoral management bodies will generally be able to act in a more swift and decisive way in making decisions on matters affecting voting operations. Where electoral management bodies are politically answerable, political interference in the conduct of voting is always a possibility, with the consequent need for careful consideration of potential contingencies and perhaps some restrictions on the choice of cost-effective methods. Where electoral management bodies represent a balance of political forces, there may be time lags in decision-making. These factors need to be considered in developing administrative time tables and work plans for voting.

Permanence and Professionalism

Permanent electoral management bodies will bring corporate experience and a greater basis for professionalism to voting operations than bodies appointed temporarily to conduct voting. While such permanent bodies are a significant ongoing cost, the benefits in reliability and cost-effectiveness of voting operations are significant, including:

• the assembling of a team of professional staff undergoing continuous training to develop their professional knowledge, management and team skills;
• the ability to undertake preparations for voting, both in planning and in acquisition of the required resources, throughout the whole period between elections, rather than this being compressed into a short, pre-voting day period. (This can both improve the cost-effectiveness of resource acquisition, and, through early implementation of functions such as voting site identification, development and planning of staff recruitment and training programmes and materials and logistics planning, can reduce the pressure on staff and control mechanisms during the election period and hence assist quality control);
• continual development and thorough testing of new systems and procedures to improve voter service and cost-effectiveness of operations.

Centralized or Decentralized Operations

While maintaining a core central presence assists in voting operations planning, the implementation of voting is usually at a local level. Maintaining a permanent local network of electoral management body offices, while an ideal for professionalism and service to voters, is generally not justifiable in cost terms. However, both election preparedness and cost-effectiveness may be enhanced by agency arrangements whereby bodies such as local governments assume responsibility, under central electoral management body supervision, for preparations for voting.

Maintaining some local presence will assist in:

• effective local organization of voting processes, through local knowledge of potential voting locations, transport routes, recruitment possibilities, and the characteristics of voters in the area;
• ongoing election preparations at a local level, in developing local budget and materials needs, maintenance of locally stored equipment and pre-packaging of materials;
• providing an experienced network of staff for local management of voting.

While the ability to maintain a local presence will enhance effective preparations for voting, whether it is appropriate for a particular environment will depend on costs, and the permanent capacity of the electoral management body to manage the activities of such a network.

Delegation of Powers: Local or Central Control

There are two basic questions critical to voting operations management:

• Who is responsible for the implementation of the various activities of voting in particular electoral areas?
• Where are the responsible staffs located?

How these questions are resolved will have a very large impact on the appropriate methods of planning and implementing voting operations. The first question would normally be answered in the legal framework. It would be normal, for elections based on electing representatives for small individual electoral districts, that a designated post or posts--whether they are known as returning officers, electoral district managers, local electoral commissions or similar title--be accountable for the conduct of voting within an electoral district. Where, for particular elections, countries, provinces or states form an electoral district as a whole, legislation may also specify the breakdown of this into electoral administrative areas, possibly based on other institutional boundaries such as local government areas, for the purposes of election administration.

The location of administrators may also be specified in the legal framework or subject to state policy, in requiring that an electoral administration office be established, for each electoral district or area, within the boundaries of that district. However, it may be more cost-effective to defer such decisions to administrative discretion.

Depending on such issues as geographic size, voter population and infrastructure of electoral districts, it may well be more effective use of available staff to manage more than one electoral district from a single location.

In determining the location of administration offices and division of powers between local and central election management offices, the following factors need to be considered:

Voting is a localized, dispersed, activity: Management of voting implementation at a local level can provide faster response to incipient problems, provide the benefits of local knowledge of the area, and break voting management tasks down into more easily controllable geographic area responsibilities. Overly centralized management of voting processes can lead to inefficiencies through long and more complex supply and decision-making lines, and concentration of decision-making powers in a single or few areas. Totally centralized management places great reliance on a very high level of performance in a single location in a high stress environment. Systems failures will be more difficult to isolate, communications with a multiplicity of locations more difficult to control, and supervisory and quality control functions will be under pressure.

Administrative efficiency: While direct implementation of all voting activities from a central point is likely to lead to inefficiencies, there may not be a need to have a voting operations administration office in each electoral district. Depending on the quality of local management available, the characteristics of the areas to be served, the ability to maintain service to voters and the efficiencies that can be gained through more effective use of staff, equipment and premises, one local administration office may be able to serve a number of electoral districts. However such situations are more likely to be the exception than the rule. Potential co-locations of local offices each need to be considered on their merits.

The cost-effectiveness, integrity, and enhanced voter service, provided by consistency of procedures: In environments where total control of election management is in the hands of local bodies, inconsistencies in procedures--forms design, methods of voting, voting station equipment, services and layouts--can increase materials and equipment costs, provide wide variations in voter service standards, allow inconsistencies in application of integrity standards, and require more localized, fragmented and expensive voter information campaigns.

Centrally-managed procedural and policy development, overall planning, bulk materials acquisitions and service quality control, combined with local management of implementation of voting operations, will generally provide a mix that best serves voter service and cost-effectiveness of voting operations. 

Communications Structure

Voting operations take place in a fast-moving environment, and generally under very tight deadlines. It is imperative that administrative structures allow, and are equipped to provide swift and accurate transmission of instructions and information from the central electoral management body to regional or local administration offices, and then to voting stations and counting locations. Similarly, feedback and data from election staff in the field needs to be swiftly communicated to the central electoral management body.

In developing administrative structures for voting, chains of command should be kept short and simple to promote effective information flow. Excessive steps--such as from central, to regional, to area, to electoral district to voting station management--should be avoided, as they will slow down information transfer and increase the potential for messages to be distorted. "Flat" management and communication structures that allow direct information flow and control from the central electoral management body to local electoral district/area offices and back would generally improve communication effectiveness.

Administrative and Technical Guidance

Voting operations administrators, no less than workers in voting stations, require guidance in both their general administration role and in the specific actions that they need to undertake to ensure that legislative, policy and procedural requirements are followed, and that voters receive a consistent quality of service.

Responsibility Structure

The cost and technical requirements of maintaining permanent electoral structures capable of internal delivery of all election materials and services is such that this is not generally a viable proposition. Thus electoral management bodies will rely to some extent on other state agencies or commercial or non-commercial contractors for the provision of vital components of voting operations.

The structure of responsibilities for provision of voting operations materials and services will vary according to capacities both within the electoral management body and within the country as a whole. The basic role of the electoral management body in voting operations is to provide effective management and ensure their freedom, fairness and integrity. This may be achievable cost-effectively through strict oversight of, rather than actual implementation of, many voting operations functions, particularly in more developed countries with highly sophisticated and competitive professional sectors.

Where there is a multiplicity of bodies involved in voting operations, accountabilities, responsibilities and inter-organizational dependencies need to be defined in contractual arrangements that contain clear performance standards, which are monitored by the electoral management body and swiftly enforced. The time frames for voting operations and the immutable nature of the voting day deadline do not allow for long-running disputes over responsibilities, or late discovery that required actions have not been undertaken.

Electoral Management Bodies

The nature and composition of the electoral management body will influence the location of voting operations responsibilities:

• permanent or temporary
• independent of or controlled by executive government
• centralized or decentralized
• comprised of independent members or interest representational members

In many cases electoral management bodies may not be free to determine these responsibility structures. Overall public sector policies on service delivery may limit their ability to adopt cost-effective solutions.

In many environments the electoral management body's perceived advantages in providing transparent, impartial, and professional service--where other state agencies or the private sector are compromised by perceptions of bias, lack of professionalism or corruption--means that no matter what the cost or efficiency imperatives, it would be dangerous for election integrity to outsource locally any voting operations functions.

There may be electoral tasks that affect voting operations that, as a matter of state policy, are undertaken by other bodies. Registration of voters and compilation of voters’ lists, for example, may be the function of another state agency whose skills and resources for dealing with population data give them effectiveness advantages in this field. Such arrangements require vigilance on the part of electoral management bodies to ensure that a timely, professional and accurate product is received.

Additionally, where these tasks are undertaken by other bodies they must maintain transparency, with provisions for monitoring and observation, as though they were undertaken by the electoral management body.

While it is not possible to cover in this brief summary all possible responsibility models, it is useful to look at what the core voting operations functions of electoral management bodies might be, and what voting operations responsibilities could, given a neutral social environment, reside elsewhere if cost-effective.

Core Voting Operations Functions

In assessing what the electoral management body's core voting operations functions are, it is necessary to determine how the electoral management body adds value to voting operations processes through expertise, public perceptions of integrity, and resource advantages. These include:

• the active oversight, coordination and quality control of all materials and services required for voting operations;
• development of all voting operations policies and procedures;
• development and monitoring of all voting operations calendars and schedules;
• specifications for design and production of all voting operations material and equipment;
• selection of voting sites;
• liaison with political participants, including advice on administrative requirements;
• liaison with other electoral stakeholders, such as civil society organizations and the media, including advice on administrative procedures
• management of voting stations, including determination of staffing and materials schedules, and managing voting day operations;
• management of ballot counts;
• determination and announcement of election results;
• monitoring of integrity of voting processes.

Other voting operations functions that do not involve an election-specific skill base could be contracted elsewhere, in accordance with the electoral management body's available expertise, resources, relative costs and performance abilities. Such contracting does not abrogate any of the responsibility of the electoral management body to ensure that these functions are completed fully in accordance with the principles of voting operations (see Guiding Principles of Voting Operations).

Given the time and quality-critical nature of voting operations, the levels of reliability and quality of service that can be provided are vital factors. In determining whether functions can be outsourced, these factors must outweigh any potential cost savings.

Functions That Could Be Outsourced

Some likely or possible functions that could be undertaken by outside organisations include:

Security: Contracted to specialist regional, national or international policing, or if necessary military agencies 

Procurement: To increase perceptions of transparency, or in line with auditing requirements, procurement may be placed in the hands of official tender boards

Voter information and education: Materials design and production, media placement and information delivery may be better handled by specialist communications agencies, and assisted by using community bodies.

Materials design for forms and ballot papers: This responsibility may be better placed with communications and production specialists, working to strict electoral management body specifications.

Materials production: While low volume forms may be effectively produced in-house, maintaining large scale production facilities for high volume forms and other voting operations equipment and materials is unlikely to be an effective use of electoral management body resources.

Selection of staff for voting stations and ballot counting centres: This is an intensive task at a time of other competing demands on electoral management bodies resources.

Given the dispersed and labour-intensive nature of voting operations, this function may be better left to recruitment experts working to strict, monitored selection standards.

Development of training material and implementation of training sessions for voting station staff: This function may be more cost-effectively handled by utilising existing educational sector resources working to electoral management body specifications.

Electoral officers payroll management: Voting day will see a massive increase in electoral management body staff. To maintain, for these infrequent events, in-house staff payment facilities capable of handling this increase may not be an effective use of electoral management body resources.

Voting site mapping: The census bureau or other agencies with existing geographic information systems (GIS) resources may be highly qualified for mapping.

Out-of-country voting operations: This function may be more effectively handled by contracting existing resources in external diplomatic, trade or other government missions, where these are publicly perceived as providing an impartial service.

Development of computer software and systems: Outside specialist companies can provide this service to electoral management body specifications.

Operation of computer hardware platforms: Given high investment levels required for computer systems that will be used infrequently for elections, use of systems and networks from outside service providers can be a cost effective alternative, as long as reliability, access and integrity can be guaranteed to the required standards.

Logistics and storage: Similarly to materials and equipment production, the maintenance by the electoral management body of permanent in-house transport and warehousing facilities (or even undertaking short-term fleet or storage management) sufficient for voting operations may not to be an effective use of internal resources.

In considering outsourcing of any of these non-core voting operations functions, a longer-term view of how developing any dependency on external service providers will affect the future reliability, quality and costs of voting operations needs to be carefully assessed. The advantages of keeping the following areas in-house, for example, need to be carefully weighed against benefits of external supply:

• internal skill development;
• consistency in service delivery framework (rather than developing fresh relationships with external service suppliers each election);
• the internal ethos of delivery to deadlines.

Development of in-house capabilities within the electoral management body may better meet the longer term needs.

Where voting operations functions are contracted out, it needs to be determined whether these responsibilities could be better undertaken by:

• other government sector bodies 
• private sector commercial contractors 
• non-government community organisations 
• international organisations 

Use of Technology in Voting Operations

 

Basic Considerations

Applications of technology can assist in the administration of voting operations. However these  issues must be borne in mind when considering, specifying, develooping and implementing technology-based systems (See Elections and Technology).  In developing technological systems for voting operations administration or for use in voting it is essential that they be:

• suitable for the environment;

• carefully specified;

• subject to strict quality and cost controls;

• thoroughly tested under operational conditions, including, wherever possible, a period of parallel running, before implementation.

Staff Effectiveness

Operating staff must receive thorough pre-implementation training if the intended benefits of technology-based systems are to be realized.

This is as true for changes to telephone networks and introduction of basic word processing facilities as it is for implementation of large, specialized computer systems. Familiarity with systems will assist performance. For example, recruiting electoral officers who have been used during the voter registration phase accesses a pool of existing knowledge of the basic technologies used during the electoral process.

Confidence

There are issues of confidence that need to be addressed when introducing new technological solutions. The voting public, election administrators and electoral officers need to be confident that the systems implemented are reliable, secure and fulfill their information and service needs. Training and information on these issues is as important as training staff in the actual operation of technology-based systems.

Communications Systems

There are base requirements that voting operations administration offices be linked to each other by communication systems--by phone, radio and, if at all possible, facsimile transmission and electronically--and that these offices have voice communication facilities with voting stations under their control.

Use of computer technology for communications can speed the transfer, ensure comparability and provide automatic monitoring of information. However institution of wide area network (WAN) electronic mail (e-mail) systems between election administration offices has to be carefully considered in terms of cost-effectiveness, comparing the advantages to factors such as:

• what continuing use can be made of the equipment;

• the costs and method of acquisition (purchase or short-term lease);

• the skills upgrades (and their lasting effects) required for effective use;

• reliability and maintenance costs as compared to using other methods such as fax or regular ("snail") mail.

Similarly, computer communications may be effectively utilized in developed societies as an efficient means of communication between voting operations administrators and voters. In areas of high computer ownership and mobile cellular telephone ownership, alternative provision of voter information materials to voters or answers to queries by e-mail or text message has been proven to be cost-effective.

Provisions for lodging administrative requests from voters by e-mail, such as applications for absentee or mail ballots, when secured against misuse can also be a low cost method of improving voter service and increasing accessibility. Electronic lodging of required information from political participants, such as reports on party financing and expenditure, can also enhance administrative effectiveness.

Voting Methods

Introduction of technology-based methods of voting has significant implications for the administration of voting operations. Important management issues will include:

Administrative structure effects: Decisions will be required on whether centralized or distributed systems provide better guarantees of system performance, and management structures reflecting the system architecture implemented.

Communications liaison: Where voting information is electronically linked from voting stations or individual voters to central or regional hubs for amalgamation, ensuring communications reliability and security is essential.

Ability to provide system support: Implementing technology-based voting methods will require high levels of either in-house or contracted technical support.

Training: For both voters and voting station staff in the operation of technology-based voting methods.

Management Systems

Ranging from simple single-function spreadsheets to large coordinated or integrated databases that manage all aspects of voting station administration, there are numerous applications for computer technology in voting operations management. Even the simplest systems can improve management capacities. Some sample applications are:

Automated payroll systems for electoral officers: However, given the large staff volumes on a single pay run, and the fact that payroll management is not a core business of election administrations, it may not be effective for such systems to be developed in-house.

Contracting payroll services to other organizations may run the risk of swamping them with volumes that they are unlikely to manage. In some environments, locally-drawn cash or cheques may still be the most effective payroll method.

Materials acquisition and inventory records: Maintenance of computerized inventory records can simplify ordering processes. It can also simplify much of the packaging and preparation for dispatch of materials for voting stations, not only in accurately calculating materials requisitions, but in automatically printing packing lists and labels, dispatch schedules and acknowledgment receipts, and reconciliation of materials schedules for use both in voting stations and on return of material.

Monitoring systems: Computerized monitoring programs allow easy analysis of the state of readiness and progress of voting operations preparations. Simple spreadsheet-based or database systems of this type can be of great use where there are large numbers of geographically dispersed administrative offices responsible for local voting operations preparations.

Staffing and training records: Maintaining simple computer based lists of electoral officers, showing updated (where possible) contact information, experience, training received and an assessment of their performance can simplify the massive task of electoral officer recruitment.

Geographic information systems (GIS): GIS software showing voting sites can assist in determining voting site locations and planning voting site logistics.

Budgets and expenditure control: Simple computer based resource costing worksheets can allow comparability of resource bids and use in various locations and prompt identification of areas of inefficiency, or probable insufficient resources.

Maintaining computer based global budget and expenditure records allows faster manipulation of available funding and expenditure trend analysis.

 

 

Sustainability Considerations

It is useful to consolidate some of the factors that are of particular importance for organizing cost-effective voting operations in developing countries.

Many of these are concerned with how best to attain voting operations’ principles and objectives (see Guiding Principles of Voting Operations) with lower levels of local resources and in environments where there is limited experience in managing accessible and transparent voting operations.

In developing societies, there are likely to be a number of factors that will require greater attention during voting operations planning and implementation than in developed societies. These would include:

• less in-house resources within the electoral management body, and a potential need to ensure transparency and integrity issues where other resources of other state organizations are required for voting operations tasks. (See Transparency and Integrity below);

• ensuring that voting operations methods and procedures provide sustainable solutions. (See Sustainability below);

• taking advantage of opportunities for development provided by materials production, staff training, introduction of technology. (for voting operation purposes,See Sustainability below);

• developing voting operations strategies that are appropriate for the literacy levels in the community. (See Literacy below);

• ensuring that local resource capacities, in terms of infrastructure and skills available, are carefully considered in voting operations planning. (See Infrastructure and skills base below);

• ensuring that procedures, materials and equipment used are suitable for the local environment. (See Procedures, materials and equipment below).

Traditional Societies

In more traditional societies there may be specific issues to be addressed--in training staff, revealing voting processes and in voting site layout and management - that require a balance between cultural sensitivity and maintaining the democratic model of a transparent voting process that protects the secrecy of the vote.

The integration of traditional leaders into voting operations processes, perhaps through accommodation within the system of representation or accessing their skills in information or administration roles, may be important for the success of voting operations.

In societies where the notion of individual secret decision-making (voting) has not been the norm, or where voting is traditionally a male preserve, enhanced measures may be required in relation to issues such as:

• promoting the employment of women in information, training and voting station staffing or voter assistance roles;

• voting station layouts that ensure and protect secret individual voting;

• creation of special voting locations and/or time schedules for particular community groups.

Transparency and Integrity

In less developed communities, effective use of available local resources for voting operations may require considerable sharing of responsibilities and resources with other state agencies.

In such cases care needs to be taken that the management of voting operations, is distinct from politically controlled civil service bodies. Wherever possible there should be a separation of premises, reporting systems, management control, and financial appropriations used for voting operations.

It is highly preferable that State agencies whose resources are used for voting operations are under formal, performance-oriented contract to the electoral management body for their services, and are bound by the electoral management body's administrative code of conduct.

Good practice requires that electoral management bodies are able to terminate the contracts or suspend the assistance from State agencies if the performance level agreement or administrative code of conduct is not adhered to. (For further discussion of voting operations responsibilities. See The Electoral Management Structure and the Delivery of Voting Operations)

Sustainability

Role for International Assistance: With regard to elections it emphasizes the key issue of sustainability, that is, how best to use local resources and any available international assistance to develop a voting operations fabric that is self-regenerating for future elections.

Many sustainability issues are as relevant to countries at a higher stage of development emerging from less-democratic regimes as they are to developing countries.

International political agendas may lead to an election, particularly where a transition to democracy is involved and the society has emerged from a protracted conflict receiving international assistance and extensive media attention, with no guarantee of future assistance due to changing priorities for donor communities and donor neglect.

Typically such elections will involve extensive monetary and technical assistance in a relatively short and unrealistic voting operations timetable.

This is often the result of using an election as the primary conflict resolution mechanism and where an election is deemed to be an effective indicator of democracy. The short period involved will often lead to the imposition of high-cost solutions not locally sustainable.

It may lead to raised expectations from the community for all state operations that cannot be met, as well as opportunities for corruption.

Rather than imposing high-cost and unsustainable "perfect" solutions from external environments or organizations, the key to developing longer-term effective voting operations solutions in lesser developed or transitional societies is in :

• providing assistance suitable to the local environment's needs and which promotes the growth of local capabilities;

• accepting that these may not initially produce a flawless election.

Opportunities for Development

Voting operations offer a number of opportunities for increasing local capacities in developing countries. Implementation of voting operations systems and methods without considering whether a local skill base has been developed to allow them to be maintained and operated for other functions or future elections is a wasteful use of scarce resources.

There are some basic guidelines that, if followed, can maximize sustainable benefits:

Use any available technical assistance programmes for voting operations in longer term skills transfer projects: rather than as short term operational staff substitutes. Without such skill transfer, there will be a continuing need for assistance at future elections.

Skills transfer should aim at covering a broader area: than just election technical matters. The inclusion of staff at local levels in generic skills training in general management, basic accounting and finance, equipment maintenance and operation, ethical conduct --all integral to voting operations--is of continual community benefit.

Less technologically intensive methods: particularly if aimed at inclusion of previously excluded members of society, can produce broader based positive effects.

Only where necessary for election integrity or performance should methods, other than those that are simple, easily trainable and able to be applied under conditions of lower technology and resource bases, be used.

Consider whether equipment and systems introduced for voting operations can have continued community use: Can communications systems be operated on a continuing basis for the benefit of the community? Is the investment in technological equipment and methods justified by its being suitable for integration with or augmentation of existing systems? Can the technology be used for implementation of other social programmes?

Acquiring equipment and technology for sole and infrequent use at elections can be a poor investment when resources in general are very limited.

When considering appropriate equipment and technologies,

Consider how much of a technological leap is involved: Local maintenance expertise (either existing or specifically trained) must be available for effective future use.

Consider carefully the benefits of foreign procurement: Are any immediate technological, cost or quality benefits sufficient to outweigh the resource-building effects of developing local facilities and capabilities?

When implementing voting operations methods, first have a skills maintenance plan: If equipment is not used between elections, skills gained, and the use of the equipment for other functions, will be lost.

If staffs employed in voting operations have no continuing framework in which to practice their skills, or communication with voting operations management, the expense of training will be of limited benefit to the community at large.

Literacy

Considerations for Semi-literate or Illiterate Communities: Population literacy levels will have a important impact on the design of voting operations materials, voting station procedures, voter information communication strategies, and staff recruitment and training methods. In areas of lower literacy the emphasis needs to be on direct and practical communication methods, which need not come at a high cost.

Voting material needs to take into account people who are unable to mark ballot papers and who are unable to complete and sign documentation and allow alternative methods of attesting information on voter identity cards, candidate nomination forms, challenges to voters, provisional or early voting documents, receipts of materials and similar official documents.

For lower literacy communities ballot design requires communication of the voters' choices through:

• uncluttered layout;

• design that visually emphasizes where to place any required voting marks;

• use of images rather than words.

Use of distinctive party symbols (reinforced during community voter information campaigning) is generally more cost effective than reproducing candidate photographs or photographs of the leaders of political parties on ballots.

The election system itself can assist successful voting operations in semi-literate or illiterate communities by adopting simple systems requiring only one mark (list or First Past The Post) on the ballot, or by using differentiated separate voting papers or tokens for different candidates. If simultaneous elections for more than one representative body are being held, use of distinctively colored or different sized ballots will enable voters to comprehend them.

For semi-literate and illiterate communities, assisted voting procedures and voter training in voting stations through practice runs and simulation need careful consideration. In such communities, voting station staff may also need to be increased in relation to the number of voters.

Visual aids to voting--illustrated guides to how to obtain a ballot paper, mark it, and deposit it in the ballot box--prominently displayed around the voting station assists semi-literate and illiterate voters to understand the voting process. The use of a single ballot box, rather than multiple boxes, for any simultaneous elections will also simplify voting for the illiterate people. Voter information should emphasis material that is not written. This can be accomplished, for example, through:

• grass roots community activity, involving community leaders in transmitting voting information through local public meetings; use of street theatre, music and radio;

• conducting voting simulations (perhaps as an adjunct to local voting station staff training sessions) where voters can practise for voting day)

Staff Training

While literacy and numeracy would be basic requirements for recruitment of electoral officers, there may be communities where the need to use local electoral officers is important, yet literacy levels are not high.

In such cases election forms must have clear, simply illustrated instructions for use, and training should be based on simulation exercises of the roles of the different staff in voting operations. Emphasis must be placed on the completion of any necessary forms.

Providing all staff with a simple cue card, with clear visual representations of the functions that they have to undertake is an effective training mechanism

Infrastructure and Skills Base

Limited local transport and insufficient production infrastructure may require earlier production or acquisition of materials and equipment, requiring care in developing realistic voting operations time lines and calendars.

Basic decisions need to be made on whether lower technology levels and possibly longer production lead times available locally provide acceptable solutions to voting operations needs.

In considering external sourcing, potentially negative impact could result from:

• long supply lines;

• little opportunity to oversee production;

• lack of internal resource building;

• establishing possible future external dependence;

• perhaps using scarce foreign currency.

An objective appraisal needs to be undertaken of the benefit external outsourcing would add to voting operations effectiveness, compared to alternatives that could be provided by current local facilities or with external technical assistance to local producers.

Transport

Where transport equipment stock is poor or transport routes are in bad condition, using armed forces transport capacities can be an efficient, and in some cases the only, solution to supplying all voting sites.

However where armed forces have had a historic or current political role, using them for transport of voting material can lead to perceptions or suspicions of them manipulating the process. These can be partially overcome by instituting strict dispatch and receipt checks on voting materials by the electoral management body and independent or political participant monitoring of these activities.

Voting Premises

The use of temporary structures or mobile voting stations may also need to be considered if the building stock, particularly in rural areas, is not sufficiently developed for use as voting stations, where distances are vast or where decision-making is traditionally an open air activity.

Depending on resources available these could be a simple as shade cloth strung between trees; in environments where armed forces are assisting with logistics more complex or elaborate solutions can provide secure, sturdy temporary voting sites.

This might include airlift or road transport of large containers with all voting station equipment and material. Additionally, upgrading existing buildings for voting operations purposes may provide opportunities, through the security and facilities needs of voting station or warehouse sites, to improve their general usefulness to the community.

Communications

Due to the dispersed nature of voting sites, communications for voting operations can be a problem in lesser-developed communities without extensive communications networks.

Installing new networks that provide communication with all voting sites can be expensive. The accessibility of required communication will be very much determined by security risk assessments and reporting speed requirements.

This is one area where cooperative ventures between electoral management bodies and other agencies may be necessary, for example in;

• using existing national communications networks and sitting voting locations accordingly;

• developing networks flexibly to allow joint financing and satisfaction of common needs.

In many developing countries armed forces communications networks have the greatest capacity; flexibility and coverage.  Similar reservations about their use, however, may exist as for logistical assistance. Enhancing communications may be a useful priority for international electoral aid funding.

Provision of viable civilian communications networks, which will have continuing usefulness, is a more positive contribution to sustainable development than using external voting operations assistance funds for functions such as producing multi-colour print ballot papers on high quality security print paper.

Many of those using communication systems in voting stations or in voting operations communications centres may never have had to use similar systems previously for formal communication. There may be a need to train people in such techniques as telephone or fax use.

Professional Skills

The increase in volume and range of workloads during voting operations may require enlistment of professional staff either from other sectors of the local economy (which may place strains on goal achievement in these areas), or external technical assistance.

The more complex the voting operations system and procedures, the more likely that the additional professional skills required may not be found locally.

In developing countries it is important that engagement of additional professional skills is used as an opportunity for management skills transfer to develop the voting operations capacities of the electoral management body, rather than being treated simply as a dispersal of functions.

Staff Recruitment

The use of existing disciplined and skilled workforces for some vital voting operations tasks can provide greater assurances of quality, and be cost-effective. Some areas where this can be considered are the use of:

• teachers, both for training voting station staff and as managers of voting stations;

• senior students as voting station staff;

• state employees such as warders for packing election materials;

• penal institution workshops for production of equipment such as ballot boxes, locks and seals.

The use of such state institutions and employees in voting operations roles may be problematic where they are generally perceived to be biased towards the state.

Even in these situations, it can be as effective, and less costly, to ensure that their actions are monitored by political participants and independent observers (for which some external training assistance may be necessary), and an effective redress system is in place, rather than initiate new administrative and production structures.

Management Skills Training

The overall management of voting operations is a skilled function in both the technical and general management areas.

Training of voting operations managers in general management skills is a widely applicable and important part of using external technical assistance for local resource building. This can occur through exposure to:

• management planning

• staff recruitment and management

• resource mobilization methods

• materials handling

• accounting principles and practices

• procurement practices

• accountability principles

• conflict resolution

Such transferred skills are portable across most public and commercial sectors.

General Skill Development

The large volume of staff required for voting operations at local levels provides opportunities for empowerment, both through general development of skill levels and use of recruitment strategies to assist in redressing gender or minority imbalances.

Many of the base level skills required at the voting operations and voting station level are highly transportable, such as, materials management, conflict resolution, maintenance of accurate records, and use of telecommunications or radio equipment. Training of local voting operations staff can assist local development in general.

Training programmes for voting operations staff, particularly in areas of low literacy, need careful attention in both goals and methods. Breaking down voting station staff roles into discrete work units, and training staff for a limited number of these, can be more effective.

Training methodology can be more effective if role playing and simulation are used, with illustrated reference cards and posters retained by voting station staff, rather than relying on written materials and lectures, especially in areas of illiteracy or semi- literacy.

Procedures, Materials and Equipment

Functionality: It is important that materials and equipment are functional in the environments in which they are to be used, simple in construction, easily maintained, and readily understood both by staff and voters. High-cost materials and equipment may provide only marginal, if any, improvement over lower-cost items, even though they may promote a more exclusive image for the electoral management body and international donors.

Use of technology should be appropriate for the level of training and equipment maintenance that can be achieved in lower-technology environments. The following issues require careful consideration.

Physical and Political Conditions

The physical and political conditions to be endured will significantly impact the development of viable procedures. Whether voting sites are enclosed or in the open, whether materials are likely to be subject to humidity, dust, cold, or rain, whether security risks have been found, all will determine the durability and security required for voting equipment and materials.

In rural areas such condition will have particular impact as back-up facilities and skills may not be available.

Examples would include:

• Cardboard ballot boxes over time may be less costly than metal or rigid plastic, but may be destroyed or affected under conditions of high humidity or rain--high strength plastic bags may be a better, cheap option.

• In dusty or humid conditions, smart adhesive labels can be both more costly and less-effective than old-fashioned writing directly on materials containers.

Availability of Power and Lighting

Where reliable power is not available, the comparative costs of alternative solutions--both monetary as well as in terms of integrity--need careful assessment in each environment. Solutions may entail:

• limiting voting operations to daylight hours, which may entail additional costs in providing more voting locations or multi-day voting;

• provision of mobile generators to voting sites, if they are available and can be maintained during voting;

• provision of emergency lighting equipment (candles, gas lamps), which may entail additional safety or training requirements.

In such circumstances the reliance that can be placed on reporting systems based on electronic equipment, and whether counting is better done at central locations, also needs careful consideration.

Monitoring Capacities

The skills and availability of independent observers and party or candidate representatives will influence the intensity of voting operations security and accountability mechanisms, as well as the materials design for these.

Form Numbers and Design

The numbers and design of forms and other documents that have to be completed by voting station staff and other officials can be a crucial issue, particularly in societies with lower literacy See Literacy above.

A proliferation of forms can test both the patience and skill of less experienced voting station staff, and incorrect or incomplete documents can affect perceptions of election validity. And as the complexity and volume of forms increase, so do election costs. Minimal form requirements relate to:

• accountability for voting materials (receipt, use during voting, unused)

• financial accountability (staff attendance and reporting, petty expenditure) and

• recording of complaints, objections and disputes.

Voting operations systems that require more complex recording at the voting station may not be as appropriate in developing societies.

Cost Considerations

What is a reasonable cost to pay for democracy? This is not a question that can be answered by accountants and financial managers. There are too many difficult-to-price values inherent in voting operations. This is not to say that cost-effectiveness is not a major guiding principle of voting operations. However, conditions over which administrators of voting operations may have little, if any, control may include:

• the confidence of the community in the stability and flexibility of the political environment;

• satisfaction of the varying needs of different sectors of the population to enable equity of access to voting processes;

• risks of manipulation of voting processes by vested political interests.

Any of these factors can limit the ability of voting operations administrators to provide lower cost, or even locally affordable, solutions that will provide operational integrity.

The emphasis has to be on cost-effectiveness for the environment, on achieving a level of voting operation’s integrity and equity that enables the acceptance of election outcomes by participants and the public, and the elimination of waste and redundant costs, rather than on lowest possible costs.

Narrow comparisons between jurisdictions of such indicators as cost per voter, without considering how effectively the expenditure dealt with achieving an acceptable balance among all the guiding principles of voting operations (see Guiding Principles of Voting Operations), may not be at all useful.

Budget Preparation

In preparing for voting operations, decisions have to be made about when and in what manner budgets are to be prepared, and purchases and other expenditure monitored to ensure that all expenditure effectively adds value to the process. 

Specific financial provisions required for voting operations, the optimal timing of expenditure and effective structures for financial management will be dependent on:

• the electoral management system, particularly its temporary or permanent nature, its local, regional or central focus, and the degree of its independence from other organs of the state;

• the general processes for public authority funding.

Guidelines

In considering costs of voting operations there are some general guidelines to consider:

Proposed expenditures should be subject to rigorous cost/benefit analysis: What do they add to the achievement of voting operations objectives; how does this compare with alternative methods; does any incremental achievement justify increased costs?

For example, is expensive special security paper required for ballots, or could the same or acceptable similar fraud prevention be achieved by using simpler and cheaper authentication methods such as use of seals or voting station official marks in voting stations?

Additionally, what non-financial costs need to be considered for alternative methods? In the above example, are there additional factors of delivery times for ballot paper stock; is there any affect on voter service by giving voting station officials an additional task?

Variations in regional or local estimated costs of voting operations require careful scrutiny to ensure that these variations are supported by valid reasons: Higher-than or lower-than average costs in particular regions or local areas need not be a cause for alarm, as long as such variations are the result of an effective response to providing equitable and consistent service to voters.

To enable a reasonable level of accessibility, voting operations costs may well be considerably higher in rural areas, or in areas with language or literacy challenges.

Wherever possible use existing capital and equipment resources or acquire equipment that can be jointly used with other bodies, or that can be used in future elections: As elections are infrequent events, this will generally be a more effective overall use of available funds. In considering these issues, attention also needs to be paid to non-financial cost factors, particularly political environment issues.

For example, use of facilities provided at low cost or free of charge by other agencies of the state--such as use of state communications systems or state premises for voting stations--may affect perception of the independence of voting operations or even dissuade voters from participating.

It is generally more effective to hire or lease than purchase major equipment: Given the high additional volumes required for only a short period, unless valid continuing uses for the equipment can be justified.

Ensure the reliability, appropriateness and affordability of methods and equipment chosen for each particular environment.

Voting operations are to some extent a showcase. However, this should not be allowed to override sound judgment about necessary expenditure. Simpler methods may not look as impressive, but can deliver a more reliable, auditable, transparent and less costly outcome.

In developing countries where the currency may not be stable, consideration needs to be given to the foreign exchange situation: Even where foreign purchases are less costly and more appropriate, their use of scarce foreign exchange and development of external dependence may make local solutions preferable.

Offers of international funding for elections need also to be carefully scrutinized for the benefits and costs of any requirements to use equipment of particular type and source. 

And lastly, a question that should be given careful consideration: Are there aspects of voting operations that can be delivered as effectively, with sufficient integrity guarantees, yet with cheaper current and overhead costs, by contracting other organizations rather than by the electoral management body? 

Budgeting and Planning Cycle

Cost effective budgeting relies on planning that takes into account the ongoing work of the electoral management body and its expected legislated outputs. Effective budgeting is better achieved if done in the wider context of financial management. The permanency or non-permanency of the electoral management body affects the efficacy of the financial planning cycle.

Developing estimates of the financial and other resource needs of voting operations is more effectively implemented within the context of an overall financial management plan than as an ad hoc exercise. Where electoral management bodies are permanent bodies, the establishment of a budget planning cycle, linked to a legislative timetable for funds approval (see Funds Assurance and Timing of Electoral Funds), with regular reviews and updates of needs for voting operations expenditures, will assist in the readiness for implementing voting operations processes.

Budget panning for permanent electoral management bodies can be continuous and more accurate as its ongoing expenses are easier to predicate adequately.

Even where elections are held at irregular terms, the introduction of such a cycle can be based on historical data on average length between elections.  Longer term financial planning can bring with it substantial cost -efficiencies in the staged and tested acquisition and introduction of new systems and technologies at a pace that the organization can digest.

It will also provide a reasonable time frame in which to develop "bottom up" estimates detailing accurately financial and other resource needs and allow more rigorous scrutiny of these. For that reason temporary electoral management bodies can be at a disadvantage in two respects when preparing budgets for voting operations:

1. Often there will be insufficient time to develop more accurate "bottom up" budgets based on actual local conditions in each local administrative area (see Budgeting Systems). This may lead to budgets being calculated more on the basis of the costs of the last election, adjusted for any broad changes in the overall election environment, than on objective current data.
2. The lack of continuity can mean that systems, voting arrangements, materials and staff have to be developed and implemented, and purchases made, in a brief time frame. This can limit the ability to purchase in the most cost-effective manner. The compressed time frame for implementation of the necessary arrangements can result in higher overheads.

Budgeting Systems

Effective budgeting and expenditure control and monitoring systems are significant to the successful management of voting operations. The compressed time frame of large expenditures on and around voting day means that there is little room for error in planning allocations of funds and having effective controls over expenditure.

Styles of budget formats vary, but there are some that are better suited to providing useful frameworks and information, and to identifying where improvements can be made to the cost-effectiveness of voting operations.

Format of Budgets

What should a voting operations budget do?

First, it should be a recording mechanism for allocations and expenditures.

It should be a control mechanism for;

• what funds can be made available, and

• progressively comparing the rate at which financial resources are used against operational functions or objectives achieved,

• so as to predict possible funding shortfalls or over funding

Finally, it should provide an evaluative mechanism through which costs of the various components of voting operations can be compared and assessed, historically and across components.

In conjunction with performance and workload data, such budget information can be used to determine areas of efficiency or inefficiency, trends in cost-effectiveness, and identify cost effective components.

For effective financial control of voting operations, budgets should separate out its various components, both within a voting operations structure and from other election cost elements.

Under different electoral systems and organizational models for electoral management bodies the fine detail of these separations can rightly vary, but internal consistency of treatment and maintaining inter-component comparability is important. This has particular importance where different organizations or agencies contribute resources to voting operations.

If different ways are used to estimate, authorize and record election-related expenditures, both between jurisdictions and over time, meaningful comparative analysis of voting operations financial data can be difficult.

This can also affect the ability to exercise prudent financial control and make it more difficult to identify, both locally and internationally, which are the more cost-effective ways of undertaking voting operations tasks. (Further discussion of this issue can be found in Inclusiveness and Comparability of Budgets.)

Budget Models

What models are available? Broadly speaking, budgets could be devised on several different models:

One is the functional model in which costs are estimated and expenditure monitored against broad type-of-expenditure headings. This model would include broad components such as Staffing, Forms, Material, Computer equipment, Transport, etc. In such models there may be little indication as to what tasks--amongst the many in voting operations, or the election as a whole--are specifically related to particular estimated costs and actual expenditures. This type of model does not reflect specifics in budget detail.

In programme or individual project models estimated costs of and expenditures on individual tasks, or logically grouped tasks, are shown separately. Funding and expenditure for various expenditure types as above can be allocated, monitored and evaluated against the specific tasks for which they are relevant.

If more sophisticated manual or computer systems are available, a model combining the features of both the above frameworks can be implemented with allocations and expenditure broken down both by expenditure type across the whole election, or individually by programme or project. Such models also provide for more reliable tracking of expenditure per item.

Programme and Project Basis

Budget frameworks incorporating a programme and project basis are most effective for both estimating funding needs and controlling expenditure for voting operations.

They ensure that more minor projects, such as processing of candidate nominations, are not lost or overlooked in the overall voting station operations budgets. By separating out expenditures, they enable more rigorous control of costs in each aspect of voting operations.

By aligning budgets to targets or objectives of specific voting operations projects they encourage a widened circle of management responsibility and accountability, and allow more effective evaluation of achievements.

Public budgets for voting operations, due to overall government budgetary policies or legislative requirements or the requirements of external funders, may not be able to take this form. In such cases potential efficiencies and information quality make it still generally worth devoting the additional resources to compiling project budgets for internal management control.

In developing budgets, either a "top down" approach, with funds requirements estimated at an aggregate level and later split, or a "bottom up" approach, with initial estimates compiled at the work unit level and later aggregated, could be taken. (Further discussion of these approaches can be found in Budgeting and Historical Data)

Funding Sources explore further under Electoral Management

Within the above frameworks it is also useful to identify the sources from which funding is to be acquired. This is generally required where international financial assistance for voting operations is being provided or sought.

Often international assistance would stipulate its own accounting and budgeting procedures. Also international assistance may be project specific and may not have an impact on other aspects of the budget.

Such a split would generally show the overall sources of funds, as well as funding sources for specific projects, in a manner similar to the following:

• funds appropriated by the state to the electoral management body;

• other local government agencies' funding;

• donations in kind from other government agencies (possibly security services, computer or communication system use, seconded staff and the like);

• internally funded services provided by local civic/non-government organizations;

• international funding--depending on the type, perhaps broken down into components such as trust funding, parallel financing and cost sharing.

Flexibility

Budgets should be viewed as guides to an efficient expenditure pattern, given that the conditions forecast for the election are consistent, and not as unchangeable documents to be fulfilled no matter what the future circumstances.

An important part of the budgeting system is the definition of review points, triggered either on the basis of elapse of time or proportion of budget expended, where the continued viability of the voting operations budgets is carefully assessed, and decisions on re-allocation of funds, the need to seek additional funding, or identifying savings are made.

Such reviews may not need to be frequent early in the voting operations time line. However, as voting day approaches and expenditure rates accelerate as funds remaining decrease, their frequency will generally need to be increased. Perhaps daily review may become necessary.

Contingencies

Flexibility mechanisms include the development of contingency budgets. Just as contingency procedures or supplies are planned for the possibility of failure of planned voting operations functions, so should contingency budgets for these measures be prepared.

Without these there is no way of determining which may be the more cost-effective means of meeting specific contingencies. 

Budgeting and Historical Data

The most appropriate methodologies for constructing voting operations budgets will vary according to the structure of the electoral management body (national, regional or local or a combination of these), whether a sole body is responsible for all voting operations activities or whether these are divided among different organizations on either a geographic or functional basis, and the public sector budgeting cycle.

"Global" budgets are required to establish overall funding needs and to identify areas where donor or other organization’s resources may be required to fill shortfalls in funding. Budgets for different geographic and functional administrative units and project budgets assist the efficient and effective allocation of funds to specific areas of voting operations.

There are two general approaches that could be taken in constructing voting operations budgets:

• a top-down approach: where an estimate is made on a global level and then split into project or functional and geographic locality budgets;

• a bottom-up approach: where the particular needs of individual geographic localities, projects and functions are determined, reviewed for validity and if necessary revised, then amalgamated into an overall global budget.

(These are of necessity simplifications of perhaps two extremes of the budget construction process).

Top-Down Budgeting

Examples of a top-down budget approach include:

• determining voting operations budgets on the basis of global expenditure at the last election (perhaps expanded for price data increases, or government policies on movements in agency budget allocations);

• determining from historic or other data an overall estimated cost per voter and deriving the global budget from that figure.

Individual projects, functions, localities are then allocated portions of the global amount according to standard criteria. Generally, this is not the most effective means of voting operations budget determination.

It does not necessarily allow for local variations, for changes in systems, procedures and conditions, or allow a proper prioritizing of voting operations needs.

By denying initial input to project and locality or regional managers, it removes one of the key factors in developing financial management capacities and any ownership of budgeting processes. It has the advantage of being a quick and relatively straightforward solution to the need for a budget.

Bottom-Up Approach

The bottom-up alternative is likely to produce a more realistic outcome, if combined with requirements for rigorous justification and review on objective output achievement grounds. Budgets are built up by estimating by defined cost categories (which ideally would go as low as staffing in individual voting stations, costs of each election form's design and production, and the like) the costs of each voting operations project, at a local geographic management unit level where feasible. 

Advantages of this method are:

• takes full account of current and projected systems, procedures and local conditions;

• allows a proper prioritizing of funding needs, and thus more rational decisions if activities have to be curtailed to meet available funding

• encourages ownership of budget processes throughout different levels the organization;

• allows identification of potential areas of both management efficiency and inefficiency;

• provides a solid, supportable basis for bids for funding.

Its disadvantages are that it is a slower, iterative process, and that project and locally based budgets need to be rigorously examined to eliminate any duplication and excessive bids for funds compared to outputs. Defining global budgets through this bottom up process is highly preferable, even if it cannot be developed to its fullest extent due to time constraints.

Inclusiveness and Comparability of Budgets

Reliability of Voting Operations Financial Records

It is still relatively rare to find budgets and expenditure records for voting operations that show an accurate representation of actual costs.

Many public sector accounting practices are such that expenditure on voting operations functions outside the election period, or by bodies other than the electoral management body, may not be included in current election costs.

Inclusiveness

All components of voting operations costs should be recognised when developing election and voting operations budgets. They are no less real because they are borne at a different time or are not charged direct to the electoral management body.

Such expenditures may include items such as:

• costs of other state agencies in providing security for voting operations;

• costs for training and voter information campaigns internally funded by non-government organisations (NGOs), civic and religious organisations;

• established communication technology

• administrative overheads for permanent electoral management bodies;

• use of other agencies' computing or communications equipment;

• longer term training of voting station staff.

What should the electoral management body's voting operations budget include? In terms of funding needs during the election, it is essential that it include its direct outlays during the election period.

If no overall budget is prepared, coordination with other bodies providing their own sources of funds for voting operations activities is also essential, so that all participants have sufficient funding to undertake their required roles.

In addition to direct outlays during the election period itself, financial requirements for other items may also need to be included in voting operations budget preparations over the election cycle, including:

• durable equipment acquisition and maintenance;

• system development;

• longer term staff training and public information programs;

• early purchase of materials;

• continuing election-related administration.

Cost-Effectiveness Evaluation

For proper evaluation of effectiveness of expenditure, an overall budget/expenditure format for voting operations is necessary. It is best practice that this budget/expenditure format includes all costs relevant to the election. Difficulties with this may occur where public agencies operate on year-by-year cash funding principles.

Set-up costs for administrative structures and major equipment needs are expensive, and budgeting for these against a single election can provide misleading data. Similarly where permanent electoral management bodies are in place their relevant running costs may not be included at all in any election's expenditures, resulting in a skewered reflection of election costs.

Currently, such inconsistencies on both national and international levels make it difficult to identify cost-effective voting operations systems and practices.

Funds Assurance and Timing of Electoral Funds

For the electoral management body to be able to plan the implementation of voting operations on a sound basis there must be an assurance that the funds required for voting operations will be made available. Uncertainty as to funding availability will lead to inefficiencies in operations, constrained leadership and a potential loss of integrity.

It is the responsibility of election administrators to ensure that requests for funding have been rigorously examined internally to ensure that they represent cost effective solutions to the legislative and service requirements for voting and that funding provided is spent wisely. This does not necessarily mean that voting is conducted in the cheapest possible manner, but rather that the electoral management body provides "value for money" in the level of voting operations services implemented.

Timing of Funds Release

Not only certainty of funding, but also appropriate timing of release to the electoral management body of approved funding for voting operations is critical for ensuring effective operations.

Certainty of Funding

To ensure certainty of operations and the integrity of the electoral process election administrators must be assured in advance of the funding that will be available for voting operations. This requires that:

• known and preferably public mechanisms for submission of estimates to and approval of funds by the relevant legislatures are in place;

• election administrators ensure that voting operations budgets are developed and integrated into the normal governmental budgetary approval cycle;

• mechanisms for approval of additional voting operations funding by legislatures exist to cover unforeseen contingencies, such as late changes to legislative frameworks, and in systems where elections are not held at fixed intervals, are available and effective.

Governmental funds for voting operations should be part of funding specifically allocated for election purposes. This may be easier where a separate body is responsible for the conduct of elections, rather than elections being one responsibility of a state or local government department or agency.

In the latter case, particularly in environments where general accountability controls are weak, tight audit mechanisms may be required to ensure that funding intended for voting operations purposes is used as intended.

Services Provided By Other Organizations

There will be specific additional considerations where funding for voting operations activities is derived from sources outside budgets controlled by the electoral management body. This situation requires vigilance by the electoral management body to ensure that funding expected for voting operations materializes.

Where other state organizations provide voting operations services at no charge to the electoral management body, it must be ensured that these bodies have the capacity to fund these services from within their own budgets to the level required by the electoral management body.

It would generally be preferable for the costs of providing these inter-agency services to be budgeted for and paid by the electoral management body. This tends to promote efficiency, may allow more direct control of processes, and provides a sounder basis for comparing activity costs. However, this may not always happen. Examples of this could be where:

• premises for voting stations or temporary election management local offices are provided by other state agencies free of direct charge, e.g. schools or town halls;

• security forces (police and/or military) provide voting operations security free of direct charge;

• use is made of other state agencies' communication networks for communication with voting stations;

• computer networks operated by other state agencies are used for processing voting operations data free of direct charge;

• staffs of other government agencies are made available for duty as voting station officers or for election administration but are paid for these duties within their normal salary arrangements with their usual employer.

Funding for Additional Costs Incurred

There may be significant additional costs incurred by other agencies in providing these services--particularly in overtime or other additional staffing costs. Additional materials, equipment maintenance and possibly acquisition of additional equipment, to meet the service levels required for voting operations support, may also result in additional costs.

Some costs of free-of-charge services provided may not be immediately apparent. Staff of other agencies engaged in voting operations support duties may not incur additional costs at the time, but the normal work foregone may require additional expenditure at a later date to be completed on schedule.

It would be preferable that funds to be used for voting operations support by other state agencies were a specifically appropriated item within their budgets, rather than relying on sufficient excess from normal operating budgets being available to meet voting operations needs.

NGOs and International Assistance

Where essential voting operations activities are being provided and funded by international organizations or local non-government organizations (NGOs), the electoral management body must be sure that commitments to provide services are solidly supported by the funds available to such organizations.

Governmental Funding Responsibility

Voting operations, in common with other electoral expenditures, would generally be funded through the particular level of representative government for which the election is being conducted. However, there will be circumstances where inter-governmental transfers of funds may be necessary to ensure consistency, equity and integrity in voting operations processes, such as:

• when new tiers of representative government are being introduced;

• where local or provincial administrations are responsible for conduct of elections for higher tiers of representative government;

• in developing environments;

• where there are gross inequalities in the funding base available to the various governments at provincial or local levels within a country.

Care should be taken in implementing mechanisms for such funds transfers to ensure that:

• accountability and audit mechanisms are in place to prevent inefficiencies through duplicate expenditure for voting operations funds from sources at different levels of government;

• where such funds transfers take place they are on an acquitted advance, rather than a reimbursement of voting operations expenditure basis.

Using the latter method generally will not assist, and may exacerbate, funding deficiencies in specific administrative areas. This issue can be particularly pertinent for elections at lower tiers of government in developing societies.

Justification of Voting Operations Funding Needs

Despite the importance of voting operation, it is one of many competing programmes for limited public financial resources. Voting operations is competing not only with other election-related expenditures--voter registration, voter education, and the like--but also within the wide sphere of services to be provided by governments.

In order to obtain the proposed budgeted funding for voting operations, election administrators will need to convince controllers of the public purse strings that proposed expenditures are:

• cost-effective in delivering the services required by the legislative framework for voting operations;

• necessary to maintain the integrity and service levels appropriate for the election.

Generally is it is preferable to have the legislature determining the amount and release of the required budget to the electoral management body.

The legislature can vote on the release date of the funding, whereas if the ministry has control over the release of funding delays may occur through bureaucratic inefficiency.

Use of Project Costing

Justification of proposed expenditures, and assurance of necessary funding, will be considerably easier where a budgeting model that provides activity or project costing has been adopted (see Budgeting Systems). Advantages of using this method in providing justifications for proposed expenditures include:

• it allows clear demonstration of the cost-effectiveness of the voting operations activities proposed through development of unit cost data;

• the impacts of the various activities on voting operations processes can be more easily shown. This shows in budget proposal supporting papers the effects of any cuts to proposed expenditures, and a prioritization of services that will be reduced or eliminated in order to reconcile activities with any funding shortfalls;

• if approved funding is less than the proposed budget, it provides a clearer framework for speedy revision by the electoral management body of proposed expenditures in order to reconcile these with approved funding.

Critical Time Frames and Funds Availability

It is critical to ensure effective preparation for voting operations that not only an adequate level of financial resources is received, but that the timing of the availability of funds is compatible with the critical intervals in the election preparation calendar. There are two basic issues to be addressed:

1. The electoral management body's internal voting operations estimates system must be organized on a schedule that allows early identification of the funding requirements.  The more complex the administrative structure of the electoral management body and the greater the number of different agencies involved in voting operations service provisions, the longer voting operations estimates are likely to take to prepare. This must be taken into account in internal budget planning timetables.
2. Where legislatures approve and revise state budgets at infrequent, fixed intervals, provision needs to be made in environments where elections are not also at regular intervals for examination and approval, at relatively short notice, of the release of funds for voting operations purposes.  Methods will differ according to the state budget management strategies. Preferably, the approved budget for voting operations will already be known by the time of formal announcement of an election date.

Approval of Emergency Funding

Mechanisms for state approval of additional emergency voting operations funding need to be in place and capable of functioning to allow a timely release of additional funds. Additional emergency funding may be required due to changed circumstances (often the result of changes to election legal frameworks close to voting day), or cost overruns prior to voting day, While it is the responsibility of election managers to keep within allocated funding, in changing environments perfect estimation of requirements may not be possible.

Inability to provide certainty of any additional emergency funding required to achieve a quality election is more likely to punish the legislature, through the potential doubts about election legitimacy, rather than the election managers.

Forward Purchases

Many vital components for successful voting operations, such as development of computer systems and acquisition of equipment and supplies, can be undertaken well in advance of the actual period for voting. In particular, there is a need for sufficient time for proper bidding and tender processes and adjudication of bids to allow cost-effective purchasing.

Where permanent electoral management bodies are in place the costs of such forward work may be accounted for by proposals within their normal operation budgets. When temporary bodies are appointed, it is essential that immediate funding for election preparations be released, possibly as an advance pending the submission of a detailed budget for approval.

International Bodies

The role of international bodies or other governments in providing financial assistance for an election also needs to be determined by the effective time for release of funds. This may become a more complex issue, as international bodies will be driven by approval processes for their own funding, that may not be in synchronization with the election funding time frames in the recipient country.

Also in developing countries, emerging from conflict situations, the release of donor funding for electoral operations may be determined by inter and external political considerations.

Late release of international assistance funding has the potential to cause damage rather than aid effective election operations, particularly where it is for complex systems which then have to be implemented in a highly compressed time frame - for example, to provide funds for a computerized vote counting system a few days before voting day.

Budget Line Item Considerations

When developing budgets and cost guidelines for voting operation projects, election administrators need to carefully identify the following:

• all the relevant cost components--failure to identify and budget for all of these can result in funds shortages during the election period;

• the most cost-effective manner for procuring these relevant cost components--wherever possible, lower cost solutions that utilize simple systems, existing infrastructure, and continuity of resources should be pursued.

Basis of Cost Estimates

The common denominator in estimating costs and acquiring election resources is the number of voters to be serviced. Definition of what percentage of voters is expected to vote is critical for establishing cost-effective operations.

Where election administrators are confident, from comprehensive past records and their analysis of the current environment that the turnout figure will be in a particular range, cost efficiencies can be gained by estimating and acquiring resources on this basis. It is preferable to base budgets and resource needs on a close to 100 percent turnout, which will allow additional capacity to deal with any contingencies.

Cost effective measures will be environment specific, depending on such issues as the level of security required for public confidence and the relative costs of labor-intensive to automated or higher-tech methods. (For further discussion of these issues, see Cost Considerations, Budgeting and Planning Cycle)

Specific Costs

The following sections cover the relevant specific costs:

• Staffing and training, see Staffing and Training Costs.

• Equipment, materials and premises (including security), see Equipment Materials and Premises Costs.

• Communications and postage, see Communications and Postage Costs

• Transport and freight, see Transport and Freight Costs

• Other costs (including voter information, overheads, insurance, challenges/legal), see Other Costs

Contingencies

Provision for contingencies will need to address issues of:

• excess levels of materials, equipment and staff for emergency re-supply;

• disaster recovery, such as where voting has to be adjourned to another day, or offices relocated due to natural disaster or disturbance, or there are major failures in computer systems;

• potential changes to election frameworks during the election period that may lead to additional workloads and resource requirements.

• provision for the payment of voting staff on a day other than election day/s. Voting staff payment becomes an activity on its own requiring a budget for personnel, transport and communications.

For reserve quantities of materials, it would be normal to maintain a 10 percent reserve over estimated requirements. Reserve quantities for relevant items will generally need to be higher where new systems or procedures are being introduced, or where there is reliance on external bodies (e.g. for the provision of transport or mail services) of unproven or historically poor performance.

Contingency estimates for disaster recovery will need to be guided by risk assessments in each specific environment. Factors of infrastructure, development and literacy levels impact upon the estimated contingency requirement plan for voting operations.

Funding for actions resulting from possible changes to election frameworks would not generally be sought in formal budget proposals. It is preferable to provide for these potential costs upfront. However, for transitional elections, where negotiations on election frameworks may continue well into the election period, the preparation of formal cost estimates for the effects of potential framework changes can be very useful.

Post Election Activity

Provision may need to be made for activities following the conclusion of the election, such as for additional resources to conduct evaluations of voting operations processes or research into voting issues or exit polls.

In some systems, such as those with a permanent voter's list or where voting is compulsory, provision will need to be made for follow-up of some voters, e.g. for those whose voter registration entries were found to be incorrect, or, in compulsory voting systems, who did not vote.

Staffing and Training Costs

Except in societies where voting station staff are undertaking a civic duty and are not compensated, the major item of voting operations expenditure is likely to be staffing costs. Hence efficiencies that can be made here will generally impact greatly on overall election cost-effectiveness. Specific costs that will need to be considered include:

• permanent electoral management body staff salaries and associated costs for overtime, travel and meal allowances;

• wages for temporary election administration staff, in field offices and at electoral management body headquarters, salaries and associated payments for training, overtime, travel and meal allowances;

• voting station staff wages, and any associated payments for training, travel allowances, and meal allowances or food supplies;

• any special facilities to be provided to voting station officials or administration staff, such as vehicles and temporary accommodation in remote areas;

• any additional recruitment costs for temporary staff.

Measures that may be taken to enhance cost effectiveness in relation to these resources include:

• use of electoral staff or voting station officials who can be employed free of charge, either by seconding from other government agencies or by working on a voluntary basis;

• retention of staff from past elections, which can reduce both recruitment costs and training costs as well as increase overall efficiency of operations and voter service;

• use of an effective standard system, based on tested workload capacities, for allocating numbers of voting station officials to each voting station.

Equipment, Materials and Premises Costs

Major voting equipment is voting compartments and ballot boxes. The style and construction of these items will have a considerable impact on their costs.

Cost comparisons will need to be made to determine whether it is more cost effective to use durable wooden, plastic or metal equipment or to use disposable ballot boxes and voting compartments.

The more durable or permanent equipment will have greater transport, repair and storage costs, but it can be used for subsequent elections. Disposable equipment may not give a sufficient image of security in some environments, or may be unusable under some weather conditions.

Other voting equipment needs will include seals or locks for ballot boxes, and any special security devices, such as ink applicators and special lighting, required for voter eligibility controls.

Automated voting will require provisions for hardware acquisition and maintenance, emergency system support, set-up and testing of machines and installation of ancillary communications equipment.

Voting material for temporary voting stations needs to be budgeted for. Due to enhanced security considerations of voting material at temporary voting stations budget requirements may be additional to those of permanent or fixed voting stations. Budget provisions for temporary voting stations should also address storage facilities for the voting material.

Office Equipment

Voting stations and temporary office facilities may need to be provided with additional office equipment, though it would be preferable to arrange for the use of fully equipped facilities (this latter course may have not only basic cost advantages but will decrease transport costs).

In general, it would be more cost- effective to lease, rather than purchase, additional office equipment. This will depend on opportunities for their future use and comparison of the rental cost for the period required against the purchase cost. For temporary local offices equipment requirements that may need to be covered in voting operations budgets include:

• Furniture, such as tables, chairs, stands, filing cabinets.

• Photocopying facilities.

• Fax machines.

For voting stations, costs of additional furniture requirements (tables, chairs, secure cabinets for storage, barriers for crowd control, and facilities), additional lighting, portable power supply generators, portable toilets, and water supply to bring voting station layouts and facilities up to required standards may also need to be estimated.

Minor office equipment items, such as calculators and box files, for voting station managers and local election administrators may also need to be included.

Disposable alternatives, such as cardboard tables and queue control barriers for use in voting stations, should also be investigated to determine their cost-effectiveness compared to the leasing of durable equipment.

Computer Software and Hardware

Costs incurred in developing, implementing and maintaining computer systems for voting operations purposes will need to be covered.These may be:

• General management systems, such as for election staffing records and payments or financial management, or

• Systems directly concerned with voting, such as systems for voting station resource allocation and control, computerized voting, candidate nominations processing, election information services or ballot counts and result calculation.

Whether all such costs are estimated against and paid from funding for a specific election will depend on accounting policies and what other sources of development funding are available to the electoral management body. Systems costing will need to take into account:

• costs of hardware (computers, monitors, printers, other peripherals and any installation costs) and additional power supplies;

• any network costs, for line or link installation and/or lease and data transfer costs;

• development, testing and implementation costs for software, and any purchase or license fees payable for externally developed software;

• maintenance and technical support costs.

• training of operators on specialized electronic electoral operations knowledge.

Operational support costs will also need to be included for any additional staff, transport, supplies, office furniture or premises required.

Materials

Estimates of costs of materials for voting operations would include:

• ballots, and, where required, ballot envelopes;

• reference and training materials for use by staff and trainers, such as manuals and workbooks, training aids (audio-visual materials), checklists, copies of election legislation and regulations;

• reference and information materials for use by candidates, parties and other external participants in the election such as security forces;

• election forms for use by voters, candidates, parties and for the maintenance of official election records;

• Election administration forms and labels for the control of recruitment, training, resources allocations, finance, assets control;

• copies of voters' lists for use in voting stations;

• information posters and pamphlets;

• general stationery items such as packaging tape, string, notebooks, pens, pencils, glue, envelopes, rulers, and rubber bands, as well as any specific needs defined in the election legal framework, such as authentication stamps for ballots;

• signage for use in or outside voting stations;

• voting station border markings;

• packaging materials, such as heavy duty envelopes or bags, boxes or other containers for transport of election materials.

Comparisons of the effectiveness of different alternatives for materials needs can produce significant cost savings. Some examples include:

• investigating ballot printing alternatives--use of special papers and security print techniques may not be necessary in all environments, e.g. where ballots can be authenticated by voting station staff when issued;

• whether the additional value added by higher technology and expensive processes, such as production of audio-visual materials, is sufficient to justify their use over simpler and less costly formats;

• comparing costs of different locations (local or centralizes) of production, taking freight into account;

• producing reference materials in sectioned, loose leaf format that can be returned, amended if necessary and reused in future elections

• investigating different forms of production methods to determine which is most cost-effective for the required print runs, and minimizing more expensive design features such as colored papers and print--lower volumes of forms may be produced more cheaply in-house by photocopying;

• using general government bulk supply contracts for stationery items or other common use items.

Premises Rental

Premises may need to be rented for local election administration offices, special voting locations, voting stations and vote counting centres. Rental for such premises will only have to be provided for if there is insufficient or no government supplied premises.

In considering the rental costs, the following factors should be taken into account:

• base rent of the building;

• any bonds to be paid;

• any additional service costs, such as electricity, lighting, communications, heating, and cleaning.

It would generally be preferable to secure premises that already contain the furniture and facilities required.

Security

The level of security that is required will vary widely in different election environments and should be determined through risk assessments. Where security is provided by the police or military, this may be provided for out of their own budgets, or could be transferred by the electoral management body from its election funds.

Cost calculations will need to encompass any requirements for security during the whole election period, not only voting day and the count, and recognize any associated costs that may be relevant, such as for police overtime, vehicle maintenance, fuel, and temporary accommodations. Additional security costs may be impacted upon for the safeguarding of voting materials for temporary voting stations.

Communications and Postage Costs

Before communications costs can be accurately budgeted for the electoral management body needs to determine the extent of communications coverage in the country. These would include fixed line operators, mobile telephone coverage, Wide Area Network, satellite facilities and radio handsets.

Communications costs will need to include:

• cost of calls made over telecommunications networks;

• costs of any additional communication equipment, such as fixed phone lines, telephone handsets, mobile phones, personal radios and base stations;

• any additional mobile or radio network facilities required.

The type of equipment that is most suitable and cost-effective will depend on the environment. Best practice would require that each voting station should be provided with some method of voice communication with its election administration office.

Wherever available and reliable, fixed telephone lines generally will be less costly and therefore preferable.

Election administration offices will generally need to augment their voice communication capacities for the election period, to deal with both administration and voter inquiries.

For the voting period, there should be sufficient capacity for voice contact with all voting stations in the office's areas of responsibility, with no significant delay.

Postage

Postage costs may be incurred for general communications with voters, parties and candidates, particularly for the provision of information sheets, manuals and election documentation. Postage costs may be substantially increased if courier services are used.

Situations may require immediate postings that are adequately facilitated by courier services only. There may also be postage costs associated with the recruitment of voting station officers.

Additional postage costs may include:

• in systems where voting by mail is available, costs of dispatch of mail ballots (and their return where reply paid returns are used);

• where applications for mail ballots are mailed to voters, these costs may double;

• mail delivery of voter information guides.

It would generally be possible, if the electoral management body pre-sorts its outgoing mail by area, to obtain substantial discounts on mail costs from postal authorities. This will usually only be advantageous for large scale mailings, such as voter information guides, mail ballots and the like.

Transport and Freight Costs

Overall Requirements

Transport and freight arrangements for voting materials and equipment will need to cover:

• post-production distribution of equipment/materials to the electoral management body (in lower risk security situations, often organised more cost-effectively by the manufacturer and included in product costs);

• any distribution required from central to regional electoral management body storage facilities, and from regional electoral management body storage facilities to local election administration offices;

• distribution of equipment and materials to voting stations and other voting locations;

• emergency voting day transport contingencies;

• transport of voting material to counting centres (where regional or central counting centres, rather than voting stations, are used for the count);

• return of election equipment and materials to the electoral management body for sorting and storage;

• disposal of any election material that is not to be retained;

• courier services between electoral management body's central/regional and local offices.

• insurance for transportation

Logistical planning should take into account the most cost-effective transport routes and means, considering local infrastructure conditions, time constraints and security assessments. Transportation of materials and equipment may require special security arrangements

It will be more difficult to service remote areas at low cost; use of aeroplane or helicopter air transport, boats and similar high cost conveyance may be necessary. Similarly service of voting locations in foreign countries will generally require high cost urgent air freight.

Contracting Out

It is generally not cost-effective for the electoral management body to maintain its own permanent transport fleet.

A combination of electoral management body owned transport and hired transport during high activity election periods may be best practice. There may be advantages in the hiring of some transport vehicles and drivers in urban areas for peak periods of materials delivery and pick up.

This may be necessary where other suitable transport operators or other government agencies' vehicles are not available. Where vehicles are hired, costing must include all associated costs, such as drivers, fuel and insurance.

Transport Security

Election materials and equipment must be transported by means that provide adequate security.

The level of security required will depend on assessed security risks. In low risk environments normal commercial transport systems or even private vehicles can be used; in higher risk environments, special arrangements for protected convoys or transport using military, police, or private or international security agencies resources may be required.

Costs in such situations may be high - however adequate security of the material is the overriding consideration.

Voting Station Staff Needs

There may also be a need to provide transport for voting station staff and, in some situations of high risk, secure convoys for voters. With regard to voting station staff, vehicle leasing may be necessary to provide:

• the required mobility for roving voting station staff (see Other Voting Operations Staff);

• a transport service for voting station staff, where they are working out of their local area, or where public transport facilities are poor (use of buses rather than smaller vehicles would be more cost-effective);

• transport for mobile voting stations, both in urban areas servicing institutions and in remote areas.

• Transport for replacement voting station staff

Potential Efficiencies

There can be opportunities for efficiencies in transport costs by using, wherever possible:

• transport resources of other government agencies or the military for equipment and materials distribution and return (a less attractive option where "user pays" systems for inter-agency services is used);

• in low security risk areas, voting station managers' private vehicles for pick up and return of voting materials and staff to and from voting stations, paying a vehicle allowance as a more cost-effective alternative to hiring transport vehicles or contractors;

• distributing voting equipment and furniture from regional locations rather than from a central hub;

• ensuring that available furniture and facilities in voting sites are used, to avoid the transport of additional furniture or equipment;

• in rural and remote areas, using voting sites that have facilities for free storage of bulky equipment, such as voting compartments or booths, between elections.

Other Costs

Voter information campaign costs are often covered under voter education or communications’ budgets. This would include materials and other product design, production of printed and audio-visual materials, training and wages to temporary voter information staff (including those working on enquiry services), costs of media space or time for advertising.

Overheads

Patterns of work during the election period may give rise to increases in overhead costs. The electoral management body's permanent offices may be in use for longer hours, incurring additional expense for electricity, heating, cooling or normal building security services.

There are also likely to be significant additional quantities of normal office supplies required. Estimates of these costs will need to be included in budgets.

Insurance

Depending on the general legal frameworks for the insurance liability of agencies of the state, there may be a need for the electoral management body to take out insurance coverage, particularly for voters, voter education providers and voting station staff within voting sites.

Legal responsibilities for insurance coverage need to be carefully reviewed and the appropriate budget provisions made.

Challenges and Legal Costs

Where electoral management bodies do not have in-house legal counsel, or do not receive legal advice and representation free of charge from other government agencies, some provision should be made for costs of:

• legal advice required for any clarification of the legal framework;

• legal representation as a party to any court challenges regarding voting operations processes or election results.

• legal costs for alternative dispute resolution or conflict management.

Provision for costs of investigations of challenges and of any alleged electoral offences may also need to be made.

Minor Costs

Some provision should be made for petty cash requirements to cover small or emergency purchases by local election administration offices or voting station managers.

Technology Costs

When considering the appropriate level of technology to be used for various voting operations processes, cost factors must be a major consideration. Considerations for expenditure on technology include:

• operational and public image considerations,

• the services and reliability that are claimed for the systems,

The enhanced effiency that new technology provides for the electoral management body may be persuasive, but without rigorous cost-benefit analysis of new technology proposals, resources may not be used in the most effective manner.

Key Issues In Assessing Technology Cost-Effectiveness

Key questions to be addressed in relation to the cost-effectiveness of implementation of technology-based solutions include:

How much value will be added by implementation of the technology?: How much more will it provide in achieving any or all of the guiding principles for voting operations (see Guiding Principles of Voting Operations), compared to simpler, lower technology solutions?

How do the benefits compare to any additional expenditures required?

Is the level of start-up expenditure justifiable, given available total election funding?

Technology based systems typically do not produce cost benefits immediately, due the level of equipment, capital, training and other start-up expenditures. Given the rate of change in technologies, and potential trends towards decreasing costs for many automated solutions, picking the right time to acquire technology is also important for cost-effectiveness.

What are the ongoing costs: Careful consideration needs to be given to future costs of maintaining automated solutions, in terms of equipment or software maintenance, training, upgrades, license fees and the like.

If technological solutions are to be introduced, is it better to develop and implement them in-house, or to contract this out to specialists?: The lower initial costs of contracting out on a fee basis may be attractive, but there may be disadvantages. Reliance on an outside contractor for time-critical technology-based voting operations functions may leave the electoral management body open to problems of reliability. Careful consideration needs to be given to cost versus control and reliability issues.

What other alternatives are available for the use of the funds that would be required?: This is not a question just limited to alternative uses within the election budget. Funds used for elections in general are not available for other social expenditure.

Guiding Principles

Without a solid basis in ethical principles, the conduct of voting operations can, at best, be ineffective or at worst become manipulated by partisan political or corrupt forces, leading to the undermining of public confidence in voting processes.

This in turn would result in the potential for lack of public acceptance and lack of credibility of the validity of election-related decisions and outcomes. Application of the following principles to voting operations is fundamental to maintaining the integrity of an election.

Accessibility

In order to exercise democratic rights through voting, opportunities to vote must be accessible to those with the right to vote.

Accessibility affects almost all voting operations and can be the most difficult principle for the election management body to maximize in a cost-effective manner. Major issues to be considered in making voting operations accessible include:

• locating voting sites in areas where eligible voters can attend easily and freely;

• provision of special voting facilities for those who cannot attend the voting station(s) in their electoral district on voting day;

• determining the day and hours of voting, taking into account issues such as voters' work patterns;

• ensuring that voting materials and information on voting cater to the levels of literacy and language differences amongst the voting population;

• provision for assistance in voting to voters with physical disabilities and challenges or semi-literate or illiterate people;

• determination of administrative and legal voting operations deadlines (for example for candidate nomination, challenges to administrative decisions or errors) that allow opportunity for public participation.

Equity

Equity demands that voting operations offer equal opportunities for participation to all eligible voters and, likewise, to all political participants. At the least it requires public, widely-accepted rules and procedures and accurate, consistent and reviewable application of these rules.

Equity encompasses aspects of accessibility through requiring feasible opportunities to vote and equality of treatment in voting for all eligible voters, regardless of their location, social status or abilities. Equity also means that any special needs of disadvantaged sectors of the voting population are met.

Equity encompasses aspects of transparency in requiring open and accountable decision-making by election management bodies or others in charge of voting operations.

In relation to the role of political participants, the concept of equity requires equal access for all to facilities for observing/monitoring voting operations processes and rights of challenge to these.

Within the management of voting operations functions, it also requires equality of opportunity in awarding contracts for supplies or services, and in recruitment and staffing practices that pay special attention to the needs of women, minority groups and the culturally disadvantaged.

Security

Security of voting operations, on a safety level, needs to guarantee that all eligible voters can participate in voting, and vote according to their own choice, without fear of harm or intimidation. Political participants need similar guarantees that they may publicize freely their electoral programmes in a safe environment.

There is an equally important but different aspect to voting operations security, namely, ensuring that the ballots that are counted after the close of voting, and the election results determined from these, are a true and accurate reflection of the choices made by eligible voters when casting their vote.

Thus security must equally address measures to prevent theft, unauthorized destruction, tampering and manipulation of election material, systems and procedures, the addition of false or unauthorized election data or material, and fraudulent attempts to vote.

Transparency

Transparency of actions and decisions is a vital component for maintaining public confidence in the equity and integrity of voting operations. In general it requires that voting operations-related documents are publicly accessible, and that all political or administrative decisions relating to voting operations are publicly available and subject to challenge and independent review.

Transparency in voting operations also demands recognition of the special role of political participants and independent observers, both international and national, through providing them with equal access to observe and challenge voting processes, particularly in voting stations, but also for other voting operations functions where discretionary decisions may be made or actions defined in law or procedures must be implemented.

Professionalism and Public Service

Professionalism in voting operations ensures the effective provision of services to voters and political participants. Whether subject to a formal administrative code of conduct or not, staff involved in voting operations must be:

• non-partisan;

• professional;

• courteous;

• effective in decision-making and use of resources;

• careful and accurate in their handling of election materials;

• cognizant of the rights of voters and political participants;

• alert to the needs of minority or disadvantaged sectors of the voting population;

• responsible regarding security and voting secrecy;

• strive to improve their performance.

The expectation of professionalism brings with it a responsibility on the executives and supervisors in electoral management bodies to provide all staff with the training necessary for them to provide voting operations services in a professional manner.

The requirement for professionalism does not merely apply to staff of the electoral management bodies. Other organizations participating in voting operations, such as security forces, civic organizations, contractors, independent observation groups and political participants, all have an equal obligation to ensure that their staff and representatives fulfill their duties in a professional manner.

Accountability

As decisions and actions on voting operations issues affect the exercise of basic rights of the population, it is important that these are made within a clear framework of accountability. This is equally important for electoral officers as well as for the most senior managers in the electoral management body. This framework should:

• define each task as the personal responsibility of particular staff;

• ensure that staff know the boundaries of their own and others' decision making powers;

• provide mechanisms for resolution of disputes;

• provide clear and comprehensive guidelines and procedures for voting operations processes and dispute resolution.

As with professionalism, staff will need training in accountability issues.

Without some form of control mechanism, accountability may be lessened. Ensuring that all decisions and actions taken leave audit trails and maintaining an active audit presence provides a necessary protection.

Open and transparent public processes for challenging electoral management body decisions and actions will also assist, as will regular, independent and public reviews of voting operations objectives and performance.

Secrecy of Voting

Preservation of the secrecy, or confidentiality, of voting is a fundamental guarantee that voters are able to make their own choice between competing political interests, without gaining any advantage and without any fear of retribution. Maintaining voting secrecy is a fundamental aspect of:

• the layout and voting facilities provided in voting stations;

• ballot and election form design;

• the conduct expected of voting station officials and the roles they and other authorized persons representing political participants and state authorities may play within the voting station;

• procedures for assisted voting.

Particular issues to be considered when designing materials and procedures for dealing with special forms of voting--by mail, in advance, by proxy, in another electoral district or country--is whether the voter's ballot may need to be accompanied by documentation identifying the voter and confirming his or her right to vote in that election. It must also be borne in mind when determining whether ballots cast at voting stations catering to distinctive communities or very small populations should be counted at those voting stations or dispatched elsewhere to be combined with those from other voting stations before counting.

Sustainability

Elections should not be one-off events. In determining appropriate processes, systems and procedures for voting operations, the ability to continue to provide these services to voters at equal or higher levels must be thoroughly assessed. This is particularly true of voting operations functions that may attract international funding for a particular election. It is not just a matter of costs, though affordability is very important. These issues include:

• skills availability for future maintenance and operation of equipment and systems;

• developing dependencies on external suppliers and technical assistance;

• potential alternative or continuous uses of skills and equipment acquired for voting operations purposes;

• economic distortions that may result from a massive influx of voting operations funding.

In all cases voting operations processes will only be sustainable if they are appropriate for the particular environment of the country.

Where international funding assistance is provided for voting operations, it provides more sustainable activity when it is used largely for skills transfer to the local population. Such skills transfer includes:

• technical assistance that advises and mentors local staff, rather than takes responsibility for complete tasks;

• provision for equipment and training that enhances local production facilities, rather than import of material.

Readiness

Voting operations requires the mobilization of large quantities of resources and the implementation of a vast range of systems within a very short time period and to an immutable deadline. This cannot be achieved without professional planning of all aspects of voting operations and enforcing the delivery of component supplies and services to strict schedules.

Planning should also ensure that new systems and procedures are introduced within time frames that allow them to be consistently meeting operational quality standards prior to the announcement of an election.

In electoral systems with fixed election dates, readiness planning can be more certain. In those electoral systems with less determinate election dates, a constant state of readiness is required.

A lack of voting operations readiness--poorly or untrained electoral officers, unavailable or poor quality materials and equipment, no or inappropriate identification of suitable voting sites, untested communications and electronic systems, poor logistics planning--will threaten election validity.

Governments and other state authorities need equally to be aware of effects that a lack of readiness can have on the integrity of voting operations. Changes imposed by legislation or administrative amendments close to the date of the election, and particularly constant changes to election legislation or rules in the weeks leading up to voting day, can throw an already challenging process into a state of chaos.

Election administrators must then attempt to reorganize activities such as materials supply, staffing levels, training content and schedules within time frames insufficient for the originally planned process.

This has potentially grave effects on the quality of the election. It is sensible, for both governments and election administrations, to negotiate a cut-off date after which election legal and administrative frameworks will be static.

Cost-effectiveness

Cost effectiveness is a principle that may seem to compete with the above principles; cost considerations may mean that ideal solutions for implementing them may not be possible. There are two very good reasons that cost-effectiveness should be one of voting operations' guiding principles.

Managing voting operations is about achieving the optimal mix of services within the generally finite funds available; ineffective use of resources in attempting to achieve particular voting operations objectives will reduce the potential to achieve others.

Executive government or public perceptions of inefficient or ineffective use of resources for voting operations can lead to questioning of whether it is worth attempting to achieve some or all of the objectives above.

Voting Preparations

To ensure that voting operations is undertaken with integrity, equity to all voters, and consistency in all voting locations, the voting framework need to be clearly defined in legislation. The balance between legal or regulatory constraints and issues that can be left to policy decisions of the electoral management body will vary in different environments. Governing legislation fr voting operations will need to be comprehensive particularly in situations:

• where electoral management control is fragmented,
• potentially subject to political influence, or
  
• inexperienced, 
  

Generally speaking, the more issues left for electoral management body policy determination, the greater the flexibility of responses to meet changes in the environment. The greater the detail in legal or regulatory frameworks, the easier it may be to enforce consistency in voting operations.

Voting Procedures

The procedures to be used for voting provide the operational focus for voting operations management. All other actions hinge on the need to ensure that these are implemented effectively. Basic requirements for voting procedures are that they:

• Are sufficiently simple to be understood by voters;

• Provide cost-effective accessibility to voting for all people eligible to vote;

• Are reliable and provide sufficient integrity to withstand challenges.

The combination of appropriate voting methods will vary in different environments. Apart from normal voting day procedures, implementation of various types of special voting facilities can assist participation, for voters who, for example, are away from their electoral district where they are registered on voting day, are ill or infirm, or who live in remote areas.

(Detailed information on voting procedures can be found in Voting Procedures and its linked articles)

Stability of Voting Frameworks

To enhance efficiency and cost-effectivness of administration and to increase preformance in voting operations, hanges in voting frameworks may be necessary(see Guiding Principles of Voting Operations   In some environments, where past electoral practices have been discriminatory, or lacking in professionalism, integrity, security and accessibility for all voters, radical changes may be required. All changes to voting frameworks should be preceded by rigorous cost-benefit analysis.

Care has to be taken that change is not introduced  where there is the potential to confuse voters is high.  Significant advantages can be gained by maintaining some stability in the frameworks used for voting. Where these have a consistent basis from election to election, familiarities of electoral officers and voters with the required procedures result in more effective voting operations.

Election Observation

Election observation by independent groups, either local or internationally sponsored, and monitoring of election processes by representatives of parties and candidates aid transparency of voting operations and can assist in identifying errors, omissions, and inequities in voting frameworks and their implementation.

Use of Technology

There are a number of technological developments--in printing techniques, new uses of materials, and computer applications and telecommunications links for voting--that can continue to expand the possibilities of voting operations.

The expertise is in selecting reliable technological solutions that actually add value to the efforts of election administrators--solutions that are appropriate for the geographic, electoral, cultural environments, and the support infrastructure.  In many cases simpler, more old-fashioned solutions continue to be more cost-effective. (Discussion of some current issues in this regard can be found in Elections and Technology )

Implementing the Law

The importance of electoral law, regulations and electoral management body policy in determining the parameters and methods of voting operations will, in many respects, be related to the standing and administrative framework of electoral management bodies.  If multiple electoral bodies under no central controls are responsible for managing different geographic areas for one election, it would be more appropriate to have a detailed legal framework.
This would be evident in respect to election forms content and design, voting station location and capacities, voter information requirements, to promote consistency and quality of treatment of all voters.  This would also be applicable where electoral management bodies are inexperienced or subject to political influences.

Conversely, where electoral management body structure provides for a strong central quality control focus ,encompassing all electoral districts, and it has a history of impartial judgment, it would be more appropriate that the more detailed issues of voting operations management were left to policies developed by the electoral management body.  This flexibility, in competent hands, can enable more appropriate and swifter responses to changing environments. 

Basic Legal Requirements

What is the basic voting operations framework that should be defined in law for any election environment? Best practice would require that the following are essential elements:

• the method of officially determining the election date;

• the significant points in the election period time frame--the nominations period, campaign period, voting day (or days) and hours, counting period, periods for special voting, official announcement of results, period for objections and appeals to the result;

• eligibility criteria for voters and where they may vote;

• qualifications and disqualifications for candidacy (individual candidates and parties), methods of nominating candidates and announcing accepted candidates and parties for the election;

• ballot types and formats;

• requirements for location and promulgation of voting stations and other voting facilities; routes of mobile voting stations;

• powers and responsibilities of voting station staff and voting operations administrators;

• procedures for handling, maintenance and disposal of accountable materials;

• the voting method, including requirements for a valid vote, and voting secrecy and integrity controls to be applied;

• treatment of voters not found on voting station voters lists;

• methods of and qualifications for any special voting facilities--absentee, early, mail, mobile, provisional/tendered, assisted votes;

• rights and responsibilities of candidates and party and candidate representatives;

• rights and responsibilities of observers and/or monitors;

• settling of disputes and challenges;

• adjournment of voting and treatment of errors and omissions in voting processes;

• methods for replacement of elected representatives, such as recounts, partial elections;

• offenses and penalties.

Additional requirements will vary according to election systems and cultural environments.

Examples

Examples of electoral laws and regulations governing voting operations from more than seventy countries can be accessed through the Internet links contained in the "Comparative Data" and "Electoral Materials" Section which can be accessed from the ACE main page

 

Voting Procedures

Voting procedures will be dependent on the legal, regulatory and policy framework. Like electoral systems, they may often be a product of the past, rather than an effective response to current voting needs.

The equity, integrity, service levels and accessibility of election processes will be primarily determined by the range of voting methods available to voters and the procedural controls.

A major challenge in devising voting methods and procedures is to ensure that all persons registered to vote have an equitable opportunity to participate in voting, irrespective of their geographic location, gender or class, literacy level, occupation, or physical condition. Guiding principles of Voting Operations should be the starting point for the development of appropriate voting procedures.

Normal Voting

Most voters will be casting their ballot on the general voting day (or one of the general voting days) at a voting station in the electoral district in which they are registered to vote. Voting procedures for this mass of voters should include:

• Electoral system requirements--in the type and format of ballots, and the method of indicating the preferred candidate or candidates;

• Integrity requirements--in preventing voter fraud, through measures to combat intimidation, unduly influence, attempted multiple voting, impersonation and ballot box stuffing;

• Service requirements--in promoting an easily understandable, orderly, swift and accurate processing of voters through the voting station;

• Cost-effectiveness requirements--in allowing staffing, premises, materials, and equipment models that enable efficiencies in processing of voters to be realized.

Special Voting Facilities

Providing special voting facilities for electors who, on voting day, are unable to access a normal voting station in the electoral district in which they are registered to vote makes an important contribution to increasing accessibility and equity of voting processes.

With increasing personal mobility, for both work and social reasons, greater proportions of voter populations are unlikely to be at their normal residence on voting day.

For voters in remote locations, or who have disabilities, equity considerations would demand that they be provided with reasonable opportunity to vote. With voter turnout proportions recognized as an indicator of legitimacy of elected representatives, there is a community interest in making voting methods appropriate for the needs and lifestyles of the population.

The extent to which special voting facilities are provided will be influenced by:

• Philosophical factors, such as whether communities regard voting as a personal right or a civic duty;

• Practical factors, stemming from examination of the need for particular types of special voting facilities;

• Financial and cost-effectiveness factors.

For cost and integrity reasons, certain special voting facilities may require additional qualifications from voters over and above those required for normal voter registration.

Cost Factors of Special Voting

Providing special voting facilities, while increasing accessibility to the election process, can greatly increase both costs and complexity of the election. There will generally be additional management requirements and direct costs for providing these facilities.

Additional staff and training, and possibly also additional logistical requirements, special materials and distribution control records and systems, and mailing costs will be needed. Additional costs will include increased communication challenges to deliver voting operations information about special voting to voters, electoral administrators and voting station staff.

Also, there will usually be additional integrity controls required on special voting methods, to prevent impersonation and to ensure that voters do not have some form of special vote and then also vote at a normal voting station.

Types of Special Voting Facilities

A number of different types of special voting, and procedures for implementing them, are described in the following sections:

• Absentee Voting, dealing with procedures for voters out of their electoral district of registration on voting day;

• Voting in a foreign country, dealing with the provision of voting facilities for registered voters who are in foreign countries at the time of the election;

•  Early Voting , dealing with methods by which voters unable to go to their normal voting station on the general voting day can vote at an earlier time;

• Proxy Voting, dealing with procedures whereby voters unable to attend a voting station may appoint another person to vote for them;

• Provisional or tendered votes, dealing with a method of assisting voters who claim to be registered but who cannot be found on the voting station's voters list.

Minority Community Groups

Apart from providing special voting facilities for the community at large, there are population segments that require specific voting facilities appropriate to their needs to enable them to participate in voting.

Devising cost-effective methods of catering to such minority groups is an integral part of providing not only voter service, but equity and integrity in voting operations as well.

For a general discussion of community sectors with special needs, and those who can only be reached by providing mobile voting stations, see Other Special Voting Arrangements specific community elements for which additional facilities would be beneficial include:

• Voters who are illiterate or semi-literate or are illiterate in the language in which the election is being conducted.

• Voters who have physical disabilities which preclude their voting in the normal fashion.

• Ill and infirm voters confined to their homes.

• Voters who are confined to hospital or other care institutions on voting day.

• Voters living in remote areas, where the voting population is insufficient to justify the establishment of normal voting stations

• Security and other emergency forces who are not able to leave their duty stations on voting day.

• Persons eligible to vote who are serving prison sentences on voting day.

• Refugees and displaced persons, who may not be able to return to their previous area of residence to vote.

• Treatment of voters who, for reasons of personal safety, have had their registration details deleted from published voters lists.

Voting in Person on Voting day

While voting procedures will differ in detail, there are common elements that need to be present in any effective procedures for normal voting, such as:

• Control of entry to the voting stations, so that only authorized persons (voters, officials, security, other accredited persons) can enter;

• A method of verifying each voter's identity and that they are eligible to vote at that voting station (i.e., they have not voted previously in this election and they are registered or are otherwise entitled to vote in respect of the electoral area serviced by the voting station);

• Noting of the names of persons who have been issued ballots to prevent multiple voting and allow materials reconciliations;

• Controlled, accurate issue of accountable ballot material (which may be ballots, envelopes, or access to voting computers issuing) to eligible voters;

• Methods to ensure that each vote is secret;

•The method of indicating the preferred candidate or party amongst those on the ballot(s) for the election;

• Ensuring that only valid voting material is placed in the ballot box.

Area Serviced By Voting Station

It would be more usual that voters were assigned to a specific voting station to vote, on the basis of the division of the electoral district into smaller geographic polling sub-divisions, generally containing approximately equal numbers of voters.

There are considerable advantages to this method. For one, it promotes voting integrity. Voters’ lists for each voting station are unique, thus minimizing the chances of multiple voting. Voters are from the immediate area of the voting station, thus any attempts at impersonation are more likely to be recognized.

Also, it allows standard staffing and materials allocation to each voting station, thus promoting efficiency in resource allocation methods. The accuracy of the division of voters’ lists into a unique list for each voting station is vital.

Specific geographic location information for each voter has to be accurately recorded at the time of registration, and voter registration systems must be able to support the production of voters lists at this small geographic area level. This task will be made more challenging when there are limitations on the national identification or population registration systems of the country.

Lack of, or limited national identification procedures and a population register means that voters’ list information is incomplete or inaccurate. The production of voters’ lists is can often be a complex task in societies where:

• general address designation systems are of poor quality, and there are areas with no defined street number or name addresses;

• voters reside in informal settlements;

• there are significant numbers of itinerant or homeless voters.

These issues need to be carefully considered when devising geographic criteria systems and recording methods within voter registration systems. Considerable precision in micro-management of voters’ lists is required. In some jurisdictions, voters may chose to cast a vote at a choice of voting stations within their electoral district.

While this promotes accessibility to voters, it requires more complex systems for voting integrity control, resource planning, staffing and materials supply as:

• voters’ lists will not be unique in each voting station, additional multiple voting controls will be required;

• the potential numbers of voters attending each voting station is more difficult to estimate;

• standard staffing and materials allocation processes will be more complex to implement.

To encourage integrity other methods than this should be encouraged.

Method of Indicating Preferred Candidate or Party

The method by which voters indicate their preferred candidate or party, as determined by the legislated election system, will have a significant impact on procedures for normal voting. Basic variants include:

The enveloped vote system: where each party or candidate appears on a separate ballot, the voter chooses the desired ballot and is issued an envelope in which the ballot is sealed before it is placed in the ballot box. In these systems it is the ballot envelopes that are the strictly controlled and accountable items; the ballots themselves can be freely available. Voting procedures are oriented to the controlled issue of ballot envelopes to eligible voters.

"Mark choice" vote systems: where alternative candidates or parties appear on the same ballot, and voters have to mark their preferences (either manually or using a voting machine or computer screen) on the ballot. There are variations in the manner in which preference must be marked. In these systems the ballots are highly accountable items, and voting procedures are oriented towards controlled issue of ballots to eligible voters.

Write-in votes: where voters write the name of their preferred candidate or party on a blank ballot. Again it is only the ballot issued to eligible electors that must be tightly controlled. It would not be usual to use such systems for normal voting, though they can be effective for use in special voting facilities such as early or absentee voting, where timetables or complexity of materials supply may prevent the use of ballots printed with party or candidate details.

In some jurisdictions, voters use tokens, rather than ballots: to indicate their choice of party or candidate. Each party or candidate is represented by a different token, often distinguished by color, and the voter chooses the appropriate one.

This method can be effective in countries with lower literacy levels. Voting procedures must control that voters only deposit a single token in the ballot box; materials production controls must ensure that tokens are of the same size and weight so that voting secrecy is preserved.

"Mark choice" votes are the more common. Within this category itself, there are multiple variations of method. Some variations depend on the electoral system.

First-past-the-post and party list proportional representation systems would more usually require that voters place only a single mark on the ballot: against a party or candidate of their choice. Allowable marks would often be defined in legislation and could be restricted to a numeric marks, or include marks such as a check or a cross. Accessibility and equity principles would dictate that the nature of the mark itself was not important and that the only important matter is that the voter has clearly indicated a preference.

Some first-past-the-post or party list proportional representation systems may operate on a negative vote basis: meaning that voters cross out on the ballot, or marks beside their names, the parties or candidates they do not prefer, and do not make any marks next to the party or candidate they prefer. These requirements can be more conducive to voter error, and more difficult to count.

Single transferable vote or alternative vote systems: of various types would require the voter to make markings against all candidates on the ballot, or a minimum defined proportion or number of the candidates, in a preference ranking, from "1" to "n".

The electoral system may require voters to cope with combinations of ballot types: for example, where simultaneous elections are for different chambers of a legislature elected using different voting systems. It is very important that voter education and information programs clearly convey to voters the manner in which they must indicate their preferred party or candidates.

Effects of Voting Method on Voting Station Operations.

The selected voting method will have significant effects on the procedures that must be implemented in voting stations. Some examples include:

• Requiring voters to mark more than one preference mark on a ballot will take longer, affecting issues such as the number of voting compartments, or booths, required, and the voter turnout capacity of voting stations;
• Whether ballots or ballot envelopes are accountable items will affect security considerations (both in the voting station and during production), and the layout of the voting station in terms of where these materials are issued;
• The holding of simultaneous elections, especially where voting methods are different for each election, will raise issues of whether ballots for each election should be issued simultaneously to the voter, or that there should be separate areas in the voting station for each election, through which the voter must pass.

Simultaneous issue of all ballots is the more efficient method, but its effects on voters' understanding of how to complete each ballot must be considered

Voting Day and Hours

The day of the week determined for the general voting day will affect planning and implementation of voting operations. Weekday voting may affect the ability to recruit voting station staff and require special arrangements to allow workers to vote, unless voting day is a declared holiday. A general voting day on a weekend may present the need for additional facilities for voters not at their usual residential locations. Different communities may have competing social and cultural commitments over weekends such as religious obligations and funerals to attend.

Hours of opening need to strike a balance between accessibility to voters, efficient resource use, and staff fatigue. Long opening hours will increase the potential for tired voting station staff to make errors in their work.

Absentee Voting

Absentee voting, that is, systems that allow voters to vote at a voting location other than the voting station (or stations) at which they appear on the normal voters list, is an additional voting facility that can considerably increase accessibility to the voting process.

For many voters, absentee voting facilities may be the most practicable means by which they may participate in voting. This would include voters, for example, who:

• For employment, security or other reasons are, on voting day, away from the area in which they are registered to vote;

• Are confined to institutions through illness or disability.

However, the more extensive absentee voting facilities are in order to increase accessibility, the greater the cost in additional materials and in the complexity and quality of systems that need to be implemented to control its integrity.

This latter requirement needs to be very carefully considered when determining which, if any, methods of absentee voting are to be included in legal frameworks and implemented.

This section should be read in conjunction with Early voting. In many environments absentee voting facilities may also cater to persons voting in advance of the general voting day or days, either in person or by mail.

Potential Frameworks

frameworks for absentee voting could allow absentee voting:

• In advance of voting day, or on voting day, or both;

• Only at voting stations within the voter's electoral district of registration, or at voting locations within a restricted range of electoral districts, or at voting locations in any electoral district in which voting is being conducted, or include locations outside the country in which the election is being conducted (see Voting in a foreign country)

• At special voting stations or locations for absentee votes (often electoral administration offices), or in conjunction with normal voting at regular voting stations, or both;

• By voters attending a voting location in person, or voting by mail, or both;

• Through prior application or registration by voters, or be available to any voter attending a voting location designated for absentee voting.

The greater the number of choices provided to voters in the methods and locations of absentee voting available, the more complex the system will be to administer and the more intensive controls and more experienced staff will be required.

More complex systems of absentee voting--those allowing voters wide freedom of choice in the voting station at which they may vote or combining on-voting day absentee voting with absentee voting in advance of voting day--would generally only be considered for implementation when there is strong and experienced central management oversight of election processes.

Issues for Consideration

In implementing frameworks and procedures for absentee voting, there are a number of significant issues that require consideration, including:

• What conditions, if any, must a voter satisfy to be eligible for an absentee vote (see Qualifications and Eligibility Procedures)

• Where may a voter have an absentee vote--for example, only within the electoral district within which the voter is registered, or in some wider area (see Locations for absentee voting)?

• How is it determined at a voting station if a voter is eligible for an absentee vote (see  Qualifications and Eligibility procedures)?

• Should the ballot format for absentee votes be the same as or different from that used for normal votes (see Absentee ballot forms)?

• What arrangements are appropriate for counting absentee votes

Qualifications and Eligibility Procedures

Absentee voting is a more complex, more costly, and potentially less transparent form of voting. Access to absentee voting facilities is often restricted to those with particular legislatively-defined qualifications.

The qualifications (if any) imposed for absentee voters will depend on the ability to provide and manage absentee voting facilities, and equity considerations for those who are unable to attend the voting station(s) at which they are registered to vote. In part this will come down to a societal ethos of whether voting is seen as a right or a duty.

In its most narrow interpretation, absentee voting may be restricted to those whose official duties prevent them from attending their normal voting station--for example, polling officials, security forces on duty on voting day, officials of the state employed at foreign locations.

If absentee voting facilities are to be provided, restricting them to serving employees of the state can raise questions about the integrity of the election process - especially where state organizations or the military are perceived as closely aligned to or under the influence of political forces.

Where equity considerations are given more weight, qualifications for absentee voting may be extended to categories of voters whose physical condition or employment duties prevent them from attending the voting station(s) at which they are registered to vote. Such categories could include:

• Serving military personnel or security force personnel;

• People with physical disabilities, such as bed-ridden patients serviced by mobile voting facilities or wheelchair patients whose assigned voting station lacks wheelchair access;

• Other institutionalized voters;

• Voters whose employment requires them to be absent from their area of registration on voting day.

Or who have moved residence, since the deadline for voter registration, out of the electoral area in which they registered.

No-Limitation Systems

In systems where voter accessibility and promoting maximum participation are the dominant principles, access to absentee voting facilities provided may be open to any otherwise qualified voter. Implementing such systems requires a high level of professionalism in election administration and will have a significant effect in increasing election costs.

The convenience for voters of being able to vote at multiple voting locations is likely to encourage voters to use this more costly method rather than make some effort to attend the voting station at which they are basically eligible to vote. Less rigorous systems of establishing voter eligibility may not be sustainable with high numbers of absentee voters.

Large numbers of absentee voters will exacerbate administrative pressures on integrity controls, voting materials supply, issue and return, and staffing requirements.

Absentee Vote Eligibility Procedures

 No matter who may be qualified to use absentee voting facilities
or what restrictions are placed on where absentee voters may vote (see Locations for absentee voting), additional measures will need to be implemented to check the eligibility of voters using absentee voting facilities. These measures will need to ensure that:

• Voters are who they claim to be;

• Voters cast their ballots for the electoral district for which they are eligible to vote;

• Voters do not vote more than once in any election, particularly by casting both an absentee ballot and a ballot at any other voting facilities.

Possible Control Methods

Potential control methods for voter eligibility would include requiring:

• absentee voters to apply prior to voting day to the electoral management body and be granted a certificate entitling them to an absentee vote which is surrendered when they vote;

• absentee voters to apply to the electoral management body prior to voting day for registration on special voters lists of absentee voters to be used in absentee voting locations;

• absentee voters to complete a declaration containing their details before being issued voting material at the voting location.

In this last instance, since there has been no prior application made, these details must be checked following the close of voting, at locations with access to full voters register details, to determine the eligibility of the voter and that the voter has voted only once, to determine if these ballots may be included in ballot counts.

Absentee Voting by Certificate

Under such systems, absentee voters obtain, prior to voting day, a certificate from the electoral management body authorising them to vote at a specified voting station, other than the one to which they are assigned. Effective characteristics of such systems would include:

• voters must apply for an absentee vote, prior to voting day, in an official form that enables the electoral management body to determine if the voter meets any restrictive criteria in election rules as to who may cast an absentee vote--and, if eligible, voters are issued certificates specifying which voting station they are entitled to use for an absentee vote (with lists of expected absentee voters provided to the relevant voting station managers);

• to maintain integrity, voters issued with such certificates would preferably be identified by the electoral management body on the voters register to be used at their home voting station;

• at the voting station, voters are subject to identity checking and surrender the certificates to the appropriate official, who arranges for the voters to be issued the correct voting material, and who also maintains a record of all such voters issued with voting material;

• controls on voter identity and multiple voting remain the same as for ordinary voters;

• records of absentee voters are included in reconciliations of voting material at the close of voting.

Such procedures, while well suited to systems only allowing absentee voters to vote at voting stations within the electoral district for which they are registered to vote, can be unwieldy where there are large numbers of absentee voters, or where voters may vote at voting locations outside their electoral district. There may also be problems in administering such systems where an election involves more than one round of voting.

Use of Special Absentee Voters Registers

Alternatively, control of absentee voting can be instituted by constructing special voters registers for absentee voters. This may be an effective means for controlling voter eligibility where absentee voters can vote at a location outside their electoral district of registration, and where special absentee voting locations are provided. Effective characteristics of such systems would include:

• a requirement for registered voters to apply, prior to voting day, to the electoral management body for registration as an absentee voter at a specific absentee voting location--with deadlines for such registration allowing sufficient time to determine if the voter meets any required qualifications for absentee voting and for printing and distribution of relevant voters lists;

• to preserve integrity, voters assigned to absentee voters lists would preferably either be removed from copies of normal voters lists used in voting stations, or their entries on these lists be marked, prior to issue to voting stations, to indicate they have been included on an absentee voters list elsewhere;

• to make location of the voters entry in the list easier, absentee voters lists produced would preferably list all voters alphabetically, with the relevant electoral district of registration indicated against each voter's entry on the list (where relatively small numbers of electoral districts are involved, a separate list could be produced for each district);

• on arrival at the voting location, the voter undergoes normal eligibility checks, for identity, against the absentee voters register, and for multiple voting, and if these are passed, is issued voting material for the appropriate electoral district as indicated in the absentee voters list;

• at close of voting, voting materials issued to absentee voters should be reconciled against names marked as issued with voting material on absentee voters lists.

Such systems can be complex to administer in the hectic period before voting day, when the preparation and integrity checking of yet more voters lists can be a significant load on electoral management bodies. They are more suited to systems where there are limited numbers of separate absentee voting locations in major regional centres (rather than available in all normal voting stations).

Absentee Voting On Application at Voting Station

Rather than imposing eligibility controls on absentee voting by verification checks before voting day, eligibility could be checked after the close of voting. Under such systems qualified voters can request an absentee vote at any voting station at which absentee votes are issued. Effective characteristics of such systems would include:

• normal identity and multiple voting checks applied to each absentee voter;

• before being issued voting material, the voters make signed declarations of their personal details--for maximum effectiveness these would include name, address of registration, date of birth, any other particulars that may assist in determining the eligibility of the voter under the particular electoral system (this statement could be witnessed by a polling official, or another voter registered at that voting station, and where voters are issued voter identification cards, relevant details could be copied by the polling official or voter from the voter identification card);

• on the basis of the information in this statement, the polling official determines the appropriate electoral district for which the voter should be issued voting material (in systems where voters are not issued and required to bring voter identification cards when voting, polling officials will require reference material linking addresses to electoral districts to ensure the correct voting material is issued);

• when voters have completed their ballots, the ballots are sealed in an envelope containing the voter's declaration before being placed in the ballot box;

• after the close of voting, ballot envelopes are reconciled to ballot issue records, sorted by electoral district, and returned to the appropriate location (the home electoral district office or a regional centre) for eligibility checking of the details provided by the voter, and further processing;

• care needs to be taken to ensure that multiple votes are not allowed into ballot counts.

As a basic precaution, absentee ballot envelopes for an electoral district must be checked against voters' lists for the relevant voting stations, and where a voter is marked as having voted at their regular voting station, the absentee ballot invalidated and multiple voting investigations commenced.

All voters from whom absentee ballots are received should also, during this check, be marked as having voted, on the relevant electoral district's voters list to guard against multiple absentee ballots from the one voter being counted.

Measures also need to be taken to ensure voting secrecy. This could be done by using a double enveloping system, where the voter's ballot is placed in an inner envelope which is then placed in an outer envelope containing the voter's identity details.

Once the voter's details have been checked after the close of voting, the inner envelope is separated from the outer envelope and mixed with other absentee vote inner envelopes before the ballot is extracted for the count.

Alternatively, a single stubbed/counterfoiled envelope could be used, with the voter's details being written on the envelope stub/counterfoil which is removed after eligibility checking and the envelope mixed with other absentee ballot envelopes before ballots are extracted for counting.

Such systems are complex to administer. In planning for voting day there is no mechanism, apart from prior election experience, to determine how many absentee voters will attend to vote at individual absentee voting locations.  Thus materials supply and staffing for voting locations catering to absentee voters will be more difficult to plan, and resource allocations may be less efficient. Additional materials and training for voting station officials may be required to ensure effective materials control.

Strict control systems for return of completed ballots are also required. It would generally be simpler for eligibility checking and counting to be conducted at a central location.

As eligibility checks occur after the close of voting, if there are large numbers of absentee voters, results of counts may also be delayed. Implementation of such procedures in environments where there is no history of integrity in election administration would not be advisable.

However, where systems promote maximum voter accessibility by allowing absentee voters to vote at any voting station, or at a large number of locations outside their electoral district of registration, it may be the most practicable method of eligibility control.

Locations For Absentee Voting

Locations Where Absentee Voters may Vote

Legal frameworks for absentee voting should be clear about any restrictions on the voting locations at which particular absentee voters may vote. There are two different factors that need to be defined:

• The relationship between where the voter is registered to cast a normal vote and the electoral areas in which the voter may attend a voting location to lodge an absentee vote;

• Whether normal voting stations may be used for absentee voting or whether special absentee voting locations are too established.

Voting Within Electoral District of Registration

In their simpler forms, absentee voting frameworks would restrict the geographic area in which an absentee voter may attend a voting location to vote. For example, in constituency-based electoral systems, absentee voters could be restricted to voting at voting locations within the constituency for which they are entitled to vote.

Where proportional representation elections for provincial or national bodies treat the whole province or country as a single electoral district, election or voter registration administration areas, or alternatively local government areas, could form the basis of such restrictions.

This simple process has a limited impact on accessibility, as its impact is restricted to voters able to vote within the electoral district for which they are registered, and within what would be, in all but sparsely populated regions, a relatively small geographic area. Particularly in constituency-based systems it will minimize the impact on election administration, as:

• Ballots used by absentee voters are those that would normally be supplied to voting stations in each area;

• There is little added complexity of systems to control ballot distribution and return for absentee voters;

• The impact on normal vote counting and tallying processes is minimized.

Voting Outside Electoral District of Registration

More accessible frameworks would also allow absentee voters to vote at voting locations in other electoral districts. Thus, widening the availability of absentee voting is likely to have significant impact on the operational actions and management capacities required.

Where voters may vote at a voting location outside their electoral district, significant additional systems for distribution and return of ballot-related material will be required.

Where elections are for individual constituencies, voting material for multiple electoral districts may need to be supplied for issue at voting locations, with a consequent need for more intensive controls for distribution, issue and return of ballot materials.

There may be increased usage of this facility, and thus a potential need to appoint officials especially for the purpose of issuing absentee votes, or have separate voting facilities for absentee voters, either within normal voting locations or at special absentee voting locations.

Where procedures require absentee voters to register before voting day, pre-printed absentee voter ballot envelopes, or packs of voting material for each individual absentee voter, may be possible to prepare.

While this may assist in ensuring that the correct material goes to each voter, it is an expensive option, and will require very strict controls on supply of materials to absentee voting locations.

More complex systems will be required for the handling of voters' completed ballots, as to whether at absentee voting locations, for example, there is a separate ballot box for each electoral district into which the appropriate ballots must be deposited. Generally, this may be a confusing exercise for voters and officials alike.

However, in voting locations set up specifically for large numbers of absentee voters, it may be possible to set up separate voting stations or ballot issuing areas and ballot boxes for each electoral district.

In other cases, absentee voters’ ballots may all be deposited into the one ballot box and sorted after the close of voting. Using this system effectively would require that ballots be enveloped distinctively for each electoral district before being placed in the ballot box.

Reconciliation procedures at close of voting will also need to account for the ballots issued for each electoral district.

Sites Used for Absentee Voting

Where absentee voters may vote only at another voting station within their electoral district of registration, providing absentee voting facilities at all normal voting stations can be achieved relatively simply.

In systems where absentee voters may vote at locations outside their electoral district of registration, whether absentee voting is accommodated at all normal voting stations, at a selection of normal voting stations, or only at specially set up absentee voting sites will again depend on careful consideration of the accessibility gains achieved balanced against the additional costs and abilities to maintain effective control of integrity, materials and logistics.

Use of Normal Voting Stations

Making absentee voting available at all voting locations will:

• maximize accessibility;

• require effective implementation of complex materials handling and integrity control procedures across all voting stations, and thus a generally higher level of election administration polling official skills;

• increase the complexity of operations in all voting stations.

More training for, and often additional, staff will be required; voting stations of larger physical area may also be required to allow a separate area for absentee voting. Limiting the number of voting stations that offer absentee voting facilities will moderate these requirements, at the expense of accessibility.

Use of Special Voting Locations

It can be more efficient to set up special absentee voting locations--for example, one in each electoral district (if elections are constituency-based), or in central and regional locations--rather than allowing absentee voting at normal voting stations. This management efficiency needs to be considered against the resulting reduction in accessibility.

Using this format can provide more effective controls, through concentration of specific absentee voting training and allocation of more experienced staff, and reducing the number of locations that have implement the more complex procedures and be supplied with additional materials for absentee votes. Thus it may be a more appropriate path to take where election management capacities are less abundant.

Absentee Ballot Forms

Two major control issues with absentee voting in systems where voters may vote at a location outside their electoral district of registration are:

• the supply of ballots to voting stations;

• ensuring that voters are issued the correct ballots.

In systems where normal voting is done with an enveloped ballot  where each party list appears on a separate ballot and voters choose which ballot to use to make their vote, ballot supply requirements can make absentee voting outside the electoral district of registration very difficult to implement.

Even where voters have to mark their choice on a single ballot, ballot supply and issue to voters will be complex to control. There are two potential alternatives for the ballot format:

• Ballots showing full details of the candidates, parties or groups contesting the election on which voters mark their choices;

• Write-in or open ballots--blank ballots which are not printed with candidate, party or group details.

Similar considerations apply for ballots for early voting (see Early voting.)

Full Detail Ballots

Using full detail ballots in each electoral district for absentee voting ensures that the correct information is on each ballot, but will generally result in a more complex supply process.

Where voters register in advance for absentee voting, personalized ballot packs with full-detail ballots for each absentee voter could be pre-packaged and supplied to the correct voting station. However, this is an expensive and time consuming pre-voting day activity.

In other circumstances, a full range of electoral districts' ballots will need to be supplied to voting stations catering to absentee voters.

While this will ensure that all ballots issued are correct in detail, it will require very careful materials control in the voting station, particularly if there are large numbers of electoral districts engaged in the election.

Blank or Write-In Ballots

This method makes supply to and control of ballots within the voting station considerably easier, since the same ballot form may be used for absentee voters from any electoral district. How these ballots are completed will depend on the overall legislative requirements for ballot design. Where it is held to be important that the ballot displays all available choices to the voter, the voting station official issuing the ballot would generally be required to write on the ballot the required details for all contestants in the relevant electoral district. This will:

• slow the issue of ballots;

• require that all absentee voting locations be issued with lists of candidate, party or group details as they are to appear on the ballot for each electoral district;

• be subject to transcription errors by voting station officials.

A simpler system would be for officials to endorse the name of the relevant electoral district on an otherwise blank ballot, on which the voters, in the voting compartment, then write in the candidate or party for whom they wishes to vote.

This will maintain ballot issue speed. However, it will also depend on voter access to lists of relevant candidates or parties, and may be subject to a higher number of errors by voters, for voters to mark a preference is less complex than to write in a candidate or party name.

It is not a method very suitable for election systems where voters have to indicate more than a single preferred candidate or list in each election.

Possible Alternatives

Alternative models for counting absentee ballots could see:

• counts take place in the voting station at which absentee ballots were issued;

• absentee ballots from all voting locations returned to a central point for counting;

• absentee ballots from all voting locations dispatched to the voting station where each absentee voter appears on the normal voters list;

• absentee ballots from all voting locations returned to a central point in each electoral district for counting.

Issues to Consider

The method adopted would depend on considerations of:

• the organisational structure and management strengths of the electoral management body--where there is a strong local presence and good control systems, return of ballots to a local level for counting is more feasible;

• logistical abilities to return absentee ballots to a single, a limited number or a large number of locations for counting;

• the method adopted for determining absentee voters' eligibility to vote;

• the ability to maintain transparency if absentee ballots are counted at locations distant from the electoral district for which they were cast, which may prevent party or candidate representatives for the relevant election from attending.

Where special absentee voters’ lists are compiled and used at a limited number of locations, counting at absentee voting locations can be more feasible. Where absentee votes are issued without the requirement for prior special registration or certification of the voter's eligibility, checking voter eligibility and counts would not be feasible at voting stations, and would be better undertaken at regional or central locations.

Voting in a Foreign Country

Voting in a foreign country, as a form of absentee voting, provides for equity and access. This form of voting may have restrictions and only be provided for registered voters who:

• have been outside the home country for not more than a defined period;

• intend to return to the home country within a defined period.

Determination as to whether voting from a foreign country should be restricted to voters who were on the voter’s register before they left their home country, or whether persons can register as a voter from a foreign country, must be made.

While allowing persons to register as a voter from a foreign country would satisfy equity principles, particularly with regard to migrant workers and their dependants or refugee populations, there may be greater difficulties to be overcome in maintaining integrity, regarding:

• applying a similar standard for authenticating and validating voter registrations as would be applied in the home country;

• determining in which electoral district these voters should be registered to vote.

More restrictive systems may limit the availability of external voting to particular classes of state employees whose employment has required them to be located in a foreign country.

However, this does little to improve general accessibility, and may raise questions of the motives behind and integrity of foreign country voting facilities.

The question of eligibility to vote from outside the country is likely to be contentious, especially where potential voters outside the country are:

• asignificant proportion of the voting age population;

• from specific national or political groupings (for example, in the case of refugees or political exiles).

Information on eligibility for and how to vote in a foreign country should be permanently and publicly available, with target locations for its availability.

Target locations would include travel agents, foreign missions of the home country, airports and other points of departures. 

Administrative Issues

There are considerable administrative difficulties that need to be overcome to ensure that voters voting in a foreign country have their ballots authenticated and returned in time to be included in the count, and to ensure that these voting facilities offer the same standard of voting integrity as voting stations in the home country. Providing external voting facilities can be a practicable service for elections for larger electoral districts, at national and possibly provincial levels.

The provision of foreign country voting facilities for local government elections, where there may be massive numbers of small electoral districts, is generally impractical.

There may be additional issues where potential voters in foreign countries are refugees or illegal immigrants in another country. Methods of registration and voting which do not endanger the voter's current status, yet retain election integrity require careful consideration.

Special Registration

Requiring specific registration for voting in a foreign country, either before leaving the home country or through diplomatic missions in foreign locations can make the planning and resourcing of foreign country voting easier.

From such registrations special voters’ registers could be compiled for use in the various foreign locations or normal voters registers annotated to indicate voters in foreign countries.

Electoral Districts

Electoral legislation will determine the electoral district of the voters in a foreign country. It would be equitable for them to retain or regain their voter registration in their last electoral district of registration in the home country, or if not registered before they left their home country, an electoral district with which some formal connection (such as residence of relatives, place of birth) can be established.

Special lists of voters in foreign countries, or other methods of identifying voter eligibility will need to be used. Rigorous controls to prevent voters voting in a foreign country and votes being recorded in their names at a voting station in the home country, are needed.

In some countries special "non-geographic" electoral districts are formed for voters living in foreign countries. Given the general lack of capacity for independent monitoring of foreign country voting stations, special electoral districts could be perceived as an attempt to manipulate the outcomes of elections, especially if qualifications or opportunities for voter registration for such electoral districts give advantage to particular nationalities, communities or groups.

Voting Methods

There are a number of alternative and complementary manners in which foreign country voting could be implemented. Voting itself could be conducted in several different ways:

• mail voting;

• at voting stations in foreign country locations;

• through facsimile or other electronic means.

It may be practical to use a combination of these methods.

If a mailed vote is used, it could be sent to the voter from, either an overseas location (such as an embassy or consulate of the home country) provided with bulk stocks of voting material for all electoral districts; or it could be mailed directly to the voter from the electoral management body.

Return of mailed votes from the voter could be to a foreign voting location or to specified offices of the electoral management body in the home country.

If conducted by attendance voting, locations used could be voting sites selected for this purpose or existing offices of the state, such as embassies, consulates, trade missions and the like. The attendance voting could be conducted only on the normal voting day for the election, or it could be open for the same or longer period that early voting in the home country is available.

Where completed ballots are collected at foreign voting locations, actual voting and counting procedures could be the same as for a normal voting station, including:

• voters' eligibility being checked from a list of eligible voters;

• ballots being deposited in a ballot box (or boxes for various electoral districts) and reconciled and counted at the close of voting;

• count totals being immediately transmitted by fax, phone or computer to the electoral management body;

• all materials being  returned to the electoral management body for checking and storage or destruction.

Alternatively, votes could be placed in a sealed envelope designed to identify the voter yet maintain the secrecy of voting (as for enveloped methods of absentee voting or for mail voting--see Absentee voting) and then put in the ballot box.

At the close of voting, voting material is reconciled, packaged and immediately despatched securely to the electoral management body where voter eligibility is checked and ballots counted. Ballots could be counted separately or amalgamated with other ballots for the same electoral districts before counting.

General Administrative Issues

There are a number of problems and additional planning, materials and training costs that are likely to arise with voting in a foreign country. Different voting methods adopted will have different specific problems. However, there are some issues that will need to be considered no matter what the voting method used.

Longer supply lines and increased delivery time for material to foreign countries means that materials for foreign country voting have to be prepared well in advance of the normal voting day. It also means that finalization of vote counting may be delayed in waiting for return of voting material.

It is more difficult to provide voters in foreign countries with information on electoral processes, parties, and candidates so that they may make an informed vote. Advertising of available facilities in foreign countries will increase voter information expenditure.

Whether, and how, any political campaigning or official publicity of voting rights can be undertaken in foreign countries will be dependent on the law of each foreign country.

Monitoring of voting in foreign countries by all political participants and independent observers is difficult. Where staff of diplomatic missions in foreign countries are not publicly perceived as politically neutral, there may be doubts about the integrity of the process and the validity of votes cast.  Rigorous controls on dispatch and checking of returned materials can only partly allay such concerns.

There are also basic concerns regarding the checking of voter eligibility and the effect methods adopted may have on voting integrity and the time needed to complete vote counts. Where ballots are issued from foreign locations using special foreign country voter registers, counting could be undertaken at these locations, and the count results transmitted to the electoral management body soon after the close of voting. This method will ensure that the finalization of results is not delayed.

However, given that these locations are not under tight management control of the electoral management body, nor generally subject to observation by party or candidate representatives, it would be prudent to treat results of such counts as preliminary, unpublicized, and to be confirmed by thorough checking of all relevant material on its return.

Additionally, votes taken at some foreign locations may be small in number; to assist in maintaining voting secrecy, it would be preferable to amalgamate these with other locations' votes before counting.

Alternatively integrity may be better served if all foreign ballots are treated in the same way as for mail or absentee votes. Votes cast are each placed in a sealed envelope, accompanied by documentation identifying the voter and returned to the electoral management body.

On return to the electoral management body the votes are subject to thorough checking to establish voter eligibility, as well as challenges by representatives of candidates or parties. This will cause some further delay in finalizing results.

Both options can be costly. Printing special voter registers will incur additional formatting and printing costs and require checks that voters are not duplicated on domestic and foreign registers. Sealed votes will require special enveloping materials. On balance, the use of sealed ballots is likely to be the preferable option for maintaining integrity.

However, control procedures for sealing ballots in individual envelopes, maintaining voting secrecy, accounting for all voting material, and security of completed ballots need to be particularly rigorous.

Mail Voting Material Direct to Voter

Administratively, this is the simplest and lowest cost method. Following an application directly to the electoral management body by the voter, or by direct mail to voters on special voters’ lists of those living abroad, voting material is mailed to voters at foreign locations.

These may be returned to a special clearing or reconciliation centre or to the relevant electoral district's office for validity verification and counting.

Additional costs are limited to dispatch (and return, if this is "reply postage paid" by the election management body) international postage, and staffing for the return clearing centre, if this additional level of control is required for validity or transparency.

The major disadvantage of using this method is the time that will elapse between despatch and return of material. Either material has to be despatched well before voting day (placing pressures on materials production) or deadlines for return of voting material need to be extended after voting day.

Mail to Voter from a Foreign Location

As a variation on mailing direct to the voter, bulk voting materials may be despatched by secure courier or diplomatic pouch to central locations, such as embassies in foreign countries.   Historical voting records or, registers of foreign voters will be used as the basis for this.

Use of embassies as mailing centers will ensure that processing staff will have some basic knowledge of the electoral system. For efficiency reasons, such facilities would usually only be provided in countries where significant numbers of voters are likely to be present.

These foreign locations operate as mail voting centres, dispatching by local post, voting material to voters, either following their application for a mail vote or on the basis of information in foreign voters’ registers. Completed votes must be received by mail or in person at the foreign centre by a defined deadline. This could be close of voting for in-person returns, with some extension for mailed returns to allow for votes completed and posted, but not received, by close of voting.

At the foreign centre,  materials are reconciled, packaged securely, and returned to the electoral management authority by secure courier or sealed diplomatic pouch for validity verification and counting.

This method has some accessibility advantages. Bulk courier or pouch despatch and return with local post can cut the turn-around time considerably; making it more likely those voters in foreign countries will have the opportunity to vote within voting deadlines.

It is important that voting material is stored under security and that completed voting material is stored in sealed ballot boxes until its return to the electoral management body. Logistical costs may be greater, and there will be significant additional organizational and training concerns.

Special despatch and return facilities may have to be established for foreign country voting material. These are likely to be complex and require skilled management control to ensure that correct amounts of all material for all electoral districts is forwarded to each foreign voting location.

To overcome the limited training of staff at foreign locations it is best practice to make up voter packs, each containing a complete set of voting and information material for the relevant electoral district. This will add further to shipping costs.

Foreign locations will be staffed by persons who will not have undergone any direct or significant training. Additional training manuals , videos and worksheets may need to be produced for staff in other countries. The lower level of training may affect the accuracy of treatment of voters.

Where embassies are used as the foreign location and their staff as voting station officials, there may be concerns about whether voting is being conducted impartially, particularly in the absence of independent or political participant monitoring. Such officials may not be direct, accountable employees of the electoral management body.

The need for urgency in election material dispatch, and,particularly, their return to the electoral management body must be impressed on embassy staff.

Attendance Voting

Whether early voting facilities are available for attendance voting at foreign locations or facilities are available only on voting day, similar issues as discussed under "Mail to Voter from a Foreign Location" above, are relevant.

If there areissues of impartiality and integrity of staff at foreign voting locations, this method may provide greater validity checks at the point of voting. Establishing full voting station facilities at foreign locations will incur additional materials costs.

Method Combinations

Most effective coverage of voters in foreign countries may be obtained by using combinations of the above methods, for example:

• mailing voting material direct to the voter from the home country, but having completed ballots returned by the voter to a foreign location, from which they are returned in bulk to the electoral management authority for processing and counting;

• providing both attendance voting and mail voting facilities from foreign locations (as long as such complexity does not unduly strain electoral management body and foreign location management resources).

Refugee Voting

Special considerations for voting in foreign countries may occur where significant proportions of a country's population are refugees in foreign countries at the time of the election. Political, security or logistical problems may prevent refugees returning to vote. In such situations, the electoral management body, with international assistance, may obtain the foreign government’s agreements for establishing voting stations under international control in refugee populated areas.

How, and against which electoral district, such voters should be registered will be significant and are likely to be politically disputed issues in election planning and management. 

Use of Faxed or Voice Transmitted Ballots

Remote areas within the country which are not reachable by normal voting means, transmission and return of voting material by fax, radio or phone could receive the same considerations as foreign locations, where postal services are unreliable or non-existent.

To ensure that votes are only received from eligible voters, and to reconcile materials, voting by such methods will mean that voting secrecy cannot be wholly maintained, and potential voters must be made fully aware of this. This may be the only way that some persons--for example those located in remote areas of Antarctica or the Arctic--are able to exercise their right to vote.

Early Voting

Providing facilities for early voting will allow those voters who cannot attend a voting station on the general voting day to vote on a special day, or series of days, prior to voting day. A balance between accessibility and cost-effectiveness is needed.

Providing these additional facilities can add significantly to materials, premises and staffing costs. However, elections conducted using one traditional method of early voting, by mail, has been shown to be extremely cost-effective.

This section, and Early Voting Procedures  should be read in conjunction with Absentee Voting In many environments early voting facilities will also accommodate persons voting, either in person or by mail, at a location outside the electoral district in which they are registered to vote.

Methods of Early Voting

The two basic methods of early voting are:

• in person, at an office of the electoral management body, a normal voting station or other premises opened for early voting.

• by mail, in which the voter requests, or is automatically sent, the relevant ballots and other voting material, which are then returned by the voter to the electoral management body.

A combination of both in-person and mail early voting facilities are in place in some jurisdictions. While promoting maximum accessibility, services may be duplicated in these environments.

Other special voting facilities, such as mobile voting stations and radio or fax voting conducted for remote locations may also operate in some jurisdictions prior to voting day.

Frameworks

Critical issues for early voting would be better defined in legislation. These would include:

• the period for early voting;

• any qualifications required of early voters;

• methods of defining locations at which early voting may take place;

• voting secrecy and count frameworks, especially for mail voting;

• information required from early voters voting outside their electoral district of registration.

Other issues, such as the opening hours of early voting offices and the numbers of early voting offices used, should be left to the electoral management body to determine.

Eligibility to Claim an Early Vote

Some systems make early voting facilities available to any voter who wishes to use them. However, as there are additional costs involved with early voting, legal frameworks may include special qualifications for voters using these facilities.

In its most restrictive form, voters who qualify for an early vote would be limited to those whose official duties preclude them from voting on voting day. These would include voting operations staff and security forces and others officially engaged in election activity throughout the hours of normal voting.

In less restrictive systems a broader range of qualifications dealing with voters who may not be able to attend their voting stations during normal voting hours would be available. These qualifications could include, for example:

• being outside the country on voting day;

• on voting day, being more than a specified distance from the normal voting station (or stations) at which they would be eligible to vote--further qualifications as to the reasons for this absence (such as work duties) may be required;

• being employed in specific occupations (such as emergency services) that would not allow taking leave to vote on voting day;

• having religious beliefs that would not allow attending a voting station on the designated voting day;

• being a patient in a hospital or other institution, or being pregnant, or being ill or infirm and unable to attend a voting station on voting day;

• being engaged in caring for a pregnant, infirm or ill person on voting day.

Additional qualifications may also exist, where early voting is in person, on the locations at which a voter may lodge an early vote. This may be restricted to the electoral district in which the voter is registered, or some other electoral administration area.

Where voters can lodge an early vote in person outside their district of registration, this in effect becomes an early absentee vote, bringing with it the same control requirements as absentee voting (see Absentee voting).

Where early voting is by mail, there may be restrictions on the location from which a voter can request an early vote. This may be limited to the electoral management office in the voter’s district of registration.

Conversely, voters may be issued mail votes from any electoral management office. This latter method, while promoting accessibility, requires sophisticated control systems.

Period for Early Voting

Periods designated for early voting can also vary widely. In restrictive systems, where relatively small numbers of voters will be eligible for an early vote, a single early voting day may be designated.

It would be normal for early voting periods to be in the range of five to fifteen days before normal voting day. Some considerations determining an effective period for early voting include:

Ensuring that there is sufficient time for printing and distribution of all materials prior to the commencement of the early voting period: If ballots with candidate or party details are used (see Absentee ballot forms, it is critical that there is sufficient time between close of nominations and commencement of early voting for ballots to be printed and distributed. Early voting, particularly mail voting, would generally not be suitable for systems where later changes can be made to parties or candidates standing for election.

The early voting period, especially if mail methods are used, is sufficient for voting material to be dispatched to and returned from voters: in all parts of the area under election.

Where early voting is by mail, the period for receipt of ballots returned by mail could be:

• on or before the closing time for normal voting stations on voting day;

• extended beyond voting day, to allow a period for mail votes completed up until the close of normal voting to be returned through the mail.

Setting the deadline for return of mail votes on or before the general voting day will not cause any delay to the finalization of election results, but may limit accessibility, especially in countries with extensive remote areas with infrequent mail services.

In other jurisdictions, any mail vote actually cast and handed to the mail services for return by the time of closing of normal voting stations should be given a reasonable chance to be included in counts.

Depending on the mail service environment, a period of up to two weeks after normal voting day could be allowed for return of these votes. While this may enhance accessibility, it can result in additional control costs and delays in finalizing election results.

Controls on Accountable Voting Materials

Where early voting facilities are available for a number of days, control of liable ballot materials becomes critical. Major issues that must be considered include:

Security of accountable materials. All completed votes, whether completed in person or returned by mail, must be maintained in ballot boxes under security until the commencement of counting.Where early votes are contained in envelopes with voter details, systems that protect the secrecy of voting and maintain the security of ballot material need to be devised for checking these voter details. All accountable materials, such as unused ballots and ballot envelopes, should be stored under security both during and after operating hours.

Maintaining periodic reconciliations of accountable voting materials: at least, until the end of each day's early voting operations. For mail voting, more frequent checks are advisable. It can be useful to collate applications for mail votes in standard batches of fifty or one hundred, issue mail ballot materials according to these batches, and reconcile ballots and other mail voting materials (e.g., ballot return envelopes) at the conclusion of processing of each batch.

Mobile Voting Stations

Legal frameworks may also allow mobile voting stations to operate during any period for early voting. Particularly for mobile voting stations in remote areas, this is necessary for cost-effective operations.

Early Voting Procedures

Voting Only in Electoral District of Registration

Some systems for early voting in person require that voters must vote within their electoral district of registration. In such systems, voting procedures would be similar to those used in ordinary voting stations on voting day.  This would particularly be the case if it is a requirement that all voting stations are to be open for in-person early voting.

Voting Outside of Electoral District Of Registration

Where voters can use in-person early voting facilities outside their electoral district of registration, procedural alternatives would closely follow those for absentee voting on voting day described in Qualifications and Eligibility Procedures

Under these systems some early voters will still vote within their electoral district of registration. It would be more effective to process these voters in the normal fashion, without the need for special voters’ lists, enveloping systems and other security mechanisms used for control of integrity of early absentee voters.

Locations
In-person early voting systems should make provision for at least one early voting location in each electoral district. Systems that require early voters to vote at their normal voting station are basically an expensive form of multiple day voting.

However, it does have advantages of familiarity, and requires minimal use of additional procedures, materials or staff training. Integrity can still be maintained by opening a limited number of sites within an electoral district (perhaps only one), depending on expected numbers of early voters.

Distances that voters may have to travel to use early voting facilities, and the availability of suitable premises, will be considerations in determining the number of early voting locations.

Conducting early voting within already established electoral district managers' offices, rather than setting up separate voting sites can be cost-effective. However, unless a separate area for early voting can be provided, the flow of voters can prove a considerable distraction to administrative staff, and space within the office can be at a premium. Where considerable numbers of early voters are expected, it would generally be preferable that separate premises be used for early voting.

Hours of Opening

As many voters using early voting facilities may be doing so because of work or care commitments, best practice would require that early voting locations are open beyond normal business hours.

Voting by Mail

Voting by mail is the most widespread form of early or absentee voting. After a request by the voter, voting material is mailed to the voter's specified address by the electoral management body. The voter then completes their vote and returns it, either by mail or in person, to an electoral management body office.
Integrity checks would require a statement of the voter's identity and eligibility to accompany the returned ballot material. Successful mail voting systems depend on an efficient mail delivery service throughout the area under election.

Integrity Issues

It is easier for integrity to be compromised during mail voting as checks and balances are more difficult to implement. Perceived integrity problems with mail voting include:

• The high level of proof of identity and eligibility standards that can be applied in voting stations cannot be applied to mail voting--particularly where voters themselves provide the address to which mail voting material is dispatched;

• there is no opportunity for party or candidate representatives to observe voting by mail;

• It is not feasible to provide complete security for all voting material as it moves through postal systems;

• There can be no guarantee that the voter who signs any declaration accompanying the vote, in fact completed the vote or was not subject to influence or intimidation when completing the vote

Perceptions of fraud or irregularities can arise where large numbers of mail ballots are received from institutions for the aged and infirm or from security forces on active duty. For this reason mobile voting stations, though more costly, are generally held to be a more effective means of enabling access to voting for voters in care institutions see Hospitals or on active security duty in the country.

In the last decade some jurisdictions have turned to holding elections entirely by mail. Analysis of these has revealed cost advantages and generally a positive effect on voter turnout. Particularly where efficient, high volume automated mail contractors are available, this voting method can produce considerable administrative advantages, although total integrity of mail voting may be compromised.

In developed societies, vote by mail elections can be seen as an advance from traditional in-person voting methods and the future of voting via personal telecommunications links.

Characteristics of Mail Voting Systems

While mail voting systems differ extensively in detail, there are necessary basic characteristics for any mail voting system. These would include:
A signed request from the voter for a mail vote. This may need to be in a prescribed form, and may need to be provided for each election or as a request for permanent registration as a mail voter (see below). There would normally be a cut-off date for receipt of such requests, aligned with the time sufficient for the voter to receive and return voting material before the return deadline.

Dispatch of voting materials to the voter immediately on receipt of the request.

Requirement for the voter to include a signed (and, often, witnessed) statement attesting to his her identity and eligibility to vote with his/her returned ballot.

Use of voting materials that both protect voting integrity and secrecy, even when returned voting material is identified to a specific voter. These may entail double enveloping systems for returned materials, or ballot envelopes with detachable flaps containing voter data 

Systems for reconciling early voting materials requested, issued, unused, and returned.

A method of return. Some jurisdictions include postage paid return envelopes with voting material sent to the voter. In other jurisdictions the voter is responsible for the return postage. This can make a considerable difference in mail voting costs. Generally requiring the voter to pay for return postage is a negligible imposition. Additionally, some jurisdictions have successfully used secure drop-in deposit boxes where voters can return mailed votes by hand without postage.

Methods for determining the eligibility to be included in the count of returned voting material. To assist in maintaining integrity, these would require measures such as comparing signatures on applications for mail votes, and returned declarations of eligibility, with voter registration records, as well as checking dates of recording or return of the vote against cut-off dates.

Checking returned mail voting material against voters lists to ensure that voters do not vote both by mail and in person on voting day. The two approaches are:

• when mail vote return deadlines are before voting day, the names of voters who have voted by mail can be marked on voters’ lists before these are provided to voting stations, so that a further normal vote will not be issued.
• when deadlines for return of mail voting material are before or after voting day, voters’ lists returned from voting stations are checked against voters who have returned mail votes. If a voter is marked as having voted at a voting station and has also returned a mail vote, the mail vote is disqualified (and appropriate voting investigations commenced).

Vote count systems that ensure that mail votes are not counted until after the close of normal voting. Returned mail voting material could, however, be checked for eligibility, ballot envelopes opened and ballots placed in ballot boxes prior to the close of voting in normal voting stations. In some jurisdictions where mail voting closes before voting day, returned mail votes are dispatched to the voting station for which the voter is registered, to be included in the count for that voting station. It would be regarded as more effective to count them at a central location.

Permanent Registration of Mail Voters

In some jurisdictions with continuous registration systems, facilities are available for voters to be placed, on application, on permanent registers of mail voters, thus ensuring that they will be automatically sent voting material for elections for their electoral district. Maintaining this facility can considerably reduce workloads for voting operations staff during the election period and provide a beneficial service to voters.

In some jurisdictions, more restrictive criteria are applied for inclusion on such registers than are applied for eligibility for mail voting in general, such as:

• permanent disability

• residing a considerable, specified distance from the nearest voting station

• incarceration (in systems where prisoners may vote)

There is no compelling reason for introducing stricter controls for other early voters (see Early voting). However, given the lesser controls that can be exercised over the integrity of mail voting, it is important that these permanent registers are regularly reviewed to ensure continuing eligibility of the voters listed.

Proxy Voting

In a very few systems, voters who fulfill certain legislative qualifications may be able to appoint a proxy voter to vote for them. A proxy vote may be given where a voter is unable to attend a voting station through infirmity, employment requirements, or being absent from the area on voting day--often similar qualifications to those for voting by mail (see Early voting).

Such arrangements may be implemented to provide accessibility where other forms of absentee voting are relatively restricted or unavailable.

Proxy voting is a method that may detrimentally affect the integrity of voting practice. It allows registered voters to appoint another person to vote in their name. Unlike assisted voting in voting stations, there can be no controls to ensure that the registered voter's instructions on how to vote are followed by the appointed proxy, and, therefore, it may very easily be subject to abuse.

It can be of particular concern where systems allow a proxy to cast a vote for more than one registered voter, and especially where a single person may cast proxy votes for any number of relatives.

Elements of Proxy Voting

Where proxy voting is allowed, its elements would normally include:

• an application from the voter stating the reasons for wanting to appoint a proxy, naming the person as the proxy, and signed by both the registered voter and the proxy, to be received by the electoral management body in sufficient time before voting day to determine and advise voting stations of proxies;

• determination by the electoral management body if the reasons are sufficient and the proxy named is qualified to act as proxy (it would be normal for the proxy to be at least qualified to vote, if not a registered voter; there may also be restrictions on the number of registered voters a proxy may represent);

• advice, including copies of the approved proxy applications, to be provided to the voting station managers in voting stations where voters on their voters lists have appointed proxies;

• when a proxy appears at the voting station to vote, verification by the voting station manager that the purported proxy is actually the person appointed by the voter, before voting material is issued;

• voting station managers should also maintain lists of proxy voters who have voted, as well as the voters for whom they have been issued voting materials.

Election integrity is much better served by implementation of other measures to assist voters who may not be able to attend the voting station at which they are registered to vote. These would include absentee voting facilities (see Absentee voting), early voting services (see Early voting) and mobile voting station facilities for the infirm (see Other special voting arrangements).

Use of Appointed Agent to Collect Voting Material

While not truly proxy voting, a very few election systems allow voters who cannot attend a voting station on voting day--for specific, legislatively-defined reasons such as illness, pregnancy, infirmity--to appoint someone else as their agent to pick up voting material and documentation to authenticate the vote from a voting station or electoral management body office and bring this to the voter.

The voting material and authenticating documentation can be returned either in person by the agent or mailed to the electoral management body by the voter.

While cost-effective, this would generally only be a useful addition to voting services where comprehensive systems for mailed ballots and/or mobile voting facilities for the infirm are not made available. Such facilities may be available only on voting day or, additionally, for a period of early voting prior to voting day. This method shares the same concerns about who has actually completed the ballot as mail-in voting, particularly where a pattern of its use by institutions for the elderly or frail is found.

Provisional or Tendered Votes

The use of provisional or tendered votes is a mechanism to:

• defuse potential dispute and maintain voter service during voting station operations;

• provide an opportunity to vote for persons who allege that they have been subject to administrative error in the compilation of voters lists, or in the marking on these lists of persons who have already voted.

It is a better service to issue a voter who claims, but cannot prove, eligibility to vote at that voting station, a vote in a form that can be subject to later eligibility verification, than to risk disrupting voting for other voters, and possibly denying the opportunity to vote to a voter who has been the victim of an official error in compiling or marking voters registers for that voting station, or who has been challenged as to the right to vote on unsustainable grounds.

While this minimizes disputes in the voting station, prevents disruption to voter service, and maximizes equity and accessibility for voters, this method has some major disadvantages, including:

• additional costs of special materials and staffing (both to issue and investigate eligibility of such ballots);

• the necessity for strict management control of the process;

• the potential to delay count results while the eligibility of voters voting in this fashion is being investigated.

The need for provisional or tendered vote facilities is likely to be greatest in those environments that can least afford them, in terms of costs and management capacity, with inexperienced election administrations, hasty or cost-cutting voters register compilation and production, and less well-trained voting station staff.

Whether provisional or tendered vote facilities are provided, and the classes of voters who may be eligible for such ballots, will depend on analysis of the consequent risks to general acceptance of election outcomes if errors in voters registers used for voting cannot be remedied in this or some other manner such as by provisions for voting day registration.

Qualifications for a Provisional or Tendered Vote

Circumstances under which voters may be issued with provisional or tendered votes must be clearly defined in legislation. Relevant circumstances could include:

Where a voter claims not to have already voted yet their name has been marked as having voted on the voter’s list . Voting station staff may and do make errors in marking voters’ lists, particularly where there are a number of similar names on the list.

Where a voter claims to have registered to vote at that voting station yet their name cannot be found on the voters list: (This should not be confused with systems for absentee voting in voting stations on voting day - where a voter is applying to vote at a voting station other than the one(s) at which their name appears on the normal voters list)  Even in highly experienced electoral administrations errors can occur, in the compilation and production of voters’ registers and voting station voters' lists that are not discovered during in-house checking or periods for public review.

In environments where there have been significant changes to voting rights or electoral boundaries, where there is inexperienced management or new systems for voters register compilation and production, and particularly for first-time elections, there are likely to be some significant errors in voters’ lists.

Implementation of provisional or tendered vote facilities (or facilities for voting day registration) can be a major influence on maintaining harmonious voting station operations in such situations.

Where a voter’ eligibility to vote has been officially challenged by voting station staff or (where allowed) by party or candidate representatives, with no conclusive resolution. In these situations it may not be possible for the voting station manager, without further information at hand, to make an informed decision on whether to allow the voter to vote. Use of a provisional/tendered vote can allow later, fuller investigation and adjudication .

Voting Methods

It is important that the provisional or tendered vote process is not perceived as being a way for the electoral management body to provide for their administrative inaccuracies or omissions. These votes must be seriously investigated to determine if they are eligible for inclusion in the count.

In some jurisdictions, tendered votes are issued of a different colour to normal votes or are kept separately in an envelope for provisional or tendered ballots. They are then placed in the same ballot box in the same fashion as normal votes, and are not further dealt with, apart from being excluded from vote counts. While this may appease potentially aggravated voters during voting hours, it does little for election integrity.

More effective and equitable systems for provisional or tendered votes would ensure that these votes were subject to investigation and included in the count where the vote was found to be eligible. While the provisional voting method would be established in legislation, the following steps are one method of implementing a sound provisional or tendered voting system.

Establish Eligibility

After establishing the voter is in a category entitled to a provisional or tendered vote, offer this to the voter. Some verification may be required, such as :

• for voters who cannot be found on the voter’s list, firmly establish that the address for which they believe is registered to vote is within the geographic area covered by the voters list in that voting station;

• for voters marked on the list who claim they have not already voted, a check of any multiple voting controls instituted--for instance, where a system of marking persons who have voted with ink has been effectively implemented, such a mark would be firm evidence that a voter had already voted and not be entitled to a provisional vote.

Record Voter Details and Issue Ballot

Voters' identity information should be recorded for inclusion with their ballot to enable later eligibility checking. Such details would include name and claimed registered address, as well as information that would assist in eligibility checking, such as:

• date of birth;

• any former names or aliases used by the voter;

• details of any receipts for registration or voter identification cards shown by the voter.

Voters should sign a declaration, preferably witnessed by the electoral manager of the voting station or another registered voter, that these details are correct. Once this declaration has been signed, the voter is given the relevant ballot(s).

Enveloping of Ballot

When voters have completed their vote, the ballot is sealed in an envelope containing their declaration before being placed in the ballot box. Measures need to be taken to ensure voting secrecy. This could include:

• using a double enveloping system, whereby the voter's ballot is placed in an inner envelope, which is then placed in an outer envelope containing the voters' identification information; once this information has been checked, the inner envelope is separated from the outer envelope and mixed with other ballots before being opened for the ballot count.

• alternatively, a single stubbed or counter foiled envelope could be used, with the voter's details being written on the envelope stub or counterfoil which is removed after eligibility checking and the envelope mixed with other ballots before being extracted for counting.

Eligibility Checking

Following the completion of counts for regular votes (where provisional or tendered vote envelopes may be required for checking of voting material reconciliations), provisional or tendered vote envelopes are forwarded to the electoral management body.

Depending on the standing of the electoral management body, eligibility checking could be conducted by it or be part of the duties of any election tribunal constituted to resolve election disputes. The eligibility checking process should be open to party and candidate representatives and independent observers.

Clear criteria for this checking must be specified in the legislative framework, particularly in terms of what may constitute "administrative errors" that have resulted in a voter being omitted from a voter’s list. For example, can eligibility be established.

• Only if an administrative failure or error in correctly processing information proven to have been received from a voter can be shown?

• Are there wider criteria, involving removal from a register due to the voter failing to respond to objection or other voter registration revision proceedings?

• In continuous list update systems, can votes be accepted if the voters have not updated their registration when moving to a new address?

Counts of Provisional or Tendered Votes

Those provisional or tendered votes from voters deemed eligible to have voted are then opened and admitted to the count of ballots for the relevant electoral district.

Update of Voter Registration

In continuous voter registration systems, other provisions may be appropriate as well, including:

• Provisional or tendered ballot voters to complete a voter registration form in the voting station;

• To reinstate or add to the voter’s list those who were wrongfully omitted ;

• To follow up with people whose votes were ruled ineligible to encourage them to update their registration.

Service from Voting Station Staff

Voting station managers should ensure that voting station staff are not reluctant to issue voters provisional or tendered votes in circumstances where voters are eligible to such votes. Voting station staff’s resistance may be due to any of the following reasons:

• Additional work involved;

• A reluctance to accept that there may be errors in voter’s lists;

• A lack of emphasis in their training that legislative provisions for provisional or tendered votes create a right for voters, rather than a privilege of which the voter may or may not be advised;

Voting station staff training should make clear any rights of voters to a provisional or tendered vote .

Other Special Voting Arrangements

Arrangements to provide voting services that cater to the needs of particular minority or disadvantaged segments of the community are an important part of maintaining accessibility and equity in voting operations. The types of special voting arrangements that may be offered will largely be determined by the flexibility and opportunities contained in the legislative framework.

Providing these opportunities cost-effectively is the responsibility of voting operations administrators.

Assistance for Voters

Voters may have special needs in relation to their understanding of the voting process or completion of voting material.

Integrating these needs into voting materials design, information campaigns, recruitment qualifications for voting station staff and provisions for assistance in voting prevents voters with special needs from being marginalized from the election process.

Occupational or Situational Disadvantages

Some sectors of the eligible voting population may not be able to access normally assigned voting facilities due to their occupation (see Voting in Remote Areas and Security/emergency forces) or a disadvantaged situation  (See Refugees and Displaced persons and Suppressed Voter Addresses).

Providing voting facilities for these sectors of the population may cost more per voter.

Whether the expenditure is effective will depend on the risks to election validity if these voters not given an opportunity to vote, the importance of the principle of equity within the electoral system, and the efficiency of methods chosen to provide voting access for these voters.

Mobile Voting Stations and Ballot Boxes

The use of mobile voting stations can significantly improve access to voting facilities for those voters living in remote areas (see Voting in Remote Areas), in hospitals or other institutional care and for other persons too infirm or aged to attend a voting station.

The organization of any mobile voting facilities requires special care, as they can be particularly susceptible to allegations of lack of security, integrity and transparency. Unless carefully controlled and subject to monitoring by political participants and independent observers, they can be open to abuse.

In some environments mobile voting stations have been introduced partially as they have been seen as less open to abuse and if properly monitored, an alternative means of providing access to the above categories of voters, such as mail voting.

While they increase accessibility, for them to be effective requires an environment with high levels of trust and transparency in the operations of the electoral system.

Operations of Mobile Voting Stations

Different methods of operation for mobile voting can be adopted, including:

• In its simplest format, it could be an allowed provision on voting day for staff to bring voting material to persons outside the voting station but too infirm to enter ("kerbside voting");

• Alternatively, staff members from a voting station could make pre-arranged visits to dwellings and hospitals in the area to allow infirm residents to vote;

• In a more extensive mode, specially trained voting station staff can make planned visits to homes of the aged and infirm, institutions such as hospitals (visiting each ward to allow voting), or on a planned route of remote locations where the population is too mobile or too scattered or the distances are too vast to effectively locate normal voting stations.

Such mobile voting stations might operate only on voting day, or during any period allowed for advance voting. Particularly in hospital environments, they will only be effective where the election system allows absentee voting.

Planning Mobile Voting Operations

In planning mobile voting station operations the following guidelines should be considered:

Careful consideration needs to be given to whether special registration procedures should exist for voters wishing to be serviced by mobile voting stations, and then special voters’ lists must be compiled for this purpose.

Planning of mobile voting station routes requires careful liaison between voting operations administrators and managers of institutions, community organizations in remote localities, and other potential clients to establish the numbers of potential voters at mobile voting stations.

For maximum integrity, the identity of persons wanting to use mobile voting facilities should be determined. To maintain equity and protect against allegations of bias, all relevant institutions and remote communities should be approached to determine if the service is desired.

Planning should envisage a sufficient number of mobile voting stations and attempt to schedule routes that provide convenient times of service to these voters, who may be in restricted institutional routines.

Mobile voting schedules should be planned in advance of the election, and locations officially announced by the electoral management body. Allowing mobile voting requests received on voting day to be satisfied can create distrust about the activities of mobile voting and disrupt voting station operations.  A cut-off date, after which requests for mobile voting services cannot be considered, should be required. This is of particular importance to voting integrity in systems that require a minimum percentage of voter turnouts for an election to be declared valid.

Touting for "home" votes on Election Day can be seen as a partisan attempt to reach such a minimum percentage.

Political participants must be advised of schedules in sufficient time to allow them to send representatives with the mobile voting station. Where mobile voting stations visit remote locations by air, boat or road, opportunity could be provided for party or candidate representatives and independent observers to travel with the officials.

There should be a minimum of two experienced voting station staff assigned to each mobile voting station, one of which would preferably be at a skill or training level of a voting station manager.

Where mobile voting stations require voting station staff to leave their duties in a voting station to conduct mobile voting, service to voters at the normal voting station must be maintained at an acceptable level with the remaining resources.

Materials carried by the mobile voting station must at least be comprised of the voting materials that are standard in a voting station. Equipment provided, such as ballot boxes, seals, voting compartments, needs to be lightweight yet very sturdy. For example, corrugated plastic, rather than cardboard or metal ballot boxes and voting compartments may be more suitable.

For security reasons ballot boxes used for mobile voting should feature a lockable slide or other closure over the slot. This closure must be locked (in the presence of any observers) at close of voting at any location, and unlocked (again in the presence of any observers) only when voting commences at the next location.

The planning and implementation of mobile voting--particularly for remote areas involving extensive transport, accommodation and provisioning requirements--can be a major undertaking for which additional resources need to be allocated. Mobile voting station voter processing capacities will be considerably less than that of normal voting stations. For instance in hospital environments there may be only five to ten voters processed per hour.

Implementation will generally be at a cost per voter serviced much higher than that of a normal voting station, or a mail vote. However, on public service, accessibility, equity and even on transparency grounds, when strictly controlled and monitored, it can make an important contribution to inclusiveness in voting operations.

Accountability for Mobile Voting Materials

There are a number of issues which require particular attention to ensure accountability for voting materials used by mobile voting stations. These would include:

Ballots and other accountable voting materials should be kept in locked containers when not in use, and, with the ballot box, should never be left unattended, whether during transport or voting.

Accounting and reconciliation of ballots requires very strict controls. This is especially vital where ballots are removed from a voting station to conduct mobile voting, or where mobile voting stations are in operation over several days.

Records must be kept of ballots issued at each location visited by the mobile voting station. Where a mobile voting station operates over more than one day, voting material should be reconciled accurately at least at the end of each day's voting, and discrepancies immediately reported to voting operations management.

Where a mobile voting station operates over more than one day, strict security measures for voting materials must also be implemented outside the hours of voting.  In urban areas, this may be return of materials to secure storage in the local or regional election administration office, or to other secure storage (police or bank storage may or may not be appropriate, depending on the political environment). In remote areas, one or more security officers may need to accompany the mobile voting station.

Other Special Locations

Often accommodating particular sectors of the community may come at no or little additional costs. In systems where early or absentee voting is permissible, careful analysis of voting history will indicate optimum locations at which additional service points may be provided--e.g., colleges, airports, bus and rail terminals, and student hostels.

In systems where there are reserved seats for particular minorities, care in designing voting station layouts, to enhance access to special voting materials (perhaps through separate ballot issuing areas) and language assistance where necessary, will enable this voting to be conducted within normal voting stations.

Assisted Voters at Voting Stations

Voting is an exercise in communication. It is important that persons of lower literacy, or members of communities using different languages, are provided with the information and facilities to allow them to communicate their voting preference effectively and in secret.

Voting Facilities

Additional voting station staff may need to be assigned to voting stations in areas where there are a large number of illiterate or semi-literate people, to act as information officers and to maintain an acceptable voter traffic flow in an environment where assistance to voters may slow the time taken to complete each vote. For such areas instructions to voters within the voting station--posters, signage, voting instruction pamphlets--should as far as possible be available in a visual format.

Even with such assistance, illiterate or semi-literate voters may require further assistance to complete their vote. Provisions for assisted voting will ensure that they may participate in the voting process. 

Similarly, where there are voters whose language is not the major language of the country and the language in which the electoral operations are conducted, additional voting station facilities may need to be provided to allow their informed participation in voting. These may include:

• Interpreting services: can be most cost-effectively achieved by employing voting station staff proficient in languages used in the local area. Where persons with the combination of language and technical skills are not available, additional staff to serve as interpreters should be employed;

• Instructions for voting on ballot papers and for other voting forms should be in all languages of significant use within the electoral district. The same holds for multi-lingual signs and voter information posters within the voting station.

Voter Information

Areas of lower literacy and diverse languages provide special challenges for voter information campaigns.

In the case of lower literacy areas, use of print media needs to have strong visual representation and be heavily supplemented with direct oral communication: through meetings, street theatre and displays, simulations and personal contact.

It may be more difficult to cater to different language groups, particularly in diverse societies with a recent history of intensive immigration to scattered locations within the country.

Where language groups are relatively concentrated, provision of bulk voter information materials specifically catering to the language group can be more easily achieved. These could be translation of the major language voter information material. However, consultation with the communities should always occur to ensure that:

• such basic translations do not offend any cultural sensitivities;

• word or visual images and examples used are culturally relevant to the specific language group.

Where language groups are more scattered, this may not be cost-effective targeting of the intended audience. Provision of information through cultural and community groups may be more effective. Similarly production of materials that provide information, in all the languages of the area, on contact points for complete voter information in the relevant languages may be more effective than bulk distribution of material in all languages.

Voters living with Physical Disabilities

Providing Equitable Service: It may seem that providing assistance to people with physical or visual challenges is a luxury service that could be considered in developed countries if there is excess administrative time and additional finances available. However, to deny voting access to a significant proportion of the population through reason of disability is no less egregious in terms of equity than to refuse access to voting facilities to persons in a particular geographic area.

Providing assistance to such voters need not be costly. In general it requires only some careful thought about the methods and locations for imparting voter information and for the act of voting, and in some cases the relaxation of strict vote secrecy provisions. Best practice dictates that requirements for this special category of voters are legislated.

Other standards of service to these voters would also be better codified (though not necessarily minutely detailed as to methods) rather than totally left to administrative discretion.

In drafting such legislation, rules or procedures, community groups catering to physically and visually impaired persons should be consulted to determine equitable and cost-effective ways of meeting their voting facilities needs.

Methods of Voting

Special voting arrangements can assist people living with disabilities in voting. These may be through special services at the voting station, or by providing facilities such as mobile voting stations (see Other special Voting arrangements) or voting by mail. Whatever method is used it is important that in providing services to voters with physical disabilities, this is undertaken in a sensitive manner that does not further distinguish them from other members of the population.

While use of special materials and perhaps even special areas of voting stations may allow them more comfort in voting, the assignment of special voting days or special voting stations for persons with disabilities is not generally to be encouraged, unless specifically requested by the communities themselves.

Services at Normal Voting Stations

At normal voting stations, physically impaired voters can be assisted by:

• Allowing another person to mark their ballot according to their instructions (see discussion below);

• Providing kerb-side voting facilities, whereby voters who cannot access the voting station (for example wheelchair-bound voters at voting stations with no wheelchair access) vote outside the voting station, having been brought ballot papers and control forms to complete by a voting station staff member, who then returns these to the voting station;

• Provision for disabled voters to apply to vote at a voting station other than the one to which they have been assigned on the voters list, if their assigned voting station is not suitable for disabled access.

Voting by Mail

Provision for voting by mail (see Early voting) may also assist participation by people living with physical disabilities. In addition to normal voting by mail facilities, administration of mail voting can be made simpler by maintaining a register of special categories of voters who wish to have permanent facilities for voting by mail. Where such registers are kept, they should be reviewed before each election (and may be more difficult to provide where there is a new voter registration process for each election).

Provision could also be made for mail voting by persons who, due to disability, cannot mark their vote or sign their name and thus attest to the validity of their mail vote. This is a facility that could be open to abuse, and should be provided only on receipt of verified medical evidence.

If used, registers of such persons must be kept and there be careful checking and control of votes cast by these persons. Where such persons are domiciled in institutions, integrity (but not necessarily costs) can better be served by a mobile voting station visit.

Assistance in Voting

Allowing certain categories of voters to be assisted in voting is always a contentious issue, as it raises questions both about voting secrecy and the possibility of undue influence on the voter to vote in a particular way.

However, for some visually physically challenged voters, as for some illiterate voters, allowing them to be assisted in marking the ballot paper is the only way they will be able to vote. Rules for such assistance need to be very carefully considered, to minimize the possibilities of manipulation.

Different solutions, influenced by the level of trust in societal institutions, are used in determining who may be allowed to assist a physically or visually challenged voter to vote. The appropriate method will be environment specific. However, there are some general guidelines that should be considered:

A person known to and accompanying the voter or designated by the voter would be the first preference for assisting the voter to vote. Such persons would generally be required to be of voting age themselves.

Where such a person votes according to the voters instructions, there should be no need for other persons to monitor the vote. However, there may need to be certain categories of people excluded from accompanying voters to mark their ballots. These would involve categories of persons on whom the voter may be dependent or who may have some societal influence over the voter; for example, for members of the military or other disciplined forces, the exclusion of superior officers would be justified.

If no such person is available, an independently appointed voting station staff member should complete the voter's ballot according to the voter's instructions. In such cases party and candidate representatives present would normally witness the vote, to ensure that the voter's instructions are followed. They should not be allowed to attempt to influence the voter in the vote. Preferably more than one party representative, from different parties, will be present as a witness.

Where voting station staff are political nominees and not independent appointments, a minimum of two representatives from different political parties should be present if a voter requires their assistance in voting.

When ballots are marked or chosen for voters requiring assistance, it should be done within a voting compartment, or booth.

There is the additional question of whether such voters should specifically register as "assisted voters" prior to voting day. This would seem generally to be a bureaucratic imposition that, given implementation of policies in line with the guidelines above, does not enhance the integrity of assisted votes.

Voting Sites

As part of the assessment of the suitability of locations of premises for voting, ease of access for the people with physical disabilities needs to be considered. It is useful for voting location standards in relation to these special categories of voters to be defined in election rules, with alternative voting facilities to be provided where no location with access suitable for voting is available in a given area. Standards should relate to the following considerations:

Entrance and exit access: Buildings used as voting stations should be fully accessible. Ground floor locations with an unobstructed access route are preferable. Slip-resistant access ramps of acceptable gradient (either a permanent building fixture or temporary provided by the electoral management body as part of voting station equipment) are necessary where primary access to the voting station area is by steps.

The voting area surface should be level, stable and non-slip, with sufficient space around voting equipment to allow disabled voters free movement. Split-level voting areas should be avoided.

Lighting: should be sufficient for the visually challenged.

Additional seating: should be provided for physically challenges voters while they wait to vote.

Reserved parking for physically challenged areas should be available close to the voting station entrance in localities where private vehicular transport is heavily used.

Voting Station Equipment

Normal full-height voting compartments will not be suitable for those people unable to stand while voting. Table top voting compartments for completing ballots by hand or positioning of at least one voting machine at a lower level are necessary to vote in secrecy. Table top voting compartments could be of cardboard durable materials, or as simple as an ad hoc arrangement by voting station staff to place a table in a curtained off area. Ballot boxes should also be positioned at a height and in a location which can be easily reached.

Materials for the Visually Impaired

Consideration should also be given to designing materials that meet the needs of visually impaired voters. These would include:

• Use of large, bold type faces on ballots, forms, posters and information leaflets;

• Provision of ballot templates in Braille

• The printing of a small proportion of ballots and/or information leaflets for use in voting stations in Braille.

Voter Information

The rights of visually or physically challenged voters to obtain assistance in voting at voting stations, the method by which they can exercise this right, and any other special voting arrangements available for their use, should be a basic and prominent feature of voter information campaigns.

Issues that should be considered during information delivery planning include:

Ensuring that essential information about times, location and methods of voting is available in both visual and aural form.  This may be as simple as ensuring that print media information (via posters, pamphlets, advertising or information feature placements) is also available through radio and public meeting formats.

Conversely, where there is reliance on public meetings or radio for information dissemination, simple print information documents (which also will need to take into account general literacy levels) should also be readily available.

If there is heavy reliance on television advertising for voter information, care in design is required to ensure that each advertisement imparts the same information both visually and aurally.

Use of community groups and medical facilities for the physically, visually and hearing challenged to relay voter information with environment-appropriate controls that such information is being relayed in a politically neutral manner.

Use of large typefaces, or where possible Braille print in printed voter information materials, both before voting day and for display in voting stations, ballot papers and election forms.

Provision of special information materials if funding is available and where facilities for their use are available. For the visually challenged these could be voter information cassette tapes, or materials in Braille. For the hearing challenged these could encompass use of standard sign language communications at public meetings or in television advertising.

Assisted Voters at Other Locations

Infirm and aged persons too ill or frail to leave their homes may be unable to visit a voting station to vote. Equitable voting systems would contain provisions to allow such people the opportunity to vote without having to leave their homes. Reasonable questions will arise as to how strict any criteria should be for allowing voting from home, particularly where such methods involve additional costs or may be seen as more likely to be vulnerable to abuse than attendance at a normal voting station.

For this reason prior registration may be required or applications to vote according to legislatively-defined criteria, either as part of the voter registration process or as separate exercise, for those wishing to vote from home.

Particularly if homebound voters are to be serviced by a visit from voting station staff--either as part of a special mobile voting station or by staff visiting from a normal voting station--it is imperative for planning purposes that the number and location of such voters be known prior to the commencement of voting to allow effective resource planning and scheduling.

Facilities Provided

Voting facilities provided could take the form of:

• voting by mail (see Early voting);

• being visited by a special mobile voting station (see Other special voting arrangements), either during any period allowed for early voting (see Early voting), or on the general voting day;

• being visited on voting day by voting station staff from the voting station at which they are registered to vote;

• appointing an agent to collect and return their voting material, either from the voting station at which they are registered to vote, or, if general absentee voting facilities are available, from an electoral management body office or other voting station;

• appointing a proxy to vote, in person, at the voting station at which they are registered to vote (see Proxy voting).

In environments with advanced technology developments in the fields of voting by phone and direct computer links may also make such home-based methods of voting generally feasible.

Each of these methods has particular cost or integrity factors which will need to be carefully considered in determining the appropriate method, or combination of methods, in the specific election environment.

Allowable methods should be legislatively defined. Whatever methods are implemented should be consistently applied. To make services available only in some areas, such as mobile voting for urban households, without some complementary method being made available in rural or peri-urban areas, will arouse suspicions that access is being manipulated to favour particular voters.

Mail Voting

Where vote by mail systems are generally in use (see Early voting), including confinement to the home through infirmity or age as eligibility criteria, this method caters to the homebound within the usual voting systems. Where permanent voters’ registers are maintained, enabling the aged or ill to register permanently as a mail voter, this too can allow access to voting material, at their home address. However, this must be accompanied by regular review.

As with mail voting in general, there may be doubts as to whether this voting method allows influence over voting behaviour by other residents at that address, particularly for the aged. Where such concerns are likely to lead to questioning of election outcomes, methods other than mail voting should be considered.

For this reason, in some jurisdictions attempts are made to provide voting facilities in care institutions through the more costly method of mobile voting stations, which can provide more direct control over voting integrity. However, mail voting may be the practicable, cost-effective solution in less densely settled rural areas.

Mobile Voting Stations

Use of special mobile voting stations in care institutions can provide both integrity and effectiveness in servicing hospital patients and residents of care institutions (for a general discussion of mobile voting station frameworks, see Other special voting arrangements). There are some issues that need to be particularly considered in relation to mobile voting in care institutions:

• Mobile voting stations in care institutions would be preferably under the administration of a local office of the electoral management body office, i.e., the electoral district manager or local electoral commission for the electoral district;

• The locations to be serviced by mobile voting stations and the hours during which they will operate should be formally determined and publicised by the electoral management body, in a similar manner to normal voting station locations;

• Liaison with management of institutions is necessary, to arrange suitable times for mobile voting station visits that will not disrupt institutional routine or disturb patients and to determine resource needs.

Some categories of patients may require more time to complete their voting than others, depending on age and physical condition. Where complicated full preferential marking voting systems are in place, in some cases these voters could take up to fifteen minutes to complete their vote. Equitable systems would allow for this and not impose any limitation on the time taken by voters to complete their vote. When mobile voting stations are moving from bed to bed, ward to ward, it would be normal to only service between five to ten voters per hour. Both the mix of patients and the layout of institutions (how many levels, access methods, overall area of the institution) will affect the rate at which mobile voting teams can service voters in institutions, and thus the staffing resources required;

• Examine the workloads in care institutions when determining how many mobile voting stations are required and their staffing make-up. For smaller institutions, it may not be necessary to assign a separate mobile voting station to cover each institution. For larger institutions, more than one mobile voting station may be necessary (or several separate mobile voting station staff teams operating from a single mobile voting station) to service all voters. Depending on the numbers of voters involved, it may be more practicable and less costly to operate the mobile voting stations during any period allowed for early voting, thus allowing a smaller number of mobile voting stations to operate at different locations on successive days rather than attempting to cover all care institutions on the general voting day. Using the latter timing may require the engagement, training and equipping of an excessive number of officials.

Multiple Voting Controls

Where both mails voting and voting at a mobile voting station is available to patients in institutions, systems for control of issue and particularly processing of ballots for the count need to be sufficiently rigorous to prevent multiple voting.

While production of special voter’ lists for mobile voting stations may seem an effective method, it may negate the accessibility advantages provided by a mobile voting station: many patients in hospitals may not know that they will be there on voting day. Using systems incorporating enveloped ballots, with the voter's identity information being included with the ballot for later eligibility checking (see Absentee voting), may be the most effective method of maximising both accessibility and control.

Voting Stations Located at Care Institutions

In systems that provide for absentee voting, there may be advantages in establishing a normal voting station with absentee voting facilities within larger hospitals, to service staff and patients able to walk, with additional mobile voting station staff attached to provide service to wards or areas of patients who are confined to their beds.

Consistent size criteria should be applied when determining whether such facilities are warranted based on the number of potential patients and staff voters at the institution (determined either through use of special registration for such voters or close liaison with institution management).

Proxy Voting

Proxy voting is both the cheapest and simplest method to administer. However, integrity may be affected as there may be a perception that proxy votes cast in the names of patients in institutions, and particularly aged patients, do not accurately reflect their wishes, (For a discussion of integrity issues surrounding proxy voting in general, see Proxy voting)

Appointment of Agent for Voter

Provisions could allow staff on duty or patients at care institutions to appoint someone as their agent to pick up voting material and documentation to authenticate the vote from a voting station or electoral management body office, bring this to the voter, and return it, in person by the agent, or mailed to the electoral management body.

Where early voting in person is available, such a service could be integrated with early voting facilities, as well as in normal voting stations. This method can have some advantages over using a normal mail vote, particularly in areas where mail services are not reliable. It suffers from the same integrity problems as mail voting, however, in that it is not possible to ensure that there is no influence brought to bear on voters when they cast their vote.

Prisons

Eligibility to Vote

In countries where the right to vote is maintained for all or certain classes of prisoners during the period of incarceration , facilities must be provided for eligible prisoners to vote. The following issues arise:

• at which address do they register to vote--at the address of the prison, which if large, may affect voting patterns, or at their last or some other address that have are associated with?

• how are prisoners provided with the opportunity to register to vote and do they appear on special or normal voters’ lists?

• where there are complicated legislative provisions for the classes of prisoners and convicted persons who remain qualified to vote, how can accurate data on these prisoners be obtained?

Planning Issues

The most effective way to provide voting opportunities for prisoners will depend on whether there are special voting facilities available within the election system, such as early voting, mail voting, absentee voting, or use of mobile voting stations. Where voting facilities can be made available to prisoners, there are some planning considerations that will require specific responses, including:

• assessing the number of prisoners in prison locations who are eligible and may wish to vote, through consultation with justice system officials and prison management;

• using prisoners aid and welfare groups and prison authorities to inform prisoners of voting procedures and facilities that will be available--relying solely on prison authorities is not recommended as they may have some resistance to disseminating information on prisoner’s rights to vote.

Best practice would require the electoral management body to develop a working relationship with a combination of government officials responsible for the management and administration of justice and prisons, to ensure that the most effective procedures for providing voting opportunities to eligible voters is undertaken.

In-Person Voting

For larger prisons, it may be effective to establish a special voting station at the prison on voting day, or have a mobile voting station visit the prison either during any early voting period or on voting day (see Other special voting arrangements for general discussion of mobile voting stations).

Voting station staff needs to be carefully chosen to ensure that they are suitable to work in a prison environment. Clear arrangements will need to be made with prison authorities for such methods:

• to ensure access for all prisoners wishing to vote;

• to ensure that adequate security for voting station officials can be provided by prison authorities;

• to organise voting times in line with established prison routines.

Where in-person voting takes place in prisons it may be difficult to arrange for observation by party or candidate representatives. Using an absentee voting style enveloped ballot for all votes (see Absentee voting), with the ballot sealed in an envelope and accompanied by voter's identity verification so that eligibility to vote can later be established in the presence of observers, may be the preferable method.

Mail Voting

Alternatively, prisoners could apply to be provided with ballots by mail, which they would complete and return to the relevant electoral management body office. There may be significant problems with this method, such as:

• prisoners may be easily subject to intimidation in the manner in which they vote, and voting by mail, with no independent voting station staff, party or candidate representatives or observers present might allow such intimidation to occur unnoticed;

• mail entering and leaving prisons is often inspected by prison authorities, and unless arrangements can be made to ensure that ballot envelopes are not opened during this process, there is no guarantee that prisoners' mail votes will remain secret.

Voting by mail may be the only way of dealing cost-effectively with small eligible voter populations in prisons. Liaison with prison authorities in providing prisoners with whatever application forms may be needed for mail ballots, and ensuring that voting material is swiftly processed through prison postal systems, will also be necessary.

Voting in Remote Areas

Providing equitable, cost-effective access to voting facilities for voters in remote communities is a challenge for electoral management bodies. To establish normal voting stations in remote areas can create problems with regard to:

• recruitment and training of staff;

• transport of materials and equipment;

• management of large numbers of small voting stations;

• cost-effectiveness of full day voting facilities in areas that may contain very few voters.

Alternatively, providing only normal voting stations at a very few locations in remote areas will require some voters to travel very long distances to vote in areas where transport means and infrastructure may be inadequate.

Other Potential Voting Facilities

Methods that could be adopted to ensure that these voters have equitable access to voting facilities include:

• voting by mail (see Early voting);

• provision of special mobile voting stations.

In societies with advanced technology and good infrastructure, voting by phone, facsimile and direct computer link may also make home-based methods of voting feasible for voters living in remote areas.

To provide coverage of voters in remote areas a combination of methods may enhance accessibility in the most cost-effective manner.

Mail Voting

Where vote by mail systems are generally in use voters in remote areas may be catered for as they meet the general criteria of (see Early voting) excessive distance of the voter's address of registration from a voting station. What may be regarded as an excessive distance could vary according to the geography, transport infrastructure and accessibility of transport in the particular environment.

In some societies where access to private vehicles or transport services is lacking, travel of even five kilometers to vote may be difficult. In more developed societies with better infrastructure a greater distance threshold may be reasonable. Where permanent voter’s registers are maintained, enabling those voters meeting this criterion to register permanently as a mail voter can assist their continued access to voting material. However, this must be accompanied by stringent regular review.

Reliance on mail voting facilities alone may not be sufficient to provide accessibility for voters in remote areas. In many instances, voters in remote areas may be members of more traditional societies where there are higher levels of illiteracy making mail voting challenging. Mail services in general may also be less reliable to remote areas, or are unable to effect the turnaround of mailing out voting materials and its return to the electoral management body within the time period provided in legal frameworks for the election.

Each remote locality should be individually examined in discussions with postal authorities when determining voting facilities to be provided for remote areas.

Mobile Voting Stations

Mobile voting stations can be more cost-effective in remote areas than providing sufficient normal voting stations to provide reasonable accessibility to all voters and can have reliability and integrity advantages over reliance on voting by mail. Mobile voting stations should offer the same range of services available in normal voting stations. Given the distances often involved in servicing remote areas, they would be more effective if they can operate during any legislatively defined period for early voting, rather than being restricted to operation on the normal voting day.

Unlike mobile voting for institutions or other facilities in urban locations, in remote areas mobile voting stations are usually dealing with voters in a specific geographic area. Thus voting procedures can mirror those used in normal voting stations, with voters’ lists being produced for the defined geographic locality being serviced by the mobile voting station.

(General considerations to be taken into account for mobile voting stations are discussed in Other special voting arrangements) However, in determining the implementation of mobile voting stations in remote areas, there are some further specific considerations.

Access Standards for Mobile Voting Stations

To ensure equity and efficiency in provision of services to remote communities, it can be useful to define access standards in the election's legislative or regulatory framework. Issues that could be considered include:

• whether the areas or electoral districts within which remote area mobile voting should or may be implemented should be legislatively defined;

• through legislation or administrative rules, determining a threshold number of voters in a locality which would require the provision of a normal voting station;

• for efficiency, determining through legislation or administrative rules a minimum number of voters in a locality for provision of a mobile voting location.

Mobile Voting Station Itineraries

Plans for mobile voting station activity in remote areas need to address a cost effective itinerary for servicing all points to be visited by mobile voting stations. Consideration needs to include:

• the numbers of voters at each potential service point and thus the time that the mobile voting station may need to be open at each location;

• the overall distances involved;

• the transport methods available to service potential mobile voting station routes;

• associated costs both in transport and staffing;

• associated costs in publicizing the routes of the mobile voting stations.

The advantage of mobile voting stations is their efficiency through flexibility in servicing a number of locations. However, itineraries and schedules for locations to be visited must follow a definite and publicized plan. The locations to be serviced by mobile voting stations should be formally determined and publicized by the electoral management body, in a similar manner to normal voting station locations. Additional publicity in the form of contact with individual voters in the remote areas to be covered by the mobile voting station may be warranted.

Exigencies in the field may lead to variations in the planned schedule, due to longer than expected traveling time or slower than expected processing of voters. Mechanisms for announcement to the affected communities of any changes in schedules need to be in place. In no circumstances should the mobile voting station leave a location before the scheduled closing time at that location.

Facilities Available At Voting Locations

At some or all voting locations in remote areas there may be no building suitable for conducting voting, and mobile voting stations may need to be equipped with tables, chairs, shade material, material (ropes/poles) for defining the voting area as well as voting materials.

Mobile voting stations need to be able to set up and move quickly, or they lose some of their advantage. There is a delicate balance to be achieved in ensuring that they have sufficient material and equipment, and yet are not overloaded and can be transported efficiently. An example of a mobile voting station that can be ready to service voters in a short period of time is a utility van vehicle.

Transport, Equipment and Provisions

The equipping of the mobile voting station with provisions and safety equipment for voting station staff will become particularly important if the mobile voting station is to be in the field for multiple days. In remote areas, the officials may need to carry with them sleeping or camping equipment, food, water, and first aid equipment sufficient for their needs.

Vehicles provided must be suitable for the terrain. Where rough terrain is to be traversed, emergency recovery equipment should be supplied. Air or water transport may be required to reach some voting locations, which will require careful consideration of the associated costs. The mobile voting station must have a portable radio or phone to maintain contact with the electoral management body, with a planned schedule of reporting.

Additional Staffing Requirements

Greater efficiency in staffing can be accomplished by appointing drivers or pilots for the mobile voting station as voting station staff. It may also be useful when voting in remote communities, particularly in traditional societies, to arrange for members of the community at each location to be appointed as voting station assistants to assist the core Staff.

Security

In higher risk security areas, the ability to secure the safety of a small group of traveling voting station staff in remote locations needs to be very carefully assessed as part of security risk analyses. It may be necessary to arrange for armed security force escorts.

Security and Emergency Forces

Voting facilities for security forces-armed forces and police--may be included in the planning of voting operations.

Voting Facilities for Armed Forces Bases

Placing voting sites within armed forces bases should preferably be avoided. Such locations may be intimidating to voting station staff, and there may be difficulties with all political participants being free to monitor voting processes, or provide party and candidate information near the voting site. This can be of particular concern where there has been any perceived history of political partisanship by armed forces.

If voting locations are within armed forces bases it may also be easier for junior armed forces members to feel pressured into voting in a particular way, through the presence of commanding or senior staff in the vicinity. For similar reasons, where there is organized transport for troop units to voting stations, officers and other senior ranks should not be in the voting station supervising troops while they are voting. Such potential intimidation may be a particular concern in countries with conscripted forces.

In voting stations near large military bases, the arrival of troops to vote may need to be organized to prevent undue pressure on voting station facilities. Troops are more likely to arrive in organized transport to vote than individually. Pre-voting day liaison between local voting operations administrators, senior polling officials and armed forces commanders will assist in smoothing the flow of troops to voting stations.

When armed forces members are in voting stations for the purpose of voting, they should be prevented from carrying their weapons with them. Some force members may remain outside the station with their arms, while other force members go into the voting station unarmed to cast their vote.

Security and Emergency Forces on Duty on Voting Day

Equity is not served if registered voters are denied the opportunity to vote because of their occupation. Where there are full scale armed forces, police and emergency forces mobilization on voting day, it would be prudent for the legislative framework to provide them with the opportunity to vote.

This would require provision of special voting facilities, since it is unlikely that many security force members will be stationed at the voting station in the electoral district where they may vote normally. Facilities for these voters could be provided by either of the following measures:

• early voting (by mail, or preferably for armed forces, in person, as armed forces mail voting could be subject to influence by officers or senior ranks);

• to allow security force members on duty to use absentee voting facilities at a voting station at or near where they are stationed on voting day.

Liaison between local voting operations administrators and security and emergency forces commanders on the requirements for any such special voting facilities is necessary for comprehensive voting operations planning.

Refugees and Displaced Persons

Elections in post-conflict environments often have to deal with substantial numbers of refugees and displaced persons, in situations where different antagonistic communities within a country have become politically or geographically polarized. The location where refugees and displaced persons should be registered to vote, and in the case of refugees from another country, whether they can vote in elections in their current host country, is a matter for the voter registration and the legal framework.

This issue is likely to generate considerable political debate which may affect voting operations planning timetables. Organising actual voting facilities for refugees can be a major voting operations planning issue and have a substantial impact on voting site locations and staffing requirements, materials production, security needs, and overall voting operations costs.

Location Where Registered to Vote

If displaced persons within a country must re-register to vote where they are currently living, the effects on voting operations are relatively manageable. There will be changes in voter numbers and locations of voting stations; special assistance with language and voter transport may need to be provided; and the siting and securing of adequate voting stations in displaced persons’ camps may require additional planning and resourcing efforts.

Where major organizational issues occur usually is when such voters must remain registered at their former (and perhaps future) residence.  A determination will have to be made whether these people should have to return to the area in which they are registered to vote or whether special voting facilities will be provided at their current locations.

There are a number of considerations to be taken into account, including:

•  The number and proportion of the total voting population represented by refugees and displaced persons and whether these potential voters are a significant proportion of any particular national, ethnic or religious community in the country: This may require a judgment to be made of the effect on perceptions of election validity, and the country's future stability, of not providing every possible facility for them to vote. Normal cost-effectiveness considerations may not apply;

• Logistical requirements of the alternatives. Forcing refugees or displaced persons to return to their area of registration to vote may necessitate providing them with transport to voting stations. This will not only involve an intensive planning effort and organization of the voters by the electoral management body in coordination with other agencies, but must be assessed against the adequacy, security and costs of transport capacities (available vehicles and infrastructure) within the country.

• Security requirements. Transporting refugees or displaced persons back to their area of registration to vote is likely to be returning them to locations from which they were forcibly ejected by currently resident hostile forces. Intense security will be required at all voting stations at which they are voting. Their transport to and from the voting stations is also likely to require heavily-secured convoys, complex in organization, as they will be delivering voters to multiple voting points. Both the joint capabilities of local and any available international security forces to provide such levels of security, and the reliability of local security forces in such situations, must be carefully assessed;
• The experience and capacity of election administrators and voting station staff.  If there is no prior experience in managing elections that allow absentee voting, the challenge of providing these facilities satisfactorily at first attempt in a tense post-conflict environment may be difficult.
• The additional organisational costs of providing voting sites and developing materials for absentee voting by refugee and displaced persons can be daunting.
  

There is rarely an ideal solution in such situations. Returning to the former place of residence to vote is the less complex solution, administratively, but can only occur if security and logistical capacities are adequate to enable participation and for the voting to be considered free and fair.

Use of Absentee Voting

If absentee voting stations are set up for refugees or displaced persons in their current area of residence, there will be a number of administrative requirements, including:

Providing special voters registers for these persons, preferably organized geographically by their current location, and identifying the electoral district for which they may vote. To guard against possible impersonation, there would preferably be verification checks to ensure that persons on these registers do not also appear on voters lists being used in the area of their former residence.

Sufficient special voting stations should be established for refugee or displaced person voting, staffed with experienced personnel who are, if at all possible, from their own community.

These voting stations will need to be supplied with sufficient voting material from each of the electoral districts in which the refugees or displaced persons are registered to vote. It may be easier to organize these as pre-packaged absentee voting material kits for each voter. In some jurisdictions, these kits are made up and individually labeled for each potential voter. While more expensive in production, this can considerably reduce errors in issuing ballots in the voting station. Spare, unlabelled packs to be used to replace incorrectly issued materials or allow re-issue in case of voter error should also be provided for all electoral districts.

Special security and logistical arrangements may need to be made so that all party or candidate representatives and independent observers are free to monitor these voting stations.

Reliable and secure communications for transmitting counting results from these stations are also required.

The count and count result transmission processes will require intensive integrity checks. Counts from these voting stations will need to be amalgamated with counts from voting stations within the displaced persons' former areas of residence. All political participants and independent observers must be free to monitor these functions.

Refugees

For refugees all of the above issues need to be considered particularly carefully. Arranging for them to lodge absentee votes in their current country of residence may require agreements with relevant governments. Bringing them back from another country to vote will involve international transportation and security issues.

Internationally-supervised voting stations in the areas in which they now live in other countries may be required for overall election outcomes to be regarded as valid.

Suppressed Voter Addresses

Some legal frameworks for voter registration allow the suppression of a voter's address from the voter’s register (and from the voters’ lists used in voting stations) in cases where the voter can show that inclusion of the address on such a publicly available document could lead to genuine threats to their safety.

These facilities could be made available to persons such as police officers, prison warders, judicial figures or ordinary members of the public who have been subject to threats of death or violence, and persons in witness protection programs.

Voting Method

Where such provisions exist, special voting methods will be required to allow the checking of the eligibility of votes cast in the names of such people.

These may be similar to those in some systems of absentee voting, with the ballot being sealed in an envelope to which the voter's identification verification are attached (excluding address) for subsequent checking by administration staff (using signature or other comparisons) before determining whether the ballot should be counted.

A special marking on the voter’s list to indicate that this person has been issued ballot material may be required. Such cases would generally be best handled personally by the voting station manager at the voting station.

Planning

In preparing for voting station operations, electoral district managers should contact the voters in question, to advise them of the special voting provisions in place and determine whether they will be using any other special voting facility such as absentee voting, and if so, where.

The voting station manager at voting stations where such electors will vote should also be contacted, to inform them that such voters whose address and identity cannot be verified from the voters list will be attending. Inventory preparation and materials for such voting stations must ensure that any special forms required for voting or packaging such votes are provided to the relevant voting stations.

Planning

There is a distinction between voter operations planning and overall task re-scheduling. Voter operations planning deal with the framework within which planning takes place. Planning considers each aspect and each phase in broad categories to determine what is required when planning efficient elections. Overall task scheduling breaks down each phase of the planning into detail.

Election Cycle Planning

Voting operations planning methodology will be largely determined by whether electoral management bodies are temporary or permanent and whether elections are at fixed or variable intervals.

Where there are permanent electoral management bodies, it is easier to undertake longer-term voting operations planning, aiming at building up resources and skills in a manner that avoids a last minute rush of preparation following the announcement of the election and which is integrated into the electoral management body's strategic plan.

If planning and acquisition resources are available permanently, this longer-term outlook is the most effective method of voting operations planning.

Election Period Planning

For the election period itself, detailed project and overall operational plans are vital to ensure that:

• all relevant actions have been identified and assigned administrative deadlines so as to meet legal deadlines;

• dependencies and links between actions are in logical time frames;

• responsibilities have been assigned for the many interdependent voting operations tasks to be completed;

• targets for activity progress and monitoring are in place.

These plans could be developed on two levels--an overall schedule of significant tasks  combined with more detailed project planning 

Ideally, project plans should have a flexible format,that shows the overall, integrated project plan for all voting operations projects in a single time line, and also shows data and time lines for each project individually. Such flexibility will make the task of individual project managers easier.

Timing

Advance planning for the election does not need to wait for the announcement of an election date. Actions and interdependencies can be established, and time frames for actions determined and placed within the planning framework in a "days before" and "days after" voting day format.

Such advance planning needs to be developed in a flexible format, to allow later insertion of actual dates and readjustment of time frames and requirements due to procedural changes.

These more detailed project plans will generally be much easier to develop where at least basic computer facilities, if not project planning software, is available. Project planning and monitoring software and ancillary technical skills on how to use it, are among the most effective contributions that technology can make to the voting operations process.

More rudimentary planning styles may employ a checklist format, listing each of the activities to be undertaken in the election period.

Needs Assessments

Detailed planning is required for all voting operations activities if they are to be implemented effectively It is good practice to undertake a needs assessment before the development of work plans for particular aspects of voting operations (see Operational Work Plan).

A needs assessment assists in determining the overall requirements. It also provides the opportunity to identify the gap between resources currently on hand and what additional resources are required and where these resources can be accessed (see Infrastructure).

Operational plans for voting operations cannot be developed in isolation either from planning for other election operations or, most importantly, from financial and budget planning. Active co-ordination, with operations managers, and understanding of voting operations goals is required by financial managers.

(For further discussion of  budget preparation, see Expenditure Planning.

Needs Assessment Role in Planning

A needs assessment that compares the structures and resources currently available with those that are necessary and contributes to the effective implementation of voting operations is the principal starting point A needs assessment deals with the systems and resources required in each local area.

This assessment may be more effectively undertaken at the local level (under central oversight) rather than from a central point.

Timing of a needs assessment is also critical for well-managed voting operations. For integrated and effective planning a needs assessment must take place at the initial phase of the planning process and thus, minimizes the danger of either wasting resources or having inadequate resource levels, distribution, or management which can lead to higher voting operations costs and possibly affect election integrity.

Basic Issues

A needs assessment encompasses two related functions:

• A corporate evaluation of systems, procedures, and management organisation to identify areas requiring additional action for effective delivery of voting operations services; and

• Identification of the overall resource needs for voting operations, and determining what additional resources in locations, materials, equipment, staffing, logistics, and communications will be required for all voting operations tasks.

Corporate Management Issues

The first issue addresses the current corporate structure, skills, and culture of the electoral management body, and any augmentation or change required to deliver effective management of voting operations processes.

Electoral management bodies can grow from a relatively small organization concentrated in a few locations to an organization with numerous and widely dispersed branches that include voting stations and large numbers of employees, i.e., polling officials. Effective augmentation of management frameworks to cope with these changes need to be identified.

In this respect the needs assessments will deal with issues as:

The configuration of voting operation management: Identify changes to existing management frameworks to provide effective management organizational structures, responsibility assignments, physical locations of managers, and chains of command to deal with the dispersed, localized nature of many voting operations tasks.

Control and supervisory mechanisms: Ensure that adequate reporting, monitoring and control structures are in place to cope with the expanded locations, staffing, and other resources. It is also necessary to consider what information is required to manage large numbers of voting stations.

Procedural frameworks for voting operations: Assess adequacy to effectively fulfill, in all envisaged circumstances, the requirements or the legal and regulatory framework for voting operations.

Coupling and complexity of systems: Frameworks for contingency planning and emergency response are required to ensure the ability to isolate failure in one part of voting operations so that it does not cause widespread collapse in related areas.

Corporate skills available: Assess appropriateness of available skills for the tasks to be undertaken and identify any additional training needs.

Communication channels--both formal and informal: Assess what needs to be established to ensure that information and instructions reach their intended recipients in a clearly expressed and timely fashion.

Appropriate management style: Determine the appropriate system for the delegation of decision-making authority to local or voting station level to cope with the expansion of the range of activities and the number of locations managed by the electoral management body.

Culture: Assess the team atmosphere and shared commitment to the principles of voting operations (see Guiding Principles of Voting Operations) present amongst election administrators. Consider and determine how these principles are instilled in additional temporary staff and external suppliers of services to the process.

Assessing the need for additional action to be taken in regard to the above points is as necessary as assessing resource needs. Without an effective management, procedural, communications, and commitment framework, available resources are not likely to be delivered and managed effectively or, at all.

Resource Needs Issues

The second issue addresses the actual resources needed to conduct voting operations effectively. The basic determinant of resource needs is the numbers of voters that need to be serviced in relation to the regulatory and procedural requirements for voting.

Assessments of tentative resource needs must be an early element of election planning, with fine-tuning occurring later as more exact data such as the number of voters and voting site locations becomes known.

Elements of the resource needs assessment include:

• equipment and materials required in electoral management body offices;

• staffing required for voting locations, the ballot count, and for election administration;

• the associated needs for staff recruitment, training, transport, and provisioning (see Recruitment and Training of Of Voting Station Staff);

• staff, materials and other resources needed for voter information programs to inform voters of voting locations and methods (see Voter Information);

• equipment required for voting locations and the ballot count--ballot boxes, voting compartments, furniture, facilities (see Materials and Equipment);

• materials required for voting locations

• any storage required for materials and equipment

• transport and distribution of voting operations equipment, materials, and personnel

• communications systems and equipment to enable effective information flow and to maintain security ;

• on the basis of risk assessments, requirements for security resources

• the locations for voting and counting sites must take into account any special voting facilities to be made available.

Standard Resource Allocation Profiles

It is important to have standard resource allocation procedures in place to allow these resources needs assessments to be conducted on a consistent, cost -effective, and less complex basis, especially with regard to such issues as:

• voting station staffing profiles

• equipment and materials profiles for voting facilities (see Materials and Equipment);

• voting site selection ;

• service levels to be provided.

Once needs have been determined, action can be taken to:

• identify where needs can be met from existing resources, either from within the electoral management body or from elsewhere;

• identify the additional resources to be acquired and the most cost-effective methods for doing this;

• develop work plans to ensure that all required resources are in place at the correct time.

A needs assessment includes an inventory of existing resources such as equipment, materials, staff, systems, and procedures, and their locations. Prepare such an inventory if current records do not already exist.

Use of Historic Data

Having data available from past elections is useful when conducting a needs assessment. Aside from data of electoral management body records of resource acquisitions and distribution, and management actions can be taken:

• evaluations and other reports on past election performance, detailing where changes to management structures, systems, procedures, and resource levels will increase the cost-effectiveness of voting operations

• reports from administration staff and voting station managers on performance at the last election

Operational Work Plan

It is good practice to derive voting operations work plans from the electoral management body's strategic plan. Work plans for voting operations are likely to be highly influenced by the nature of the electoral management body and the predictability of the election cycle.

Temporary Electoral Management Bodies

Without permanent electoral management bodies, all voting operations activities, including the development of work plans, are likely to be compressed within the election period. This requires notice of the election sufficiently in advance to allow management structures to be established and implemented and all processes to be ready by voting day.

The length of this time period is particularly important in transitional elections where electoral management bodies may be newly appointed legal and procedural frameworks may have changed and may be subject to change again during the election period.

In such cases it would be unlikely for an election of acceptable quality to be organized without at least a six month period between finalizations of the election framework, the appointment of the electoral management body and the setting of the voting date.

Permanent Electoral Management Bodies

Permanent Electoral Management Bodies have certain advantages. These include:

• The development of voting operations systems and the acquisition of the resources required to manage the election can progress between elections maintaining a state of improving readiness. Work plans that include the entire cycle from election to election invariably produce more cost-effective and higher quality results.
• Electoral management bodies that maintain only a core central presence between elections allow for election cycle work plans to more easily concentrate on the development of systems and procedures, the planning of supply needs and their acquisition, and voting operations implementation at local levels.
• Electoral management bodies that have some permanent presence at a more local level (which can generally be more cost-effectively maintained on an agency basis using other state resources),are able to develop work plans that include the whole election-to-election cycle.  This can more easily be extended to maintain local readiness, in terms of issues such as:

• identifying potential voting sites and locations;

• preparing preliminary materials and equipment needs schedules;

• identifying potential staffing needs;

• maintaining contact with potential senior voting staff;

• pre-packaging of existing materials for voting stations;

• maintaining local voter information programmes.

Integration of Tasks

Voting operations work plans that integrate the activities of all key participants, provide a layered structure of task definitions, time frames and task responsibilities for individual staff and each electoral management body office within an overall systemic view.

Effective voting operations integrate the activities of large numbers of people from a number of different organizational entities - including contractors for supplies, security forces, and electoral management body staff- and develop work plans based on proven business planning principles that allow the tracking of election readiness.

Essential ingredients of a work plan include:

• Identifying all tasks relevant to the implementation of voting operations;

• Prioritising these tasks by identifying those essential for the proper conduct of voting and those that are “add-ons” that will improve the quality of service, but, in the event of insufficient time for implementation, can be foregone without affecting election integrity;

• Establishing the relationships and dependencies between all these tasks, that is how they fit together and what tasks have to be commenced or completed before work on other tasks can begin;

• Developing integrated time frames for the completion of these tasks that will result in all processes being ready for operation at the time required in the election calendar;

• Responsibilities and accountabilities for the completion of particular tasks and liaison between the various service providers are clearly identified see Assignment of Responsibilities;

• Although reviews of progress are vital in relation to the critical points in the election calendar, continuous monitoring and reporting is also necessary for timely rectification of any deficiencies.

It is good practice to use self-monitoring and supervised checklists to review progress (see Checklists for Planning. To be effective special care must be taken to ensure that voting services that need to be operational before the general voting day, such as early voting in any form, are adequately covered in the work plan time frames. (For further discussion of calendars and time lines for work plans, see Calendars and Time Lines)

Developing Work Plans

When developing work plans for voting operations, the following considerations need to be taken into account:

Work plans that aim at providing realistically achievable level of services. the bottom line for an effective plan is that it must work. There are potentially elegant and sophisticated ways of organizing and implementing voting that are not necessarily effective. Put in place the most effective plan as there is only one chance for it to work. Rather put emphasis on planning for the most practical solutions to provide acceptable levels of election integrity.

The time frames for actions must also be realistic, and sufficient for

• administrators to accomplish the required tasks cost-effectively;

• to allow the participation of voters and political participants;

• to allow the effective integration of services provided by external suppliers, such as; Contractors, other government agencies, and/or international organizations.

Some measure of flexibility is required to allow for adaptations to any changes in the environment whether from failure to achieve intended work objectives or changes to the election framework;

• Contingency measures are an essential part of voting operations work plans, particularly where elections are not at fixed intervals as the early calling of an election may interrupt medium to longer term development strategies, and where elections are being held under new systems;

• Flexibility is important as voting operations work plans may need to cope with adjustments for delays and extensions in other election processes, such as voter registration. In post-conflict situations, particularly, voting operation work plans may have to cope with continuing negotiations on the election framework.

"Readiness" encompasses more than procedures and materials being in place on the day they are required.

Work plan time frames must allow for an assessment of whether all required facilities are actually functioning. For some tasks, such as the development of new systems and procedures, work plans may have to provide for a training period of some weeks. Avoid overloading or taking on too many tasks into the week before the general voting day as during this period staff are under pressure preparing for voting day. Additional pressure can provoke a crisis.

Information Management Plan

An important, and often overlooked, part of voting operations work plans is the development of an internal information management plan for the electoral management body. Voting operations require the transfer of vast amounts of information, from central management through regional and/or local offices, and then to voting stations, regarding procedures and the environment, and then back up the chain, about conditions and occurrences in the field.

Methods of disseminating and acknowledging the receipt of information, and a planned information dissemination timetable are basic issues in ensuring consistency, competency, and flexibility of service. (For information dissemination methods, see Communications Systems)

Calendars and Time Lines

Calendars and time lines incorporate work plans in an easily digestible summary, showing key voting operations activities and their dates, deadlines, and periods for implementation. They are necessary reference and monitoring tools.

Calendars for voting operations need to be relevant for their intended audience. Prepare different calendars and time lines containing different levels of detail where necessary. For example calendars and time lines prepared for internal management use and those for public or political participant information are not always the same. Clearly distinguish between administrative deadlines and legal dates and phases Administrative deadlines may be missed without necessarily affecting the integrity of the election; legal deadlines cannot.

Generic Format

As with work plans, draft time lines can be prepared even if the date of voting day is not known. This can be done on the basis of an administrative assessment of the days required to undertake particular tasks and shown in the form of "days before" and "days after" any points defined in electoral legislation. For example, identifying task deadlines in terms of "voting day minus x number of days."

Draft timetables need to be flexible and amended if necessary, particularly where the legal definition of significant periods is non-existent or variable. Where there are flexible deadlines in the legal framework, political considerations, rather than election administrator’s needs, are likely to be the determinant for government decisions on time periods available.

Deadlines and Periods Defined in Legislation

In its simplest form election and voting operations calendars are an overview of legally defined dates, deadlines and periods for voting operations activities, the basics of implementing voting.

Legally defined issues that may be included in calendars and time lines are likely to include:

• period or deadline for voters to register for the election or change registration details;

• period for official review and finalisation of the national voters register;

• deadline for registration of political parties;

• periods and deadlines for nomination of candidates and groups and for announcement of accepted nominations;

• the campaign period;

• voting day(s);

• deadlines for commencement and completion of vote counting;

• deadlines for announcement of results;

• period for filing challenges to election results.

Depending on the election system, other possible items could include:

• deadline for determination of voting station locations;

• period for nominations checking and challenge of candidates and groups participating in the election;

• deadlines for supply of materials for voting stations;

• any period for early voting;

• deadlines for receipt of completed mail ballots;

• deadlines for certification of election results;

• deadlines for prosecution of election offences;

• deadlines for reporting of election contributions and/or expenses by parties and candidates.

This legal time frame calendar is the basis from which all voting operations planning and implementation activity evolves. It is insufficient on its own as a reference guide for voting operations activity. Each of these legal reference points may involve multiple administrative actions. An effective legal time frame calendar needs to:

• be a combination of these legal time frames with their consequent key administrative action periods and deadlines;

• keep information in the overall voting operations timetable manageable;

• include the key administrative deadlines and time periods are necessary for overall management control and prompting;

• develop detailed time lines for each voting operations activity as lower level documents for use by individual activity project managers and their staff.

Administrative Timetables

While different election systems will have different specific voting operations time line requirements, the key dates, time periods, and deadlines for completion needed for effective management control would include

General administrative issues:

• legal and regulatory frameworks and procedures;

• policies for determining staffing and equipping voting stations;

• needs assessments;

• security plans;

• election systems and procedures tests and simulations;

• budgets and budget review.

Voter information:

• information plan;

• materials production;

• information campaign phase;

• information distribution schedules (via mass media or other means).

Parties and candidates:

• registration of political parties;

• party and candidate briefing completion;

• nomination of candidates and parties;

• objection to nomination of candidates and parties

• announcement of accepted nominations;

• the campaign period;

Voting locations:

• voting and counting centres;

• reviewing and determining voting site equipment and materials needs.

Staffing and training:

• staffing requirements;

• commencement and completion of polling staff recruitment;

• training plan finalisation;

• training of trainers and then of polling staff.

Voters register

• registration of voters or change in registration information;

• official review and finalisation of voter’s register data;

• printing of certified voter’s registers for use in voting stations.

Ballots:

• finalisation of ballot content;

• printing ballots;

• voting machine installations (if applicable);

• voting and count computer programming (if applicable).

Voting operations materials and equipment:

• materials production plans

• materials and equipment specifications and procurement plans

• review of voting location/counting centre and other materials and equipment needs

• placement of orders for materials

• determination of allocations of voting site equipment

• production, review and repair of existing stocks for ballot boxes and voting compartments

• production of general voting operations period materials, early voting materials and voting day materials

Logistics:

• completion of logistical plan;

• finalisation of logistics contracts;

• completion of deliveries of materials/equipment from suppliers;

• packaging materials and equipment for voting stations and counting centres;

• distribution of materials and equipment to voting and counting locations;

• supply, test and distribution of communications equipment;

• return of materials;

• sorting of returned materials for secure storage or destruction;

• disposal of unwanted materials.

Voting period:

• voting day(s);

• periods of early voting;

• deadlines for receipt of mail and absentee votes.

Counting and results:

• commencement and completion of ballot counts;
• validity checking of special votes;
• announcement of results;
• lodging of challenges to election results;
• investigation and prosecution of election offences.

Assignment of Responsibilities

In developing voting operations work plans, it is important that:

• each required task is identified;

• the time frames within which each task must be completed is specified;

• dependencies and relationships among the various tasks are clearly shown;

• specific persons or teams are assigned responsibility for each component task.

A clear assignment of responsibilities allows for effective monitoring of performance and prevents the break down of accountability mechanisms. In the pressured environment of voting operations it is easy for seemingly low level, yet critical, tasks to be forgotten.

Clearly identify individuals responsible for tasks and ensure that they know that they have responsibility for their completion. Many voting operations tasks also have an accompanying legal responsibility for their correct completion.

It is critical that those assigned responsibility for tasks are made fully aware of both their own responsibilities and how these inter-relate with other voting operations activities. Providing staff with the appropriate legislation, regulations, and rules, and manuals and checklists for all activities will assist with this.

Focussing on the personal and positive aspect to responsibility assignment can enhance performance. Identifying and promoting individual accountabilities can raise staff self-fulfilment and lead to enhanced performance.

Task Assignment and Electoral Management Body Structure

The actual pattern of responsibility assignment depends on the electoral management body's administrative structure and any legally defined accountability.

Too many responsibilities assigned to centralised levels of authority wastes available expertise and limits its further development in any local or field offices. There is a need to ensure that staff that should be ensuring overall supply, quality, consistency, and integrity are not overloaded with distracting operational tasks at local levels.

Voting is a localised function. Materials development and production, standards, procedures and quality control are generally more consistent and effective where centrally driven. Local functions--such as voting staff recruitment and training delivery, voting location determination, local logistics--can generally be more effectively conducted if responsibilities for their implementation are at the regional or local level.

Maintain Accountability for Service Provision

Many functions included in voting operations work plans will require contributions from different areas of the electoral management body and/or liaison between the electoral management body and other organisations. Where such liaison is required, work plans must identify the operational staff within the electoral management body with the accountability for task completion and the liaison structures that will be in place.

Even where voting operations functions are contracted to other organisations, it is vital that accountabilities for ensuring these tasks are completed correctly and are still assigned to specific persons within the electoral management body. These accountabilities should carry with them the task of implementing quality control measures  to ensure that the products or services are provided at least to the standard required under contract.

Task Assignment in Voting Stations

At the voting station level developing work plans that assign specific task responsibilities to particular staff can both increase the efficiency of training and assist in voter service, while maintaining some flexibility.

Checklists for Planning

Detailed voting operations work plans can be too unwieldy for everyday use by all staff. Calendars and time lines, as a summary of the key dates and issues in the work plans, will provide the most effective task reminder and monitoring format. Use of checklists provides an intermediate step between these two other necessary planning and monitoring documents.

Checklist Content

Checklists can usefully be developed on a number of levels, tailored to:

• the responsibilities of individual staff members;

• activities at particular locations;

• project-based and overall monitoring of activity.

A hierarchical format provides an effective management tool. A hierarchical format is where checklists for completion of all steps in single activities or functions in each location provide information to overall monitoring checklists.  This tracksactivity completion against election time line requirements.

Such checklists can be computerized and automatically integrated to provide efficiencies in data transfer Completion of steps in a particular task in a particular location automatically updates progress against overall time line checklists.

Checklist Design

When designing a checklist consider the following:

• clearly keep in mind the purpose for which the checklist is used ;

• better designs will include space and directions for the responsible staff member to mark completion of each individual stage on the checklist and sign off the completed activity;

• individual activity or function checklists used as action prompts need to include all key actions, in logical time sequence, for the correct completion of a task;

• tailor the level of detail included on the checklists to the experience and the immediacy of supervision;

• voting station staff checklists may need to be more detailed in their breakdown of actions than those for experienced voting operations administrators;

• keep checklists short and simple, restricted to a single function or activity per checklist to promote their use;

• checklists for monitoring activity completion need not necessarily note all steps in each task, or they may become unwieldy;

Journals and Diaries

Electoral district managers and other voting operations administrators are well advised to keep a journal throughout the election period;

• A journal may be in the form of a basic calendar-style checklist  showing the significant milestones and the dates on which they are scheduled to be and actually were achieved (see Canada Diary of Duties of Returning Officer)

• A journal can be of greater future use if in the form of a combined checklist and diary, any significant occurrences--particularly those which have created to disputes or challenges, or which have implications for the planning of future elections--are formally noted see Australia Returning Officer's Election Journal (1996)

• A journal could also be in straight diary format, with all actions taken and occurrences recorded each day and compared against project planning deadlines see New Zealand Returning Officer's Diary (1996). A plain diary format would be better combined with the use of other specific checklists for task activities.

Infrastructure

An assessment of national and local infrastructure capabilities is required to determine whether the quantities and quality of various resources that will be required to effectively implement policies and procedures for the election and the geographic areas in which they will be required.

A needs assessment also identifies whether these needs can be met from facilities currently available within the country and, if not, whether:

• voting operations needs can be modified to suit infrastructure capabilities;

• infrastructure can be augmented through domestic or international funding;

• any specific voting operations resource needs can be met only from foreign sources.

Electoral management body administrative staff uses a needs assessment of current national and local infrastructure vital for determining capacities in the following key areas.

Distribution and Transportation Facilities

To ensure the successful implementation of voting operations the reliable, secure, and rapid movement of large volumes of materials, equipment, and often staff throughout the whole election area is required. For example voting locations may not be in readily accessible regions and forward planning is necessary.

A detailed analysis of the following conditions is essential before realistic logistical plans for voting operations can be developed:

• the transport base - roads, railways, air routes, waterways, and their condition under various climatic conditions, and warehousing facilities;

• the transport stock- available land vehicles, air, and water transport units and their load and turnaround capabilities, reliability, economy, and maintenance facilities. (For further discussion of transportation infrastructure issues, see Transportation Infrastructure)

Communications Networks

The coverage, reliability, and load capacity of available communication networks, and possible affordable augmentation, must be established before communications strategies for voting operations can be developed and finalized. (For further discussion of communications infrastructure issues, see Communications .The dispersed nature of voting locations, combined with the need to maintain communication with all these location during the voting period, will place a heavy peak demand on available communications networks. In addition to this, there will be requirements for administrative communications, communication with security forces, and, where used, necessary computer links.)

Production Facilities

The following factors are important when determining critical information such as the location of production facilities available and suitable for voting operations materials and equipment, as well as their production capacities:

• the style of materials and equipment design that will need to be adopted;

• realistic time frames for voting operations activities;

• lead times required for placing orders for materials and equipment;

• logistical requirements.

(For a discussion of materials and equipment production infrastructure issues, see Materials Production)

Use of Existing Infrastructure

Cost-effective administration of voting operations will involve using the facilities provided by available national and local infrastructure, to the fullest extent possible, while still meeting stated objectives. Given the interdependence of voting operations activities this may require an iteractive planning process--for example, amending materials design to suit available production facilities, which may affect production lead times and thus administrative timetables and logistical planning.

Transportation Infrastructure

Transportation needs for voting operations are concentrated in three distinct periods:

• the delivery of voting operations materials and equipment from manufacturers to storage for packing and delivery to voting stations;

• the delivery of materials, equipment, and staff to voting stations;

• the return of materials, equipment, and staff from voting stations.

Transport Infrastructure Assessment Issues

Transportation infrastructure should be carefully assessed to see whether it can meet these peak requirements. This will include determination of:

• destinations that can be reached by all-weather roads and any load limits on such roads;

• where roads are not present or suitable, availability of rail transport, fixed wing or helicopter air transport;

• availability of transport vehicles - from private, other government or security forces--their load capacity and reliability;

• availability of warehousing facilities for secure storage of voting operations materials both before and after voting day;

• where materials are being sourced from foreign countries, international transport or shipping schedules, customs clearance requirement times, and if by sea, wharf clearance facilities;

• emergency transport facilities, for re-supply of areas where original supplies were deficient or have been misplaced.

Effects on Supply Decisions

The coverage and condition of transport infrastructure will determine feasible timetables of voting operations logistics and their costs. (For example, if air transport is required, considerable increases in costs may be incurred).

Transport infrastructure may also influence the type of security measures that are required. If transport stock is insufficient, or unreliable, logistical scheduling will need to allow for increased transport time, affecting all functions dependent on delivery of materials. In such cases, modern management practices of just-in-time delivery will not be applicable, leading to increased need for secure warehousing for materials or the procurement of more locally-based warehousing facilities.

Decisions on sourcing materials from locations with poor transport services must take into account delivery prospects. Quality, price, or production time advantages may be illusory where transport infrastructure deficiencies result in uncertain delivery dates.

Available transport infrastructure may also determine the feasibility of service to some potential voting locations. Conversely, where road transport conditions are poor, decisions on locating voting stations, even at the increased cost of air supply, will be guided by accessibility considerations for voters in the surrounding area.

Election-Specific Transport Infrastructure Investment

Generally, there will be little justification for investment in transport networks purely for voting operations purposes. Use of existing transportation networks and vehicles will usually be more cost-effective.

However, international election assistance in the form of transport stock that can later be used for other development purposes may be justified as a sustainable contribution in some less developed countries.

This is provided so that controls on the management of such transport equipment during the election period are sufficient to ensure that it remains in public or other authorized use after the election. In the intense activity of the voting period, such controls may be difficult to maintain where significant quantities of transport equipment are involved.

Special Voting Facilities

Some special voting facilities will require additional analysis of available transport infrastructure. Where it is planned to use mobile voting stations  particularly for remote areas, examination of feasible transport routes needs to be undertaken prior to determining the operations of such teams.

Where all-weather roads or suitable vehicles for lesser quality roads are not available, the availability of air transport (regular service or charter) and landing, facilities or water access will need to be assessed.

Costs or unavailability of all-weather infrastructure may require a re-assessment of the viability of planned mobile voting locations.

Where voting stations in foreign locations are used, it is essential that voting materials can be quickly forwarded to these locations for issue to voters, and that completed ballots can be returned quickly to the home country for verification and/or count within any legislative deadlines for return of material. Without regular and reliable air transport services, a foreign country location for voting would generally not be feasible.

Communications

Voting operations communications require reliable and secure information networks that provide access throughout all areas of the elections. Potential communications facilities are major determinants in devising voting operations systems, procedures, and reliable administrative structures.

A country’s communications infrastructure is subjected to intensive testing during times of peak load for a national election, on and around voting day. Careful consideration and examination of a communications infrastructure needs to be given as it will not be possible to run a full simulation of all voting day communication in advance.

Communications Needs

There are two broad needs for consideration when assessing communications infrastructure capabilities:

• internal communications, i.e., between the different components of voting operations administration, such as administration offices and facilities, voting stations, counting centres, mobile field staff, technical advisers, security providers, suppliers  and

• external communications, i.e., between voting operations administrators and voters.

Internal Communications

The massive peak load on voting day is the major focus in assessing the capacities of a current communication infrastructure. Relevant considerations will include:

• existing telecommunications networks--fixed line, mobile phone, and radio--and their coverage;

• reliability of telecommunications networks--load capacities, switching quality, service and maintenance capacities, including any reliance on foreign components or expertise;

• reliability of electricity supply in maintaining telecommunications;

• existence and coverage of radio communications networks;

• availability of telephone and radio equipment for office, voting station and personal use;

• existence, coverage, load capacity, and reliability of data or document communications networks by computer or facsimile transmission;

• levels, reliability, and maintenance support available for data and document transfer equipment;

• security of telecommunications networks, particularly where emergency or security communications and data transfer is involved;

• the skills base available for operation of voice, data, and document telecommunication facilities or radio;

• ability to extend existing communications networks--costs, component availability, and lag times on construction;

• the coverage and reliability of postal and other direct mail services.

Effects of Communications Infrastructure

Available communications infrastructure will not only determine communications strategies but may also influence issues such as:

• the location of voting sites, election administration offices at the local level, and counting centres;

• result deadlines and calculation methods.

For example:

• direct communication links with all voting stations on voting day are highly desirable. It is generally unwise to place voting stations in locations with no fixed line communications or satisfactory radio or mobile phone reception;

• where counting systems rely on speedy document or data transfer to central locations for amalgamation of results, the use of special counting centres may be required where all voting stations do not have access to or equipment for the required communications systems.

Consistency in Communications Methods

Consideration of the following can assist in consistent communication methods:

• use of consistent communication facilities within the area of the election is preferable to enable greater consistency of procedures and training;

• government sponsored networks will often have the greatest coverage and reliability, and voting operations communications strategies would generally seek to maximize use of these;

• in many countries, not only developing ones, military and security force communications networks are the most extensive, reliable, and most capable of quick supplementation to meet voting station needs. Before aligning networks with existing power or government structures take care to ensure that no perceptions of lack of integrity arise.

Use of a variety of local existing communications facilities may be feasible, particularly if there is a stable, locally-based administrative structure for voting operations where there is no national communications network. However, this may provide inefficient and in particular where security issues are involved, dangerously degraded information transfer.

• consider additional fixed lines, upgrading existing load capacities, additional telecommunications towers for radio or mobile phones where communications infrastructure in particular areas is poor.

Given the lead times generally required for installation and testing of upgraded telecommunications facilities and their costs, this should be implemented only when it is certain that these additional facilities can be installed in time and it provides a cost-effective solution. Cost efficiencies will include situations where substantial public benefit will be derived from continuing use of the additional facilities after the election.

External Communications

Communications infrastructure considerations for external communications will relate to:

• providing information on voting operations to voters and the general public;

• the ability to offer some special voting facilities that are dependent on reliable and speedy communication.

Infrastructural considerations for voter and public information campaigns will have a different focus than internal communication considerations. In this context, mass media infrastructure and penetration is a major consideration, along with more targeted systems relying on telecommunications and mail infrastructure and personal contact, in developing effective communications strategies. (For detailed discussion of external communication issues in relation to voter information, see Voter Information)

Special Voting Facilities

Communications infrastructure will determine the viability of using mail or telecommunications for the conduct of voting. Postal voting is not only a form of absentee voting but conducting elections using solely mail voting has been recently demonstrated, in some highly developed societies to be a highly cost effective method of conducting an election.

When considering voting by mail a number of infrastructural issues need to be considered, including:

• standardisation of nomenclature of individual addresses to ensure that mail ballots are delivered to the correct voter.

• an effective and reliable mail system with quick pick-up and delivery turnaround times is necessary to ensure certainty of mail ballot delivery into the right hands.

• even if correctly delivered, especially in remote areas, the minimum possible elapsed time between despatch of ballots to voters by the electoral management body and return receipt of completed ballots from voters may exceed the deadline for return of mail ballots.

With regard to the use of telecommunications in voting, some jurisdictions now accept ballots received by fax transmission or radio telephone. Where the necessary infrastructure is available, such means may provide the most effective access for voters in small remote communities or for voting from foreign countries.

Technological advances are beginning to tap the potential of home-based voting using telecommunications systems for voting by telephone or by using the internet. Before such voting methods are considered for implementation, the election system and the communications infrastructure must be secure, reliable, and accessible to voters.

Materials Production

The wide range of materials and equipment needed for voting operations allows a considerable diversity of materials usage and production methods, from the simple typeset or photocopied form to production of integrated materials of considerable complexity. The design and production capacities of domestic infrastructure are a major determinant when planning materials and equipment requirements. (For a discussion of the various types of materials required for voting operations, see Materials and Equipment)

Capacity Assessments

In assessing materials production infrastructure capabilities, the following issues need consideration:

• the production processes available;

• the reliability of and maintenance facilities for production plants;

• the volume capacities of production facilities, allowing for other contracts that may be in progress at the time voting operations material is required, plant down-time, and start-up and testing periods for production runs;

• the locations of production plants in relation to transport infrastructure (see Transportation Infrastructure).

Effects on Materials Design

Materials production infrastructure capabilities will affect design of election materials. Often it will influence the basic procedures that are feasible to implement for voting operations. For example:

• ballot paper security and authenticity procedures will be influenced by the ability to produce or obtain watermarked or security print paper.

• if full colour presses with sufficient capacity are not available, design of voter information materials or ballot papers with full-colour print will be an expensive import, if not an impossible method.

Similarly, production infrastructure will govern the ability to take advantage of possible cost savings, such as the use of disposable or semi-permanent lightweight voting station ballot boxes and equipment.

Effects on Supply Schedules

The amount of voting operations material required is dependent on the numbers of voters and is not easily manipulated. Production output capacities are thus a major consideration in materials design and supply scheduling. Low volume capacities will mean that:

• supply of equipment has to be planned earlier.

• production has to begin earlier.

• where facilities are not available for emergency re-supply of forms, initial order quantities must be set high enough to accommodate all contingencies.

• some warehousing facilities will be required for a longer period.

Production volume capacities need to be carefully considered when determining the election timetable and procedures, such as:

• allowing amendments to voter registration data until close to voting day may increase accessibility but is not feasible if there is not the capacity to print revised or supplementary voters lists in time for distribution to voting stations.

• timing of the close of nominations for the election has to be aligned with the ability to thoroughly verify, print and distribute ballot papers prior to the commencement of voting.

Printed Materials

Voting operations generate a large quantity and range of printed materials, e.g., forms, ballot papers, voters’ lists, information leaflets, posters, and signs. Many of these print materials have very short time frames between availability of information and end-use distribution of the material.

Sufficient print capacity is essential for voting operations to be conducted successfully. Where print infrastructure is limited, rigorous print scheduling to allow progressive supply according to need becomes vital.

Sourcing

Tailoring materials design and supply timetables to production facilities available domestically can provide advantages with regard to control over supply and service, costs, and time frames for re-supply. Particularly in developing countries, reliance on foreign production, while possibly enhancing in the short-term the sophistication of materials, can add considerably to costs, diminish control over supply and service, and induce reliance on unsustainable systems and less flexible arrangements.

Apart from materials actually used in the voting process, consistent conduct and monitoring of voting operations will require the production of manuals and other reference materials for voting operations staff.

Storage and Distribution

Voting operations supplies will require secure storage before distribution to voting stations. Material returned from voting stations, especially accountable voting material, will be required to be stored under security, at least until any time period in which the election can be challenged has elapsed. It will also need to be stored under security in systems where recounts of votes may later be necessary, until the term of office of the representative body elected has expired. 

Effective distribution and return of supplies to voting stations requires both effective transport planning  and efficient methods of determining and packaging voting station supply needs.

In most circumstances, centralized or regionalized packing of standard supply kits for voting stations, with direct distribution to voting stations from these packaging centers, will prove the most effective method.

Communications

Voting operations requires an extensive network of effective communication facilities between electoral management body staff, to and from voting stations, and with other participants in the election process such as security and emergency forces, political parties and candidates, and executive government.

It is recommended that given the geographic distribution of voting stations, maintaining the necessary communications with them on voting day and, if relevant, during the ballot count can be one of the greater challenges of voting operations management, particularly in countries with less developed communications infrastructures. Appropriate and effective use of radio, mobile phone, fixed telecommunication lines, and back-up facilities requires careful and early planning.

Considerations for Observer Groups

Election managers, observer groups, whether national or international, carefully need to plan their materials equipment, transport, and communications requirements.

Voter Information

Need for Voter Information

Voter information is necessary to ensure that electorate is adequately informed and provided with the correct information to enable them to cast their vote in a confident manner. Effective voter information on voting operations issues provides:

• voters participating in the election with information to make informed voting choices;

• a reduction in additional workloads on voting operations staff in assisting or re-directing voters in voting stations. Before entering into a discussion on voter information it is important to note the difference between voter information and voter education.

While the distinction between voter information and voter education is in an artificial one generally voter information as indicated above, refers to information that voters need regarding when, where and how to vote.

Voter education provides prospective voters with information on the context in which elections take place within the overall democratic process, voters' rights and responsibilities, basic principles of the vote, indicators of free, fair and credible elections, and citizen participation through the democratic electoral process.

Some voter information issues, particularly on voting methods and procedures, are obviously also a part of voter education.

Unlike voter education, which is more effective as a continuous process, voter information's impact is going to be greatest when carefully timed to appear when voting interest is greatest, i.e., immediately before and during voting. Voter information needs do not cease at the close of voting. For confidence in the integrity of the election, open and mass availability of election results is a necessity, through such measures as:

• media broadcast and publication;

• availability of ballot count documents for public inspection;

• publication of result information documents by the electoral management body.

Standard Information Issues

Voter information contains some standard issues about which all voters will need to be informed, in order for them to participate in voting. In broad categories, these concern:

• who is eligible to vote;

• the range of methods of voting available;

• the location of voting sites and the hours of voting;

• basic voting station procedures, such as any documents a voter must bring to the voting station;

• how to cast a valid vote;

• the integrity of the voting and counting processes, including the conduct standards expected of political participants and election officials;

• parties and candidates contesting the election;

• the election results.

Voter information campaign should aim at providing all potential voters with accurate information on these issues. 

Additional Issues in Specific Cases

Particularly for referenda and special format ballot, such as elections undertaken wholly by mail, the electoral management body is best placed to provide authorized statements to inform voters of:

• in the case of a referendum, the yes and no cases for propositions;

• candidates' platform statements.

In some jurisdictions, the electoral management body is required by law to provide such information to all voters at their registered addresses.

Reaching the Audience

The most cost-effective mix of means to reach the maximum voter audience with information needs to be carefully analyzed when determining voter information strategies. It would be very unusual for a single-track approach to providing information will be effective. Basic methods of imparting voter information include:

• general media - through mass or specific market media outlets, public signage and posters, information displays (see General Media);

• direct to individual voters - through delivery by mail, stocks of information leaflets in public places, meetings or briefings, telephone information services, inquiry offices, use of direct electronic means (see Information Direct to Voters);

• reinforcement of voter information at voting sites through use of posters, pamphlets, and assistance from staff.

• where appropriate technology is in place, by placing information on the electoral management body or relevant electoral supervising authority website.

• mixes of voter information delivery methods will be environment or context specific. Amongst other things, they will need to take into account:

• general literacy levels;

• language groups;

• levels of penetration and affordability of mass and electronic media;

• cultural and gender differences;

• use of and access to information communication technology;

• geographic terrain;

• patterns of transport and assembly of crowds.

Information formats should also be carefully considered for their effectiveness in imparting information to both voters as whole and specific target groups of voters.

Additional or modified voter information systems and materials for specific audience groups will be required to maintain equity and accessibility in the information provided for different groups, such as:

• women;

• different language groups;

• voters age groups, e.g. youth

• voters of lower literacy;

• the visually or aurally impaired;

• physically challenged;

• voters outside the country at the time of the election.

Research Based Strategies

Strategies accounting for these requirements can only be efficiently devised if based on thorough research. Evaluations of voter education programmes and information from voter educators are a significant source of useful data.

Further information to guide information targeting and appropriate methodology can come from both electoral management body sources, such as sectoral analyses of past data on voter turnout, invalid votes cast, redirections to different voting stations, or data from other sources, such as media penetration statistics, passenger transport data, mail reliability data. 

Timing of Voter Information Campaigns

Voter information campaign timing will depend on the length of the election period and the timetable for specific activities occurring within this period.

Information on voting operations would generally be concentrated in the month before voting day. To maximize information retention, information campaigns should be planned so that broader and more general information is gradually refined to specific data in the few days before voter action is required.

This is important in the use of mass media. There may be many peaks for this, particularly where alternative methods of voting allow voting in advance of voting day. Where voter registration deadlines are within the voting operations period, information on these will form another peak for information.

Effective information targeting can only be achieved with advance planning. Effective campaign strategies, scheduling of media placements, design of effective materials require both research and testing. 

Aiding Informed Media Comment

The media is an important channel of conveying information to voters. This includes:

• development of media information kits 

• official briefing sessions for journalists and regular press releases during the voting operations period which can assist in developing accuracy in media reports of voting administration issues.

• the use of news stories (where accurate) resulting from media briefings can have a significant additional cost-effective impact in voter information campaigns.

Uncontrolled contact with the media, however, may do more harm than good. electoral management bodies should have a media strategy designed to ensure accuracy of media reporting and extract maximum benefit from the timing and content of news stories. (For further discussion of the elements of a media relations strategy, see General Media.)

• On voting day and during the count, the use of a media centre to act as a hub for information on voting progress and the count will concentrate media information demands in a single, manageable site. To gain maximum effectiveness, this should be the only site through which media briefings and information are provided.

This will free other voting operations staff from media demands during their busiest period and enable a broader perspective to be placed on information releases. In more developed environments, such centers could also contain facilities such as direct feeds to media organizations of computerized progress figures on the count.

• Producing guides for journalists and commentators by electoral management bodies reduces the chances of misinformation or misinterpretation of procedures being widely broadcast through the media.

• Handbooks for journalists similar to those produced for candidates may be considered.

• Where complex technical operations are involved, such as for computer-based voting or counting systems, special media handbooks to assist with informed comment may need to be produced.

Partisan Media

In societies where media or the major media outlets are controlled by the government or other political participants particular issues arise such as access to media for impartial news stories providing voter information without any political slant may be difficult. Post-edited stories for audio-visual media need to be approached with particular care where voting operations officials' participation is requested.

Official voter information will be the only unimpeachable information available where media are controlled by such political participants. It is important that media placements are controlled carefully so that they appear in an unamended form. Monitoring of media coverage of voter information is particularly important in such environments.

General Media

Focused Media Use

Before using news and other communications media for voting information purposes, intensive research is required so that this relatively expensive form of voter information, especially where mass media is involved, is used cost-effectively. Unfocussed media use for voter information wastes money by over saturating sectors of voters that are easily reached and missing access to particular categories of voters, be they:

• age-based (e.g., the young, the aged);

• experience-based (e.g., first-time voters);

• culture-based (e.g., language and minority groups, non-working voters);

• knowledge or skill-based (e.g., voters of lower literacy levels).

Effective public media advertising tends to concentrate on short, sharp messages. Include contact details for official services providing more detailed voter information in all media placements.

Legislative Basis

Legislation often specifies that minimum levels of media information advertising are undertaken by the electoral management body to ensure that voter information is accessible.

Such minimum specifications can usefully apply to announcement of voting methods available, listings of voting sites to be used in each electoral district, the geographic voter registration area each covers, and listings of candidates running in the election in each electoral district.

Advertising Strategy

Media use should be based on a formal advertising strategy and plan, setting objectives, target audiences, information outcomes required and available financial resources, and determining the best media mix to use on the basis of this strategy.

Mass Media

Although it is accepted that high penetration print, radio and television media provides instantaneous coverage to large numbers of voters. Production costs and space and time costs for mass media advertising are not cheap. Use of mass media may be:

• limited by funding constraints or through cost-effectiveness considerations.

• can be a fragmented approach, if detailed readership, listening and viewing audience data is not available.

Where mass media is used, evaluation of information penetration and recall by voters is necessary, both to assess if target audiences are being reached and the effectiveness of information transmission. Different types of mass media will be more effective for different voter information messages. For example:

• listings of all voting stations, while useful in print media, are not suitable for audio-visual mass media. At the same time, audio-visual media of geographically limited coverage could be used for providing this information for a limited area (see "Specific Sector Media" below).

• visual representations of how to complete a voting paper correctly are generally more effective. Using radio for this purpose, accessibility factors being equal, would be less preferable than using print or television media.

Appropriate Media Mix

Selection of the appropriate media mix to achieve coverage targets and information outcomes is important. Factors to be considered include:

Literacy levels: Even where print media has high penetration, it may not be understood clearly by some sectors of the populations. Depending on the information conveyed, the use of illustrations for example can assist in providing voters with the required information.

Penetration: What different population sectors,--broken down by age, past voting participation and cultural group are reached by the various media outlets, and how do these fit information campaign targets needs to be considered.

Reinforcement: Use of different media for the same message can reinforce the message. However, where the same sectors are being targeted by the media, there is the possibility of over saturation, where funds could more effectively be used targeting other sectors.

Coordination with Critical Dates

Scheduling and content of the different components of mass media voter information campaigns needs to be coordinated with critical points in the voting operations timetable to ensure maximum information retention by voters. Avoid confusing voters by attempting to transfer too many information messages or too much information at high rotation at one time. Rather use a staged voter information process.

For example information issues covered could progress from voter eligibility to general information on voting services available, to correct ballot paper completion, to voting station locations, to reminders to vote and bring necessary documents to the voting station.

Specific Sector Media

Where research or field information shows likely under-participation or lack of knowledge amongst specific age or cultural sectors of the population, addressing them through minor media popular in those specific markets will increase voter information coverage, in addressing:

• youth-through information in music, video, student publications, and alternative radio stations;

• the aged-through pensioner or other association publications;

• the military-through armed forces publications and other in-house media;

• regional audiences-though regional media;

• minority language groups-through print or audio-visual media broadcast in minority languages.

Use of community organization radio, publications, and newspapers, particularly those whose language is different from those used by mass media. Community media is an effective tool for providing low-cost voter information accessibility to voters who otherwise may not be informed.

Other Public Media

Static public media may also be used effectively, especially where displays or posters are used in high-traffic areas such as:

• transport hubs such as bus, rail, and air terminals;
• market or shopping areas with high pedestrian traffic;
• billboards and signs on roads.

Selection of appropriate sites requires research on pedestrian and vehicle traffic flows, consider that:

• posters in such areas are best used for short, sharp messages for the date of voting day and voting hours, examples of correct ballot marking, rather than attempting to fully explain procedures.

• posters can also act as a lead-in to satisfying more detailed voter information needs by providing information on locations and times where further information can be accessed.

• messages can also be tailored to the particular public environment in which they are placed. Major transport hubs, for instance, would be an effective place to inform the public on the availability of services for early and absentee voting.

Other more interactive solutions to public information display have been developed with low-cost computer technology.

• secure, user-friendly touch-screen information systems placed in public places can provide information on a large range of voter information issues in response to standard questions.

• audio prompts for voter interest can be included and pictorial and audio representation of both questions and answers is easily achievable. While more expensive than poster or other public display methods, it has some advantages.

• voter information queries can be monitored, thus allowing analysis of the amount of information disseminated and issues of interest. The equipment can also have a continuing use after elections for government or non-government-sponsored information campaigns on many other public issues, such as health, education and welfare.

Using unpaid media space and time to assist in voter information is discussed in Voter Information

News Coverage and Press Release Strategies

Before implementing effective enhancement of voter information messages a strategy for dealing with media relations needs to be implemented, The objectives of the strategy should be to ensure accuracy, authenticity, maximum content, and impact of voting operations news items. Elements of such a strategy include:

• designation of authorised spokespersons who should be the sole conduits through which information is released to the media;
• training of voting operations spokespersons in media skills - particularly important if less predictable and less structured media such as talk radio and television interviews are to be used for voter information purposes;
• a news information release plan, which can only be an intended plan, i.e., timing and subjects of media briefings are often generated by unforeseen questions about the voting operations processes and are out of the control of the electoral management body, with a basic plan for press release, media briefing content, and scheduling also prepared;
• planned media access to voting operations materials production, training and administration facilities negotiated with media, to allow combined information on voting procedures and progress in election preparations to be reported;
• guidelines for authorisation of media to enter, and particularly film, inside voting stations and counting centres;
• monitoring of all media throughout the election period, both to evaluate success of the strategy with regard to penetration of voting operations news and to enable quick response to inaccurate or biased reporting.

Working with media assists in informing voters, and also promotes the transparency and professionalism of voting operations. Where extensive media contact is envisaged, the employment of public relations professionals to guide the election management body's information release strategy can be effective. Development of media information kits is always useful.

Use of Internet Technology

Internet technology provides a very cost-effective means for providing public voter information and voter education material for increasing numbers of the population in developed countries and certain sectors of the population in developing countries, usually those who are based in urban centers.

Internet sites can cover the full range of voter information material and news releases, either as reproductions of printed material or specially designed pages. They can also increase voter service by allowing on-line access to such facilities as applications for mail or absentee ballots, applications for voting official employment, and other public voting operations forms.

Information Direct to Voters

Direct Contact Methods

Direct contact methods of informing voters on voting issues vary in complexity and costs, from the simple method of meetings to sophisticated electronic systems.

It is important to recognize the advantages that direct contact methods have in accessing cost-effectiveness i.e., there is a guarantee that information is going to its intended target. The reliability and target population coverage that can be achieved by delivery systems for direct contact methods needs to be carefully considered when assessing appropriateness.

Personal Contact

• simple direct personal contact through meetings or information centers may be a highly appropriate voter information focus in areas or societies with poor media penetration and particularly of lower literacy.

• use of personal contact is generally the single most dependable method by which voter information can be imparted to all levels of society in areas where literacy levels are low;

• in other environments, direct contact methods in general are a useful complement to broader media use;

• provision of some personal contact facility will allow explanation of more complex issues and interactive response to voter questions and concerns;

• when using direct personal contact methods provide staff with standard question-and-answer sheets for common voter information questions and concerns to assist consistency of information imparted.

Meetings

• mass or targeted meetings of voters can be used to provide some basic information concepts, such as how and when to vote, but may be less successful in providing information on where to vote, unless targeted to distinct geographic communities.

• meetings can be a most effective front-line information tool where mass media accessibility is poor.

• use of civic and voter educators in this information role provides a skilled staffing base.

• targeted meetings can be a more effective means than other media for reaching small groups of voters with specific information needs such as small minorities using different languages and the visually or aurally impaired.

In environments where voting, or the system of voting to be used, may be an unfamiliar experience, informing voters of the correct procedures for voting may best be achieved through a simulated activity of the voting process.

Although such an activity is better place in a voter education exercise if you consider using it for voter information considers the following:

• civic educators and voting operations staff trainers may be appropriate persons to conduct such activities.

• a simulated exercise is effective but when undertaken on a comprehensive scale requires considerable organizational and management skill and the availability and training of a large pool of skilled educators.

• ensure that there can be no perception of political bias in the manner in which people are shown how to vote, nor any involvement of political parties or candidates in this official information process.

Use of Inquiry Centers

Use of voting operations administration offices at the local and regional levels or specially designated inquiry centers for in-person voting information inquiries provides a facility more responsive to individual voting information needs.

While less pro-active and cost-effective than organizing meetings, and often of using printed information, their strength lies in the breadth and detail of information that can be provided and their effectiveness in media-deficient and less literate areas. Staffing such facilities can be a considerable drain on trained resources where voter information personnel are in short supply. If this method is being considered for use, the ability to effectively staff such centers needs to be carefully examined.

Locations for inquiry centers are better targeted to mass population movement centers, such as transport hubs, shopping or market areas, or special events. Staff used in such centers should receive training both in voting procedures and effective interviewing skills.

Telephone Information Services

Telephone information services can be used before and during voting day to provide specific answers to voters’ questions. Their effectiveness will depend on the penetration and reliability of telephone services. Costs of hiring and training additional staff for such services and whether additional premises and telephone equipment is required for reasonable service will determine if they are cost-effective.

Advice on Correct Voting Station

Providing print information directly to voters on the location of their voting stations can be useful in more literate societies. Where voter identification cards are provided to all voters for an election as further verification, these could contain information on:

• the correct voting station to attend and day and hours of voting;

• how to correctly complete the ballot.

Ability to provide information in this way will depend on the timing of the printing of voter identification cards in relation to the determination of voting sites.

Other suggested methods include:

• how to contact voting operations administrators for further information;

• the location of voting stations (including maps);

• any special voting facilities and how to access them;

• how to complete a ballot;

• contesting candidate and party information.

Situations where some voters attend the wrong voting station to vote will occur, therefore it is necessary to have facilities for redirecting such voters in place at voting stations. However, a carefully designed information program will minimize this number.

General Voting Guides

Comprehensive voting guides, pitched to the general literacy levels of the society, provided directly to voters' home addresses and/or made available in public institutions or places can provide useful, relatively cheap (compared to media buying) and comprehensive basic information on issues such as:

• how to contact voting operations administrators for further information;

• the location of voting stations (including maps);

• any special voting facilities and how to access them;

• how to complete a ballot;

• contesting candidate and party information.

These general guides can also be used to promote more specific voter information services, such as office or telephone inquiry services locations, times, and telephone numbers.

Where reliable mail services are in place delivering these guides by mail direct to voters assures access to the complete target audience. Where mail services are not reliable (or relatively expensive), using temporary election staff or other contractors for house-to-house delivery may be feasible.

Specific voter information guides are also useful to provide information on facilities available for minority groups (and any special arrangements being taken for their security, where these are necessary), the physically impaired, and groups such as security forces for whom special voting arrangements are available. Distribution of these materials through relevant community, language, medical, or support groups effectively targets the intended audience.

Voting by Mail

Provide voter information directly to voters with the mailed-out allot is essential when voting by mail. This material should, at the minimum, provide clear instructions to voters on:

• how to complete the ballot paper;

• how to complete accompanying forms containing personal information required for checking voter eligibility and/or validity of the vote;

• how to correctly seal the ballot in its envelope(s);

• the specified location to which and date by which the ballot must be returned by mail.

This information may also be required by law to include authorized statements of platforms by the candidates where the entire election is by mail.

Use of Electronic Communications

The internet is effective in directly delivering voter guides and similar information wherever possible by electronic mail (email) to registered voters has been found to be extremely useful as a communication method in highly developed societies because:

• transmission costs are negligible;

• reaching the target voter is nominally assured;

• there are no print costs to the electoral management body;

• existing infrastructure can be used.

Usage of Telephone Information Services

Appropriate Use

Experience with telephone inquiry services has shown that:

They are most efficiently organized on a central or regional basis with toll-free dialing: A local structure can work if automatic call-redirect services or single, toll-free number access for all locations can be provided. However, while this is efficient, in many environments provision of such services on a local level may be more effective.

This requires less sophistication and only localized reliability of telecommunication services. Unless more centralized services have well trained staff and are well equipped with information retrieval facilities, locally-based services may also be better suited to answer local questions on such issues as voting station locations.

They are a useful supplement to print and general media information: One area where they can be of particular use is in providing cost-effective information in minority languages. Instead of printing all voter information in languages only used by small minorities, print information in all relevant languages on the one sheet can refer voters to a language specific information service phone number.

Staffs for such services require training in their duties and voting operations procedures.

Telephone staff should be provided with question and answer scripts to ensure consistency in answering frequently asked questions, as well as access to voters lists and voting site location lists (when prepared).

Senior supervisory staff should be available for more difficult inquiries.

Such services are only worth pursuing if reliable, and sufficient lines are available for the expected load. Constantly engaged phone lines will annoy voters and impede the flow of information.

Monitoring of questions asked of telephone voter information services also provides a useful analytical guide to voter information issues that need further emphasis in media or other public formats.

Operation on Voting Day

In a few countries telephone information services have been used on voting day as a resource for voting operations officials to determine the correct voting station for voters who are not on the voters list at the voting station where they have turned out to vote. The telephone traffic created by this service is generally not sustainable and it can also tie up voting station communications equipment to prevent it from being used for other purposes. It is suggested that that this course of action is only undertaken if:

• There is complete confidence in the load capacity of the system;
• Complete voter’s register data can be reliably and speedily accessed;
• Alternative communication systems have been provided in voting stations;
• Information service staffs are very well trained. 

Voter Information Requirements

Information Campaign Focus: While there are standard issues that need to be covered in all voter information campaigns, the information emphases will vary according to the particular voting environment.

Specific geographic areas or cultural groups with a history of low participation may require a greater emphasis on all information issues. Any changes to election systems or procedures should be given high profiles in information campaigns. For example:

• Where there have been changes to electoral district boundaries, greater emphasis on advertising voters' appropriate voting stations will be needed.

• Where there are significant new participants in the election process, or where voter registration levels are low, considerable emphasis may need to be given to information on voter eligibility issues;

• Where there have been changes in voting systems, intensive information on how to mark and cast a valid ballot will be needed.

• In areas assessed as being at high risk of voter fraud or manipulation, intensive information on voting operations integrity controls may assist in deterrence.

(For further discussion of the management of voter information campaigns, see Voter Information)

Voter Information Content

Information provided to voters should promote the awareness of:

• The voting facilities that are available to voters and who is eligible to use them, including special voting facilities such as early voting, absentee voting, mobile voting stations, assistance for disabled voters or voters of low literacy

• The locations of voting sites, the geographic areas serviced by them, and the hours they will be open

• What is expected of the voter at the voting station, e.g., documents to bring, forms to be completed, services provided by polling officials

• How to mark and cast a vote correctly

• The overall integrity of the election process

• Under some election systems, and particularly for referendums, there may also be a requirement for the election management body to provide voters with information on the candidates contesting an election, or on the positive and negative arguments regarding propositions being put to the voters in a referendum.

In some systems the information content that must be provided to all voters and the manner in which it must be provided is specified in the legal framework for the election to ensure that equity is promoted and there is accessibility to voter information. These minimum standards are reference points from which effective voter information programs can be developed.

While it may be important that information materials refer to or cite references to the legal framework, effective methods of information transfer need more than a statement of the law. Creativity in devising messages and formats, attuned to the cultural environment, that will maximise the transfer of information to voters is essential. 

Information to Political Parties and Candidates

It is in the interests of election administrators that political parties and candidates are provided with accurate information on all the processes pertaining to voting. Political parties will be used as a source of advice on issues such as voting procedures and methods, locations and hours for voting by many voters.

It is preferable that they are provided with relevant official voter information materials, rather than being left to their own, possibly inaccurate, understanding of processes as the basis for information they provide to voters. Briefing sessions for parties and candidates.

Information at Voting Locations

However effective the pre-voting day voter information campaigns, access to voter information at the voting station itself will be a necessity. Voter information provided at voting locations should be geared to assisting voters in understanding the voting procedures and also to promoting effective accessibility to and crowd control within the voting station.

This section looks at information at voting locations

General Information

To ensure easy accessibility and visibility of voting stations the following methods are useful:

Outside the voting station:

• using prominent signage -Voter accessibility and passage through the voting station is enhanced if prominent signage is used.

• start outside the voting station itself, with the use of a prominent sign identifying the voting station location.

• directional signs to the voting station in the surrounding area or streets will assist accessibility.

• posters or signs advising that a location is going to be used as a voting station can be placed at the location a few days before voting day. This would also apply to institutions being covered by mobile voting facilities, where posters advertising the day and time of visits by mobile voting stations should be placed at relevant points within the institutions a few days before the scheduled visits.

Inside the voting station:

• within the voting station, prominent signage and directional arrow signs can be effectively used for crowd control, identifying any areas with specific functions, such as entrances, exits, ballot issue area, voter information points, special voting facilities areas, queuing points, and restrooms. While provision of this signage is at additional costs, it can greatly enhance the effectiveness of voter traffic flow and reduce the general inquiry load on polling officials.

• display simple posters reinforcing required conduct such as voting secrecy, smoking or no-smoking areas, prohibitions on political campaigning within the voting station area, littering prohibition

In developing materials design, production and supply plans, the types and quantities of voting station general signage required need to be considered.

Information on Rights and Procedures

Displaying printed information on voting rights and procedures reduces the time spent by staff on dealing with voter information needs. Formats could be:

• a pamphlet or booklet giving full information, available at an information point by the voting station entrance;

• wall posters prominently displayed around the voting station.

Posters are effective as they may be less expensive and tend to be less disruptive to voter flow, as they provide constant information to all voters in the voting station. Using simple bold realistic illustrations of the actions required from a voter, rather than textual explanations, will ensure wider and faster comprehension will be achieved.

Complex voting procedures or where multiple language groups have to be accommodated in the one voting station, may require that you provide back up the basic information on posters with a more comprehensive booklet.  There are a number of specific subjects that these information materials could cover to assist in voter service, including:

• maps of the electoral area covered by the voting station, and information on other voting locations or facilities placed at the entrance to the voting station;

•posters advising voters to have their identification documents ready for inspection and showing the identification documents required to be produced;

• information on the rights of voters to vote and any challenge mechanisms;

• information on how to correctly mark a ballot and place it in the ballot box, or use the voting computer or machine correctly;

• information on facilities for physically impaired voters or other voters needing assistance or special facilities;

• information on contesting candidates or parties.

Where election systems of representation are complex (e.g., where voters must mark a number of preferences in a specified fashion on the ballot, or where simultaneous elections using different voting method are being held, and especially where they are being used for the first time) material explaining the representation system may also be useful information within the voting station.

Role of Voting Operations Officials

Information on display needs to be backed up by trained officials capable of answering voter queries. Apart from those voters who may need assistance in understanding the common voting procedures, there are many voter information issues that can only be handled personally, such as redirections to the correct voting station and eligibility for special methods of voting. The role of voting operations officials as service providers should be considered most important.

They are the public face of the election machine. Their ability to provide information and their attitude towards voters in need of assistance are a large factor in determining public perceptions of the professionalism of electoral management.

Whether staff should be specifically allocated to information assistance roles will depend on factors such as the size of the voter turnout expected and the general levels of understanding of the voting system by voters.

Senior polling officials may be able to cope with information duties in addition to their management roles where voting stations are catering to small numbers of voters and the voting system is stable and well known.

Preferably employ additional officials with a specific voter information in situations where:

• there are larger numbers of voting stations,

• any environment where new voting procedures have been introduced,

• there are large numbers of new participants in voting processes,

• or more complex computer or machine-based voting methods are used,

There duties would include redirection of any voters who have arrived to vote at a voting station at which they are not eligible to vote.

To ensure the sufficient provision of staff in situations indicated above it is necessary to provide for their inclusion in the planning for recruitment programs and in developing training packages. Staff in voter information roles will need a broader understanding of voting processes than staff engaged in more routine functions, and their training will need to be commensurate with this.

Voter Information Requirements

Information Campaign Focus

While there are standard issues that need to be covered in all voter information campaigns, the information emphases will vary according to the particular voting environment.

Specific geographic areas or cultural groups with a history of low participation may require a greater emphasis on all information issues. Any changes to election systems or procedures should be given high profiles in information campaigns. For example:

• where there have been changes to electoral district boundaries, greater emphasis on advertising voters' appropriate voting stations will be needed.

• where there are significant new participants in the election process, or where voter registration levels are low, considerable emphasis may need to be given to information on voter eligibility issues;

• where there have been changes in voting systems, intensive information on how to mark and cast a valid ballot will be needed.

• in areas assessed as being at high risk of voter fraud or manipulation, intensive information on voting operations integrity controls may assist in deterrence.

Voter Information Content

Information provided to voters should promote the awareness of:

• the voting facilities that are available to voters and who is eligible to use them, including special voting facilities such as early voting, absentee voting, mobile voting stations, assistance for disabled voters or voters of low literacy

• the locations of voting sites, the geographic areas serviced by them, and the hours they will be open

• what is expected of the voter at the voting station, e.g., documents to bring, forms to be completed, services provided by polling officials

• how to mark and cast a vote correctly

• the overall integrity of the election process

• under some election systems, and particularly for referendums, there may also be a requirement for the election management body to provide voters with information on the candidates contesting an election, or on the positive and negative arguments regarding propositions being put to the voters in a referendum.

In some systems the information content that must be provided to all voters and the manner in which it must be provided is specified in the legal framework for the election to ensure that equity is promoted and there is accessibility to voter information. These minimum standards are reference points from which effective voter information programs can be developed.

While it may be important that information materials refer to or cite references to the legal framework, effective methods of information transfer need more than a statement of the law. Creativity in devising messages and formats, attuned to the cultural environment, that will maximize the transfer of information to voters is essential. (For further information on the content of voter information see Voter Information )

Information to Political Parties and Candidates

It is in the interests of election administrators that political parties and candidates are provided with accurate information on all the processes pertaining to voting. Political parties will be used as a source of advice on issues such as voting procedures and methods, locations and hours for voting by many voters.

It is preferable that they are provided with relevant official voter information materials, rather than being left to their own, possibly inaccurate, understanding of processes as the basis for information they provide to voters. Briefing sessions for parties and candidates will also be useful in this regard.

Information on Eligibility and Methods

Voter Registration and Eligibility to Vote

A basic concern of voter information campaigns for voting operations is to ensure:

• that people are aware if they are eligible to register to vote; and

• that all those who are eligible to vote are encouraged to be registered to vote.

The manner and timing of this will be dependent on the registration philosophy and systems used, as well as the deadline for voter registration for an election.

Since this message is also a basic concern of voter education campaigns, information and education strategies in this regard require close integration. Information campaigns regarding voter registration and eligibility to vote involve the following stages:

• Information on registration qualifications, methods and facilities, and the need to register to vote to have a voice in choosing political representatives (in this latter message overlapping with voter education campaigns) during the voter registration period;

• Information on availability of voter’s registers for inspection to ensure details on the register are correct, and on methods of amendment or challenge of any incorrect details entered in the register;

• Where additions to and amendment of voters registers is allowed up to a cut-off point close to voting day, a further intensive information campaign promoting correct voter registration aimed at those who become interested in registering only when an election is imminent, or who have moved to a new address or become eligible to vote since registers were last compiled;

• After the closing of voter registration and on voting day, information on voting day registration where this is allowed under the election system.

The relatively simple, self-contained messages required (e.g., not only to register but to verify registration information is correct), supported by information on where to get further information, or obtain registration forms, lend themselves to a wide range of print, aural and video media. They are also usefully reinforced by increasing the intensity of voter information meetings and activities at the critical points in the registration process, particularly immediately before the registration deadline for an election.

Where there are legal requirements that voters register inspection periods and locations be publicly advertised, this is better implemented in a prominent way, rather than by barely fulfilling legal notice requirements. The benefit of correct voters’ lists to election integrity is greater than the costs of encouraging voters to check that register details are correct and of processing resulting amendments.

Even in voter registration systems where it is held that the onus is on the individual to maintain correct registration, rather than on the Electoral Management Body, public information campaigns encouraging correct registration are necessary to gain this same net benefit.

Targeting Information

Specific targeting of voter registration and eligibility information campaigns, through analyzing progressive data during the voter registration period, will increase coverage and cost-effectiveness. The following factors can assist when planning how to target information:

• Correlations between age and gender splits in population and voter registration data will provide information on age/gender groups under-represented in registered voters, and allow targeting of media and locations effective for reaching high proportions of these.

• Correlations between population and registered voters on a locality basis will provide data on geographic areas that are under-represented in registered voters, and allow targeting of these geographic areas, through meetings, local media, and distribution of posters and pamphlets.

• Population mobility statistics will allow identification of areas of greater or more frequent population movement, and similar targeting of information campaigns encouraging checking of voters registers and provision of amended registration details.

Relationship to Voter Registration Systems

The timing, emphasis and intensity of information campaigns on this issue will be different according to whether a continuous registration system, a census-style registration well before voting day, or a civil registry base is used to compile voters lists.

There will also be a greater need to provide intensive information on voter registration facilities and methods in systems where voters are required to register to vote.

Continuous Voter Registration Systems

Where a continuous registration system is used, information on the advantages of retaining correct voter registration is also useful on a continuous basis, even if relatively low key or provided as part of voter education activities. Simple print messages and registration forms can be targeted at relevant locations, such as property agencies and other utilities (electricity, gas, telephone, postal services and the like) likely to be used or contacted by voters when changing address, schools where senior students are likely to attain voting age, or combined with applications, information and accounts produced by these agencies and utilities.

Continuous information campaigns encouraging voters to maintain correct voter registration assists in achieving one of the major benefits of continuous registration systems--the elimination of an overwhelming number of new registrations and amendments to be verified and processed at the deadline for registration for an election.

This will not negate the need to implement an intensive information campaign leading up to the deadline for registration for an election. Even in continuous systems, many voters will not bother to apply for or amend registration details until an election is imminent. 

Census-Style Registration Systems

Where census-style registration systems are used, the focus of registration information messages will be within the census period and in any later period for review and amendment of registration details. Where these periods are well before voting day, the voter information campaigns can focus solely on the registration issue.

However, in spite of this, they may require a higher intensity level, as they are not feeding off other election information and publicity.

Civil Registry Systems

Where voters’ lists are extracted from civil registry records, a different approach may be needed. The initial information needs to be more generally directed at persons ensuring that they change civil registration details when required by law to do so. The voter information emphasis will generally be more useful if it concentrates on encouraging voters to check, during any period for verification, that the extract of civil registry records to form voters’ lists contains correct data, and the processes for amendment of outdated or incorrect data.

Voting Methods

Where voters can vote only in voting stations in their own electoral district on voting day, information on voting methods can be contained in voter information campaigns on voting procedures  and voting locations.

Special Voting Facilities

Where additional methods of voting are provided for voters who cannot attend their normal voting station on voting day, information needs to be provided during the voting operations period on what additional facilities are available and qualifications required for using them.

As information on special voting facilities can be complex, it is generally better organised on two levels--general coverage through media, meetings, posters, public displays to create awareness of the types of facilities available and basic qualifications required, with specific information then available on contact with inquiry offices or telephone inquiry services. Targeting of particular geographic areas, institutions and relevant public facilities with print information is an effective back-up to mass communication.

General information showing the types of special voting facilities available, a simple description of qualifications required for using them, and contact details for more detailed information can also be provided:

• at voter registration offices;

• at register revision facilities;

• by the people conducting census-style voter registration;

• in voters guides delivered to electors

Early and Absentee Voting

The start of the information campaigns for early voting preferably begin at the start of the elections period, and builds in intensity until the start of early voting. Specific focus of the information will vary according to the early and absentee voting systems used.

The information will need to cover:

• methods of early and absentee voting available (e.g., in person or by mail) and the period within which various facilities are available;

• qualifications that voters must satisfy to be eligible for early or absentee voting (e.g., absence from electoral district on voting day, illness, military service);

• when and where voting materials are available for absentee and early voting;

• as voting day approaches, reminders to return voting material;

• where absentee voting also occurs on voting day, the voting stations with absentee voting facilities and any special requirements for absentee voters on voting day.

It is helpful that, in addition to general information campaigns, placement of printed information pamphlets in locations such as major rail, bus, air, sea terminals, travel agencies, and military bases (if armed forces qualify for absentee voting) can effectively reach potential early and absentee voters.

Mobile Voting Stations

Where mobile voting stations are operating in institutions:

• advance notice of the times at which voting is being conducted should be publicly displayed in the institution.

• provide a wider public display of information on such facilities, though this will need to be balanced against the possibility of this resulting in voters not eligible to use these facilities attempting to use them to vote.

• arrangements for special provision of material on voting procedures to institutions to be covered by mobile voting stations may also need to be made.

Where mobile voting stations are operating in remote areas, liaison with the relevant communities is required to announce the date and hours for voting. There may be difficulty in providing voter information to such remote communities before voting day. Mobile voting station staff may need to provide much of the voter information, from materials and by personal explanation, during the hours of voting.  Their training should be at an appropriate level for this.

Voting Abroad

Information on eligibility and how to vote in a foreign country is made continuously available through the Election Management Body, where foreign country voting is available. Specific campaigns throughout the election period will generally be required as reinforcement. Various options for locations for placing material for this include travel agencies, foreign missions of the home country, airports and similar points of departure, and in media abroad. 

Other Special Voting Facilities

Where special voting arrangements are made for prisoners or other relatively small, specialized categories of voters, information on the methods and time of voting is better specifically targeted to the individual voters and the institutions in which they are resident. Armed forces may also fall into this category. Before making these arrangements there is a need to consider the risks in sending this information only to institutional management for distribution as depending on the level of understanding of the principles of rights to vote, it may not reach the affected voters.

Completion of Ballots

Voters using special voting facilities may also require additional information on how to complete specialised voting material.

Information on Voting Location and Hours

Information Required before Voting Day

Voters turning out at a voting station at which they are not permitted to vote is a common problem and a major source of disruption. It takes time for polling officials to redirect voters and may even lead to altercations. It may also lead to voters being denied an opportunity to vote, if they are unable to travel to the correct voting station by the time of closing of the poll. Pro-active information to voters on their correct voting station will enhance accessibility and service levels to voters. (See Information at Voting Locations for additional information) The information about voting locations that is useful to convey to voters is:

The voting location or locations at which the voter is eligible to vote: If more than one location is used, identification of the closest location, in order to aid voting station resource planning, is useful.

The address of the relevant location or locations and the geographic area which it services.

The hours during which the voting location will be open for voting for:

• normal voting stations, it is important to emphasize the time of closing.

• early voting facilities, dates and voting hours are required.

• mail voting, the closing hour and date for receipt of returned ballots requires heavy emphasis, with wide publicity also being given to locations for personal return of mail ballots.

• voters serviced by mobile voting stations, - it is important that these voters are aware of the scheduled time and date the mobile voting station will be at their location. The date needs particular emphasis if mobile voting stations are conducting voting in advance of voting day.

If transport to and from voting stations is being provided by election authorities, the departure time and locations as well as return times of this transport will need to be announced. If this is occurring in a high security risk environment, assurances of security need also to be provided.

Information before Voting Day

Information on voting locations can be issued in general fashion, targeted specifically at each individual voter, or a combination of methods used. The appropriate information method will be partially dependent on the flexibility voters have in determining where they will vote. Possible methods are:

Publish a list of voting locations and hours of operation, accompanied by a map of the relevant electoral districts, in the print media. This could be preceded by a series of teaser advertisements in a variety of media announcing when and where this list will be available. Local media could be targeted for local electoral district information, with consolidated information published in national media.

Distribute information to each household on the location and voting hours of the appropriate voting station for that address. Support for this by media advertising, advising voters that they should have received this information and giving a contact number or address for arrangement of supply if a voter has not received this printed information, is useful both to raise awareness and to correct delivery errors. This information could be combined with other information on voting procedures, in a general voting guide. This can be cost-effective. Care needs to be taken that the delivery of this information is undertaken accurately, particularly at the borders of electoral districts, and that all recipients are encouraged to check their eligibility to vote.

Include voting location information on a personal voter identification card for all registered voters. This can be an effective means where voters are assigned to a single voting station. It could entail significant additional costs depending on the style of the voter identification card. In addition to the voter's personal details the reverse of the card can contain the address, location map, and hours of operation of the assigned voting station. The card could be provided as part of the voter registration process, by mail where mail services are reliable, required to be collected from government offices, or they distributed at community meetings.

Hold community meetings, particularly where media and delivery resources lack penetration, or in areas where awareness of voting is low.

Provide inquiry offices and/or telephone services as a resource for voters' questions on the location of their appropriate voting station.

Use and publicize the actual voting station premises as information centers for voters.

Mobile Voting Station Information

Additional methods of information before voting day may be required where mobile stations are being used. This could include:

• posters announcing time of team visits in prominent locations in institutions

• information direct to the voter if home visits are to be made.

• direct communication with the community, or its individual members, by radio or other means, to announce voting hours and dates may be necessary for mobile voting stations servicing remote areas.

Information on Voting Day

Various methods can be used to provide information on the voting day.

General publicity on voting day through the media can emphasize the hours of operation of voting stations and contact details for information offices where more detailed information can be provided. It may also be useful to publish, in generally circulated print media on voting day, a listing of the addresses of voting stations and the localities which they serve.

Use of centralized telephone inquiry systems on voting day for redirection of voters has not always proved successful and, therefore, should be subject to very careful load capacity and effectiveness analysis before implementation.

In voting stations display prominent maps at the entrance showing the geographic area in which voters must be registered to be eligible to vote at that voting station will assist in early warning to voters that they may be at the wrong voting station.

Providing systems to allow staff to redirect voters to their correct voting station, if they have turned out at one where they are unable to vote. The complexity of these systems will depend on the flexibility of rules regarding where a voter may vote.

An information officer able to provide voters with a contact number or address at which they may check their correct voting station. where voters are allowed no choice in voting station or method.

Provide information officers in voting stations with voters’ lists for surrounding voting station areas if certified voters lists for use in voting stations are produced in sufficient time.

Local registry offices should also be open on voting day to help redirect voters where voters’ lists are based on civil registers.

Use of tendered or provisional ballots may assist voters who attend the wrong voting station where systems are more flexible, and account for the fact that voter registration processes are often incomplete, and rarely fully accurate.

Specific Information for Absentee Voting on Voting Day

In countries spanning more than one time zone where absentee voting is allowed on voting day, information to absentee voters should make clear any specific rules as to the closing time for voters voting in a different time zone from the area in which they are registered. This will be particularly necessary in jurisdictions where absentee voting must close no later than the equivalent closing time in the voter's own electoral district.

Information on Voting Station Procedures

Specific Focus on Procedures Required

Conducting an information campaign specifically addressing voting station procedures will assist in ensuring that voters are prepared for voting when they arrive at the voting station.

While much of this information is more a long-term voter education issue, there are some specific messages that will need reinforcement if voter service and voter traffic flow is to be effective., Voting procedures information is not something that voters can be expected to fully retain from election to election, even if procedures remain unchanged and they need to be reminded about it for each election.

Targets and Issues

It is helpful to consider the following questions when assessing what should be included in voter information (apart from education), campaigns on voting procedures, cost-effectiveness, and potential information overload effects:

• What procedural information is vital for voters to understand before they arrive at the voting station, i.e., which issues might seriously prejudice the exercise of the right to vote or voter service if not fully understood?

• How much intensive information can voters absorb in a short period before voting day?

• What procedural information can be more cost-effectively reinforced in the voting station than by media or other information campaigns before voting day?

Vital pre-election knowledge of voting procedures would include issues such as:

• any identity or other documents that voters must bring with them to the voting station;

• entitlements and procedures for assisted voting;

• how to mark and cast a vote correctly

• voting station locations and voting hours, and in certain circumstances, transport

• provided to voting stations

• voting secrecy

• eligibility to vote in general or to use special voting facilities

Documents to Be Shown by Voters

Voters may be required to bring specific documents to the voting station to establish their identity or eligibility to vote, such as national identity cards or voter identification cards.  If they arrive without these, they may not be able to collect these in time to return to vote. Excluding these voters from the voting station may cause altercations that can severely disrupt the election process. Intensive information prior to voting day on the specified documents voters that voters need to bring with them will minimize these occurrences.

It is a simple message that can be closely linked with or form part of information messages on voting days and hours and voting locations. Both mass coverage and targeting of particular voter groups who may not have access to normal mass communications will be needed.

Assisted Voting

Information on assisted voting may be more specifically targeted to particular geographic areas or through institutions and community groups dealing with physical impairment and lower literacy.

Information Content

There are advantages in producing communications media, public display or direct delivery information materials on voting procedures that can be broadly outlined in a message which emphasizes these steps.

This is particularly advantageous where voting procedures have changed or there are significant numbers of registered voters with no or little experience in voting. These materials create the background message from which other more specific parts of the information campaign are developed.

The key consideration is to keep these materials simple, since this is information and not formal education, and to leave more detailed information to personal contact methods and polling official advice. Visual and aural media messages should be based on a series of simple statements that explain:

• date of voting day;

• hours voting stations are open;

• voting station locations;

• registration requirements;

• identity documents required to vote;

• eligibility verification procedures;

• voting procedures;

• voting secrecy.

This style of information message is useful as a general reinforcement that can assist in tying together information in the voters' minds. Effective information communication will generally require specific separate messages on the vital issues, such as voting locations  and correct marking or casting of ballots.

Information Methods

Print media is generally more effective for this broader information format. Care must be taken to ensure that posters or print advertisements produced accommodate the literacy levels of the society.

A high pictorial content can generally be more effective in explaining more complex procedures.  Television can also be used effectively. E.g. A simple video script used against a visual background of a voting station in operation.  The number of different steps in voting procedures messages being delivered may make radio use less than ideal.

Community meetings, simulations, and displays are also an effective means of delivering this more complex message. Text messages on cellular telephones can be used to provide voting information.

Voters Guides

The publication of a voters guide delivered to voters' registered address or available from public locations can provide full information on all voting procedures to an assured target audience.

Consider personal addressing of such guides, rather than household drops as this may, assist in ensuring that all voters have access to the information, although they are more expensive. This may be particularly relevant in reaching groups such as women in households where they have been traditionally excluded from decision-making processes. Support for this by media advertising advising voters that they should have received this information, and giving a contact number to arrange re-supply if necessary, is useful to raise readership of the guide and to correct delivery errors.

On Voting Day

Voters continue to need information even on voting day. Suggestions as to how best this can be achieved include:

Requirements for prescribed documents - The requirement of bringing the prescribed identity documents to the voting station is a message that needs to be reinforced, This can be done through the media on voting day itself and can be combined with messages reinforcing that it is voting day and the hours of operation of voting stations.

Voting processes information - It is preferable on voting day to provide information on the steps in voting processes to voting station officials, or personal contact through information centers, rather than complicating the media message. Information services offices and any telephone inquiry services should also be operating at least throughout the hours of voting.

Procedural queries - Specific voting operations officials can usefully be assigned to answering procedural queries from voters  in voting stations, supported by visual materials in key areas of the voting station, particularly around areas where voters queue to vote. Subject matter can address both what is expected of voters and the services provided in the voting station.

Special Voting Facilities

For a discussion of voter information programs on procedures for special voting faciliites, see Information on How to ensure a Vote is Valid and Information on Voting Eligibility and Methods.

Information on How to Ensure a Vote is Valid

 

Basic Issues

The act of voting, either manually or by using a voting machine or computer, is the fundamental purpose of an election. If a voter incorrectly marks (or in envelope-based systems, incorrectly envelopes) a ballot, or incorrectly casts a ballot so it is excluded from vote counts, the voter's participation in choosing a political representative is invalidated. Once the ballot is deposited in the ballot box or accepted by a machine, it is not a recoverable error. All election expenditure relating to that vote, in essence, has been wasted.

Underlying Factors

Information on how to vote correctly is of sufficient significance to justify its being a separate and a resource-intensive focus of voter information programs. The extent of its emphasis will depend on factors such as:

• proportion of votes completed incorrectly in past elections;

• the complexity of actions required to correctly mark, and/or envelope, and cast a ballot - ranging from simply depositing a token in the ballot box to having to allocate a different preference number to each of a long list of candidates on a ballot to correctly using a machine or computer for voting;

• the numbers of ballots to be completed (where simultaneous elections are being held);

• stability or change in procedural requirements for completing a ballot;

• she experience of voters in completing ballots.

There are certain conditions under which more intensive and comprehensive information campaigns on how to vote correctly will be a vital necessity. These include:

• where there has been a change to the election system. For example, a change from a first–past-the-post to a proportional representation system;

• where the franchise has been significantly extended or there are significant numbers of new voters;

• where the method of marking a ballot has changed. For example from a negative vote (deleting the candidates the voter doesn't want to vote for) to a positive vote (marking the candidate the voter wants to vote for); from an enveloped ballot system in which the voter chooses from amongst a number of possible ballot papers, to a "mark choice" system where the voter has to mark preferences on the ballot; or from optional preferential marking to full preferential marking of all candidates;

• where there has been a change from paper ballots to voting machines or computers for voting, or where machine-based systems have changed;

• where the design or format of the ballot has changed. For example in the use of symbols and names for candidates, or in order or style of appearance of candidates on the ballot.

• where new methods of voter identity eligibility have been introduced.

Audience Groups

For all elections, information on correct completion of ballots is an essential ingredient of voter information campaigns. Elections are held too infrequently to expect full retention of this information from election to election, even in the most elementary voting systems. Additionally, there will always be new voters who have reached voting age or gained voting rights through fulfillment of other qualifications such as citizenship.

Cost-effective targeting of campaigns to maximize the number of voters who complete their ballot correctly will depend on thorough research. While there is a need for maximum coverage on this issue, there may be pockets of voters requiring special attention, which will include:

• first-time voters;

• the young;

• voters from minority cultures or language groups;

• the elderly;

• newly acquired citizenship.

Many societies require special attention to be paid to information specifically targeted at women voters, particularly where they have not had a history of participation in public activity.

Research into invalid ballots from past elections will assist greatly in targeting this aspect of the voter information campaign. This research can highlight areas with higher proportions of invalid ballots where more intensive information campaigns can be of greater effect and/or the most common errors made in marking and/or casting ballots, on which information campaigns should concentrate.

Once the period for challenge to election results has elapsed, powers to examine ballots or other records for such research purposes are useful legislative or regulatory provisions for Electoral Management Bodies. Legislative requirements or administrative schedules for destruction of ballot material must also allow sufficient time for such analysis.

Significant Information Issues

Common issues that need to be addressed in informing voters about completing their ballots correctly will include:

• using a valid preference mark (permissibility of numbers, cross, tick, strikethrough of candidate's name, etc) to indicate the preferred candidate(s);

• the number of preference marks allowable or required, and if more than one, the order of sequence required;

• where voting machines or computers are used, the method of operating the machine;

• not placing any mark on the ballot that would identify the voter, i.e., signature, thumb mark, or the like;

• in enveloped ballot systems, following the French model, the correct method of choosing and enveloping ballots.

In areas of lower literacy, official information campaigns may also have to stress the symbols or images being used by different political participants or any official numbers used to identify candidates on ballots. This needs to be done equitably and very carefully, so as not to give rise to any perceptions of bias towards any political participants.

In some environments it may be possible to use a mock-up of the ballot, with political parties and candidates listed as they will appear on the ballot. However, caution needs to be exercised in using such "mock" material, so that there can be no perception of political bias in the information provided by officials.

In systems where more than one mark has to be placed on a ballot i.e.-where all or some candidates have to be numbered according to the voter's preferences or all but one candidate have to be deleted from the ballot, the added complexity of the voting system  may require a series of separate ballot completion information messages. These messages could relate, for example, to:

• a requirement to use numbers rather than any other style of mark;

• a requirement to indicate a preference rank for all or a specified number of candidates.

Simultaneous Elections under Different Systems

Additional complications will arise when more than one ballot is being used for the same or simultaneous elections, especially if these have to be marked by the voter in different ways. Simultaneous elections for bicameral parliaments where an election for one house requires a voter to place a mark or number against the name of more than one party or candidate, while for the other house only a single preference mark may be made on the ballot, will present a special challenge for voter information. In such a case, information campaigns would generally deal with each ballot method in separate messages, rather than trying to combine correct completion instructions for both in one message.

Similarly, there will be a need for enhanced, specialized local information campaigns where voters in different electoral districts have different ballot marking requirements. This will occur, for example, where:

• different voting equipment is used in different electoral administration areas - an issue particularly where local electoral administrations independently determine voting procedures for elections at state, province or national level;

• different electoral districts elect different numbers of representatives under multi-member district systems.

Information Methods

Information methods vary depending on the information that is being imparted as indicated below:

• Providing a separate distinctive public message on correct ballot marking and/or casting will clarify the issue in the minds of voters. This is information that is better represented visually, and pictorially (rather than by long textual explanations), through print media, posters, television or simulations. Audio information is better used as reinforcement or to assist those not accessible by visual media, through language, distance, affordability or literacy differences.

• In areas where voting participation is a new phenomenon, or of lower literacy, or of poor media penetration, simulations of voting or mock elections are an important component of voter education campaigns. Such simulations can also be used to good effect close to voting day for voter information purposes, guiding voters through the act of marking and/or casting a ballot.

• Materials used in information campaigns on this issue are most effective when based on the actual ballot appearance i.e., color, layout, and shape,-and by showing a correctly marked and/or cast ballot. In preparing materials in this way, great care must be taken so that if imaginary candidates or party groups are depicted on these simulated ballots, they could in no way be associated with any political participant in the election. This applies to names, symbols, pictures, abbreviations used and needs to take into account public perceptions of political participant nicknames and images. In addition, complete, rather than partial, representations of ballots should be shown. It is important that no perceptions of apparent bias can be drawn from this information material.

To maximize the impact of this information, use of mass media is better concentrated in the week before voting day.  Where comprehensive voter information guides are produced for general distribution, ballot marking and/or casting instructions should form a prominent section of the guide.

Voting Day Assistance

On voting day, provision of posters in the voting station showing how to mark and/or cast a ballot correctly will provide a reminder to voters at the time of voting. Placement of posters in each voting compartment, either facing the voter, or as a placemat on the writing surface used, or as an integral part of voting machine booths (where used), will maximize effectiveness.

If cardboard voting booths are used, this information could be printed directly onto the booth itself.  Most importantly, where paper or card ballots are used, each ballot itself should contain succinct, clear instructions to the voter on the correct way in which to mark a ballot. For example: "Place a cross (X) in the box next to the candidate of your choice."

Information from Voting Operations Officials

Voting operations officials can also actively promote valid completion of ballots. For instance, where any slogan has been used to promote correct ballot marking information, this could be used as reinforcement by voting officials involved in controlling voter queues.

Officials should also be ready to explain correct ballot marking following any voter requests for information. Officials should be careful not to actually assist voters to complete ballots unless allowable under rules governing such voter assistance.

Use of Computers

Where voters have to use computer terminals to vote, whether by touch-screen or keyboard methods, intensive assistance will be required in the voting station to ensure that voters know how to use the machines correctly. In general, each voter should be allowed a trial run on a simulation computer (with imaginary candidates) under the guidance of a well-trained polling official, who should be satisfied that the voter is capable of using the computer to cast an actual vote.

Special Voting Facilities

Special voting facilitities - Voters using special voting facilities such as absentee or mail ballots will need particular instructions on how to complete both their ballots, and any forms or envelopes that accompany their ballots to establish their eligibility to vote. While these instructions may be available in separate formats, or promoted in specifically targeted voter information campaigns, they must also be on or with the ballot materials that have to be completed.

Enveloping system - If an enveloping system is used, instructions on how to correctly insert ballots into envelopes will also be required and, for mail voters, instructions on return post, including a clear statement of the deadline for the receipt of returned mail ballots.

Since such voters are likely to be unable to make contact easily with the Election Management Body for further clarifications, it is extremely important that these instructions are comprehensive and clearly understood.

 

Information on the Integrity of the Voting Process

Information Issues

There are two key aspects to providing voter information on voting operations integrity.

1. The ongoing promotion of the integrity of election processes, which is governed as much by public awareness and judgments of the election management body's performance as any specific voter information, education or image building initiatives.
2. Publicizing the measures that will be applied during voting in the period before voting commences to ensure that voting processes are open and transparent, and free of fraud, manipulation or intimidation.

Information Focus

There are some integrity issues that may be reinforced during the period prior to voting day, particularly in environments where there are significant numbers of new participants in voting processes or where open and fair methods of voting have only recently been introduced

Secrecy of the vote is an issue that may require emphasis, particularly in emerging democracies, but also in more traditional societies where male heads of households or traditional leaders are accustomed to an unchallenged decision-making role. In the latter case, reinforcement of the notion of voters marking their own ballot, in a compartment or booth out of view of anyone else, will assist voting officials in their attempts to prevent group or unauthorized proxy voting.

These messages can be combined with voter information on how to complete the ballot correctly, or, where cultural history shows the need for more intensive emphasis, as a separate component of voter information campaigns. (Voter education should also reinforce voting secrecy) Reinforcement by use of posters around the voting booth area in voting stations will also be useful in these environments. Voting station officials may need to emphasize that there are no secret or hidden recording equipment in the voting compartment that will record how the voter has voted.

Voter fraud prevention methods to be applied are another issue that may require specific focus in voter information campaigns related to the integrity of the process.

Where these are administrative controls, publicizing them widely through information campaigns may act as a deterrent. Where they require the active participation of each voter, such as having fingers marked with indelible ink, they can be used both to prepare voters for the process and allay any fears of fraud or reprisal.

For example, inclusion in voting procedures information campaigns that the ink used is invisible to normal sight, or only remains active for a limited period of time, can calm fears that persons who vote are later easily publicly recognizable.

Use of News Media

In more experienced and media-rich democracies, use of news releases and media coverage may be more cost-effective in reinforcing voting integrity issues than producing information material for distribution.

News releases and arrangements with media for stories on issues of public interest in reporting election preparation progress -such as ballot production, voting processes, issue of voter cards, and systems for preventing multiple voting--can all be focused to provide an emphasis on integrity issues.

Special Voting Facilities

For special voting facilities that require enveloped ballots and personal information from voters which can be used to check their eligibility to vote (such as in some systems of absentee or mail voting or for tendered or provisional ballots), voters may fear that this information will be used to determine how they voted.

Voting materials used for these methods of voting would preferably indicate the steps taken to separate voter information from ballot material before ballots are examined. Information material on the availability of such special voting facilities would also indicate how voting secrecy is to be preserved.

Expenditure Planning

Effective and efficient management of expenditure planning is crucial in any election there fore financial arrangements for voting operations must ensure that:

• sufficient funds are available for the required activities;

• there are adequate controls on their effective and proper use;

• funds are available at the time that they are needed.

There are further issues regarding financial management of voting operations that extend beyond budget and costing issues.

Authorization of Expenditure

During the election period there are times when a need may arise for staff expenditure and urgent purchases in field locations.

Procedures for expenditure authorization need to account for this through a strictly-controlled system of delegating limited expenditure powers up to the limit of their budget allocations to local offices. Monitoring systems for all expenditure are vital to ensure:

• that budget limits for local administration areas are being adhered to,

• to shift funds between areas where necessary, and to ensure that funds are not being misappropriated.

In well-controlled environments the issue of official credit cards for use by election administrators in purchasing election supplies may be appropriate. It is recommended however that this is only instituted where there are effective controls.

Probity in Purchasing

Generally electoral management bodies have applicable state purchasing procedures that govern the usual purchasing activities.

However, the time frames needed to apply these procedures fully in the use of standard tender processes, and possibly approval of major purchasing requests by infrequently meeting state tender boards-may make these impracticable during the compressed time frames of an election period. It is important, for timely supplies of material and equipment, that accelerated purchasing procedures are available that also maintain accountability and probity in purchasing.

These should still require:

• comparison of potential suppliers product quality, suitability and prices so that value is achieved;

• protection against illegal commissions or collusion;

• controls against fraud by staff.

Staffing

Generally the most significant cost component of voting operations are staffing costs, except in those jurisdictions where voting staff are legally obliged to provide their services free. How well these costs are managed, to a large extent, determines the cost-effectiveness of the whole election process. The following points can assist in ensuring efficient, cost effective staff:

Payment levels for staff need to be carefully considered. Except in societies where voting officials' duties are regarded as a civic responsibility, payment rates will need to be sufficient to attract and retain staff of acceptable quality. Retention is important as it reduces long terms costs as a body of skilled staff is built.

If payments are regarded as too low, voting officials may not be willing to accept employment offers for future elections, thus leading to loss of experience.

Acceptable payment rates for voting officials could be derived by aligning their payments with those of staff with similar levels of responsibility in public sector agencies. Where different voting station officials have different responsibility levels, e.g., for voting station managers as against a ballot box guard, some pay scale differentiation would be required. However, pay scales should be kept to as few gradations as possible, to enable simplicity and accuracy of processing.

Simplicity can be enhanced by paying voting officials a lump sum payment at the applicable rate for their voting day duties, training sessions and similar standard responsibilities.

Temporary administrative staff assisting in electoral management body offices would generally be more cost-effectively hired and paid on an hourly basis, in line with workload peaks and troughs. (For further discussion of voting operations staffing, see Recruitment and Training of Voting Station Staff)

Staff Payment Systems

There must be a workable system in place to pay all polling officials accurately and promptly. The large numbers of staff employed as voting officials will often put pressure on systems for payment of staff and control of validity of payments. It is good practice to inform staff of payment methods and dates during training to avoid problems at a later stage.

Ensure that payment systems are capable of performing to a standard that allows these commitments to be met as late or missing payments will discourage staff to accept future voting official appointments.

It is useful to pursue opportunities for using existing wage payment systems in large government agencies or private payroll contractor.

For national elections, especially, the large numbers of staff to be paid may make it difficult to receive satisfactory service levels from external contractors (and staff not receiving payments within two weeks of voting day would be an unsatisfactory service level).

The more expensive route of developing an in-house system may need to be considered where there are no reliable existing systems of sufficient capacities available.

Staff Payment Methods

The actual method of payment varies according to the environment. These include:

• payment to staff on voting day itself. This method may require providing additional security problems on a day when election material security is the paramount objective. It also requires strict financial accountability controls on each voting station manager.

• mail payment cheques to officials following receipt and processing of attendance and performance records following voting day. This is a commonly used method. However, payment immediately following conclusion of duties or by personal receipt from the electoral management body may be the only practicable method in some societies.

Where payment is made after voting day, special arrangements need to be made to forward payments to officials in areas where mail services are unreliable or in remote communities. Direct credit to bank accounts or personal receipt from electoral management body offices may be possible.

Where payment is made after voting day, special arrangements need to be made to forward payments to officials in areas where mail services are unreliable or in remote communities. Direct credit to bank accounts or personal receipt from electoral management body offices may be possible.

The distributed nature of staffing in large numbers of widely dispersed voting stations can present opportunities for "ghosting", i.e., the payment of fictitious staff, and making unwarranted additional payments to polling officials.

Systems for staff appointment and payment control have to be sufficiently robust to prevent these misappropriations, yet simple enough to allow expeditious processing of a large number of payments.

Accountability and Audit

As voting operations involve large numbers of staff and valuable, and often highly portable, equipment distributed over many locations, systems for financial accountability need to be very robust.

Particular care needs to be taken in maintaining controls over highly disposable small items, such as mobile phones and personal radios, and in ensuring that only authentic, officially appointed voting staffs are paid. Official financial control procedures should be in place sufficient to ensure that:

• records are maintained of materials and equipment acquisitions and transfers, including assets registers, supply and receipting procedures and records, asset and materials disposal procedures and records;

• auditing systems for and records of voting staff payments are fully maintained;

• staff are made accountable for funds and materials/equipment in their possession;

• controls on finance disbursements and materials/equipment disposition are sufficient to prevent illegal or fraudulent appropriation of election assets.

There is a need to ensure that election officials are made aware of these procedures, as well as any penalties for breaches of financial probity standards during their training.

It is good practice that all financial transactions and acquisitions or transfers of materials and equipment for voting operations are subject to thorough auditing to ensure that accountability processes are enforced. Where the electoral management body does not have its own auditing capability, there will be a need to engage outside auditing specialists.

International Assistance

International financial assistance for voting operations purposes is often provided on the basis of brief assessment missions. A drawback is that they lack the time and opportunity to become fully acquainted with local issues of timing requirements for funds availability.

There is a particular danger that late decisions from examination and approval processes in donor countries will lead to inefficient use of or unused assistance. It is more effective if financial arrangements are better planned in relation to the election timetable and properly targeted, rather than indiscriminately provided or provided too late for effective use for their intended purpose.

An important financial management issue: Accountability for international funding, particularly where it has been provided late and funds remain unspent at the close of the election period. Donor involvement, through involvement in steering groups for funds use, or retention of some powers to approve funds use, may often be appropriate.

Materials and Equipment

Planning, design, acquisition, and distribution of election materials and equipment for staffing and selection of voting sites is one of the major focuses of the electoral management body in ensuring that all is in readiness for voting day.

In developing supply programmes overall considerations must be that materials and equipment:

• are acquired in accordance with a planned acquisition program (it is essential that there is thorough and early planning of all materials and equipment needs);

• are appropriate for the environment;

• fulfil the legal obligations of the election framework;

• provide adequate security and transparency for all election processes;

• are acquired cost-effectively;

• are easy to use, and, particularly where used by voters, the emphasis is on simplicity in format;

• are monitored comprehensively and regularly to allow continuous assessment of election readiness and early implementation of contingency plans to address deficiencies.

It is extremely important to manage materials and equipment effectively in order to conduct an election that maintains public confidence in the integrity of voting processes and provides a quality service to voters. Failure to supply or late supply of essential materials for use by voters, or poor security in handling of voting materials, can have serious effects on both public perceptions and the actuality of election integrity and can lead to the rejection of election results.

It is prudent that accountability for equipment and materials supply tasks clearly reside with a senior administrator. It is also vital that supply managers are integrated into voting operations policy and management decision-making forums to ensure that procedures developed and adopted are supported by supplies with appropriate functionality, reliability and delivery times.

Importance of Reliable Data

Materials, equipment, and logistics planning cannot proceed effectively without provision of accurate data from other functional areas of electoral management. Early advice of voter registration figures, locations of voting stations, and any changes to voting operations procedures is essential if cost-effective, reliable, and sufficient supplies are to be made available to all voting stations. Important considerations include:

• changes to legislation and voting procedures as they affect the types, timing, and quantities of supplies required. Given the long lead times required for acquisition of some supplies (and subsequent effects on voter education and staff training), it is prudent if a moratorium on legislative or procedural changes affecting voting operations can be instituted for the three months before voting day.

• voter registration figures at national, electoral district, and voting station level, are the essential element in estimating the quantities of each type of material and equipment that will be required. Without early registration data, ensuring sufficient supplies for all voting stations is difficult

• effective logistics planning depends on knowledge of where voting stations are to be located. Late determination of voting station locations will affect not only the calculation of the overall quantities of supplies required, but can result in substantially more expensive forms of transport being required.

The short notice of elections, often given in systems where elections are not for fixed terms, heightens the need for continuous accurate data and a high state of readiness for materials and equipment planning.

Control Measures

Controls on the acquisition, distribution, use, and return of election materials and equipment are necessary to ensure:

• financial probity and the ability to prevent loss of assets;

• readiness assurance, so that election managers are aware at all times of the location, quantity and status of all equipment and materials and can take contingency actions to redress deficiencies.

Essential elements of these controls for materials and equipment controls include:

• clear specifications for all materials and equipment to be acquired;

• approval and maintenance testing programmes;

• a systematic numbering system for all materials and equipment to aid standard identification;

• systems for authorisations of expenditure on materials and equipment;

• simple systems for recording, collating, and examining despatch and receipt data for items at each stage of supply, from manufacture right through to post-voting day return to storage or for destruction;

• systems for restricting access to or allocation of supplies to authorised persons;

• accurate maintenance of asset registers showing quantities, locations, accountabilities for, and condition of voting operations materials and equipment;

• systems for authorising materials and equipment destruction or disposal.

All those involved in supply acquisition and distribution must receive clear instructions on maintaining the audit trial for suppliers, that is suppliers, transport and warehouse workers, polling officials, and electoral management body staff,.

It is important that copies of supply and distribution management summary records are available to managers at the local, regional, and central level so that they are aware of the readiness profiles and to enable effective monitoring of materials supply and distribution.

Lack of controls and proper audit trails on materials and equipment can cause grave problems for electoral management bodies. Acquisition in haste leads to lack of controls or inadequate controls being implemented often where elections are implemented in a very brief time frame, For example without knowing whether supply orders have yet been filled, supplies that have arrived at their destinations, or the quality and condition of supplies makes it difficult to ensure effective voting operations.

Lack of controls and accountability for distribution and control of supplies can affect election integrity if accountable materials are missing, and can cause serious financial loss. Many equipment items used in voting operations such as mobile phones, computer equipment, and vehicles are highly portable and susceptible to theft or loss.

Control of Supply Sources

Controls on sourcing of materials and equipment are also required to provide financial probity, cost-effective acquisitions, and reliability. Necessary controls include:

• transparent competitive bidding procedures to ensure cost-effective purchasing;

• careful consideration of the potential disadvantages of sourcing internationally in terms of sustainability, reliability, length of supply of lines, and cost-effectiveness;

• sourcing only from suppliers willing to enter into performance bonds or guarantees;

• sourcing from suppliers with accredited quality control systems.

Supply Requirements

Voting operations supply requirements entail a complex array of materials and equipment. (For discussion of requirements for major items, see Production of Ballots, Voting Day Equipment and Voting Materials.) Estimation of quantities of materials and equipment required must allow for all usage, not only what is needed for direct voting day operations.

In particular, consider in-house use by the electoral management body for staff training and other activities, and material and equipment required for public information and education activities. Contingency reserves and wastage must be calculated (for most supplies, generally in the range of 5 to 10 percent).

Use of Standard Reference Material

Development of standard reference material for voting operations is required to serve a number functions, including:

• translation of the legal and regulatory frameworks for voting operations into easily understandable terms;

• compendium of standard procedures and good practices for voting operations activities;

• assured and accurate basis from which voting operations staff can provide services to voters;

• basis for training voting operations staff;

• monitoring base against which the extent, timing, and quality of implementation of required tasks can be checked;

• repository of corporate knowledge about voting operations;

• transparent record of the ways in which the electoral management body provides voting services to the public.

Accurate and well-presented reference material provided to all staff and targeted to their specific duties will result in better voter service. Voting staff can be confident that they have correct guidelines for all activities if they have been provided with quality material.

In turn voters can be confident that they are being treated in an equitable fashion according to standard procedures and practices.

Reference material provided by the electoral management body to other participants in the elections, for example, parties or candidates and their representatives, independent observers, security forces, and the media, will assist in ensuring that all participants are fully aware of their roles, rights, and responsibilities in election processes.

Manuals

Formal manuals containing basic reference material are preferable to (see Manuals) ad hoc instructions. Informal ad hoc instructions are more likely to be mislaid and may lack comprehensiveness. During the election period it is advisable that election managers maintain regular formal communication with voting operations staff to monitor:

• overall activity progress;

• any changes to previously arranged procedures or practices (particularly where local variations may arise);

• present and imminent timetabled activities.

Communication in the form of a regular information bulletin during the voting operations period is a useful adjunct to existing reference material.

Checklists

Manuals may also be supplemented (or for less complex tasks, replaced) by task checklists (see Checklists and Cue Cards). Simplifying procedures and tasks to a checklist format enhances ease of understanding and provides a self-monitoring record of task completion. Messages in manuals showing demonstrations of the tasks described in the manuals can be reinforced by use of other visual reference material such as video, posters, or slides.

Development of Manuals

When developing manuals for voting operations, consideration needs to be given to the following basic issues:

Flexibility of format: The expected life and target audience of the manual needs to be carefully considered. If amendments may occur during the life of the manual, for example, a loose-leaf format is preferable and easily included in the existing manual. Breaking subject matter organisation within a manual or series of manuals into sections appropriate to particular staff or discrete tasks is effective.

Verification of accuracy of framework descriptions, and comprehensiveness, appropriateness, and practicality of procedures and practices described. Expert reviews of materials included in the manual are necessary. As manuals are for the use of field operations staff they are best placed to know if the format and instructions are readily understandable and that procedures and practices espoused are practicable and appropriate for the range of field conditions that may experience.

It is good practice to include a range of field operations staff, including local area administrators and assistants, voting station managers and staff, counting staff and client representatives in the development of voting operations manuals. If this is not possible, it is recommended that there should be a review of each manual's contents by such staff and clients prior to formal introduction.

Use of simple language, as well as pictorial representations or diagrams and appropriate examples wherever possible.

Timing of compilation and distribution so as to give staff sufficient time to become familiar with the contents before they have to apply them.

Version control mechanisms to ensure that amendments to manual contents are prepared, and received and understood by all relevant staff.

Manuals

There are some overall design and content issues to be addressed when designing manuals for voting operation purposes. As some manuals may have cost implications, manual designers need to be aware of how to provide maximum user friendliness at minimum cost.

Electoral management bodies utilize different kinds of manuals depending on the function and target audience. This section looks at the different manuals firstly in terms of the generic content and then in specific detail. Generic factors that need to be considered are:

Flexibility of format: For example the production of manuals wherever possible in a loose-leaf format to enable incorporation of any changes or additions of training material.

The nature and capabilities of the target audience: Language style and density of content needs to be suitable for the type of staff who will be using the manual. The use of simple, non-legal language, the breaking of complex actions down into simple, discrete steps, and visual rather than textual representations wherever possible enhances understanding.

Production and distribution costs: Questions such as: Is full color section differentiation really necessary to facilitate ease of reference, or will use of bold typefaces and clear indexes suffice? What durability and weight of covers or binders is really needed for the expected life of the manual? Need to be asked when designing a user friendly manual

Types and extent of information required: When considering this aspect consider whether all staff need a full, detailed explanation of their tasks in a manual format, or are check lists of their duties both easier to understand and less costly to produce for staff with simple functions? Another consideration is whether a single large manual should be produced, or are there sufficiently different staff functions and roles to make production of separate manuals of smaller size for staff undertaking different duties preferable?

Print Quantities - Determination of print quantities for manuals will depend on economy and ensuring that all relevant staff have access to the reference materials required to complete their tasks effectively.

Large quantity runs - the large quantities of manuals required for voting officials means that they are generally better handled by printing contractors rather than in-house by the electoral management body.

Short-run manuals – can be done in-house where such infrastructure is available. This includes manual for electoral management body staff responsible for voting operations administration, production of master copies in-house and bulk production by photocopy specialists may be an option, No matter how strict the guidelines, there will always be voting staff who lose or forget their manuals. The basic quantities of voting official manuals required will be determined by estimated staffing. It is important to include voting operations administration offices that will also require copies of the manuals used in voting locations.

Past experience, if available and relevant, is the best guide for excess quantities required. It is recommended to print at least an additional 10 percent for use as spares at training sessions and at voting locations. Additional copies could also be printed to meet any requests for copies from political parties, candidates, and the general public where this is offered. Voting operations manuals should preferably be available on request by the public as part of the promotion of transparency in voting operations administration.

Types of Manuals

Electoral management bodies normally produce:

• Administration manuals - for the overall administration of voting operations
• Voting Station Officials manuals - for voting and counting officials
• Trainers manuals for trainers involved in voting staff training

Electoral management bodies may also produce:

• • Party candidate handbooks - it is also highly useful for the electoral management body to produce a handbook for the use of political participants in the election, outlining the legal and procedural frameworks and party and candidate rights and responsibilities within these.
• • Security force manuals - security forces involved in election activities also need a guide for their role in the democratic process which can be included in their operational instructions for election-related tasks.
• Observers Manuals – observer groups require a manual as this assists in ensuring quality and consistency in observation activities. The development of observer manuals is sometimes undertaken by the sponsoring organization. However the electoral management body is best placed to provide information relevant to the conduct of the election and the legal framework within which an election takes place.

Administration Manuals

Administrative manuals are important to ensure equity in treatment of all voters and to ensure that election laws and regulations are consistently and correctly interpreted by administrative staff.  Having voting operations administrations manuals available as public documents promotes transparency in voting operations management.

The range and content of such manuals depends on the structure of the electoral management body such as whether they maintain a permanent local or regional presence or hire temporary local or regional managers, premises, and equipment for election purposes, whether they have national control of voting operations, or whether voting operations are undertaken by other local agencies

Codification of Procedures - Codify overall procedures and practices for administration of voting operations for use as reference material and as a basis for developing technical training for those staff of the electoral management body responsible for voting operations administration.

Staff Responsibilities - clearly define the responsibilities of staff. Where administration is organized along lines of functional division, or there are central, regional, and/or local administrative offices maintained for the voting operations period, clarity of responsibilities can be promoted by producing a distinctive task/procedural manual for each organizational division or level. Subject matter should include:

• the range of tasks to be undertaken;

• their legal basis;

• relevant procedures;

• organisational methods and good practice models;

• examples of relevant standard forms;

• examples of common problems and solutions.

Subject Matter– there is a need to ensure that the subject matter covers relevant and pertinent information such as:

• codes of conduct;

• voting operations planning cycles, formats, responsibilities and inputs, implementation progress monitoring, reviews;

• review and determination of resource needs, e.g., voting sites and suitable locations, staffing and training, finance, materials supply and management, security, communications, logistics, special voting facilities (absentee voting, early voting and the like), voter information;

• budget inputs, preparation, and review;

• staff recruitment, training, payment, and performance monitoring for administrative assistance, voting stations, and the count;

• voting site selection and reservation;

• management oversight of voting station operations;

• materials management, e.g., requisitioning of materials and equipment, production and quality control, storage, distribution and return for administrative offices and voting and counting sites, materials security, post-election archiving;

• security arrangements;

• fraud and corruption control and electoral offences;

• nomination of candidates and registration of parties;

• determination of party and candidate order on ballots (where "mark choice" ballots are used);

• voter information procedures and campaigns;

• liaison with political participants, other agencies, community groups, and observers;

• rights of voters and political participants;

• management of any special voting facilities, e.g., additional specific arrangements for staffing, logistics, materials distribution and return, monitoring, different voting procedures;

• ballot counting procedures and management oversight of counts;

• verification of counts and recounts;

• determination and announcement of results;

• handling of complaints and challenges to administrative decisions;

• evaluating performance.

Voting Station Officials Manuals

Where staffs are categorised and assigned duties at different skill or responsibility levels within a voting station, separate manuals for these categories of staff may be justified, both to minimise the risk of confusion and to allow more detailed guidance for those staff in positions requiring superior literacy or skills.

Keeping the style of the manual and the checklist formats within them simple(see Checklists and Cue Cards), the more likely voting station officials are to refer to them to assist in swift and correct decision-making under the pressure of voting day.

Information Focus - Voting station officials’ manuals need to cover four basic areas of instructions:

• technical data on voting procedures;

• materials and personal security issues;

• maintenance of voter service and rights;

• staff rights, responsibilities, administration, and welfare issues.

Subject Matter - Specific issues voting station officials’ manuals include are:

• the voting station official's role, decisions within their responsibility, and when advice should be sought from more senior staff;

• payment, welfare, meal, accommodation, transport, insurance, and other entitlements;

• responsibilities under the election staff code of conduct

• responsibilities regarding training attendance and activity completion;

• pre-opening of voting station duties;

• materials to be issued to and maintained by staff;

• maintaining the security of voting materials while in and not in use;

• instructions for use of any equipment to be used by voting station officials;

• maintenance of voting station layout, cleanliness, and materials;

• information regarding handling of ballots (and any ballot envelopes used) and their relevant ballot box, and descriptions and instructions for use of electronic or other voting machines;

• voting station entrance and exit controls;

• persons authorised to be in voting stations;

• maintaining voter flow and controlling voter queues;

• providing information and assistance to voters;

• establishing identity of voters and required checks to prevent impersonation and multiple voting;

• use and correct marking of voters lists;

• treatment of persons not found to be on the voters lists;

• issue of ballots and control of computers or other voting machines;

• procedures for maintaining secrecy of voting within the voting station;

• treatment of spoilt, rejected, discarded, or cancelled ballots (or ballot envelopes, where these are accountable items);

• securing of ballot boxes;

• rights of voters within the voting station;

• rights and responsibilities of party and candidate representatives and independent observers in the voting station;

• common problems encountered in voting stations and standard responses;

• procedures for close of voting;

• procedures for reconciliation, packaging of materials, and their despatch or preparation for the count, following the close of voting;

• role of security forces;

• emergency, accident and adjourned voting procedures, and personal security measures.

Voting Station Managers: It may be prudent to provide managers of voting stations with a separate manual, since their responsibilities will also encompass additional or higher-level functions, for which additional guidance may be required. Additional duties to be covered in such manuals would often include:

• the management, training, and welfare of staff;

• establishment and maintenance of voting station layouts;

• management of complaints and challenges;

• overall materials security and accountability within the voting station;

• completion of voting records and voting station reports;

• liaison with voting operations administrators and other agencies;

• roles in staff and voting site selection.

Note: Where counting takes place at specific counting centers, rather than at voting stations, and is done by different staff, separate manuals for the count will be required. If counting takes place at voting stations, counting procedures may be better included with voting procedures in the one manual.

Officials for Special Voting Facilities Officials staffing special voting facilities will have some quite specific duties according to the nature of the special type of voting. Where there are considerable differences in their procedures and duties compared to officials in a normal voting station, to enhance clarity of instruction, it is preferable to produce separate manuals.

Mobile Voting Stations Officials on mobile voting stations particularly if operating for more than one day, will have specific additional functions in relation to logistics, materials security and reconciliations, and often voting procedures involving early or absentee voting

Voting Abroad - Where voting is conducted at voting stations in foreign countries , officials will have specific and different duties in regard to materials supply and return, and administration of mail voting or absentee voting.

Early Voting - Staff conducting early voting may  whether by mail or in person, may also be subject to different voting procedures.

Local Referenda: In some circumstances, referenda held concurrently with elections may be restricted in voter eligibility to particular local areas or community groups.

In such cases, rather than include instructions for such a referenda within all voting station officials manuals, it may be more effective to produce a specific manual for use only in the voting stations affected.

Trainers Manuals

Trainers of voting station staff need a different manual to voting station officials and administrative as these manuals address the construction of the training session and the manner in which information is delivered, They are essential where a cascade system of training is being implemented by those with little formal adult training experience.

Training Workbooks - specific works for completion by voting station officials during their trainer ensure that their competence can be monitored and are necessary as part of training reference and knowledge assessment materials. They have limited use in societies of lower literacy, or where cost considerations prevent their use.

In such cases the use of role playing and simulations, directed by experienced trainers, can be effective as a knowledge assessment process. (Refer to Information Direct to Voters for the use of suitable training aids)

Party/Candidate Manuals

Party Candidate Handbooks are useful for detailing the processes that will be applied by voting operations staff and the actions, responsibilities, and rights of political participants during this phase of the election. Providing political parties/candidates with this information minimizes the potential for conflict or tension at the voting station.

It is good practice to have these handbooks available to political participants well before the commencement of the period for nominating candidates or party groups for election.

(Similar handbooks on other issues affecting political parties and candidates, such as party registration and the framework for party funding and expenditure, are also useful.)

Content of Handbooks

• contact details for officials who can provide further clarification or assistance;

• participation of parties and candidates in the voting operations process;

• correct presentation of party and candidate nominations;

• checking processes for nominations and criteria for acceptance or rejection;

• determination of candidate or party order on ballots (where "mark choice" ballots are used);

• codes of conduct for political participants and election officials;

• media access rules;

• campaign rules;

• election security measures;

• provision and accessibility of election materials, including any rights of political participants to distribute these to voters;

• voting station sitting and layout;

• eligibility of voters;

• voting procedures, including those for any special voting facilities such as absentee voting, mail voting, mobile voting stations, voting abroad;

• roles, responsibilities, and authority of voting operations administrators and voting station officials;

• roles, rights, and responsibilities of party officials, candidates, and their representatives in relation to voting procedures, voting locations, and voting operations administration;

• procedures for the counting process, including criteria for determining validity of ballots and interpreting marks made by voters on ballots, aggregation of counts, and announcement of results;

• roles, rights, and responsibilities of party officials, candidates, and their observers in relation to counts, result determination, and announcement;

• rights, methods, and procedures with regard to challenging decisions made by voting operations administrators, voting station officials, and counting staff.

Observer Manuals

Audience - Observer groups comprise people from different backgrounds, with varying levels of technical knowledge about elections and different professional or other skills. As many observers will be operating in unfamiliar environments, their manuals should be a complete guide to the election framework and procedures, their monitoring role and responsibilities, observation administration, and observer survival. These subjects are the necessary basis for observer training

Subject Matter:

• purpose, scope, and objectives of the observation program;

• the principles of neutral, independent observation;

• the political and cultural background and legal and administrative frameworks for the election, including relevant extracts from electoral legislation and rules, examples, and potential problems or issues of interest which may need special attention;

• list of voting operations administration, political party, community organisation, media (where appropriate), and legal contacts at the appropriate levels;

• identification of required observer activities, including issues to be monitored, methods of monitoring, and action to be taken if irregularities are discovered;

• observer code of conduct, explanation of its meaning, and enforcement provisions;

• statement of rights of observers;

• accreditation requirements;

• examples of election materials;

• use of observer communications systems and reporting requirements;

• copies of monitoring checklists to be completed by observers and instructions on how to complete them;

• personal and group security information, including, where necessary, emergency evacuation plans and mine information;

• administration arrangements for observers, e.g., deployment details, administrative contacts, accommodation information, transport information, logistics, emergency services contacts, training requirements and details, regular and emergency payment arrangements.

Security Force Manuals

Electoral Management Body Contribution - Security forces produce their own threat analyses, operational security guides and manuals, and deployment strategies as a framework for their election action plans.

Electoral management bodies contribute by developing and assisting security forces in developing, a manual detailing security forces' overall responsibilities in assisting to ensure free and fair election processes. These manuals should be distributed to all security force personnel engaged in election security activity.

Subject Matter:

• human rights issues in relation to security forces' role in the election;

• security objectives and strategy in relation to the election;

• the standards of professional, impartial, neutral, and non-intimidating conduct to be upheld by security forces during the election period;

• contact mechanisms and liaison details between the electoral management body and security forces;

• an overview of election processes and methods, and security forces' roles in protecting these;

• details of offences against electoral laws.

The format and content of such manuals will clearly need to be pitched at the literacy levels of security forces.

Particular care in providing strict guidelines regarding the security forces' role in the election process may be needed in transitional environments or where security forces have recently incorporated previously irregular units into their ranks.

Checklists and Cue Cards

Checklists are effective as control and reference information providing simple standard formats that are prompts to action, monitoring tools, and more easily referenced than relying solely on accessing descriptive data in bulky manuals.

Checklists are particularly useful in encouraging consistent monitoring of task completion. Checklists are a supplement to, not a total replacement for, procedures manuals.

The design and method of production depends on the subject matter and target audience. Checklists for central administrative actions such as materials supply, may only be used by one or two staff, and can be hand drawn or in the form of simple computer generated control sheets.

Checklists that are used to standardize the action of larger numbers of staff, such as electoral district managers, materials packaging staff, voting station managers, and voting station staff, may better be produced as appendices or integrated sections of their procedural instructions or manuals.

Checklists can be especially useful for a range of tasks some of which include:

Nominations

Processing nominations can be a complex process, particularly where qualification checking involves obtaining data from other authorities.

Processing checklists will aid in accurately tracking the stage of processing for each nomination, and provide a standard format of data from which to accept or reject the nomination.

Voting Site Assessments

Checklists support consistent assessments of potential voting station locations to determine if they meet the standards required.

Materials Management

Maintaining checklists to monitor the design status, ordering, quality control, supply, and distribution of election materials is a necessary management control tool in a complex supply environment.

Constructing inventory, dispatch, and reconciliation records in simple checklist format will aid in correct completion.

Supervisors of Voting Stations

Active performance monitoring of voting stations during voting hours provides voting operations administrators with information on voting progress, operational problems, warning of any possible challenges, and data useful in voting site and staff selection for future elections.

If supervisors on visits to voting stations complete performance checklists, this information can be retained in a standardized format.

Voting Station Staff

Checklists are an immediate reminder to voting station staff of their specific duties and a useful tool for voting station managers in monitoring staff performance and ensuring that required actions have been taken. Simple checklists that can effectively be used for tasks including:

• checks of material, equipment, and staff prior to opening the voting station;

• required actions in issuing ballots to voters effectively designed as place mats for the desks of voting station staff, or where signage identifying ballot issuing areas is attached to the tables being used, printed on the reverse side of these signs;

• close of voting procedures;

• packaging and reconciliation of materials following close of voting.

Manuals for voting station officials may be more functional if designed as a series of checklists. 

Ballot Counts

Ballot count checklists are useful reminders of counting procedures and validity criteria that apply to ballots for staff. . Specific tasks that lend themselves to simple detailing in checklist format include:

• steps for opening ballot boxes and reconciling ballots;

• steps for checking admissibility of enveloped ballots, including absentee or mail votes;

• criteria for determining validity of ballots;

• packaging of materials following completion of the ballot count.

Ballot Paper Design

Electoral management bodies need to take into account a range of issues when designing the ballot paper. A general principle underpinning any design is that the simpler the ballot paper the more effective. Ballot paper design has an impact on two important aspects of the election process:

1. The ability of voters to understand the choices of candidates or parties running in the election and select their choice in a valid manner. Elements on the ballot paper such as party symbols, candidate photographs, a short description of the party's and/or candidate's goals, and clear instruction on the ballot paper as to the method of casting a valid vote will support this.
2. The accuracy of counting of votes. Poorly designed ballot papers, with, for example, small and closely aligned preference squares, can lead to voters' marks overlapping more than one square, with consequent dispute at the count over whether the voter is valid, and, if valid, which party or candidate the voter selected.  Two other factors that impact on the design of the ballot paper are:

a; The cost of the design is a factor that needs to be considered.

b; The flexibility of design – this is constrained by limitations of the election system and the definition of ballot layouts in legislation.

It will be difficult to design a simple ballot paper, for instance, where the system allows large numbers of candidates and their parties to appear on the ballot, and the voter must choose to either make a single preference mark for the party of choice or number sequential preferences for each of the individual candidates.

Within these constraints election administrators can influence the ballot paper design by:

• the clarity of layout,

• the use of clear typefaces,

• having clear instructions on the ballot paper,

• the size of the font,

• the spacing between candidates/parties names, the quality of the print

• by advising on legislative changes that will simplify ballot completion.

• the space for the box in which the voter places his/her mark

• inclusion of party symbols

• inclusion of candidate/ party leader photographs

• color coding for different ballots

Essential Information

There is some essential information that printed ballot papers should contain.

• the date of the election

• the elected body for which the election is being conducted

• the electoral district for which the ballot is to be issued

Basic Types

The two basic types of ballot require voters to cast their ballots in two distinctly different ways:

• voters faced with a selection of different ballot papers, each representing a different party or candidate. Voters have to choose which ballot they prefer, usually sealing their choice of ballot in a ballot envelope before placing it in the ballot box.

• voters issued with a single ballot containing all the parties or candidates in the election. Voters have to indicate on the ballot paper which of these is preferred before placing the ballot in the ballot box.

Where separate ballot papers are provided for each candidate or party, and voters have to choose and envelope the one appropriate to their choice, ballot paper design considerations are relatively simple and should:

• clearly identify the party or candidate it represents, usually through use of a distinctive colour, or use of party name or symbol, or candidate name, symbol or photograph;

• give clear instructions for correctly selecting the preferred ballot and enveloping or otherwise depositing it in a ballot box.

Components of "Mark Choice" Ballot Paper Design

While there are common factors in "mark choice" ballot paper design, the manner in which they are implemented provides a wide array of different styles and possible permutations. The following examples are by no means an exhaustive review but give an indication of the range of possibilities in current ballot paper designs.

Methods of marking preferred choice:

• writing a number or mark in a box beside a candidate or party;

• writing a number or mark in a ruled off section containing the candidate or party

• circling the number next to a party or candidate

• crossing out all candidates or parties except the preferred one

• drawing a connecting line between two arrows next to a candidate or party

• filling in a small oval or circle next to a candidate or party

• striking through the name of the preferred candidate or party

• writing on a blank ballot a candidate or party number

• writing on a blank ballot the name of a candidate or party

• numbering sequentially all candidates on the ballot

• numbering sequentially a specified number or proportion of the number of candidates on the ballot

• recording a vote for "none of the above"

• setting a punch card machine to punch a hole in the ballot next to the candidate/party

• placing an official stamp on the name of the party

• having the option of placing a mark next to a party, or numbering all candidates sequentially

• keying the number or symbol of a candidate or party on a computer keyboard

• touching a computer screen on the symbol or name of a candidate or party

• pulling levers on a voting machine corresponding to parties or candidates

Party or candidate information:

• code number for party or candidate with no further information

• candidate name or party name

• Party list name and list candidates' names

• candidate name and party name or abbreviation

• party or candidate name, and party symbol

• candidate name and photograph, party name

• party name, party symbol, party abbreviation, party leader photograph

Voter instructions:

• none

• instruction on how to complete ballot

Size and color of ballot:

• one third A4 sheet

• around one metre wide

• consistent size for all electoral districts

• different size according to number of candidates

• colour coded for elections to different representative bodies

• colour coded for different methods of voting (normal, absentee, early, tendered/provisional)

Order of candidates and parties:

• alphabetical

• random draw for position

• rotating, so all candidates appear at the head on an equal number of ballots.

Simultaneous elections

• on the same ballot paper

• each election on a different ballot paper

Clear Specifications

Whatever the format of the ballot paper, clear specifications, approved by the electoral management body, will aid consistency and quality control of printing. These would cover issues such as:

• overall size restrictions

• information to be provided and its positioning

• fonts and point sizes used

• borders and other graphics

• minimum space between candidates or parties

• size of boxes in which voter's mark is to be placed (if used).

Making Voting Easier

The ballot paper form and content needs to be easily understandable. Simplicity aids speed of voter flow, and assists all voters - not only those less literate - to vote with confidence that they have not made a mistake. The following issues can assist voters and aid administrative effectiveness.

Clear instruction for voters on the ballot Paper: For most ballot papers these need only be variations on wording such as: "Write your mark next to the party of your choice." An illustration at the top of the ballot paper may assist in less literate societies.

Reviewing restrictive provisions that specify a single particular type of preference mark to the exclusion of all others such as a number, or "X", or "tick", or circled number, and disallow ballot papers marked in any other fashion, even when the voter's preference is clear.

Ensure that the size of the box or space in which preference marks have to be placed is large enough, especially for the elderly and physically challenged writers, to place their preference, especially where more than one preference has to be numbered. Similarly, the distance between spaces or boxes in which preferences have to be marked should be sufficient to prevent confusion.

Negative vote systems (crossing out all the candidates the voter doesn't want) can be more conducive to error, and take more time to mark a ballot paper than simple single positive preference systems. However, given the history of using negative vote systems in some countries, change can lead to confusion.

Information on candidates and parties assists voters in making their choice. At the very least, the party or candidate name, and for candidates the party affiliation, should appear.

In all environments, inclusion of the party symbols on the ballot paper will help voters. In less literate societies, especially where party affiliations are more fluid, candidate or party leader photographs are useful.

For simultaneous elections, color coding of ballot papers and ballot box signs for each separate election can reduce or minimize confusion.

Review fonts and point sizes used for clarity.

Where ballots for different electoral districts are different sizes, examine the possibilities of standardizing size.

Very large ballots, particularly those that have to be folded to fit into voting compartments, can take longer for the voter to understand the range of choices.

Examples of Ballot Papers can be found in ACE Electoral Materials Section.

Printing of Ballots

In systems where ballots are liable items, strict security and controls must surround ballot paper printing. If ballot authenticity is provided by the use of special papers, paper stocks must also be strictly controlled. As ballot paper printing is a high volume, short turnaround time process that demands total print accuracy, is necessary for the electoral management body to have total confidence in the capacity, quality control procedures, integrity, and security of ballot paper printing contractors. The electoral management body should be also instituting its own strict quality control mechanisms.

Where enveloped ballot voting procedures are used, such as in those following the French system, ballots are freely available to voters. While accuracy of ballot content is still an important issue, there is no need for the same levels of integrity and security controls as where "mark choice" ballot papers are used.

Printing Location

Before determining the design of the ballot papers, there is a need for the electoral management body to consider the time ballot papers take to print and whether potential contractors are capable of meeting the print specifications.

Ballot papers with special features may be restricted in potential production facilities, or not be able to be produced locally, either through lack of technology required or lack of capacity to complete the task within the available time frame. For example:

• using watermarked or other special papers;

• security print methods;

• producing in a booklet with numbered stubs;

• using full colour print and/or colour photographs of candidates.

Production of ballot papers using these more expensive methods can add significantly to election costs.

Additionally, foreign production can make it more difficult to control quality and supply scheduling for the most important item of election material and lead times may be longer, unless very expensive transport methods are adopted. Decisions to print in another country should only be made after very careful consideration of locally produced alternatives.

If there is not sufficient local expertise to print ballot papers contracting ballot paper printing at the regional level can be more appropriate, if suitable contractors are available due to the high volumes and short time period usually available. Contracting to multiple contractors at local levels is generally not sustainable as quality control and standardization of product can too easily be compromised.

Print Scheduling

Print scheduling also depends on how soon various ballots are required for use by voters. If full detail ballots are required for early voting, or sending to voting stations in other countries, there may be some urgency to produce small initial quantities of ballot papers for all electoral districts.

Conversely, where blank votes (which can be produced earlier) are used for early or absentee voting, central or regional production facilities usually start printing with the electoral districts at the furthest distance and with the longest transport lead time, to enable packaging of ballots, with their voting stations' other supplies, to begin first.

Print Quality Control

Before printing ballot papers there is a need to apply intensive quality control measures by both the electoral management body and the print contractor to ensure that ballot papers are correctly printed. Transference of ballot format and content data electronically from the electoral management body to the print contractor can assist in ensuring accurate printing. All ballot printing needs to be undertaken in line with strict control instructions, covering authorizations to print and transfer material, quantities, content, security, and distribution.

For each ballot paper printed (for different electoral districts, different types of voting, or different elections), the quality control measures that need to be implemented would include the following initial checks.

• provision of detailed design specifications to the contractor, and ensuring that these have been fully understood. Mock-up proofs obtained from the contractor and thoroughly checked;

• detailed checking of ballot content material before it is sent to the contractor for print set-up. Checking party/candidate order against the order announced following the close of nominations. Checking the correctness of all party/candidate details required on the ballot against the information provided on accepted nominations forms;

• checking and signing off all contractor-produced film and plate reproduction material, by electoral management ody staff, before production proofs are printed.

During print production, the following checks need to be implemented:

• an experienced electoral management body staff member should be present during the make-ready process for the press and check the format, information, colour, image position, and trim of the ballot. Production printing should only commence when proofs have been approved by the electoral management body as correct.

• there should be a regular extraction of sample ballots for checking as to colour, image position, and trim during printing. If any deficiencies are found, printing should cease until a fresh satisfactory proof has been printed and approved by the electoral management body. Stocks of ballots produced since the last accepted sample should be checked and faulty ballots destroyed.

• repeat these control processes whenever a new plate is used, a different press brought into production or commencement of a different ballot print.

• check samples of the final product to ensure stubs are numbered correctly in sequence and/or packs contain the correct number of ballots, where ballots are being produced in numbered stub booklets or other standard packages.

Although this may seem tedious the consequences of incorrect ballot format, party or candidate order or data, trimming of ballots (so candidate/party names, or ballot completion instructions are deleted), or color (particularly for color print ballots containing candidate photographs or party symbols) can be serious enough to jeopardise the election.

Security

Where ballots are liable materials, the following security measures should be applied during printing.

• an undertaking by the contractor regarding security of ballot materials;

• secure, weatherproof storage by the print contractor of all printed ballots, ballot paper stock, printing plates and other ballot reproduction material;

• physical security in the printing plant, including searches of employees leaving the premises;

• secure return of all printing plates and reproduction material to the electoral management body for secure destruction at the conclusion of prints run.

Where special paper stock is used as an integrity control, security would also be required, including:

• secure storage of ballot paper stock on the print contractor's premises;

• contractor's accounting for and secure destruction of all off-cut and waste paper stock and printing spoils;

• contractor’s accounting for all paper stock supplied but not used.

Printed Ballot Integrity Controls

It is important that the production and distribution of ballots that are the accountable voting material issued to voters are subject to adequate integrity controls.These controls address two issues, namely:

• the number of ballots;

• the authenticity of ballot papers

In systems using enveloped ballots, following the French or similar models, the need for such strict controls on ballots is not necessarily evident.

Assurance that the number of ballots is correct can be attained by various secure packaging, numbering and counting methods. Assuring the authenticity of ballots issued to voters can be an expensive process if through use of special papers and print methods, or relatively simple and inexpensive through validation at the time of issue.

The types of integrity controls instituted depend on how much reassurance the voting public needs regarding voting integrity. Simple validation methods in the voting station can be effective but may not appear as professionally secure as special paper or secure printing.

Security features are necessary to maintain the integrity of the process. The cost of each of these features varies and the electoral management body may decide to use several methods to ensure maximum security.

As the costs vary from one feature to another and this may impact on the choice made by the electoral management body.

Number of Ballots

Printed ballots are normally subject to a series of reconciliations from the time that they are printed to the time of completion of ballot counts.

Counting the ballots at each stage of the distribution process and during reconciliation in voting stations and the count can be assisted if quantity control systems are instituted at the time of manufacture.

Systems banding ballots loose in packs of standard quantities according to specification. This system is the most simple but the least effective as bands can easily be torn, and accuracy of packaging with this method is often suspected. Shrink wrapping of loose ballots in standard packs provides more packaging security but can also be suspect in accuracy.

Printing ballots with a numbered, perforated stub and collating the ballots in standard, stapled booklet,-usually of fifty or a hundred ballots, provides more surety as to numbers.

The ballot paper itself should never be numbered as this indicates to voters that voting secrecy may not be maintained. If this method is adopted, it is important the electoral management body is satisfied that print contractors are experienced and qualified to produce these ballots in booklets accurately otherwise the additional expense will be to no avail. In some environments this facility may not be available locally.

Full Counts

It is essential that a full count of ballots be conducted on delivery of ballots to the voting station and for counts of both used and unused ballots during reconciliations at the close of voting, to identify any manufacturing errors in numbering of these ballots.

This also includes the use of numbered stub ballots.

Authenticity of Ballots

Ballot authenticity can be assured by using:

• special papers, such as watermarked or ultraviolet light sensitive coated paper;

• special security prints methods, such as micro-printed security codes and colour shift print.

Significant lead times for production may be required for these methods, particularly for watermarked or coated paper, which may not be readily available to the required specifications locally in all countries.

Costs of printing using these special papers or print methods are considerably higher than using normal paper stock and print facilities.

Use of Official Marks

In election systems where each ballot is accountable,the ballot paper is validated on issue by the election official placing an official mark or signing or initialing the back of the ballot paper. This is a cost-effective manner for assuring that only valid ballot papers enter the count, and in most environments provides as effective authenticity controls as special and expensive paper stocks or security print methods.

Perforating instruments or stamps can be official marks used by the election officials. A different, distinctive mark would preferably be provided to each voting station to enable full accountability and integrity checks during counts. These are highly accountable items whose design should be kept secret until use and that should be kept under strict security at all times.

Even more cost-effective--but of slightly less integrity and of less use in less literate societies--is the alternative method of requiring the ballot issuing polling official to sign or initial the reverse of each ballot as it is issued.

Place the official mark or election official endorsement in the same position on every ballot, to allow it to be visible when the ballot is folded by the voter.

The top right hand corner of the reverse of the ballot paper is probably the most expeditious position for quick application by most (right-handed) polling officials. The correct position could be marked by a box or other shape on the reverse side of the ballot.

The additional costs of two-sided printing, however, should be carefully weighed against any likely advantages in accuracy.

Voting Day Equipment and Maintenance Considerations

Equipment for use in elections comes from a wide variety of sources and in many different shapes, sizes and possible functions which can be quite confusing.

There are essential issues that require consideration in determining the range, method of acquisition and maintenance of election-related equipment.

Legislative definitions of equipment for use by the electoral management body: It can be useful to include the functions that equipment serves in legislation.

There needs to be a balance between too restrictive a legislative definition of the materials from which equipment, or its components, must be made as it can restrict the ability of the electoral management body to take advantages of technological change or new materials available in the market.

The election environment: Different equipment configurations will be more suitable for different climatic, security, and maintenance support conditions.

Equipment should meet the following conditions to be effective:

• capable of performing under, for example, extremes of heat, dust, or humidity, when these are likely to be encountered;

• capable of providing high levels of security where security risks are high (or conversely has high security features where these are not necessary);

• capable of being understood by its likely operators and/or voters;

• can be maintained and logistical supported locally;

• not waste resources, no matter how low the initial cost.

Costs and benefits to voter service: It is necessary to consider cost effectiveness when evaluating potential equipment acquisitions.

Equipment should bring real and reliable benefits to voter service in a cost-effective manner more than promote a progressive corporate image for the electoral management body.

Management Issues

The electoral management body needs to carefully plan equipment provision at both the strategic and operational levels to ensure effective and economical supply of all election equipment needs.

The following are significant matters requiring consideration when developing equipment management programs:

• integrate equipment management programs with the overall election planning process so that appropriate equipment types and acquisition timing is achieved;

• establish reliable source data for the quantities of equipment required, the locations at which they are be required, and the links to systems providing voter registration data and voting station location data;

• plan equipment needs well in advance to ensure that required equipment is available in sufficient time for use, and to avoid any penalty costs of last-minute acquisitions. Pay special attention to items with long supply lead times, either due to complex and/or innovative design specifications, or sourcing from distant or international sources;

• develop detailed specifications for all equipment needs to ensure that the functionality required of equipment is achieved;

• dmplement accurate systems for monitoring equipment on hand i.e. quantities, locations, movements, and monitoring the acquisition process, to aid reviews of election readiness and provide an audit trail for equipment management;

• ensure that acquisition methods are cost-effective. Since most election equipment will be used infrequently, the possibilities of hire or lease for durable equipment, or use of disposable equipment, may be considered;

• ensure that all uses of equipment are considered in the planning of required equipment quantities and delivery timing. Equipment is required not only on voting day, but for earlier activities such as election officials training, public information, voter education, as well as post election functions such as dealing with election challenges and maintenance programmes.

Further information on specific classes of election equipment can be found at:

Communications Systems
Ballot Boxes and Seals
Voting Compartments
Temporary Structures
Furniture
Amenities

Quality Control

Before entering into a contract to supply election equipment there is a need for electoral management bodies to ensure that implementation of an acceptable production quality control plan is a necessary condition in contracts for supply of equipment.

Evaluation and approval by the electoral management body of suppliers' quality control plans is necessary for ensuring that equipment supplied meets requirements. In some cases the electoral management body may want to implement its own additional quality control measures on production of essential equipment.

In general, more effective controls can be maintained over equipment quality under the following conditions:

• clear and accurate specifications for equipment requirements have been provided by the Electoral Management Body to suppliers;

• equipment is ordered only from reputable suppliers, preferably accredited under the International Standards Organisation (ISO) series of quality benchmarks;

• equipment is produced locally, enabling on-site production inspections by electoral management body staff, and shorter time delays in identifying quality deficiencies;

• a rigorous pre-delivery testing regime is instituted for all equipment to ensure that it meets specifications.

A consideration for electoral management bodies is that supply from other countries can make it difficult for the them have any oversight of quality issues until the equipment is delivered, which may be too late to remedy deficiencies properly.

Disposable Equipment

Recent development of disposable voting station equipment such as ballot boxes, voting compartments, or booths, and furniture made of corrugated cardboard or plastic sheeting;-provide lightweight, easily transportable and cost-effective alternatives to traditional durable equipment while meeting election security and transparency requirements.

In many environments disposable equipment represents a more practical alternative to holding large stocks of durable equipment for infrequent use. Where lightweight cardboard equipment is used, assembly methods should form part of election official training, and assembly instructions should be provided with the equipment.

A further side benefit may accrue from using disposable cardboard equipment in general, namely, where schools are used as voting stations, the disposable cardboard ballot boxes, voting compartments, and barriers can be left at the school for use by teachers and civic educators in continuing voter education for students.

Assurance of Performance

Methods of assurance that all election equipment will perform to the expected standard on voting day are necessary. Performance assurance methods require the preparation of detailed specifications, thorough testing, and implementation of continuing maintenance programmes.

Equipment storage

Equipment comprises a substantial portion of any election budget and consideration needs to be given to proper and effective storage between elections, especially if it is non durable

Costs of storage vs Costs of replacing equipment: This is especially relevant to disposable equipment or equipment that depreciates due to the rapid advancement in usable technology.

Safety: It is necessary to store equipment in a safe lock up area

Inventory: It is good practice to prepare a detailed inventory of the items being stored, the number of items, and the condition they are in at the time of storage and the estimated value. If items are being stored at different venues keep a list of where each item is stored.

Size of venue: The venue should have sufficient space to store the equipment without damage .

Temperature: Ensure that equipment that may be damaged in temperatures that are either too damp in or moist is stored in a suitable environment.

Maintenance

As a general rule, if the resources and storage facilities are not available for proper maintenance of durable equipment, it would be a waste of money to acquire it.

Regular maintenance checks (at the least at six-monthly intervals) of all durable equipment in storage prevents equipment failure during voting operations. Particular attention should be paid to regular testing of electronic and communications equipment.

Where special equipment is used to maintain voter eligibility controls-such as ultra-violet or other special lamps or fingerprint readers--particular care also needs to be taken with their maintenance.

It is highly preferable to develop formal maintenance and testing schedules for all durable equipment and ensure that reports on results are brought to the attention of senior electoral management body officials.

Sensible precautions for maintaining equipment in good condition need to be remembered, such as removing batteries from battery-operated equipment before it is placed in storage.

Testing of all equipment prior to it being shipped to voting stations will guard against the provision of useless items. It is also prudent to require that voting station managers thoroughly test all equipment in the voting station following installation, both to ensure that the equipment is in good working condition and that they know how to operate it.

Ballot Boxes and Seals

Ballot box design is of considerably varied nature, including:

• clear high density plastic construction (allowing highly visible proof that the ballots are not being tampered with);

• metal;

• other durable plastic construction;

• lightweight, disposable ballot boxes made of corrugated cardboard or, for multiple day use, corrugated plastic sheet;

• acceptable to all stakeholders including contesting political parties and voters. For example transparent ballot boxes may be necessary in some countries, whereas in others disposable ballot boxes may not be acceptable.

• the size of the ballot box taking into an account the number of estimated voters. In a highly conflicted environment it may be necessary to have one large ballot box sufficient to contain all estimated voters to avoid increasing tension due to mistrust between the participating stakeholders including voters, political party poll watchers and national observers.

• the maximum number of voters to be processed in a voting station (and hence the number of ballots) and ballot size.

• ensure that once the ballot box has been sealed, ballots cannot be removed from the ballot box without breaking security seals or locks.

• when folded in the correct manner, pass easily through the insertion slot .Some designs include a lockable slide to seal the ballot paper insertion slot; this more expensive option may provide no more security than covering the slot at close of voting with security tape.

• size - the weight of the construction material can mitigate larger size ballot boxes made of durable materials; no such restriction applies to cardboard ballot boxes.

These can be produced in a range of sizes, from the very compact and easily portable (for use by mobile voting stations) to large floor standing models that allow a single ballot box to be used for voting stations servicing large numbers of voters.

Appropriate Materials

The effectiveness of ballot boxes is not necessarily in the strength of the material or the size of the lock. Lightweight cardboard ballot boxes when sealed properly offer no less security or transparency than those made of durable materials. When considering their lower transport costs, negligible storage and maintenance costs, and flexibility as to size, they are more cost-effective.

They may not be suitable for some environments, however, particularly in wet or very humid conditions (though similarly lightweight, disposable corrugated plastic ballot boxes can be).

Durable Ballot Boxes

Where durable ballot boxes are used, proper maintenance is important:

• in ensuring that they are all retrieved from voting stations;

• that regular stock takes are undertaken;

• that they are regularly inspected in storage;

• necessary repairs are made or replacements obtained.

Ballot Box Quantities

Quantities of ballot boxes required at each voting station will depend on a number of factors in the legal and procedural framework.

Significant amongst these are:

• the number of voters expected;

• the size of the ballot paper;

• the capacity of the ballot box;

• the number of different ballot papers to be completed or separate elections being held simultaneously;

• whether the voting station is split into different polling streams for different polling subdivisions.

A general rule is to:

• keep the number of ballot boxes to be dealt with at a voting station to a minimum as the most practicable course;

• have separate ballot boxes for each voting subdivision where there are different polling subdivision voting streams in one voting station, to allow effective reconciliations of voting materials;

• have separate ballot boxes where simultaneous elections are being held. While this has no real bearing on integrity, it can save time at the start of the counting process. Where voter numbers are low, a single ballot box can be used.

Unique Identification of Ballot Boxes

Where ballots are to be transported to separate counting centers, it is essential that unique identification codes be clearly marked on each ballot box and recorded before delivery to the voting station.

This unique coding can also be necessary when counting takes place at the voting station, especially if otherwise unidentified ballot boxes are used for different elections or voting subdivisions ballots in the voting station.

Seals for Ballot Boxes

Tamper-proof sealing of ballot boxes is one of the basic guarantees of voting integrity. Ballot boxes must be sealed from the commencement of voting through to their opening, after the close of voting, for removal of ballot boxes for the count.

Where ballot boxes are also used as the container for transporting accountable materials to the voting station and from the count back to the electoral management body, they will also need to be sealed for these shipments.

The following methods of sealing can be considered:

• One method of sealing ballot boxes is a uniquely numbered keyed lock or locks. It is appropriate to seal, with a paper seal, wax, or some other method, over the keyhole of each lock when it is affixed to the ballot box.

• Another method is uniquely numbered plastic or nylon security tied seals. Numbered plastic security tied seals are effective and generally more practicable.

• Assembly joins may be further secured by the use of security tape where disposable ballot boxes are used.

Whether plastic security ties or traditional locks are used, these are liable items that need to be maintained securely. To ensure the integrity of the process accurately record their use on each ballot box used in voting stations.

The quantities of seals required will depend on the number and design of ballot boxes. Sufficient seals should be on hand in each voting station to cover all sealing points for all required and re-sealing of the boxes.

• Durable ballot boxes normally have two sealing points, on a hinged lid and on a sealing slide on the slot.

• Designs for disposable ballot boxes of two-piece construction (separate lid) normally have four sealing points (at each top corner).

• Single piece constructions (fold-down lid) have two sealing points.

Voting Compartments

The purpose of voting compartments, or voting booths, is to allow voters to mark or select their choices of candidate or party in secret. It does not require expensive (in both production and storage terms) durable equipment.

Where "mark choice" ballots are used, and no tables are available in the voting station, it will need to be of solid free-standing or interlocked construction and contain a strong writing tray.

Design

Common alternatives in styles of voting compartments include:

Table-top models: need be little more than a simple double or single fold piece of corrugated cardboard, which can be taped to a table, or of durable wood, plastic, or metal.

These should be of sufficient height to prevent voters in adjoining compartments being able to view each other's ballots. Where table-top or free-standing compartments are used, the writing area within the compartment should preferably be wide and deep enough to allow the ballot paper to be placed on it without having to be folded and the height of the compartment above the writing surface level sufficient to prevent voters in adjoining compartments from viewing each other's ballot paper.

Free-standing voting compartments, of disposable corrugated cardboard or durable wood, metal, or plastic. Durable equipment of this nature is bulky and expensive to store, maintain in good repair, and transport.

If durable construction, storage and transport costs can be reduced if voting compartments can be kept in permanent, secure storage at the voting site, particularly for voting stations in rural areas. This will presume the availability of the same voting sites for successive elections. Where free-standing compartments are normally used, at least one table-top version should be issued to each voting station for the use of disabled voters.

Drop cloths of dark or opaque fabric, with the addition of some nails, can be cost-effectively used to curtain off areas in which a table can be placed. In the same, but more design-conscious, vein, commercially produced compartments, featuring cloth hanging from a supporting frame, are also available, at a cost.

Fundamental to the choice of the voting compartment is that voting remains secret. Even split cardboard boxes, taped to a tabletop, may be suitable in an emergency. Where voters mark their choice of party or candidate on the ballot paper, voting compartments should contain some means of attaching a pen or pencil to the compartment.

Where normal tables with a makeshift screen are used, this could be as simple as attaching the writing implements with tape or string. Specially designed voting compartments with a self contained writing surface would preferably have a drilled hole through which the writing implement can be attached.

Disposable Cardboard Compartments

Disposable free-standing compartments need to be rigid and solid when assembled. Some voters are likely to place young children, briefcases, or the morning's shopping on the writing surface while completing their vote. Most fully recycled corrugated board does not have sufficient strength.

Best results generally come from using corrugated board made from a mix of recycled and virgin pulp. Effective construction normally means an interlocking design in which each screen is supported by the one on either side.

Using cardboard voting compartments will allow printing of voting instructions directly onto the side of the compartment directly facing the voter rather than having to print and affix separate instruction posters.

Quantities Required

Quantities of voting compartments supplied to each voting station depend on:

• the number of voters to be serviced;

• the times the voting station is open;

• the average time estimated for each voter to vote;

• the number of ballot papers to complete;

• the complexity of the voting procedure. For example exhaustively marked full preferential ballot papers take longer to complete than those on which a single mark is placed.

Sufficient voting compartments need to be provided to each voting station to allow a smooth flow of voters through the voting station. Insufficient voting compartments cause delays in voting. Ballot papers should only be issued to voters when there is a vacant voting compartment. Conversely, if ballot papers continue to be issued when all voting compartments are occupied, voting secrecy is likely to be compromised as voters may then complete their ballot papers in the open.

Supply quantities of voting compartments in various jurisdictions are generally in the range of one compartment for every one to two hundred voters, depending on the factors listed above.

In France, using an enveloped voting system where the voter chooses which party or candidate ballot to place in the voting envelope, the ratio is one screen to two hundred voters.

For Australian national elections, where each voter has to complete two ballot papers, one a fully marked preferential vote and the other a ballot which can be marked with a single party reference or an exhaustive preferential numbering of candidates, the ratio is one compartment to every 120 voters.

Larger quantities of compartments need to be allocated to specific voting stations where voters may take longer than average to complete their vote. These groups include:

• aged voters;

• voters unfamiliar with voting procedures;

• voters of lower literacy

• voters from minority language groups.

Temporary Structures

Voting stations that are located in areas that have no suitable permanent premises for voting will require the use of temporary structures.

Appropriate temporary structures vary in style, according to local costs, weather conditions, and transport availability.

Typically, tents or canvas or plastic sheeting shelters would be used and delivered for erection with the voting materials. However, some other solutions have proven effective when available and suitable transport can be provided. Shipping containers, for example, can make effective portable voting stations. They also have the added advantage of providing adequate security for materials if delivered on site prior to voting day.

In environments where there is little risk of inclement weather and where voting in the open is an accepted practice, it may be possible to dispense with any structure and have the voting station area merely delimited with ropes or similar barriers. Mobile voting stations catering to very small numbers of people at a voting location may be able to dispense with temporary structures or barriers altogether.

Light/Power

Lighting equipment needs to be supplied with portable structures or permanent structures without reliable electricity if the voting station set-up, voting, or counting is to continue through hours of darkness.

The supply of generators and portable lights may be necessary for larger voting stations. Where this is not cost-effective or feasible, gas or battery lamps can be suitable--preferably battery powered, for safety reasons.

It is important that operating instructions are supplied with this equipment. It is necessary to ensure that voting officials are given adequate training on how to use temporary lighting supplies as they may be unfamiliar with, for example, safe methods of replacing gas cylinders on gas lamps.

Furniture

When identifying premises it is highly preferable that premises that already have sufficient furniture on site are used as voting stations. Schools, in particular, are likely to meet furniture needs. Delivering and retrieving furniture from voting stations, particularly bulky items such as tables, can be costly.

Sources of Additional Furniture

The following sources can be considered when additional furniture is required for voting sites:

Other government sources: Loan or rental may be arranged from other government agencies. Government surplus stores may also hold stocks of useable furniture.

Private furniture leasing contractors

Purchase of disposable corrugated cardboard furniture. Disposable cardboard two-person tables for voting officials, crowd control barriers, and rubbish receptacles have been developed in some jurisdictions.

Costs for tables, in particular, can compare favorably with leasing costs for durable items, especially when transport is considered. For examples of design specifications for disposable corrugated cardboard furniture for voting stations, see the following:

It is very unlikely that there will be any justification for the Electoral Management Body to purchase durable furniture for voting station use although in some less developed environments the purchase of furniture may be the only option to ensure that voting stations can function effectively if there is insufficient private leasing or other government stocks available.

If furniture does have to be acquired, specifications would preferably ensure that it is of future wide utility in other public sector activities.

Furniture Requirements

The amount of furniture required for a voting station depends on the staffing levels and numbers of expected voters. The essential basic requirements include:

• Tables and chairs available in good condition and sufficient for use by voting staff, in voting compartments (if required), as ballot box stands (if required), party or candidate representatives and observers, and to provide seating for elderly or physically challenged voters;

• Barriers to direct voter traffic flow and maintain queue control, as simple and cost-effective as rope strung between poles or as corporate image conscious as the cardboard equipment whose specifications are linked above.

Additional furniture requirements, such as secure storage cabinets and waste bins, may also be useful. 

Amenities

To provide an acceptable standard of amenities for staff (who will be spending a very long day within the confines of the voting station) and for voters, additional equipment may be required. Before doing so electoral management bodies need to ensure that basic services are available at the voting site. Where there are deficiencies the following may need to be obtained:

• lighting, where voting or counting is undertaken after daylight hours;

• toilet facilities;

• drinking water;

• food.

Lighting and associated power generators would preferably be obtained from other government agencies (such as military forces) or leased from private contractors.

Leasing of portable toilets (at a ratio of one to every 400 to 500 voters expected) is preferable to having voting staff, as their first duty on voting day, digging latrines.

There is generally little justification for the purchase of these items, though stocks of small-scale lighting equipment (torches and lamps) can be held by the electoral management body.

Voting stations with no running water available can be assisted by, visits from local government or military water tankers may be arranged. Small quantities of drinking water for use by voting staff may be delivered with voting materials. 

Sensitive vs. Non-Sensitive Material

The material required for conducting elections varies from basic stationery such as pens, papers and rulers, to voters’ lists, validation marks and ballot papers. The election management body has the responsibility to manage the wide range of material and equipment in a way that ensures the confidence of the electorate and the contesting parties in their ability to conduct the election in an efficient and impartial way. The material can be categorized into sensitive and non sensitive material.

Sensitive Material

Sensitive material refers to items such as:

• validation seals that are placed on ballot papers to verify their authenticity. This is especially necessary during the counting process;

• ballot papers;

• voters lists;

• computers - this is particularly relevant in systems where the voters list is computerized or electronic voting is used;

• ballot paper stamps;

• indelible ink where this is used as means of verification to prevent duplicate voting;

• voters identity cards;

• ballot box seals.

Non sensitive material

Items such as:

• voting equipment, that is, voting compartments, ballot boxes, tables, chairs;

• stationery – pens, paper, rulers, erasers;

• tape for cordoning off the voting area or indicating where voters may or may not queue,

Security

While all equipment needs to be adequately stored, storage of sensitive material in particular is extremely important. To ensure maximum security most electoral management bodies allocate this responsibility to senior election staff such as District Electoral Officers who in turn may designate this responsibility to the Electoral Manager.

These election officials work closely with the relevant security forces (where the security forces have the trust of the public) or make alternative arrangements for additional security. In some countries election staff to agree to abide by a Code of Conduct that binds them to confidentiality regarding sensitive material

Voting Materials

Timely and accurate production of voting day materials is essential if voting station supplies are to be packaged and distributed effectively. Voting station supplies such as election forms are the interface with the voting public. Their impression of election quality will be influenced by how easy it is for them to understand the materials they have to use.

It is important that there are strict specifications and quality control procedures applied to the large volumes of materials that are produced for use on voting day to ensure this timely supply and functionality.

Production Capacity

Production capacity is an important factor to consider in determining the scheduling and location of materials production. Election form production in particular, can put great pressure on available print capacities.

Where production deadlines are tight, print scheduling also needs to take into account transport times. If voting station specific or electoral district specific items, such as voters’ lists, are produced centrally, print those for the most distant electoral districts first.

Decisions will need to be made on whether materials are to be produced locally, regionally, or nationally, and for some items internationally. The packaging and distribution method adopted for voting station supplies is an important factor in this decision (for example, it would generally be unwise to produce materials at a local level if a centralized packaging methodology has been adopted).

Where standard materials are required in large volumes, there are cost-effectiveness and quality control benefits in centralized or regionalized production, provided that there are effective distribution methods available. Local production can be more effective for controlling materials with substantial local variations, or for local use only.

Voters’ Lists

Voters’ lists will be the most used item in voting stations on voting day. They need to be designed in a format that allows speedy and accurate location by polling officials of all relevant voter information. As they will be the basis for determining eligibility to vote, it is important that they are an accurate representation of the relevant section of the voters register. (For detailed information on voters lists, see Voters Lists)

Voter Identification Cards

In many systems, voters are issued, either at the time of registration as a voter or at a date prior to voting day, a voter identification card that is the basic document to be presented at the voting station to prove an entitlement to vote.

The voter identification card must contain adequate safeguards against transferability in order to be effective. This could be through including a non-removable photograph, fingerprint, or other assurance of identity of the bearer capable of being accurately checked at the voting station. Cards bearing only the signature of the voter may provide less integrity assurance.

Election Forms

Voting day is a massive exercise in information transfer. Much of this information records answerable actions, or needs to be recorded in a consistent manner to aid decision-making and transparency.

Hence, there are likely to be significant numbers of election forms, no matter what efforts are made to minimize their number. It is important that election forms are simply designed and easy to understand. (The production of election forms is discussed in detail at Election Forms. For issues regarding the printing and supply of ballots, see Production of Ballots)

Voter Information Materials

Production needs for voter information materials also have to be considered. Large quantities of these materials may be required, particularly if voter information guides are to be provided to each registered voter or household.

Arrangements will need to be made for production of information posters and pamphlets on voting procedures for use in voting stations, as well as a range of other signs and visual aids, such as voter direction signs and voting station location notices, that will assist voters.

General Supplies

A large range of general supplies will need to be acquired and supplied to voting stations, including:

• Stationery items such as pens, pencils, envelopes, and note paper;

• Packaging materials;

• Emergency lighting supplies;

• Items specific to particular voting procedures, such as ballot validation marks or multiple voting control supplies.

(For voting station needs for general supplies are discussed in detail, see General Supplies.)

Voters' Lists

The accuracy of voters' lists used in voting stations in extremely important for  the integrity of the voting process and needs to be ensured by The electoral management body.  Rigorous checking that each voter' lits accurately reflects the relevant portion of the voters' register must be undertaken. Any errors found need to be corrected immediately, preferably by revising and reprinting the affected lists before the lists are distributed to voting stations

As voters' lists are likely to be the most used single time of material during voting hours, it is important that they are a quality product. Information in them needs to be clearly presented, and the material on which they are constructed needs to be durable.

Quantity Produced

Voters' list are a highly accountable item. They should be maintained under security while awaiting distribution to voting stations and on their return following close of voting.  Normally they are only produced in the exact quantity needed for voting station use. This is generally one copy of each unique voters' lists. In systems where voters may have a choice of voting stations to attend within an electoral district or subdivision, multiple copies of the relevant lists will be required.

Voters' lists or full voters registers for electoral districts are normally also printed for public information purposes

Timing of Production

The production of voting station  voters' lists is determined by the legal deadline for additions , deletions or amendments to be made to the voters'  register. In setting the deadline, a balance  has to be achieved between

• accuracy of the voters' list in ensuring that recently deceased voters can be removed and other allowable changes made;

• time required for printing and distribution of voters' lists to all voting stations

Location of production , whether centralised , regionalised or distributed to local areas depends on the processing structure of the voter registration system.

Certification

It is important that  a legally designated electoral management body or other official certify that each voters' list used in a voting station is a true copy of the relevant portion of the voters' register. In some systems, the integrity of this process is protected by requiring this function to be undertaken by a member of the judiciary or a member or a revision court convened to review the register.

Design

The format of voters' lists are almost as numerous as the formats of ballot papers depending on the voter registration systems, voter identification , and post-voting day list processing methods used.   Information required in the list is usually and properly defined in electoral legislation.  Voters' list formats include:

• A handwritten or typed listing of electors eligible to vote at a voting station
• An index of the original voter registration cards for all voters eligible to vote at the relevant voting station
• Printed lists of voters eligible to vote at that voting station generated from computerised data
• Optical character readable lists
• Lists containing a photograph of each eligible voter for the voting station as well as textual information 
  
  

Basic Design Requirements

The three major considerations in the design of voters' lists are:

1) the inclusion of all information required by election legislation

2) user-friendliness for voting officials

3) cost-effectiveness in printing

Some basic design specifications can serve as  guidelines for the wide variety of potential designs for voters' lists (where these are printed volume)

• Each page should contain the election title and date, electoral district name , subdistrict or voting subdivision name, voting station identification code and/or name and consecutive page number
• Paper size should be at a minimum of A4 and the color white
• Paper weight should be at a minimum of 70-80 g
  
• Suitable binding such as lockable ring binders , make ruling through of names easier. Binding specifications must ensure that the voters' list opens flat, without splitting.
• The names of voters should be shown in strict alphabetical order, in most societies in order of family name.
• Typefaces uses should be of a point size that is easy to read quickly
• Single sided printing of the list would be preferable.
• Names should spaced sufficiently for them to be marked clearly when the voter is issued a  ballot paper , without obscuring any adjacent names.
• Information shown should include the voter's full name as it appears on the  voter register, ( family name generally first) full address of registration and serial number or identification number on the full voters register or a link number to this serial number.
  

 

Special voting facilities

 

 

Where special voting facilities are available, ( such as absentee , early or mail vote),  methods of ensuring that voters cannot claim both a special vote and a normal vote at their voting station will be required.

Some alternatives in voting frameworks include

• marking voters who have cast a special vote on the relevant voting station voters' list before it is dispatched to the voting station
• constructing a special voter's list or lists for all voters applying for special votes and removing them from their normal voter's lists
• using enveloped ballots for special voting with voter details contained on the envelope being checked against the relevant voting station voters's list - to guard against impersonation and multiple voting- before the envelope is opened and the ballot acepted for counting.
  

Election Forms

Forms serve a vital control function in voting operations. While every effort should be made to keep the number of forms required to the minimum necessary, there will always be a significant number of voting operations forms, due to:

• the highly accountable nature of many voting operations actions, and the need to be able to demonstrate, possibly in response to a challenge to the election, the exact nature of actions taken;

• the need to record the vast amount of information associated with voting events in a standard manner, to enable consistent decision-making and to protect election integrity. 

Reviews

Forms are a necessary but obtrusive part of voting operations accountability mechanisms. It is important that voting operations management undertakes regular reviews of the numbers of forms and their content, to determine how much of the information being collected is:

• required by legislation;

• needed to ensure election accountability and transparency;

• used for effective current management of voting operations;

• may be useful to look at sometime;

• information whose purpose can't be immediately ascertained.

The last three categories should be closely scrutinized to determine which forms and information items collected:

• are really required as a formal record;

• have been overtaken by current practices and need revision;

• would be equally useable if merely noted or reported informally;

• have no discernible purpose.

Information being collected for no discernible purpose, especially, is a waste of valuable voting operations resources.

Forms for Internal Use

Avoid overloading voting operations staff with an excessive number of data collection, supplies tracking, and monitoring forms to complete. Voting operations staff will already be under pressure, and adding to that with requests for non-essential information or multiple requests for the same information from different management areas of the electoral management body, will not assist their performance.

Too many or too complex a system of required forms will lead to errors in completion, and, at worst, failure to respond to essential data requests that have been buried in a mass of other information requests. Try and keep forms simple but in a way that they are able to capture the necessary information.

Language

Forms may need to be produced in more than one language in societies with different official language groups or significant minority language groups.

To simplify supply, it is preferable for multi-lingual forms to be produced, rather than separate forms for each language. The time needed for effective translations needs to be considered in designing form and supply timetables.

Design Principles

The most effective forms are those that are easy to understand and to complete. Some principles that can be considered in designing voting operations forms include:

• use ordinary language, not legalese. Only a very small proportion of people who use voting operations forms will be lawyers.

• clear instructions for completing the form. Instructions are generally better as an integrated design element of the form, rather than as an add-on.

• all required information about the respondent (name, address, etc.) that can be identified clearly.

• information in a logical flow, using grouping of information requests where this is useful.

• clear spaces between individual information requests. Trying to put too much on to a single sheet is not efficient; it just makes understanding the form more difficult.

• areas in which responses are to be written are clearly delineated and sufficient room is provided for possible responses.

• a checklist on the form where there are standard administrative processes to be applied as a result of responses to a form. These administrative action checklists should be clearly separated from the information gathering section of the form.

• an indication on the form o how the information will be used. In countries with privacy protection legislation, this may be mandatory.

• as long as the intent of questions remains clear, and different sections are clearly delineated, collecting different types of data on the one form (instead of providing multiple forms) can be effective.

• collecting data only once, as far as possible. Multiple forms requesting the same information become a nuisance and may hinder correct completion of the requested data.

Other Distribution

Examples of relevant forms are usefully included with voting officials manuals, with their use being explained, if possible by simulations, during training.

In the interests of transparency it is also useful to make reasonable quantities of voting operations form samples available to political participants and other interested citizens.

Domiciling

Using laser or ink jet printing facilities can be effective to pre-print electoral district and voting station information, name or code number and electoral district/voting subdivision directly onto forms.

However a judgment has to be made as to whether this assistance to voting officials and assurance that all material is domiciled is outweighed by any added costs and complications in quality control for packaging and distribution of voting station material.

Forms Control

The amount of data that may need to be recorded on forms for voting operations can be immense. The forms listing examples at Election Forms Control Inventory give some idea of the number of forms that may need to be designed, produced, and completed.

Controlling form design and production is a major task in itself and requires adequate resourcing. Rigorously enforced systems of standard form numbers and revision and version control are necessary to maintain controls on voting operations forms numbers and content.

The following listing does not attempt to note all forms that will or can be used for voting operations, but it highlights the areas where standard recording or provision of information on forms, or their electronic equivalents, is likely to be necessary.

Nominations

• formal notices of nominations period

• nominations forms and any attachments 

• rejection or acceptance of nomination.

• withdrawal of nomination

• declaration of accepted nominations

• ballot order determination

• appointment of party/candidate representatives

• campaign expense and contribution reports

Materials Control

• contract/purchasing documentation

• labels or pre-printed envelopes for despatch and return of voting station materials

• inventories, supplies receipts, and delivery schedules

• loss and destruction notices.

Staffing and Training

• information pamphlets for prospective staff

• offers of recruitment, suitability assessments, and contracts/appointments 

• training schedules, advisory notices and assessments.

• undertakings to abide by codes of conduct/maintain voting secrecy

• staff identification badges

• records of staff attendance and payment records

Voting Site Management

•premises and security assessments

• determination and notification of voting locations

• voting hours notifications

• ballot paper issue, accounting, and reconciliation records 

• boting station notices - voter flow signage, prohibitions on voter behaviour (no smoking, no firearms, and the like)

• instructions to voting officials 

• instructions to voters

• voter information posters and pamphlets 

• ballot envelopes for enveloped ballot system

• spoilt and cancelled ballot envelopes

• adjournment of voting

• summary of voters not on the voters list

• voting day voter registrations

• supervisors checklists

• voting station managers reports--could be a series of separate forms covering all aspects of ballot accounting, voting activity, staff and premise management, or a voting record booklet

Count Recording and Results

• notification of counting times and venues

• reconciliations and movements of voting materials to and from counts (

• counting records, summaries, and reconciliations

• determination and declaration of results  Counting total and result compilation forms must be designed to show all the calculations necessary for a result to be declared; leave nothing to back-of-an-envelope, non-transparent, invisible-to-observers calculations. Results slips, protocols, or minutes should not contain any pre-printed numbers in count columns (e.g., "1" in the thousands column against candidates expected to receive a large proportion of the vote).

Special Voting

Included here are absentee, early, and mail voting, as well as voters requiring assistance:

• information posters and pamphlets for voters

• application for a ballot paper

• instructions for completing the vote

• ballot envelopes and outer envelopes

• records and reconciliations of ballots issued

• reports by managers of special voting locations. This could be a series of separate forms covering all aspects of ballot accounting, voting activity, staff and premise management, or a voting record booklet

Challenges

• statements of challenges

• requests for recounts 

• investigation reports.

Accreditation for Observers and Party Representatives

• applications for accreditation or appointments as representatives

• identification badges

• statements of acceptance of code of conduct

Voter Follow-Up

•  voter fraud statements and investigation reports
•  voter registration confirmations and inquiries (in continuous registration systems)
  
• Compulsory voting inquiries, responses, investigation records, and summaries (in compulsory voting systems)

General Supplies

Apart from the variety of forms, equipment, and information materials supplied to voting stations, there is a wide variety of general supplies required for voting station operations.

Many of these will be standard stationery or supply items that can be acquired as easily through any standard government supply arrangements, or private contractors, without need for modification for election purposes.

However, as for equipment and materials produced specifically for election purposes, it is important that specifications for each general supply item are developed and samples of planned acquisitions tested against these specifications before acquisition. It might only be a plain envelope that is required, but if the form that has to be contained in it won't fit, or it doesn't maintain its seal under election conditions, it becomes useless to supply to a voting station.

Voting stations require general and specific supply items for the effective functioning of a voting station. They deserve as much attention in their acquisition as do other more innovative or customized material. Clearly expressed information materials at the voting station will assist voters and take some pressure off election officials by providing a constantly visible set of information to satisfy potential queries from voters.

The legal framework often specifies the basic directional and procedural information material that must be provided for voters in voting stations. It is appropriate to think beyond these minimum requirements to devise information signs, posters, and pamphlets that enhance efficient processing of voters and assist voters' understanding of how to vote.

When designing this information material the emphasis should be on facilitating quick comprehension. Thus, the use of symbols, diagrams, and pictorial representations, rather than large blocks of text, is important.

Consideration of the needs of less literate voters and of minority language groups is necessary.

Types of Materials

The types and quantities of general supply materials required for voting operations Varies widely according to voting methods and voting station management procedures. There will be little use, for example, in providing pens and pencils for marking ballots where machines or computers are used for voting. However, there will generally be a need for general supplies in some quantities in the following categories:

• office stationery-pens, pencils, note paper for use by polling officials and voters;

• packaging materials-for packing supply kits for dispatch to the voting station, securing materials within the voting station, and return of materials from the voting station;

• emergency lighting, in case of power failure;

Under specific voting methods, there will also be a need for such items as:

• ballot validation tools;

• multiple voting prevention supplies--special inks and, if invisible inks are used, ultraviolet lights;

• tape or rope to seal off areas within or around the voting station;

Voting station information materials basically falls into two categories:

• directional and other advisory material for orienting voters;

• information on voting procedures.

Voting Stations

Outside the Voting Station

It can be useful to provide directional signs to the voting station put up in the surrounding streets, particularly where voting station locations have changed since the last election. Where new premises are being used, it will be helpful to place a notice of where voting is now being conducted outside the former premises. People can be creatures of habit, no matter how much publicity has been given to current voting station locations.

Clear identification of the voting station through the use of an external sign is necessary. If voting station materials are delivered and returned in a large heavy duty bag, the bag can be designed so that it can double as a "Voting Station" sign that can be tied to the front of the premises.

Internal Signs for Voter Control

Signage throughout the voting station that designates different operational areas and provides general information on how voters should proceed throughout the voting station will aid voter flow. Basic signs or posters that would be needed include those that:

• state the hours of voting;

• identify entrances and exits;

• show the geographic area serviced by the voting station;

• identify key areas of the voting station, such as "Queue Here" signs (or if queues are split, the alphabetic or geographic split of the queue), special voting facilities, and the voting station manager's desk.

Signs indicating any required conduct within the voting station (e.g., no smoking, no firearms, prohibitions on campaigning, and the like) should also be provided.

Voting Procedures

Information materials available in the voting station on voting procedures should cover the range of actions required of voters. Specific information materials generally include:

• posters showing how to cast a valid vote, in larger sizes for the voting station walls and smaller to fit in each voting compartment or booth;

• posters advising voters to have their identification documents ready for inspection and showing the identification documents required to be presented;

• posters and handouts on the rights of voters to vote and any challenge mechanisms;

• posters on facilities for physically impaired voters or other voters needing assistance or special facilities;

• posters and handouts on contesting candidates or parties;

• posters indicating the availability and pamphlets explaining the details of special voting facilities available;

• where different ballot boxes are provided for different ballot papers or voter streams, clear signs as to who is to use and what has to be placed into each ballot box;

• in continuous registration systems, information and forms for updating voter registration;

• in complex or new voting systems, posters and pamphlets containing a brief explanation of how the voting and representation system works.

Voting Station materials

Quantities of voter information material required for voting stations depends on the number and characteristics of voters and the size and configuration of the voting station.

While it would be efficient to have voter information material supplies based on standard packs, the need for additional material in specific circumstances must be considered. This could include:

•voting station premises with multiple rooms or more than one entrance and exit;

• local voting populations with significant proportions of voters from minority language groups, first time voters, or voters with specific information needs.

Stationery Supplies

General stationery supplies are likely to include:

• pens and/or pencils: in sufficient quantities for record keeping by each voting official, for marking voters lists, preparing reports, completing voting records. Where ballots have to be manually marked by voters, pens or pencils for each voting compartment will be needed (including sufficient replacements for those that will inevitably disappear during voting). If pencils are used, sharpeners will also be required.

• rulers: to assist voting officials working with voters lists.

• ink and ink pad are necessary: if there are official stamps to be applied to voting materials or records

• note paper: for voting officials

• envelopes: for voting material and forms could be specifically designed and printed for election purposes, or standard stock used. The latter method can be less costly. However, if used, it is highly preferable that stock envelopes either have stick-on labels for use in the voting station or overprinted by the electoral management to provide for standard completion of details such as:

• the voting station to which the material enclosed in the envelope refers;

• the type of material contained in the envelope;

• the election type and date;

• the signature of the relevant voting official.

• staplers/staples, rubber bands, paper clips or similar fastening materials.

Packaging Materials

Packaging methods and materials can vary widely. Packaging needs to include:

Containers used to transport materials to and from voting stations. These could be cardboard boxes or heavy duty sacks for outer containers. It is also useful to provide inner containers i.e. heavy duty envelopes or plastic bags, for packaging the various classes of material for return from the voting station.

Each of these inner containers should either be supplied with a label on which the contents and other relevant election information can be noted, or directly overprinted. Complicated systems of color-coded inner containers and labels tend to confuse more than assist voting officials.

Some jurisdictions supply voting stations with sheets of brown paper in which to wrap materials for return; while economical, this is not necessarily effective.

If counting is to take place at the voting station all this packaging material can be supplied to the voting station. If counting takes place at a separate counting centre sufficient labels, envelopes, and inner packaging appropriate to post-counting packaging (for separation of ballot papers for the different parties or candidates, invalid ballots, forms used at the count) will also need to be supplied to the counting centre.

Methods of fastening the packages e.g. Balls of string or rolls of tape. Corporate printed adhesive tape promotes a professional image but does not add any fastening power for the additional expense. Where separate counting centers are used, additional supplies for use during and after the count will be required.

Security sealing for packages of materials - this can be by paper adhesive seals or security tape. Whichever is used, it should be of the type that is split, and breaks apart when an attempt is made to open the package. What is important is that any attempt to open packages is visible. Where locks are used on ballot boxes, wax may be needed to seal keyholes. Sufficient supplies of security sealing materials need to be acquired to accommodate:

• Packaging of materials following close of voting;

• Any opening and resealing of packages during the count;

• The inevitable further opening and resealing that will occur once voting materials have been returned to storage--for investigations, research purposes, and the like.

Discussion of packaging methods is at Packaging Materials and Equipment for Delivery

Emergency Lighting

Voting stations that will be in operation in hours of darkness will need to be supplied with some form of emergency lighting. This could be torches/batteries, battery or gas powered lamps, or even candles and matches.

Even in highly developed societies, power outages can occur during voting day. For voting locations where portable generators are supplied to provide power and lighting, arrangements for supply of fuel will also be necessary.

Validation Marks

In election systems where each ballot is accountable, the ballot paper is validated on issue by the voting official placing an official mark or signing/initialing the back of the ballot paper.

This can be a cost-effective manner of controlling that only valid ballot papers enter the count, and may preclude the need for special and expensive paper stocks or security print for ballots.

Official validating marks used by voting officials can be perforating instruments or stamps. A different, distinctive mark is preferable for each voting station to enable full accountability and integrity checks during counting. As these are highly accountable items, keep the design secret until use. At all times the validing marker should be kept under strict security at all times.

An official seal may also be used by the voting station manager to validate forms completed in the voting station or the integrity of materials packages to be returned after closing of the voting station. In some systems (though it is not a recommended solution) voters mark their ballot paper with an official stamp to indicate their voting preference. If this system is in use these seals need to be supplied also as a highly accountable item, under strict security.

Multiple Voting Control Equipment

It has become more common in recent years for voters to have some part of their hand marked with ink when they are issued a ballot paper to prevent multiple voting.

Although this is a fairly expensive control to apply, it is appropriate where there is lack of confidence in the quality of the voters lists, or where voters may vote at more than one voting station or where an election is being held for the first time in a post conflict situation.

To ensure the integrity of the process it is important that the ink used is visible and indelible. The disadvantage of this method that it can be a personal safety risk in divided communities as it indicates that the voter has cast his/her vote.

The most commonly used method for using indelible ink is to use ink that can only be detected under ultra violet light (under normal light conditions) Where these are used, ultra violet lamps should be supplied to each voting station with spare bulbs. Battery powered models (with spare batteries also made available) will often be more appropriate to acquire, as they can operate in areas without reliable electricity supply.

If the effort is going to be made to mark voters’ hands with ink, it is important that:

The ink formula is secret- preferably with a different formulation for each election, so that it is not likely that voters will be able to chemically remove the ink before the end of the voting period. To ensure that the most effective ink is used it is often determined to obtain inks from suppliers in another country. Therefore the acquisition program will need to allow for potential time-lags in foreign supply.

The ink does not provide a permanent stain: but wears off within a defined period. Care must be taken, where voting extends for more than one day, that the life of the detectable ink mark is longer than the period during which voters may vote. Similarly if a two-round voting system is used, ink used should be formulated to wear off before the second round of voting or strict instructions need to be given to election officials to mark different sections of the voter's body at the first and second election rounds be followed.

Sufficient quantities of the ink to mark the number of expected voters will need to be supplied in leak-proof, security-sealed containers to each voting station. Supply from manufacturers in the final containers, rather than later repackaging by the electoral management body, is preferable.

Materials Quality Control

Implementation of materials production quality control procedures is vital for ensuring that the electoral management body has sufficient quantities of useable, quality materials for the election.

An effective quality control plan needs to be developed by the electoral management body. Unfortunately, in the effort to complete other urgent election tasks, this is a matter that can often be overlooked.

The practical objectives of, and guiding principles underlying, the quality control plan need to be clearly defined and understood by materials contractors and electoral management body staff.

Materials quality control can be more effective where:

• clear, accurate design specifications are provided to all suppliers by the electoral management body;

• materials are ordered from reputable suppliers;

• suppliers' production methods hold quality accreditation under International Standards Organisation (ISO) or similar standards;

• there is some on-site production monitoring by electoral management body officials. For this reason it will be preferable to use supply contractors within the country.

Quality Control Plan Elements

There are a number of basic steps that need to be included in quality control plans for print and materials production. These include:

• formal sign-off and approval of materials design specifications;

• provision of sample materials, testing of these against the design specifications, and formal approval of samples before full production is commenced (random samples drawn from each production run is advisable, especially print materials, to ensure print legibility and correct print positioning;

• monitoring of materials production quantities and production rates;

• controls over materials movement and security;

• creation of a proper audit trail of decisions on specifications, acceptance of product, and materials movements.

Maintenance of Materials

Where unused materials can be used for future elections, maintenance plans need to be implemented to ensure their future availability and reliability.

Appropriate storage conditions (addressing issues such as security, the effects of heat, dust, dampness, or humidity) and locations must be considered. Particular care needs to be taken with the storage of paper-based materials.

Regular inspections of the condition of materials and inventory of all materials should be scheduled as part of a formal materials quality control plan.

Requisition and Inventory Preparation

Requisitions and inventories are more usefully prepared as multi-level documents to meet the following needs:

• Master requisitions and inventories for the total supplies required in each area of election administration at local, regional, and central levels;

• Individual inventory and supply requirements for each voting location (including any special voting facilities such as mobile voting stations, mail voting facilities, or foreign country voting locations) and each election administration office.

Use of standard materials packages (see Packaging Materials and Equipment for Delivery) will aid voting station inventory preparation.

Method

Requisition preparation is more effectively undertaken on a bottom-up basis, with voter registration or expected voter turnout data determining the materials and equipment needs for each individual voting location, and then combining these to arrive at a master inventory and requisition requirement.

Master Inventories

Master inventories listing all supplies for an election may be unwieldy if they show the total supply needs for all individual locations and functions in the one document, particularly if prepared manually.

Manual and simple spreadsheet methods, will comfortably handle these master requisitions and inventories if they are designed as a summary sheet which is then broken down into separate pages for supply categories--e.g., voters' lists, election forms, ballots, etc.--showing individual voting location requirements.

Control Function

Voting station inventories play an essential control function in ensuring correct receipt of materials at the voting station. All voting station managers should be provided with copies of the inventory of materials and equipment they are meant to have received, and they should personally check supplies received against it.

A copy of the inventory, noting actual supply quantities and highlighting any shortfalls, can be used as the detailed receipt of delivery and returned to the electoral management body.

Automated Production

Inventories and packaging lists can be effectively produced automatically from expected voter turnout at a voting station or registered voter data, where voting station supplies are based on standard packages (see Packaging Materials and Equipment for Delivery).

Such automated systems could also produce additional items such as packaging labels and ballot box identification numbers and labels.

Storage Prior to Voting

Materials and equipment for voting day are likely to be produced over a period of several weeks or even months.

Suitable storage facilities for such material and equipment awaiting packaging and/or dispatch to voting stations will be required. It is important that the premises used for storage are both accessible and secure. Security in particular is of the utmost importance as the builds the confidence of the electorate and political parties in the election process.

Security

Security levels for storage will need to be appropriate to the existing security risks. All liable voting materials, and especially ballot papers, need to be subject to strictly secure storage conditions.

Even in low-risk environments it is usually appropriate to have armed guards on stores containing printed ballots around the clock. The public perception that the ballot papers are strictly secure is necessary even if not needed in reality.

In very volatile situations it may be appropriate to use military or civilian police installations for storage of liable materials. The use of security forces however depends on the perceptions of impartiality of security forces.

Storage Environment

The storage facilities that are suitable for the equipment. For example if the ballot papers are in storage the facility needs to be suitably ventilated and damp proof. Material should be stored in an orderly and well organized manner to allow for easy and quick dispatch.

Local or Central Storage

Storage locations should aim to reduce redundant handling to the minimum. Where voting day supplies are being packaged centrally or regionally (see Packaging Materials and Equipment for Delivery), centralized or regional storage of materials is appropriate. Where supplies are packaged at the local level, it is generally more effective to maintain them in central or regional facilities until immediately before packaging commences.

In any case, it is cost-effective if storage facilities used are also the packaging centre and dispatch point for voting station materials.

It is important that reserve supplies be available at the local level for voting day. It may be possible to use electoral district managers' offices for this purpose. In rural or remote electoral districts of large geographic size, depots for emergency supplies may need to be established in key community centers.

Durable Equipment

Some equipment and materials, such as durable ballot boxes, voting screens, voting machines, and computer equipment, may be maintained in storage from election to election. It is important to implement regular inventories and testing of this equipment and material to ensure that it is in good condition and to effect repairs or replacements if it is not.

Computer equipment especially, will need to be stored in controlled conditions that are away from dust, heat, and humidity, if it is to remain in operable condition following long-term storage. Forms and other paper-based supplies kept in long-term storage will also need to be kept in facilities that are free from dust and humidity to maintain good condition.

Where durable ballot boxes and voting screens are to be supplied to voting stations in more remote locations, it may be more cost-effective to arrange for secure storage on-site. This may be possible if locations such as schools or government offices are used as continuing voting stations.

Ballot Paper and Printed Ballots

Printed ballots must always be stored under tight security. Where special paper is used for ballot printing, such as distinctively watermarked paper, secure storage should be maintained. Special papers can have long production lead times.

Especially in systems where elections are not at fixed intervals; there may be a need to maintain considerable reserve quantities of special ballot paper stock to ensure supply. It is important that the storage conditions for this paper stock are monitored to ensure the material remains in good condition.

Packaging Materials and Equipment for Delivery

There are two basic methods of packaging materials for delivery:

1. A "pick and pack" exercise, where materials from each voting station are individually packaged according to a detailed inventory of supplies needed for each voting station* This may be appropriate where voting stations are of widely differing voter capacities and where wages and other costs are low compared to materials costs.
2. A standard pack with uniform quantities of materials (in one or more containers) for delivery to voting stations. Where voting station capacities are similar (particularly where there is a low limit on maximum numbers of voters to be serviced), this is the more effective method.

Even where voting station capacities vary widely, the provision of multiple standard packs to larger voting stations or the creation of a standard "normal" pack and a standard "reserve" pack will generally be more efficient than packing individually for each voting station.

In either case, it is more effective to pack a single item of material at a time, rather than attempt to assemble a complete package, or voting station inventory, before moving to the next one. In this fashion, materials can be packaged for voting stations progressively as they arrive from suppliers.

In addition, it will be more effective to deliver all supplies to a voting station in a single delivery. Multiple deliveries may make control more difficult for the voting station manager and will add to shipping costs, as well as increase demands on security at most voting stations.

Additional measures include:

• packages of election materials and equipment must be in containers of construction, size, and weight suitable for the method of shipment;

• packs should be sealed with security seals and/or security tape so that any tampering is immediately evident;

• packs must be labelled clearly as to their destination and contents.

Location of Packing

It is more effective where standard materials kits for voting stations are used, to place this material at central locations and this eliminates redundant handling in packing and transportation and removes the potential for errors. Whether individual packs are made up for each voting station or centrally or regionalised, packaging:

• avoids redundant handling and thereby reduce shipping costs and potential errors;

• provides better quality control.

Packaging Controls

It is good practice to ensure that strict accountability and audit trails are maintained during packaging in the following respects:

• implementation of a packaging sequence plan;

• marking off individual pack or voting station inventories materials as they are packed;

• reconciliations of accountable materials following packing;

• numbering and labelling packages;

• maintenance of packaging progress records;

• maintenance of strict security over the packaging site.

Health and Safety Standards

Packaging should comply with legal requirements for occupational health and safety. To ensure that materials are transportable to and within the various voting station environments, no individual package should exceed twenty kilograms in weight.

Storage After Voting Day

Before putting material into storage there is a need for the electoral management body to sort and categorize the material. It may be helpful when doing so to sort material into the following categories:

• materials that may be immediately destroyed;

• reusable materials and equipment, either to be placed in storage until the next election or to be used in the course of normal business;

• material to be maintained under strict security.

It would be usual for the electoral legislation to define election materials that must be maintained in strictly secure storage as well as the period for which they must be kept.

Additional materials such as election officials’ payment records and other financial, purchasing, or recruitment documentation may also have to be maintained securely for audit purposes. Security cannot be stressed enough especially if any component of the election including the results is to be challenged.

Liable Materials

Accountable voting materials should always be maintained under strict security until the period for challenge to election results has elapsed. These include:

• ballot papers, both used and unused;

• accountable ballot envelopes, both used and unused;

• applications for votes;

• voting day registrations;

• declarations of eligibility made by voters, for normal or special voting facilities;

• voters lists;

• materials supply records;

• ballot accounting and reconciliation records;

• voting station managers' and count centre managers' reports on proceedings;

• challenge and complaint records from voting stations and ballot counting centres

• documentation of ballot count totals and results as well as decisions on validity of ballots.

In election systems where retiring, dismissed, or deceased representatives are replaced by means of a recount of ballots from the last election, used ballot materials will need to be maintained under security for the term of the elected representative body.

Access to this material may be necessary for voter follow-up investigations, for research purposes, or in relation to challenges. For equity reasons, persons formally challenging aspects of the election would be allowed to view relevant accountable materials in the presence of election officials. However they the material should not be allowed to be removed for their own investigations, or altered or tampered with it in any way.

The electoral management body needs to ensure that all access to sealed packs of accountable materials must be strictly controlled, with each access recorded, and packages promptly resealed.

Unsealing and resealing should be endorsed on the packages, and, if new plastic tie seals are attached, a record maintained of their numbers. Maintaining a register of access to these sealed packages is useful with the "who," "when," and "why" of each sealing and resealing. Any material extracted from sealed packages must be held securely while being used for investigations. Packages of accountable materials should not be left unsealed if opened.

Asset Management

As election materials and equipment represents a considerable investment, accountability for election equipment and materials needs to be reinforced through imposition of thorough audit trails tracking to whom equipment has been assigned and asset control measures such as regular inventories.

An asset management plan should be developed for reusable equipment and materials, either for them to be put back into storage until the next election or to be made available for intermediate use by the electoral management body or other agencies.

Disposal Schedules

Destruction of used election-related materials should be strictly in accordance with approved disposal schedules. Some retainment periods may be specified in electoral or other legislation.

Comprehensive disposal schedules for all election materials should be developed by the electoral management body, if materials retainment periods are not subject to detailed public sector-wide direction. There must be defined accountabilities for materials destruction, and use of secure destruction methods for liable voting materials or materials containing personal information on voters or polling staff.

In addition to requirements for retainment of material for potential challenges, recounts, and audit purposes, disposal or destruction schedules for election materials should take into account issues such as:

• keeping examples of materials for the historical record and future reference;

• the time required for research and evaluation of election procedures and programs.

 Illegitimate ballots, for example, can be a fruitful source for information on the efficacy of current voter registration methods and future information campaign emphases.

Logistics

Logistics planning is the essential support functioning for ensuring that equipment, staff, and communications methods are in place in time for the successful conduct of voting.

Logistics planning has to be flexible and thorough in its consideration of possible contingency arrangements. Logistics has to ensure delivery from suppliers to meet an election calendar that stipulates  unalterable dates.

 

Distribution

 

Effective distribution of materials and equipment requires:

• detailed planning of delivery and retrieval schedules, methods of transport to be used and shipping routes
• efficient means of splitting bulk deliveries of supplies into separate shipments for each voting location, avoiding wastage, yet ensuring that all voting stations have sufficient supplies to service the voters
• adequate security for the specific environment
• storage appropriate for maintaining stocks for election materials and equipment in good condition
• comprehensive tracking of the movements of all election materials and equipment as they go through the distribution and return chain

Both accountability and probity considerations, as well as operational needs to be informed initially about the state of readiness for voting, and later of the successful retrieval of supplies, are served by carefully tracking all shipping and distribution of supplies.

 

Staff Support

Transportation may be required for voting station officials to attend and return from their voting stations. These may be officials who need to be mobile due to  the nature of their duties, such as those assigned to mobile voting stations or as roving voting station supervisors. They may be staff from normal voting stations who, due to the unavailablitly of other reliable transportation services, considerations of personal safety or remoteness of their assigned station, would not otherwise be able to attend to their duties.

 

Communications

 

The extent and intensity of communications during the election period requires that a through assessment be made of communication needs. Apart from the heightened flow of information within the electoral management body's offices and the need to provide facilities for  communication with voters, political parties, security forces, and other government agencies, there will be a large number of dispersed voting sites that will need to be in communication with electoral district managers' offices.

Effective communications methods for these voting station will need to take account of voting stations' communications requirements-for security, procedural advice, progress reporting and (where relevant) count results- in relation to the  available communications infrastructure.

 

Party and candidate agents

 

The electoral management body may be required to assist parties and candidates in the logistics of deploying their representatives. This may require providing lists of voting stations to the parties and candidates as well as the routes of mobile voting stations and the departing times of electoral officials who are conducting special votes away from voting stations.

 

Observers

 

Independent observers, particularly if they are participating in international observer mission in a country with which they are not familiar , will require carefully planned logistical support.

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Transportation

Provision of transportation that is reliable, secure, and on time is critical in ensuring that voting stations are fully prepared for the commencement of voting and that accountable and valuable election supplies are retrieved expeditiously and safely.

Planning

Planning of transportation is a highly complex operation that needs to be completed well in advance of the election. The management resources needed to support an efficient election supplies transportation operation should not be underestimated, particularly where large geographic areas are involved and a wide range of transportation means need to be employed. Transportation plans need to be fully integrated with packaging plans and be flexible enough to respond to variations in delivery dates from suppliers.

Planning the retrieval of supplies from voting stations is as important as planning the initial supply. Ensuring that all accountable materials are returned to secure storage is an essential guarantee of election integrity. Loss of accountable materials at this stage will immediately raise public suspicions about the validity of voting and counts.

Methods

The required methods of transportation will depend on the terrain, weather conditions, time available for supply, and distances over which materials and equipment have to be transported. Whether direct distribution from a central store, or staged distribution from central to regional warehouses and then to voting stations, is used will partially depend on transportation infrastructure  and distances to be covered.

It may be efficient to enlist the assistance of other state agencies in the delivery and retrieval of voting station supplies in the short time frames available. However, public trust and confidence in their use must be considered.

It may be efficient to enlist the assistance of other state agencies in the delivery and retrieval of voting station supplies in the short time frames available. However, public trust and confidence in their use must be considered

Controls

Strict controls need to be applied, particularly for accountable voting materials and valuable supplies. A full audit trail of delivery and receipt documentation for accountable materials, from the time that supplies leave the manufacturer to their return to electoral management body stores following voting day, must be available.

Records of the locations of all supplies at any time must be rigorously maintained and personal accountability for their safekeeping enforced.

Delivering Voting Site Resources

As with delivery of materials, equipment and, where necessary, staff to voting stations, intensive planning of retrieval of voting site resources is required. This will involve:

• planning of pick-up routes and times;

• arrangements for checking that all accountable and reusable material has been returned.

Where ballot counts are conducted at separate count centres, transportation arrangements will need to include delivery of materials from the voting station to the counting centre, and after the count, from the counting centre to checking and storage.

Pick-Up of Material

These arrangements can be more complex than delivery of materials to the voting station and less likely to follow a pre-arranged timetable. Actual pick-up times from voting stations will be affected by how quickly close of voting activities are completed (there may be long delays if large numbers of voters are in the voting station at the time of close of voting), accounting and other records completed, and materials packaged. At the end of a long day, this may not be accomplished quickly.

Clear pick-up instructions must be conveyed to voting station staff and the importance of the roll back of election resources must be stressed to.

Pick-up schedules should allow for this. Most important is that there is liaison between the electoral district manager's office and each voting station so that progress can be monitored and any adjustments to pick-up scheduling relayed to drivers.

In more remote rural areas, it may not be practicable to return all material to the electoral district manager's office immediately after the election. It may be feasible to arrange for these materials to be held at any secure emergency resupply depots established, for next day or later pick-up and delivery to the electoral district manager's office.

There are jurisdictions where, in urban areas, the voting station or counting centre manager is responsible for returning all election materials to the electoral district manager's offices. In low security-risk environments, this can be cost-effective.

Checking Return of Material

The most important issue to check immediately on return of material is that all accountable voting materials and equipment have been returned. The delivery and receipt audit trail maintained for materials delivery should be used to control returns. Particular care needs to be taken that all ballots have been returned, that all ballot accounting records have been correctly completed, and that portable equipment (mobile phones and personal radios especially) are returned.

Wherever possible, it is preferable that voting station managers be present when their material is returned and checked into storage. Any missing accountable materials or equipment may be more readily traced with the assistance of the voting station manager at this stage, rather than later.

Following check-in and verification, the materials should be prepared for secure storage, reuse, or disposal.

Staff Arrangements

A retrieval schedule will also be required for staff who were transported to the voting station. For staff in remote areas, retrieval the next day may be more appropriate, in which case arrangements for an overnight stay will be required.

Arrangements with Suppliers

It is preferable that arrangements with materials and equipment suppliers be on an FIS (free into store) basis, including provision for supplier transportation to the electoral management body’s central and regional storage or packaging centres. This will generally be more cost-effective than transportation arranged by the electoral management body and will remove an extra administrative burden from election staff.

In higher security risk environments this may not be appropriate. In this case, it may be more prudent for the electoral management body to take responsibility for secure transport into their storage and packaging facilities.

For large quantities, staggered delivery may be more appropriate. Particularly when using supplier's transportation, it is essential that detailed checking of loads delivered into storage takes place before the transportation departs, and that transfer documents (supplier delivery dockets, electoral management body's supply control records) are annotated for any differences to the expected delivery and endorsed by election staff and the driver. This is an important component of the audit trail and accountability mechanisms for election supplies.

It is also prudent to ensure that the type of transportation to be used by the supplier will be appropriate and not compromised as a result of cost-cutting to ensure maximum financial returns for the supplier. Types of vehicles to be used (e.g., weather-protected and suitable for fast unloading at election storage facilities) should be specified.

Security Force Transportation

In high security-risk environments where security forces are involved in protection of voting locations, voters, and voting materials transport, integrated planning of logistical needs will assist in maintaining the necessary levels of protection. The use of a joint operations centre model can be effective.

It is of little use if election managers devise detailed plans for delivery or return of voting station materials along routes where, or at times, when security support cannot be provided.

Security forces need to assign some mobile capacity on and around voting day. Voting stations are obvious places where disturbances or unrest may occur. There may be other targets such as groups of voters travelling to and from voting stations. The concept of appropriately equipped rapid response forces for voting day can be useful.

Transportation Security

Where election materials are being transported between electoral management body offices and voting stations, an appropriate level of security needs to be provided at all times.

In low security-risk environments, the presence of an electoral management body staff member with the delivery vehicle will normally be sufficient. Observation of materials in transport by party or candidate representatives will assist transparency.

In higher security-risk areas, police or other security forces escort may be prudent or even necessary. Advice from security forces on this need should be sought and joint planning of transportation routes and schedules undertaken if security escorts are necessary.

Communications Systems

Voting operations generate a vast amount of information, not only internally, but also in interaction with the voting public's information needs. Early assessment of needs and planning for upgrading communication facilities to cope with the increased load will be necessary. Without the ability to communicate accurate information reliably, it will not be possible to make informed decisions in what is often a rapidly changing environment.

Communication networks will need to be set up between voting stations and electoral management body offices. In many situations, there will be no suitable existing communications facilities in voting station premises, and arrangements will need to be made for additional fixed line or mobile telecommunications.

There will be vastly increased communication traffic between electoral management body offices and existing facilities will need to be augmented to cope with both increased voice traffic and the need to communicate documents and acknowledge their receipt speedily. Requirements of public information programmes (e.g. telephone-based information hotlines) need to be integrated into overall telecommunications plans.

Communication Network Needs

For internal communications, examination of available infrastructure and its possible augmentation will address the following needs:

• Voice, document, and data communication between central, regional, and local voting operations administrative offices;

• voice and possibly document or data communications between all voting locations and their supervising electoral district offices;

• voice communication between staff in transit and their base, such as mobile training teams, mobile voting stations, and roving voting station supervisors;

• voice communications between electoral district managers, security force commands, and emergency services.

• voice and possibly document and data communication between counting centres and their supervising administration office;

• facilities needed for public information centres.

In higher security-risk environments, the potentially intensified interaction between electoral managers, security forces, and emergency services may be simplified by using joint operations centre

Infrastructure Capacities

Accurate infrastructure assessments must inform strategies for communications. For example, basing voting station communications on fixed line or mobile telephones where the infrastructure has neither the tested capacity or assured reliability for this is dangerous.

Similarly, reliance on computer data transfer for amalgamation of results or document communications between electoral management body’s local, regional, and central offices is dangerous where reliability of data transfer lines is doubtful.

Early Planning

In many societies, augmenting telecommunications capacity can entail long lead times. Early planning and notice to telecommunications authorities of the need for additional fixed lines is always advisable.

Involving telecommunications provider representatives when developing communication plans will facilitate early verification of the practicality of proposed plans. This can also prevent the use of unworkable solutions, such as proposing the use of mobile phone contact in areas with unreliable reception.

Testing

Where new or augmented communications facilities are being used, it is vital that they are properly tested prior to implementation date.

It is important that the tests cover not only individual pieces of equipment, but also simulate the total expected load on communications infrastructure. For large scale data and telecommunications loads, comprehensive trial runs are vital.

Service

Arrangements should be made with telecommunications providers to have service available on urgent call throughout voting day. For critical data communications links, an on-site service presence may be warranted.

Communications Procedures

Effectiveness of communications will be enhanced if there are standard procedures for routing of information, whether in traditional hard copy or data transmissions.

It is important that all staff, particularly those temporarily engaged for the election, are aware of these standards.

Asset Security

Strict asset control over communications equipment issued to staff is vital. Mobile phones, radios, portable fax machines, and computers in particular are highly portable items that can easily be concealed.

Effective allocation, recording, and personal accountability systems will be required to ensure that communications equipment is all returned after the electoral process is complete.

Cost-Effectiveness

The cost-effectiveness of solutions to communications problems must be considered. Considerable extra funds can be expended on strategies that may offer little more in the way of speed or reliability or offer features that are redundant.

Considerations would include:

• is it really necessary to put a fax machine in every voting station? How often will it be used? Can results be as effectively phoned in?

• does all headquarters staff need mobile phones, or is it sufficient to have enough phones for use by staff when out of the office?

• is daily courier service to all electoral district offices really necessary or is every other day, backed up by existing fax facilities, sufficient?

• should there be a limit on the mobile phone usage, for voting station managers? How should the cell phone costs be monitored and maintained?

Voice Communications

Additional Voting Station Facilities Required

It is likely that additional voice communications facilities will be required for communication between electoral management body offices and some voting stations.

Voting stations needs assessments should determine the availability of existing telephone connections to voting station premises.

All voting stations should have access to voice communications with the electoral district office. Where fixed lines are not present, the cost and lead time on installation should be assessed against the costs and reception of short-term leased mobile or radio phones.

Local Offices

Electoral district managers’ offices should be set up so that they are capable of conducting business and having lines available for public inquiries. In addition to general office phone links, additional needs would often include:

• a separate, unpublicised line for the electoral district manager to maintain reliable contact with other electoral management body offices;

• rotating lines for public inquiries that can be augmented as inquiries peak towards voting day;

• a line for communicating with voting station managers (or rotary line, depending on number of voting stations being supervised);

• additional lines for communicating results, if this is done by phone;

• a mobile phone or radio on voting day to enable staff to inspect voting stations at some time during voting day and remain in contact with the office;

• for roving voting station supervisors, a mobile phone or radio while they are on duty.

If joint operations centres are established, they will also need to be supplied with adequate phone facilities.

Regional and Central Offices

Assessment of how many additional phone lines will be required, based on estimated operational traffic, will be needed. Current switchboard capacities or the need to provide switchboard facilities will also need to be considered.

Telephone Information Services

The number and configuration of additional phone lines required for any telephone information service for voters will need to be carefully assessed.

A determination needs to be made as to whether this is a local operation in various offices, or whether a call forward options to the first vacant line available in any office will be used., These options will affect the number and location of lines required. Too few lines, resulting in long delays or constant busy signals, will annoy more than assist voters. 

Recruitment and Training of Voting Station Staff

Ensuring that there is a sufficient staff, which has been trained to be competent in their required duties in voting stations and at the vote count, is the backbone of voting operations. For a national election, staffing and training will be one of the biggest staff mobilization exercises undertaken in a country. Similarly at provincial and local election levels, staffing and training requirements for voting operations will be the largest personnel exercises administrations are likely to implement. The sheer scale of the exercise requires precise planning.

Staffing for voting will generally be the largest cost component in election operations, small savings in unit costs can have a large impact on overall cost-effectiveness. But electoral officers and the effectiveness with which they serve the public are also the most visible service aspect of the election and are the point of interaction that citizens have with the electoral process. The basis of staffing plans must be cost-effective service delivery, rather than merely low cost service delivery.

Staffing Profiles

In order to effectively determine staff functions and categories for voting operations, staffing profiles should be developed for voting stations and the count. Development of these profiles will require:

• determination of the service standards that voting operations staff must deliver to the public

• defining staff duties and any staff categories required to ensure comprehensive, service-oriented implementation of voting procedures

• determining the required staffing levels in voting stations to deal with the number of potential voters in each voting station;

• consideration of any temporary administrative assistance required in the planning and organization of voting operations

While effective staffing numbers will vary widely in different election environments, according to factors such as the procedural framework and the experience of both officials and voters have had of current voting procedures, adopting standard staffing models for voting stations and count centers will assist in delivering cost effective services  From the number of voting locations and estimates of the staffing needs at each, a master summary of required staff to be recruited should be drawn up for each electoral district or voting administration area

Recruitment of Staff

In accordance with staffing profiles for voting stations and other voting operations activities, a recruitment strategy that aims to finalize engagement of sufficient staff in time for them to be trained to the required competency levels prior to their taking up their duties needs to be implemented. Essential elements of an effective recruitment strategy include:

• Determining the responsibilities for recruitment action, and the appropriate timing of recruitment of staff. In many environments, decentralization of recruitment to the local level will provide a more effective method of obtaining suitable staff 

• Determination of the skill levels and personal qualities required for employment, against which applicants for employment are to be assessed. In defining recruitment standards, it is important to ensure that voting operations staff is not only capable of undertaking their duties, but also that they are representative of the local communities which they are serving  

• Devising cost-effective recruitment methods. These may include general advertising for staff, seeking staff from other state agencies, or approaching professional associations or other organizations whose members are likely to possess the requisite skills for voting operations.

Important factors in maintaining cost-effective recruitment is the endeavor to retain the services, from election to election, of experienced electoral officerswho have given satisfactory service. The method of selection of successful applicants needs not only to be transparent  but also ensure that applicants are properly assessed so that the most appropriate staff are selected.

• Temporary staff engaged for voting operations should be employed on a cost-effective, and fair, contract basis.

• The number of staff recruited should also allow for contingencies such as unavailability of staff on voting day and replacement of staff who do not satisfactorily complete training.

Training of Staff

Training of staff for voting operations has to instill competencies and the election integrity ethos in a large number of trainees in a relatively short time.

Organization of training will need careful planning as to:

• what competencies need to be developed in voting operations staff , who is to be trained and the training timetable

• training materials, locations  and reference materials to be provided to trainees

• developing consistent session content and delivery styles for all trainers

• any training necessary for those who will act as trainers of voting staff

• ongoing monitoring of voting staff to determine that they are knowledgeable about current administrative or legislative amendments.

The extent of this need will be very much determined by whether training is conducted in a centralized or distributed fashion and whether professional trainers or supervisory voting operations staff is used for training polling officials.

Equally important to the effective delivery of training is that it is conducted in suitable venues and utilizes appropriate training aids

Evaluation

To ensure that training has been effective, the training plans and methodologies also need to incorporate methods of assessing voting staff competencies during and immediately after completion of training and a program for evaluating the success of staff recruitment and training processes

Briefing Other Election Participants

The electoral management body's involvement in training will usefully include providing at least materials, and preferably briefing sessions, for other participants in the election process, including;

• parties, candidates and their representatives 

• independent observers

• security force members with election security responsibilities

Codes of Conduct

To ensure a high level of service and integrity, and to ensure that staff are aware of the behavioral norms which they are expected to adhere to, it is useful to develop codes of conduct that all voting operations staff must undertake to uphold. Similarly codes of conduct for political participants in voting operations will provide them with an integrity framework and a guide for voting operations staff in their dealings with party and candidate representatives.

Voter Operation Staffing Profile

Standard Staffing Profiles

A common set of standards will ensure that staffing needs for voting operations are effectively determined, particularly in allocation of staff to voting stations and for ballot counts. These should:

• define the service level targets on which staff duties and staffing numbers are based;

• determine different categories of staff that will be required;

• define standard functions and duties to be undertaken by each category of staff 

• Provide a standard schedule of the number of staff that will be required in relation to the workloads estimated at each voting station, for other voting facilities provided, and for any administrative or logistical assistance required.

The Need for Common Standards

Leaving staff categories, staffing levels and service standards for voters wholly to the discretion of individual local electoral administrators or voting station managers is highly likely to lead to:

• inconsistencies in voter service and local variations in implementation of standard election procedures to fit the type and number of staff engaged;

• inefficiencies in staff usage, either through engaging too many staff for the tasks to be undertaken or numbers of voter to be serviced, or through excessive attempts to cut costs by reducing the staffing levels below what is required to undertake relevant tasks effectively.

Regulation of Staffing Profiles

It would be normal for electoral legislation to define a basis for the staffing framework and staff functions for voting stations and voting administration . This is necessary to determine legal accountabilities of staff in the voting process.

In some jurisdictions, very detailed standards are included in electoral legislation or regulations, e.g., for all staff categories that may be employed, staffing numbers per voting station, and similar specifications. This may be appropriate in environments where electoral management bodies are relatively new, or where there is little history of integrity in administrative service to democratic ideals.

However, this is a relatively inflexible approach which can lead to inefficiencies. It would be generally preferable to leave the detail of staffing profiles to the electoral management body as an administrative issue.

This will ensure an appropriate response to differences in local conditions. Voting stations of similar size in different areas can often have different needs in terms of the types of staff and numbers of staff employed, according to the linguistic, cultural, age, and educational levels of the voters in the voting station. Some facility for approval of variations to standard staffing profiles in particular voting stations is useful to promote both cost-effectiveness and ensure services provided meet the local population's needs.

While such flexibility allows the electoral management body to rapidly implement efficient procedures or systems that affect staffing numbers and functions, it requires robust management control. Departures from standard profiles must still meet the base requirements of the legal framework and should be subject to approval from election administrators.

Environmental Effects on Staffing Needs

While there is a common need for standard staffing profiles to enhance effectiveness, the actual staffing profiles, functions, and service levels for voting operations will vary among election environments.

There is no universal "best" staffing profile. Appropriate determination of how many staff are required and what they should be recruited and trained to do is dependent on a number of other interdependent variables in the election process. Significant amongst these are:

• The election system. The complexity of the system of voting, and the familiarity of voters with the voting system and procedures will affect voter’s potential information needs in voting stations and the time they take to cast their votes. This will affect both the overall numbers of staff and the staff category mix required in voting facilities.

• The number of voting facilities provided and any restrictions on their size. The basic determinant of staffing resources required will be the number of voters to be serviced--not just in total, but with regard to each voting facility. Staffing costs can be contained by providing a lesser number of larger voting facilities.

Determining the appropriate number of voters that a voting facility can effectively service is one of the critical issues for effective voting operations management, and it will vary in different procedural, societal, and management quality environments 

• The voting procedures adopted. Procedures adopted for controlling voters within the voting station, determining voter eligibility, issuing of voting materials, dealing with unregistered voters, providing voter information, and any arrangements for special voting facilities will determine the functions of staff and any useful separate categories of staff, and have a large bearing on the numbers of staff required in voting facilities.

• The basis for employing staff, whether as independent officials or, as in some jurisdictions, counter balancing representatives of different political sectors of society.

Different staffing profiles will also be required between models that use a hierarchical organisation of staff in voting facilities, with a defined management structure, and those that use a consensus model, where all staff have equal responsibility.

• Effectiveness of public information campaigns on voting procedures Better informed voters will generally require a lower staff-to-voter ratio in voting facilities.

• Election calendars. Compressed time frames, whether for the voting period or for production and distribution of materials before voting day activities, will generally increase the need for temporary administrative assistance in electoral management body offices.

• Count locations and procedures--whether ballot counts are to take place at voting stations or at centralised facilities and the deadline for their completion will affect the ability to use voting station staff for the count. Decisions in this regard will impact on the numbers of staff required overall, the skills required of voting station staff, and the framework of training

Staffing Costs

Except in situations where voting station staff are compelled to undertake their duties as an unpaid civic duty, staffing of voting stations will be a significant, if not the largest, cost component of the voting process. Cost-effectiveness in voting station staffing will therefore have a large impact on the overall cost-effectiveness of the election. It is very important for legislators and election administrators to recognize this fact when determining election frameworks and procedures. Most aspects of the election process will have an impact on the cost of voting station staffing.

Voter Service Standards

Determining Service Level Objectives

As with any service-oriented activity, before determining the staffing profiles necessary for voting facilities, it is necessary to define the level of service to voters that these facilities are expected to provide. Formalising service objectives is an essential, though often overlooked, factor in the determination of staff functions and rational, cost-effective allocation of staffing resources for voting operations. It is of equal importance in developing appropriate work practices for implementing voting procedures.

Instilling service objectives in polling staff during training provides them with a motivational platform. Public availability of the service standards that the electoral management body strives to meet is an important part of maintaining public accountability of the management of voting processes.

Service Criteria

Service objectives for voting facilities would generally address the following criteria:

• traffic--how many voters per hour each voting station can reasonably be expected to service;
• accuracy--what level of accuracy in the processing of voters must be achieved;
• integrity--what level of risk of voting integrity being breached is acceptable;

In an environment with unlimited resources, voting facilities could be staffed so that no voter has to wait to vote, all voters are processed accurately, and there is total control over all aspects of voting integrity. In fact, such resources rarely exist. While service standards will vary in different election environments--particularly for traffic--a balance has to be struck between service and cost-effectiveness in a manner that is acceptable to the public.

Traffic Standards

The most highly visible aspect of voting operations is how long voters have to wait at a voting station to cast their vote. There are a number of significant factors that affect voting station traffic.

Important issues relate to staff performance, particularly the time taken to issue voting materials. It is useful to develop and thoroughly test a standard rate for issuing voting materials--expressed in voters per hour--that polling officials are expected to achieve. This can become one of the major determinants of voting station staffing levels 

Achievable voting material issuing rates will vary widely in different election environments based on the following considerations:

• voter identification and eligibility checks to be undertaken;
• the accuracy and design of the voters lists used;
• the number and style of the ballots being issued;
• the method of voting, particularly the difference between using manually completed paper ballots, voting machines, or computers.

There is no generic voting material issue-rate standard that can be applied to all environments. In some environments, polling officials can comfortably achieve voting material issue rates of around sixty voters per hour. At the other end of the spectrum, mobile voting stations dealing with elderly or infirm voters may only be able to deal with five to ten voters per hour.

There are also other important factors that will influence the rate at which voters can be processed. These include:

• the number of voting compartments provided;
• the number of voters requiring assistance or detailed explanation of voting procedures;
• the complexity of the ballot and, hence, the time taken for each voter to complete the ballot.

Queuing Time

What is an acceptable time for voters to have to queue to vote will vary according to general service expectations within a society. In more advanced societies the public's tolerance of queuing is likely to be less.

In Australian federal elections, for example, the service objective is that voters will generally not have to queue for more than ten minutes before being issued ballot materials.

Where democratic elections are a new experience, or in environments where people expect a lengthy queue for government-provided services, tolerance of long queuing times to vote may be greater. However, any voter having to wait more than thirty minutes to vote could be generally regarded as unacceptable.

Peak Voting Periods

It would be highly unusual for there to be an even flow of voters throughout the hours of voting. For many reasons--such as availability of transport or encouragement to vote early--large numbers of voters will tend to arrive at the same time. To effectively plan staffing levels to handle such peak periods, research based on accurate records from past elections of voter attendance broken down by time period is necessary.

Cost-effectiveness can be served by a staffing model that permits the engagement of additional staff for part of voting day, during the peak voting hours only (which in many systems will tend to be during the first few hours the polls are open) for such functions as providing information to voters and issuing voting materials. Where such models are implemented, additional controls may need to be introduced to ensure full accountability of all polling official actions.

Service Evaluation

Evaluating whether there has been satisfactory achievement of voter service objectives and that the service targets set were appropriate for the environment is important for planning any future, cost-efficient improvements.

Appropriate methodologies for this could include analysis of such issues as complaints received from voters, records of voter queuing delays, and using sample exit polls or other service-oriented surveys of a sample of voters conducted by the electoral management body.

Level, Categories & Duties of Electoral Staff

Effectively calculating the number of staff required in voting stations is essential for providing quality service to voters and controlling voting operations costs.

Overall, the number of staff required will be directly related to the number of registered voters that have to be serviced. However, the actual staffing levels required in each voting station will be directly related to a number of other factors including:

• the range of services to be provided, in terms of voting facilities required by the legal framework and additional services provided to assist voters;

• the complexity of the voting procedures;

• the physical layout of the voting station;

• how familiar and experienced voters are with the voting procedures;

• the number of hours during which voting will take place;

• whether a single election or multiple simultaneous elections are being held;

• the service standards for voter processing that have been set by the electoral management body. There are also localized factors that may affect staffing levels in specific voting stations, such as:

• the characteristics of the local voting population, particularly in terms of age and literacy in the official language to be used for voting;

• local conditions that may exacerbate peak periods of voter attendance and thus require additional staff to ensure service standards are met throughout voting day.

Effective Staffing Levels

Given that there will be wide variations in these factors; it is difficult to determine an ideal staffing level applicable to all environments, which will ensure that all the functional responsibilities in a voting station are effectively implemented.

However, there are some general principles for determining staffing levels that can be applied. Most important is in establishing a standard staffing model for voting stations at a particular election. The manner in which this is done will depend on the way in which voting sites are determined  In broad terms, there are two basic methods for doing this:

1. By dividing electoral districts into voting station areas containing approximately equal numbers of voters, one staffing model may be developed that is appropriate for all voting stations. This implies the formulation, either through regulation or preferably by administrative direction, of a standard voting station size.

In some circumstances, particularly where accessibility needs to be preserved for rural residents or there are large differences in literacy levels between rural and urban residents, there may need to be two different models for rural and urban electoral districts. This model is relatively simple to implement since it provides a single or very limited number of standard staffing requirements for voting stations.

1. A more flexible policy on how many voters will be accommodated at each voting station may be determined by efficiencies that can be gained from local circumstances (e.g., size of premises available, experience of staff).

Staffing is determined on the basis of a sliding scale directly related to the number of voters expected at each voting station. While there can be efficiencies derived from this method, it is most viable in advanced electoral management systems with access to computers and relevant software to determine staff allocations for each voting station.

Flexibility

The way that standard staffing for a voting station is determined will require some managerial flexibility to adapt staff numbers to local circumstances. This is as useful where additional staff are required to provide an acceptable service level (e.g., in areas with high proportions of aged residents or low literacy levels or where voter traffic may be slower and information needs greater) as it is for circumstances where standard staffing is excessive and cost efficiencies can be achieved without affecting service.

However, such flexibility should be treated on an exception basis and require approval from senior electoral management body officials to ensure consistency of service and avoid wasteful additional staffing and emphasis on economy over effective service by local officials.

(For futher information see table 5, staffing to meet specific election needs)

Staffing to Meet Specific Election Needs

The following table5 shows how widely standard staffing varies between jurisdictions and how dependent it is on the specific election environment, particularly in terms of voting procedures and voters' familiarity, and the availability of experienced staff. The examples for Australia and South Africa have the following characteristics:

Both deal with similar numbers of voters in the voting station.

Both are for elections in which voters had to complete two ballot papers--by a single mark in the South African case, and in the Australian case by a choice of a single preference mark or exhaustive preferential numbering on one of the ballot papers and again exhaustive preferential numbering on the other.

Voter identity checks were more rigorous for the South African example, involving production of identity cards and in some cases marking with ink. In the Australian case, voters were simply asked to declare that their claimed identity and address were correct and that they had not previously voted in the election.

In the Australian example, where both voters and officials were experienced in the voting procedures, voters could vote at any voting station in their electoral district, and bank-style queuing was used in which voters were directed to the first available ballot issuing officer in the voting station the South African example, voters and officials were not experienced in the voting procedures used. Most had little experience with voting. Voters were assigned to a single specific voting station, and voters lists were generally split between two, eligibility checking and materials issuing tables divided alphabetically (i.e., A-M, N-Z).

VOTING STATION STAFFING PROFILES
	SOUTH AFRICA LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 1995	AUSTRALIA FEDERAL ELECTION 1996
Method of Determining Staffing	Standard staffing up to a maximum voter registration of : Urban areas (literate voters) 2500 Urban areas(less literate voters) 1250 Rural areas 750	Flexible according to number of voters
Possible adjustments	Decrease in officials on approval of Premier where small numbers of voters expected Increase in numbers of voters to Urban areas (literate voters) 4000 Urban areas(less literate voters) 2500 on approval of Premier	Adjustments can be made for local circumstances
Number of hours voting open	15	10
Expected voter turnout for this example	Maximum voter turnout in: Urban areas (literate voters) 2500 Urban areas(less literate voters) 1250 Rural areas 750	2500	1250	750
STAFFING CATEGORY	NUMBER OF STAFF
Voting Station Manager	1	1	1	1
Deputy Voting Station Manager	1	0	0	0
Entrance Control /Queue Control Officers	2	1	1	0
Exit Control Officer	1	0	0	0
Voter's Register Checking Officer	2
Individual Constituency Ballot Issuing Officer	2	*5	*3	*2
Proportional Representation Ballot Issuing Officer	2
Voting Compartment Monitor	2	0	0	0
Ballot Box Guard	2	1	1	1
TOTAL STAFF	15	8	6	4
The same official both checks voter eligibility and issues both ballots to the voter.

Voting Station Management

It is preferable to appoint a person to be responsible for all operations at a voting station. Under most legal frameworks for voting, this is a requirement--whether the position is defined as a voting station manager, a chairperson of a voting station election commission, the assistant returning officer for the voting station, the presiding officer for the voting station, or the like.

Defining a single accountability point provides an appropriate focus for information flow between the election administration and the voting station, and holds a voting station official legally accountable for voting station operations. Functions that would be appropriate to formally delegate to the voting station manager include:

• inspection of the voting station to ensure that it meets required standards and to become familiar with the characteristics of the location

• ensuring that all materials and equipment required for the voting station have arrived on schedule;

• set-up of the voting station according to the approved layouts, preferably on the day before voting day, with assistance from other staff;

• ensuring that the voting station opens and closes at the correct times

• management of the voting station's staff during the hours of voting 

• dealing with party or candidate representatives and observers in the voting station and liaison with security forces

• dealing with objections from voters and party or candidate representatives and resolving conflict situations or referring that to the relevant authority for resolution;

• communications with the election administration on voting progress and any difficulties encountered, and receipt of instructions for voting station activity;

• dealing with more complex voter information requests;

• providing any special facilities that require the intervention of senior voting station staff--such as recording objections or challenges to voters, overseeing or assisting with assisted votes, dealing with unregistered voters who claim to be eligible to vote, controlling voting day registration services (these responsibilities would normally be defined in the legal framework for voting operations);

• implementation, with the assistance of other staff, of close of voting procedures, sorting and packaging of all material for the count, and for return of material to the electoral management body;

• compiling and endorsing all required voting station records and completing management and operational reports on voting station activity;

• where counts are conducted at voting stations following the close of voting, managing the count.

In low security-risk environments where private transport is common, allowing voting station managers to be responsible for the transportation of voting materials, apart from bulky equipment such as voting compartments or electronic voting machines, to and from the voting station, can be a cost-effective measure.

Where full cascade models for training are implemented, voting station managers could also be responsible for training the staff of their voting station. Under some circumstances, particularly in rural areas where the election administration has no local presence, they could also assist with recruitment of their voting station staff. Where voting station managers are required to undertake duties prior to voting day--such as inspection of sites, staff recruitment and training, materials collection and transport, and set-up of voting station materials and equipment--payments for their duties should include a supplement for these responsibilities.

Deputy Voting Station Managers

Particularly in larger voting stations, it is prudent to formally appoint an official as deputy to the voting station manager, both to assist in the management of voting processes and to act as a substitute manager of the voting station when required. In many systems, the voting station manager holds legal responsibilities which only the holder of that position may undertake. In such circumstances, it is essential that provision be made for a designated voting station staff member to take over in this management role in the absence of the voting station manager.

Deputy voting station managers, in addition to assisting the voting station manager in supervisory duties during voting, could be assigned such duties as:

• dealing with information requests;

• dealing with assisted voters;

• supervising any special voting facilities provided;

• assisting the voting station manager with any duties before voting day. Where voting station managers undergo additional training, their deputies would preferably be trained to the same standard.

Entrance and Queue Control

It may be possible to assign entry and queue control duties to the same official, depending on the risks of unauthorized persons entering the voting station, the method adopted for checking voter identity, and the number of voters that the voting station will accommodate. Combining these functions will be more difficult if there are multiple queues within the voting station.

Entry Control

Entry control duties will include:

• controlling the flow of voters entering the voting station so that it does not become overcrowded;

• checking that voters are in possession of any identity document required for them to be issued voting material and turning away those without the necessary document(s);

• checking that voters are attending their correct voting station and directing those who are not to information assistance facilities;

• ensuring that only persons authorised to be present in the voting station enter the voting station.

Security

Security issues regarding entry to the voting station, such as surrendering of weapons, are better handled by security forces than voting station staff.

Queue Control

Queue control functions will include:

• maintaining orderly queues of voters waiting to be checked for eligibility and issue of voting material;

• where there are multiple queues of voters within the voting station (e.g., derived from an alphabetical split based on surnames, or on different geographic areas covered by the voting station), directing voters to the correct queue;

• pro-actively seeking out any voters that may need information on voting procedures, and directing any voters with complex queries that cannot be answered quickly to the appropriate information official;

• identifying voters requiring assistance with voting and advising the voting station manager;

• identifying voters with language difficulties and directing them to any language assistance facilities provided;

• identifying voters who may require special voting facilities;

• ascertaining if voters have registered to vote, and if not, directing them to the appropriate officials;

• monitoring the time spent by voters in queues waiting to vote and advising the voting station manager of any bottlenecks.

Effective queue control mechanisms are an essential feature of an effectively managed voting station. 

Information and Language Assistance

In some environments it may be necessary to appoint voting station staff whose specific duties are to provide information to voters. The need for special staff to fulfill these functions should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Conditions that would require special staff for voter inquiries would include:

• a large voting station where other staff will be fully occupied with other core duties;

• where there are significant numbers of new voters or voters not familiar with voting procedures. Situations where the standard staffing profile for voting stations may need to contain separate information officers in all voting stations include:

• where there have been an overhaul of voting procedures or the introduction of new voting equipment such as computers;

• the population has had little experience with voting.

Unless there is a specific task on which all voters need to be informed--e.g., taking them through a trial run on voting machines or computers--information officers can generally be more effectively used in a voting station if they are mobile, rather than stationed at a desk. Such officers can deal with more complex information requests that cannot be handled by other voting station staff without slowing down the processing of voters. As these officers would need to have a good knowledge of voting procedures, it may be appropriate to combine information officer and deputy voting station manager functions in all but very large voting stations.

Interpreters and Language Assistants It would be cost-effective, in areas where there are communities not fluent in the language used in official voting materials, to engage within other staff categories officials who are fluent in languages commonly used in the area. If this is not possible, service standards can be improved, and voters assisted in voting in the correct manner, by engaging staff as interpreters and language assistants for languages spoken by significant numbers of the voters in the area.

Such officials should be subject to the same codes of conduct and voting secrecy requirements as other voting station staff. Their duties should be restricted to translating official documents for voters, without making any personal comment, and interpreting information requests by voters to voting station staff and the information provided in response to these requests.

Controlling the Voting Process

In controlling the voting process, staff will be required for the following functions:

• checking that voters are eligible to vote at that voting station;

• issuing the correct voting material;

• monitoring voting compartments, or booths;

• ensuring the security of ballot boxes and their contents, and/or voting machines or computers, where used;

• controlling the voting station exit;

• providing any special voting facilities that may be required.

Voter Eligibility Checking Officers

The basic duties required of officers checking voter eligibility include:

• check the voter's identity, either by reference to the required identity document or on the basis of a required statement from the voter;

• check the voter's name and other information (e.g., address, date of birth) against the voters list;

• if the voter is found on the voters list, mark, in the prescribed fashion, the voter's entry on the list to show that the voter has voted, and direct the voter to the voting materials issuing officer;

• if the voter cannot be found on the voters list, direct the voter to the appropriate voting station staff member or the voting station manager for assistance;

• at the close of voting, consolidate records of the numbers of voters marked as having voted.

Where multiple voting controls are based on marking the voter with special ink, a separate official may need to be appointed to check that the voter has not been previously marked with ink, and then apply the ink, to maintain an adequate processing speed for voters through eligibility checking.

It is more cost-effective--and enhances voter queue control--for the functions of checking voter eligibility and issuing accountable voting materials to be undertaken by the same official. However, this is not always possible to implement, as eligibility checks may be complex and the voting station staff member may not have the required skills to undertake both these activities. Where there is any doubt about the ability of individual staff members to undertake both tasks, or it would slow voter processing significantly, it is better for these tasks to be allocated to separate officials.

Legislative frameworks may also require that different voting station staff undertake these two functions.

Voting Materials Issuing Officers'

Depending on the voting method used, whether based on accountable ballots or ballot envelopes, these officials may be required to issue ballots, ballot envelopes, or both. Their basic functions are to ensure that, once the voter's eligibility to vote has been determined:

• any required official mark is applied correctly to each ballot and/or ballot envelope;

• voters are issued the correct ballot(s) and/or ballot envelopes(s);

• the method of marking or otherwise correctly completing the ballot, and the requirement to complete the ballot in secret in a voting compartment, is explained to all voters;

• under accountable ballot systems, the method of folding the completed ballot so as to display any official mark to an official before depositing the ballot in the ballot box is explained or demonstrated to each voter;

• voters are not directed towards the voting compartment area unless a voting compartment is vacant;

• accurate records of the numbers of ballots (and/or ballot envelopes) issued are maintained;

• at the close of voting, ballots and/or ballot envelopes issued are reconciled to the number of voters marked off the voters list or allowed to vote under other prescribed circumstances.

Where computers are used for voting, the ballot issuing function will generally not be required. However, officials may be needed to monitor the use of computer equipment.

Voting Compartment Monitors

Responsibilities for supervising the voting compartment area need to be allocated to specific officials. Regular checks need to be undertaken to ensure that:

• any information posters required to be displayed in the voting compartments are in place and are replaced when necessary;

• no voting material has been left by voters in the voting compartments;

• Any papers or symbols that may influence voters that have been left in or written on the voting compartments are removed;

• where ballots are to be marked by pen or pencil, functioning writing implements are in each voting compartment.

The area around the voting compartments must be kept free of extraneous material to provide smooth passage for voters. To ensure secrecy of voting, supervision of this area will ensure that:

• voters are alone in voting compartments;

• ballots are not marked outside voting compartments;

• there is liaison with materials issuing officials to ensure that voting materials are not issued to a voter unless a voting compartment is vacant;

• on completing their ballots, voters are directed to the ballot box (or appropriate ballot box, where more than one is in use);

Depending on the number of voters attending the voting station, and their familiarity with voting processes, there may be no need to appoint additional officials to carry out the above responsibilities. The voting compartment area could be monitored by other officials, such as information officers or the voting station manager and/or deputy manager, if their primary functions will allow this. Where voters are familiar with voting procedures, staff issuing voting materials may be able to direct voters to vacant voting compartments.

Ballot Box Monitors

Except under procedures that require voters to return to the official who issued their voting material and deposit their ballot at the material issuing table, it is always prudent to have staff whose sole function is to monitor the ballot box(es) into which voters deposit their ballots. In some very small voting stations it may be possible for the voting station manager to undertake this function, but it would be generally advisable to have separate staff for this function. Duties of ballot box guards would include:

• guarding the ballot box and preventing any attempts to damage, deface, or tamper with it;

• ensuring that no unauthorised material enters the ballot box--generally requiring that any official marks placed on the reverse of the ballot by the issuing official are inspected before the voter is allowed to deposit the ballot(s) in the ballot box;

• ensuring that electors deposit ballot(s) into the correct ballot box before leaving the voting station and do not place additional ballots in the ballot box;

• directing voters to the exit after they have deposited their ballot(s);

• checking the ballot box(es) regularly to determine how full they are (generally done by passing a ruler through the ballot box slot) and advising the voting station manager if a fresh ballot box is required.

Where voting machines or electronic voting systems are used, appointment of staff for these functions will not be necessary. However, this saving in staff may be balanced by the need to engage more staff to inform voters on how to use the voting equipment.

Exit Control Officers

Where voting station layouts allow the ballot boxes to be placed in close proximity to the voting station exit, exit control functions may be undertaken by the same staff who are guarding the ballot boxes.

In larger voting stations, or where there are security concerns, even where this layout is achieved, it would be more prudent to appoint separate staff to undertake exit control duties. Duties of exit control officers would include:

• ensuring voters leave the voting station promptly after voting;

• preventing any assembly of unauthorised persons around the voting station exit or any entry of persons to the voting station through the exit;

• ensuring that voters do not leave the voting station with voting materials.

Special Voting Facilities

Where special voting facilities (such as absentee voting or mobile voting) are provided from normal voting stations, staff with these specific responsibilities should generally be engaged. Exceptions to this may occur in cases where the expected number of voters using these facilities is sufficiently low to be handled, without detriment to other voters, by staff undertaking other functions.

Other Voting Operations Staff

Apart from the main contingent of staff required in voting stations on voting day and for the count, there will generally be a need to engage staff for other voting operations support duties. These would include:

• Where there is no permanent electoral management body presence at a local level, temporary electoral district managers, local election commissions, or similar staff (depending on how accountabilities are defined in the legal framework) responsible for the election in each electoral district.

Where the election is not electing individual representatives to multiple electoral districts, these could be geographic administration areas based on other administrative boundaries, such as local government districts.

• Staff for special voting facilities, such as early voting, mail voting, voting at foreign locations, absentee voting facilities, and mobile voting stations.

• Administrative support for election preparation tasks, such as organising supplies and logistics, recruitment and other staffing matters, packaging of material for despatch to voting stations, and return of material from the count.

• Where resources and geographic conditions allow, a network of roving field supervisors to assist voting station managers and monitor voting station performance on voting day.

Administrative Support

To maintain cost-effective service delivery, even permanent electoral management bodies would not usually be permanently staffed to the level required to deliver all required services during the election period. Cost effective solutions to additional output needs during this period could involve engagement of temporary staff for;

• administrative support, or

• contracting out (with sufficiently rigorous performance guarantees) some large scale administrative functions, such as payroll management and packaging of voting station material, to other organizations

Strict controls on costs of additional administrative support staff should be implemented. As most tasks are likely to peak and trough in an irregular fashion, it would be more cost-effective to engage most temporary administrative assistance staff on an hourly basis rather than guaranteeing them work on a daily, weekly, or longer basis.

Temporary administrative assistance staff would be generally more usefully employed on intensive, larger scale process-driven tasks, such as:

• maintaining staffing and payroll records;

• preparing purchasing documentation for approval and monitoring supply of orders;

• checking materials and equipment supplies and repackaging this for delivery to voting stations;

• checking and sorting for secure storage, re-use, or destruction of materials returned from voting stations and counts;

• assisting with any mail voting functions conducted from electoral management body offices;

• general administrative and logistics assistance to electoral management body staff, including in electoral district managers' offices;

• answering less complex queries from voters.

Maintaining comprehensive historical data on processing times and workloads will help in developing frameworks for improving efficient use of temporary administrative staff. Except for tasks requiring any specialist data entry or similar skills, it would generally be more effective to draw on the same database of staff for these needs rather than engaging staff for specific functions.

Roving Officials/Voting Station Liaison Officers

Voting operations administrators often need to be relatively office-bound on voting day, particularly if managing electoral district or regional operations and security centers 

Management effectiveness can be greatly enhanced if senior voting station staffs (preferably with some prior experience as voting station managers) are appointed as roving liaison officers or inspectors for a group of voting stations. The ability to do this will be limited by the availability of suitable staff, the distance between voting stations, and the security environment. In rural areas, particularly, this may not be practicable to implement.

The number of roving officials that would be reasonable to assign will vary according to the geographic size of the electoral administration district and the number of voting stations. A sufficient number should be employed to allow a minimum of one visit during the hours of voting to each voting station in their areas, and preferably two, one in the first few hours of voting and another later in the day or around close of voting. Voting stations under the control of less experienced managers (during training) should be targeted for more frequent visits.

These roving officials should generally be able to provide effective field supervision for eight to ten voting locations. Such officials can serve as effective "eyes and ears" for the election administration and provide support for voting station managers in their tasks. Appropriate duties for such officials would include:

• sure that procedures for voting are being followed correctly in voting stations and provide guidance to voting station managers and staff on correct procedures;

• inspect checklists of activities completed by voting station managers and ensure that all required tasks have been completed;

• ensure that voting station layouts follow the correct plan, or if modified are an effective response to difficulties with the location being used;

• carry with them reserve stocks of voting materials to use for emergency re-supply of voting stations;

• assist voting station managers with any planning issues for the remainder of voting day;

• ensure that close of voting activities have been conducted correctly and provide any required guidance on the packaging of materials;

• monitor the correct application of count procedures where counts are to be conducted in voting stations;

• complete performance quality checklists for each voting station visited and provide progress reports to the electoral district manager on the overall situation in the field during voting day;

• following the conclusion of voting, provide a report to the electoral district manager on the performance of voting station managers and an assessment of the operations in each voting station. To be effective, these roving officials will require:

• reliable transportation sufficient to hold a travelling reserve stock of materials;

• clear delegated authority from the voting operations administrators to direct voting station staff;

• radio or mobile phone communication from their vehicle to voting stations and to the relevant voting operations centre.

While the engagement of this additional staff may be considered a luxury, in jurisdictions where they are used they have had a marked positive effect on the quality of voting station performance.

Recruitment

Voting operations, as an activity that requires high quality performance across many widely-dispersed sites, depends for its success on the quality, integrity, sound judgment, and self-reliance of the staff employed.

Elections succeed or fail at the voting station level. It is vitally important, therefore, that sufficient numbers of motivated and suitably qualified staff are recruited, trained, and are subject to effective supervision.

Recruitment Responsibilities

Decisions will need to be made on who is responsible for recruitment. Possible recruiting methods would include:

• a selection process conducted by the electoral management body, either as a centrally controlled exercise or devolved to local management areas;

• nomination of staff from other state agencies;

• use of external specialist recruitment agencies to advertise and select applicants for acceptance by the electoral management body.

Where large numbers of staff are required, combinations of methods may need to be employed.

Recruitment Integrity

Integrity and accountability of the recruitment process will be enhanced by establishing recruitment procedures that:

• promote transparency through documented selection of staff on the basis of public criteria;

• avoid corruption and political bias in appointments;

• establish clear contractual obligations between the electoral management body and its temporary voting operations staff;

• Provide a basis for financial probity. To promote integrity, it is important that all voting operations staff appointments are made by the electoral management body. Even where voting operations staff is nominated for appointment by other agencies or bodies, the final selection and approval of staff appointments should rest with the electoral management body.

Staff Qualifications and Standards

Staff recruited for voting operations functions must be capable of providing a procedurally accurate, efficient, and impartial service of high quality to voters. The criteria that persons must satisfy to be employed for voting operations, tests and standards should confirm certain basic qualities in a candidate, such as:

• impartiality;

• basic arithmetic accuracy;

• basic literacy;

• materials control skills;

• ability to communicate with the public;

• experience in a voting operations or similar environment;

• ability to follow procedures;

• ability to work accurately under pressure;

• positive attitudes to responsibility and service.

(For further discussion of criteria and standards for recruitment of voting operations staff, see Recruitment Standards.)

Community Representation

In addition to ability, impartiality, and attitude, recruitment criteria for voting operations staff should also promote the selection of staff who are representative of the community. This would require that staff be engaged wherever possible from the local area.

Additional measures may need to be taken to encourage employment of staff from minority communities, different language groups, and those who--through caste, gender, nationality, lack of employment history, or physical impairment--may often be overlooked for public sector employment. In elections held following intense inter-communal conflict, criteria may include a requirement that equal members of each community be appointed to all voting operations locations.

General Public Policy

Recruitment of voting operations staff must abide by government public sector policies on equality of employment opportunity or targeting of disadvantaged groups, such as the unemployed, for employment. This should be balanced with ensuring that they do not conflict with impartiality and integrity standards required of voting operations staff.

As a major employment exercise, recruitment of voting station staff can assist in broadening employment opportunities for population segments who may, in the social environment, lack other opportunities for employable skill acquisition.

This can particularly apply to encouraging the employment of women and in fostering local recruitment in lesser developed areas. Using voting operations recruitment as an agent of social policy or change may incur higher short-term training costs specific to the election, but may reap substantial and sustainable social benefits.

Numbers of Staff Required

The prime concern of the recruitment process is the timely recruitment of sufficient numbers of staff required for each voting operations function and location, including:

• temporary administrative assistance;

• voting station staff;

• staff for special voting facilities;

• counting staff, with careful consideration of whether voting station staff should be used for the count or whether additional staff should be engaged;

• staff for logistics and other support.

As with most other voting operations resources, the basic factor in determining how many staff will be required is the number of registered voters to be serviced. In determining cost-effective numbers of staff, consideration should include the following:

• the number of voting stations and other voting facilities to be staffed and the number of voters expected to use each of these;

• contingency staff reserves required;

• time frames and deadlines for completion of tasks;

• definition of particular staff roles and levels;

• cost considerations, particularly in situations where there may be a choice of engaging additional staff, with associated additional training costs, or paying higher rates in overtime to a smaller number of core staff;

• capacity for effective supervision;

• any general state policies that must be followed - for example in using temporary election staffing to provide some employment to large numbers of the generally unemployed.

Unless there is sufficient competent supervisory capacity, engaging larger numbers of staff may decrease the quality of service and output. The intended effects on speed of processing may be illusory. While recruiting the unemployed may not be generally cost-effective, or conducive to quality, this may serve broader social goals.

Staffing Models

Numbers of staff required can be most effectively calculated by using models of each phase of the operations--in terms of service standards, levels of service, activity timing--to develop basic staffing needs for each location and adjusting these for any specific circumstances at the local level. This approach is preferable to an ad hoc approach.  The numbers recruited should not only cover the defined staff needs, but should also include some allowance for contingencies, such as replacement of staff who fail to complete training satisfactorily or who are unable to work when required.

Continuity

Costs of training can be contained and service levels to voters enhanced, if there is a commitment to retaining the services of experienced and competent voting operations staff who have been employed at previous elections. At the very least, this will require maintenance between elections of accessible records and data bases of staff appointments and performance evaluations. Additional measures may also assist in staff retention, such as:

• encouraging voting operations staff to advice of changes of address; voting station staff experience could also be tracked in voter registration information.

• regular communications with voting operations staff through newsletters. This can assist in future training by providing news of changes in voting frameworks and procedures. It can also enhance staff motivation by communicating to temporary staff that they are valued members of the electoral management process.

• judicious use of incentives, such as promotion to more senior voting station staff positions, employment in other electoral activities such as voter registration, or possibly even retention bonuses.

Staff retention will be an easier task where there are permanent bodies with electoral management responsibilities. To maintain records on all staff employed can be an onerous task, particularly where computerised staffing records are not available. While this would deliver the maximum benefits to service enhancement, it may not be possible to maintain continuous records for all staff in environments where capacities are very limited.

It is crucial that efforts are made to retain the services of voting station managers and other senior voting station staff who have satisfactorily performed supervisory responsibilities. Without this core of experienced staffing, the already heavy training and management burdens will be increased, and voting operations performance is likely to suffer.

In some jurisdictions, strict employment preference is given to those with previous voting operations experience. Where adequate records of former staff and their performance exist, this is a cost-effective method of recruitment.

However, voting station staff who have not performed satisfactorily should not be re-employed. Such a policy needs to be applied flexibly, so as not to exclude new workers with better skills and ability. Giving strict employment preference to those with voting operations experience will not be the appropriate recruitment methodology in environments where there have been major changes to the right to vote entitlements or where past recruitment practices have been discriminatory.

Recruitment Standards

To ensure that voting operations staff with appropriate skills and other relevant attributes are selected through the recruitment process, defined criteria must be developed against which the abilities and attitudes of potential voting station staff can be measured. While this may seem an overly bureaucratic process defining comprehensive criteria will serve to:

• identify those with relevant experience and abilities suited to particular voting operations tasks;

• eliminate potential staff whose impartiality may be questioned;

• allow elimination of potential staff who are not qualified under the legislation or rules for the election to be engaged for voting operations;

• encourage the recruitment of voting operations staff who are representative of the communities which they are serving;

• provide transparent benchmarks to aid in combating corruption in appointments

Overall, criteria must ensure that only people with the ability to achieve competencies in implementing technical procedures following training are offered employment. This reduces wastage and increases the efficiency of training programs.

Criteria for Employment

The skills and qualities that are required of voting operations staff are those which will enable them to:

• implement voting procedures accurately under pressure;

• provide a courteous and effective service to voters and the public;

• perform all tasks with impartiality and integrity. In developing systems for assessing the suitability of applicants for voting operations staff positions, there are some general criteria that would be useful to apply.

In designing application documents or interviews for voting operations staff positions and evaluation reports on applicants it would be prudent to address the following general criteria:

Avalability. Applicants must be available to work during the periods they may be assigned voting operations duties, and be available for and willing to undertake the training required.

Personal qualities of integrity, reliability, willingness to accept responsibility, and accountability are necessary in voting operations staff. In some areas, senior voting station staff ,in particular, may need to be persons who command the respect of the community.

Basic skills. Applicants should possess basic skills that would indicate their ability to understand and implement voting procedures accurately following training. Skills that are important include:

• numeracy and arithmetic skills;

• good literacy skills, for senior voting station staff

• the ability to maintain and sort materials accurately;

• the ability to use equipment (including vehicles) relevant to the position;

• the ability to comprehend and implement instructions and procedures.

Practical testing of these skills prior to offering employment (e.g., through exercises such as finding names in a sample voter’s register, numeric and alphabetical sorting, and simple arithmetic tests) can be useful in eliminating unsuitable applicants.

Self-motivation, self-reliance, and stamina. As many voting operations activities must be completed within tight deadlines, applicants should demonstrate they possess the motivation and ability to complete tasks on time and to maintain stamina and accuracy under pressure. The ability to work effectively without constant supervision is also necessary.

Good health and eyesight standards are required. Effective inter-personal communication skills are an integral part of providing a quality service to voters. This requires not only oral and written communication skills in the official language of the area, but personal qualities of diplomacy, tact, and composure under pressure in dealing with the public and fellow workers. Fluency in any minority language(s) used in the area is an additional skill that will enhance service.

Prior experience. Applicants would preferably be able to demonstrate some prior experience in an area of work that requires similar skills and personal qualities. as voting operations. This could be previous satisfactory performance of voting operations duties (which should be verified by reference to staff evaluation records from earlier elections) or in other work requiring similar accuracy and customer service skills.

In areas of high long-term unemployment, application of an experience criterion may negatively affect balanced representation. Use of more intensive basic skills testing and training, and reference to educational standards achieved, would be more appropriate.

Other Considerations

There are a number of other standards that will need to be considered in developing recruitment criteria for voting operations staff. These would include:

• whether staff must be independent of any political activity, or whether a balance of political interest is sought 

• any circumstances that would disqualify a person from employment

• whether staff should hold particular educational or professional qualifications 

• the employment of staff who are representative of the community within which they will be working (see Representativeness).

Criteria Sensitive to Staff Functions

Criteria and levels of achievement against criteria may need to be different for particular voting operations staff positions. For example, additional criteria regarding initiative and management ability would be appropriate for those in charge of voting stations; on the other hand staff temporarily employed to assist with logistics or packaging materials may not need as highly developed inter-personal communications skills as those working in voting stations. Some functions such as marking a voter’s hand with ink would not require good visual ability, whereas this is a requirement for most other voting staff positions.

In developing environments, particularly those where literacy levels may be lower, skills requirements on recruitment may need to be relaxed to ensure community representation in voting station staff, with basic skill enhancement achieved through a more intensive training process.

Representativeness and independence of staff

There are some jurisdictions that aim for political balance in staff in each voting station rather than appointing non-partisan staff. Under these systems, staff could be nominated by:

• political parties for appointment by the electoral management body, or

• in seeking applications for voting station staff positions, the electoral management body could require applicants to identify their political allegiance. Under such systems, legal frameworks for staff appointment could be based on:

• appointing an equal number of staff from each of the major political parties to each voting station;

• appointments of staff from each political party according to the proportions of votes cast or representatives elected at the last election.

Effects on Efficiency and Impartiality

This method of recruitment can create some difficulties in achieving efficiency and impartiality of voting station operations. For example:

• staff with a strong emotional commitment to particular political contestants could too easily confuse the role of looking after political participants' interests with that of providing a neutral service to voters, leading to later challenges to voting station activities.

• combating perceptions of potential bias may lead to inefficiencies in staffing levels and voter service through the need to have different political participants' nominees present when any possibly contentious activities--such as assisting voters to vote, providing voter information, calculating ballot reconciliations, challenges to voter eligibility--occurs.

• some staffing models of this nature may exclude staff aligned to all but the two major political participants and may give rise to perceptions of collusion in any decisions against minor parties or independent candidates.

Transitional Elections

There are some few circumstances where achieving a political or community balance in voting operations staff may be the most practicable staffing method available. In some environments, the level of political activism may be such that it is not possible to select sufficient staff who are perceived as being politically inactive.

Particularly where elections are held as a transitional mechanism in countries emerging from inter-communal conflict, it may not be possible to select voting operations staff who are perceived by all participants as capable of being neutral or impartial. Levels of inter-communal trust can be close to non-existent, and membership in a particular nationality or community embodies perceptions of political bias.

In such situations, staffing voting stations through pairing of staff from opposed communities or political factions may not be cost-effective, but it may be a useful means of promoting all communities' acceptance of how voting procedures are implemented.

Disqualifications from Employment

Impartiality is a major qualification for employment as a voting operations staff member.Persons who do not formally agree to adhere to the code of conduct (see Codes of Conduct for Voting Operations Staff), or other statements declaring that they will act in an impartial manner in carrying out their duties, would not be suitable for appointment.

Political Activism

Where the focus is on appointing non-partisan voting operations staff, there may be an exclusion of potential staff on the grounds of political activism. In some jurisdictions this would exclude not only those who are members of political organisations with an interest in the election outcome, but also those who are perceived as being an active public participant in political or electoral affairs.

This could include persons listed as nominators on nomination documents or as supporters on petitions or other documents for party registration. Under such systems, checks in this regard will need to be made of all potential appointees.

Voter Registration

It is common practice that to be considered for voting station staff employment, applicants must be registered voters in the locality in which they are seeking employment. This has advantages in promoting local representation in voting station staff and requiring some displayed interest in the electoral process as a prerequisite for employment.

Nepotism

In some jurisdictions there may also be a ban on more than one member of the same direct family, or any relatives, from being appointed as officials in the same voting station or electoral district, or being employed as temporary voting operations staff in the same administrative area. While an efficient deterrent to nepotistic corruption of employment, such bans may disbar effective and well-qualified potential staff.

Requirements for transparent approval of staff appointments, rather than inflexible disqualification of family members or associates from employment, would be more effective.

Educational Qualifications

In some jurisdictions, defined educational or professional qualifications are the major criterion for appointment to some or all voting operations staff positions.

Setting reasonable minimum education standard may be a useful way of ensuring that staff members possess the basic skills required, particularly for those whose work histories may be non-existent or an unreliable measure.

Potential Restrictive Effects

Requiring professional qualifications for temporary voting station staff may unduly restrict employment opportunity and is often an inappropriate response to problems caused by lack of properly defined procedures. For example, in some jurisdictions, senior voting station staff are required to hold legal qualifications. Yet, lawyers may not be the most appropriate managers of staff for voter service quality.

Any problems of election law that arise during voting would be better solved by reference to a comprehensive standard procedures manual, backed by access to consistent legal advice. To allow voting station managers and other voting station staff to interpret election law, whatever their legal experience, can lead to controversial inconsistencies.

Technical Staff

Where temporary staff are engaged for administrative or technical support functions, requirements for professional qualifications may be entirely appropriate (for example, where temporary support staff are needed to maintain or operate financial or computer-based systems).

Recruitment Action Plan

Action plans for recruitment of the required number of voting operations staff need to define:

• responsibilities for recruitment and appointment,

• recruitment timing so that staff are appointed and trained in time to undertake their tasks, and

• A methodology for recruitment that ensures that the best available quality staff are appointed in a transparent manner. For discussions of these issues, see the following:

• Recruitment Methodology;

• Transparency in Recruitment;

• Nature of Appointment Contracts and Staff Appointment Documentation;

• Contingency Staff;

• Training of Voting Operations Staff.

Recruitment Planning

The sheer numbers of staff that are required for voting operations means that planning of recruitment needs to be meticulous and detailed in its approach. National elections are likely to be one of the largest staff recruitment exercises undertaken in a country. The major steps in planning recruitment of voting operations staff include:

• determining recruitment responsibilities;

• implementing publicity campaigns for employment of temporary voting operations staff through the use of media, civic and voter educators, and publicly available information pamphlets;

• maintaining applications received for voting operations staff positions;

• assessment of applicants or nominated staff against criteria for requisite voting operations positions;

• determination of numbers of staff required for voting stations and other special voting facilities, including contingency reserve staff (see Contingency Staff);

• selection and training of the appropriate staff;

• formal appointment of staff to defined staffing positions and their allocation to specific voting station locations or reserve duties.

Recruitment Responsibilities

Best practice requires that the formal appointment of staff would be the responsibility of the electoral management body.

Electoral management bodies may not have the resources or expertise to recruit all staff from a central point for the entire election. Centralised recruitment may also not be the appropriate model to allow effective use of local knowledge of employment environments and suitable potential staff, or quick and appropriate response to particular local needs.

Adopting a model whereby the bulk of recruitment is devolved to a regional or electoral district level can have significant advantages. Where electoral management bodies are temporary, a full cascade recruitment process--in which the central electoral management body recruits electoral district managers and, these in turn, recruit their voting station, counting, and administrative assistance staff--will reduce the load on central administrators. In some cases, particularly where administrative districts cover large geographic areas, it may be more effective for voting station managers to recruit their own voting station staff. In such decentralised systems there will need to be monitoring and review of local recruitment processes to ensure that quality and impartiality standards for staff are met and that recruitment processes are being applied in a transparent manner. (For further discussion of recruitment methods, see Recruitment Methodology.)

External Assistance

The electoral management body may not have sufficient resources to undertake the entire recruitment process without external assistance. Using external alternatives, such as contracting out recruitment to specialist employment agencies or automatically accepting nominations from other state authorities for voting operations staff, may be seen to compromise staffing integrity.

In such instances the electoral management body should retain control of final selection of staff.

However, where a full selection process is undertaken with applications and interviews of all those applying for employment, specialist agencies may be of assistance at the shortlisting stage in assessing and ranking applicants.

Nomination and seconding of state agencies' and local government authorities' staff for voting operations positions can provide core staff with dependable relevant skills. Responsibilities for final selection and appointments should still reside with officers within the electoral management structure specifically authorised to engage staff.

Timing of Recruitment

Recruitment processes must be firmly tied to the election timetable o deliver sufficient trained staff by the dates their services will be required. The appropriate timing for recruitment will depend largely on:

• The election system. Where elections are held at fixed, regular intervals, staff recruitment should be integrated into continuous election planning. It can be initiated some months prior to the known voting date.

Where election dates are flexible, or an election is being held to resolve a period of social conflict, recruitment strategies need to be initiated as soon as possible after the date the election is announced. In all cases, recruitment must be completed in time to allow training of voting station and counting staff to be completed around seven days prior to the election.

• The organisational management structure of the electoral management body. Where there are no permanent staff, or agents, of the electoral management body at the local level, there will generally be a need to recruit highly skilled electoral district managers, or local election commissions, to manage voting operations in each electoral district or for subdivisions of electoral districts.

In these circumstances, recruitment will need to be undertaken in at least two phases--an initial phase to put a local supervisory management structure into place and a later phase for the bulk of staff required for voting station and count duties.

• The methodology adopted for recruitment. If staff members at all levels are to be recruited in a single centralised process, this may be less efficient time-wise than distributing recruitment responsibilities to the local level. The recruitment period may also be compressed where active contact is maintained with staff from previous elections, rather than having to start recruitment anew for each election, or where the bulk of voting station staff are seconded from other government agencies.

The rigorousness of the selection process for new staff will also affect the time that is needed to finalise recruitment. Earlier commencement of recruitment will be required where a fully transparent merit selection process involving review of applications for employment and/or interviews with applicants is implemented.

• The range of voting services to be provided. Under voting frameworks that allow early voting there will be a requirement for some voting station staff to be trained for duties in advance of voting day. Depending on the numbers involved, and the length of the period allowed for early voting, it may be considered useful to recruit these staff members at an earlier time than those required only for the general voting day.

• The overall numbers of temporary staff required, as well as the resources available to apply to recruitment processes.

• The need for temporary administrative assistance for voting operations functions in staff servicing functions, such as payroll management, logistics organisation and control, and materials packaging.

As these tasks will need to be undertaken well in advance of voting day, and may require different skills, , earlier recruitment drive could be considered to fill such positions.

Recruitment Methodology

To ensure that an appropriate method of recruitment is in place, the electoral management body must determine responsibilities for recruitment and qualifications required for staff, and determine:

• the methods for making initial contact with potential staff;

• how applicants are to be assessed as suitable and selected for available positions;

• the method by which staff are to be formally appointed and contracted;

• how to monitor the numbers of staff appointed to ensure that all staffing requirements are satisfied.

Initial Contact

In recruiting voting operations staff, there are various ways initial approaches can be made. The approach taken will be influenced by factors such as:

• whether there is a contactable pool of experienced staff from past elections;

• whether there have been changes in the electoral system, eligibility to vote, or redistricting.

Methods of contact could include:

• direct written or other personal contact with potential staff;

• targeting particular professional groups which may have the qualifications necessary for voting station staff or be particularly suited to voting operations duties;

• seeking recommendations of potential staff from community, civic, and occupational groups;

• inviting seconding or nominations of staff from other state agencies;

• advertising voting operations vacancies through community or mass media, meetings, and public information campaigns;

• requesting civic educators to identify potential staff;

• requesting voting station managers to recruit staff for their voting station.

Direct Contact

Where a contactable pool of experienced voting operations officials exists, direct written or other personal contact with potential staff can be the most cost-effective way to recruit most staff. However, without effective mechanisms for evaluating staff performance at previous elections, the cost-effectiveness may be illusory.

Reliance solely on this method can also lead to a restricted field of potential voting station officials. New candidates with better competencies may not get the chance to prove themselves, and any past restrictive patterns of employment with regard to gender, minority groups, or groups only recently eligible to vote, may be perpetuated.

Targeting Specific Groups

Occupational groups that may have skills relevant to voting operations would include lawyers, educators, state employees, bank employees, and local municipal staff. There may be advantages in targeting particular professional or occupational groups, particularly in less literate societies, where in some geographic areas there may be a limited number of individuals with the ability to perform voting operations functions.

Teachers may be a rich source of voting operations staff, because they will often have the advantage of site familiarity (and perhaps an enhanced ability to assist with site equipment and facilities) where school locations are used as voting sites.

Seeking Recommendations

Civic and community groups, particularly in areas of lower employment, may be well placed to recommend those with skills appropriate for voting operations employment. Similarly, occupational and employment groups or societies may have significant local knowledge of potential staff. Recommended staff could either contact, or be contacted by, voting operations administrators to establish their interest.

Where the staffing framework requires the appointment of independent staff, political organisations should not be approached for recommendations of suitable staff. Some jurisdictions present the names of the appointed staff to political party liaison committees in the interests of consensus and to proactively address potential problems or perceptions of bias.

Seconding of Staff

There may be risks in accepting direct nominations for voting operations staff positions from other state or judicial authorities. Where institutional political neutrality is not well established, this can lead to public perceptions of lack of impartiality on the part of the electoral management body. If such nominations are provided, the electoral management body must still test these applicants against the qualifications required for voting operations duties--most importantly, political neutrality--and have the authority to accept or reject each applicant.

Use of employees of other state organisations, however, can be a cost-effective method of staffing voting operations. Secondment from other state authorities may incur little in apparent additional costs, since these costs remain with the seconding agencies. Particularly if voting day is on a normal work day for such employees, the staffing costs for voting stations can appear to be minimised, but the true cost of the staff is the their absence form their normal work duties.

Employees of other state organisations may bring familiarity with basic bureaucratic processes, such as how to use communications systems, deal with people, notions of accountability and public service, and adherence to process to the voting operations process. These competencies can assist voting operations, particularly in developing countries., Alternatively these skills may need to be instilled in other potential staff. Thus, using employees of other state organisations may lead to savings in training and performance enhancement costs.

There may also be opportunities for the secondment of staff from private sector employers that could be pursued. This could support the administration or implementation of highly skilled generalist technical functions--such as logistics and auditing--where relevant skills are not available within the electoral management body.

Public Advertising

Advertising for voting operations officials through community or mass media, meetings, and public information campaigns promotes transparency and equity in the recruitment process and can provide a wide pool of potential staff from a diverse range of cultural and geographic backgrounds.

The downside of this is that it may create extra workloads in assessing the suitability of all applicants.

Recommendations from Civic Educators

Requesting civic educators to identify potential staff during their visits to communities can be particularly effective in geographic areas where the electoral management body does not have a permanent administrative presence. It can also decrease the staff selection workload, since potential staff have already been screened by persons with some knowledge of election processes and staff duties.

Recruitment by Voting Station Managers

Using a "cascade" system of recruitment, in which the electoral management body recruits voting station managers, who are then responsible for recruiting their own staff, can significantly disperse recruitment workloads and ease the pressure on election administration staff. It also provides another layer of accountability and ownership of management duties for voting station managers. It can be a useful method for recruiting officials for voting stations in more remote areas.

However, it can make quality control of the recruitment ocess more challenging. As with other methods of recruitment, the actual approval of employment of these voting station officials should remain with specified staff of the electoral management body.

Applications for Employment

People, particularly those who were not previously employed for voting operations duties, should provide some form of application. In general, such applications should be written and require an indication of the applicant's abilities for the qualifications required (see Recruitment Standards).

In areas of low literacy, where equity considerations have modified literacy requirements for voting station staff undertaking less responsible positions, meetings of potential staff may need to be organised and application and selection proceedings may be conducted verbally.

Selecting Staff to be Offered Employment

Staff for voting operations should be selected strictly according to the qualifications necessary for the functions that they will have to perform (see Recruitment Standards).

It is preferable that there is some method of assessing the quality of potential voting operations staff before employment is offered, rather than discovering unsuitability during training, with the attendant additional costs of rejection at that stage. Assessment could be made in the following ways:

• where the applicant has previously worked in elections, review any assessments made of their performance;

• where there is no such history, administer an examination that tests the applicant's experience and skills against the required qualifications and voting operations duty descriptions.  Special arrangements for assessment will need to be made if there are representativity considerations requiring employment of illiterate or semi-literate persons for some positions.

It is important that the selection process be conducted in a transparent manner (see Transparency in Recruitment). Depending on time and other limitations, applicants would preferably be met and interviewed before any decision on offering them employment is made.

Offers of employment should generally be made according to order of ranking against the qualifications required, though this may need to be modified in order to meet representativeness criteria. Where any such modification of merit selection is made, any representativeness criteria applied should be publicly available and transparent.

Appointment of Staff

Staff appointed to voting operations positions should receive a formal contract for their services. (For contract offers and confirmation documentation, see Staff Appointment Documentation. For issues to be considered in developing staff contract contents, see Nature of Appointment Contracts)

Contingency Staff

The number of staff selected needs to account not only for the identified positions to be filled but also for potential contingencies (see Contingency Staff). Recruitment should identify sufficient excess staff to be trained to cover for:

• staff who drop out or are otherwise found to be unsuitable during the training phase;

• staff who become unavailable for personal or other reasons between the time of recruitment and voting day;

• voting day contingencies. Sufficient staff should be formally appointed to cover voting day contingencies, relating to:

• voter turnout where historic data or flexibility in voting methods available do not allow accurate prediction of voter turnout or voting peaks at all voting stations;

• staff absences or failures to report for duty on voting day.

Monitoring

After the number of vacancies for staff in various categories (for voting stations, ballot counting centres, administrative support) has been established, monitoring systems are necessary to ensure that staff allocations proceed efficiently and that any additional recruitment action or review of previously unsuccessful applicants can be implemented in a timely fashion. Such monitoring would include tracking:

• staff who have accepted positions against locations;

• vacancies remaining;

• satisfactory training completion;

• reserve staff.

Given the likely time constraints on the recruitment process, it is also vital that basic administrative controls are effectively executed to ensure that the correct offer and contract documentation is sent to, and is returned from, all the correct individuals at the correct time.

Transparency in Recruitment

In recruiting voting operations staff, strict adherence to guidelines that promote transparency in the appointment process is necessary. The basic guarantees of transparency are in the application of the following:

• publicly disclosed selection criteria for positions;

• a documented process of selection through equitable, written assessment of applicants against the relevant selection criteria, with reasons provided for decisions to employ or not to employ;

• a procedure for open and equitable resolution of any complaints about voting operations staff selection processes.

Transparency will be further enhanced by a genuine public invitation for applications for employment as voting operations staff.

Ensuring transparency in recruitment will create some additional workload in soliciting applications, screening the applications, and then conducting a proper selection process.

The most compelling benefit of transparency in recruitment is that it promotes public confidence in the impartiality and skill of voting operations officials, and it assists the effective operation of voting stations and count centres by selection of the most qualified available staff.

Transparency is also necessary to ensure that:

• the appointment process is not manipulated so voting station staff who will support a particular political viewpoint in their official duties are appointed;

• patronage in voting station staff appointments does not result in the engagement of staff who do not have the ability to undertake their tasks.

Patronage or Financial Gain

Large numbers of staff need to be recruited as voting station and counting officials. There can be a temptation, particularly where recruitment is decentralised, to appoint family members, friends, or associates, regardless of their suitability for the positions. In regions of high unemployment, where voting operations employment may be the only paid work opportunity available for some time, the temptation is greater.

(This is a different scenario from that where official government policy may reasonably give preference to suitably qualified unemployed persons as voting station official recruits.) Different jurisdictions take different approaches to prevent patronage and particularly nepotism in voting station official appointments, resulting in the appointment of unsuitable staff. When determining appropriate controls, the desirable recruitment outcome must be considered--to engage persons who are most effective at undertaking the required tasks in an impartial manner, and whose appointment is free of corruption. Who a prospective voting station official knows or is related to need not necessarily be a hindrance to recruitment.

The basic control is in the intensity of regional or central monitoring of the recruitment process: in ensuring that those selected for training meet formally defined basic skill criteria, and that any complaints about bias in recruitment are reviewed openly and quickly.

Secondary controls are at the training stage, where unsuitable patronage recruits may be disqualified (this could be an ineffective control in cascade training systems, where the trainer and the recruiter may well be the same person).

Particular controls against nepotism in recruitment of voting operations staff used in some jurisdictions include:

• prohibition of relatives working within the same voting station;

• prohibition of employment of relatives by administrators or voting station officials with recruitment responsibilities. While such prohibitions aid the perception of integrity in recruitment, they may harshly preclude well-qualified potential voting station officials.

Perceptions of integrity would be equally well served by requiring that the selection process provide proof of superior merit, accompanied by approval of appointment by an independent senior electoral management body official.

Political Influence

There are two basically opposed concepts of how to control political influence in voting station official appointments. In most environments, the more effective model is to ensure freedom from political influence in selection of voting station officials by:

• overall transparency in recruitment processes as detailed above;

• specific disqualification of any person who is a member of a political party, an active supporter of any political party or candidate for election, or has taken an active role in the political campaign for the election.

While these disqualifications are an integrity/transparency check on recruitment, care must be taken that they are not used in a partisan manner to unfairlyprevent people with alleged connections to opposition parties from serving as voting station officials. The checks against this lie in the recruitment process meeting overall transparency requirements and in the independence of complaint and review mechanisms.

Control of political influence within staff appointments is of a different nature in systems where voting station officials are appointed on the basis of their affiliation with a political party. Rigorous mechanisms are required to ensure that at each voting station, different political interests are equitably represented amongst voting station staff.

This is a system that may be appropriate in societies where, historically, impartial decisions have been reached through the checks and balances provided by competing interests, with a strong background of institutional integrity, and where there are few stable organised political forces.

In other environments, it is generally not a suitable mechanism. It relies on political checks and balances at a voting station level that due to the speed of occurrences may be difficult to apply. It can also exclude representatives of any emerging parties, or independent candidates, from appointment as voting station officials. It may also require the appointment of more voting station officials, and hence higher costs, than would otherwise be necessary, so that significant actions can only be taken by officials of opposite party acting together. Political participants are generally better served through appointing representatives to monitor the work of voting station officials.

Post-Conflict Environments

In post conflict situation is may be most practicable to appoint voting station officials as representatives of particular political interests, where they act as checks and balances on each other and enhance community acceptance of the integrity of voting operations. In post-conflict environments, where the conflict has been nationality or party based, there is little likelihood of the acceptance by the whole community of the independence of any appointed voting station official.

Appointment of equal numbers of officials on a nationality or party basis to each voting station, and ensuring that procedures require consultation and agreement between the various interests represented may be the most practicable, though not efficient, means of neutralising inherent community distrusts.

Traditional Societies

In areas still under traditional leadership, or in societies where there are strong familial support responsibilities or powers of official patronage and allegiance still held by clan leaders, it may be difficult to impose open and transparent selection on voting station official recruitment.

An independent selection of voting station officials should still be attempted through negotiation with traditional authorities. A possible solution may be to negotiate to bring in some voting station officials from outside the area. This will assist in providing checks, balances, and expertise in voting station operations.

However, if this is not possible, the —option to bring in full teams of transparently appointed voting station officials from outside the area--may have negative affects on election co-operation, voter turnout, and ability to provide voter service in the area. It should only be contemplated after very careful consideration of its possible effects.

The only effective solutions may be to pay special attention to impartiality issues during training, and strictly monitor voting station and count operations, by the electoral management body, party and candidate representatives, and observers.

The Nature of Appointment Contracts

In constructing offers of employment and appointment or contract documents for voting operations staff, there are issues both for the protection of staff and the protection of the electoral management body that need to be considered. These would include:

• the specification of staff duties;

• legal responsibilities of staff;

• the basis of staff payments;

• staff disciplinary provisions;

• the termination or suspension of staff

• the method by which staff accept appointment;

• any restrictions on the scope of employment;

• provisions for emergency engagement of staff.

(For further information on voting operations staff appointments, see Recruitment Methodology, and for contract offer and confirmation processes, see Staff Appointment Documentation.)

Specification of Duties

The duties which staff are expected to undertake should be specified. However, this should be done in a manner that allows some flexibility in staff duties, by including a clause that staff may be required to undertake additional or different duties at the direction of supervisors.

Where an individual is contracted for clearly separate duties, particularly if at different remuneration rates--e.g., as a voting operations administrative assistant and as a voting station official on voting day--the contractual obligations for each position would be better specified in separate appointments.

Legal Responsibilities

Any legal responsibilities of staff should be clearly described in documentation provided with their appointments.

While this may not be relevant for lower level staff engaged in, say, packaging of election materials, it is particularly important where local managerial staff, for example, electoral district managers or local election commissions with legally defined responsibilities for the conduct of the election within an electoral district, are temporary staff engaged on short-term contract.

Payment Basis

Appointments or contracts should not require the electoral management body to make any unnecessary payments. For temporary administrative staff, or staff assisting with early voting in person or by mail, for example, costs can generally be better contained by appointing staff for duty on an hourly basis, as required, rather than as full-time employees for a fixed period.

Voting day staff contracts are more cost-effective if written on a task completion basis, a fair flat rate for however long it takes for specified duties to be completed (especially if staff are also to undertake the count at voting stations) rather than on an hourly rate.

Disciplinary Provisions

Any disciplinary provisions must be made clear to staff when they are appointed. Any prerequisites for confirmation of employment, e.g., satisfactory performance at training, must be clearly stated in the contractual documentation provided.

Penalties for breaches of the code of conduct and any rights of the electoral management body to terminate or suspend employment should also be made clear, and reinforced during training. Staff should also be advised of any methods of challenge to decisions to penalise them regarding their performance.

Acceptance of Appointment

Appointments and contracts must be signed or personally marked by the employee and a representative of the electoral management body. No staff member should be allowed to commence duty without having signed acceptance to the appointment.

It should be made clear to staff that in signing the contract or appointment offer, staff are indicating that they fully understand its contents, their rights, and obligations. In particular, staff should sign specifically that they accept and will comply with the code of conduct (seeCodes of Conduct for Voting Operations Staff) or similar legal obligations to uphold the integrity of voting, and are not disqualified in any way from holding their appointed position.

Restricted Scope

Appointment documentation should make no indications of additional work outside the contract that may be made available.

Where public sector employment policies allow translation from temporary to permanent staff status, or require payment of additional benefits to temporary staff under length of service conditions, care should be taken in making their appointment. The nature or length of their appointment should not qualify them for unintended benefits or increase costs above budgeted levels.

Emergency Staffing Appointments

There may be emergency situations in voting stations that require swift additional recruitment and appointment action. If staff numbers are depleted and sufficient contingency staff are not available to make up the shortfall, voting station managers may have to appoint emergency staff. For this they will need both emergency powers and the provision of emergency staff appointment documents in their voting station materials.

Similarly if a voting station or count manager is taken ill or is absent for a period during voting day, it may be necessary to formally transfer the legal responsibility of the conduct of voting or the count at that location to another staff member. Mechanisms for this need to be provided.

Contingency Staff

In developing voting station staffing plans, a contingency factor should be included in the number of staff that need to be recruited to replace staff staff who drop out.

In establishing the required levels of contingency staff, consideration needs to be given to all relevant factors that may cause staff to be unavailable, including:

• personal emergencies;

• transport failures;

• unsuitability for voting station duties established during training;

• sickness or fatigue experienced during voting day.

It may also be necessary to recruit contingency staff to accommodate unexpectedly high voter turnouts at specific voting locations, depending on how flexible voting systems are with regard to voter’s choice of voting station and the percentage voter turnout basis for initial staffing allocations.

Numbers of Contingency Staff Required

The numbers of contingency staff required will vary according to environment. Previous electoral history may be some guide, but this is not necessarily relevant where there have been major changes to election systems or political environments. In stable systems, contingency reserves may only be needed at the level of one staff member to around eight to ten voting stations.

In less stable systems, where there are new participants in the voting processes and difficulties in recruiting staff with high base level skills, this may rise to as much as one or two reserve staff for each voting station. Voting operations budgets must allow for costs related to contingency staff, e.g., fees, training, and logistics support costs.

Location of Contingency Staff

On voting day contingency staff would generally be best assigned to report to the regional or local election administration office, rather than to individual voting locations. The regional or local administration office will assign then where they are needed. This may need to be varied in more remote areas and where reliable emergency transport is not available to all voting locations.

It may also be better to assign reserve staff to the voting station location in environments where general public communication systems are poor or where history or current circumstances indicates the likelihood of significant levels of failure to report for duty by voting station officials.

Generic Voting Station Officials

Contingency staff are more cost-effectively recruited at the base voting station official level. Contingency staff should generally be treated in the same way as other voting station officials.

They should all receive the same training, and where required to report for duty on voting day, be paid at least a retainer as a voting station official, even if not required to work. Contingency staff may cost-effectively be used for other localised tasks if not required for voting station duties on voting day--for example, administrative assistance in operations centres,  accompanying roving voting station officials as runners, or assisting with emergency materials control.

Voting Station Managers and Senior Voting Station Officials

Contingency staffing arrangements for voting station managers do not necessarily need to involve the recruitment of staff specifically for voting station management positions. Structuring voting station staff profiles so that there is a designated deputy in each voting station will provide a replacement in case of management drop-outs.

This could require some reassignment between neighbouring voting stations. These staff can then be replaced in their original positions from the pool of reserve voting station officials. To cover for such contingencies, staff occupying designated second-in-charge or deputy manager positions will be more effective if provided with the same level of training as voting station managers.

The appointment of senior voting operations officials as roving first-line supervisors or troubleshooters for voting stations within particular geographic areas may provide some contingency reserve for voting station managers. The appropriateness of this will be more limited in rural areas with low population density.

Additionally, if these roving officials are used as replacement voting station managers, there will be a loss of more general first-line supervisory capacities. 

Staff Appointment Documentation

Depending on the manner in which applications for voting operations staff positions are sought, offers of employment could be made either as an introductory inquiry to establish interest and availability, or as a firm offer after suitable applicants have been selected.

Whichever manner is used, there is a staged process that would preferably be followed in order to maintain effective control over staff recruitment:

• seeking applications from potential staff, or confirming interest and availability of previously experienced voting operations staff or nominated persons;

• assessment and selection of staff from those who respond;

• notices to unsuccessful applicants;

• where availability has not previously been established, or applicants applied for positions in general, rather than a specific position, sending out of offers of employment requiring confirmation of availability for the specific position;

• formal written appointment of successful applicants to a specified position--preferable with a clearly stated stipulation that formal confirmation of the position is dependent on the applicant's successfully completing the required training. Maintaining proper documentation of this process is necessary to combat any challenges to the integrity of employment decisions.

Once voting operations staff have been selected and have confirmed their willingness to be employed under the terms and codes of conduct applicable, a formal appointment or contract confirmation must be provided to each recruited staff member.

Without these, the recruitment process loses all accountability.

Staff Appointment Documentation

Contract and appointment documentation provided to staff should disclose sufficient information to establish staff rights, responsibilities, and entitlements. Relevant information that should be provided includes:

• the title of the position to which the person is to be appointed;

• general terms and conditions of employment;

• the duties and responsibilities of the position (this should be further explained in accompanying procedural documentation);

• the location, date(s), and time(s) at which the person is required to report for duty, and the duration of the employment;

• training requirements;

• code of conduct requirements, including any declarations of conduct to be signed by the employee;

• declaration of secrecy to be signed by all voting station staff

• remuneration rates and payment arrangements for both voting operations duties and training, including any tax liabilities or other contributions required;

• any additional entitlements--such as transport, accommodation, insurance, expenses--and arrangements for these;

• any specific arrangements the staff member needs to be aware of for effective conduct of duties;

• penalties for failure to comply with appointment conditions;

• contact information for inquiries;

• request for prompt confirmation of acceptance or notification of unavailability.

Other additional information may also usefully be provided with appointment documentation. For more senior staff this could include details of their appointed subordinates. For voting station managers this could include such information as delivery or collection times for equipment, voting station security arrangements, collection and return arrangements for voting station premises keys and preparation of reports.

Other Material

Delivery of staff appointment documentation, whether at meetings, through the mail, or by other delivery methods, is the most effective opportunity to provide each staff recruit with:

• a copy of their relevant procedures;

• any training prerequisites (workbooks or exercises to complete);

• specific information on any transport or accommodation arrangements made in connection with their duties.

Where, because of the location of their duties on voting day, staff will require an absentee vote, any application forms required for this should also be included with the appointment documentation.

Codes of Conduct for Voting Operations Staff

Voting operations staff have a special position of trust. There is an expectation that they will adhere to all relevant rules and regulations, and faithfully and professionally undertake their duties to provide election outcomes of high integrity.

While this is particularly true of officials conducting voting and counting ballots, it also applies to all connected with the election process, from couriers, voter educators, mail sorters, materials despatchers to senior electoral managers. For the bulk of staff involved in voting operations, this is infrequent, short-term employment, which will generally have more intensive impositions regarding ethical behaviour and impartiality than their usual activities.

Need to Develop Conduct Codes

Formal codes of conduct for voting operations staff provide them with the knowledge of the expectations of their behaviour and a basis for sanctions against them if they breach standards set in the code.

In their simplest form, codes deal only with the basic cornerstone of a free election, that is, the maintenance of the secrecy of voting, or refer to legislative requirements for ethical behaviour. However, it is preferable to provide each voting operations employee with a succinct outline of required behaviour standards in undertaking their duties.

Officials codes of conduct could be:

• an integral part of the legislative framework for the election, backed by the sanctions contained in this framework;

• an administrative direction from the electoral management body, backed by reference to sanctions in electoral legislation and/or in legislation governing the conduct of public officials generally.

Provision of Code to Officials

The code, examples of how it is maintained in practice, and information on disciplinary mechanisms and penalties for proven breaches, should be provided to persons seeking employment as voting operations officials.

It should be fully explained to all successful applicants during training sessions. Officials should also be provided with extracts from electoral legislation or regulations that provide the legal framework for their particular duties and that underpin the requirements of the code.

Content of Codes Of Conduct

Codes of conduct for voting operations employees deal with the following major issues:

• impartiality, integrity, and professionalism in dealing with voting operations matters;

• maintaining security of election materials and secrecy of voting;

• standards of service to be provided. Wording of codes should be such that they are applicable to all voting operations staff.

Content of codes of conduct for voting operations staff would usefully include requirements that staff:

• undertake to maintain the secrecy and integrity of voting at all times by not disclosing any knowledge of a voter's voting intentions or observed voting behaviour;

• maintain impartial and non-partisan conduct at all times--including acting in an impartial and non-partisan manner at all times; not attempting to influence or communicate with any voter on political issues; doing nothing, either in a personal or official capacity that could be seen to indicate by action (including the wearing of any politically associated apparel), attitude, manner, or speech support for any political participant or tendency; not undertaking activities that could be perceived to involve conflict of interests, and reporting any relationships that could be perceived as potential conflicts of interests;

• not commit or attempt any act of corruption--including a ban on accepting inducements to act in a particular way, on accepting any gifts, favours or promise of reward from political participants or their supporters (the code may also require an active stance against corruption--to report, oppose, and combat any act of corruption discovered in the course of their duties);

• accept the authority and direction of the electoral management body over officials' actions;

• perform all duties and functions with care, competence, accuracy, and courtesy;

• maintain secrecy of the voting operations and respect the confidentiality of the voters;

• treat all members of the public with dignity;

• reject and report any form of discrimination, in relation to voting operations administration or political activity for the elections, based on race, gender, ethnicity, language, class, or religion;

• accept the rights of accredited party or candidate

• representatives and observers to observe voting operations processes, and the rights of voters, political participants and accredited observers to object to irregular procedures, and investigate such objections with courtesy, tact, integrity, and timeliness;

• undertake to safeguard all electoral material entrusted to their care;

• undertake, unless good cause can be shown, to attend all training sessions or meetings in connection with their duties, and report for duty as directed.

Post-Conflict Environments

In post-conflict environments, voting operations officials may be dealing with other officials and political participants with whom, only recently, they were in violent conflict. Officials' codes of conduct in such environments may need to extend their range of content to commit officials to specific undertakings, such as to:

• cooperate with all authorities in delivery of election materials and services;

• acknowledge the authority of international supervisors and not impede their work;

• not impede campaign activities of any political participants or interfere with the electoral rights of any person;

• assist monitors, observers, and supervisors in carrying out their duties;

• assist in ensuring, within any boundaries established in the legal framework for the election, the freedom of movement of all participants in the election.

Declarations by Employees

Before being formally appointed to voting operations positions, all staff should be required to make a declaration that they will follow the rules contained in their code of conduct. At the very least, if full codes of conduct have not yet been developed, a declaration that the employee will respect the secrecy of voting and relevant legislative requirements should be obtained before appointment.

There are other participants in the voting operations process to whom elements of the election staff codes of conduct should also formally apply. Official visitors to and observers in voting stations may observe the act of voting. Before accreditation to visit voting sites, they should also confirm that they will undertake to maintain the secrecy of voting. Contractors who supply election materials or are contracted for logistics, should sign brief declarations binding them to maintain election materials security and voting secrecy.

Contractors or community groups providing voting operations services, such as voter information activities, should also be bound by the impartiality, service, secrecy, and security aspects of the election official’s code.

Enforcement

A code of conduct has no effect if there are no clear avenues for its enforcement and no knowledge of penalties that will be imposed for proven breaches. There must be clear mechanisms for swift, effective, and impartial disciplinary action--of an administrative nature for less serious offences and of a criminal nature for serious misconduct.

Serious conduct would include corrupt or violent behaviour, that would be criminal in any context, or breaches of voting secrecy. It is useful for electoral legislation to provide administrative penalties for misconduct, such as immediate dismissal from employment (with appropriate safeguards of justice), that can be swiftly applied by the electoral management body.

It is important that disciplinary mechanisms and penalties are appropriate to the offence. Dealing with even minor offences solely through the court system is likely to delay resolution until after the election period, and thus lose the possibility of effective salutary action.

Courts may also be loathe to impose significant penalties for what may seem as minor breaches of administrative trust, and will generally not be the most effective means of dealing with misconduct, unless it is of a criminal nature. Any disciplinary or court actions taken, and any resulting penalties should be widely publicised.

Training of Voting Operations Staff

Training for voting operations staff is a valuable investment in the integrity of the election process. It is a necessary and integral part of each election, and ensures that all staff have the competency to apply election procedures accurately, impartially, and consistently throughout every administration office, voting station, and count centre.

It is these officials in local workplaces who make or break the election. Training for voting operations forms part of the overall training program of the electoral management body.

Competency Development

In training for voting operations, it is essential to achieve competency, which means the development of the ability of staff to implement procedures in the required manner, not just know about them. This basic objective governs the manner in which training for voting station staff is undertaken. It requires more than just a familiarity with relevant legislation. Voting station staff are engaged in a one-time event, working under intense pressure and with little latitude for error. Without an opportunity to first practice what they have to do, the risks of failure are high.

Thus, regardless of their past training or experience, voting operations staff need the opportunity, close to the election date to be trained in the actual voting-related tasks for which they will be responsible. It is immaterial whether or not staff have worked on elections previously, or that procedures should be common knowledge. Procedures and performance expectations change from election to election, and without the opportunity for constant application, learnt skills will have deteriorated.

Compulsory Training

Undertaking training should be a prerequisite for confirmation of employment as a voting operations official. This training would preferably be face-to-face.

In circumstances where this is not possible, a program of home learning through assessable workbooks will need to be substituted. Even where face-to-face session attendance is required, initiation or reinforcement of this learning through required completion of home reading and exercises will result in more effective training sessions.

The inducement to complete training properly is to make this a condition of confirmation of employment. A positive inducement is the provision of a reasonable remuneration for attendance at training sessions, for any associated travel, and for time spent on reading and completion of home training exercises.

Continuous Training Systems

Specific election training will be less daunting if voting operations staff have a more developed knowledge base. Systems of continuous training and briefings for voting operations staff can assist with this. This will require the maintenance of records of voting operations staff employed and continuing contact with them.

Stability of Legal and Procedural Framework

It is important for effective training and subsequent staff performance that laws, regulations, and procedures for voting operations are settled early and remain stable during the election period. Development of reference materials and training programs takes time. Changes to frameworks after reference materials have been finalised, and particularly after training sessions have been conducted, can only confuse staff in their actions.

Conducting emergency retraining, involving staff "unlearning" their previous training and learning the new methods, poses considerable information retention difficulties.

Planning Training Programs

Training of voting station staff is one of the largest and most concentrated training programs undertaken by any institution, and places heavy demands on organisational planning and service capacities. Proper strategic planning of training objectives, target groups, material development, and intended learning outcomes, and detailed operational planning for all training activities and their integration with other election tasks are essential.

Without such planning, training focus, effectiveness, and accountabilities are lost, and training implementation becomes haphazard.

The timing of training delivery is important to ensure that competencies are retained and that training scheduling are part of with other election priorities. Care should be taken that training is not offered to far in advance of the election date , as there may be further ongoing changes to knowledge required by the voting station staff.

Methodologies of Voting Operations Training

There are varying methodologies that could be applied for training such large numbers of staff. The use of centralised or decentralised models will depend on the training resources and time available.  Within these models, the way in which training is presented will greatly influence the effectiveness of the learning experience. Factors to be considered include:

•the training content 

• the quality of implementation of self-directed or various techniques of face-to-face presentation 

• the physical facilities and training aids used ;

• the materials available for continuous reference by voting operations staff

With such large numbers of staff to be trained in a short period, electoral management bodies may not be able to undertake training delivery from within their normal staff resources. The identification and recruitment of suitable persons for conducting voting operations staff training, (see and providing these trainers with the skill and knowledge to undertake voting operations staff training successfully can be a major task, especially where decentralised training models are used.

It is important that those employed to train staff, whether they be professional trainers, general educators, or voting operations staff themselves, are equipped both with:

• an intensive practical knowledge of voting procedures;

• the skills to transfer this knowledge and guide competency development in voting operations staff.

Monitoring and Review

The fact that voting, in most instances, occurs for a short time only, with little opportunity to correct errors, means it is essential to ensure there is confidence in the competencies of voting operations staff. This needs to be instituted at the time of training. Such measures are two-fold:

• implementing programs for assessing the knowledge of potential voting operations staff before they are actively engaged in their duties, so that ineffective staff can be identified and their employment terminated;

• monitoring and evaluating training programs and delivery

Other Organisations

Electoral management bodies can also play a role in the training of other organisations participating in voting operations. It is in their interest that representatives of parties and candidates, independent electoral observers, and security forces, in particular, are well informed on their rights, responsibilities, and the voting procedures to be implemented.

Organisation of Training

Organisation of training for voting operations staff is a massive exercise that requires clear lines of communication, accountability and control. There are two basic elements to organising training:

• defining a clear strategy for the training program, appropriate training delivery methodologies, and materials development;

• developing the detailed operational plans that define locations, identify and assign trainers, assign voting station staff to training locations, produce and distribute training and reference materials, and procure logistics needs. For more detail on:

• training strategy, see Defining Training Objectives;

• training materials development, see Training Materials, Equipment, and Sites;

• possible methodology and structures, see Training Methodology;

• content of training operational plans, see Training Plan.

Consistency of Training

No matter whether centralised or decentralised structures (see Training Methodology) are used for training delivery, there will be a need for training accountability and some organisation at a more centralised level. Voting operations staff need to deliver equitable, impartial service and follow procedures in a consistent fashion, Allowing unsupervised localised control of training will be counterproductive.

Centralised quality control, even where training is not directly administered centrally, will assist in ensuring that training standards deliver this consistency. Areas where this is essential will include:

• content of trainers and voting operations officials reference materials;

• content and presentation of training sessions;

• provision of training to all voting operations staff by scheduled dates using an appropriate training method;

• training programs for voting operations staff trainers;

• monitoring and evaluation of training performance.

It would be preferable if a standard set of training materials is produced, by the electoral management body, for use in all voting operations training. If this is not feasible, materials produced by other bodies should be approved by the electoral management body before use.

The situation becomes more complex where local electoral management bodies are empowered to make their own arrangements for the conduct of elections for higher levels of government.

Different equipment use and detail of procedures will make consistency across an election for higher levels of government and standardisation of training impossible. This is not an insurmountable problem and can be dealt with effectively by ensuring that there is some central oversight, if only advisory, to ensure that:

• an adequate level of training is provided to all officials in all jurisdictions, perhaps through a system of formal accreditation of local training programs;

• reference materials provided are accurate and emphasise the application of principles of equity, impartiality, and service, even if they may vary in procedural details.

Management of Training Implementation

Organisation of the operational details of training will generally be more effectively undertaken at a more local level. The large number of training sessions that will need to be undertaken, especially for national elections, may create decision bottlenecks if all operational decisions are made at a central level. How much can be organised locally will depend on the structure and methodology used (see Training Methodology).

Simultaneous or mobile team training methods will require greater organisation from a central level in planning training schedules, materials distribution, and often trainer transportation arrangements. However, decentralised management will generally be more responsive to local needs in the following areas:

• distribution of training materials;

• assigning staff to training sessions or if not trained face-to-face, overseeing self-directed training;

• determining appropriate training timing within scheduling limits;

• reserving training facilities and arranging for equipment;

• organisation of transportation for trainers and trainees.

Use of Skilled Trainers

An important consideration in organising training is ensuring that there are sufficient skilled trainers available to conduct training. Early identification of potential trainers will assist training implementation. No matter what their previous training or voting operations experience, trainers will require some training themselves, in relevant current procedures and/or in presentation of the training session outlines to be used.

(For more detailed discussion of this aspect of training organisation, see Training of Trainers.)

Defining Training Objectives

Development of training programs and plans for voting operations staff would start from a basis of analysing and defining:

• the overall training objective: what the electoral management body wants to achieve through training its voting operations staff;

• who needs to be trained: both in general, and any category of trainees that would increase training effectiveness and economy;

• the learning outcomes: what each person trained is expected to be able to do, and expected to know, at different stages in the election calendar and at the conclusion of training for the election;

• the coverage of voting operations staff that is aimed to be achieved: this may be by different aspects of the training program, such as continuous on-the-job training, face-to-face intensive sessions, information briefings, provision of reference or information materials, or other means.

Only by first defining these objectives can training planners develop plans (see Training Plan) and select methodologies (see Training Methodology) appropriate for the environment and effectively tailor them to resource constraints.

Expected Training Outcomes

Objectives need to be defined to ensure accountability. When determining the objectives of training, training managers and planners should also define the indicators by which they can judge whether training programs are successful. This will make evaluation of training considerably more relevant (see Evaluation of Recruitment and Training).

In defining training objectives, and indicators of performance against these, training planners are focusing on organisational outcomes, related to the principles and procedures of voting operations (see Guiding Principles of Voting Operations) Regarding training of voting operations staff, objectives would concern issues such as:

• service levels to voters;

• accuracy of ballot issue and count processes;

• impartiality and integrity of voting processes.

Individual Staff Learning Outcomes

In defining learning outcomes, the focus is on individual-oriented outcomes on a practical level:

• what competencies to perform particular tasks must training develop in specific staff;

• what capacities to deal with situations must training provide them with.

In most situations there is no need, time, or resources to transfer detailed knowledge of theoretical concepts. Required outcomes must apply a practical balance between anunderstanding of the reason why an action is done in a particular way and having the ability to apply procedures correctly.

As an example, for voting station managers, training should provide the following competencies. That they:

• know, are willing to comply with, and are aware of how particular actions may be judged in terms of the staff code of conduct;

• are able to set up a voting station according to approved layouts in a manner that will ensure efficient service to voters;

• are able to use all voting station materials and equipment;

• are able to prepare the voting station for opening according to required procedures;

• are able to apply the correct procedures for voter identification, issue of ballots, and marking and casting of ballots;

• can manage voting station personnel and materials accountability and security issues;

• know the rights and responsibilities of representatives of political parties or candidates and other observers in voting stations;

• can deal effectively with typical examples of problems and challenges likely to arise in a voting station;

• can complete all required voting station documents and reports accurately and efficiently;

• are able to close the voting station and package material according to the defined procedures;

• know communications requirements;

• can apply staff management techniques. Where voting station managers are also responsible for ballot counts at their voting stations, their training will need also to relate to;

• accuracy of ballot counts;

• rules for determining valid or invalid ballots;

• preparation of result records;

• methods of transmitting count results.

For other voting station staff, there may be a standard set of learning objectives. Where there are significant differences in staff functions and it is more effective to sub-categorise staff for training, there may still be core objectives for all staff, to which specific objectives are added for the individual staff categories with higher level or more specialised functions.

It is important to define performance indicators and targets against these objectives that are acceptable and practical expected levels of achievement. For example, one of the training performance targets for voting station officials who will be involved in establishing voter eligibility could be that, at the conclusion of training, a certain percentage of these staff can correctly find and mark a given percentage of a sample of voters on a voters list. Much as elections should be perfect, it is reality that not all staff can be trained to be perfect. Knowledge assessment techniques need to be integrated into training to enable assessment of whether adequate competencies have been achieved by each voting operations official.

Staff Target Groups for Training

Identification of who is to be trained, their numbers, and locations for training is the other major foundation of voting operations training planning. These should be realistically detemined from voting location determinations  and staffing/recruitment needs calculations. All voting operations staff should receive training.

Regarding voting station and count officials, it is also realistic to base the training focus on an assumption of zero procedural knowledge. To try to determine separate training groups according to levels of knowledge already acquired is a needlessly complicated and possibly detrimental approach. More experienced and knowledgeable trainees in groups are of assistance to trainers in group participation activities.

Consideration has to be given to whether all voting operations staff should be considered as a single group for training, or whether trainees can be usefully split into subgroups, according to levels of responsibility and functions. This latter method can generally be a more effective way of conducting training. Staff receive training only in the skills they need to have.

Information retention can be improved, as all information is totally relevant to their tasks and length of training sessions can be minimised. Such an approach would see, for example, all voting operations officials receiving training in basic procedures, with additional training modules being provided to those with particular specialised or supervisory functions.

District Election Managers

Where district election managers or local election commission members with legal responsibility for an election's conduct in an electoral district are recruited as temporary staff for an election (and thus will require intensive training), their training needs are both broader and occur earlier than those of other voting operations staff. They are an obvious separate target group for election period training.

Voting Station Managers

Voting station and count managers, and any roving voting station supervisors, would also form a separate target subgroup. Training for their responsibility levels requires different content and often different approaches from that for other voting operations staff.

Staff designated as deputies of voting stations and count centres could also be included as part of this group, as they will be the reserves who may find themselves in a managerial role during voting hours and the count. In terms of coverage of these subgroups, it is important that 100 perecnt face-to-face training coverage is achieved.

Temporary Administrative Staff

For other voting operations staff, further categorisation can be useful. Temporary staff engaged to assist with the administration of voting operations--for such tasks as assisting with staffing, materials supply and packaging--may be recruited for a single task, or multiple tasks. Depending on the complexity of their tasks, their training may be effectively accomplished by on the job briefings and guidance rather than formal training sessions.

Voting Station Officials

Further refining of target groups among voting station officials can also provide some benefits. Categorisation could target separately those staff:

• Who do not have any responsibility for contact with voters or responsibilities for ballot material--for example if staff are engaged merely to assist with material packaging or voting station/count centre set-up (for these staff a briefing immediately before commencing duties may be sufficient training);

• Whose functions are routinely procedural--such as checking voter identity, issuing ballots, guarding ballot boxes, crowd control (the bulk of voting station staff); for these staff, face-to-face sessions are highly preferable, but there may be some ability to target less than 100 percent of these staff for face-to-face coverage and still maintain quality (all such staff need to be provided with training materials, and demonstrate satisfactory knowledge of procedures);

• Whose functions require broader knowledge and greater exercise of judgment--for example, those who are acting as education or information officers; additional training for these staff in backgrounds to procedures, alternative voting methods, voter registration issues, and the like is required for them to provide an effective service (it is highly desirable that 100 percent of these staff are provided with face-to-face training);

• Who are engaged as count officials--voting station officials also engaged to count ballots will require additional specific training in ballot count procedures; where separate staff are employed for the count, their training can be limited to specific count-related duties (given the critical nature of accurate ballot counts, it is highly preferable that 100 percent of these staff are provided with face-to-face training);

• Who are recruited to provide special voting facilities--where any of these facilities have different procedures, such staff should form a separate target subgroup undergoing training in the procedures relevant to their duties.

Training Participation Incentives

Another issue is how to ensure that voting operations staff actually participate in their intended training. The most effective, and essential, method is to make employment conditional on satisfactory completion of the required training, whether through attendance at training sessions or proof of self-training through completion of workbooks or other home exercises. It can usefully be augmented by positive monetary or status incentives, tailored to the specific environment. Examples of these include:

• an attractive payment structure for training;

• conducting training in attractive locations;

• presentation of formal certificates or some other positive status reinforcement on successful completion of training;

• integration of voting operations staff training with accredited general education programs through recognised educational institutions.

Training Materials, Equipment, and Sites

For voting operations staff training to be effective, it needs to be fully supported by appropriate materials, equipment, and logistics planning. These are additional and necessary training costs which must be considered when developing voting operations budgets

Face-to-face training sessions are generally the most effective way to train voting operations staff. Effective implementation will require considerable organisation in terms of selecting appropriate locations, allocating staff to training sessions, developing training materials and aids, identifying and training suitable trainers and, often, transportation arrangements. Even where face-to-face sessions are not feasible, staff who are provided with quality reference and training materials from which to train themselves, will be more capable of fulfilling their responsibilities properly.

The materials, equipment, logistics, and management support required for voting operations staff training will vary according to the training methodology adopted (for alternative training methodologies, see Training Methodology). For example, using a simultaneous training model is likely to require more intensive facilities and greater quantities of materials (and hence be more expensive) than other models.

Training Locations

Potential training locations need to be identified and reserved in the same way and usefully at the same time as are voting station sites. Site standards required are discussed in detail at  Where training is occurring in local facilities, through cascade or mobile training team methods, there may be efficiencies in using intended voting station locations as training venues (if they meet the facilities standard required), particularly if these are schools or other government buildings available on demand for election purposes.

Training Materials

The quantity of materials required for voting operations staff training sessions needs to be considered when determining overall order quantities for election materials. Where early or continuous training programs are in place, early delivery of a proportion of election materials may need to be arranged to meet training needs.

It is vital for training effectiveness that, from the time of preparation of training materials through to the election, that there is a period of stability in the legal and procedural frameworks for voting operations.

Materials required fall into several basic categories:

• reference materials and guidelines for voting operations staff;

• training reference materials and aids for trainers;

• materials to be used in demonstrations and simulations of voting station activity.

The construction of training materials kits for polling officials is useful, where these can be packaged (possibly by staff packing voting station materials) without significant additional cost. These can contain both reference materials and examples of forms and material to be used in voting stations.

Reference Materials

Development of reference materials should be closely controlled by the electoral management body, if not actually undertaken by it. If voting operations staff reference materials are to be produced by contractors or independently by other organisations, the electoral management body must the power of preproduction approval and prevent distribution of any material that does not conform to correct procedures and practices.

Provision of a manual to each and every voting operations official is a vital component of maintaining election integrity. Voting operations officials undertaking the same tasks need full and identical information on their responsibilities and correct procedures. Extracts from election law, or ad hoc collections of intermittent directions from electoral or judicial authorities are not sufficient. Manuals can be usefully supported by check lists and cue cards providing handy reference to voting operations officials and other staff on specific tasks.

Cost-cutting by providing manuals only to voting station managers, or having group use of reduced manual stocks, is likely to lead to confusion and possible improper decisions on voting day. Wherever possible, staff should receive their reference materials before they attend any face-to-face training sessions.

Where there are significant differences in levels of responsibilities of voting operations officials, or in their tasks, for example, between voting stations managers and other voting station staff, between staff working in ordinary voting stations and those staffing early, absentee, mobile or other special voting facilities, it would be preferable that specific manuals, addressing their particular tasks, were produced for similar categories of officials. Organising manuals (and training) on a modular base makes such differentiation easier.

Development of Trainers' Manuals

While training should be based on the contents of the voting operations staff manuals, training session content and presentation requirements themselves need to be properly defined in separate trainers manuals, to assure consistency and assist quality of training presentation. Again, each trainer should be provided with their own copy of such manuals, as well as of the procedures manuals on which training is based.

If inexperienced trainers are being used, which is particularly likely to occur under a cascade methodology  it is essential that they are fully supported by manuals or guidelines on presentation styles. 

Other Support Materials

Apart from reference materials, other support material will be required according to the specifications of the training session plans, such as slide, video and audio materials, and overhead transparencies, to aid demonstrations and actual election equipment and material so that skills learned can be practised during training in a voting station atmosphere.

Examples of all election forms to be used by polling officials should be available and practice in their use integrated into the session. Ballot boxes, seals, voting compartments, signage, and voting machines or computers (where used in voting stations) should also be available so that voting simulations can be conducted in a more realistic environment.

Training Structure and Materials Planning

Where cascade or mobile training team models are used, much of the material provided can be reused or will be required in lesser quantities. Using mobile training teams with appropriate transport facilities:

• equipment can be carried with the training teams, rather than fresh sets provided at each location;

• materials, apart from those retained by polling officials for reference, may also be able to be re-used in multiple training sessions.

Similarly, under cascade training models, staggering of training in adjacent localities can provide opportunities for sharing of materials. Simultaneous training models generally offer no such materials economies.

Training Logistics

Logistics planning requirements will vary according to whether training is decentralised to local areas or concentrated in central or regional centres. Under cascade training arrangements  there will generally be relatively few (if any) staff with significant transportation requirements and possible need for accommodation during the training period. Regional trainers may need to be brought to a central point for training, and support for staff monitoring decentralised training sessions provided, but beyond that generally only local travel will be involved.

Where mobile training teams  are used, itinerary scheduling and planning will be a significant part of training organisation. Significant transportation support will generally be required for the trainers themselves, and will usually require coordination from a central or regional base. Mobile communications facilities will be of benefit for such teams.

Simultaneous training models  will require considerably more logistics support, in coordinating all resources to be available at a single or multiple points on the one day.

They may also involve some transportation and accommodation support for voting operations officials as well as trainers, if training staff resources are limited to the extent that training can only be undertaken at a restricted number of more centralised locations.

Training Plan

Training of staff for voting operations is a complex process for which careful planning is essential to bring together the varied information inputs into a cohesive system to allow effective, reliable training delivery at the grass-roots level. Quality of planning for this training is enhanced if it is undertaken at both strategic and operational levels.

Strategic Planning

Strategic planning for voting operations training is needed to identify:

• training objectives, target groups for training, and required learning outcomes

• appropriate mixes of methodologies for target groups and regions;

• materials development requirements

• training evaluation systems

• overall training resource requirements.

In developing training materials under the strategic plan, care must be taken to allow sufficient flexibility to handle any changes to legal or operational frameworks that may occur close to the election date.

This strategic planning is necessary for properly focusing operational training plans. It is highly preferable that this level of planning is maintained on a continuous basis. To initiate training planning at the announcement of an election runs the risks of strategy being merely an ad hoc reactive response to very time-sensitive operational needs. This is not likely to deliver the most cost-effective training.

Operational Plans

Training operational plans should identify:

• the training functions to be undertaken and their location and timing;

• detailed resource needs for training;

• the personal responsibilities and accountabilities for training management and delivery.

They may be prepared and implemented centrally, or, if cascade training models are used, there is the opportunity to devolve much of the planning to regional or local levels.

Operational plans for voting operations training may be able to be partially prepared prior to the final determination of voting locations and numbers of staff to be employed at each location, but will require review and possibly amendment once these are known. Early identification of voting locations and numbers of staff to be recruited will certainly assist training planning.

Operational training plans would usually detail both the procedural training requirements for voting operations staff, and any training of trainers that has to be implemented. Issues that need to be defined in the operational training plans include:

• the numbers of staff to be trained, categorised into any separate target groups determined under the strategic plan 

• the methodology by which each of these target groups is to be trained 

• the scheduling of training 

• production and distribution of materials required for training 

• the trainers to be assigned to each training session, including any arrangements for contracting training functions 

• the locations to be used for training, their reservation, and the numbers of staff to be trained at each location 

• the transportation, accommodations, and communications required to support trainers and voting operations officials attending training;

• logistics for distribution of training materials and equipment;

• the methods and resources required for knowledge assessment

• the methods, scheduling, and resources needed for monitoring and evaluating training consistency and quality 

• contingency plans for emergency or remedial retraining;

• costs of training;

• any contributions required to training of persons not employed by the electoral management body, for example, representatives of political parties or candidates, observers, and security forces

Training operational plans need to be integrated with materials supply, logistics, and recruitment planning, as well as with financial management planning and review cycles.

Training of Trainers

Training of trainers has two distinct objectives:

• imparting knowledge of voting operations procedures;

• developing training presentation skills.

When using external professional trainers there is a need to ensure that they are thoroughly familiar with the technical and administrative content and formats of the training sessions for which they will be responsible.

When using non-professional trainers for voting operations staff training - as in cascade-style structures (see Training Methodology), or in any system where more senior voting station officials have training responsibilities for their staff - there is a need to ensure that those staff who will be doing the training also roles also receive skills training on how to train others. This will assist in making the training more effective than.

A training skills development programme is also necessary in environments where school teachers or other educators are appointed as senior voting station officials, and used in voting station official training roles as the skills required for adult training are different to those used for school teaching.

Procedural Training

The technical content of training sessions for trainers is taken from the same information as that appropriate for voting operations staff. When using external professional trainers it is important that they have sufficient knowledge of voting operations technical issues to answer participants' questions.

The alternative is using technical advisers from the electoral management body at all training sessions. This is usually difficult to integrate with other demands on technical specialists' time during the same period.

Training in Training Skills

Training is an acquired skill. The ability to do a task is not any indication of the ability to transfer these skills to others. There is a need to ensure that non-professional trainers receive some training on effective training presentation skills and use of training materials when using them to train voting operations staff, for example, local voting operations managers being used to train voting station managers, who in turn train their voting station officials.

The intensity of this training depends on the complexity of sessions that these staff will be expected to present.

In addition to covering procedural aspects of voting, a comprehensive trainer training program covers the following issues:

• an understanding the human learning and skills acquisition processes;

• creating a positive learning environment;

• encouraging learner participation;

• the development of a skills/competency training approach as distinct from an education approach;

• directing trainees towards competency objectives;

• setting up an effective training environment such as venue,

• breaks, recognising attention spans, consultation with trainees;

• equitable treatment of each individual trainee;

• time management to achieve training session timetable objectives;

• effective frameworking, revision and summarising of information provided;

• imparting values, quality expectations and procedural information;

• directing question and answer sessions and group exercises towards group learning and practical skill demonstration;

• equitable and practical methods of assessing each trainee's competency in performing the required tasks;

• self-evaluation of the trainer's performance.

Assessment of Trainers

An assessment of trainers is an integral part of any training programme and the acquisition of these skills by trainers needs to be tested.

This can be achieved through the implementation of mock training exercises during the training session Ideally this is followed up by close supervision of the initial training session undertaken by each trainer but this may not always be feasible as it requires time and resources.

Many trainers, in a cascade system particularly, may only present one session.

There is a need to implement some form of quality control, even if only by attendance of monitors from the electoral management body or training program managers, at a sample of the sessions conducted by newly-trained presenters.

Training Methodology

In developing both the overall strategy and the detailed session plans for training from the objectives determined (see Organisation of Training), it is essential to select a structure and methodology that will be most effective for the training environment, considering factors such as:

• cultural environment;

• available training resources;

• available timeframes;

• affordability;

• cost-effectiveness.

Training Focus

The focus of training for voting operations officials is on achieving task competency--the ability to carry out a range of activities accurately and with integrity under pressure, not just to know about them. Appropriate methodologies derive from this basic principle.

It is recognised that task-based learning is better accomplished in face-to-face training sessions rather than from book study. Thus training programs for voting operations officials should be based on aiming to provide all with some face-to-face training. In remote areas, or where face-to-face training is not affordable for all staff, all voting operations officials should at least be provided with the standard reference materials, with a requirement that self-trained officials undertake some form of knowledge assessment, through use of workbooks or exercises provided with the reference materials.

In addition to these formal training and briefing methods, the importance of informal training activities as a reinforcement should not be underestimated. These could include contact through newsletters or quasi-social activities.

Specific Issues to Be Considered

In determining training structure and methodology, there are a number of interrelated issues which require resolution:

• what is the best structure for the training program (see below) and when should it be implemented (see Timing of Training);

• who should be used to present voting operations officials training (see Training Delivery Responsibilities) and what do they need for a successful presentation (see Training Reference Materials);

• what subject matter should training sessions cover and how should this be organised (see Training Session Content);

• what training facilities and aids are required (see Training Environment);

• how is the success of the training to be measured (see Knowledge Assessment and Evaluation of Recruitment and Training).

Testing

Training voting operations officials for a general election is an immense training exercise. While simulations during training can enhance voting operations officials' learning, without the reality of election pressure it is not possible to fully evaluate the degree of success of the chosen training methodology.

Wherever possible methodologies selected should be thoroughly tested in a live environment, if possible in partial elections (by-elections) or other localised elections, before being implemented on a large scale.

Training Structure

Determining the training structure is interdependent with assessing resource needs against resource availability. Often there will need to be some compromises between ideals in relation to:

• the time taken to complete voting operations official training;

• the number of trainers required;

• the ability to engage professional trainers;

• the size of training groups.

Initial decisions will need to be made on whether it is feasible to provide face-to-face training sessions for all voting operations staff. There are three basic training structure models for face-to-face training of voting operations officials:

• the cascade, ripple, or pyramid model;

• the mobile team model;

• the simultaneous training model.

Each has positive aspects that may be sufficient to make it preferable in a particular environment. Elements of each may be combined to provide the most effective structure for an environment. Their positive and negative factors are worth examining in some detail.

Cascade Model

The cascade, ripple, or pyramid model acts through training small groups of people in both voting operations functional skills and training techniques, who then, in turn, train small groups of people with functional skills and training techniques, and so on, until functional skills are passed on to the lowest staff level. In an election environment the model could progress as follows:

• central electoral management body technical specialists and professional trainers train central electoral management body staff;

• central electoral management body staff train regional or local electoral administrators;

• regional or local electoral administrators train voting station managers;

• voting station managers train their voting station staff.

The number of layers in the cascade can be manipulated to fit available time, geography, and logistics considerations and optimal training group sizes. The following table indicates some significant advantages and disadvantages of this model.

CASCADE TRAINING MODEL
ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
It is flexible.
It is empowering and capacity-building, in delivering transportable training skills to a large group of people.	It requires a large number of non-professional trainers capable of having training skills - and confidence in their own training skills - developed in a relatively short training session.
It is sustainable, in that is has only moderate demands on professional training resources.	Requires detailed development of trainer's manuals, lesson plans and presentation resources.
Through use of small groups it enables fully participative competency training.	Non-professional trainers may not be able to make effective training use of group activities.
It requires few logistical resources, as the bulk of training can be locality-based.	May be difficult to revise training session content or presentation style in accordance with evaluation findings.
It requires few central organisational resources - though a significant organisational load is spread over a large number of locations.	It requires central monitoring to ensure that sessions are in fact organised and conducted as planned.
It can be cost-effective as it can use staff already employed for other functions in training roles.	Staff selected for other skills may not be effective trainers/presenters.
It can train a large number of people in a relatively short time: though some time for absorption is required between being trained and conducting training for others.	Time period strictures may compress the levels to the stage where small group advantages are lost.
It is decentralised, allowing local accountability.	There is less control over quality and consistency. The constant and effective monitoring required to ensure that the correct messages are passed on in effective ways at each level of the pyramid may be beyond election management body capacities.
Reinforcement, through conducting training sessions for others, will enhance skill levels.	It requires a longer training session - covering both voting operations and training skills - for a significant number (but a minority) of staff who will, in turn, train others.

Where there is confidence that lower levels of trainers are going to be successful in conducting training sessions (and this can be assisted by maintaining a simple structure for participative activities), and an effective quality monitoring function can be implemented, this model, or a combination of it with some mobile training team features (see below), is a very effective training structure.

Mobile Training Team Model

The mobile team model involves teams of two or more trainers visiting different geographic localities and conducting one or a number of training sessions there. Different variations would see the training team training all staff in the locality or training senior staff only, with these staff in cascade fashion then training their subordinate staff.

The following table indicates some significant advantages and disadvantages of this model:

MOBILE TEAM TRAINING MODEL
ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
It uses professional trainers to train all, or at least higher level, staff at local levels.	It requires availability of professional trainers over a longer period.
Use of professional trainers may stimulate learning activity.	It does not build training capacities and may not be a sustainable development path.
Has in-built quality and effectiveness controls through use of small teams of professional staff.
It provides presenters skilled in participative, competency development training.	Depending on the number of teams that are affordable, it may not be possible to maintain small participative training groups if mobile teams are to cover all staff in the time available.
It has low logistics costs, relating almost wholly to transport for the trainers.	Logistics problems through unavoidable occurrences such as bad weather may stall the whole training program.
It requires relatively few central organisational resources - most of the organisational load can be devolved to the local level.	It requires planning of training circuits by a central authority.
It provides a consistent stream of evaluation data which can be used to improve session content and presentation.	Time period required for training may be longer than is realistically available.
It reduces reliance on a highly structured trainer's manual - use of professional trainers can allow flexibility in presentation for local conditions.	It does not leave trainers' manuals out amongst election staff for future reference.
Length of training session only has to be sufficient to cover voting operations technical issues.	There is no transfer of training skills to voting operations staff at regional and local levels.
Provides cost effectiveness through minimising transport and shorter training sessions.	It has longer-term professional and accommodation costs for trainers.

The major problem with this model in its pure form is the length of time it may take for mobile training teams to train all voting operations staff. This may not be possible under election timetables or mean that training has to be commenced so early in some areas that retention by the time of voting day may have suffered. Conversely, the employment of sufficient mobile teams to train all staff in a short period may not be possible within available budgets or available professional training resources.

Combining a mobile team model for more senior local staff, electoral district administrators, and then using a cascade style where electoral district administrators train their voting station managers who train their own staff can provide a reasonable balance of consistency, time availability, and professionalism.

Simultaneous Model

Under this model all staff are trained simultaneously, on the one day or days, throughout the area for which there is an election. The following table indicates some significant advantages and disadvantages of this model.

SIMULTANEOUS TRAINING MODEL
ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
It creates a high profile training event which may stimulate recruitment, community election involvement, and interest in learning.	It requires a large number of trainers to be available simultaneously.
It can be conducted in a short time period.	There is little chance for evaluation or modification of training sessions.
It can result in training capacity-building if trainers are specifically trained for this event, rather than professional trainers being solely used.	As all professional training staff are likely to be involved in the event, there will be little capacity for monitoring the quality of training presentations.
	It is dependent on complex logistics plans working effectively.
	It requires considerable central planning and logistics organisation.
	It may require larger training groups to enable all training to be conducted on the one day.
	It may require production of a greater volume of materials for training purposes than other methods.
	It may stretch the capacities of available professional trainers to train in time all trainers required.

Where election training is being promoted as a national event to stimulate interest in electoral education in general or an upcoming election, a simultaneous training model such as a national election training day may assist in image-building and in voter education. For this to be successful, appropriate publicity campaign materials will need to be developed. It may also be an appropriate model where unexpected elections are called at short notice. However, its significant disadvantages will generally mean that unless there are some special environmental factors present, other models offer more cost-effective solutions.

Training Delivery Responsibilities

 

In determining the appropriate methodology for voting operations training, the resources required to be used for developing and presenting training programs need to be carefully identified when conducting election needs assessments  and in training planning 

Factors that will need to be considered include the internal training capacities of the electoral management body, the training structure adopted  and the quality and availability of external training resources. Available training presentation resources may well be the major determinant of the training structure itself.

There are a number of alternative presentation resources that can be used to provide effective training, each requiring different models for managing training quality and ensuring on-time delivery. Given the large numbers of staff to be trained in a short time period, and the potential consequences of training failure, engagement of sufficient training presentation resources is a key issue to be addressed early in election planning.

Use of In-House Resources

Permanent electoral management bodies may maintain in-house professional training facilities, though as training per se is not really a core professional business of electoral management. In less public-sector dependent environments there are arguments that this may be better left wholly to professional training organisations.

Where such internal training units exist, their orientation is likely to be more towards training program development and training of permanent officials. It would generally be excessively wasteful to maintain permanently a training force sufficient to train all voting operations staff.

However, through their knowledge of training techniques and voting procedures, in-house trainers have a major supervisory role invoting station official training presentation. They can be most effectively used to provide:

• first level "train the trainer" sessions  for other electoral management body staff, or other persons recruited for training roles;

• quality monitoring of the voting station official training program, through attendance at samples of training sessions and review of session evaluations

In this fashion in-house trainers' expertise can have a wider influence on training activities than if they were fully occupied in session presentations to voting station staff. The basic problem is one of available time. For maximum effectiveness, the bulk of voting operations official training will be compressed into a short period before voting day. Permanent in-house training capacities will generally not effectively cope with the number of sessions required in the time period.

Where electoral management bodies or their agents (such as local government administrations under some systems) have a permanent regional or local area staff presence, these may also be used as front line resources in voting station official training roles, following their being trained as trainers (for such permanent election-related staff, training as trainerscan be more effective as an ongoing program).

In general, using wherever possible trainers who already have experience with elections is preferable to using external professional trainers, as long as these staff can demonstrate presentation capacities and their other election preparation duties do not suffer due to commitments to training presentations.

Training Delivery by Other Sources

Where resources outside the electoral management body are to be involved in training, which would be in most environments where there are no permanent electoral management authorities with regional or local presence, a basic decision on management of training delivery has to be taken. Is it to be?

• wholly contracted out as a package to a professional training institution;

• managed by the electoral management body but using additional resources hired specifically for training purposes;

• a combination of the above two approaches, with training functions contracted out in regions with institutional training strength allowing the electoral management body to concentrate its training management capacities in other areas.

Wherever external persons or organisations are engaged to conduct voting operations training, it must be crystal clear to them that they are bound by the official code of conduct, and all persons engaged in training should be prepared to formally adhere to this code.

Lack of neutrality in training can raise suspicions about the impartiality of voting operations officials themselves or, worse, provide them with malicious information that may adversely affect their implementation of voting procedures.

Contracting Out for Training Functions

There are some advantages in contracting training delivery out as a package. It removes one day-to-day management function from a crowded period in the election timetable, and it can provide a fully professional training force.

It may be the only feasible way to mobilise and manage sufficient training resources, particularly in a simultaneous training structure  For cascade structures, it can be the most appropriate method for training higher levels. However, there are also significant disadvantages that need to be carefully considered before adopting it. Contracting all training to other organisations may threaten perceptions of election integrity, particularly if contracted out to state-connected educational institutions in environments where there is suspicion of the neutrality of state institutions.

It will also require rigorous performance monitoring to ensure that training is being undertaken with the facilities and in the manner required.

Potential Training Contractors

The types of bodies that could be considered for conducting voting operations officials training are:

• government institutions, such as training boards, technical training institutions, other educational authorities;

• private sector professional groups;

• community groups, such as non-governmental civic organisations with an interest and expertise in civic education and human rights issues, or even churches.

Where such institutions are community or regionally based, a joint consortium approach may be useful, bringing different training organisations under one coordinating umbrella for the purpose of voting operations training. This may be required to achieve the necessary coverage but will heighten the need to monitor consistency and quality of training services provided.

International Assistance

Training development and implementation may also be seen as an appropriate priority for international election assistance in less developed countries.

However, such assistance may do little to build a sustainable training capacity unless its focus is to train local staff as trainers and support their performance, and international staff are not simply used to conduct all training.

Employment of Additional Staff for Training Purposes

Direct employment of additional staff by the electoral management body for training purposes can provide greater control over training processes.

Such staff, however, are likely to be less-experienced in conducting adult training, and training trainers by electoral management body staff or professional trainers will generally still need to address training presentation skills.

The varied experience levels of such staff will also require strict monitoring of training presentations. Groups from which trainers could be recruited could include:

• school teachers and other educational workers;

• civic or voter education workers;

• members of civic education-oriented community and professional groups;

• senior voting operations officials, in particular voting station managers.

Use of educators and community professionals may be more appropriate for mobile or regional team training structures and simultaneous training models.

Use of senior voting operations officials is a cost-effective method for training the majority of voting station officials where cascade structures are used. Their training duties will also enhance their own knowledge levels by making them more aware of the totality of functions within the voting station environment.

Number of Trainers Conducting Each Training Session

Even working with relatively small training groups, it is preferable, wherever affordable and the training resources are available, to assign a minimum of two trainers as a training team to each training session. This can serve a number of purposes:

• provides more intense guidance and faster organisation for simulation and group activities;

• different personalities provide changes in presentation styles and enhance attention spans;

• particularly where mobile training teams are travelling to various locations, provides back-up in case of illness;

• can assist in maintaining trainer energy and completion of sessions within the assigned times.

Where training capacity building is an objective, it may be useful for training teams to include a "trainee" trainer--for example, an outstanding polling official--being groomed for future training responsibilities.

Presenters who are experts in their technical field can also be useful to assist with training presentations. Introductions to training sessions from senior electoral officials can reinforce the importance of training to participants.

Appearances during relevant segments by security experts, communication facility managers, and procedures drafters can enhance the image of the information presented. This can assist effective training, particularly in providing variations in presentation style during training sessions, but need not be essential.

Training of Observers, Party Representatives, Security Forces

Training of observers and party or candidate representatives is the responsibility of their organisations. However, it can be highly useful for the electoral management body to be involved in both preparing technical reference materials and providing expert presenters for observer and party/candidate representative training.

This can assist in ensuring that correct legal, procedural, and operational information is used in training by these organisations. (For further discussion of these issues, see Training for Parties and Candidates and Training for Observers.)

For security forces, the electoral management body has a role to play in developing specific programs and materials, training trainers within security forces in election procedural issues, presenting relevant sessions, and in monitoring security force election training.

However, responsibility for conduct of election training of security personnel is better left to security forces management. (For further discussion of these issues, see Security Force Training.)

 

Training Session Content

Training session content for voting operations staff is logically based on the procedures manual(s) to be used by voting operations officials as the guidelines for their duties.

Training content should aim to develop all the competencies required by voting operations officials to undertake their tasks.

Scope of Content

In some environments, training session content may not be limited to voting procedures only. There may be a need to train staff in basic systems used to support voting stations or other election processes, for example:

• how to assemble portable voting station equipment;

• use of telephone (or fax equipment if used);

• use of other communications systems such as personal radios;

• use of special calculators;

• some basic information on computer operation where computers are used for voting.

These issues can be as important as the voting procedures themselves for ensuring staff effectiveness.

Training sessions are also the most effective forum for reinforcing organisational values, staff welfare, and assistance matters as well as answering queries. Relevant issues would include:

• the integrity, impartiality, and professionalism expected of all staff;

• dealing with voters and the public in a polite and effective manner;

• wage payment amounts, method and timing;

• assigned duty stations;

• arrangements for transportation to and from their duty station;

• accommodation and meal provisions;

• any arrangements for reimbursement of expenses and allowable expense items.

Particular attention during training should be given to identified areas of difficulty. These may have been identified from:

• past experience;

• complexity of the procedural requirements;

• importance to the integrity of the voting process;

• introduction of new procedures that require retraining of staff.

Common areas requiring particular emphasis include:

• control and reconciliations of voting materials;

• voter identification and marking of voter lists or other voter attendance records;

• unregistered persons wanting to vote;

• procedures for challenged voters or votes;

• secure and correct parceling of materials;

• correct determination of valid ballots and (where relevant) voter preference marks.

Other subjects may need greater attention according to the cultural history of the particular environment; these could be issues such as voting secrecy, voter service, and rights of party/candidate representatives and independent observers.

Staff Categorisation for Training

It may be more effective to categorise staff for training purposes, depending on how recruitment strategies (see Recruitment) and polling staff categories have been defined. This needs to be taken into account in training planning 

For example, staff with voting station management roles will require additional training content to those guarding ballot boxes. Where staff are recruited for specific duties or mixtures of duties in a voting station--for example, voting materials issuing, queue control, voter information--there can be learning efficiencies in training each staff category with a specific program content appropriate to their defined tasks.

These may be greater when recruited staff have little experience or a low basic skill base. A drawback to this is that limiting training to specific tasks may limit staffing management flexibility within voting stations and reduce team cohesion.

Modular Training Content

Developing a modular training program (see Training Delivery Style and Training Reference Materials) can be an effective base for training staff for different roles.

Using this approach, the basic staff training session can be augmented by modules appropriate to staff requiring broader or higher skill levels. Length of training sessions can be tailored according to what specific categories of staff may need to know.

General Voting Operations Officials Training Content

The key content issues to be covered during voting operations staff training relate to the:

• legal and procedural bases of voting operations staff tasks;

• behaviour expected of staff;

• materials and equipment to be used;

• conduct of voting;

• provision of quality service to voters;

• rights and responsibilities of election participants;

• administrative arrangements for staff;

• security, integrity, communications and safety issues.

Structuring training content in a similar way to that which information is organised in staff manuals will aid understanding. Content may be structured on a simple "time of action" basis, by breaking the sessions down into sections dealing with:

• administration and staff welfare issues;

• activity before commencement of voting;

• conducting the voting;

• close of voting and collection of materials;

• the ballot count (where relevant).

Content may be more effectively organised in a modular format (see Training Delivery Style). Modules deal with discrete, though interrelated, skills or information sets. A modular structure for a training session for voting station officials could contain modules on:

• registration of participants;

• session introduction/summary of objectives;

• staff entitlements, deployment, and welfare;

• the election environment/purpose;

• code of conduct, integrity, and impartiality, voter service issues;

• function and use of, and accountabilities for, voting materials and equipment;

• voting station layout and functional areas;

• duties prior to opening of the voting station;

• role of party/candidate representatives and independent observers during voting;

• crowd control;

• voter information;

• voter identity and eligibility checks;

• issuing voting material;

• maintaining voting secrecy;

• assistance to voters;

• special voting facilities (if appropriate);

• maintenance of the voting area;

• problems that could arise during voting;

• personal safety (including responses to emergencies) and materials security;

• close of voting;

• packaging and security of materials;

• session review. These modules may vary in amount of content, from five to ten minutes of presentation time to up to an hour. Where not all staff have the same duties, the training on the specialist tasks--such as crowd control, voter information, issuing and accepting voting material, special voting facilities--could be presented only to those staff with these specialist duties.

Specific procedural environments will have additional modular requirements required by voting procedures, for issues such as voting day registration and use of voting computers.

Senior Voting Station Staff

Training content for staff with management roles in voting stations, e.g., voting station managers and their assistants or deputies and roving officials or supervisors, needs to be augmented to cover their additional specific duties and management roles. In a modular format, the modules noted above for general staff would be augmented by additional modules which could cover:

• setting up the voting station and ensuring receipt of all materials;

• staff management, supervision, and welfare;

• materials, equipment, and premises management;

• conflict resolution methods;

• communications strategies;

• security management, i.e., the roles of security forces and managing emergency procedures;

• completion of voting station records and reports;

• a "Training the trainer" session if they have responsibility for training their staff.

Additional training in these management issues will enhance the efficient operations of voting stations.

Officials for Special Voting Facilities

Where special voting facilities are being used  staff involved will have specific training needs requiring additional or different content. Specific additional content will vary according to the election system parameters, but may need to include:

For early, absentee, and foreign voting location staff:

• procedures for issue of voting material, whether through attendance of the voter, by mail, or by electronic means;

• controls to ensure voting material is issued for the correct electoral district;

• completion, verification, and checking against voter registration records of information supplied by voters supporting the validity of their vote;

• materials packaging and despatch to correct electoral district or administrative centre;

• voting material reconciliations.

For mobile voting station staff:

• liaison with mobile voting location communities or institutional managers;

• completion of records for multi-location and multi-day voting;

• logistics support;

• additional equipment and materials security measures.

Where procedures and content of training for officials staffing special voting facilities are significantly different from those for other voting station staff, totally separate training sessions will be more effective.

Training for Ballot Counting Officials

Training content for ballot counting officials will be governed by whether additional staff are engaged to conduct the count at regional or central count centres, or whether counting, either in the voting station or in a separate count centre, is conducted by the same staff used in the voting station. Where voting station officials are involved in the counting of ballots, additional training modules will be required on issues such as:

• preparation of materials and set up of count area;

• function and use of count materials and equipment;

• rights and responsibilities of party and candidate representatives and independent observers at counts;

• counting and sorting procedures;

• assessing the validity of ballots, determining voter preference marks (where used), and treatment of challenges;

• problems that could arise during the count;

• closing the count and calculation of results;

• packaging of materials at close of count.

Where ballot counting staff are separately recruited and trained, some additional behavioural and administrative topics will need to be covered in addition to the specific count procedures content, including:

• registration and administration matters for the session;

• the election environment;

• staff entitlements and logistics arrangements;

• code of conduct and impartiality and integrity issues;

• personal and materials security.

Additional content of count managers training should also cover similar management matters to that of voting station managers, e.g., staff and materials management, transmission of results, security management, adjudication of challenges, completion of count records, and return of count material to the electoral management body.

Some staffing structures allow additional logistics staff to be employed at the count, to assist, under the supervision of count officials, in voting station clean-up or organising furniture during preparation for the count, moving ballot boxes, and packaging and securing of materials. A short briefing session by the count manager prior to commencement of the count will generally be sufficient training for such staff.

Temporary Administration Assistance Staff

It is equally important that any temporary staff engaged in administrative positions for voting operations are trained to undertake their duties.

Where such temporary staff have legal and management responsibilities with regard to the election--for example, in electoral district management--it is vital that they are fully trained so they can accurately guide the operations of polling staff within their area and confidently accept accountability for voting operations activities under their control.

Training Delivery Style

The effectiveness of training for voting station officials can be considerably influenced by the delivery style and presentation methods used.

Choosing the right delivery style or mix of delivery styles is a matter of carefully assessing the following factors:

• the skills which training aims to develop;

• the subject matter to be absorbed;

• the existing skills of the individuals who are to be trained;

• the trainees' cultural familiarity with potential delivery styles;

• The numbers in the groups to be trained.

As with the introduction of any system, it is prudent to test delivery style and content combinations of new training programs on a sample of trainees, and make adjustments after evaluating the trial's success, before implementing full-scale training. While an added expense, it can prevent failure and the need for significant retraining later.

Potential Presentation Methods

Different training delivery styles may be required for senior polling officials, such as voting station managers, than for junior staff.

In junior staff the aim is to develop competencies in a limited range of tasks--such as, issuing voting material, checking voter identity, securing ballot boxes, and assisting voters with information on how to vote--that are based on demonstrable standard procedures that can be easily practised and assessed.

Officials with supervisory and management roles in voting stations need a broader range of skills--some procedural, some for judgment and management--for which effective training would vary the delivery style mix with a greater orientation towards group discussion, problem-solving, and analytical work.

Basic Presentation Styles

Basic styles may be divided into two main categories:

• non-participative, where training participants are fed information relevant to their tasks by the trainer, make notes, and perhaps have some time to ask questions;

• Participative, using formats through which interaction between the group and the trainer, amongst the group, and the practice of skills are integral parts of the training.

The typical non-participative styles include:

• lectures;

• demonstrations by experts;

• watching and listening to video and audio training aids;

• Revision tests and assignments. Typical participative styles include:

• discussion groups, either of the training group as a whole or using smaller sub-groups, with discussions and reporting back of conclusions guided by the trainer;

• games used to stimulate thinking about task parameters and conduct;

• simulations of voting station activity involving role play by group members and trainer-guided comments by the group;

• exercises in undertaking required tasks;

• competitions, involving individual or group knowledge and demonstrations of skills learned.

Determining Appropriate Delivery Styles

In determining which are the appropriate styles to use for imparting particular knowledge and skills, there are some general guiding principles that should be considered. Reliance on non-participative methods, particularly lecture-style presentations, and training aids (see Training Environment) is not the most effective means for developing task competency.

However, these styles are useful to introduce and reinforce the legislative and procedural framework, demonstrate and describe skills to be learned, and summarise expected learning.

Participative methods stimulate task competency and learning, provide practice for the participants in the tasks they will have to undertake, and assist in building team cooperation amongst participants. If carefully designed and controlled they can allow continuous assessment of knowledge and support the evaluation of training progress (see Timing of Training and Evaluation of Recruitment and Training).

Simulations and Role Play

For polling staff, simulations of their voting day duties, in an area set up to resemble a voting station with real materials and rotating role playing amongst the group (playing a variety of officials and voters), is a highly effective, if not essential, part of their training. Suitable subjects for simulations would include:

• set-up of voting station equipment and materials, including sealing of ballot boxes (or initialisation procedures for voting machines or computers), distribution and checking of voting materials, signage and voter information display;

• checking voter identity and eligibility;

• issuing voting materials;

• handling of party/candidate representatives and independent observers, complaints and problem situations;

• crowd control and voter service;

• voting material reconciliations;

• monitoring of ballot boxes and voting compartment areas;

• collecting, sorting, and packaging of materials at close of voting and preparations made for the ballot count.

Where staff are also being trained for the ballot count, additional simulation activities could include:

• checking in of materials (if at separate counting centres) and reconciliation of ballots;

• determination of validity of and preference marks on ballots;

• sorting, tallying, and aggregating votes;

• interventions by party/candidate representatives and independent observers;

• final reconciliations and packaging of materials.

Other forms of participative training--large or small group discussions, quizzes, or competitions--can be used to reinforce and extend the learning from simulations or act as learning stimulants on their own.

Training Skills Needed for Participative Methods

The drawback with participative methods is that they will generally require a higher level of trainer skill and confidence. It is a lot easier to stand and lecture a group, and demonstrate personally or with audio-visual aids, than it is to effectively lead group discussions, exercises, and simulations. For that reason, in cascade systems (see Training Methodology), lower level and generally inexperienced training presenters should be selected with care and must have the opportunity to practise participative training skills during their training sessions, if they are to use participative training methods for training other voting station officials.

Session Lengths

There is no ideal length of training session. Optimal length will basically be determined by:

• complexity of the subject matter to be addressed;

• base skills and prior experience of the participants;

• information retention capacities of the trainees.

However, sessions of longer than five to six hours in a single day will tax participants' and trainers' energies and attention spans, and possibly lead to reduced effectiveness.

Especially for senior polling officials, multi-day training may be necessary to cover both management and procedural issues. Where relatively experienced polling staff are being trained, procedural training may be completed in a half day, whereas a full day may be required for less experienced staff.

Where voting station officials or other staff are also being trained as trainers, it would be unlikely that sufficient effective training skills would be learned in less than two days, in addition to their procedural and technical voting operations training.

Cost is a significant deterrent to providing thorough training. However, the ultimate costs of even a very few voting stations where there are significant procedural or management irregularities can be significantly greater than any apparent savings made in training.

Training Session Organisation

Organisation and effectiveness of training sessions is considerably enhanced if the session is broken down into specific planned modules. Free-form sessions can too easily fail to cover the subject matter or group activities required and thus fail to achieve the session objectives.

Adequate rest breaks are important for maintaining participants' attention. These are not only scheduled rest, snack, or meal breaks, but depend on the trainer closely watching the responsiveness of the group and allowing brief rest or stretch breaks (which may include physical or mental focusing exercises) between or during modules, particularly where participants have been seated for an extended period of time.

Where sessions are being conducted at night, the needs, energy, and attention limits of those participants who have been working on other tasks during the day need to be considered in structuring the session content and determining its length. For full-day sessions, stimulating activities need to be programmed for the post-meal and late afternoon "dozing" periods.

Subject Module Organisation Training sessions can also be better controlled if broken down into modules, with each module representing a specific block of learning to be achieved by the participants.

Organisation of sessions in modular fashion assists trainers by maintaining a structure on time usage and provides more easily identifiable specific training and learning objectives against which trainee's achievements and the trainer's performance can be evaluated.

Each module should be supported by a lesson plan. These lesson plans should provide a detailed guide to the trainer in presenting each module in regard the following:

• information content;

• presentation methods

• training aids;

• timing structure;

• information review activities.

The number of modules into which a session is divided and the length of each module will depend on such factors as:

• the extent of the subject matter (for detailed discussion of session content see Training Session Content);

• the presentation style or styles to be used (e.g., simulations will take longer than lectures and review);

• the attention spans and information absorption capacities of the trainees. Attention spans may vary in different environments (for example, there may be significantly diminished attention spans in post-conflict election environments where the population has been traumatised by conflict).

As a general rule, modules that are more than sixty minutes long will tax the energy, absorption and attention of participants.

Within each module, thought needs to be given to aspects of the module being presented in different ways. Normal effective attention spans are at maximum twenty minutes; for passive activity, such as watching a video demonstration, they can be very much shorter.

Within longer modules, a change of presentation style or activity should occur at least at twenty minute intervals to maintain fully effective attention. Such changes may be as simple as the movement from a group discussion activity to presentation of group conclusions, from a demonstration to a question period on the activity demonstrated, or from a lecture style description of an activity to its simulation.

During each module there must be the opportunity for questioning. By the conclusion of each module there must have been the opportunity for the trainer to assess each trainee's skill competency in the relevant subject. This could be done by means of a short assignment, participation in a demonstration, simulation, or group discussion or other appropriate means.

Special Considerations for Training Ballot Counting Officials

Where count officials are the same staff as in voting stations, they are likely to have already worked a busy ten to fifteen hours already, be fatigued and liable to errors in judgment, before they commence their counting duties.

Effective training for these officials has to be oriented towards instilling automatic, practised responses through intense simulations of ballot sorting, counting, handling challenges to votes, and determining ballot validity.

Training Environment

The physical environment in which training is conducted can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the training. Skills acquisition may be adversely affected by environments in which either those being trained or the trainers themselves feel uncomfortable, or the facilities are inadequate for the requirements of the training session.

Where participants are being brought to a central point for training, attention must be given to ensuring that their travel arrangements have been efficiently planned, that they are provided with adequate shelter, and that food and drink is available for them during the training period. Responsiveness to training will be significantly diminished if basic living needs have not been satisfactorily organised.

Training Venue Standards

Basic standars that would preferably be met by the areas or buildings to be used for training would include:

• accessibility to transportation;

• ease of access--buildings accessed by long flights of stairs or narrow entrances which may impede use of equipment should be avoided wherever possible;

• sufficient light and air movement, wherever possible avoiding environments in which extremes of temperature cannot be modified;

• sufficient space for the size of the training group--anything less than two to three square metres per participant is likely to become uncomfortable during all but very short training sessions;

• sufficient comfortable seating for all participants;

• sufficient tables or desks for all participants to use for taking notes or any revision assignments;

• freedom from noise in adjacent areas during training sessions;

• non-offensiveness to the cultural sensitivities of any of the officials to be trained;

• access to toilets and water;

Additional requirements, according to the content of the training session, could include:

• a single space sufficient to simulate the operation of a voting station and/or counting centre;

• room for the training group to break into small discussion or exercise groups;

• where required by training aids or sessions conducted at night, electricity supply and lighting systems.

It is important that intended venues for training are checked in advance to ensure that these basic facilities are available, and that water and toilet facilities and electricity supply (where required) actually work. School classrooms can often provide excellent training venues, but will be limited as to available times for use.

Facilities and Materials

Facilities and materials available at the training venue fall into two groups--the essential, without which training cannot proceed, and the optional, which may improve training presentation. Essential materials and facilities would include:

• training manuals and training aids;

• materials for group exercises and revision assignments;

• sufficient election materials, forms, and equipment (ballot boxes and seals, voting compartments, voting machines/computers where relevant) for participative use during the training session;

• spare staff procedures manuals and workbooks (or manuals for all staff attending, if these have not been distributed earlier);

• writing materials, including large sheets of paper for presentation of results of any group exercises;

• equipment on which training aids depend, such as overhead projectors, video recorders, television monitors, audio equipment, and the like.

• name tags for all participants;

• access to food and drink, especially for longer sessions.

Where training programs depend on training aids equipment, it is more cost-effective to seek venues already equipped (if available) than to purchase or lease such equipment solely for voting operations staff training purposes. All equipment to be used during the training session should be thoroughly checked by the trainer before the commencement of the session to ensure that it is working (and that the trainer knows how to operate it).

Optional facilities could be presentation aids such as black or white boards and appropriate writing materials, pointers, or staff comfort facilities for tea and coffee.

Set-Up Of Training Venue

The training venue should be set up well in advance of the commencement of the session.

This will both use the group's time more effectively and allow early identification (and replacement) of any missing materials and equipment. Requirements for materials and set-up of the venue should be comprehensively detailed in the trainer's manual (see Training Reference Materials).

Group Organisation

Experience in general has shown that when skills training groups have more than 15 or 16 members, the opportunities for skill practice and group interaction during the training session become limited. This should be the maximum group size. Where there are more than that number of staff in a single voting station, it may be preferable to train these staff together as a group.

However, once training groups contain more than twenty-five to thirty members, achieving any training effectiveness is difficult, particularly if those conducting the session are not professional trainers. Cost advantages of training larger groups are irrelevant if such training is ineffective.

In setting up the training session venue, trainers should consider the needs of participative training; for example, arranging lecture-style rows of desks with seats behind them creates barriers between trainer and trainee and discourages group interaction.

However, the needs and comfort of the group take precedence, both in seating arrangements (where some more participation-inducing styles of seating may be seen as too confronting by groups culturally attuned to a less participative educational style), organisation and frequency of rest and meal breaks, smoking restrictions, etc. On comfort issues, trainers should regularly consult with the group.

Encouraging Participation

Care should also be taken to encourage participation in group work and any simulations by women and minority community members of the training group who may not normally have such open opportunity. Where the group has to be divided into smaller groups for particular training activities, trainers should also ensure that small groups members are assigned so as to bring a range of experience and personality styles to each small group.

Use of Training Aids

When using training aids, it must be remembered that these are aids to facilitate communication of specific issues. They are not the substance of training. Too heavy a reliance on static training aids can become expensive and limit the opportunity for interactive learning and skills practice that is the basis of acquiring task competencies.

Apart from the important use of election materials and equipment in simulations of voting station activities, aids that could normally be used include:

• Procedures manuals, detailing in simple language and/or pictorially the procedures to be applied by voting operations staff; wherever possible, staff should be provided with these manuals in sufficient time for them to have read them prior to their training session.

• Staff workbooks, in which voting operations officials, either before, during, or after their training are required to answer questions on their duties and return these for checking by trainers as an aid to knowledge assessment (see Knowledge Assessment); where there are separate training sessions for staff having specific functions to perform (particularly where they are involved in delivering special voting services  separate functionally based workbooks for knowledge assessment in these different functional areas will be useful.

• Overhead projections are useful for summarising and emphasising key issues, but not for imparting large volumes of printed information; reliance on too many overhead projections can lead to the trainer spending more time talking to the screen than to the group;

• Video materials could be used in two ways: to set the atmosphere for the voting station environment, or to illustrate particular voting station procedures being carried out correctly, including such subjects as crowd control measures, security awareness, checking voter identity, issuing of voting materials to voters, use of voting machines/computers, packaging of materials, completion of voting station reconciliations, and documentation;

• Audio presentations of procedures may be useful, similar to videos, for procedures where there is meant to be verbal interaction between the polling official and voters, for example, checking of identity, checking the correct name on voters lists, and issuing voting materials.

Video materials should be used sparingly, as short procedural demonstrations of no more than three to five minutes at a time. They cannot be a substitute for practical work by the group, but they can be a useful introduction to simulations of particular procedures and can provide an attention stimulating break from the trainer's style.

Such training aids will only be usefully integrated into training programs if the facilities for their use are likely to be available in all the venues used. To design a training session around such aids, without knowledge of facilities available for their use, may be wasteful and may make the trainer's task very difficult, if not impossible.

Remote Locations

For some training needs, such as for staff of voting locations in a foreign country and in very remote rural areas, face-to-face training may not be possible and reliance for training will be placed on the aids developed.

In these cases, video and audio material, if the facilities for their use are available, can be of great assistance in demonstrating the procedures outlined in manuals and workbooks provided to staff. However, such video or audio media are useful additions, if cost-effective, but not essential for such training.

Timing of Training

There are a number of basic and often competing considerations in determining the most effective timing of training sessions for voting operations staff.

The weight given to each of these considerations will vary in election environments of different maturity and trainer resource availability, and be affected by:

• how much advance notice of the election is provided;

• the basic educational and literacy levels of staff recruited;

• the extent of any existing base of competent staff with experience in voting operations officials' duties. These timing considerations include:

• Knowledge retention: For how long can polling officials be expected to retain the information provided during training sessions? Allied to this are considerations of learning reinforcement--how many times do recruited staff need to be presented with the information before it is assimilated to an acceptable level.

• Knowledge absorption capacities: Particularly when commencing from a zero knowledge base, there can be limits on how much information can be absorbed effectively in a single training session. This will affect the effective length of training sessions and, therefore, the possible need for multiple sessions and their optimal timing.

• Evaluation of knowledge transfer: Sufficient time needs to be allowed between training and activation of staff to allow an assessment of their knowledge (see Knowledge Assessment) and implementation of remedial training or replacement of those who cannot reach an acceptable knowledge or skill standard.

• The election timetable: There needs to be an awareness of the timing of activities in the election timetable and the duties of different categories of staff in relation to these.

Training will be more effective if delivered in synchronisation with the election timetable and divided into different sessions to avoid information overload, particularly where the same staff are being trained for different functions. Thus, training in some activities--for example, early voting, or in assisting with packaging and dispatch of election materials--is better handled earlier than that for voting day or for the ballot count.

• The numbers of staff being trained: What time period is required for all staff to have effective training contact, given the trainer resources available?

• The training structure: For example, training under a cascade model will need to be commenced earlier than where all election staff are trained simultaneously.

• Affordability and cost-effectiveness: Each training session will have costs related to the venue, equipment, staff transport, and materials. Where training sessions can be timed to coincide with other activities, there can be cost-effectiveness gains.

For example, use can be made of opportunities for training where voting operations officials are involved in the packaging of election material for voting stations.

Timing Guidelines

In considering the optimal timing of training, it is more useful to work backwards from voting day, the point at which the bulk of staff will be actively employed. An appropriate aim is to have all voting station officials and count staff trained, whether single or multiple sessions are used, by around seven days before voting day.

Leaving training to any later will present problems in assessment of training effectiveness and providing remedial training or training replacement staff for those found to be inadequate.

It may also present training management problems given other tasks to be completed in the week before voting day. Conversely, if training is completed any earlier, knowledge retention levels may deteriorate.

From this "deadline" of seven days before voting day, other training timing can be determined. Particularly where cascade models are used (see Training Methodology), it would be prudent to allow around seven days between the completion of trainer training sessions and these trainers conducting sessions, whether these be by regional trainers for voting station managers or voting station managers for their staff.

This period will allow time for the newly-trained trainers to become familiar with the materials they have to present and the methods of presentation required.

The length and number of training sessions required for various officials may be as much determined by cultural expectations as the breadth of competencies to be developed. However, intensive session presentations of more than five to six hours in a day will tend to tax both the attention of the trainees and the energy of the trainers.

Staff for Special Voting Facilities

Where different training sessions are to be held for staff recruited for special voting facilities, and for general assistance with election operations tasks, these should be timed to coincide with the commencement of their tasks.

As there are considerably smaller numbers of staff involved, training timing will be less complex. For general assistance staff, training can be more cost-effectively conducted by combining an initial session at the commencement of their duties with continuing on-the-job sessions as new tasks come due under the election timetable.

For special voting facility staff, formal training, as for general voting station officials, should again aim to be completed around seven days before their duties commence.

Electoral District Managers

Where electoral administration at a local level is undertaken by temporary staff--in the roles of returning officers, local election commissions, or regional administrators--it is more effective to maintain a continuous register of potential staff and provide them with continuous refresher training. If these staff are recruited only at the commencement of an election process, their training should be undertaken immediately.

Use of Briefing Sessions

Formal training sessions can usefully be augmented by less formal refresher sessions in the last week before voting day, depending on affordability. For example, if voting stations are set up on the day before voting day, involvement of polling staff in this activity will reinforce their roles and assist in building team relationships.

Most importantly, the hours of duty for voting station officials on voting day should be structured to allow a briefing session for all staff, by the voting station manager, prior to the opening of the voting station. This is vital to provide an opportunity for reinforcement of procedures in the "real life" environment, and also as the only effective means of transmitting to all voting station staff any changes in the voting environment or procedures that may have occurred in the time since they were trained.

Opportunity for the same style of briefing or refresher session should also be provided before the commencement of the ballot count.

Electoral management bodies must maintain regular contact with their voting station and counting managers on any procedural or environmental changes between their training session(s) and voting day.

Continuous Training

Where permanent electoral management bodies are in place, there is considerable cost-effectiveness in attempting to maintain contact with voting operations staff, particularly senior voting station staff such as voting station managers. Not only does this assist in recruitment for future elections, but it can also provide a continuing training environment.

Continuous training need not be face-to-face formal sessions. By use of simple means such as regular low-cost newsletters, providing invitations to visit electoral administration offices or events, or even by merely maintaining some social contact, election administrators can promote team-building activities, provide information on changes to voting frameworks, systems, and procedures, and reinforce knowledge already gained. This will then provide a sustained basis of knowledge which intensive pre-election formal training can extend, rather than commencing the intensive training phase from a zero knowledge base.

Using continuous training strategies can provide significant advantages when applied to more senior officials in environments where cascade training structures are used. Even allowing for inter-election drop-out rates, cost-effectiveness is maintained.

Knowledge Assessment

It is important that voting operations managers are satisfied that voting operations staff have sufficient understanding of their duties to undertake them competently in the pressured atmosphere of voting stations and counting centres.

Poorly performing staff in voting stations can disrupt the voting process and at worst, through incorrect application of voting or counting procedures, result in challenges to election validity. Knowledge assessment methods are also an integral part of the performance evaluation of training programs (see Evaluation of Recruitment and Training).

Integrating Assessment into Training Session Activities

It is preferable that the knowledge of staff undergoing training is assessed before they leave the training session. This could be a continuous assessment process during the session.

For this style of assessment, performance during simulations and in group activities is a useful guide, though care must be taken to ensure that less extroverted personality types or those for whom past gender or previous discrimination practices have induced a less participative manner are equitably assessed.

Integrating knowledge assessment into the training presentation in this fashion is cost-effective, requiring no special assessment materials or additional time. It is also a most practicable method in societies of lower literacy. However, assessment using this method does require good training skills:

where relatively unskilled trainers are being used in a cascade training approach, it will have limitations.

Staff Self-Assessment

At the end of critical points in the training program, the trainees themselves may be asked to identify areas where they believe they require further information or training to undertake their duties competently.

These concerns can be addressed through additional individual counseling during training session breaks, or modification to the remainder of the training program to allow additional revision and further discussion of areas where the group in general requires more information.

Use of Workbooks

Alternatively, staff could be required to complete workbooks containing questions on their required knowledge, either during the training session itself or in their own time. To provide a stimulus to learning, confirmation of employment can be made dependent on satisfactory completion. As an additional refinement, workbooks and answer sheets may be separate documents, so that the trainee keeps the workbook for continued review.

Questions and exercises in the workbooks should be related to specific issues covered in the training session and covered in the appropriate manual (see Training Reference Materials). This method will require the print and distribution of a large quantity of additional materials, and also place additional demands on the time of trainers, so it has some cost disadvantages.

Awards

Awarding of certificates to voting operations officials who have successfully completed training programs, and whose competencies in their tasks have been assessed as sufficient, can be a useful method of stimulating interest during training. Arranging for voting operations official training, particularly where it contains trainer training components, to gain accreditation under technical education schemes can also stimulate interest, both in voting operations official recruitment and training participation.

Training Reference Materials

Training manuals are better developed as an additional resource, specific to the needs of trainers for assisting the delivery of information to staff.

Training manuals need to fulfil a different function from voting operations staff procedures manuals, though their content is based on the staff manuals.

Each type of training session should generate its own specific training manual or guide. The training manuals should provide the structure within which trainers present their material. In outline form, the material that needs to be covered in the training manuals includes:

• the overall objectives of the training session;

• trainer preparation required;

• materials required for the session;

• guidelines for effective presentation;

• the learning objectives--that is, what polling staff should know or be able to do by the end of each module or topic area in the session;

• a schedule of the training session, topic by topic, indicating start and finish time, location, training method, and presenter (if more than one presenter is used);

• a detailed lesson plan for each module (see below for further details);

• evaluation sheets for trainees to complete at the conclusion of the training session;

• copies of any overhead projections or audio/video material to be used during the session.

Individual Training Module Lesson Plans

Standard lesson plans for each module of training are necessary to ensure that different trainers present the same material at training sessions, in a standard, proven effective fashion.

Well-developed lesson plans are particularly important when large numbers of trainers, many of whom may be relatively inexperienced in training, are being used in cascade-style training structures. The lesson plan should guide trainers as to:

• what to say;

• what to do and when to do it;

• which issues group discussion or questions should be directed towards;

• how to set up, focus, control, and achieve the required objectives from any group participation activities. Module lesson plans should:

• define the type of presentation, whether lecture, small group activity, large group activity, simulation or role play, exercise, review/testing, demonstration, or otherwise;

• detail the materials that are required for presentation of the module--audio-visual aids (overhead projection, slides, video, etc.), equipment, or election materials;

• detail any space requirements, including placement of furniture, size of room, outside location, or the like;

• define the module objective (for example, "to demonstrate how to set up a voting station in the approved layout");

• define the learning objective of the module;

• criteria for the trainer to use in evaluating the success of the presentation;

• provide a detailed plan for the presentation of the module.

The presentatio plan should include a listing of all the segments in the module (introduction, explanation of task, conduct of group exercises, revision and testing, objectives and direction of discussion, summing up) with the timing of these segments. What the trainer must say, do, and use in each of these segments should be clearly defined.

Points in the presentation where particular training aids are to be used, and references to be made to staff manuals, should be clearly indicated.

Trainees Reference Materials

All voting operations staff should receive a training kit--if possible, prior to attending their initial training session to allow them to become familiar with its contents. Sufficient quantities of the kits should be produced to allow all voting operations officials to retain it after completion of training.

The kit should include, in addition to the relevant procedures and activity manuals, training workbooks, deployment and other administrative information, a full, clearly marked sample set of the materials which staff will be required to use in their activities, including sample pages of a certified voters list, sample ballots, official forms, envelopes, packaging slips, and checklists. All sample materials should be clearly stamped or marked as samples.

Training will be more effective if trainees can handle real election materials rather than merely listen to others talk about it. Provision of this material also enables more realistic group exercises on matters such as proper completion of forms and allows for realistic simulations of voting station activity.

Trainer Training Material

To reinforce the messages of trainer training sessions, it is useful if prospective trainers can take with them, for reference during their training of other voting operations officials, a guide to effective training methods and presentation. This need not be lengthy, but it can cover in point form the most important aspects of training others.

Issues that non-professional trainers will find helpful for continuing reference during their training duties will include brief statements on:

• skills training approach, as distinct from an education approach;

• setting up an effective training environment--venue, breaks, recognising attention spans, consultation with trainees;

• instructions on how to operate any equipment required as training aids;

• equitable treatment of each individual trainee;

• module time management to achieve training objectives;

• understanding the human learning and skills acquisition processes;

• directing trainees towards competency objectives;

• effective frameworking, revision, and summarising of information provided;

• imparting values, quality expectations, as well as procedural information;

• directing question and answer sessions and group exercises towards group learning and practical skill demonstration;

• equitable methods of assessing each trainee's competency in performing the required tasks;

• self-evaluation of the trainer's performance. 

Security Force Training

Where security forces are going to be heavily involved in voting operations security, and particularly in societies emerging from conflict or in transition to democracy where security forces may have been closely associated with particular political participants, it is imperative that they receive training in appropriate general behaviour and emergency responses during the election period.

In low security-risk environments, where security forces have a tradition of political neutrality, general electoral management body and security force liaison, or the activities of operations centres, may be sufficient to make specific election training for security forces superfluous.

Training Content

What is vitally important is that security forces members fully understand the impact their actions--intentional or unintentional, while on election security duties or not--may have on perceptions of freedom and fairness of the election process.

Implementation of training on emergency response tactics and operations, following strategies agreed by the security forces and the electoral management body, is a matter for security force commands. However, it is useful for electoral management bodies to have input into course content, especially with regard to treatment of voter and candidate/party rights issues, and to monitor that training is undertaken to the extent and in the manner intended.

There is generally little necessity for security forces to be familiar with the detail of voting and counting procedures. However, a general understanding of voting operations processes, and a thorough knowledge of what constitute offences under election laws and rules, is essential.

Electoral management body advice in the preparation of relevant training material and sections of security force manuals  can be of considerable assistance and will ensure that the training is conducted on a basis of correct understanding of electoral procedures.

Issues to be Covered

Specific issues that would be included in security forces training programs include:

• expected performance standards of security forces in relation to human rights and elections;

• a summary of the environment for the election, election/voting operations processes, logistics, and voting arrangements;

• methods of providing voting operations security in a disciplined, low profile, and professional manner;

• liaison arrangements and communications strategies with electoral management bodies and officials, including emphasis that security force members are at the service of and act at the request or direction of election officials regarding election security;

• details of potential threats to election security (to voters, political participants, community organisations, and officials) identified from risk assessments as relevant to the pre-voting day, voting day, and post-voting day periods;

• threat response strategies, including simulations where practicable;

• details of plans of action and deployment strategies relevant to the training session participants;

• particularly in societies emerging from conflict, the specific security needs for the initial meetings of elected institutions.

Emphasis in the performance standards training module should be placed on issues such as:

• requirements for fundamental respect for all human rights in election security matters;

• avoidance of intentional or unintentional acts of intimidation, discouragement of participation, or prevention of legally-sanctioned access to voting operations services by voters, electoral administrators, polling officials and political participants and their supporters;

• strict requirement for neutral and non-partisan behaviour during the election period and in responses to all election situations;

• accountability of security forces for their actions.

It is important that there is extensive consultation between security forces management, electoral management bodies, and community or human rights groups in the development of training materials covering this content.

Method of Training

Given the large numbers of security force personnel to be trained, there is really no option but to use a cascade method for training.

Senior security force trainers would usually undertake the initial training of their own training staff. There is considerable value in using election managers, and human rights specialists, for delivering their relevant segments in such training sessions, and also being on hand to answer any election process questions. The numbers of levels in the cascade will depend on the complexity of administrative and geographical units within the security force structure.

However, a training or briefing contact officer within each security force unit, with election security responsibilities, will be essential as a conduit for briefings and any additional training materials and evaluations.

In societies emerging from conflict, or where security forces have a history of political alignment, training for security force trainers would generally be better conducted by international security trainers.

These international contractors can also continue to monitor that accurate guidelines continue to be conveyed throughout training programs, particularly with regard to human rights, professionalism, subordination to electoral managers, and neutrality issues.

Timing

Training in election security, and particularly its human rights aspects, is a worthwhile addition to normal security force training programs, from induction to senior promotion courses. Training for specific elections should be scheduled to coincide with the commencement of the earliest election activity.

Voter registration campaigns may require as much security as political campaigning, voting, ballot counting, and result announcement period.

Evaluation of Recruitment and Training

Evaluation of voting operations staff recruitment and training programs is necessary to provide a guide for future improvements. More importantly, if instituted as an integral and continuing part of recruitment and training processes, it can provide early warning of deficiencies and allow the chance to rectify these before voting day.

As with all evaluations, a starting point should be the objectives and performance standards set as an essential part of the planning and management of recruitment and training programs. Such standards would cover performance in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, integrity, and service.

Recruitment Process Evaluation

Evaluation of recruitment processes is oriented towards assessing whether recruitment methods are:

• delivering the quantity of staff required;

• encouraging applications from those with sufficient basic skills to be trainable in voting operations roles;

• Retaining competent staff with prior election experience.

In assessing these factors, evaluations would address issues such as:

Are potential staff being targeted effectively in recruitment processes?

• are these processes too narrow in scope, or conversely too broad, to interest those with the right basic skills;
• are there particular, suitable occupational or community groups that could be specifically targeted;
• are more frequent recruitment messages required;
• are there advantages in maintaining continuing contact with staff from past elections?

Are the assessment selection criteria appropriate?

• do these adequately test the basic skill levels required for the specific voting operations tasks;
• were the criteria properly applied in selecting applicants?
• Is voting operations employment sufficiently attractive to attract applicants with a suitable skills base? If it is not, are there any means by which conditions of service can be improved to induce applications? Such improvements need not be monetary. Consideration could first be directed towards cost-neutral solutions such as:
• increasing position prestige;
• arranging for voting operations staff training to be recognised for accreditation as a module of general educational qualifications;
• voting operations staff service providing future work preference for other public employment;
• ensuring prompt rather than increased payment.

However, consideration may also need to be given to whether payment rates are adequate to attract suitable staff.

Staff Performance Evaluation

Each voting operations official should be subject to performance evaluation. For voting station officials, this would be logically done by the voting station manager prior to the finalisation of activities at the voting station, and included with reports on voting activities.

For voting station managers, roving officials, and other voting operations support staff, this could be prepared by the election manager for the electoral district. These performance appraisals serve two functions:

(1) as a formal recognition of the staff member's services which they may use in future employment, and

(2) as a future recruitment reference for voting operations managers. Performance evaluations can indicate those staff who are suitable for re-employment or promotion to polling official positions of greater responsibility at future elections.

The appraisals should be based on objective criteria, which should be made known to staff at their training. A useful format is as a checklist of performance ratings (poor to excellent) against expected duties, punctuality, voter service qualities, which could be augmented by a general comment noting potential future capacities.

All staff should be given the right to review and comment on their performance evaluations before they are finalised.

Training Evaluation

There are two basic, interrelated orientations to evaluations of voting operations staff training:

• determining whether sufficient information has been understood by polling officials to enable them to carry out their duties competently on voting day, i.e., an assessment of individual learning 
• Determining whether the methods, information content, scheduling, and locations being used are appropriate to the skills transfer needs, i.e., an assessment of the training environment.

Implementation of continual evaluation programs during training is necessary so that knowledge levels of staff and effectiveness of training presentation methods can be assessed and any remedial measures put in place, if at all possible, prior to the commencement of their duties.

Continual evaluation is especially important where cascade training models are being used. Where multiple training sessions are scheduled, either in dealing with staff in a cascade manner or multi-day sessions, feedback on method appropriateness and coverage can be converted into improvement during the duration of the training program.

If staff knowledge is assessed as requiring further training input, additional training sessions may be the only answer for senior polling officials such as voting station managers.

For more junior staff, the most cost-effective solution may be to ensure that briefing sessions in voting stations, prior to the opening of voting, thoroughly cover subjects where staff knowledge is lacking. At the very least, such assessments will provide the basis for improving training activities for future elections.

Training Evaluation Methods

There are a number of methods by which such assessments can be implemented:

• integrated assessment programs implemented during training sessions, through the monitoring of group activities, and knowledge expressed during simulations and role plays;
• training session or home activities in the form of question and answer books that can be later collected and assessed by trainers;
• completion of evaluation forms by staff on completion of each training session;
• monitoring of and reporting on training sessions by voting operations managers;
• monitoring how staff perform on voting day.

While the last method is an important part of training evaluation, it is not recommended that it be the only method used. To wait until voting day to assess whether staff have sufficient knowledge may be useful in terms of assessing overall effectiveness of training methods and whether staff are suitable for future employment, but it is likely to allow inefficient staff performance during the election.

Where staff complete such home exercises, it is important that they receive individual feedback on the accuracy and appropriateness of their answers to such exercises. Not to do so not only alienates staff, but runs the risk of their continuing to apply any incorrect understanding of procedures.

Feedback from Trainees

An important aspect of determining the appropriateness of training styles and methods, and gaining an impression of where staff may require further training for voting operations competencies, is to ask the staff themselves.

This can be done formally at the conclusion of training sessions through completion of questionnaires addressing such issues as:

• the appropriateness and comfort of the venue and its facilities, ease of transportation access, length of sessions, breaks, opportunities for questions;
• the relevance of the material presented and any areas in which trainees believe they require more information or practice;
• the appropriateness of the styles and methods of training delivery used--which were effective in imparting information to the trainee and which were not effective (for example, use of lecture formats, role playing, demonstrations, expert presenters, small and large group exercises);
• an overall self-assessment of competence in the required duties;
• Suggestions for improving future training sessions.

It is important that where these are completed by trainees, there is feedback to them from trainers as to how their suggestions and comments have been analysed and what future improvements will be implemented.

To augment this formal information gathering, trainers should actively engage in continual evaluation communication with the trainees, for example, during meal breaks and at the commencement and close of each session to determine where knowledge gaps still exist and trainees' preferences for presentation styles.

Independent Assessments

Evaluation of training sessions by staff independent of the training process can also identify where improvements, particularly in delivery style and facilities need to be made.

This additional method should always be used where contractors, rather than electoral management body staff, are used for training purposes, and at least a sample of training sessions at the lower levels of a cascade training structure.

Training for Parties and Candidates

It is in the interests of voting operations administrators that party officials, candidates, and their representatives are very familiar with the legal, procedural, and practical implementation aspects of voting processes.

Considerable unnecessary disruption can be caused by party or candidate representatives, particularly in voting stations and during the ballot count, if they are not aware of the correct processes and issue challenges or complaints on the basis of an imperfect, or lack of, understanding of the processes to be implemented and their legal basis.

Similarly the integrity of the foundation of voting processes--the nomination of candidates and party groups--may be threatened if political participants are not aware of the correct procedures to follow for their nominations to be accepted.

Training Responsibilities

Political groups have the primary responsibility to ensure that their officials, candidates, and representatives have a correct understanding of voting operations processes.

However, a little time spent by voting operations administrators in pro-active training or briefing sessions, and also in the production of reference materials for political participants, may save considerable administrative energy on additional dispute resolution and action justification at periods when task pressure is already high.

It may also reduce instances of patently ill-founded claims of irregularities being publicised, and thus unjustifiably affecting public perceptions of the integrity of voting operations administration.

Training and Briefing Sessions

Ongoing liaison between voting operations administrators and political participants is necessary, and the scheduling of specific training or briefing sessions for political participants does not derogate in any way from the responsibility of the electoral management body to ensure such liaison occurs regularly in an equitable and transparent manner throughout the election period. Specific training or briefing sessions on voting operations issues will clarify rights, roles, and responsibilities in the minds of political participants.

In developing training and briefing sessions for political participants, consideration needs to be given to content, timing, and most importantly, ensuring equitable opportunity for access, so that there is no perceived bias towards specific political participants. The number of sessions that can be held will depend on other pressures on voting operations administrators.

A minimum of two should be considered, with a third preferable. Where elections cover a large geographic area, holding these sessions on a regional basis should be strongly considered, to enable equality of access to all candidates and their representatives.

Timing and Content

With regard to timing and content, effective scheduling would include:

• a session just prior to, or upon the commencement of the nomination period, covering nomination procedures , codes of conduct, campaign rules, any candidate or party expenditure or finance rules, media access, security, election materials, voting station locations, challenges to administrative decisions;

• a session around a fortnight before voting day, (or prior to the commencement of any period for early voting if this occurs earlier), covering voting and counting procedures, voting station layouts, rights, roles and responsibilities of polling officials and party or candidate representatives, accreditation of party and candidate representatives, voting procedures, counting procedures, challenges to voters, challenges to ballot counts or results.

A third session, basically as an administrative progress briefing and opportunity for public airing of any problems, difficulties, or misunderstandings arising during the voting operations period to date, could be scheduled for around midway through the campaign period.

Session content and presentation should leave political participants in no doubt as to their rights and responsibilities in participating in and observing voting processes, as well as the sanctions that may be applied should they breach their code of ,or similar responsibilities.

At such briefing or training sessions, accreditation forms for party and candidate representatives at election sites should be made available

Attendance at Voting Station Official Training

There is also merit in inviting equitably selected representatives of parties and candidates to voting station and counting official training sessions. If staff training capacities are sufficient to accommodate such additional participants, this may be a cost-effective way of covering such issues as voter eligibility, voting procedures, and observer rights and responsibilities.

Accredited party and candidate representatives should also be invited to be present at any voting day briefing sessions conducted by voting station or counting centre managers for their staff.

Equity Issues

In terms of maintaining transparency and equity in this process, consideration should be given to the following:

• sufficient notice should be given, and accessible locations chosen, for such sessions to enable attendance.

• for pre-nomination briefing or training sessions, there should be wide public announcement of their availability, particularly in systems where candidates not aligned to registered parties may nominate, as well as invitations to registered parties.

• any materials distributed at briefing or training sessions should also be sent to representatives of registered parties or nominated candidates unable to attend.

It is also useful to keep a transcript of proceedings at such briefings, particularly of questions from party or candidate representatives and their answers, to be provided to those registered parties or candidates unable to attend, and as a record of the information given.

General Governance Issues

In societies in transition to democracy, training for potential candidates, and later for successful candidates, on general governance issues and roles and responsibilities of elected representatives will also be important for a successful outcome to any election process.

These issues would generally be seen to be outside the responsibility of electoral management authorities, though such bodies may see it as useful to play a stimulating role in development of such training.

Special Manuals and Handbooks for Political Participants

It is useful to produce a specific manual or handbook for the use of political participants, detailing the correct processes that will be applied by voting operations staff and the actions, responsibilities, and rights of political participants during this phase of the election

For comprehensive coverage, such handbooks should include sections dealing with:

• contact details of electoral management body officials who can provide further clarification and assistance;

• participation of parties in the voting operations process and their rights;

• correct presentation of party and candidate nominations;

• checking processes for nominations and criteria for acceptance or rejection;

• determination of party and candidate order on the ballot (if relevant);

• codes of conduct for political participants and election officials;

• media access rules;

• campaign rules;

• election security measures;

• provision and accessibility of election materials, including any rights of political participants to distribute these to voters;

• voting station siting and layouts;

• eligibility of voters;

• voting procedures, including those for any special voting facilities such as absentee voting, voting by mail, mobile voting stations, voting in a foreign country;

• roles, responsibilities and authority of voting operations administrators and polling officials;

• roles, rights, and responsibilities of party officials, candidates and their representatives in relation to voting procedures, voting locations, and voting operations administration;

• procedures for the ballot count, including criteria for determining validity of ballots (and valid preference marks, where relevant), aggregation of counts, and announcement of results;

• roles, rights, and responsibilities of party officials, candidates, and their representatives in relation to counts, result determination, and announcement;

• rights, methods, and procedures for challenging decisions made by voting operations administrators, polling officials, and counting staff;

Such handbooks should be available to political participants well before the commencement of the period for nominating candidates or party groups for the election.

Multiple copies of political participants' code of conduct and accreditation forms for their representatives should also be made available both through electoral management body offices and to offices of registered parties and candidates.

Provision of Election Staff Manuals

It is also useful to provide to the office of each registered party or political group and independent candidate running in the election, a copy of the general administration manual used for voting operations by the electoral management body.

Manuals and reference materials produced for voting station officials and counting staff should also be distributed.

Not only may this assist political participants in their understanding of the manner in which voting operations will be conducted, but it further emphasises the transparency of the actions of the electoral management body. It is reasonable, for reasons of cost, to restrict the number of such documents that will be made available to each political group, with the responsibility of intra-group dissemination being on the political group itself.

Where cost considerations are such that providing additional copies of these documents for all political participants is not possible, public access to them should be arranged and publicised, at electoral management body offices, and/or at public libraries or similar research locations, where photocopies or other notes of their contents may be made.

Training for Observers

Training of independent observers would normally be under the control of the observer group's management.

Giving election administrators the responsibility for or control over observer training will raise questions about observer independence, and may result in a narrow training focus on election technical practices.

However, on specific election technical issues, such as political or human rights background and application of election laws and procedures, it may be appropriate to include presentations by electoral management body officials and human rights or legal groups in observer training programs.

Training Scope

Independent observer training has in some ways a broader reach than training of actual political or official participants in the election. It has to impart:

• a thorough understanding of the election system and procedures;

• the tools to undertake a critical yet positive analysis of election activities;

• an attitude of neutrality, impartiality, and non-interference in election matters;

• an effective knowledge of observation administration procedures.

For international observers, there will also be a need for cultural and political background information.

In post-conflict situations, this may include techniques for communicating with election participants who may be suffering from post-traumatic stress.

Cost considerations may well affect the extent of observer training. In most situations, it is preferable to have fewer, reliable, and well-trained observers than to provide very limited training in order to maximise the number of observers involved. By recruiting, wherever possible, observers who already possess the basic skills and experience for election observation, training costs can be minimised

Training Plans

The extent of additional knowledge needed by independent election observers, particularly those from international organisations, usually means that it is unlikely that training can be accomplished in a one-day session. This should be considered in developing observer deployment plans.

Effective training timing and planning will depend on the scope of the observation.

For longer-term observations, training sessions on each aspect of the election process as it is about to commence will reduce information overload and maintain information relevance and freshness. In longer-term observations, core staff engaged at the commencement of the observation program will be available, with their store of experience gained, to conduct training sessions for any large numbers of observers assigned to voting and counting locations.

For most independent observation environments, the majority of observers may not be in place until very near voting day. This means that there may be insufficient time to implement more structured cascade methods of training for observers scattered in the field.

Use of mobile training teams or pre-deployment centralised training methods may be more practicable. For an effective training outcome to be achieved, consideration needs to be given to general learning principles in conducting any mass training of independent observers, including:

• restriction on training group size--fifteen participants is ideal, over thirty excessive--to allow maximum participation and evaluation of individual knowledge, or at least breaking up into small groups for interactive exercises;

• use of comfortable, effective locations and training aids;

• recognition of information absorption and overload factors;

• inclusion and encouragement of simulations, role playing, and interactive activities to stimulate learning and develop tactful, effective information-gathering techniques;

• encouragement of questions at all stages of the training.

Training Updates

Training for independent observers cannot be seen as a one-shot, static formal exercise. To get the most out of observation activities, regular training activities should be undertaken, particularly for longer-term observation programs.

These need not be formal training sessions, but could include simple exercises such as regular briefings or other communications for observers in the field to notify them of any changes in voting operations activities and any issues that have arisen that may require more intensive observation.

Training Content

For ease of training observers and continuing observer field reference, content of training is better based on a comprehensive observer manual.

Detailed training session agendas will differ for longer-term observers and those observing only voting day and the count. A sample agenda for observer training would include the following modules:

• pre-voting day distribution of any training or reference materials not yet provided to observer group;

• introduction of trainers and participants (check that all have necessary materials and arrange distribution of spares to cover deficiencies);

• purpose and objectives of training session;

• outline of session coverage, activities, and administrative arrangements;

• outline of observation organisation's nature and goals, including specific objectives of current observation program;

• observation program administration arrangements, including accommodations, payment, transport, deployment, emergencies, and the like;

• communications strategies, procedures, and responsibilities;

• personal and group security;

• political and cultural background to the election, including the nature of elected institutions;

• legal, regulatory, and administrative framework of the election system, including relevant contact points;

• election timetable;

• election procedures and practices;

• effective monitoring practices and responsibilities;

• criteria for free and fair elections;

• observer code of conduct;

• specific issues to be paid particular attention during observation;

• illustrations of particular situations of concern that may occur, including any rights of complaint or challenge;

• observer reporting responsibilities, materials, and time frames.

Throughout all modules, use of interactive exercises, simulations, and periods for questions and answers, as well as regular "stretch and re-focus" breaks, should be included. Without these, not only may interest levels wane, but evaluation of trainee's information absorption will be more difficult.

Timing and sequence of more interesting and less interesting activities should be oriented towards attention spans and the ubiquitous post-lunch attention drift.

Considerations for International Observer Groups

As members of international observer groups may not be familiar with the cultural, political, and administrative environments in the country to which they have been assigned, their training programs will generally need a broader focus than those for local observers (see International Observer Training).

International Observer Training

Not only in content but also in format, there are particular considerations in developing training programs for international observer groups. In addition to the issues discussed at Training for Observers, as international observers are in an environment with which they are unlikely to be familiar, particular emphasis during training is required on:

• observer administration, logistics, and communication procedures;

• basic living and survival issues, such as accommodation, food, fuel supplies, and personal and group security;

• political and cultural background to the election environment, and the system of elected representation.

These issues may well encompass at least one full day of training, and are the immediate priority on observer arrival.

Training Session Format

With regard to format, international observer groups will often include persons with different language skills and a range of expectations of training environments, from those who expect fully interactive training participation to those for whom accustomed training is little more than a series of lectures.

These differences within international groups must be recognised in developing training programs, and evaluating and providing guidance to individual participants.

There is a requirement for clarity of expression, of course, particularly in oral communication, a more deliberate training pace, a mix of culturally relevant examples, and care in the use of group participation exercises.

Effective training of international observer groups could be seen as a four-stage exercise:

• provision of observer reference manual prior to the departure from the home country (for initial core groups of long-term observers, it would also be advisable to provide some political/cultural background and relevant election system briefings at the observer groups headquarters, if the budget allows);

• provision of training on administrative issues and environment/background issues immediately upon arrival at the election observation location;

• after allowing time for absorption of this data, training on detailed election procedures;

• monitoring of information retention by observation management and provision of follow-up training, briefings, or communications as needed.

Voting Sites

The determination of how many voting sites are needed and their locations is one of the basic requirements for providing an appropriate level of service to voters and organising the resources needed to conduct voting.

Legal Frameworks

Legal frameworks for the election would normally clearly specify:

• the relationship of voting sites to electoral districts and the electoral or geographic areas that voting sites may service;

• the minimum (and any maximum) number of voting sites to be provided in each electoral district;

• a method for officially designating or appointing voting sites, as well as de-commissioning, voting sites;

• responsibilities for determining voting sites, and particularly any role played by governments, elected representatives, and other political participants in the determination of voting site locations;

• methods of identifying voting sites by a unique name or number;

• where special voting facilities may be made available, any specific requirements or restrictions on appointing voting sites for these purposes.

In some systems, maximum and/or minimum voter numbers for a voting site are also determined in the legal framework. There may be some advantages in this, particularly in systems where election administrations may be less experienced, or where, for other reasons, there is a need for a legislative guarantee of service to voters. However, it can lead to inflexibility and restriction of opportunities for efficiency of service to voters.

Such parameters may be better left to electoral management body policy. However determined, any restrictions on the numbers of voters that a voting site may service should not be made without prior research on their practicality and cost-effectiveness.

Given the essential nature of voting site data for election planning, and for voter information purposes, the legal and policy framework for determination of voting sites must be finalised as early as possible, and certainly before the election period commences. Adjusting the parameters, particularly regarding maximum voter numbers, during the election period can throw election planning into chaos.

Formal Approval and Designation of Voting Locations

To ensure accountability in the process of designating voting sites, and to minimise "phantom" or unauthorised voting sites controlled by political participants, all voting sites should be authorised by an official published mandate required by law. This should clearly state the name and preferably the location of the voting site 

If to be used outside the normal hours of voting day (e.g., as a mobile voting or early voting location), the hours of operation and the voting facility provided should also be specified. Where continuous election management systems are in operation, such formal notice need only be given when changes to voting station status occur

Determining the Need for Locations of Voting Sites

Need for voting sites, and the areas in which they must be located, will be determined by:

• any legislative or administrative policy requirements on the number of voters to be serviced by a voting station;

• the number of voters to be serviced and their locations;

• providing accessibility to all voters to the voting process, in a cost-effective manner; Common legislative or policy approaches would include:

• specifying the maximum number of voters that may be serviced by a voting station, and drawing geographic boundaries for voting sub-divisions which encompass no more than this maximum number of voters, and of such size that will enable effective and accessible service to voters;

• alternatively, the electoral district could be split into geographic voting subdivisions of roughly equal size, with boundaries determined by natural features, transportation links,etc

It would be usual to require that a voting site be located in each voting subdivision and that, unless eligible for some special voting facility such as absentee voting, voters are assigned to vote at the specific voting site within their voting subdivision. Effectiveness may be served by allowing some flexibility in such systems, to allow a single voting site to accommodate, in separate areas or voting streams, voters from other specified voting subdivisions.

This can provide efficiencies (particularly for some local government elections or other circumstances where voter populations of voting subdivisions is small). Care must be taken not to adversely affect voter accessibility. Adopting methods based on voting subdivisions of relatively equal voting populations will make election planning easier.

However, in areas of less dense population, more flexible size criteria may be required to preserve voter accessibility. Some legal frameworks, however, allow voters a choice of attending any voting site within a larger geographic area--often the electoral district for which a representative is being chosen at the election.

This may have advantages in flexibility and accessibility for voters, but it provides some difficulties in providing correct resource allocations at each voting site and requires more complex controls for preventing multiple voting and establishing eligibility of voters.

Planning Basis

Within each electoral district and voting subdivision analysis of potential voter numbers, accessible locations with regard to transport links and geography of the area, and characteristics of electors in specific areas forms the basis for effective planning of voting site locations.

(For issues to be considered when determining optimal locations for voting sites, see Demographic Analysis and Locations of Voting Sites.)

Voting Site Arrangements

Once the general area in which a voting site is required has been determined, arrangements must be made for identifying suitable premises or other areas to be used for voting, and, subsequently, the detailed allocation of voting operations resources on the basis of expected voters, feasible logistics, and necessary security.

(For an overview of voting site arrangements, see Voting Site Arrangements, and for security issues, Voting Site Security.)

Premises to be used for voting should be assessed as to their suitability to provide reasonable facilities for the numbers of voters expected.

Effective voter service will be enhanced if voting station managers are provided with an approved layout for their voting stations. These should be based on standard layouts that have been devised to maximise voter service and election integrity, adapted if necessary for the physical shape or floor plan of particular voting locations.

Needs assessments  for voting sites should be undertaken on the basis of the premises or other locations to be used, the facilities required to be provided,the layout criteria and the numbers of voters expected.

A monitoring system will be required to ensure that all voting sites are fully prepared for the opening of voting at the correct time.

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Long Lines on Election Day by Vincent J. Brown is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.0 Generic License.

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Afternoon of a Lesser Election by unprose is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivatives 2.0 Generic License.

Demographic Analysis

To provide both cost-effective and service-oriented voting facilities it is necessary to analyse the demographics of what could be termed each potential voting facility's "catchment area", in both a numeric and qualitative fashion, and use this as the fundamental determinant of voting station locations (see Locations of Voting Sites)

Analysis of potential voter numbers, accessible sites for voting, and the characteristics of voters in different geographic areas is the basis for effective planning of voting operations and the reliability, quality, and efficiency of service provided to voters.

Use of Demographic Analysis

Analysis of demographic data can assist in the solutions of some basic voting operations management needs, such as:

• determining where and how many voting stations are required (and consequently staffing and materials requirements);

• determining the special services that may be required in a voting station;

• determining the needs for any legally sanctioned special voting facilities, e.g., foreign country voting facilities, early voting facilities, or mobile voting stations.

Analysis Required

The nature and extent of the analysis required will depend on both the availability, accuracy, and sophistication of demographic information and the legislative and regulatory frameworks for determining voting facilities. These frameworks could be classified broadly as:

• Restrictive systems, where voters must vote at a specified voting station. Such systems would presuppose the existence of a voters list capable of being accurately broken down into or formed from individual voting station voters lists.

As potential voters at each voting station are relatively predictable from voter registration data and projections from historic voter turnout information, demographic analysis required is of a more qualitative nature;

• Open systems, where voters have some choice in the voting facility they may attend to vote. This may be through allowing a voter on voting day to attend any of a range of voting stations within an electoral district, or by providing special voting facilities (e.g., early voting, voting by mail, or absentee voting) that allow voters a choice of when they vote and a wider choice of where they may vote.

In such systems, careful analysis both of historic figures for voter turnout by location and current or projected demographic data are required for the effective resourcing and location of voting facilities.

Additionally, legal frameworks may impose size restrictions, on  the minimum number of voters required to establish a voting station and, more often, the maximum number of voters that a voting station may service. Where not set in the legal framework, such maximum/minimum limits may be set by the electoral management body to assist effective management, voter service, and resource use.

Data Availability

It would be rare for the full range of accurate, up-to-date demographic data useful for voting facilities planning to be available at the time voting sites and resourcing have to be determined.

It is thus useful for electoral management authorities to maintain a "feel" for the demography of the specific local environments within their area of management, through their own local operatives, agency arrangements with other state authorities, or developing reliable local information sources.

Relevant Data

The data that may be relevant to examine will vary depending on the range of voting services provided to electors, as well as the social environment. However, in all cases, an estimate of the number of voters likely to use particular voting facilities will be required. Thus, both current voter registration data and voter turnout figures from past elections in the area are a basic information tool.

Where final voter registration figures are not available at the time of planning voting facilities, alternative sources will need to be used, derived from census or other population estimates, as either a substitute for voter registration data or to adjust the most recent voter registration.

Particular analytical care needs to be taken with voting history figures when organising voting facilities for an election following any system changes or attempts to adjust any past experience to the current circumstances, whether due to:

• changes in the system of governance (for instance elections affecting a transition to democracy);

• changes in voter eligibility criteria;

• a redrawing of electoral district boundaries;

• recent major population displacements;

• changes in the methods of voting available.

Such analysis can be assisted by powerful computing tools developed to analyse demographic data

However, before embarking on such programs there needs to be a careful cost/output analysis of the incremental advantages in voting site locating and resourcing that maintaining such demographic data management programs may bring. In simpler electoral systems, results of equivalent effectiveness may well be achieved by less costly analytical means.

Useful Demographic Data

In determining voting sites and their resourcing there is a wide variety of demographic data that may be useful in particular situations. The following data has generally useful application.

Overall Voter Population and Mobility: This is the basic tool of determining voting site locations, size, and resourcing. The smaller the geographic units for which this data can be obtained, from voter registration data, census projections, and internal or external migration data sources, the more useful it will be.

Census data should be handled with care according to data reliability. Factors to be considered include the last date of the census, method/coverage of census (full door-to-door, sample, aerial photography, or other estimates), and the methodology of data projections since the last census. In areas where there have been significant movements of refugees or displaced persons, liaison with international humanitarian agencies may be the only practicable way of obtaining population mobility data.

Age Accommodations: Analysis of age distribution will assist in determining where special voting facilities for the aged (e.g., mobile voting stations for aged persons homes or institutions) may be required.

In general, identifying areas with high proportions of aged persons will assist in identifying where greater numbers or lower traffic in voting stations may occur due to reduced voter mobility, and where additional voting stations facilities--such as chairs, rest areas, assistance staff--may be necessary to provide effective voter service. Overall age structure analysis may also be useful, in conjunction with local knowledge of other voting day events, in assessing likely peak periods for voting.

Where computerised voter registration records are maintained, manipulation of these to provide age distribution data is an excellent source. For general analysis, census records may be useful. For more qualitative analysis of what specific facilities need to be provided in local areas for aged voters, liaison with organisations such as medical services, pensioner associations, and nursing home operators is useful.

Occupation and Work Patterns: Analysis of these may assist in identifying such factors as student or military age populations who may require specifically targeted voting sites. Work patterns, in areas with high numbers of seasonal migratory workers can indicate the need for additional voting stations in particular months, or of variations from historical figures of voter turnout (and hence number of voting stations and resourcing needs) according to the time of year of the election.

Transportation Patterns: Analysis of transportation routes used by workers to and from work, and for the general population to and from activities, such as shopping, will assist in determining effective locations for voting sites.

An analysis of peak travel periods, particularly in relation to work patterns where voting day is not a holiday, can also help in determining times of peak voter attendance at voting stations. Where absentee voting is permitted, analysis of records of movements through major transportation service terminals will indicate if there is justification for setting up voting stations in these locations.

Language and Literacy: Useful demographic studies for determining voting stations with a requirement for staff with specific language skills, the distribution of voting material in specific languages, and the need for additional staff and special materials to assist voters of lower literacy could include census data as a basic source. This may be supplemented by data from education authorities and government or non-government social service agencies.

Cultural Demographic Factors: Certain nationality, gender, or religious groups may have difficulties in voting at particular locations or during particular days or hours. The issues to take into consideration could include:

• migratory patterns of nomadic populations;

• specific buildings as voting sites (e.g., state facilities or churches) having negative connotations for sectors of the population;

• provision of special voting facilities where voting day falls on a religious holiday;

• sensitivity towards gender issues when determining voting station location and internal layout.

Census data as well as government and non-government agencies for minorities data plus liaison with social support agencies and community groups is useful for this analysis.

Foreign Relations Authorities: Where voting for an election is permitted at foreign country voting locations, liaison with embassies or other government agencies responsible for tracking international movements will assist in identifying external locations with significant numbers of potential voters and in any required registration of these voters.

Local Resources

In the absence of reliable comprehensive statistics, there is no substitute for maintaining networks of local officials for supply of demographic data.

However, data obtained in such a way may need to be treated with some scepticism as to its complete accuracy, particularly if local funding for election or other projects is dependent on population figures which are not objectively verifiable.

Locations of Voting Sites

Basic criteria for determining how many voting locations will be required to accommodate the expected numbers of voters and where they are best located, will include:

• legal or administrative directions on the placement of voting sites within electoral district or voting subdivision boundaries;

• voting station capacity, i.e., the numbers of voters that a voting station can service;

• accessibility and service standards for voting.

Providing Service to a Defined Geographic Area

There may be legal restrictions as to the placement of voting stations in relation to electoral districts or voting subdivisions of electoral districts. It would be usual that electoral districts be divided into voting subdivisions, each of which must contain a voting site.

Definition of these voting subdivisions' boundaries would normally be better left to the discretion of electoral management bodies, on administrative grounds, rather than become part of any determination of electoral representation boundaries.

Appropriate voter populations of voting subdivisions, their boundaries, and, hence, the numbers of voters that voting stations must service must be determined early in the election timetable for effective planning of staffing, materials supply, and logistics.

There are different approaches to defining appropriately-sized voting subdivisions. One approach is to break each electoral district into geographic areas, or voting subdivisions, containing nearly equal numbers of registered voters.

Such an approach allows for standardisation of staffing levels and materials supply and can thus provide a simple and effective basis for voting operations resource allocation and service. While simple, this approach may present accessibility problems, particularly in areas of lower population density.

A modification of this method would be to set varying maximum voter populations for voting subdivisions according to societal and geographic factors--at different levels for urban and rural environments, or between areas of higher and lower literacy. Maximum flexibility can be gained if voting station areas are determined purely on local criteria.

This will allow maximum effectiveness to be gained for available local facilities, but can lead to widely varying numbers of voters serviced by voting stations and thus increases the complexity of planning and resourcing.

Some legal frameworks allow voters a choice of attending any voting site within a larger geographic area, often an electoral district for which a representative is being chosen at the election.

This may have advantages in flexibility and accessibility for voters, but drawbacks may include:

• the uncertainty of where voters may attend to vote under such systems greatly increases the complexity of planning appropriate locations and resourcing of voting stations and has the potential for resulting in excessive costs;

• such systems will require more complex and perhaps less effective procedures for preventing multiple voting and establishing eligibility of voters.

Voting Station Capacity Criteria

The number of voters that a voting station can reasonably accommodate will depend on a variety of environment-specific factors.

There is no ideal capacity for a voting station that can be applied to all election environments. In some measure, prescribed voting station capacities reflect the philosophy of the voting system, whether it aims to promote a sense of local community participation through provision of smaller-sized neighbourhood voting stations or to gain efficiencies through more impersonal, larger voting stations.

Equally significant for determining voting station processing capacities are the interdependent operational factors that will influence voting station effectiveness, such as:

• the hours during which voting stations will be open;

• the range of services to be provided, both in terms of voting facilities required by the legal framework and additional services provided to assist voters;

• the complexity of the voting procedures;

• whether a single election or multiple simultaneous elections are being held;

• the procedures for checking voter eligibility and issuing voting material to voters;

• the physical area available for voting and whether this is a single room or is broken into multiple smaller spaces;

• the way in which the physical layout of the voting station is arranged, and particularly the number of voting compartments that are provided;

• the availability and abilities of suitable staff for both voting station management and other voting station official positions;

• the service standards for voter traffic that have been set by the electoral management body;

• voter fraud control (in smaller, neighbourhood-based voting, most eligible voters will be known to officials and observers and opportunities for voter fraud more limited);

• how familiar and experienced voters are with the voting procedures;

• the structure of the local voting population, particularly in terms of age and literacy in the official language to be used for voting.

Voting station processing capacities will be more limited where they deal with a single stream of voters.

Conversely, depending on the physical area of the voting station, using multiple voting streams (either based on voters lists for geographic sub-districts, an alphabetical split of voters, or having multiple copies of voters lists available for voting), can greatly increase voting station capacity

General Standards

There are some general standards which can provide useful reference points:

• While there are economies of scale in larger capacity voting stations, voter traffic of 4000-5000 voters is likely to lead to problems in voting station management.

• Conversely, very small voting stations, with voter traffic of under 300-400 voters, are generally an inefficient use of resources and should only be considered where they are required to provide voting accessibility to voters in more isolated areas or where an electoral district's voter population is low.

• Traffic in the range of 1200 to 2500 voters per voting station will generally offer a reasonable level of efficiency, yet not be too unwieldy for staff of average ability to manage. However, the ability to service this number of voters will be dependent on the issues noted below.

Service Criteria

Sites chosen as voting locations need to meet basic criteria to ensure that they are able to effectively service voters and that they are conducive to the conduct of a free and fair election. The basic factors that need to be considered in choosing specific locations include the following:

The ability of the site to cope with the expected number of voters: The physical capacity of the location to cope with both the total number of expected voters, and the likely peak periods of operation, require assessment.

The accessibility of the site to voters, party/candidate representatives and observers: Accessibility must be a paramount consideration. Having to travel long distances or for long periods to their nearest voting station will be a deterrent for voters to attend to vote, particularly where transportation may not be readily available.

Considerations in this regard would include the condition and number of roads servicing the voting station, the availability and frequency of public transport services, and in urban areas, the availability of parking. Locating voting stations in restricted areas, such as military bases, that may prove difficult to observe freely, should generally be avoided.

Special care needs to be taken that voting sites are accessible to voters with disabilities, both in access to and condition of premises  and their location. For example, in environments with few transport facilities where voters will generally walk to a voting station, location of voting sites at the summit of steep hills can inconvenience elderly or frail voters.

The safety and security of voters, election staff, and party/candidate representatives: The ability to ensure that a voting site and its environs are safe assumes great importance in situations where there has been recent or there is current violent political conflict. In such situations, perceptions of how safe the voting site is for those of particular political views or community groups will have a large effect on voter turnout and hence the legitimacy of the election .

Familiarity: Voters will be more easily able to find voting stations if they are in prominent locations.

Wherever possible, sites that have been used previously for voting stations should continue to be used, unless they have negative connotations through connections with former repressive regimes or no longer meet capacity/facilities standards.

This is particularly useful in areas with multiple layers of government which have different voting days; using the same sites for elections at the national, provincial, and local levels will minimise voter confusion and make public information campaigns on voting locations easier.

Where elections are preceded by a locally-based intensive voter registration campaign, early identification and use of voting sites as a local registration office within each voting subdivision will aid voters in their recognition of the correct voting station to attend.

The acceptability of the site to voters: Certain state agency sites such as police premises may not be acceptable as voting locations to the local community.

The ability to supply the voting site with voting materials: Logistics considerations need to include the condition of transportation infrastructure. If there is no suitable road network for delivery of materials, the ability to supply by air or other means must be available.

Availability at all times required for voting purposes: Locations may be ideal for voting, but they need to be available for all voting-related functions required to be undertaken at the site. These could be well before voting day, in systems where voters lists for each voting station are posted for inspection at the relevant voting station.

They may be required after voting day, for finalisation of counts where these are undertaken at the voting station. Where buildings are used they should be available on the day or night before voting day, to allow officials to set up the voting stations, and be able to be left secured from the time of set-up through to commencement of voting.

Telecommunications capabilities: It is very important that voting stations maintain reliable communications with the election administration and, in higher security risk areas, security forces.

Voting stations should not be located in communications shadows, that is, at a location where there is no fixed line telecommunication facilities and mobile phone or radio contact is unreliable due to surrounding natural features or other interference.

Suitability of Location

In determining what are suitable premises or locations for voting stations, there are basic considerations of costs, the floor or ground area available, accessibility, and the condition and availability of facilities in the location  Buildings that would generally be suitable for voting sites would include:

• schools, including pre-schools and kindergartens;

• court houses;

• community operated halls or club premises;

• government buildings.

Use of Private Premises

Where suitable public or community buildings or locations are not available--and this may occur often in rural areas--it may be necessary to lease privately owned premises.

In leasing private property for voting sites, care should be taken in ensuring that the location will be acceptable to all voters, in that the owner is not associated with active political participation. Similarly, it should be ensured that any private property used for voting is not normally used for an activity that may be offensive to minority cultural groups.

In some jurisdictions, additional restrictions on premises that may be used as voting sites are imposed in the legal framework (e.g., that they are not licensed to sell alcoholic beverages).

Integrity Considerations

Consideration also needs to be given to any effect the use of particular premises may have on perceptions of election integrity or on participation by voters.

This may be particularly important in transitional elections where significant sectors of the population may associate buildings owned by the state with repressive action by former regimes.

Costs

Public buildings such as schools and government offices are often available at concessional rates or free of charge from state agencies for voting use. Election legal frameworks could contain provision for forced requisition of state or other premises, either by the electoral management body or by state executive direction.

Such powers to requisition state premises can be very useful in systems where elections may be called at relatively short notice.

Co-Location

Depending on the size of the premises available, dealing with voters from more than one voting subdivision within the same electoral district at the one physical location can be an efficient manner of organising voting sites in urban areas. However, in using this method:

• staff management structures within the voting site must be rigorously defined;

• layouts organised so that material from the different voting subdivisions is kept separate and properly accounted for;

• additional control staff may be required to ensure that voters are directed to the correct voting stream at the voting station;

It would be usual that voting stations are located within the electoral district to which they are attached. This is often required by the election legal framework. Some flexibility in this regard may be useful.

Co-location of voting stations from different electoral districts at the same location near the border of adjoining electoral districts, may, in urban areas, allow the use of facilities that can take advantage of economies of scale.

It can be very useful in reducing the higher unit cost absentee votes in election systems that allow absentee voting on voting day. Control systems for such voting locations need to be particularly rigorous.

Special Voting Facilities

Care is needed if consideration is being given to creating special voting sites to accommodate specific occupational groups, such as government employees or military personnel. There is always the potential at such sites for intimidation of voters by their superiors.

Ballots from such sites would preferably be mixed with those from normal geographic area-based voting stations before being counted.

Voting Site Arrangements

Once the necessity for voting sites in particular areas has been established (see Demographic Analysis and Locations of Voting Sites), the following arrangements must be made:

• the actual buildings or other locations where voting is to take place must be identified;

• contractual arrangements for their use must be put in place;

• action must be taken to ensure that they are properly equipped. furnished, and supplied.

Identifying Suitable Premises

Arrangements for identifying suitable voting sites are better organised at the local level, through the electoral district manager or local election commission for the electoral district or administration area, rather than attempting to do this centrally. Local staff will usually have better ability to find potential facilities in their area.

Where there are permanent electoral management bodies with a local presence in place, periodic assessment of potential available voting locations/premises will assist in minimising workloads during the election period. It is important that contact is initiated with the representatives of state authorities responsible for or owners of potential premises at an early stage in the election period.

Site Inspections

Wherever possible, sites or premises to be used for voting should be inspected by experienced staff before any decision to use the location is made.  If inspection is not possible, information on size, facilities available, and so forth should be gained from inquiry of the site or premises owners.

To aid in determining the suitability of specific premises or locations for use as voting stations, criteria should be developed with regard to the standard facilities that should be present at a voting location.

Standard Layouts

The development of standard layouts for voting stations will assist in maximising the following:

• consistency of service to voters;

• cost-effective resourcing;

• correct implementation of voting procedures.

Needs Assessments

It may not be possible to obtain the use of locations that fully meet the requirements of facilities standards and which have sufficient furniture and other equipment on hand to effect authorised layouts.

For each voting station, a needs assessment should be completed, identifying the additional equipment and other facilities that will be required.

Contractual Arrangements

The specification of actual voting locations should be a recorded process--for both operational and financial accountability reasons.

Buildings or locations to be used for voting should be covered by a formal contractual arrangement (whether there is payment involved or not) to ensure the site and facilities are available as required for voting

Decisions on suitable voting locations will need to consider the associated costs, both any leasing costs and any costs that will need to be incurred in upgrading the facilities present.

Voting Station Readiness

One of the most important tasks in the management of voting operations is to ensure that all voting stations are ready for operations on voting day.

Monitoring systems for tracking the state of readiness of each voting station and rectifying deficiencies are essential for effective management of voting day and for the integrity of voting.

Maps

It is essential for planning of logistics, and for public information campaigns, that maps be produced showing voting site locations. The detail required of these maps will vary according to the purpose for which they are being used

Voting Station Names/Identity Numbers

Each voting station must be given a unique identifying name or number, for use in:

• public information campaigns;

• crucially, for ensuring control of the despatch and return of ballot boxes and election materials;

• control of counts and results.

Where voting stations for different voting subdivisions or electoral districts share the same location, it is critical that they have separate identifying names and/or numbers. It would be usual for the election legal framework to require that the name or number allocated to each voting station be authorised by a designated senior member of the electoral management body, and officially published.

Voting Site Standards

Assessment of the suitability of specific sites for voting should be made against a set of standards defined by the electoral management body.

These standards should cover all facets of the requirements for voting. In many areas it may not be possible to find available buildings that fully meet the required standards, or any suitable buildings at all.

In such circumstances, it will be necessary to determine from needs assessments of the available locations whether one of the following alternatives may be employed:

• bring any existing premises up to the minimum standard required for voting purposes;

• arrange for temporary accommodation, in a tent, caravan, portable cabin, or other temporary shelter, for the voting station;

• hold voting in the open.

The latter possibility is generally only feasible where voting stations are expected to accommodate relatively small numbers of voters and where weather conditions are expected to be favourable (though open-air voting facilities may be the norm in societies where there is a tradition of open air local decision-making as part of the cultural fabric).

Personal Inspection

It is highly desirable that a thorough personal inspection of the location be made. It is more effective if such assessments are undertaken by locally-based election administration staff (the electoral district manager or members of the election commission for the electoral district) in the presence of a representative of the location's owner.

It would be preferable that the voting station manager (if already selected) also attend such inspections in order to get a preliminary feel for the capacities of the location.

Reporting on Inspections

Preparing standard reports on these inspections in check list format will assist in assessing suitability and determining areas where additional equipment or facilities must be provided by the electoral management body 

Where, due to remoteness or other reasons, it is not possible to make a personal inspection of the location, a report in a standard format should be requested from the owners or their representatives

Issues for Assessment

The issues that need to be considered during such assessments include:

• the suitability of the physical area of the location for an effective layout of the voting station and its capacity to cope with the number of voters expected 

• road or other transport access (and in urban areas any parking facilities);

• the facilities that are available--communications, furniture, shelter for waiting voters, secure storage, staff and voter amenities such as toilets and water, reliable power supply and lighting, heating or cooling equipment, ventilation 

• suitability for use by frail, elderly, or disabled voters 

• in higher security-risk environments, the ability to secure the voting station

• the premises is not disqualified from use for voting by any other activity that may normally be undertaken there that may breach legislative requirements for voting stations, offend the cultural sensitivities of the local community, or raise questions about election integrity 

• expected costs of the location and any conditions on its use.

Voting Site Facilities

In determining the necessary standard of facilities required in a voting station, there are some basic issues to consider, including:

• the effective implementation of all required voting procedures;

• the public's ability to vote in safety and comfort;

• provision of an acceptable work environment for voting operations officials.

Standard checklist reports are useful in determining the facilities available at voting locations and providing the basis for needs assessments. ( Needs assessments are further discussed at Voting Site Needs Assessments.)

Minimum Standards

There will be a bare minimum standard that must be provided at voting locations in any environment. These standards will relate to the ability to implement all required procedures in a safe environment.

Elements of comfort in voting locations may be a relative concept that will vary from environment to environment. What is acceptable in a less developed rural area may not be an acceptable standard in advanced urban areas.

However, even in regard to comfort there are some facilities, such as access to toilets and water, that should be regarded as essential at any voting location. Details of facilities that are necessary at voting locations are discussed below.

Condition of Premises

Wherever possible, buildings in sound condition should be used. The condition of external and internal building walls, roof, ceilings windows, and floor should be assessed.

The voting area should have adequate ventilation and a level, non-slip floor surface. Where there is no alternative to a building in poor condition, the electoral management body may need to supply waterproof sheeting for temporary repair purposes.

Accessibility

There are two issues regarding accessibility:

• the accessibility of the voting site location;

• the ease with which voters and officials can use the location for voting.

Accessibility of the voting site location to transport facilities, its relationship to where voters reside, and similar issues are discussed at Locations of Voting Sites.

There are a number of issues that can be assessed in terms of ease of access within the voting site, with special attention being paid to accident prevention and the needs of disabled voters. These issues would include:

• vehicle parking facilities;

• width, gradient, state of repair, and non-slip surfaces of approach paths and entrance and exit of the voting area;

• number of external and internal steps (wherever possible areas with level external and internal access, or with ramps as an alternative to steps, should be used);

• railings provided on landings, stairs, and ramps;

• lighting available for approach paths and its accessibility for use;

• non-slip surfaces on voting station floor area;

• entrance, exit, and internal doorways of sufficient width to allow free access and suitable for speedy evacuation in case of emergencies;

• internal corridors of sufficient width;

• the area available for use is sufficient to cope with the expected number of voters, officials, and observers using an approved voting station layout;

• whether a single room of sufficient size for all voting activities is available or whether multiple rooms must be used;

• availability of a covered area outside the voting station for voters waiting to enter.

Most of these factors cannot be easily ameliorated by actions of the electoral management body. Premises that do not meet all these criteria may be the best available premises. In some jurisdictions, for example:

• portable ramps are supplied to voting stations to assist disabled voter access;

• temporary coverings are supplied to provide voters waiting to vote with some shelter. While useful, these would not be generally regarded as essential needs.

Security and Safety

Security considerations concern the internal security facilities and the ability to secure the external area around the voting station. With regard to internal arrangements:

• it would generally be essential that any area of a building used for voting has lockable external doors and preferably also windows;

• where the building has its own electronic security system, this must be accessible to voting operations officials to activate/deactivate or owner's representatives be available for these tasks;

• fire extinguishing equipment should also be accessible.

If security forces will not be guarding voting sites from the time of delivery of materials through the commencement of voting, it is highly preferable that the location has security alarms installed.

Where legal provisions bar political activity in a defined area around a voting station, consideration needs to be given to the suitability of the location for establishing this area. Locations with external fencing may be preferable.

In high security-risk areas a cleared area around the voting location would be preferable for establishing a security perimeter.

A secure area would also preferably be available so that bulky equipment, particularly voting compartments and any additional furniture required, can be delivered during the week before voting day and stored on the site awaiting use.

Electricity

Each voting station would preferably have a reliable electricity supply. While this is primarily important for lighting, this would also include power outlets in the area to be used for voting, with a load capacity sufficient for any electronic equipment to be used during the vote.

Fuse boxes or other circuit breaking equipment should be accessible to voting operations officials in case of power failure.

Where a permanent reliable electricity supply is not available, arrangement should be made by the electoral management body for supply of generators, either from other state sources such as the military or by lease from private contractors. Where portable electricity supply equipment is used, it should be tested prior to the commencement of voting.

Lighting

In most environments, and particularly where counts are undertaken at voting stations, voting station operations will extend beyond daylight hours. It is essential that the area used for voting and the count should have reliable lighting. Existing facilities may need to be supplemented by the provision of portable electric lamps.

Special attention should be paid to lighting in the area in which voting compartments will be positioned. Where a reliable electricity supply cannot be provided, sufficient portable lighting facilities, such as battery, gas, or other fuel lamps, will need to be included with the voting material provided by the electoral management body.

Where electricity supplies are not reliable, flashlights and batteries or even candles may also be required as back-up emergency lighting.

Communications Facilities

It is essential that voting stations have reliable communications with the electoral management body during their hours of operation. The area used for voting would preferably contain one, and in high security-risk environments preferably two, reliable fixed telephone connections or have these accessible in close proximity.

Where reliable permanent telephone connections are not available, the electoral management body should arrange, where sufficient time and the technical facilities are available, for sufficient fixed telephone lines to be installed or, alternatively, the provision of mobile phones or portable radio communication equipment to the voting station.

Where mobile phone or radio communication is to be used, it is essential that voting locations chosen have reliable reception. It is also essential that strict controls on the issue and return of portable telecommunications equipment are instituted.

Fax Machines

In some jurisdictions fax machines are provided by the electoral management body to all voting stations with fixed telephone lines. These may be useful and convenient for such tasks as:

• ensuring correct, consistent receipt of any further instructions or directions to voting station managers during voting;

• receipt of formal legal advice on issues arising during voting;

• transmission of count results, where counts are undertaken at voting stations.

However, they could not be regarded as essential or even necessarily as cost-effective use of resources.

Photocopiers

Similarly, there may be a use for photocopiers in voting stations for such matters as emergency re-supply of official forms. When assessing voting location facilities, it can be useful to determine if photocopying facilities are available.

However, this would not generally be regarded as an essential facility.

Furniture

The essential basic requirements are for tables and chairs available in good condition to be sufficient for polling staff, party/candidate representative, and observer use, and to provide some seating for elderly or physically handicapped voters. The number needed will depend on the number of staff to be allocated to the voting station and their roles, but generally provision will need to be made for:

• table and chair for voting station manager and deputy;

• table and chair for entrance control officer;

• tables and chairs for voter eligibility checking officers and voting materials issuing officers;

• tables for ballot boxes and chairs for ballot box guards;

• chair for any exit control officers;

• table for information materials;

• tables and chairs for party/candidate representatives and observers.

Sufficient chairs should also be provided so that staff who are mobile through the voting station, such as queue control offices and information staff, also have somewhere to sit, and a small number should also be provided for voter use.

Additional tables and chairs may be needed for use in voting compartments, depending on the design of the voting compartment used.  Where no special barriers are provided for crowd control, the availability of additional tables and chairs can be useful for defining areas for queues and voter flow. However, if this is done, strict control must be exercised to ensure that these are not used instead of secret voting compartments by electors marking their ballots.

Use of schools and similar public premises as voting locations will generally ensure that sufficient tables and chairs are available on site, Where the room(s) to be used for voting are insufficiently supplied, wherever possible arrangements should be made for this shortfall to be made up from elsewhere in the institution. If sufficient tables and chairs are not available from the voting site, the electoral management body should arrange for the lease and delivery to the location of sufficient quantity for the identified needs.

Additional furniture, such as lockable storage cabinets for materials, can be useful but not generally essential. Packaging used for delivery of materials may suffice for materials storage during voting hours.

Polling Staff Amenities

Toilet facilities and drinking water for staff use are necessary requirements. Separate toilets for male and female staff would be preferable. In areas where no available or otherwise suitable locations can provide these facilities, arrangements should be made for their provision from other state agencies. Portable toilets may be leased commercially and delivered and returned with voting equipment. The military may be able to assist with these facilities.

In rural areas where portable toilets may not be able to be obtained, or where temporary shelters are erected for voting, during set-up of the voting station, the digging of pits and erection of screens for toilet facilities may be required.

Small quantities of drinking water could be delivered with voting materials. However, particularly where larger numbers of voters are expected, and there is no nearby public source of drinking water it may be more practicable to negotiate for the use of water tankers from local government, water authority, or military sources. Where elections are to be held in cold conditions, premises used would preferably have some form of heating available.

Additional facilities, such as tea/coffee making facilities, a separate area for staff to eat or take breaks, access to refrigerator, stove, microwave, and/or a meals preparation area, would assist in maintaining staff comfort, but are not necessary and would not generally be supplied by the electoral management body if not already present on the premises.

Voter Amenities

For staff, availability of toilet and drinking water facilities is necessary. In many circumstances, voters and staff may be able to share the same facilities.

However, some leases may contain conditions that preclude voters from using staff toilet facilities, and security reasons may also preclude this. Where such facilities are not available, they should be provided in a similar fashion as described above for staff.

A ratio of one portable toilet for every four to five hundred voters expected should be sufficient, as long as voters are not faced with long voting delays. Drinking water, if not available on the premises, would again be more effectively provided by use of water tankers from state or military sources.

Voting Station Layout Standards

Layouts of voting stations should aim to maximise:

• the efficiency of the flow of voters through the voting station;

• the effective implementation of voting processes as required by the legal framework;

• the security and integrity of voting;

• the transparency of the voting process;

• efficiency of staff allocation;

• protection of the secrecy of voting.

It will not always be possible to fully achieve all these aims simultaneously, as there will often be restrictions imposed by: The voting procedures as defined in the legal framework for the election.

For example, requirements that ballot boxes be stationed next to the officers issuing voting material and that voters return to the table from which their material was issued to deposit their ballots can impede effective voter flow.

In developing voting station layouts, the most effective way of implementing the required procedures must be considered.

The suitability of the building or area used. There may not be much choice available in voting locations, and buildings or other areas used may not be of the optimal size or configuration for the numbers of voters, numbers of staff, party/candidate representatives, and observers present, staff responsibilities, and the processes to be implemented.

Approved Voting Station Layouts

Standard layouts for voting sites are a necessary basis for developing cost-effective staffing profiles, any standard staffing levels assigned to voting stations, materials supply, and staff training. Some flexibility will be needed to allow adaptation of standard layouts to suit the floor area available in each voting station.

Following inspection of voting sites (or where inspection is not possible, provision of a floor plan by the building management), an approved layout should be prepared for each site.

It is useful for voting station managers (if already appointed) to assist in this preparation. In remote areas, it may be left to voting station managers to prepare the layout; these should still be approved for use by the relevant electoral district manager.

Voting station managers must be required to implement the approved layout for their voting stations. Enforcing adherence to approved layouts is a major factor in ensuring effective voter service on voting day and maintaining cost-effectiveness.

Entrances and Exits

To promote an orderly, easily controlled flow of voters through a voting station It is preferable that:

• the voting area has only one available entrance and one available exit;

• the entrance and exit are at opposite ends of the voting area, to allow a one-way progression of voters through the voting area.

This configuration will not be available in all sites used for voting.

Many otherwise suitable (or the only available) locations will have a single entrance and exit doorway or entrances and exits in close proximity to each other. In such cases, barriers should be used to promote the flow of voters around the voting station and especially to separate voters entering from voters leaving the voting station.

Supervisory Staff

Positioning of the voting station manager's (and deputy's, where allocated) table should allow effective oversight of all staff and voter activity.

It would generally be better located near the entrance to the voting station, to allow easy access by voters needing assistance with information or in voting. The area around the voting station manager's table would also be the preferable area for secure storage of voting materials not currently in use.

Materials Issuing Area

Tables for issuing of accountable voting materials should be set up so that officials issuing material have a clear view of both the queued voters and the voting compartments.

Having materials issuing staff directly facing the queued voters may make it difficult for them to have a clear view of both of these. Also, their location should allow a well-defined queue to form.

Voting Compartments

Voting compartments need to be positioned so that voters can complete their votes in secret and that activity around the voting compartments can be monitored by polling officials. The style of voting compartments used, whether free standing, table-top, or needing support from a wall, will affect the flexibility of positioning available.

Wherever possible, they should be located between the voting materials issuing area and the ballot box(es). Care must be taken, when tall freestanding voting compartments are used, that their positioning does not obscure officials' and observers' view of the ballot box(es).

Often the major cause of delays in voting stations is not any lack of efficiency by voting operations officials, but the time taken for voters to complete their ballots.

This is a factor that needs careful study in determining:

• the number of voting compartments required to maintain a steady flow of voters for the expected voter turnout.

• the voting station floor area required to install the requisite number of voting compartments in a layout that allows easy voter access to the voting compartments.

Consideration should also be given to the space requirements for provision of compartments for use by disabled or wheelchair bound voters. These may require a more generous space allocation and special tables or voting compartment design to allow wheelchair access.

Furniture

Many of the officials working in the voting station will require tables, and in designing layouts the space requirements of these need to be carefully calculated to ensure that there is sufficient room for free access. Tables would normally be needed for:

• voting station manager and deputy manager;

• staff checking voter eligibility and issuing accountable voting materials (the more these functions are split between different staff, the more table top space is likely to be required).

Where these tables are placed, and the direction in which they face, will have a large effect on voter processing. They may also be required for:

• display of information or other electoral materials;

• as a stand for ballot boxes;

• as a working or reporting area for party/candidate representatives and observers.

The balance has to be struck between providing officials with an adequately sized work surface and not overcrowding the voting area with furniture. Exit and entry passages should be kept free of furniture. In cases where materials are being issued or voter checks undertaken at the entrance to the voting station, there may be a need to use tables to allow only one voter to pass at a time; however these should not overly obstruct the passageway.

Tables for which there is no apparent, specific purpose should not be left in the voting area. Not only do they impede voter traffic, but it is tempting for voters to use these, instead of the secret voting compartments, as a place for completing their ballots.

Other furniture, such as storage cabinets for materials and secure storage for filled ballot boxes, may also be required. Space requirements and locations of these should be clearly marked on layout plans.

Barriers

The use of even rudimentary barriers can be of great assistance in ensuring that voters move in a controlled manner through the voting station. The placement of barriers should clearly define the voter flow path yet still allow free movement of officials and observers within the voting station. Areas where barriers can be usefully employed include:

• to define the queuing area;

• direct voters to the appropriate sets of voting compartments and ballot boxes where such differentiation is required by the voting procedures;

• maintain separate paths for voters entering and leaving the voting station (particularly important where a single access point is used for both entry and exit);

• ensure that voters, having deposited their ballots, do not move back into the voting area.

Barriers can both define the path of the queue and be used to coil the queue to make maximum use of the available queuing space. Where there is more than one queue, they can be used to ensure that the queues remain separate. Barriers should be arranged so as to maintain access for voters to the voting station manager and information staff.

While electoral administrations wanting to present a highly professional image may have special barriers produced, barriers can also be constructed cost-effectively from ropes or use of existing materials from other government sources, such as barriers used for vehicle or pedestrian traffic control.

Ballot Boxes

Ballot boxes should be set up in a position in full view of polling officials, party/candidate representatives, and observers, and not obstructed by voting compartments or other furniture. The numbers of ballot boxes required as defined in the legal framework (e.g., separate ballot boxes for different ballots in simultaneous elections or separate ballot boxes for different voting streams) and any legal requirements for voters to return to the point of issue of voting material to deposit their ballots will influence where ballot boxes can be located within the voting station.

The most efficient placement, in terms of voter traffic control is between the voting compartments and the exit to the voting station. The area required for ballot boxes will depend on whether they are freestanding units or require tables to bring them up to a reasonable height.

Communications

Fixed line telephone connections should be set up so that, wherever possible, telephones are located on the voting station manager's table. Where a fax machine is required it should also be set up in the area where the voting station manager's and deputy's tables are located.

Multiple Room Voting Stations

It is preferable that voting locations allow all voting activity to occur within a single area. Where the only available premises contain multiple rooms, it would be better to split voting activity so that voters do not have to move from room to room to complete voting processes.

For example, where multiple voting streams are used (using an alphabetic or geographic split of voters attending), the aim would be to fully process a different voter stream, from eligibility checking to depositing of ballots in the ballot box, in each room.

Using multiple rooms for different functions--checking voter eligibility in one room, issuing ballots and/or ballot envelopes in another, positioning voting compartments and ballot boxes in another--can have efficiency disadvantages.

In general, use of multiple rooms voting stations may be less cost-effective in additional control staff required to maintain voter flow, in additional management difficulties, and often in additional equipment required and should be avoided wherever possible.

Potential Voting Station Layouts

 

The following diagrams give a few examples of how voting stations may be set up under different procedures and voting area configurations.

It is not possible to give examples that would cover every potential situation. However, those provided do illustrate some of the key aspects of effective voting station layout given various procedural requirements. While they show a maximum of two voting streams servicing regular voters, depending on the size of the voter population to be serviced and the voting station area, this may need to be increased.

In this model, the voting station has only a single access point which must be used for both entrance and exit. Barriers are used to ensure that the voters entering and leaving the voting station have separate paths. Other features are:

• at positions 1 and 2, positions for staff to maintain control of the entrance and the queues (in low security-risk situations and where voter flow is not intensive, the same official may be able to undertake both tasks);

• clear view of all proceedings to voting station  staff and observers;

• provision for an area for storage of materials (at 4) under the control of the manager (or deputy manager if the voting station is of sufficient size);

• a single table (at 5) for checking voter eligibility and issuing ballot material (whether undertaken by the same or separate officials) positioned to allow monitoring of both the queue waiting to vote (2) and the voting compartment area (6);

• positioning of the ballot box on the route from the voting compartments to the exit (8);

• with a single entrance/exit, one official could maintain both entry control and exit control, depending on voter numbers;

• an area where party/candidate representatives and observers can sit (9), make notes and the like.

Party/candidate representatives and observers should not generally be restricted to any such area but permitted to move around the voting stations, as long as they do not impede voter service.

Where there is a separate entrance and exit, it will be easier to coil the queue, through use of barriers, to make better use of the available space within the voting station. This model uses separate entrance and exit doorways and positioning of staff to promote a one-way flow of voters through the voting station. Barriers are again used to control flow from entrance to eligibility checking/materials issue area and to prevent voters moving back into the voting area from the ballot box.

Care must be taken to ensure that voters needing assistance, for complex queries on voting or assistance with completing a ballot, have free passage to the area where the voting station manager is located.

In other respects, this model is generally similar to the previous model. With a coiled queue, where there are larger numbers of voters, separate entry (1) and queue control (2) officers may be required. Using a separate exit, the ballot box may be placed closer to the exit to allow exit supervision by officials guarding the ballot box (8).

Where voters are marked with ink to indicate that they have voted, an additional polling official and table (5) may be needed next to the voter check/materials issue table (5a) for checking that voters are not already marked with ink, and applying ink to voters established as eligible to vote at that voting station.

In this model, the voter queue is split into queues divided alphabetically on the voters' names--in the example, separate A to M, N to Z queues, each going to a separate eligibility checking/materials issuing table (voters lists will need to split in the same alphabetical fashion). Clear signs and a staff member at or near position 2 are required to direct voters to the correct queue. Other features include:

• at positions 1 and 2, positions for staff to maintain control of the entrance and the queues (in low security-risk situations and where voter flow is not intensive the same official may be able to undertake both tasks);

• use of barriers to ensure that the separate queues do not get mixed;

• placement of the multiple voter eligibility checking/material issuing tables (at 5 and 6) so that officials can monitor both the queue waiting to vote and the voting compartment area.

In systems where regular voting stations may issue voters special types of votes, such as provisional/tendered votes or absentee votes, which require the voter to

• complete a form or declaration and

• after completing the ballot, return to the issuing officials for the ballot and declaration to be enveloped together  it is generally better to provide a separate area for issuing such ballots, rather than holding up normal voters while this more lengthy process is completed.

When there are small numbers of such voters expected, these ballots could be issued by the voting station manager or deputy. Where larger numbers are expected, a separate official or officials may need to be engaged (10 in the above diagram). Where these officials are positioned may be difficult to organise effectively depending on the space available: it would be preferable that they are near the voting station manager's location, as these votes may present greater difficulty to the issuing officials.

However, care should be taken not to interfere with other voter flows if this positioning is adopted. Alternatively, this issuing area could be located near the exit to the voting station, by re-arranging the observer positions at (9) in the above diagram.

A separate ballot box for these voters will generally be required. In such cases, voting compartments specifically for the use of these voters should also be provided, separated from the voting compartments for normal voters, to reduce any voter confusion. This ballot box and voting compartment would be effectively positioned beside the table(s) used for issuing these votes.

While having many similarities with sample layout numbers 4 and 5, this particular layout is set up to utilise bank-style queuing (with use of the queuing area maximised by coiling the queue), so that when voters reach the head of a single queue at position 2, they are directed to the first vacant voter eligibility checking/materials issuing table.

Use of this method will require a legal framework that allows a copy of the complete voters list for the whole geographic area serviced by the voting station to be used at each of the tables checking voter eligibility 

Where there is more than one voting stream in a voting station and each of these streams is for a different voting subdivision, it would be usual for voters from each stream to be required by law to deposit their ballots in a separate ballot box. Setting up a voting station to maintain an uncluttered logical voter flow can be difficult, particularly if the same access has to be used for entry and exit from the voting area.

Even where there are separate entrance and exit doors, configuring the voting station to minimise the risk of voters placing their ballots in the incorrect ballot box, by use of appropriately placed barriers, can be difficult to achieve without disrupting the ability of officials and observers to move around the voting station. In the above model, the two streams for different voting subdivisions are kept apart with voters from voting subdivision 1 moving through the eligibility/materials issuing area (5) through to their voting screens (7a) to their specific ballot box (8a) and thence to the exit. Similarly voters from voting subdivision 2 move through their relevant areas, (6b), (7b), and (8b).

Voting stations operating these procedures may be more difficult to control without a relatively large floor space to voter ratio, or entry and exit points on opposite sides of the voting area, to allow voters to pass in a straight line through the stages of the voting process.

 

Reserving Voting Sites

Arrangements should be made to contract for the use of voting sites as soon as they have been identified, inspected as to suitability (or assessed by other means), and the date or dates on which they are required to be used are known. For elections on fixed, regular dates, this can be planned well in advance.

Where election dates are not at fixed, regular terms, there will usually be speculation about probable voting dates for some time before the election announcement.

Where voting sites are at locations which cannot be demanded for election use, it is generally wise for the electoral management body to make tentative booking arrangements for possible dates, in advance of the formal election announcement.

Issues to Be Covered in Contractual Arrangements

Whether voting sites are on state or privately owned premises, formal contracts for their use need to be arranged, so that there is no doubt in anyone's mind as to the facilities to be provided and dates on which the electoral management body has use of the location. Contracts for use of voting locations should cover the following issues:

The dates and times for which the location is to be available for voting-related activities. Exclusive use during the time between delivery of election materials to the voting stations and dispatch of material following close of the votinh or the count is required. Clear definition of access to the location, for example, for installing additional telephone lines or other infrastructure equipment, prior to voting day is also needed.

The facilities that may be used. If a building has more than one room, the rooms to be made available should be specified. Voting staff and/or public rights of access to communications, water, toilet, power, lighting, and food preparation facilities available at the location should be specified and agreed.

Responsibilities for cleaning of the location at the conclusion of the contract period and any associated costs for which the electoral management body will be liable should be specified.

The fee (if any) to be paid for use, and any circumstances under which this may be varied must clearly stated.

Any requirement by the location provider for their staff to be present in a caretaking capacity during voting use, and any additional payment associated with this should be outlined.

Responsibilities for damages and methods of assessing the value of any damage caused during voting use. Before signing the contract, election administration officials should note any existing damage and a defects report should be prepared and signed by both parties. In some circumstances a deposit for damages may be required; it should be confirmed that this is refundable.

Particularly when leasing private property for a voting location, care must be taken to ensure that:

• there are no restrictions in any other contractual arrangements that would prevent the use of the location as a voting station;

• signatories to the contract are authorised to sign.

Other Matters for Agreement

There are a number of other matters that may not need to be specified in the contract but which will need clear written agreement with the provider of the voting location. These would include:

Any requirements for the electoral management body to take out liability insurance for the period of the contract. This would normally be the electoral management body's responsibility, though in some jurisdictions the state may act as its own insurer.

It is prudent to ensure that there is valid public liability insurance coverage against accident/injury to officials, voters and others on the premises.

Arrangements for picking up keys and any security passwords required to enter the premises, and for return of keys at the conclusion of the contract. Keys to premises should generally be available for delivery of materials and to the voting station manager on the day and/or night before voting day, to allow set up of the voting station.

It is crucial that these arrangements are clearly understood and that the keys or access codes provided allow entry to all the areas and facilities (including toilets, kitchen facilities, storage areas, or cabinets) specified as available in the contract.

Availability of a representative of the location's owner during the period the voting station is being set up and is in operation, in case any problems arise with any of the site's facilities.

Contingency Voting Sites

While it as an additional expense, particularly in areas where security risks are high, it can be useful to identify a small number of contingency voting sites within each electoral district, and arrange for them to be reserved for use for voting, in case of emergencies at other voting stations.

The cost of any wasted leasing fees are insubstantial compared to those for postponing an election.

Voting Site Needs Assessments

Materials and equipment required in each voting location will be dependent on:

• the number of expected voters (see Locations of Voting Sites);

• the range of voting services to be provided;

• the number of voting station officials that will be present, which will itself be dependent on voter numbers and voting procedures to be implemented;

• the standard of facilities that are to be provided .

Allocation of materials and equipment to each voting location, to be cost-effective, needs to be based on strict needs assessments taking into account the circumstances at each location.

For maximum cost-effectiveness, this needs to be a "bottom up" process (overall requirements being a total of identified needs at each location), rather than "top down" (creating an overall "guesstimate" of requirements and dividing this among all locations).

This will be more effectively implemented if voting sites are identified well in advance of the election, sufficiently before deadlines for placing orders for materials and equipment.

Conducting Needs Assessments

In conducting needs assessments there are three phases:

1. Determining, from expected voters and staffing numbers, the materials and equipment that will be required for effective operation of the voting station.
   These needs should be formally recorded for each voting location. Integrating these requirements on the same record may become unwieldy under non-automated systems. Separate records for facilities requirements, voting equipment, staffing and voting materials may be easier to control. Voting materials requirements, in particular, are usually better dealt with in a separate record 
2. Determining which of the required facilities and equipment are already available at the voting location, from inspections of the voting location or other investigations and ensuring in contractual arrangements for use of the location that these will be made available for voting
3. Determining the shortfalls and making arrangements for supply of the necessary equipment/materials. For each voting location an inventory should be prepared listing quantities of all items to be supplied to the location. Depending on the origin of the supply (some times, such as additional telecommunications links, additional water, and toilet facilities, may not be supplied directly by the electoral management body) such inventories may need to be broken down into separate delivery schedules by supplier and a supply date.

Review of Needs Assessments

Where needs assessments are conducted by local electoral managers, some form of supervisory management review of estimated requirements at a regional or central level will assist in standardising resource use and services provided and maintaining controls over cost-effectiveness.

The use of standard schedules, related to voter numbers expected, for estimation of resources needs by field/local managers, for staffing, materials, equipment, and facilities, with any variations from these standards requiring management approval at a regional or central level will minimise the management control workloads.

Arrangements with Other Organisations

Upgrading of facilities at voting sites may require coordination between the electoral management body and other government agencies or service organisations.

Given the often rushed time frames of election preparation, it is essential that close liaison is established between senior electoral management body officers and similarly senior executives of external service providers to ensure that the priority for election-related upgrade work is firmly established.

In some cases, pressure may need to be applied through executive government; this can be necessary when dealing with state-based monopoly service providers, such as telecommunications providers, in many countries.

Voting Station Readiness

Failure to implement control systems to ensure that each voting station is properly prepared to open for voting at the appointed time can lead not only to poor service of voters but potential failure of the election.

It is  vital that electoral management body workplans for the election period include review points where voting site preparedness must be assessed to enable speedy rectification of any deficiencies.

While the exact timing of most of these review points will depend on the time frames in the specific election's calendar, there are standard issues that need to be addressed. In the last week before voting day, especially, daily monitoring of the state of readiness of voting stations is essential.

This encompasses not only assurances regarding the sites themselves, but that all supplies and personnel are in place for transport to the required locations and that all material dispatched has arrived at its intended destination. These checks are generally better distributed down the election chain of command than all undertaken from a central level.

Use Of Checklists

Use of checklists for these reviews is to be encouraged.

At the electoral district level these could be either separate for each voting station or a combined master inventory of voting station readiness. At the central level, the overall state of readiness on each electoral management district should be similarly tracked.

Initial General Review

First level readiness reviews could take place around four weeks before voting day, depending on the election timetable. At this point, electoral district managers should be able to assure the executive of the central electoral management body that:

• all required voting locations have been officially approved and any legal requirements for their appointment for voting satisfied;

• satisfactory agreements for use of all required voting locations and count centres have been signed;

• layouts for each voting location have been approved;

• needs assessments have been conducted for each voting location and the required equipment and materials, logistics/transport arrangements, site facilities improvements have been identified, recorded, and arrangements for supply, either from the electoral management body or outside suppliers, implemented according to prescribed procedures;

• staffing numbers for each voting and count location have been approved and staff recruited for all positions;

• training arrangements for all staff are in place.

Second General Review

While continuous monitoring of voting site preparations will be taking place throughout the ensuing weeks, a further major review point should be scheduled for around seven days before voting day.

At this point, assurances regarding the following voting site preparations should be provided to the central electoral management body:

• all required voting station staff have been contracted and have been trained (replacement staff assigned where necessary);

• any additional telecommunications facilities required for voting stations are in place, and that communication systems to all voting stations have been tested and work satisfactorily;

• arrangements for collection of keys and entry to voting station premises have been confirmed;

• contingency plans for materials, equipment, and staffing are ready to be activated if necessary;

• status reports on receipt of all materials required for supply to voting sites and action taken to redress any shortfalls;

• status report on packaging of materials and equipment for transport to voting sites;

• status report on any locally placed public information programs for publicising voting facilities, voting station locations, and hours of voting.

Distribution of Supplies

To ensure voting site readiness, all materials and equipment required for their operation should be distributed prior to voting day; to leave this until the morning when voting commences is to invite problems.

In low security risk situations, where materials are distributed to or collected by voting station managers, these must be checked by each manager on receipt and any omissions or shortfalls reported immediately.

Similarly, where materials are delivered directly to the voting station, voting station managers should arrange to be present at their voting station to receive and check correct delivery of all equipment and materials on the voting station's inventory. Any delivery discrepancies should be immediately reported to the electoral district's administration office. Checklists for these reports should be maintained by electoral district managers.

Set Up Before Voting Day

Voting readiness will be greatly enhanced if voting stations are set up by voting station managers (assisted if necessary by other voting station officials) on the day/night before voting commences, wherever the location is suitable for this (outdoor voting locations, for example, will generally not be possible to treat in this manner).

It is useful if, following set-up, each voting station manager reports to the electoral district manager that the voting station is set up and secured, ready for the commencement of voting the following day. Such reports can also serve as a final test of the communication systems to be used on voting day.

Following completion of set-up, and reporting of voting readiness, the voting station manager should ensure that lights are extinguished, any security alarms are activated, and that the area is locked before leaving.

Set-Up Checklist

A checklist should be completed by each voting station manager showing that all required actions for setting up the voting station have been completed. Relevant items to include on the checklist would be:

• lighting is satisfactory, and any additional lighting equipment requisitioned has been installed;

• communication systems--telephone, fax, radios, as relevant--are operational;

• all required areas of the voting station are accessible with the keys provided;

• the correct ballot boxes are present, remain unsealed, and are in the required positions;

• tables, chairs, and barriers have been arranged according to the approved layout;

• voting compartments have been installed, correctly positioned, and (where manual voting is used) have writing implements attached;

• all allocated communications equipment is in place;

• information posters and notices required inside the voting station have been displayed in the correct positions;

• material, including any instructional material or checklists for officials, has been sorted for use and allocated to the correct tables/areas of the voting station;

• if continuous security has been arranged, the security forces are in place according to plans;

• ballots, voters lists, and other accountable materials have been properly secured (in environments of low security risk, these could remain with the voting station manager and be brought in on voting day; in less secure environments, the voting station manager should report that these accountable materials are safely secured in whatever location had been previously arranged, for example, police, bank, or other institutional safes);

• any electronic equipment to be used for voting has been tested on site and is functioning correctly.

Morning of Voting Day

On the morning of voting day, before the scheduled time for commencement of voting, each voting station manager should report to the electoral district manager that the voting station is ready for voting. This information is vital to election managers.

The last problem they want on voting day is to be unaware of voting stations that are not going to be open on time or voting station managers who have suddenly discovered that they are missing vital materials.

Where voting stations have been set up and readiness reports have been provided the previous night, this may seem like a redundant requirement.

However, situations may change between set-up time and arrival the next morning. Where large numbers of voting stations are administered from one point, a schedule of reporting times will generally need to be drawn up; what is important is that a report is received before the time for commencement of voting from all voting stations.

Any problems at the voting stations--staff who have not reported for duty, materials or equipment problems not previously noticed, security issues or large crowds of voters already gathered to vote--should be quickly and clearly reported to allow early implementation of contingency plans 

Voting Location Maps

Once the locations of voting sites have been officially approved, maps should be prepared showing the location of voting stations and relevant electoral district and voting subdivisions boundaries.

The timing of production of these maps is important; it is one of the first actions that should be undertaken as soon as voting station locations are determined.

Use of Maps

Maps will be necessary tools in planning functions required to be implemented well before voting day, important amongst which are:

• planning by the electoral management body of effective logistics routes for delivery and return of materials  and for allocation and transport of voting station officials;

• developing security plans, including the need for any security escorted transport of materials, voting station officials, and voters to and from voting stations, and devising optimal locations for voting security forces and emergency response units (see Voting Site Security);

• public information campaign purposes, in advising voters of the voting station or stations at which they should vote.

Maps will also be of significant use at voting stations in redirecting voters who have attended an incorrect voting station.

Map Production

The manner in which the maps are developed, and the quality required, will vary according to the sophistication and reliability of mapping systems available and their cost-effectiveness, as well as the purpose for which they are being used. Potential methods of production could include: Use of sophisticated automated geographic information systems (GIS) to plot voting station locations. Where electoral GIS systems exist for voter registration or boundary delimitation purposes, plotting of voting station locations and production of the relevant maps could be undertaken through that system. In most circumstances, such sophisticated map production would have to be contracted out, often to state land management agencies or even to the military.

Given the critical importance of correct maps, such sophisticated systems should not generally be used unless they have a proven track record of accurate, timely preparation for electoral purposes. In less developed societies particularly, reliance on lower technology mapping methods are generally a more effective and safer alternative.

Hand plotting of voting subdivision boundaries and voting station locations on existing maps. These could be maps prepared for electoral district boundary delimitation purposes or other generally available maps that clearly show roads, other transport, and topographic features.

For logistics, operations centre, and particularly security planning purposes, considerable detail will be required. Developing maps with transparent overlays showing the various components of logistics/security planning, administrative and security areas of responsibility, materials transport routes, and likely voter routes to voting stations can be a useful tool for integrating the large amounts of information required to be shown.

Preparation by the electoral management body staff of hand-drawn maps showing voting station locations and electoral district/voting subdivision boundaries in relation to major topographic features and road/transport infrastructure.

These can be perfectly adequate for public information distribution, such as in pamphlets advising voters of their correct voting station.

Scale of Maps

It is important that the scale of the maps produced suits their purpose. Local administrators will require detailed maps of their administrative area and possibly less detailed maps of surrounding regions. Logistics and security planners will need detailed local area maps of voting locations for the whole area in which elections are being conducted, with larger scale summary maps.

Voting stations can usefully be supplied with a detailed map of the electoral district/voting subdivision(s) which the voting station serves, and a larger scale map showing this in relation to surrounding electoral districts/voting subdivisions.

Quantities of different types of maps produced will need to be carefully related to the needs--in voting stations, by electoral administrators, for public distribution and voter information, and to external bodies such as security forces, observers and political participants.

Voting Site Security

What is involved when looking at the broad area of security in relation to voting operations? Immediate attention is generally attracted to securing voting locations and voter safety on voting day, so that voting may occur without disruption, fraud, intimidation, or threat to life.

However, the facets of election security are much broader than that and affect all aspects of an election. Without sufficient guarantees of security at all stages of the election process (and "sufficient" varies widely according to each country's social and political environment), there can be no guarantee of election freedom, fairness, and integrity.

In broad terms, election security would address three objectives:

• physical security of premises and materials;

• personal security of voters, candidates, party workers or officials, electoral officials, and the general community;

• security of election information, computer systems and software, and communication systems  Powers to enforce election security measures in these regards would normally be legislatively defined.

Specific Security Concerns

Specifically, measures taken may need to address the security needs of:

• electors registering to vote;

• voter registration staff and premises;

• electoral management body staff and premises;

• voter education and information workers;

• production, transport, and use of election materials and equipment, particularly voting material;

• premises used for production and storage of election materials and equipment;

• potential voters;

• training, voting, and ballot counting locations;

• training, polling, and counting officials;

• party workers, candidates, and their supporters 

• premises used for party or candidate activities;

• election-related data, and the manual or electronic systems in which it is stored;

• voice and data communication systems used for the election;

• prevention of election-related fraud, whether concerned with candidate and party registration, voting , vote counting and determination of results, or voter registration and compilation of voters lists;

• premises and staff of other state or non-government authorities who are perceived as having a symbolic or actual relationship with the election processes.

Thus security, in one form or another, is an issue from the time initial preparations for an election commence. Voting operations security measures discussed in this section need to be integrated into the overall security operations for the complete election process.

Voting Site Security

Security for the operation of voting sites can be a complex exercise, particularly in higher security risk environments, due to the dispersed nature of the locations which need to be secured. It is also costly, both in terms of providing secure equipment and materials and a safe environment in which voters may vote.

Thus there is a responsibility on security planners to ensure that cost-effective responses are provided to the level of risk assessed as surrounding the voting process. 

What Are Adequate Security Levels?

Security is a high-cost exercise. In some respects the true cost may not always be apparent to electoral administrators. While the costs of measures to protect election material integrity (such as ballot boxes, special paper stock, voter identification cards) will generally be provided from election-specific funding, the costs of providing personal and property security may often be invisibly subsumed within operating budgets of other state agencies.

To promote efficiency and sustainability of election operations, it is advisable that a total project budgeting approach be taken, and such hidden costs be openly identified in election financial management systems.

Conducting thorough election security risk analyses allows a cost-effective targeting of security measures. While it is not possible to cover in this brief summary the range of alternative security measures that may be appropriate for different specific environments, some examples include:

• Is a police or military presence justified at all or some voting stations, or is the level of threat such that adequate security can be maintained by taking other measures like locating voting stations close to existing security force locations, or by merely maintaining operational liaison with security forces to ensure swift response to any disruption?

• Are expensive special security paper stocks required for ballot papers and other voting material, or can production controls and issuing integrity measures be implemented to provide adequate security through methods such as placing an official authorisation mark on voting material at the time of issue to a voter?

• Do election materials production and storage sites need to be guarded, or can adequate security controls be implemented by measures such as better staff integrity screening, physical site security (e.g., use of existing safes, locking and alarm mechanisms), and rigorous and auditable production and dispatch controls?

• Do security forces need to accompany election materials in transport, or can adequate safeguards be provided by confidential transport scheduling and routing, or using the presence of representatives of political participants to provide counter-balancing checks? Additionally, can transport of election material be minimised to reduce any potential security risk?

• Should ballot boxes be made of durable material, or do cheaper and more easily transportable bags or cardboard boxes provide adequate security?

• What measures are adequate to minimise voter fraud? Are special voter identification cards really necessary? Can existing identification documents be used, or can a combination of other measures (for example challenge procedures and ballot issue procedures) negate the need for any identity document to verify voting rights? Can adequate multiple voting controls be instituted through rigorous identity controls and accurate voters lists, rather than use of expensive additional measures such as marking of voters with security inks?

Low Security Risk Environments

There are countries for which the peaceful determination of continuation or transfer of powers of governance is an established tenet of societal behaviour. In such countries the large scale formal involvement of the state's security apparatus (police or military forces) in a security role for elections is likely to be limited (though their logistics and communications capabilities may be extensively used).

This limited security involvement will still require coordination and planning with the electoral administration.

Even in such societies, with little or no threat of election-related personal or property violation, open and transparent elections demand some level of administrative security measures to be in place to ensure the integrity of election materials production and handling, the protection of data, the safeguarding and secrecy of ballots, and the deterrence of fraud and manipulation.

High Security Risk Environments

At the other end of the spectrum, societies in or emerging from intense or violent conflict or characterised by a high degree of distrust among political participants may require very close integration of election administration and domestic or international security forces' activities to enable an election to be conducted with disruption kept to a minimal level and the integrity of election materials assured.

Security Responsibilities and Planning

To ensure that security at voting sites is delivered cost-effectively, planning of appropriate security precautions and responses should be undertaken on the basis of risk assessments of the general election environment and specific geographic areas (for details of security risk assessments, see Security Risk Assessments).

Coordination with Other Agencies

Unlike most voting operations management issues, which may be fully addressed within the electoral management body, providing security for voting sites may involve intensive cooperation with other agencies of state--police and military forces--with their own method of operations and priorities that may not be fully in line with that of election management. In planning voting site security measures, essential issues include:

• ensuring that sufficient security resources are available in the specific locations and during the hours required;

• fostering very close coordination between security forces management and election managers in developing security responses and voting site plans;

• clearly identifying the chains of command and responsibility for security planning and action between civilian and security forces organisations. These factors in voting operations will be more critical the higher the security risks for the election.

No matter what the security situation, some degree of planning and cooperation between electoral management bodies and security forces will be required. It is important that this is, and is seen to be, under the control of electoral management bodies; security forces control of this planning process can be easily interpreted as evidence of control of the election.

Responsibilities

The boundaries of different organisations' responsibilities must be clear to all participants in security planning. Broadly they can be outlined as:

• electoral management bodies responsibility for decisions on security planning that may affect election processes (but taking appropriate advice from security forces on issues such as the security implications of particular voting site locations or methods of transport);

• security forces responsibility for determining what is the appropriate use of force or power to ensure public safety in response to situations arising during voting. Under any circumstances the following particular aspects have to be dealt with during security planning.

Joint Planning Structure

The structures implemented to develop security plans will also vary according to the level of risks in the election environment. In all cases, continual information exchange between election managers and security forces is beneficial.

Even without formal consultative structures, it is highly useful for officers in both electoral management bodies and security forces to be designated as contact persons on election security matters, and meet regularly to ensure that corporate knowledge of each other's activities is current within these organisations. In low security risk environments, where the focus of security is more on election integrity than personal safety, such liaison may be the only security planning structure required.

In higher security risk environments, and particularly where there are many players in the state security structure or international peacekeeping forces have been introduced, a formal structure that meets regularly on security issues, chaired by an appropriately senior electoral official, is vital for voting security coordination.

Geographic Areas of Responsibility

Electoral district boundaries, especially when drawn by an independent body, are unlikely to be congruent with security forces' normal administrative or operational areas. As far as possible, security forces' operational boundaries for election security should be made up of whole electoral districts (either singly or in clusters), to ensure simplified, effective action and liaison during voting.

Effective liaison points between election and security authorities need to be developed within each of these areas of responsibility.

In higher security risk environments, such liaison is usefully developed into joint operations centres, fully integrating security force planning and action into voting operations management (see Operations and Security Centres).

Resource Planning

In planning security requirements, all involved need to realise that security forces generally do not know a lot about elections operations, and conversely, election managers are not often experts on appropriate security responses.

It is useful if security is dealt with like other technical issues, with needs and specifications drawn up by the electoral management body, draft plans to meet these developed by security forces, and then brought to a joint meeting for approval, using wherever possible security force personnel with an understanding of election needs through prior experience.

Sufficient advance notice of voting operations plans is necessary to enable security force resource planning. The basic information needs are:

• proposed location and period of operation of voting sites, count centres, election administration offices, and storage facilities;

• proposed distribution and return plans for election materials, equipment, and staff.

These should be provided to security forces, even in low security risk environments, as soon as they are determined. In higher security risk environments, information on other aspects of voting, such as planned/approved political campaign rallies and expected voter routes to and from voting stations, will also need to be discussed with security authorities. Advice on security issues relating to these proposals should be considered by the electoral management body before planning is finalised.

Early advice to security is prudent as provision of election security may require adjustment to security forces' existing plans in a number of areas, such as:

• leave rosters;

• unit rotations;

• use of their budget allocation for overtime or fuel;

• servicing schedules for vehicles or air transport.

In high security risk environments, manpower planning for election security is likely to be an extensive task for security forces. Consequently, advice on likely needs is required as early as possible before voting day.

Without mobility, security forces will lose considerable effectiveness in their ability to cover all voting sites. As these may be large in number, and geographically dispersed, it will often not be possible to provide static forces close to each voting site capable of dealing with all emergencies. Thus transport and logistics planning (sufficient availability of light and heavy vehicles and for remote areas possibly helicopters or aircraft) must be carefully considered in security plans.

Emergency Responses

Part of the planning process is to develop clear guidelines for responses to emergencies; be they possibly natural such as fire, or of human intent, such as bomb threats and public riot. For such planning, there may be a need also to involve civil emergency personnel. Plans and guidelines in this regard need to be provided to voting station officials and reinforced during their training.

Chains of Command and Accountability

It is important to determine who is responsible and accountable not only for overall or regional security planning, but for security delivery at the voting site level. As further discussed in Voting Site Security Arrangements, it is highly preferable that at all levels election managers, down to voting site managers, remain responsible for decision-making in the election environment.

The issue of how much discretion local security force commanders have will vary according to the risks in the particular environment, and needs to be covered in security action plans for voting sites. However, for a security force commander to act without a prior request from voting station officials or election management, where there is no clear threat to safety, may compromise the perception of integrity of the election.

Communications

For effective implementation of security plans, a clear communications strategy needs to be developed, both in terms of the physical networks used and communications use policies.

A single communication network linking election managers, voting,sites and security forces through regional or electoral district operations centres will enhance communications effectiveness. (For further discussion of security communications issues, see Use of Communications Networks.)

Higher Security Risk Environments

In all cases it would be preferable to be able to rely on civilian policing authorities for provision of voting site security, to maintain the image of the election process. However, there will be cases where, either through lack of resources, lack of professionalism, or perception of bias in civilian police authorities, that military forces are required to assist with voting security.

In such cases, it is generally preferable that they take a low-visibility role, except when required to take action on actual or potential security breaches.

Security Risk Assessments

Basic Issues

Security is a factor to be considered by electoral administrators in all environments, even those where risks of election-related physical violence are low.

The level of security that is required to assure election freedom, fairness and integrity, can be accurately determined from conducting risk assessments of each voting operations component process within the specific election's environment.

A single blueprint for election security measures cannot be established.

Focus of Security Risk Assessments

Security risk assessments would usually examine for each voting operations component process:

• its vulnerability to disruption, violence, fraud, or manipulation;

• its importance in producing a free and fair election outcome;

• potential security threats to which it may reasonably be subjected;

• the potential impact, if it is not sufficiently secure to withstand potential threats, on the election outcomes, on personal safety, on infrastructure, on other legal or societal obligations (e.g., release of legally protected personal data), or on additional election financial requirements.

Factors to Be Considered in Risk Assessments

In assessing the level of specific threats, it is useful to considerthe following issues, as specific to the particular election, to enable the planning of an appropriate security framework:

The political environment, including analysis of:

• the commitment of each political participant to open and transparent processes;

• the relative competitive strengths of political participants;

• the history and current atmosphere regarding political participants' acceptance and implementation of equitable election frameworks;

• the history of acceptance of potentially adverse election results;

• the stability or transitional nature of current political systems;

• the existence and strengths of any active groups or individuals who may wish to disrupt or subvert election processes;

The conflict environment, including analysis of:

• evident or likely conflict resolution mechanisms (discussion, negotiation, manipulation, fraud, intimidation, violence);

• the level of distrust between political participants;

• the existence of strong geographic, nationality, or issue-based conflicts that will be apparent during the elections;

• the intensity of political conflict;

• the need for or imposition of international intervention to initiate election processes;

The administrative environment, including analysis of:

• the propensity of state institutions to interfere directly or through surrogates in election processes;

• the independence and integrity of election officials;

• the integrity and existing internal security procedures for materials and services suppliers;

The security force environment, including analysis of:

• domestic policing and military forces' integrity, impartiality, professionalism, and operational capabilities;

• the presence and mandate of any international security forces;

• the existence of private militias or official armed forces under the partisan control or influence of political participants;

The information environment, including analysis of:

• the complexity, integrity, and reliability of manual and electronic systems used for storing data on which the proper conduct of the election depends.

Standards and Site Assessments

The best emergency response plans, security management structures, and security personnel resource availability will be tested to the limit if there are not clear security standards implemented within voting stations, and if locations used for voting are not conducive to maintaining security.

Security Standards

Security standards to be applied in voting stations embrace the physical facilities available, crowd control, and materials security measures. Security standards are only one of a number of standards that have to be applied in assessing the suitability of a particular site for voting purposes. Compromises will often need to be made.

(Arrangements for implementation of these standards are further discussed at Voting Site Security Arrangements.)

Physical Facilities at the Voting Station

From a security standpoint, the physical facilities and environment of a voting station should offer:

• a location that is not used for any other purpose during the time the voting station site is in operation;

• communications capabilities, either reliable fixed telephone line(s) or good mobile phone/radio network reception (see Use of Communications Networks);

• clear lines of sight throughout the voting station area--buildings used would preferably be of open plan rather than multi-room design;

• exit and entrance facilities that can be effectively monitored with a minimal staff allocation and are placed to allow a logical flow of votors through the voting area (wherever possible buildings with a common entrance/exit would preferably be avoided);

• proximity to security forces' permanent or temporary election operational bases;

• emergency exit facilities that allow quick clearance of the voting station area.

Crowd Control Measures

In relation to crowd control, a basic essential measure is to be able to identify easily those persons authorised to be in the voting station area. This is most simply done by ensuring that:

• all authorised persons who are not attending to vote (voting station officials, party/candidate representatives, independent observers, official visitors) are issued an official identification badge by the electoral management body, or, failing that, an officially recognised letter of accreditation;

• in environments of potential disruption, only voters eligible to vote at that voting station are allowed to enter, by screening voters' identification documents or checking their details against a copy of the voters list, at the voting station entrance.

Methods of removal of unauthorised visitors, possibly with the aid of security forces, need to be clearly understood by voting station officials and security force personnel.

Within the area used for voting, crowd control measures should aim towards:

• moving voters as quickly as possible through the voting station along defined paths (if possible by the use of portable barriers);

• ensuring that voters do not linger in the voting area after casting their vote.

Delays in voting and consequent slow-moving queues or confused patterns of movement through the voting station may well provoke totally avoidable security problems and disturbances.

Conduct in Voting Stations

Enforcement of some basic personal and political behavioural standards within voting stations will also help in maintaining security. On a personal level, the banning of weapons and alcohol or other drugs within the voting station reduces the potential for disturbance.

Similarly, any intoxicated or obviously biased voting station officials require immediate replacement, and intoxicated voters need to be removed swiftly.

A legally enforceable ban on campaigning within the voting station area helps in preventing exacerbation of existing tensions.

Depending on the environment the extent of this ban may vary; at a minimum it should include a ban on political speeches and distribution of political literature within the voting station.

This may usefully be extended to cover an area surrounding the voting station itself, or to the wearing within such an area of any clothing or badges that may be associated with any political candidate or issue.

With regard to parties, candidates, and voting station officials, clear guidelines on behavioural issues are necessary in their respective codes of conduct.

Such codes of conduct may be voluntary agreements, or included in electoral legislation.

Materials Security Locations for voting stations should also, if possible, offer facilities that help in maintaining voting material security. It would be preferable that secure storage be available for voting material not currently in use.

No matter what safe storage facilities may be available, materials security will be underpinned by implementation of strict standards for materials handling. These standards require thorough reinforcement during voting station officials' training, as the quality of their implementation affects both voting security and integrity. Basic standards include:

• guarding of all official voting material from the moment it reaches the voting station until it leaves--simple issues often overlooked by staff, like leaving material unattended to take a restroom break or leaving unused voting material in the custody of senior officials who may be called from their posts may breach security;

• apart from the voter (or if an assisted voter, their designated assistant), no other person apart form authorised voting station officials should be permitted to handle election material;

• thorough reconciliations of voting material on delivery and at the close of voting.

Site Assessments

In determining voting station locations, potential sites need to be assessed against security standards in conjunction with other suitability criteria 

These assessments should, wherever possible, be done by personal inspection of the site by an employee of the electoral management body. In high security risk areas, it can be useful to gain expert security advice from police or military staff accompanying such inspections.

Where voting station officials have been appointed prior to determining locations for voting stations, the voting station manager could undertake this inspection or accompany the electoral management body staff.

Security and general operations planning will be aided if a checklist style report on this inspection is completed.

Where personal inspection is not possible, a checklist of the security and other suitability criteria should still be completed by the owner (or in the case of state authorities, occupier) of the premises and returned to the electoral management body.

Operations and Security Centres

Particularly in medium to high security risk environments, it is essential to find effective means of integrating security planning and implementation with other aspects of voting operations, while retaining the electoral management body's control over voting processes. Such integration can be achieved by creating joint operations centres (JOCs) for voting processes.

Management Responsibilities

JOCs are an initiative better taken by the election management body than other participants. By integrating the oversight of security and voting operations facets of voting day into one joint body, reporting from voting station site staff and security forces is more efficient and can assist in making response times to queries and operational and security crises more effective.

A major responsibility is the planning, implementation, and response management of security for voting. However, they can be effectively used in a broader role in overseeing voting station performance and dealing with operational emergencies during voting.

The JOC's role could also be extended to cover voter registration campaigns (if held close to voting day) and security for political campaigning. The following could be seen as generic responsibilities:

• developing plans for voting security and ensuring that all required election security resources are in place;

• coordination of responses to security emergencies;

• coordination of response to logistics, staffing, or other operational emergencies;

• information control from and to voting stations, security units, and other voting operatives in the field--in this respect it is important that communication is two way: not just reporting of occurrences from the field, but advice from the JOCs to field staff of action being taken or replies to queries;

• communications base for regular security and voting operations reporting from voting stations and security units;

• providing advice on any permissions required for political activity.

The use of JOCs, as well as aiding voting management coordination, can also provide a focal point for media covering election processes and provide consistent information for public reporting.

It is important that any JOC decisions or actions taken that affect the voting process are documented, in case they are raised in any challenge to the validity of the election.

Management Control

It is highly preferable that management control of the JOCs remains in the hands of representatives of the electoral management body, taking advice from specialist members in such areas as security, civil emergency, traditional society needs, and the like.

While representatives of executive government may be present in JOCs, their role should be that of observer and information conduit only.

Representation in JOCs

The staffing of such centres will depend on the types of organisations that are contributing to the successful conduct of the elections.

Representatives of these bodies in the joint operations centres must be of sufficient standing to make decisions on behalf of their organisations, or the benefit of prompt response and coordination is lost. At the most basic level, representation in the JOCs would, at all times it is in operation, comprise:

• senior elections manager(s);

• staff officers from the police forces and, if involved in election security, national or international military forces;

• representatives of political participants in the election. Depending on the cultural and security environment in the JOC's area of responsibility, representation from the following organisations may also be required:

• civil emergency and rescue services, such as fire and ambulance services;

• skilled negotiation or conflict resolution specialists;

• non-government bodies (NGOs) and other civic organisations;

• women's groups;

• in rural areas, leaders of traditional society or their representatives.

Geographic Areas of Responsibility of JOCs

The level at which JOCs are set up will influence their operational effectiveness. Geographic areas of responsibility should follow election administration areas, for single electoral districts or clusters of districts.

Depending on the potential workloads and response times, it may be useful to set up JOCs at the local as well as regional level, taking care that in any multi-level JOC structure there is clear and prompt communication between the levels and that each level is clear on the boundaries of its responsibilities.

Period of Operation

In planning the integration of security and operational actions, the JOC should be in place at the very latest at the calling of the election. Full-time operation, with at least the basic representation noted above present, is useful from the time any early voting commences, or when materials delivery to voting stations commences.

(It may also need to be considered during the voter registration period.) Depending on assessed security risks, JOCs may also need to be operational after the close of voting through to the announcement of results and return of materials from voting stations or counting centres to secure storage.

JOC Facilities

JOCs would preferably be located in civilian premises, but if police or military communications networks are being used, it may be more cost-effective to set up JOC facilities near communication base stations. Some basic facilities will be required for their operation:

• a room of sufficient size to accommodate all JOC members and support staff during long hours of duty;

• communication base facilities (fixed line telephone, mobile phone, radio, and facsimile) sufficient to allow prompt and reliable communication with all voting stations, electoral administration offices, fixed and mobile security forces, reserve supply depots, executive government representatives, emergency services, and civil society leaders within the area of responsibility, and with links to electoral management bodies and security forces elsewhere;

• maps of the area of responsibility showing locations of voting stations, security forces, election administration offices, election reserve supply depots locations;

• voting management reference material, e.g., copies of the legal texts and manuals forming the basis for voting procedures, staffing, logistics, and security.

Voting Site Security Arrangements

In implementing the security regime for voting stations, operational tactics will depend on:

• the goals that are intended to be achieved;

• the resources that are available;

• the roles played by the various participants in voting operations in maintaining security.

Particularly from a resource perspective, planning of voting station security arrangements needs to be integrated with other election security requirements (see Voting Site Security).

Voting station security arrangements may appear appropriate on paper, but their effective implementation depends upon voting station  officials and security forces at the local level establishing good liaison and acting in a decisive manner. (For discussion of the roles in voting station security of polling officials and security forces, see Role and Powers of Voting Station Staff and Security Forces.) This section looks at physical and personal security within, and in the vicinity of, voting stations.

Aims of Voting Station Security

Effective implementation of security measures at voting stations aids in ensuring the openness, freedom, and integrity of voting. The goals that voting station security arrangements should aim to achieve can be summarised as:

• freedom of movement to and from voting stations;

• prevention of, or at least providing an effective response to, any disturbances in or near a voting station, or attempts to disrupt voting;

• security of all election materials, and particularly ballot material, while it is at the voting station

• preventing intimidation of voters and voting station officials within and around voting stations;

• the safety of voters at the voting station;

• the safety of voting station officials, observers, party or candidate workers, and official visitors at the voting station;

• ensuring that voting is conducted in a lawful manner;

• ensuring that only authorised persons enter the voting station and any surrounding restricted area.

Any public perception of or actual bias shown by voting station officials or security forces towards any of the political participants in the election is likely to exacerbate tensions and make these aims more difficult to achieve.

Voting Station Security Issues

Within these general aims, the specific issues that voting station security arrangements need to cover include the following:

Protection of materials and the voting station between the time of delivery of materials to the voting station and the commencement of voting. Where materials are delivered in an effective way, that is, on the day before voting day, such arrangements will need to cover overnight security and security while the voting station and materials are being set up.

Ensuring a safe passage for voters, officials, and candidates on their way to and from voting stations . In higher security risk areas, this may require security forces patrolling around the voting station perimeter. In areas of extreme risk, secure transport for voters, officials, and candidates may need to be provided (Where such cases are the result of inter-communal violence, it may be more cost-effective to revise voting station locations, or institute facilities for absentee voting).

The maintenance of effective voting station entrance and exit controls during voting. In developing these, a basic principle of prevention rather than reaction is useful. In higher risk environments, screening persons as to eligibility to enter the voting station at as far a distance as is possible from the actual voting area minimises potential disruption. Controls at this point may need to include confiscation of weapons.

Rapid response from security forces in case of threats to the safety of voters or officials . Particularly where security forces are not present in voting stations, reliable communication systems in each voting station and security force transport need to be in place.

Protection of voting materials from theft or misuse . A major factor in this is arrangements to counter attempted voter fraud  This issue also includes proper materials reconciliation processes on delivery and close of voting, physical layout of the voting station ( and providing secure storage during voting hours for materials not currently in use.

Emergency evacuation procedures, in case of threats to safety or natural disaster . In higher security risk areas, it is prudent to draw up formal plans for security force involvement in these circumstances under the control of the joint operations centres (see Operations and Security Centres). In all circumstances, voting station managers and their staff should be aware of procedures for adjourning voting and evacuating voting stations following natural disasters or other emergencies.

Control of access to the ballot count. This would include, if the count is to be conducted elsewhere, strict control and reconciliation of voting materials on dispatch to and arrival at the count, and monitoring of transport to the count centres.

Physical Arrangements

Security considerations are important in both the selection of appropriate voting locations and the layout within voting stations. In establishing voting stations, security-conscious management will consider the following issues:

• Voting stations are, wherever possible, located within reasonable proximity to security forces' operational bases.

• The building or area used for voting has a relatively open area around it which can be physically marked in some way (if not fenced, then marked with rope or tape) to designate the external boundaries of the voting station within which only authorised access is permitted. This area would be monitored by voting station officials (from within) or, if necessary, security forces (preferably from without).

Ejecting unauthorised persons at such a distance, rather than from amongst voting activities, is likely to be much less disruptive. Some jurisdictions define legally such an area in terms of a radius in metres around the voting station itself; where security risks are relatively high, this is an effective security control mechanism.

• There are a limited number of entrances to and exits from the actual voting area, that can be closely watched by voting station officials. Preferably, there would be a single, separate entrance and exit. Any access to the actual voting area that are not in official use are better securely locked.

• Securing materials inside the voting station is easier if there is a clearly defined path for voters to follow through the voting station--in through one door or area with the layout leading voters out through another door or area preferably on the opposite side of the voting station from the entrance  A confused voter path through the voting station can lead to voters milling around and getting in each other's way, and has the potential to create conflict.

• The need for any secure repository, outside the voting station, for confiscated weapons.

• There is a voice communication facility between each voting station and the electoral district manager and operations control centre (see Use of Communications Networks).

• Procedures are in place for commencement and finish of voting that allow public verification of sealing and unsealing of ballot boxes or voting machine/computer records.

• Ballot boxes (whether in current use or full) are always guarded throughout voting hours by a voting station official (as this tends to be a boring task, rotating voting station officials through this position at regular intervals can be useful).

• Care in positioning of materials and ballot boxes within the voting station so that they remain clearly visible and cannot be removed, for example, where security risks are relatively low, placement of the ballot boxes can allow a single official both to guard the ballot box and to ensure that voters do not enter the voting station from the exit for the voting station; however, care needs to be taken that they are not placed so close to the exit to invite their removal.

• Storage of voting materials and staff positioning within the voting station in a manner that ensures that materials are not left unattended, and that materials not currently in use (in particular unused accountable voting materials and filled ballot boxes) are kept securely.

• If the voting station is dealing with voters voting for elections for different electoral districts, appropriate use is made of barriers or rooms to ensure that these voter streams are kept separate.

• Where voting is by machine or computer, that equipment (including cables, modems, and other ancillary equipment) is placed and guarded in such a manner that it cannot be tampered with or deliberately damaged.

• Whether voting stations can also be used effectively for the initial counts of ballots, thus minimising any additional security needs for the count and transport of ballots.

Role and Powers of Voting Station Staff and Security Forces

Within the boundaries of the voting station, however defined, effective control over security can only be achieved if there is clarity about the respective roles and responsibilities of both voting station officials and security forces.

Linking voting station officials and security forces chains of command through local or regional joint operations centres (see Operations and Security Centres) allows better coordination of their respective roles.

Lower Risk Environments

Under normal circumstances, control of the voting station is an election management issue and, therefore, is a matter for the voting station manager. If security forces are to be present within the voting station, it should preferably be at the voting station manager's invitation in response to a specific occurrence, and security forces would normally leave when the occurrence has been resolved.

In low security risk environments, security forces may operate from their normal bases; as risks increase, dispersed operational security bases or rapid reaction forces (see Rapid Reaction and Reserve Forces) may be necessary.

Presence of Security Forces

However, many elections are held under conditions that do not approach normal circumstances, and different models may need to be applied, depending on the risk analysis for the particular voting station or its region. In determining whether there should be a security force presence inside voting stations, the basic factors to be considered include:

• the level of risk;

• the intimidating effect that security forces within voting station may have on voters;

• the cost-effectiveness of internal versus external security presence.

These factors cannot be considered in isolation, though voters' and officials' safety considerations are of paramount concern. Where high risks of violence towards voters or officials--particularly bomb threats, potential ballot box theft, blatant favouritism by election officials--have been established, a security force presence inside voting stations needs to be carefully considered.

Against this, consideration needs to be made of the effect this presence will have on voters, dependent on the established professionalism and integrity of security forces. It is important that voting station security is maintained. It is equally important that the presence of uniformed police or armed forces, or close supervision of voters' actions by administrative authorities, does not in and of itself influence or intimidate voters.

Particularly where local executive authorities or security forces are perceived as being biased towards or against some political participants, their very presence in the voting station may be intimidating.

Lastly, consideration needs to be given to the cost-effectiveness of a security presence inside voting stations as opposed to outside. Generally, having more mobile security forces stationed outside voting stations is more cost-effective. Where risks are such that security forces are needed near all voting stations, it may be more cost-effective, for example, in terms of communications equipment needs, to have some presence inside.

Powers of Voting Station Officials

In all cases, it is essential that administration of election procedures remains the province of voting station officials, and security forces deal only with potential or actual breaches of the peace and disasters. This boundary of responsibility can easily become blurred; for example, in screening people attempting to enter the voting station so that only authorised persons enter.

There may be a need for security forces to assist with this, especially in societies where personal weapons are routinely carried and need to be removed before entry, but the decision on admission or rejection should be that of the polling official. The actual enforcement may be made by security personnel.

Security Force Role

What are the roles at voting stations that are better specifically reserved for security forces? While not exhaustive, the following listing provides a guide:

• providing security for election materials at the voting station between time of delivery and commencement of voting;

• sweeping for explosive devices in and around the voting station before, during, or after voting;

• searches for and control of weapons;

• action against any voting station officials whose breaches of their code of conduct endangers public order or safety;

• closing down any unauthorised or phantom voting stations;

• when present, protection of safety and evacuation following disasters (fire, explosion, etc.);

• if justified by risk analyses, maintaining site perimeter security during voting and the ballot count; For other tasks, security forces are generally better used as the back-up to voting station officials' actions. These would include:

• removal of aggressive, intoxicated, otherwise impaired, or unauthorised persons from the voting station who have refused to move at the request of voting station officials;

• protection of ballot boxes, ballots, and other election material.

Use of Communication Networks

For security to be effective for voting stations, given their dispersed nature, it is vital that reliable communication systems link voting stations to:

• the joint operations centre (see Operations and Security Centres) or separate security command centre and election operations centre;

• security force operational bases;

• any mobile security units (see Rapid Reaction and Reserve Forces).

This requires that each voting station be tied into a reliable communication network. In selecting what sort of network to use, in high security risk environments, reliability considerations for this vital aspect of voting operations outweigh considerations of lowest cost, and additional communications equipment may need to be acquired. In low risk areas, it may be sufficient to use available fixed telephone lines.

Telecommunications Uses

Reliable telecommunications on voting day are not only necessary for security reasons but for normal operations with regard to:

• seeking guidance on operational or legal issues;

• regular reporting of voting station activity;

• advice to election managers of any need for additional supplies or emergency staff;

• reporting of successful commencement and finish of voting;

• reporting dispatch of election material;

• advice of preliminary count figures (if the count is conducted at the voting station).

These multiple use of telecommunications networks is a sound reason for managing both security and operational issues for voting stations from a joint operations centre (JOC), resulting in a simple system using the same links for both purposes.

Planning Considerations

Communications needs may place some restrictions on where voting stations may be located. If mobile phones or radios are to be used, locating voting stations in radio or mobile network shadows (that is in buildings or areas with poor or no signal reception) will render communication strategies useless.

Communications systems should always be fully tested prior to operational use to ensure their functionality in all operating locations, particularly where mobile phones or radios are to be used.

In determining communications strategies, estimated loads on the system need also to be considered; load factors can result in excessively centralised communications systems proving less reliable. If radio or mobile phone equipment is to be used, equipment distribution plans must allow sufficient time for all persons using the equipment to undergo training and become familiar with its use prior to their taking up their duties.

Communication Arrangements

For low security risk environments, the minimum standard required is that each voting station has access to telephone communication systems.

Preferably this would be an on-site telephone, either through fixed line or mobile link. However, in low security risk circumstances, an available telephone in a neighbouring location may suffice, as long as access to this facility can be guaranteed throughout the time the voting station is being used (this would be better detailed in a formal agreement). In remote areas with no telephone facilities, each voting station should have access to radio communications, wherever possible using existing facilities.

For higher security risk environments, a method more reliable than telephone, and that can enable immediate communication with security units in transit, is generally required.

This will mean investigating ways of implementing radio communications to all voting stations cost-effectively. It is obviously going to be less costly to use an existing radio network, though the cost of outfitting each voting station with radio handsets, if these cannot be borrowed for election purposes, will still be substantial.

Use of multiple networks (for example both police and military), unless dictated by geographic coverage reasons, should generally be discouraged. It is less confusing if all those involved use the same communications format.

Use of security forces' telecommunications systems, provided that these can provide a professional service with integrity, may provide the most effective reliable communications with full geographic coverage. It also has the advantage of familiarity for many who will be required to use it.

Communications Procedures

Effective telecommunications require standard procedures. These procedures should cover both methods and manner of communication. Elections administration staff need to maintain an up-to-date communications directory of all voting station, election administration, and security force telephone numbers or radio call signs. Each voting station official and security team should have up-to-date copies of such information relevant to their area.

The designation of regular, fixed check-in and reporting times for voting stations and security teams serves both information and safety objectives. If personal radios are used, call sign allocations should be logically allocated and strictly controlled.

Telephone and radio reporting formats and etiquette should be defined to:

• allow quick identification of the caller;

• allow clear transmission of information;

• give priority to emergencies;

• prevent calling traffic from clogging or jamming networks.

Where communication is by personal radio or phone, election administration or joint operations centre staff rosters need to be developed so that designated radio bases and/or phone contacts are staffed at all times that voting stations are operational. This would include the periods during which material and staff are being transported to and from voting stations.

Use of the telecommunications network equipment should be covered in voting station official, election management staff, and security force training sessions.

Rapid Reaction and Reserve Forces

Where areas of potential risks to voter safety or public order have been established through risk analyses, it can be more cost-effective to deal with voting site physical security (see Voting Site Security Arrangements) through the deployment of small rapid reaction security units, either police, military, or mixed forces, depending on the security situation, capable of responding to emergencies in more than one voting station.

Such units would preferably act under the direction of the relevant joint operations centre (see Operations and Security Centres) to ensure consistency and coordination in the chain of command.

Areas of Responsibility

Each rapid reaction unit would normally operate within a defined area of responsibility embracing particular voting subdivisions or electoral administration areas.

Depending on the level of threat and the location of voting stations, the operational methods used may vary. Where voting stations are in close proximity to each other, and none are regarded as of very high risk, there may be total reliance on highly mobile rapid reaction units.

In areas of higher security risk, a mixed solution may be used, with a small presence at each individual voting station backed by mobile reserve forces.

Similarly, in areas where voting stations are widely dispersed, it would be unwise to rely solely on mobile security units without some presence at or near each voting station. In lower security risk areas, use of usual policing centres as the bases from which teams may be sent if necessary may be sufficient.

Bases for these mobile units need not be established security force bases, though there are obvious advantages in using these from communications and support perspectives. Whether it is more useful for such operational bases to have a discrete or a high-profile presence will also vary in different environments.

Factors to be considered are whether a show of force is deemed necessary to reduce potential disturbance or, rather, will aggravate the situation or intimidate voters.

Necessary Conditions

Rapid reaction forces are likely to be effective only under certain conditions:

• bases situated to provide a fast response time to all voting stations within each force's area of responsibility;

• sufficient staff and vehicles to allow response to more than one emergency simultaneously;

• reliable voice communication systems between the mobile security team's base, all its vehicles, voting stations within the team's area of responsibility and the relevant joint operations centre.

Reserve Forces

Effective security for voting sites requires the ability to call on reserve or back-up facilities for emergencies.

To ensure response time is reasonable, such reserve forces need also to be operating from dispersed bases. In high security risk situations, these may be additional police or, if necessary, military units at the ready during the whole period voting sites are operational.

In lower security risk environments, the ability to call security forces from other tasks may suffice.

Whatever the case, plans for the mobilisation of such forces need to be considered in security planning and their role, the chain of command from election operations centres, and the priority to be given to election emergencies needs to be made clear to the relevant security units.

Information Security

Security of information systems and data is an important issue that may be overlooked in the midst of more visible aspects of electioin security, such as ensuring that election fraud and intimidation are deterred.

Elections are data-driven events. At all stages of the election process, large and complex amounts of data have to be accurately handled and protected from unauthorised manipulation, particularly in:

• compiling voters registers and producing accurate voters lists for voting stations;

• processing nominations and, from these, correctly printing ballot papers;

• determining locations of voting stations and resourcing them;

• recruiting, training, and assigning staff;

• reconciling voting material, conducting ballot counts, and determining results;

• adjudicating grievances.

Loss, unavailability, or unauthorised changes of election data can both cripple election operations themselves (and result in significant cost penalties) and lead to perceptions of lack of integrity or legitimacy of election processes and outcomes.

Security provisions need to address ensuring the availability, accuracy, integrity and, where relevant, the confidentiality of information. The more complex the information systems used, the more complex security measures may need to be.

Manual Information Systems

For information held in non-computerised formats, security is founded in normal office administration systems such as:

• registration of information and documentation received;

• logical filing and secure storage of documents;

• retaining separately stored copies of important documents;

• controlling access to documents.

Computer-Based Information Systems

For information held in computer-based systems, security measures need to be more complex, particularly where these systems are used to produce or process voting material or calculate vote totals or election results, where there is a time-critical need for accuracy and integrity. Risk analyses need to be undertaken to determine the most effective methods of ensuring information security.

Basic security measures that may need to be carefully applied include:

• adequate physical security of the buildings in which computer equipment or critical communications equipment (microwave installations or optical fibre/cable exchanges) are held--including protection against both human intervention and possible natural disaster (flood, fire);

• back-up and recovery capabilities in case of system failure--including recovery of power supply, telecommunications links, hardware, and software, as well as provision for manual or lower-tech methods of achieving the same task in case the computer system cannot be revived, and simple precautions such as daily backups of all systems and data and storage of backup media at a separate location;

• thorough testing of all aspects of systems under production conditions prior to their being placed into production mode;

• access controls on software and data, to prevent unauthorised external access (hacking) or internal attempts at manipulation of system configuration, software code, or data recorded;

• thorough training of staff in the computer systems and software they are required to use, so that data is not lost or systems damaged accidentally;

• ensuring that all staff are aware of the security precautions that need to be applied.

Voting

The focus of all planning, all preparation, all recruitment and training, materials production and equipment acquisition, system testing, and the other preparatory activities is to ensure that operations on voting day or days run effectively.

No matter how good the planning, and the testing, efficient implementation on voting day is the critical aspect of the election's success.

The following factors are important ingredients in ensuring this success.

Preparing for Voting Day

In the days before voting day, and on the morning of voting day itself, the final pieces in the voting preparations jigsaw puzzle are put into place.

Wherever possible, by the night before voting day, voting stations should be in a state of total readiness. To leave essential materials delivery, voting station set-up, and checking that all materials are present and equipment in working order until the morning of voting day can court disaster. A checklist for these final arrangements might include:

• the distribution of voting station material.

• checking by voting station managers that all the material and equipment required for their voting stations has been delivered in the correct quantities and in good condition;

• ensuring that all voting station officials have transport to and from their duty stations;

• reviewing contingency plans for voting day, and implementing backup solutions for problems arising with deficiencies in materials, in voting site availability, or in staffing;

In more developed areas, voting station staff may be able to make their way to the voting station by their own means. In more remote areas, or in developing countries, transport may have to be provided by the electoral management body.

Additional arrangements may need to be made where voting is being held over more than one day

Hours of Voting Operations

While voting stations are in operation, the focus of all voting operations staff is on ensuring that voters are provided with an efficient, courteous, high integrity service. Prior to the time for commencement of voting, final checks of all voting materials and equipment, and that all staff are present, should be followed by notification of readiness from all voting stations to the electoral district office.

Throughout voting station hours of operation, voting station managers are responsible for ensuring that:

• staff are supervised effectively  to provide a high standard of service to voters

• voting integrity is maintained  and security of the voting site, voters, officials, and materials is properly maintained ;

• voting procedures are correctly implemented at all times by all voting station officials;

Procedures in the voting station can be broken down into a number of routines:

• controlling voter entry and ensuring a smooth flow of voters through the voting station

• accurate checking of each voter's identity and eligibility to vote at that voting station, and recording all who have voted;

• efficient issue of ballots to voters, maintaining vigilance over voting secrecy and the security of voting materials;

• providing information in a proactive manner, and, where required, assisted voting services;

• effectively dealing with voters who are apparently not registered to vote at that voting station; 

Monitoring by party or candidate representatives of voting station activity enhances the transparency of voting processes, and can provide a safeguard against errors or partisan practices on the part of other participants in the election.

Actions after Voting

No matter where ballots are to be counted, there are common actions that need to be implemented in voting stations at the close of voting. These include:

Closing the voting station at the correct time so that there can be no later challenges based on voters arriving late being allowed to vote. Equitable treatment of voters already queued to vote at close of voting time, and any decisions made to extend the hours of voting, can have important implications for perceptions of election integrity, and should be addressed in the legislation.

Collection and securing of all liable voting materials--ballots, voters lists and ballot envelopes (if used and accountable). One of the most important aspects of voting station officials' duties is to undertake thorough and accurate reconciliations of liable voting materials following the close of voting. This is often one of the least understood and, coming at the end of an intense working day, most disliked aspects of their tasks. However, for an efficient count, and to guarantee election integrity, it is vital that these reconciliations be accurately completed and any discrepancies investigated. Inaccurate voting materials accounting at this stage can compromise integrity, and create considerable additional expense during counts and in answering election challenges

*The sorting, verifying, and packing of voting station materia. Overly complex systems for this will result in much time wasted later, either in the later sorting of materials by the election management body or in counting. However, it is important that accountable materials, as well as reusable and disposable materials, are clearly separated at this stage.

Many of the actions that are undertaken at the close of voting, particularly involving voting material reconciliations and sealing of ballot boxes or closing down voting machines or computers, are of critical importance to electoral integrity. As such, it is best for election transparency that party or candidate agents that are present witness these actions.

Before leaving the voting station, voting station managers should ensure that all voting records and reports on activities during voting day have been completed. Other actions at close of voting will vary according to whether the count is to take place at the voting station or at a separate counting centre:

• Where ballots are to be counted at the voting station, the voting station layout will need to be modified to facilitate an efficient count 

• Conversely, where ballot papers are to be transported to another location for counting, emphasis following close of voting will needs to be placed on a speedy but accurate sort and verification and packaging of all materials, so that they are ready for transport.

There may be additional organisational or materials accounting requirements at the close of voting where special facilities are provided (for absentee, early, or mail voting, or mobile voting stations). This is particularly so when these facilities operate over several days.

Dealing With Challenges and Complaints

Both during the hours of voting and in the aftermath of voting day, electoral management bodies are likely to have to deal with complaints about the service being provided, about political participants behaviour, decisions of voting operations staff, and about the validity of procedures and practices implemented. Following voting day, election results may be challenged on the basis of perceived irregularities; it is important that there is an open and fair process for handling such complaints, challenges, and disputes.

Follow-Up Actions

The electoral management body will a number of responsibilities after an election. Major activities would include:

• Ensuring that election materials and equipment are recovered, sorted, and maintained in secure storage, or made available for reuse or destroyed in line with legal obligations and electoral management body policy.

• So that future improvements in voting operations can be realised, it is important that a thorough evaluation of voting operations frameworks, procedures, and practices is undertaken, as soon as possible after the election so that valuable impressions and data are fresh in people's minds. This is crucial in improving performance, service, and cost-effectiveness 

• Election voting records will require examination and further investigation where any instances of voter fraud, such as multiple voting and impersonation, are suspected.

In continuous voter registration systems, elections can provide a wealth of information on voter changes of status and addresses, which will require follow-up and processing. In compulsory voting systems, investigations of registered voters who did not vote are also required

Independent Observation Groups

Voting day is also the period of most extensive activity for independent observers. It is when:

• Their resources are likely to be stretched to cover sufficient election locations;

• their data gathering is at its most intense;

• They are likely to be called upon by political participants to intervene on their behalf.

There will generally be an expectation, on the part of the local and/or international community, that they deliver accurate and timely judgments on the freeness and fairness of election processes Proper functioning of observation during this period requires detailed identification of the critical processes for observation, such as election preparatory processes that will indicate the voting day environment, voting hours operations, and the ensuing counting of ballots and declaration of results.

• For this observation to succeed, observers must be provided with reference materials that assist their task

• For the observation to have any influence, observer groups need to produce logical, concise reports on their activities and their assessments of election processes

Image:

Timor-Leste Holds Second National Village Elections Under UNMIT Supervision by United Nations Photo is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.0 Generic.

Ensuring Readiness

In the period immediately prior to voting day, electoral managers need to carefully review that all planned actions have been undertaken and that voting operations will be ready to operate effectively at the scheduled commencement time on voting day. Important elements of this review include assessing that:

• Voting station equipment and materials have been delivered and acknowledged by voting station managers;

• All voting sites are in a state of readiness;

• arrangements for staff transport to and from their duty stations, whether through private means or provided by the electoral management body, are confirmed (see Transportation of Voting Station Officials);

• ealistic contingency plans for materials, staffing, or voting site problems on voting day are in place (see Contingency Plans).

Where deficiencies in materials deliveries have been found, arrangements for replacement supplies must be promptly made (see Distribution and Receipt of Voting Materials).

Readiness Reporting

Carefully monitoring the results of readiness reviews becomes more important to the central management of the electoral management body in the lead-up to voting day.

In the week before voting day, daily reports on the state of readiness in each electoral district should be obtained from electoral district managers.

Distribution and Receipt of Voting Materials

• strict controls need to be exercised over the implementation of delivery plans for voting station materials and equipment to ensure that materials and equipment arrives at each location

• in time,

• according to planned delivery schedules;

• in the correct quantities;

• security is maintained throughout.

Delivery to voting stations can generally be more effectively undertaken from central or regional packaging centres than from local offices.

Delivery methods will vary according to available resources and the security environment. In low security risk, urban areas, it can be cost-effective for voting station managers to pick up their voting station's materials, apart from bulky equipment, from the electoral district management office.

This could be combined with a refresher briefing session for managers in the days before voting day. Highly accountable materials could be stored in local secure storage until voting day. However, this method is only suitable in environments of low security risk and high public trust.

It would be more usual, and prudent, to arrange for secure delivery of all voting station materials through transport contractors. In some circumstances, assistance from the military or other state agencies with widespread available transport resources can be a cost-effective means of delivery. However, this would only be suitable where such agencies are publicly accepted as non-partisan.

Timing of Delivery

It is preferable that all equipment and materials are present at the voting station or with the voting station manager at the latest on the day before voting day. In rural areas, slightly earlier delivery may be necessary to ensure enough time for the resupply of any deficiencies.

However, delivery too early to voting stations, especially in areas of higher security risk, increases the potential for loss of or tampering with supplies. Public perceptions of election integrity may also suffer if liable voting material is stored for longer periods outside of high security stores.

Voting station delivery arrangements will be made more complex and costly where there are delays in materials supply, or where essential items cannot be produced until immediately before voting day (e.g., in systems where certified voters lists are open until the day before voting day).

The effects on materials delivery reliability and costs should be assessed when determining procedural and legal frameworks and production schedules for voting materials preparation.

Delivery Documentation and Receipt

Deliveries of materials for voting stations should always be accompanied by delivery documentation specifying the types and quantities of materials delivered. This would preferably be a full/partial copy (depending on the delivery method adopted) of the standard "materials pack" contents list or materials/equipment inventory prepared for each voting station.

It is best that voting station managers are on hand to take delivery of their voting station's materials. Receipts should be issued for all materials delivered.

This acknowledgment of delivery should be returned to the electoral district management office. Receipts returned to the electoral management body may need to be completed in two stages:

• An initial acknowledgment of receipt of the delivery.

• A formal notification that all materials have been correctly supplied, after the voting station manager has checked.

This detailed notification is an essential part of maintaining a verifiable audit trail for all liable materials and equipment.

Checking Material on Receipt

It is vital that voting station managers thoroughly check the materials against the inventory of expected supplies for their voting station as soon as the materials are received, and immediately advise their electoral district manager of correct delivery or of any discrepancies. Electoral district managers should monitor that these reports are received.

Deficiencies would require prompt implementation of contingency plans for materials ressupply (see Contingency Plans Even materials delivered in pre-packaged "pack" form can contain errors in quantities or materials missing on delivery. Special attention needs to be paid to:

• Ballot boxes, to ensure the correct number and type have been delivered, and that ballot box serial numbers or other codes are correct for that voting station;

• voters lists, to ensure the correct list, or lists, have been delivered for that voting station and that they are complete, without missing or misprinted pages;

• ballots, to ensure complete supply and that no numbered ballots or ballot booklets are missing;

• ballot box seals or locks, particularly that locks have the correct keys;

• other accountable materials, such as voting station seals or perforating instruments for validating ballots, and ink and associated equipment for marking voters, where used;

• voting compartments, to ensure that they are functioning and present in the correct quantity;

• Essential general supplies, such as pens and pencils, where these are to be used to mark ballots, legally-required instructions to voters, and packaging for used and unused accountable voting material.

Even counter foiled, numbered ballot booklets can have missing ballots. Loosely packed ballots or ballot envelopes, particularly without numbered counterfoils, are even more susceptible to error in post-production packaging in standard bundles. It is essential that ballots, or, where relevant, ballot envelopes received at each voting station are counted on delivery and any discrepancy between delivery notices and actual stocks received formally noted in ballot accounting records.

These figures would then be used as the starting point for all subsequent ballot/ballot envelope accounting calculations. For non-accountable and general purpose materials, an exact check count would not be necessary.

It is also important that equipment necessary for voting station operations, such as voting machines or computers, lamps for detecting invisible ink marks on voters, bar code readers for voter identification cards, or emergency power generators are installed and tested as soon as possible after receipt. To leave this testing on site until the morning of voting day may leave insufficient time for replacement or repair.

Transportation of Voting Station Officials

Basic Issues

Ensuring that officials appointed to voting stations have transportation available to enable them to report for duty is an essential issue in ensuring voting station readiness.

In the week before voting day, electoral district managers, through their voting station managers, need to review that acceptable transport arrangements, both to and from voting stations, are in place for all voting station officials. All hired transport arrangements for voting station staff should also be reconfirmed with contractors at this time.

Provision of Transport

To ensure that voting station officials arrive at their voting station on time, it may be necessary for the electoral management body to arrange transportation through shuttle buses or similar arrangements.

Clear notice as to departure and arrival times should be provided to all staff, preferably with the voting station official's appointment documentation.

Voting station managers should confirm that all their officials know and understand these transportation arrangements.

Provision of special transportation for voting station officials can be necessary particularly in environments where:

• there is low private vehicle ownership and public transportation systems are unreliable;

• security risks are high, necessitating the escort of voting station officials to and from duty by security forces.

Travelling as a group in a single vehicle will make protection of voting station officials' safety easier.

While additional costs may be incurred, in these circumstances it is a small price to pay to ensure that all staff can report for duty.

Rural and Remote Areas

While it is preferable that voting station officials be appointed from within the local community, there will be occasions where officials have to be imported to rural and remote areas. Transport arrangements need to ensure that:

• staff are transported in sufficient time to undertake all their duties effectively;

• reliable transport is provided, so voting station staff are not stranded in a remote area;

• particularly in remote areas, voting station officials are able to report their arrival and departure to the electoral district manager (radio equipment in the transport used may be necessary for this).

Where staff duties involve recruiting and training local assistants or taking delivery of materials and setting up voting stations, staff may need to be transported several days before voting day. Similarly, if long distances are to be travelled, it is unrealistic to expect staff to drive all night and then function effectively in a voting station in the morning.

Where overnight stays are involved, suitable accommodation and food also needs to be arranged. It is important for staff performance in these situations that care is taken; a tired and hungry voting station manager and staff may not perform at their best during long hours of duty on voting day.

Developed Societies

In developed societies, it is not unreasonable to expect that voting station officials make their own way to and from their duties, though a transportation allowance may need to be paid, especially where travel distances are considerable.

Any potential transportation difficulties should be requested from and discussed with staff at the time of their appointment; cost-effective arrangements through use of staff car pooling and the like can often are made.

Mobile Voting Stations/Roving Supervisors

Transportation arrangements for mobile voting stations need also to be planned in advance. In urban areas, mobile voting stations would normally require access to a vehicle. Car rental would be usual, though paying transportation allowances to mobile voting officials for using their private vehicles can be more cost-effective.

In remote areas, mobile voting stations may need access to air or water transport to access all voting locations on their route. Availability of such transport at a reasonable cost must be taken into account when assessing viable mobile voting station routes and itineraries. It is important that any required air or sea charter arrangements are made early; leaving them to the last minute can result in excessive transport costs.

Any roving voting station supervisors  will also require access to a vehicle during voting hours and the count. Suitable vehicles should be provided for the terrain and, if acting as a mobile emergency materials supply source, materials cartage as well.

Readiness Reviews

In the period immediately prior to voting day, electoral managers need to carefully review that all planned actions have been undertaken and that voting operations will be ready to operate effectively at the scheduled commencement time on voting day.

Important elements of this review include assessing that:

• Voting station equipment and materials have been delivered and acknowledged by voting station managers;

• all voting sites are in a state of readiness;

• arrangements for staff transport to and from their duty stations, whether through private means or provided by the electoral management body, are confirmed ;

• realistic contingency plans for materials, staffing, or voting site problems on voting day are in place

Where deficiencies in materials deliveries have been found, arrangements for replacement supplies must be promptly made .

Readiness Reporting

Carefully monitoring the results of readiness reviews becomes more important to the central management of the electoral management body as events move even more swiftly in the lead-up to voting day.

In the week before voting day, daily reports on the state of readiness in each electoral district should be obtained from electoral district managers.

Multi-Day Voting

While it would be more usual for regular voting to occur on a single day, under some election systems or circumstances, voting may take place on several days.

Multiple day voting would generally fall into one of the following broad formats:

• an initial round of voting to establish the leading candidates with a second round at a later date to determine the election winner

• voting being conducted on different days for electoral districts in different geographic areas;

• provisions for the same voting station to remain open for voting for more than one day in a single round election;

• special forms of voting, such as early voting or mobile voting stations, being held for more than one day.

Multiple Rounds of Voting

Systems requiring two rounds of voting will place additional organisational pressures on voting operations managers:

• They will generally lead to significant rises in voting operations costs through higher use of materials production and staffing for voting and counts, logistics, and security.

• Where "mark choice" ballot papers are used, there will be severe pressures on ballot production and distribution for the second round.

Operational planning will need to carefully and separately consider the requirements for each round of the election and address what efficiencies can be found through ensuring that at each round of voting:

• the same premises/locations are used for voting stations;

• the same staff are used as voting and counting officials;

• forms are, as far as possible, designed for common use at each round.

Material production and distribution for the second round, in general, will need to be carefully planned.

Staggered Elections

The progressive conduct of elections for electoral units in different geographical areas can provide efficiencies where election equipment, logistics capacities, security capabilities, and staff expertise are scarce resources, or where the sheer size of the voting population makes single-day elections difficult to manage.

If coordinated by a national electoral management body, multi-day voting can allow resource sharing and better capabilities. Particularly for such important components as training and security, the ability to stagger requirement in different geographic areas can allow for the best use of scarce professional resources.

Disadvantages of this method mainly relate to control of count and results information and the possibility of tensions or security problems being exacerbated by a lengthy period for voting:

• On the one hand delaying counts until all voting is completed may promote accusations of malpractice. It will also require return of material awaiting the commencement of counts to well-secured central locations.

• On the other hand if votes are counted and results are announced immediately, to promote public confidence, they may affect voting behaviour or promote attempts at manipulation in areas voting later.

Multi-Day Voting at Same Location

Holding of voting over more than one day at the same location presents administrative challenges in delivering services in a secure and cost-effective manner. It can, however, afford the opportunity for electoral administrators to make adjustments to services to compensate for any initial problems with logistics, staff allocation, or application of procedures.

In looking at these challenges, it is useful to distinguish between multi-day voting concerned with:

• special voting facilities, such as early voting

• operation of ordinary voting stations. This section is concerned with the latter circumstance.

While it is more usual that voting in an election occurs on a single day, there are circumstances where, because of system constraints (such as insufficient voting stations), cultural factors, or to enhance access to voting opportunities, voting occurs at the same location on multiple days.

Whether it is a cost-effective method of organising voting will depend on the cost structures in the particular environment.

However, the direct costs (such as additional payments to voting station staff) and indirect costs (security availability, and any goodwill costs in maintaining public confidence) are likely to outweigh the costs of providing additional voting locations (additional staff training and recruitment, transport, materials, and security). Its benefits depend on the degree to which it enhances voter access and turnout. This may have particular appeal in countries with very large voter populations or without a history of mass voting.

The following sections deal with issues that need to be considered when planning and operating voting stations that will be open for voting for more than one day for a single round of an election.

Security

Multi-day voting places extra demands on security forces to maintain an adequate presence at voting stations.

Particularly in high security risk situations, their ability to meet these demands needs to be carefully considered in determining the practicality of a voting period of more than one day and the voting locations used. Furthermore, security presence overnight will need to be considered if it is likely that voter unable to vote by close of voting on one day stay overnight near the voting station in order to vote the next day.

It is preferable that voting material is not transported from the voting station until voting is completed. Therefore, voting station locations and the material within them must be secured between the closing of the voting on one day and opening of voting on the next.

Only where there is a high degree of trust in state authorities by all political participants should alternatives such as deposit of the material overnight in police or security forces safekeeping be considered.

Voting Station Premises

As material will need to be secured overnight, temporary structures or open-air facilities may not be suitable.

Materials and Equipment Management

All materials and equipment should still be delivered to the voting station prior to the commencement of voting, unless there are local, specific reasons (such as transport capacity or security) that make staggered delivery cost-effective. For some materials and equipment, the levels supplied will depend on the number of days over which voting occurs.

Particularly where combined with larger voting station traffic, planning for multi-day voting should allow for increased levels of reserve equipment, such as ballot boxes and voting compartments, in case of damage during the voting period.

Ensuring Transparency

It is important that representatives of the political participants are able to verify the integrity of election material throughout the voting period.

In circumstances of extreme distrust, this may require the physical presence of political party or candidate representatives at all times from the commencement to the close of voting, even when the voting station is closed overnight. This should be carefully co-ordinated to avoid conflict.

More practical solutions emphasise the manner in which ballots and other voting material are stored during the voting period. Durable ballot boxes would preferably be used, rather than cheaper cardboard or other non-durable material.

At the close of each day's voting, and the commencement of the next, the condition and sealing of ballot boxes containing completed votes cast should be recorded by senior voting staff and witnessed by party or candidate representatives present.

Other material whose integrity is essential for the successful outcome of the election should also preferably be stored overnight in sealed ballot boxes, and if not, in other secure storage. This would include:

• voters lists,

• unused ballots, and

• completed forms for absentee voting, assisted voting, challenges to voters, and voting eligibility for voters not on the voters list,

• seals, and fraud control equipment such as light sensitive ink.

The sealing of these at close of voting each day and their unsealing at commencement the next day should be recorded by senior voting staff and witnessed by party and candidate representatives present.

Capacity Planning

Multi-day voting makes capacity planning more difficult, particularly if it is occurring for the first time in a country or in a transitional election. It is not simply a matter of dividing expected voters by the number of days of voting and thus establishing expected daily voting station traffic.

Analysis of the potential voter population's daily work patterns, the impact of voter information campaigns on voters' understanding of when they may vote, transportation schedules, and past time patterns of voter turnout are useful in determining likely attendance on each day.

In the absence of any historical patterns, basic voting station location and resourcing capacities should consider meeting a potential turnout of between two-thirds and three-quarters of the total potential voters on a single day.

But voter turnout may not be logical; societal traits or the specific election environment may determine the number of voters from the start of the first day of voting compared to the numbers of final day voters. Ensuring the maintenance of voter service entails planning a reserve capability to increase traffic capacity (by using additional staff) on the final day.

There are administrative means of staggering the turnout over multiple voting days. Potential voters may be administratively split and assigned particular days to vote. This may be effective if done on a geographic basis, but is more likely to cause voter confusion if done on other bases, such as name or employment type. Sensible administrative measures would include electoral administrators' liaison with parties and communities to attempt to schedule any mass transport to voting stations in a staggered fashion over the period of voting.

Hygiene and comfort

Multiple day use of a voting station means that daily cleaning arrangements for the voting station and other facilities, such as portable toilets and replenishment of water supplies, need to be considered.

In less developed countries particularly, voters may have had a long and arduous journey to the voting station, and may wish to stay overnight if unable to vote by the time the station closes on the day of their arrival. If facilities are not available for this, there is the potential for disruption, and possibly violence. Choice of voting station locations and security planning should take this into account.

Staffing Allocations

Working in a voting station involves long hours and is a potentially exhausting experience. The more days of voting, the greater is the need for trained reserve staff to cover illness and absenteeism, and as a precaution for a higher than expected turnout on a single day.

It is sensible to set basic staff to voter ratios higher than for single-day voting and to allow for more frequent rest breaks for staff, particularly when the same voting station staff are conducting the counting. This will offset any apparent staffing efficiency of using fewer, larger capacity voting stations for multiple voting days.

Voter Information

There are some additional voter information messages to be conveyed in a multi-day voting situation (for general voter information issues. In addition to advising of locations and hours of voting, voter information messages in the days before voting day can help in distributing the turnout over the available days.

Apart from use of media, such assistance can be given by staggering the scheduling of any local or street-based "reminders to vote" during the voting period. During the initial voting day, turnout statistics need to be monitored to determine if there is an immediate need for additional voter information placements, either generally or in specific areas. The potential need for these is also a consideration in management of the voter information budget.

Unplanned Multi-Day Voting

There are also significant administrative differences depending on whether the multi-day voting schedule has been planned as part of the election process, or is a response to deficiencies encountered in general or in particular locations on voting day. Limited, defined allowance for such responses is a prudent component of the election legal framework.

Relevant deficiencies could include:

• late or non-delivery of essential material and equipment;

• adjournment of voting due to threat, violence, or natural disaster;

• an inability to process during voting hours the voters who have turned out to vote (an indication of major planning deficiencies);

• a judgment that voter turnout on the specified voting day is insufficient to give credibility to the election.

In these cases the effectiveness of contingency planning  is critical to the success of the extended voting period.

Extension of voting to a further day, or days, is not a decision to be taken lightly, not only for its affect on resourcing, but as it may delay finalisation of vote counts beyond the planned and publicised dates.

Responsibilities for making such decisions are better assigned to the senior executive of the electoral management body and defined in the elections legal framework. In some environments, laws requiring judicial and/or executive government endorsement may be appropriate.

Maintaining public confidence in such circumstances will require additional measures such as:

• ensuring that any partial count results are not publicised before the completion of all relevant voting;

• ensuring that ballot material is handled securely and transparently throughout the extended period;

• mobilising additional resources to allow the publicised count timetable to be followed as closely as possible.

Contingency Plans

Contingency plans are an important part of voting operations management plans in all environments and circumstances. The time critical nature of voting operations requires backup plans to enable quick reaction to operational failures or changes in the social or physical environment.

Developed contingency and backup plans are vitally essential where processes or systems are being operated for the first time or in environments undergoing social dislocation. Ideally, contingency plans should identify flexible options adaptable to specific situations; it is generally not possible to foresee every possible contingency.

Operational Focus

Contingency planning needs to address several broad areas where system or other failures, or events over which voting operations administrators have no control, may affect the ability to deliver voting operations services effectively according to the standard plan. These can include:

Operational or management difficulties in particular voting stations: These may be staff failing to report for duty, communications links being severed, or particular materials or equipment not arriving on schedule. These could well be handled at the voting station or in conjunction with local representatives of the electoral management body.

Breakdowns in general electoral management or supply systems: Such contingencies would include general logistics failures, in transport, mail or communication systems, production failures for essential items such as ballots, voters lists and election forms, and inability of computer systems to perform to expectations.

As these affect overall capacities and effectiveness of voting operations, implementation of contingency plans would generally best be taken at a more central election management level, by senior election administrators in a position to take a broad overview of the effects of responses on all aspects of the election process.

Physical or social environment disasters: These would include fire, flood, earthquake, social upheaval, or other disturbances. These may affect voting operations as a whole or be limited in their effect to a single or small number of voting stations. As decisions may need to be made about postponement or adjournment of voting in these circumstances, involvement of senior election management in determining the appropriate response to such occurrences would be necessary.

Decision-Making Responsibilities

Not only should contingency plans present a clear framework for emergency decision-making and the contingency options available, but they should also firmly establish the responsibilities for determining the implementation of such plans and the trigger points at which such decisions must be made.

They must specifically define for which contingencies determination can be made at a local level, those for which decisions must be made by senior executives of the central electoral management body, and those for which other agencies of state must be consulted or involved in such decisions.

Without such a defined framework, there is a risk of local decisions being made on issues of wider significance; such decisions may be inconsistent or fail to address the root causes of the problems.

Contingency Plan Content

Contingency plans should identify:

• the nature of the contingency;

• the operational impacts of the contingency;

• the feasible responses;

• the financial implications of the responses;

• any effects on other processes.

Feasible responses, financial implications and flow-on effects are likely to vary according to the timing of contingency plan implementation decisions; information on these variations should be included in the contingency plans.

Recognition of Process Interdependence

Given the interdependency of election processes, it is important that contingency planning does not treat each voting operations activity as a discrete task. It should follow through the future effects of contingencies in one area, which may not be within voting operations activities, on subsequent activities. For example:

• unavailability of planned voting sites will affect materials distribution, staff deployment, and voter information activities;

• failure of voters lists printing systems may require preparation of lists in a different format, which voting station staff will need to be trained to use;

• Late redistribution of electoral districts will affect the timing of candidate nominations and the identification of voting sites.

Realistic Planning

Contingency plans must be realistic and effective. There should be a mechanism for determining which alternative contingency plans are implemented, taking into account their cost-effectiveness. Whatever the particular task that may need backup or contingency facilities, the basic aim is to have sufficient voting sites, adequately resourced to enable all attending voters to vote. In crisis situations, performance against other objectives is subsidiary.

Systems failure may often be due to excessive complexity for the environment. Creating contingency plans of similar complexity, or entailing considerable expenditure to effect only small increments in performance or service would generally not be cost-effective.

Materials Contingency Plans

Building Reserves

In preparing contingency plans for voting station materials, issues that are significant to consider include:

• the quantities of reserve materials that it is prudent to hold;

• where reserve quantities of materials are to be held, and in this regard, both available storage locations and the ability to transport from the storage location to voting stations are relevant;

• the provision of emergency transport arrangements--e.g., vehicles and drivers and, for remote areas, possibly air transport--for delivery of contingency materials.

Potential Problems

Problems that may occur with materials supply for voting day would generally fall under two broads categories:

A failure in production processes leading to unavailability of materials. This could be either through a breakdown in production (so that no, or insufficient, material has been produced in time), or errors in production have resulted in unusable materials (e.g., ballots with incorrect candidate or party information).

It would be a grave lapse in production quality control processes if unusable materials were produced.

Failures in materials distribution, so that materials have not reached their intended voting station destination at the required time. This could occur through breakdowns in shipping arrangements or errors in addressing supplies for distribution.

Reserve Quantities of Materials

Appropriate reserve quantities of materials will vary for different types of materials and in different environments. Contingency reserves quantities must address a balance between maintaining cost-effectiveness and being able to meet reasonable contingencies for essential materials. Appropriate reserve quantities would generally fall within the range of 5 percent to 10 percent of expected usage.

However, contingency reserve level would prudently be increased if:

• there is little confidence in overall potential voter figures, through lack of recent updates of voter lists, particularly when combined with provision that allow voters to register on voting day, or otherwise claim a vote;

• there is a large variety of types of voting facilities available, or where there are no strict restrictions on the voting station at which a voter may vote, making "micro" predictions of voter turnout more difficult;

• there is automated mail-out of ballots which can be subject to high wastage rates.

As with normal supply of materials, contingency materials can be more efficiently processed if packed in discrete emergency supply kits.

Location of Reserve Supply

Reserve supplies can only be useful if they can be rapidly delivered to replenish materials shortages.

Centralised contingency supply arrangements generally are not conducive to achieving this. For that reason, it is imperative that contingency materials be held at a regional, or sub-regional level. In general, electoral district managers' offices would be the appropriate contingency supply centres for voting stations, and this need should be considered when office premises are selected.

In electoral districts covering large geographic areas, sub-regional secure depots may need to be leased for the supply period.

Emergency Transport for Materials

Contingency materials are of little use if no method of delivering them to voting stations has been arranged.

Particularly for remote areas, lack of early planning of delivery methods can result in substantial costs if, for example, air transport has to be arranged for immediate delivery. In urban areas potential methods would include:

• providing roving voting station supervisors with suitable vehicles and security so that they can also function as a mobile emergency supply repository;

• maintaining emergency supply vehicles and drivers attached to the electoral district manager's office during the voting period. In a more rural environment, where voting stations may be at considerable distances apart, practical solutions may come at a higher cost.

Attachment of transport facilities to secure emergency supply depots set up for the voting period in significant population centres may need to be considered, depending on transport distances to all voting stations from the electoral district manager's office.

Staffing Contingency Plans

Basic Issues

To meet staffing crises that may emerge during voting election administrators should ensure that reserves of staff are available. Allowance should be made for allocated staff not reporting for duty or voting stations being swamped by higher than expected numbers of voters.

Organisation and deployment of these contingency staff would generally be more effectively implemented at a local or electoral district level. The shorter the chain of command, the swifter the response is likely to be to staffing emergencies. Holding reserves at a central location may result in more complex logistical requirements to get staff into the field.

Location of Emergency Staff

Crucial decisions involve not just how many emergency staff are to be recruited but also where contingency staff should be located during voting hours. A balance between cost-effectiveness, considering both staffing and logistics costs, and the ability to swiftly cover for staffing emergencies and maintain a good level of voter service has to be sought.

Different environments, in terms of transport links, logistics, geographic areas to be covered, and expected needs for contingency staff, will affect the manner in which emergency staff are deployed. Possible solutions include:

Having a small number of contingency staff report for duty to each voting station.  The disadvantages of this method are that it limits flexibility to a certain extent and is relatively costly. The need for additional staff will not generally occur in an equitable manner, but is more likely to be concentrated in a few voting stations. This method may also be wasteful of resources, in catering to a pessimistic scenario at every voting station.

Locating reserve officials at electoral district managers' offices or other local electoral management body offices or depots. While this will give greater flexibility in despatching staff to required voting stations, its effectiveness will depend on transport availability and the geographic area to be covered from each office.

Transport needs to be on hand for such emergencies--not only vehicles but also drivers, to enable the return of vehicles to these offices for further use.

Where roving senior officials are used as field supervisors , assigning trained emergency staff who may be re-assigned to voting stations duties in emergencies as their assistants

This provides:

• some flexibility of response within the roving officials' relevant areas of responsibility,

• uses vehicles already in use for travelling between voting stations, and

• provides the benefit of the roving supervisors' assessment of the situation at voting stations with staffing emergencies.

This method will be limited in use to areas suitable for coverage by roving officials.

Arranging for emergency staff to be on call at home. There could be arguments for this in some areas where officials are appointed from the local communities. There may be some cost advantages if these staff can be paid on-call rates (as opposed to the emergency staff automatically reporting and being paid for duty whether used or not). However, it is only likely to work effectively where:

• public communication systems are reliable, and

• private means of transport is more common (or contingency staff live nearby to the relevant voting locations), and

• election administrators can be sure these staff members will remain on call throughout voting hours.

Emergency Staff Appointments on Voting Day

Plans for staffing emergencies should also consider the fact that contingency reserves of voting station officials may prove to be insufficient. While, hopefully, this will not occur, election administrators and the legal framework for the election should recognise this possibility.

It may be possible to use administrative staff from electoral district managers' or electoral management body offices as voting station officials in emergencies.

These staff members will at least have the advantage of being familiar with some voting processes. However, staff available from this source will generally be very limited in number, and the effect their reassignment to voting stations may have on administrative support during voting must be carefully assessed.

The legal framework for the election could allow voting station managers to appoint additional voting station officials on voting day, in defined circumstances, such as inability to operate the voting station effectively due to failure of officials to report for duty or absence of staff due to fatigue or illness. Where such appointments are made, the voting station manager would need to ensure that these persons sign a contract of employment, as well as the code of conduct and declaration of secrecy or similar documents required of all voting station officials.

It would be preferable if these untrained field-appointed staff were used in less complex tasks, such as exit control or guarding ballot boxes. Election administrators need to ensure that these persons are entered in payment and service records.

Appointments of this nature need to be firmly monitored by the electoral management body to ensure that they are justified in terms of required resources and that the persons being appointed are suitable, in terms of impartiality of actions, to act as officials. The voting station manager should seek advice from the electoral district manager's office before taking this course.

In highly politically charged environments, it may not be possible for all political participants to be satisfied with the impartiality of such field appointments; it may be prudent, therefore, to take the safer, yet more costly, path of a higher level of normal reserve staff recruitment and appointment.

Voter Turnout Contingency Plans

Basic Issues

Contingency planning related to voter turnout issues may need to address situations that include:

• voters turnout overall, or in particular areas, is much less than expected, possibly to the extent that it may threaten the legitimacy of the election result;

• voter turnout overall, or at particular voting sites, is much greater than expected, or is resulting in higher than expected levels of peak period activity.

Methods of addressing these problems will depend on the following considerations:

• the flexibility allowed by the legal framework in revising voting hours and procedures to accommodate the actual circumstances and the ability to adjust staffing or facilities available in voting stations;

• contingency reserves of staff and materials that can be made available

Voter Turnout Less Than Expected

Whether voters decide to vote or not would generally be a decision purely for the voters themselves. Low turnout may well be an indication of the perceptions of voters of the legitimacy of the election process or the quality of the nominated candidates or parties.

However, there are some particular situations where a less than expected voter turnout may need to be addressed by the electoral management body. The following are some examples of potential situations.

Minimum Voter Turnout Requirements in the Law

Some legal frameworks establish minimum voter turnout requirements for the election to be valid. In such situations, it would be generally inappropriate for the electoral management body to take action, other than through increasing the intensity of publicity campaigns during the voting period urging people to vote. Any other actions could be perceived as aligning itself with leading candidates or parties.

Where contingency planning must be implemented immediately--where it appears that turnout may be below any required minimum--is in preparations for a re-run of the election within the time period allowed by legislation.

Transitional Elections

In transitional elections particularly, a low voter turnout may affect public perceptions of the election legitimacy or acceptance of election outcomes. In environments where there is little history of mass voting, this may be as much the result of voter uncertainty or unfamiliarity with voting hours and processes as any dissatisfaction with the election process.

In such circumstances, decisions may need to be made as to whether to extend the hours (or days) of voting, to implement of related contingency information campaigns, or to provide assistance for voters to attend to vote. These are decisions that would be appropriate to make at a central level following legal advice and consultation with the political and any international participants in the election.

Disasters

Natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, earthquake, tornado, hurricane, landslide, avalanche, or anaconda) or intimidation may prevent significant numbers of voters from going to vote. Again, response to these would be more appropriately determined at a central level after consultation with all relevant interests.

Occurrences affecting single voting stations may be handled at the local level.  Use of joint operations centre structures will assist in coordinating responses.

Voter Turnout Greater Than Expected

Competent election planning should accurately assess the numbers of voters likely to turn out at each voting station and allocate effectively the resources required to service expected voter turnouts. However, there are situations in which contingency plans to cope with additional voter turnout should be developed. These circumstances would include:

• at the time of selection of voting sites, there is doubt about the accuracy of voter population figures;

• election systems have no requirements for voter registration before voting day, or are likely to result in significant numbers of voters registering on voting day itself;

• election systems give voters a wide choice of voting stations to vote (initial action would preferably be to redirect excess voters to other nearby voting locations whose resources are being less fully utilised);

• for cost-efficiency reasons, resourcing of voting stations has been calculated on a specific proportion of registered voters turning out to vote;

• Peak periods of voter activity are more intensive than expected, leading to unacceptable delays for voters voting.

Contingency measures for dealing with higher than expected voter turnouts would generally be directed towards:

The ability to increase the resources available to service voters during the voting period:This would require contingency planning for the delivery of additional materials.

Extending the period available for voting: Where voter turnout has overwhelmed available voting station resources, large numbers of voters may still be outside the voting station, waiting to vote, at the close of voting. Flexibility in legal frameworks for extension of voting under specific circumstances can be useful to deal with such circumstances. Particularly in transitional elections, altered processes may result in estimation of turnouts and voting station resourcing of lesser quality.

Decisions on extension of voting hours would be appropriately made at a central election management level according to any processes allowed by the law and consultation with the political and any international participants in the election

Voting Hours Operations

Operations during voting hours and the vote count are the culmination of all election activity. They are the result of the complex interplay of all factors impacting the electoral process, both those under the control of electoral managers and environmental factors.

The range of methods by which voters may participate in the voting process is of wide variety among jurisdictions. It is not possible to cover all potential methods in these brief summaries.

Subsequent sections attempt to draw out from this highly complex interplay some general guidelines for methods of operation during voting hours.

What is most important to remember is that providing voting facilities is a service industry. All aspects of voting hours operations need to be oriented to quality and cost-effective service to voters.

Voting Station Readiness

To ensure that voting stations are ready to open at the required time on voting day, voting station managers and staff must be required to arrive for duty well before the scheduled opening time and conduct commencement of voting checks on all materials and facilities to be used during voting day

Items to check include:

Ensuring that the voting station has been set up correctly: that all signs and/or barriers are in place, entrance and exit are freely negotiable, all furniture and equipment is set up correctly, any security zones have been delimited and security forces are in place.

Ensuring that all staff is present, that any replacement staff required are sought, and that staff are aware of the duties for which they will be responsible during voting hours. 

Rechecking materials available to ensure that these have been allocated correctly to the relevant staff and that any reserve materials are securely stored;

Testing that any equipment to be used during voting hours is correctly installed and is functioning. This would include communications equipment, lighting and heating, ballot boxes and voting compartments. This may also include emergency power supplies, voting machines, and computers. Even if these have been tested the previous day during installation, they should be rechecked just prior to the commencement of voting.

A reporting schedule is necessary to ensure that each voting station manager reports to the electoral district manager on the state of readiness of the voting station prior to the scheduled time for commencement of voting.

Voter Service

When turning out to vote, voters have a right to expect to be processed courteously, professionally, and efficiently. Effective implementation of procedures for voting is a team effort within each voting station, which can be broken down into a number of key areas:

• maintaining control over voter queues and voter flow through the voting station so that voters are processed in an orderly manner-l;

• providing effective means of determining if voters are eligible to vote at that voting station--

• efficiently issuing ballots to voters, ensuring that they are able to make their vote in secret, and are guided as to how to cast their ballot correctly;

• providing information, either in response to voter queries or proactively to enhance voter flow;

• assisting voters whose names cannot be found on voters lists or who require assistance in voting-

Staff Management

To realise the potential effectiveness of their staff, voting station managers and other supervisors have to proactively manage what is happening in their voting stations, rather than sit behind a table watching voters pass by.

Voting station managers need to continuously monitor and supervise their staff's activities, and ensure that staff's working environment is conducive to high-quality performance levels 

Integrity of Voting Processes

Effective implementation of measures designed to protect the integrity of voting is essential if the election results are to withstand any challenges. Voters must have the opportunity to vote freely and confidentially.

Voting station staff must properly implement procedures to ensure that only those eligible to vote are allowed to vote, through efficiently:

• conducting identity checks on voters;

• determining, by reference to voters lists and/or other documents, whether a voter is eligible to vote at that voting station;

• undertaking checks to prevent impersonation of eligible voters and multiple voting.

(For details of procedures in regard to these issues, see Integrity Controls.)

Security

There are a number of aspects to security during voting hours, including:

• maintaining personal security of voters, voting station officials, and political participants;

• ensuring that voting stations are free of threat and intimidation;

• preventing loss of or damage to voting material, or the introduction of spurious voting material.

Cooperation between voting station officials and security forces, and a clear understanding of their respective roles, is vital.

Crisis Management

While effective planning of voting station operations should minimise the chances of crises occurring, there will be issues over which election staff have little or no control, such as natural disasters, civil disturbance, and other unforeseen occurrences. Operational deficiencies may lead to voting stations not being supplied with the necessary materials or equipment.

Contingency planning should address such potential circumstances. Where it is not possible to continue voting station operations, decisions on whether to adjourn or postpone voting will need to be taken (see Crisis Management).

Role of Party/Candidate Representatives

Transparency of voting is enhanced when party and candidate representatives can freely observe voting processes at all voting locations. To publicly assure election integrity party or candidate representatives should formal witness voting station officials actions; critical activities, such as verification that ballot boxes are empty prior to the commencement of voting, and sealing of ballot boxes and packaging of materials at the close of voting require their confidence.

With rights to observe, party and candidate representatives also have responsibilities with regard to their behaviour while in voting stations. 

Stability of Voting Frameworks

Significant advantages can be gained by maintaining some stability in the frameworks used for operations of voting stations. This is not to say that changes should not be introduced; but change needs to be shown to cost-effectively increase performance against the principles of voting operations. Change for its own sake can both lower cost-effectiveness and confuse voters.

Stability has these advantages:

• voting station officials build-up their store of knowledge of voting processes, so that both their performance improves and training may be more cost-effective;

• analysis of past performance can lead to improvement in methods of implementing the voting framework;

• voters can develop a reasonable understanding of what will be expected of them when they go to vote, relieving pressure on voting station staff to guide voters through voting processes and leading to efficiencies in staffing;

• voters are less likely to make errors in casting a valid ballot, thus enhancing effective participation;

• Voter education and information campaigns may be more cost effective.

Preparations for Commencement of Voting

Prior to the start of voting, it is vital that voting station managers ensure that the voting site and its staff are completely prepared and ready to open at the correct time, with all services required available and set up to operate in the correct fashion.

Those voters who turn out early to vote are entitled to the same level of service as those arriving later in the day. If there are still voting site preparation or staffing difficulties being resolved in the first hours of voting, service may suffer, and the effects may last throughout the hours of voting.

Use of Checklists

The extent of the checks to be undertaken is such that the provision of checklists to voting station managers, on which they can note the completion of required tasks, is essential for an efficient start to voting.

Pre-Voting Day

Wherever the security situation and the nature of the voting site allows, delivery and checking of voting station materials and equipment supplies, installing furniture and equipment according to approved layouts, and ensuring that the required facilities are available and working would be undertaken the day before voting day.

This additional access to voting sites will need to be negotiated with site owners. It may incur some additional costs:

• for voting station managers and other staff setting up the voting station,

• for site rentals(if not using premises made available under any official free use policy), and

• for additional security, if required, between voting station set up and commencement of voting.

However, benefits for an efficient commencement of voting would generally more than outweigh any additional costs.

Where the voting station is not in enclosed premises pre-voting day preparation may not be possible. In these cases voting station staff may be required to report for duty sufficiently early to ensure that the voting station is fully ready for operations at the required commencement time. However, the site should still be inspected on the day before voting day to ensure that it is still in a suitable condition to allow preparation as a voting station the following morning.

(For information on actions that may be taken pre-voting day to ensure voting station readiness for the commencement of voting, see  Ensuring Readiness.)

Arrival of Staff

Voting station staff must be required to report for duty before the voting station opening time. For voting station managers and other senior officials, this would be at least one hour before commencement time. Other voting station staff may also need to report for duty at the same time, particularly if the voting station has not been fully set up on the eve of voting day.

Cost considerations must be taken into account--not all staff may need to report for duty an hour beforehand--but staff members must be required to be at the voting station by a deadline that will allow them to be assigned duties and familiarise themselves with the materials to be used, materials locations, and voting station layout and facilities. Time should be allotted for staff to be briefed by the voting station manager, and also to allow the voting station manager sufficient notice of staff who have failed to report for duty in time to seek replacements by the time of commencement of voting.

Pre-Commencement Checks

Pre-commencement of voting checks by the voting station manager on the morning of voting day need to be thorough. In broad terms, they would fall into the following categories:

• site checks to ensure that all necessary furniture and facilities are in place and operational, the voting station is set up correctly, security is in place, all signs and posters are displayed as required, and any crowd control barriers or other such equipment are correctly erected. (see Site Checks);

• staff checks to ensure that all staff are present on time, any required replacement staff are requested, staff are allocated and given a final briefing on their duties (see Staffing Checks);

• materials checks to ensure that the correct quantities of materials are available and have been laid out for use (see Materials Checks);

• equipment checks to ensure that voting and communications equipment is functioning (see Equipment Checks);

• time check to synchronise watches and clocks in the voting station to an accurate source (such as telephone time service or by radio) to ensure that the voting station opening time is punctual.

Any problems found that cannot be resolved on the spot should be immediately reported by the voting station manager to the appropriate election administration office for action.

Readiness Reporting

Local and regional election administration offices should have a readiness-reporting schedule implemented for all voting stations under their control. Contact should be established with all voting stations prior to commencement time for assurance that all readiness checks have been undertaken and of their readiness to open on time.

Time of Opening of Voting Station

The voting station should open for voting exactly at the legally defined and advertised commencement time.

Where essential material has not arrived in time for opening at the designated time (e.g., the ballots, equipment such as ink and lights for multiple voting controls, or voters lists) the voting station should remain closed until enough of these become available to maintain effective voting integrity and service. (This would depend both on the nature of the material missing and any immediate threat to security if the voting station remains closed).

To cover situations where voting starts late at a voting station, provision in the legal framework for authorisation to extend voting hours by a similar period, if necessary to process all voters, would preferably be available. Contingency plans  should be prepared to cover such an eventuality.

Site Checks

Prior to commencement of voting, the voting station area must be completely checked to ensure that it is ready to function effectively at the time voting opens.

Even where the voting station has been set up earlier, a final check of readiness should take place. Issues that the voting station manager needs to ensure are checked include:

• that all voting station furniture and equipment is correctly arranged according to the approved layout for the voting station;

• ballot boxes (unsealed at this stage) are in their correct positions;

• gates or doors leading into the grounds in which the voting station is situated are unlocked (but not the entrance and exit to the voting station itself until the time for voting to commence);

• that any lighting or other power facilities required for voting station operations are working;

• there is free access to all parts of the voting station, e.g., keys supplied will open any locked doors to rooms required for voting or cupboards required for safe storage of material;

• directional signs and other external signs identifying the voting station are in place;

• establishing personal contact with any security forces allocated to the voting station area and ensuring that they are present according to security plans;

• ensuring any barriers around the voting station for security, crowd control, or delineation of a "no-campaigning" area have been erected;

• any required voter information posters, directional signs, and national symbols are in place inside the voting station;

• that any areas that may be hazardous to voters, such as steep steps, slippery floors, and the like, are clearly marked.

In high security risk areas, checking that risk prevention measures as defined in the security plan, such as sweeping the voting station for explosives or arms, have been implemented may also be necessary.

Staffing Checks

At the appointed time for staff to report for duty, the voting station manager should:

• check which staff are present and also check their contract or accreditation documentation;

• contact the local administration office to advise of staff who have not reported for duty and seek replacements;

• allocate the specific duties (or reinforce prior instruction) to each staff member;

• be aware of staff who have never worked in a voting station so that extra supervisory attention can be paid to them during the initial hours of voting;

• ensure that all staff are wearing their identity badges or other means of identification.

Briefing for Staff

It is also preferable that the voting station manager gives a final briefing to staff prior to the commencement of voting. This reinforcement of procedures and any special information regarding the voting station can be of great assistance in minimising errors, particularly early in the day when there may be many conflicting calls on the voting station manager's time. The briefing should cover:

• introduction of supervising staff;

• reinforcement that staff's role is to provide quality service to electors;

• any late instructions or procedural changes received from the electoral management body;

• reinforcement of basic voting procedures—and security; secrecy of voting; voter eligibility checks, such as underage voters ; integrity controls on and methods of issuing ballots; location of spare materials; controlling voter traffic flow; voter, voting staff, party and candidate representative, and observer rights and responsibilities;

• maintaining the cleanliness of the voting station;

• specific characteristics of the voters likely to attend the voting station--age, nationality, language, and the like--and how these may impact staff's performance of their duties;

• facilities in the voting station, such as toilets, washroom facilities, drinks, rest areas;

• rosters for staff breaks;

• emergency procedures;

• reminder of any administrative requirements for staff, for example, signing of attendance record, completion of payroll sheets, or transport arrangements.

In the interests of transparency (and also to use time efficiently by pre-empting potential individual questions), any party or candidate representatives and observers present at the voting station should be invited to listen to the staff briefing.

Materials Checks

No matter what checks may have been instituted on receipt of material at the voting station, a final check should be conducted prior to the commencement of voting to ensure that all material required is present.

If a voting station is set up prior to voting day, it may be possible to lay out some material in its appropriate positions--excluding ballots, certified voters lists, and other highly accountable material--before the morning of voting day. Prior to the opening of the voting station, ballots, ballot envelopes (where used), and voters lists should be distributed to the relevant tables.

Ballot Accounting

Strict accounting controls must be implemented on ballots (or ballot envelopes) received at the voting station. For the accuracy of ballot (or ballot envelope) reconciliations after the close of voting , it is vital that all ballots received at the voting station are individually check counted, to ensure that the number actually supplied is recorded:

• Even where ballots are supplied in booklets, with numbered stubs, errors can occur during production of the booklets.

• Where more than one person is issuing ballots or ballot envelopes, or not all ballots/envelopes are allocated to the ballot issuing area prior to commencement of voting, strict accounting records must be kept by the voting station manager of the quantities and times of allocation of ballots/envelopes to specific issuing staff.

• Whether done as a single allocation prior to voting, or by multiple allocations during voting hours, each allocation for ballots/envelopes should be check counted by the staff member to whom it is allocated. Particularly where a multiple allocation method is used, these staff should also maintain records of ballots/envelopes issued to them for use.

Materials Checks

Pre-voting materials checks required would include that:

• all ballot or ballot envelope issuing officers have received and counted their ballot or ballot envelope allocations and have been issued with all other necessary equipment (such as official marks with which to stamp ballots or envelopes, where these are used);

• figures for ballots (or if applicable ballot envelopes) on hand for the commencement of voting have been entered in ballot reconciliation records;

• all forms and other envelopes required for voting are available and appropriately distributed to staff tables in the voting station;

• voter information materials are in place for distribution to voters;

• voters lists are distributed to the appropriate staff and given a final check to ensure they contain a complete set of pages and are ready for use;

• any ballots, ballot envelopes, or ballot material such as seals kept in reserve are in a secure container in a location that can be constantly supervised;

• if ballots are to be manually marked, a pen or pencil is firmly attached in each voting compartment;

• general stationery supplies (e.g., pens, pencils, note paper) are distributed to all staff.

Equipment Checks

All equipment to be used during voting should be fully tested prior to commencement of voting to ensure that it is functioning. The range of testing to be undertaken will depend on the reliance placed on equipment for voting, but possible likely requirements would include:

• testing communications equipment--telephones, personal radios, fax machines (if supplied)--to ensure that the communication network is operating to all locations the voting station manager may need to communicate with and that the actual devices are working;

• where multiple voting is controlled by marking voters hands with ink, ensuring that any equipment needed for this, such as ink rollers and special lighting equipment, is functioning properly, and any spare equipment supplied is tested and ready for use;

• all voting compartments have been set up correctly;

• emergency power supply generators, if required, are fuelled up and ready for operation;

• Where machines or computers are used for voting, ensuring that these have been correctly installed.

Each voting machine or computer terminal should be tested by processing identifiable, distinctive test ballots/cards through the machines or test transactions through computers to ensure that both the equipment and any necessary software or communications lines are fully operable.

Communications tests to and from voting stations should be to a planned schedule controlled by electoral district managers. Where communications facilities to be used for voting are not in the actual room used for voting, access availability to the premises containing the fixed line phone or other facility must be checked.

Ballot Boxes

Just prior to the commencement of voting, the ballot boxes to be put into use immediately should be displayed empty to the staff and any party or candidate representatives or other accredited observers present. Once they are satisfied that the boxes are empty, the boxes should be sealed with the locks, plastic tie seals, paper seals, or other materials used.

If locks or plastic tie seals are used, the numbers of the seals or locks should be recorded and any party or candidate representatives or other observers present invited to witness the record. In the absence of such observers, staff members should witness.

If locks are used, the keyholes should then be sealed with a paper or other seal. If paper seals are used on ballot boxes, their numbers (if any) should be similarly noted and witnesses invited to sign across the seals. Under no circumstances should seals be then broken or ballot boxes opened until after the close of voting.

Only those ballot boxes to be used at the commencement of voting should be closed and sealed prior to the commencement of voting. If additional ballot boxes are required to be put into use during voting hours, the above routine must be undertaken immediately before they are put into use.

Where voting machines or computers are to be used to record votes, similar procedures to verify that voter count or other recording mechanisms are set to zero (or any start record number data recorded) should be undertaken, documented, and witnessed by party or candidate representatives and observers present, or in their absence, other voting station officials.

Ballot boxes, voting machines, or computers, once sealed or verified for voting, should not be removed from the voting station until after the close of voting, or the count (if held at the voting station), and then only strictly in accordance with procedures for their removal.

Voter Service

Voting stations are the public faces of the electoral management body and voting day the one time when the majority of the public will come face-to-face with formal democratic processes.

The public's experiences in voting stations--how they are treated, the perceived efficiency and integrity of voting station operations--will colour their attitude about the effectiveness of the electoral management body, and often the democratic process itself.

Voting hours operations are a massive exercise in voter service, not just a blind application of rules for the benefit of officials. Under the pressures, within the tight time frames common for elections, of constructing a large network of voting locations, staffing and supplying them, and ensuring that procedures are applied with integrity, administrators can at times lose sight of service issues. The service aspect is of equal importance to, and enhances, integrity.

As with any customer-based activity, poor voter service will drive the customers away. Experiences with long queues, rude or unknowledgeable officials, complex and ill-explained procedures and materials, inflexible facilities, and lack of accuracy in registration records can contribute to decisions not to participate in voting and, hence, in democracy.

Service considerations are an essential component of all stages of planning and preparation for voting, including:

• the voting procedures and methods used and the range of voting facilities provided so as to stimulate voter participation.

• the staffing levels allocated to voting facilities 

• the voter information provided to voters 

• the user-friendliness of design and the availability of election materials and equipment (see Materials and Equipment);

• the training provided to voting station staff

• the measures taken to assure voter safety

Planning Considerations

In the end, no matter what preparations are made, service and integrity rest on the practicality of voting procedures and the quality of their implementation by voting station staff on voting day. Elements that need to be carefully considered in providing voter service during voting hours include:

• voting station locations, size, and facilities—(voting station area, staffing, materials, and equipment allocations) should be of sufficient capacity to cope with the expected number of voters

• voting station layouts should create a one way flow of voters from the entrance, through eligibility checks, issue of ballot materials, to voting compartments, casting of ballots, and thence to the exit

Service Implementation

In implementing plans for voter service, attention needs to be paid to:

• methods of controlling crowds of voters waiting to vote to promote an orderly, efficient, and friendly atmosphere in the voting station, using voting station layouts that encourage a logical flow of voters through the voting station, and ensuring that waiting time to vote is minimised 

• determining eligibility of voters to vote speedily, accurately, and courteously, and in a manner that minimises possible disruption to other voters.

• the manner of issuing ballots and casting votes (see Issue and Casting of Ballots);

• provision of information to voters that will assist their understanding of the voting process (See  Informing and Assisting Voters) and providing assistance to voters with physical disabilities or literacy or language problems;

• systems to identify voters who may need further information or assistance early, before they reach the eligibility check and accountable voting materials issue area and possibly delay other voters' progress;

• helping people who turn out to vote at a voting station at which they are not eligible to vote ;

• motivating and supervising voting station officials in the performance of their duties (see Voting Station Staff Management);

• providing a secure voting station environment (see Security in Voting Stations).

Crowd and Queue Control

Ensuring an orderly flow of voters through the voting station promotes efficiency of voting services and enhances the maintenance of security in the voting station. Time spent waiting to vote is often the major factor that voters remember of their voting experience.

Having to endure a long or disorderly wait to vote can be a significant negative factor in voters' perceptions of the efficiency and integrity of the election:

• Long queues for voting are not necessarily the only problem. Slow moving queues, no matter what length, are also to be avoided.

• A large number of voters inside a voting station is not a problem, if the size of the voting station area is large and the control mechanisms are effective.

• A small number of voters milling around aimlessly in a voting station, with no clear idea of where they should go next, can cause delays and confusion.

• Where voters are accustomed to voting station procedures, speed of voter processing can be increased and voters' waiting time and requirements for crowd and queue control are diminished.

• The fewer voters that need individual attention from voting station officials for procedures to be explained, the more familiar vote styles are, and the greater efficiencies are both in staffing requirements and processing, the more speed can be attained.

Thus creating voting processes and procedures that are sustainable and stable in the longer term will considerably aid effectiveness in voter service.

Crowd Control Focus

There are four distinct areas and functions in the voting station that need to be considered in organising effective crowd control measures:

• queues of voters waiting to be checked for voter eligibility and issued with voting materials, which may extend outside the voting station itself and require assistance from security forces in external crowd control;

• the area between ballot materials issuing tables and the voting compartments;

• voters seeking information or assistance or being redirected within the voting station;

• control of voting station exits.

Factors That Will Aid Crowd and Queue Control

There are some crucial factors that need to be considered in providing an effective framework for crowd and queue control inside a voting station, including:

• the size of the voting station and the appropriateness of its staffing and facilities for the expected number of voters;

• the effectiveness of the voting station layout;

• allocation of staff to crowd control duties;

• control of entry to the voting station, including the use of restricted entry areas around the voting station;

• early identification of and facilities for voters who may be slower to process;

• use of clear signs, voting information posters, and crowd control barriers;

• making voting station officials and other authorised persons in the voting station clearly distinguishable, through use of badges, armbands, caps, or other distinctive apparel;

• use of more than one voter eligibility checking and accountable voting materials issuing table.

Attention to these issues can ensure effective management of large numbers of voters through a voting station in a single day.

Allocation of Staff to Crowd and Queue Control

Crowd and queue control duties should be assigned to specific voting station officials. This may not necessarily mean staff have this as a sole task--for example, in all but very large voting stations or high security risk situations, the staff member guarding ballot boxes may also be able to ensure that voters do not congregate around or attempt to re-enter through exits.

In all but the smallest voting stations, control of queues of voters waiting to vote would generally be assigned to a specific official. However, in enveloped ballot systems, where envelopes are issued on entry to the voting station, this entry control official could also undertake queue control functions.

In other systems, depending on the method of voter identity checking used, and where the issuing tables for accountable voting materials are located, queue control could also be combined with control of the voting station entrance. In very small voting stations, it could be undertaken by the voting station's manager or any voter information officer allocated.

Voting Station Staff Crowd and Queue Control Functions

In instituting effective crowd and queue control measures within the voting station, all voting station staff have a role, not just those assigned to voter queue control duties. This is not just a matter of control; effective handling of voters queued to vote would enhance service to voters.

Staff responsible for entry and/or voter queue control must ensure that:

• Queues are kept in orderly lines, and particularly that voters are not permitted to congregate around the issuing area for accountable voting materials;

• voters have identity or other required documents ready for eligibility checks;

• voters are directed to the voting materials issuing table (or the correct one, if more than one is operating) as soon as it is vacant;

• they have an active engagement with the voters waiting to vote, patrol the queues on a regular basis;

• monitoring the time spent by voters in queueseither on a regular, formal basis, through the use of time stamped cards presented to the voter on arrival at the voting station and also time stamped when the voter is issued with a ballot, or, less formally, through monitoring of a random sample of voters' progress by an official using a watch; service evaluation and improvements can be based on an objective foundation.

These officials can play a large role in enhancing the service to voters and the efficiency of voting materials issue through such activities as:

• escorting "priority" voters to the head of the queue;

• actively providing information on voting process requirements;

• actively attempting to identify any problems with regard to eligibility or voting processes that voters may have and attempting to have these resolved before the voter reaches the ballot issue table;

• identifying voters with language difficulties, or who may require assistance in voting, and arranging for assistance for these voters.

Issuing of Voting Materials

The efficiency of methods used by staff checking voter eligibility and issuing ballots is a major determinant of how fast voter queues are processed. As far as possible, any disputes or difficulties with voters at these points should be directed to senior voting station officials to prevent disruption of service to the bulk of voters. Issuing staff should ensure that:

• Where voters' names cannot be found on the voters list within a reasonable time, assistance is sought from supervisory or voter information officials--arguments over eligibility should not be allowed to hold up the voter queue.

• Voters with language problems or needing assistance in voting are referred quickly to the voting station manager or other senior information staff.

• To prevent congestion in the voting compartment area, a voter is not issued with accountable voting materials (ballots or envelopes) unless a voting compartment is empty.

Congestion may lead to breaches of voting secrecy requirements through voters attempting to complete their ballot outside a voting compartment.

Exit Control

Staff responsible for control of the voting station exit must ensure that voters leave the voting station immediately after depositing their ballot in the ballot box (or after lodging a computer or voting machine vote).

Monitoring by Managers

The voting station manager and any other supervisory staff must constantly monitor the length of time voters are waiting in queues, entry control, and activity at the ballot issuing tables. Issues needing particular attention include:

• checking the overall number of voters in the voting station at any time and advising entry control staff of any need to slow down or speed up entry rates;

• being aware of any difficulties or disputes arising at ballot issuing tables and moving quickly to ensure that these do not affect voter flow;

• in voting stations with multiple voting materials issuing tables, the relative speed of issue at each table.

Where tables deal with separate alphabetical or other divisions of the voters list, inefficient or tired staff at one table can lead to a long queue, and resentment at relatively slow processing, for one segment of voters. Flexibility in systems to allow rotation of staff between the different tables or functions will help maintain overall voter service and goodwill. Such rotation will require a more complex system of maintaining staff accountability for voting materials issue.

Perimeters Around Voting Stations

Legal delineation of an area around the voting station available only to voters, security forces and accredited party or candidate representatives, observers or guests, but not to party campaigners or any other persons not attending to vote, can aid both crowd control and voting station security.

The appropriate radius of this area will vary according to the number of voters assigned to the voting station and the security situation. In various jurisdictions the radius of this exclusion zone may range from a few metres to several hundred metres7. Where buildings used as voting stations (such as schools) are set in fenced grounds, the fence line could also be legally defined as the voting station area. Such perimeters--established with rope, tape, or other barriers--can be of use in distancing any disturbances and crowd problems from the voting area itself.

In some jurisdictions, judicious use of staff and distribution of copies of voters lists to officials stationed at the perimeter are used to assist in advising intending voters if they do not have any required personal documents, have turned out at the wrong voting station, or are not registered, before they join a voting queue, and thus ease crowd control burdens within the voting station.

However, patrolling such perimeters can be very resource-intensive and impractical to enforce if set at a considerable distance from the voting station itself.

Control of Voting Station Entry

Entry to the voting station should be controlled to ensure only those with authorised access to the voting station--voters and other accredited persons--are allowed to enter, and that the number of voters within the voting station area at any time is of manageable proportions. All voting station officials, party or candidate representatives, observers, and security staff authorised to be present in a voting station should:

• be issued an accreditation document or card which must be presented on entry to the voting station;

• prominently wear a badge or other article of apparel that clearly distinguishes them from voters and indicates their function while in the voting station.

Stationing of a voting station official at the voting station entrance to check voters' identity documents can be the most efficient method of controlling voter entry. The nature of the entry check will be in part determined by voter eligibility requirements and the ballot issue system, and in part by efficiency considerations.

Entry control is easy to achieve in systems where voters must produce a document--a general identity card or a voter identity card of some description--to gain entry to the voting station. The issue is how far should the checks on entry extend to achieve a balance between strict entry control, efficiency, and accessibility to voters.

Rigorous control of voting station entry will also be impossible in systems where maximum accessibility to voting processes is the overriding goal--for example, where there is no requirement to show an identity card on entry, where voters lists are not unique for each voting station, or where unregistered persons may register at a voting station or cast a tendered or provisional vote.

Basic Check

The simplest level of entry check is merely to ensure that voters have  the documentation required for voting.

Where such documentation is a general purpose identity card, or a voter identity card that does not identify the voting station at which the voter is eligible to vote, this check may only filter out those ineligible to vote or unable to attempt to vote until they return with their identity documentation.

It may allow persons who are not registered or whose registration does not entitle them to vote at the voting station to enter, and transfers the need to deal with these persons to officials controlling queues inside the voting station or issuing voting materials. It does reduce delays for voters entering the voting station.

Higher Level Checks

Where effectiveness of crowd control inside voting stations or integrity of issue of ballot materials is perceived as a potential problem, more thorough checks on entry to the voting station may be appropriate:

• Rigorous entry checks can be maintained if all voters are issued voter identification cards showing their appropriate electoral district and voting station.

• However, due regard must be paid to voter accessibility and equity issues, so as not to exclude voters who have been the victims of error in production of official materials.

Use of Voters List as Entry Control

In systems where voters are not issued voter identity cards, a copy of the voters list is sometimes used at the entrance of the voting station to determine eligibility for entry. However, there are significant disadvantages to this method:

• It can add to delays in entering the voting station, particularly where the quality of compilation or accuracy of details on voters lists' is poor.

• It is inefficient since it duplicates the effort of other voting station officials, as the vital voters list check should occur when voters are issued accountable ballot material.

However, checking against the voters list at the voting station entrance can have some advantages, though these need to be carefully assessed against the above disadvantages:

• It can provide early notification to voters that they cannot be easily found on the voters list, or are not on the voters list, and allow these voters to be immediately directed to senior officials for assistance and information.

• It moves the area where major disputes are more likely to occur with voters away from the area issuing accountable voting materials.

Use of Maps for Entry Control

Use of voting district maps at the voting station entrance and questioning of voters as to their address of registration can be an effective method of redirecting voters who have turned out at the wrong voting station.

This can be particularly important where voters' lists have only recently been introduced and where there are doubts about the general awareness of voters of the correct voting station to attend, due to new procedures or changes to electoral boundaries.

Numbers within Voting Station

Numbers of voters entering the voting station need to be controlled to the extent that orderly queues are maintained, and so that the number of voters inside the voting station does not prevent voting station officials, party or candidate representatives, and other observers from having a clear view of all voting compartments and ballot boxes.

Some relaxing of strict control of numbers entering the voting station may be required immediately before the time for close of voting if there are still voters outside the voting station waiting to vote.

Weapons

Confiscating weapons carried by voters is a task that should be carried out by security forces outside the voting station rather than by voting station officials.

In environments where this is likely to be an issue, liaison between local security forces and the voting station manager on optimal methods for ensuring weapons are surrendered, and establishment of secure storage and collection points for surrendered weapons, will be required.

Signs

Signs and barriers can be used to assist voters in their flow through the voting station and in keeping queues orderly. Signs should prominently identify the areas and tables for:

• issuing voting material;

• the voting station manager's desk;

• issuing special votes;

• information, language, or other assistance services;

• the ballot box (es).

It is important that signs used are comprehensible to all voters; particularly in areas of lower literacy, symbols should be used, rather than relying totally on words.

Where there is more than one table for issuing voting materials, and these are to deal with different sub-sets of voters on an alphabetical or geographic residence basis, there must be clear, visible signs above or by each table and at the head of the voter queue for each table indicating the correct table and queue for voters to join.

In all cases, placing of signs and markers for heads of voter queues some two to three metres from the relevant issuing table will prevent congestion around the voting materials issuing area.

Barriers

Barriers can be used to maintain a controlled queuing area and keep voters moving in the correct direction through the voting station. Use of a lightweight, flexible, barrier system, such as rope, modular cardboard or lightweight plastic poles/stands, or even road-marking barriers, can allow maximum effective use of available queuing space by compressing queues into a zigzag or similar formation.

Barriers are particularly useful for exit and entry control where voting stations have a combined entrance/exit. They can be similarly used to ensure that voters do not re-enter voting stations after depositing their ballot in the ballot box.

The need for crowd control barriers, and the staff resources that need to be devoted to crowd control, will vary according to the cultural environment. In societies where patience and order are a significant part of the general cultural ethos there may be a minimal requirement for crowd control measures.

Efficiency Measures

Speed of processing of voters and voter capacity of voting stations can be increased by:

• combining voter eligibility checking and voting material issue at the same location;

• having more than one voter eligibility checking/voting material issuing table, allowing simultaneous processing of more than one voter;

• Where voters must complete a ballot for more than one election, issuing ballots or accountable envelopes for all relevant elections simultaneously (either as separate ballots or combined on the one ballot).

Making voters go sequentially to different tables for eligibility checking and voting material issue for each of simultaneous elections being held in a voting station has the potential to cause confusion and slow down voter processing. Some rare exceptions to this may occur where there are major differences in eligibility criteria for different elections being held simultaneously.

Splitting Voter Queues

Where several streams are used for eligibility checking and voting material issue  it would be more usual for the voters list to be split on an alphabetical basis by surname, with voters directed to a queue formed in front of the appropriate table. Where this form of organisation is used, care needs to be taken that:

• the voters lists have been printed so that a fresh sheet is commenced with each alphabetical family name division;

• the split of the list allows approximately equal numbers of voters to be serviced by each issuing table--this will depend on frequency of family names: for example, in many societies, a straight A-M, N-Z split of the list will give widely unequal parts.

Local electoral management officials, while planning voting station operations, should determine appropriate splits for each voting station.

Use of Bank-Style Queuing

Where there is more than one eligibility checking/voting materials issue table in a voting station, voter flow can be most efficiently handled by using a single voter queue.

Officials would then direct voters to the first vacant eligibility checking/materials issue table, rather than splitting voters into separate individual queues based on an alphabetical split of family names or on address of residence.

However, this method's greater efficiency in speed of processing has to be balanced against other cost, management, and integrity considerations that can be adversely affected by its implementation:

• Instead of printing a single voters list for each voting station, that may be split to create different voter streams, additional complete voters lists for the voting station will be required, with consequent additional print and control costs.

• Being marked on a voters list can no longer be a solitary, primary control to prevent multiple voting; though it can be used as a means of identifying voters who vote more than once.

• Additional controls, such as surrendering of voter identification cards or marking voters with ink, are required for prevention, with the additional materials, or equipment and staffing costs involved.

Voting station management needs to be of high quality to take full advantage of the service flexibility possible.

Provided that the voters list format, and measures for materials control and ballot validation are sufficiently flexible, using the voting station manager or another staff member at a temporary eligibility checking/materials issue table can assist in clearing longer voter queues at peak-periods. This is more cost-effective than allocating additional full-time staff that may be under-employed for the whole day.

Other Planning Measures

There are other highly important planning measures that will assist in crowd and queue control. These would include:

• pro-active liaison between local officials of the electoral management body and political, community, and employer groups to determine if and when to expect large influxes of voters, through organised transport or other arrangements, and attempts to negotiate scheduling of these so that they do not arrive at the same time;

• maintenance by the electoral management body of individual voting station statistics of voter turnout by time period, and of queuing time for a sample of voters, so that resource allocations (e.g., the number of voting compartments required or part-time staff) can be effectively matched to peak voting periods.

Determination of Eligibility to Vote

One of the major functions of voting station officials is to determine whether voters turning out to vote at a voting station are in fact eligible to vote at that voting station. Eligibility requirements that need to be satisfied for a voter to be issued a ballot need to be clearly specified in legislation.

The effectiveness of the application of procedures for determining if a person is eligible to vote in an election is one of the crucial determinants of the overall integrity of the election process.

Steps in Determining Eligibility

Three significant questions must be answered in determining an intending voter's eligibility to vote:

• Is the person who he claims to be? Either through presentation of identity documents or by other means, is the voting station official satisfied that the voter is not impersonating someone else?

• Is the voter on the voters list for that voting station, or otherwise qualified to vote at that voting station?

• Does it show that the voter already voted in this election, and if so does this preclude another ballot being issued?

These are best undertaken as an integrated check, immediately before the voter is issued a ballot (or ballot envelope, when these are the controlled materials). In all circumstances, eligibility checking, including any checks of voter identity, should be undertaken by a properly authorised voting station official, not by police or other security personnel stationed at the voting station.

There is no generic system for implementing these controls in all circumstances. The intensity of procedures adopted will depend on a number of factors, including:

• risk analyses of possible manipulations;

• the level of community trust;

• accuracy and availability of relevant documentation.

What is appropriate in transitional elections may be excessive and heavy handed in environments with a history of election integrity.

Importance of Consistency

One important factor is that the eligibility tests are consistently applied by voting station officials, both throughout all voting stations and to all persons attending to vote.

Inconsistency in application will raise valid questions about election integrity. Achievement of consistency can be of particular importance where:

• there is a range of identity documentation, or documents possibly of unverifiable authenticity, that voters may use to prove eligibility;

• there are inaccuracies in voters lists, through errors in compilation, or voters having moved since the compilation of the lists.

Reasonably equitable voter eligibility checking systems take account of such errors (for example that, the elector's name may be misspelled or reversed, address details may have been erroneously transcribed to the certified voters list or may not be current) and would err on the side of the voter, allowing any significant perceived problems to be dealt with by means of challenge to the election.

Where such subjective judgment has to be applied by voting station officials, clear guidelines for their actions, and supervision to ensure that these are implemented consistently, are necessary.

• The overall level of integrity provided by voter eligibility checking will very much depend on the quality of the voters lists.

• It is also likely to be easier to check voter eligibility in smaller voting stations with staff drawn from the local community.

Basic Approaches

In general, there are two ways of approaching voter eligibility checks:

• in an active manner, by requiring voters to prove that they are eligible, that is, by requiring voters to produce some defined identity document, to show in some manner that they have not already voted in the election and possibly to have an exact match with details recorded on the voters list;

• in a passive manner, by relying on an oral or written statement to a voting station official by voters regarding their identity, the match with details on the voters list and that they have not already voted. Appropriate and cost-effective procedures could combine elements of each of these two approaches.

The basic consideration is: are eligibility checking mechanisms to be very high integrity checks that will absolutely prevent anyone not eligible from voting, very possibly at the expense of some eligible voters being turned away, or are they to be more realistically targeted at eliminating significant or systematic manipulation, through maintaining some flexibility in order to maximise participation?

Efficiency of the Eligibility Checking Process

Effectiveness of eligibility checks can be enhanced if:

• the eligibility check is carried out by voting station officials immediately before, and at the same table as, the issue of accountable voting materials (ballots and/or envelopes);

• there is opportunity for officials to challenge the eligibility of any intending voter, and either to have this adjudicated by the voting station manager (or other senior voting station official) following the swearing of a declaration as to eligibility by the voter, or to allow challenged voters to vote only by way of a provisional ballot.

In some systems, party or candidate representatives may also challenge whether a voter is eligible to be issued voting material, though more often this right is restricted to challenging inclusion of these votes in counts.

Voter eligibility checks can efficiently be applied by a single voting station official with the combined functions of eligibility checking, marking the voters list, and issuing voting materials (ballots and/or ballot envelopes). However, it is common that functions of eligibility checking and ballot or ballot envelope issue are assigned to separate officials.

On balance, this may be a more costly method. It may provide some additional integrity through cross-checking between the staff but is often the result of lack of confidence in staff professionalism or additional extraneous tasks, adding little to integrity, being loaded on to these officials.

If multiple voting controls include the marking of voters with special ink, a second voter eligibility control official engaged in checking voters for ink marks and for applying the ink will generally be required.

Voters Eligible for More than One Vote

Under some systems of elections at local government levels, voters may be entitled to vote more than once, in respect of their domicile and also of any other rated property owned or leased by the voter. While the philosophy behind such systems may be open to question, where they are used, the compilation of certified voters lists, preparation of voters lists, and voting station procedures for determining voter eligibility and preventing multiple voting will need to be adapted to allow such voters their legal entitlement to more than one vote.

Similarly, in systems where proxy voting  is allowed, proof of eligibility will need to be established in regard to each vote being claimed by proxy voters.

Multiple voting controls based on marking voters with ink will be more difficult to implement where proxy voting is allowed.

Voter Identity Checks

The first step in checking voter eligibility is to determine if voters are who they claim to be. This should be established before moving to check if the voter's name appears on the voters list at the voting station.

It would be more usual, and generally seen as necessary for voting integrity (for public perceptions, even if not to combat real risks) for voters to show a specified document or documents to prove their identity. The most simple and cost-effective means of checking voter identity is through requiring voters to present a nationally recognised identity card of high integrity.

Determination of Valid Identity Documents

Whatever documents may be used for establishing identity in the voting station, the identification system must maintain equity and, as far as possible, simplicity in defining the relevant document or documents required to prove identity. In implementing proof of identity systems for voting there are some useful principles to use as a guide:

• It is best that a single, unique form of document be used as the basis of establishing voter identity.

• Where a range of documents, or a combination of documents is acceptable, the range should be kept to the minimum required to cover all eligible voters. This issue is more likely to arise in post-conflict situations where administrative identity systems have broken down and there is insufficient time or finances to develop specific voter identity cards for the election. The acceptance of both military and civilian documents as identifiers should generally be avoided.

Where a range of documents may be used to prove identity, additional controls on multiple voting, such as marking the voter with ink, may be required, particularly if voters lists are not of high quality.

• Eligible voters must have had equitable opportunity to obtain the identity document(s) required for voting. (This may be important where elections are rushed as a conflict resolution mechanism in post-conflict or new state situations.)

• The identity document or documents required should not be easily forged.

• Documents bearing a photograph or other high integrity personal characteristics of the voter would preferably be used.

Without these, the documents may be too easily transferable and add nothing to voting integrity.

Using signed documents and requiring some form of signature check (on an application or receipt for voting materials) against an identity document has significant disadvantages; it will slow the voting process, is not reliable (officials are not handwriting experts), and creates problems for illiterate voters.

• The required document(s) must be public knowledge and voting station officials made totally aware of what is acceptable.

• Where a range of identity documents is acceptable, voters must be treated equitably no matter what acceptable identity document they choose to use.

Voter Identification Cards

It is becoming more common that voter identity is established by showing some form of receipt for voter registration or a voter identification card issued for the election. This additional measure may be particularly useful where there is no general national identity card system of sufficient integrity.

Production of a high integrity voter identification card eliminates the need for any other proof of identity to be shown in the voting station (instead these checks are undertaken at the registration stage).

Surrendering or cancelling of the card in the voting station can also provide an effective multiple voting control. High integrity cards would normally bear a non-removable/alterable photograph of the voter. Development of other voter identification systems (using developments in technology for thumb print recognition, voice and retinal imaging) is also current.

However, in determining whether specific voter identification cards are required, all associated costs and the longer-term sustainability of production must be considered.

Their use would be justified in environments where there is likely to be sufficient contention over voting eligibility that lack of a high integrity identity mechanism specifically for voting could affect overall acceptance of election outcomes.

Applications to Vote

High integrity control on voter identity can be achieved, where no national identity card system exists, by requiring each voter to complete an application to vote (or finalise an application pre-printed from registration records) on arrival at the voting station.

The details on this application, including voter's signature, are then compared with original registration records provided in the voting station to determine if the voter should be issued voting material.

While this method can achieve integrity in assessing voter eligibility and preventing multiple voting, it is a comparatively slow, cumbersome method of processing voters, with big disadvantages in societies of lower literacy and requires voting station officials to make quick judgments on handwriting comparisons.

Declaration by Voter

There are systems in which identity checking consists solely of voters orally declaring to the voting station official that they are who they claim to be, and there is little if any evidence that this openness is abused.

While this may be appropriate in societies where there is a tradition of political restraint, transparency, and community trust, it is not a model that is generally applicable.

Location of Identity Checking

Where documents proving identity are to be shown at the voting station by voters, checks can effectively be instituted in two stages:

1. An initial check on entry to the voting station, to ensure that voters have the relevant documents with them and turning away any voters without the required documentation (for discussion of voting station entry controls, see Crowd and Queue Control). Service to voters can be enhanced by questioning voters on entry, or while queuing to vote, to determine if they are at the correct voting station and advise them accordingly (see Crowd and Queue Control).
2. A check of identity as part of a full eligibility check by the official controlling the voters list, prior to being issued a ballot and/or ballot envelope. Voters should be asked to present the required identification documents to the official for inspection.

Eligibility to Vote at a Voting Station

Following confirmation of the voter's identity, the next step in establishing eligibility to vote is to determine whether the voter is eligible to vote at that voting station.

It is preferable that certified voters’ lists be used for this check, rather than relying purely on voter identification cards or on some external source prepared for some other purpose, such as civil lists. Inclusion of a voter on the voters list used in the voting station would generally be regarded as proof of a voter's right to vote at that voting station; if the list includes voters believed to be ineligible, this may be a matter for later challenge.

Checking Against Voters List

In undertaking this check, the voters list should be searched for the voter's name (with reference to the identity document provided by the voter where these are required), and if found, the name and particulars confirmed with the voter. The voters list is then marked to indicate that the voter is issued a ballot. Depending on how the lists are to be later processed, the manner of marking may differ.

Where manual reconciliations of voters marked on voters lists to ballots and/or accountable ballot envelopes issued are to be undertaken, it would be usual and prudent to draw a line through both the voter's name and serial number on the certified voters list. If certified voters lists are later to be processed electronically, special marking means may be required.

Standard Marking of Names on Voters Lists

Care should be taken to ensure that all voters' names are marked accurately and in the same manner. Some issues to consider include:

• Marking of voters on the list should be clear and precise to aid calculation, after the close of voting, of total voters supposedly issued with ballots and/or accountable ballot envelopes (for use in reconciliations),

• The voter's entry on the list should not be totally obliterated; there may be a need to refer to it later in case an incorrect marking has been made.

• Where a voters list entry has been erroneously fully or partially ruled through, this should be clearly indicated by the voting station official through use of an initialled standard mark.

• Use of a ruler can assist the voting station official to mark cleanly through the voter's name and serial number, as long as writing implements with non-smudging ink are used.

• Accountability for marking of voters lists is important.

Particularly where there is more than one official with the duty of marking names off voters lists, the names of the officials responsible should be clearly indicated on the cover of each voters list or section of the list.

Common Problems Encountered

There are a number of common problems that may arise with checking of voters' names against the voters list.

Hopefully, as many as possible of these potential problems will have been ascertained before the voter reaches the table for eligibility checking and for receiving ballots (or ballot envelopes), and either solved or the voter directed to the voting station manager or voter information officials. Where the voter's name cannot be found on the voters list, this could indicate that:

• the voter is not registered at all;

• the voter is registered at another voting station;

• there is some difference in the name/details provided by the voter, and the details as they appear on the certified voters list;

• there has been an error in preparation of the voters list, resulting in omission of the voter's details.

Where the voter's name and details cannot immediately be matched to an entry on the voters list, the voting station official should not make an immediate assumption that the voter is not eligible to vote.

This is a poor service standard to provide; the principle of maximising valid participation in the election should be kept in mind.

However, lengthy checking of the voters list by eligibility checking officials can considerably delay other voters. If, after a reasonable check, the voter cannot be found on the voters list, the voter should be directed to the voting station manager for assistance.

If the voting station manager finds that the voter is listed on the voters list, the voter would then be returned to the voting materials issuing area. If the voter's name is not found, the voting station manager would most likely undertake the appropriate action for voters not on the voting station's list (for further discussion of this issue, see Voters Not Found on Voters Lists).

Matching Voter to Voters List Entry

Where no immediate exact match to a voters list entry can be made, eligibility checking officials should carefully check the voter’s list and question the voter to ensure that:

• The voter's name has not been misspelled, or given/family names jumbled in order on the list. Care needs to be taken regarding voters from minority cultures, who may be known under different names peculiar to their culture, or whose given/family names may appear on the list in an order different from that used in their culture. Further investigation of the voter's identity documents may help clarify such an issue.

• The person has changed name since registration, for example, by taking another name after marriage. Equity would require that these voters be accepted as eligible to vote; integrity would require evidence, by means of a statement provided by the voter, or other evidence, of a link between the two names.

• The voter's current address (as shown either on an application for a ballot, the required identity card, or in questioning by voting station officials) is different from what is on the voters list.

Procedures for handling such occurrences can vary widely according to how restrictive the proof of eligibility and integrity controls required by electoral legislation are.

Where the address on the voters list can be shown to be incorrect as a result of an error in voters list processing, equity would demand the voter be allowed to vote. Where the address on the voters list and any other address provided by the voter are within the same electoral district, both integrity and equity can be served by a legal framework that still allows the voter to vote; the vote, however, may need to be supported by a formal declaration of eligibility by the voter.

Where these addresses are in different electoral districts, and it can be established that the address on the certified voters list is a recent former address of the voter, in systems which place the emphasis on maximising participation, it could still be argued that it is preferable to allow the voter to vote in some fashion, provided that there are sufficient controls on multiple voting.

Circumstances where voters whose details cannot be matched exactly on the voters list may be deemed eligible to vote need strict definition in election legislation or rules, and consistent application of procedures by voting station officials. The extent of such problems will be influenced by the comprehensiveness of voter registration measures, the quality control in voters' list preparation, and the quality of the identity documents required.

Voters Already Marked as Having Voted

Conversely, on looking up the name in the voters list, the official may find that the voter's name has already been marked as having received voting materials. This could be due to either the voter having already voted or the voter's name having previously been marked in error for another voter.

The problem is, how to separate the voting station official errors (which may well occur, particularly with families with similar or the same names at the same address) from attempts to vote more than once.

Where multiple voting controls (such as marking voters with ink, surrendering or cancelling of voter identification cards, requiring voters to sign a record when issued a ballot) have been effectively implemented, a voter who has passed these checks but who is found to be already marked as having voted on the voters list could be presumed to have been marked on the list in error.

Equitable systems would contain procedures to allow these voters to be issued with a ballot.

Where the voter’ list is the sole control on multiple voting, it is more difficult to determine correctly. These are not matters for the voting station official to determine. Assistance and decision should be sought from the voting station manager, with, no doubt, opinions from party or candidate representatives present.

Systems that would allow voters in such cases to vote in the normal fashion after swearing a declaration that they have not previously voted, or to cast a sealed tendered or provisional ballot, with later determination of validity by a court or tribunal (or where it is of trusted integrity, the electoral management body), can assist resolution in the voting station. Any such occurrences should be noted by the voting station manager in reports on voting station operations.

Announcement of Voters' Names

In some systems an additional function of the official checking the voters list is, having found the voter's name on the certified voter’s list, to call out the serial number or name of the voter for the benefit of all present including observers and party and candidate representatives.

The serial number and/or name may also be recorded on a ballot stub or list of voters. The supposed benefits are in enhanced transparency and in better control of materials issue. This practice can give rise to misperceptions about voting secrecy and is better avoided.

Prevention of Multiple Voting

As part of the voter eligibility checks, the voting station official must check that the voter has not previously voted. The intensity of this control will very much vary with the environment. Use of accurate, unique lists is the most cost-effective control to prevent multiple voting.

Provided that lists are unique and are carefully and accurately marked by voting station officials, they will immediately show when a voter is attempting to vote more than once. Where apparent multiple voters make claims that errors have been made in marking of lists, these will need to be dealt with as described under "Voters Already Marked as Having Voted" above.

In systems where each voters list is not unique, or there are doubts about their accuracy, or if national identity documentation systems are weak, additional multiple voting controls will be needed. Depending on the security risk environment and the need to allay public fears of multiple voting, this could be accomplished by methods of varying intensity, including:

• before issuing accountable voting materials, requiring all voters to make a verbal or written declaration that they have not voted before in this election;

• the surrendering or defacing of unique special voter identification cards or stamping of other identity cards;

• marking voters with special inks when they vote.

Use of Special Ink

Marking voters with special indelible ink when issuing ballots has become more common, particularly in transitional elections, but it is an expensive mechanism.

For security, safety, and aesthetic reasons, indelible inks of secret composition, a determinate lifespan, and visible only under special (usually ultra violet) light are better used. The additional costs incurred, in ink production, supply of special light equipment, and the need to engage at least one additional staff member per voting station to implement this control, can be considerable.

While this is an effective method, alternative measures such as ensuring accuracy of unique voters lists are less costly, more sustainable, and make marking of voters redundant. However, where other controls are weak, or where there is a need to present a strong image of integrity control to the public for acceptance of election validity, the additional costs of using special ink as a multiple voting control can be justified.

Where special inks are used, the voter should be checked to determine if the specified body part has been marked with ink prior to checking identity or voters list entry. In some situations this could be done on entry to the voting station, usually this would occur just prior to other eligibility checks. If the mark is revealed, the voter should be removed from the voting station. If not, identity and other eligibility checks proceed.

After the voter has been found on the voters list, or otherwise deemed eligible to vote, the voter is marked with the special ink. If done before this point, voters who have turned out at the wrong voting station may then find themselves unable to vote at the correct one.

The ink must be applied in a consistent fashion, to specified fingers or hands either by dipping in a container or application by a device. If inks invisible to the naked eye are used, the voter should be immediately tested under the appropriate light to ensure that the ink has been applied correctly.

Fraud Control through Use of Voter Identification Cards

Voter identification cards, issued by the electoral management body, could alternatively be used as a control on multiple voting, as long as these are high integrity photographic or similarly personalised cards that must be surrendered or cancelled when the voter is issued voting materials.

Without a photograph, or other easily distinguishing personal mark of the voter, such cards can be easily bought, traded, or stolen, and their effectiveness as both an identity and multiple voting control is very low.

Issue and Casting of Ballots

Following determination that a voter is eligible to vote at the voting station (see Determination of Eligibility to Vote), the accountable voting materials should be immediately issued to the voter.

The materials subject to strict accountability of issue will vary according to the basis of the ballot issuing system:

• Where ballots are accountable, and their use restricted, issuing controls will apply to ballots.

• On the other hand, if ballots are freely available, but instead there is strict accountability for the ballot envelope issued to voters in which the voter's ballot must be included (as in the system operating for manual ballots in France), issuing controls will relate to the ballot envelopes.

• For some types of voting, both ballots and envelopes may be accountable and subject to issuing controls.

Such systems relying on accountability of envelopes can be more costly, in additional printed materials required and in additional time taken in preparing materials for ballot counts.

Ballot Issuing Controls

Where the ballots themselves are the accountable voting material, the basic process of issuing the ballot entails:

• taking the ballot from its pile, folder, or tearing it from it's stub;

• where required, validation of the ballot by the voting station official placing an official mark or stamp, or endorsing, the reverse side of the ballot;

• showing the face of the ballot to voters and explaining the correct method of recording a vote (including advice to read any instructions on the ballot);

• showing voters the correct method of folding the ballot so that the vote remains secret and any validation mark required on the reverse of the ballot is visible;

• if the ballot has to be placed in an envelope before being placed in the ballot box, instructing voters on how and where this will be done;

• instructing voters on how and where to place the ballot in the ballot box (and, where more than one ballot is being issued, or there is more than one ballot box in use, the correct ballot box in which to place each ballot);

• directing voters to a vacant voting compartment, and instructing them that they must be alone in the voting compartment while marking the ballot (for discussion of systems where the voting station manager may authorise assisted voters to be accompanied in the voting compartment, see Assistance to Voters).

For reasons of efficiency in staffing and crowd control,  (see Crowd and Queue Control), where more than one election is being held simultaneously, ballots for all elections would preferably be issued at the same time to a voter.

Issuing of ballots to voters using special voting facilities, such as early, absentee, or provisional voting, may require a more complex process. Where voting machines, which mechanically or electronically record votes, or computers are used, controls on voters recording a vote require a different methodology.

Validating Ballots

In many election systems where each ballot is accountable, the ballot is validated on issue by the voting station official placing an official mark on or signing or initialling the back of the ballot.

This is a cost-effective manner of controlling that only valid ballots enter the count, and will generally do away with the need for special and expensive paper stocks, bearing watermarks or security print, for ballots.

Official marks used by voting station officials could be made by perforating instruments or stamps. A different, distinctive mark would preferably be provided to each voting station to enable full accountability and integrity checks during counts. These are highly accountable items for which design should be kept secret and that should be held under strict security until the voting station opens for voting, and then be secured immediately following close of voting.

Even more cost-effective, but of slightly less integrity and of less use in less literate societies, is the alternative method of requiring the ballot issuing official to sign or initial the reverse of the ballot.

The official mark or voting station official endorsement should be placed in the same position on every ballot, to allow it to be visible when the ballot is folded by the voter.

The top right hand corner of the reverse of the ballot is probably the most comfortable position for quick application by most (right-handed) officials. The correct position could be marked by a box or other shape on the reverse of the ballot; the additional costs of two-sided printing should be carefully weighed against any likely advantages in doing this.

Overly complex systems for thus validating the ballot should be avoided; a single mark or voting station official's endorsement should be sufficient.

Requiring multiple official marks, more than one voting station official to endorse, or party or candidate representatives to counter-endorse increases the chances of error, slows down the voting process, and implies poor selection of and lack of trust in staff.

Voting station officials validating ballots must validate each ballot only when it is about to be issued to a voter:

• To validate a stack or book of ballots in advance defeats the purpose.

• However, in their haste to issue a voter with a ballot, voting station officials can forget to place any official mark or endorsement required on the ballot and thus jeopardise acceptance of the voter's ballot for counting. In systems where such validation is required, training must reinforce the importance of validating each ballot issued.

Other Controls on Issuing Ballots

In systems where ballots are accountable voting materials, various additional controls may be applied in issuing a ballot. These could include the ballot issuing official:

• copying the voter's serial number from the voters list onto the issued ballot's counterfoil or stub;

• maintaining a list of voters who have been issued ballots, or making voters sign a register or list on receipt of their ballot paper.

These additional controls slow down the ballot issuing process and add little to its integrity, while raising doubts in voters' minds about voting secrecy.

Where voting station officials accurately mark voters names on voters’ lists when ballots are issued, they are a duplication of effort. Whether they are of more use in disputes over whether particular voters were issued ballots than good quality control on marking of voters lists is open to question.

It would seem more appropriate to concentrate voting station officials' efforts and management supervision on ensuring the voter’s list was marked correctly, and using this as the basis both for determining how many and who voted, rather than adding additional recording tasks that are equally prone to error or challenge.

Enveloped Ballot Systems

As an alternative to being issued an accountable ballot, some systems issue electors instead an accountable envelope. In these systems what happens to the stock of ballots is not relevant; the envelope quantities must be accountable. Such systems may operate under either very high integrity controls or lesser controls.

Simple Enveloped Ballot Systems

Under simple enveloped ballot systems, the voter, after being assessed as eligible to vote at that voting station, being marked as voting on the voters list, and having obtained a ballot, is issued or obtains a ballot envelope.

In these simple variants, ballot envelopes are not separately identifiable by any detachable counterfoil or serial number. Controls can be instituted by:

• having on hand only as many ballot envelopes as voters registered to vote at that voting station;

• officials carefully watching or issuing the ballot envelopes during voting to ensure each voter obtains only one envelope;

• officials guarding the ballot box to ensure that voters insert only one envelope in the ballot box;

• reconciling numbers of voters marked on the voters list as having voted with numbers of envelopes issued;

• validating each ballot envelope on issue with an official voting station stamp.

With a simple system:

• if integrity controls are instituted through matching the number of envelopes available to the number of voters registered, it can be inflexible in treatment of persons who may have valid claims to be on the voters list but have been omitted in error;

• there may be difficulties in ensuring adequate levels of control, and is more suited to environments of high community trust.

Higher Integrity Enveloped Ballot Systems

Higher integrity enveloped ballot methods involve envelopes that are fully accountable through numbered tear-off stubs or counterfoils that are retained by the envelope issuing official or another voting station official. Alternative methods for such systems would require:

• the voter to return to the ballot/ballot envelope issuing table with the completed ballot(s), where it is sealed in the envelope by the official who issued the envelope and then deposited by that official in the ballot box, located on the table or nearby;

• the voter being issued the envelope and ballot, and having recorded the vote, places the ballot in the envelope and deposits it in a ballot box.

To use such a system for all ballots can be a cumbersome, inefficient procedure to protect integrity; that would be more effectively served by high quality identification checks and voters lists. Where ballots need protection from damage, such as where punch card or optical scan ballots are used, it may be a useful system.

Special Voting Facilities

Where voters may vote in absentia, use early voting facilities, or vote by mail, where systems allow a provisional or tendered vote, and any voting method that requires later verification of the voter's eligibility to vote, a similar system of enveloped ballots may be used. It would be usual to have an attachment to or enclosure with the ballot envelope containing sufficient voter information for assessment of voter eligibility.

In such systems, it would be more usual to ensure voting secrecy by using a double enveloped ballot, with the ballot sealed inside a plain envelope and with this envelope again sealed in an outer envelope containing the voter's information. Using this form of enveloped ballots is a reasonable solution for extending voter accessibility to participation in voting.

Voters Recording a Vote

After being issued a ballot, or obtaining the ballot envelope, depending on the system being used, voters should be directed to a vacant voting compartment to record their vote.

There should be no pressure placed on voters to hasten completion of recording their votes; it is a choice of great significance that voters are making. Additional time may need to be taken by elderly voters, first-time voters, or those having difficulty with ballot instructions, and where more than one ballot or complex preferential ballots have to be completed. This should be taken into account when planning voting station capacities, staff, and numbers of voting compartments required.

After recording the vote, by marking the ballot or choosing which ballot he or she wishes to use, each voter will cast their ballots according to the system being used:

• if ballots are to be deposited directly into the ballot box or returned to a voting station official for enveloping, the ballot should be folded by the voter before leaving the voting compartment, so that the voting preferences are not visible and any official validating mark stamped or written by the ballot issuing official is clearly visible.

• if the ballot has to be enveloped by the voter, the voter should insert the ballot in the envelope and seal it before leaving the voting compartment.

Marking of Ballots

In systems where preferences have to be marked on ballots, the method used to mark a paper ballot has cost implications. Pens are more expensive than pencils, and more likely to be taken as a souvenir by voters.

Pens offer no greater integrity; a voter's mark with a pen can be as easily overwritten as a pencil mark can be erased. However, where there is wide public concern about election integrity, use of pens may enhance the image, if not the reality.

Use of special stamps with which voters mark their ballots and which have to be returned to the ballot issuing table by the voter can cause problems for voter flow.

Voter inconvenience and the additional costs of providing such equipment and of directing staff required are generally not commensurate with any additional integrity achieved.

Monitoring Voting Compartment Area

The area around the voting compartments needs to be constantly monitored by officials to ensure the secrecy and efficiency of voting. Issues to be carefully monitored include:

• Voters are not marking their ballots outside the voting compartments.

• Voters are alone in a voting compartment, except in cases where authorised assistance to the voter is being provided.

• The voting compartment area is kept clean and tidy. Particular care must be taken to remove and deal with any ballots left in the area by voters (see "Ballots Discarded by Voters" below);

• No political campaign material--pamphlets, posters, stickers, or graffiti on surfaces--that may influence voters has been left in any voting compartment by earlier voters.

• Where "mark choice" paper ballots are used, each voting compartment has a functioning pen, pencil, or other required marking implement attached to it;

• Where instructions to voters on how to vote are in the voting compartment, are not removed or defaced.

In some environments there may be a need for allocation of at least one voting station official whose single role is constant monitoring of the voting compartments area to ensure that voting is conducted in secret.

In all voting stations, officials should regularly inspect the area to ensure that voting is conducted in secret, that voter flow is orderly, and that the area is kept clean and free of extraneous material. Officials should not enter voting compartments when occupied by voters, of course, unless the voter is authorised to receive their assistance in voting.

Special attention needs to be paid to hierarchical groups--such as military, state officials, particular families--arriving together to vote, to ensure that there is no intimidation within the group with regard to voting preferences and that all ballots are marked in secret by the correct voter.

A common cause of congestion in the voting compartment area, and of voters attempting to record their vote outside voting compartments, is that ballots or ballot envelopes are being issued to voters when there are no voting compartments free for use.

Staff monitoring the voting compartment area should check continually with officials issuing ballots (or ballot envelopes) to regulate appropriately the rate of issuing ballot papers.

Depositing of Ballots in the Ballot Box

When voters have completed recording their votes, they should be directed to the ballot box. Where the voter goes will depend on whether:

• The ballot is to be deposited directly into a ballot box;

• the ballot is required to be returned to the issuing voting station official for enveloping, either by itself or with details of the voter attached before being deposited in the ballot box.

Where the ballot is to be deposited by the voter directly into the ballot box, ballot boxes should be located, as far as possible, in a direct line between the voting compartments and the voting station exit, and as near the exit as is prudent for security. Ballot boxes should at all times be closely supervised by a voting station official.

When the voter approaches the ballot box, the official should ensure that:

• if the ballot is not required to be enveloped, the ballot is deposited in a manner that the voter's preferences cannot be seen;

• if the ballot has been enveloped by the voter, the voter has only one ballot envelope, and the envelope has any required official mark;

• where separate ballot boxes are being used for different elections being held simultaneously, the voter deposits each ballot or envelope in the correct ballot box;

• no voter leaves the voting station without depositing their ballot or ballot envelope in a ballot box;

• nothing other than ballots or ballot envelopes is deposited in ballot boxes. Clear instructions and signs, and especially colour-coding of ballot boxes to match ballots or envelopes, will assist in the voting process.

However, there will still be voters who deposit their vote in the incorrect box, and once in, they cannot be removed until the count. For this reason, equitable ballot or envelope validation and vote counting systems would allow ballots or envelopes deposited in the incorrect ballot box, if otherwise valid, to be counted.

When voters have deposited their ballot(s), officials should direct them to the exit. Voters should not be permitted to congregate around ballot boxes.

Inspection of Validation Marks

Where official validating marks are required to be placed on ballots by ballot issuing officials, it is appropriate that the ballot box supervisor be required to check, before the voter deposits the ballot in the ballot box, that the required official mark or voting station official's endorsement is on the ballot.

If the mark is not present, the voter should not be allowed to deposit the ballot in the ballot box; assistance should then be sought from the voting station manager.

If the voting station manager determines that the ballot was validly issued, it could either be validated with the correct mark by the voting station manager or cancelled as "spoilt" and a fresh ballot issued to the voter (at no stage of these actions should the way the voter voted be made visible).

The former course is the more efficient; the latter preserves full accountability measures. Where the voting station manager determines that the ballot was not validly issued, details of the incident should be noted for voting fraud investigation and police may need to be called.

Where an error has been made by the official issuing ballots, these actions can protect the voter's voting rights. Where a voter is attempting to deposit an illegal ballot, it will be stopped. In either case, later ballot disqualifications and disputes during the count will be avoided.

Checking Need for Fresh Ballot Box

Officials should regularly check how full each ballot box being used is (a ruler or similar implement can be used if needed) and warn the voting station manager in good time when any additional ballot boxes need to be sealed for use.

Early warning is needed, as this procedure may take some time (for procedures for sealing of ballot boxes, see Preparations for Commencement of Voting). Also extra ballot boxes may need to be sourced from another voting station that has surplus or local electoral management body office.

Use of Multiple Ballot Boxes

Whether separate ballot boxes or the same ballot box are used for simultaneous elections held in a voting station is a matter of practicality for the particular environment rather than of principle. There is a cost factor to be considered: the costs of acquiring, maintaining, transporting, and securing separate ballot boxes as against the costs of accurately sorting different elections' ballots taken from the same ballot box at the count.

There is also a perception of integrity factor: when different ballots are deposited in the one box, it may be harder for ballot box supervisors to ensure that only validated ballots are deposited.

Spoilt Ballots

In systems that depend on ballot accountability, spoilt ballots, that is, ballots that are returned to the ballot issuing table because a voter has made an error in marking the ballot or cannot be used due to print defects, need to be carefully controlled so that they do not find their way into the ballot box. Prudent control mechanisms would ensure that:

• no replacement for a spoilt ballot is issued until the original ballot has been surrendered to the voting station official who issued it;

• voting station officials do not look at the manner in which the ballot has been marked;

• where more than one ballot issuing table is in use, the voter returns the spoilt ballot to the table from which it was issued;

• spoilt ballots are fully accounted for in ballot reconciliations following close of voting .

When spoilt ballots are surrendered by voters, they should immediately, in the presence of the voter, be:

• cancelled by the official, by writing "spoilt" on the reverse of the ballot or using any stamp provided for this purpose;

• sealed individually in special envelopes--one ballot per envelope--and maintained under the security of either the ballot issuing official or the voting station manager until the close of voting.

Misprinted or damaged ballots found amongst those to be issued should be similarly enveloped and sealed immediately on discovery, to prevent their issue.

Leaving enveloping or sealing of spoilt ballots until some fixed time, or leaving a single envelope to contain spoilt ballots open throughout voting hours, runs too great a risk that these ballots may find their way into a ballot box, or may be inadvertently lost creating problems in the verification process later.

The voting station official should record on the outside of the spoilt ballot envelope some basic information to aid accountability and reconciliation, such as:

• the signature of the voting station official issuing the replacement ballot;

• identification of the voting station;

• if multiple elections are being held simultaneously within the voting station, the election for which the ballot was issued;

• if multiple voting material issuing tables are in operations, identification of the table from which the replacement for the spoilt ballot was issued. It is useful to have specially printed envelopes available for this purpose.

Damaged Optical Scan or Punch Card Ballots

In some systems where ballots are later counted automatically, such as ballots designed for optical scanning or punch card machines, methods of dealing with damaged ballots will need to be implemented either at the voting station or at the counting centre.

Spoilt ballots that have been torn or otherwise damaged after completion by the voter will not be read accurately by machines.

For integrity purposes, these ballots be set aside from machine counting and counted manually. Attempting to remake these ballots so they can be machine counted, even under intense observer supervision, political or otherwise, can raise doubts as to the motives.

Ballots or Sealed Envelopes Discarded by Voters

While it is the duty of officials supervising ballot boxes to ensure that all voters, before leaving the voting station, deposit their ballots or envelopes in the ballot box, this supervision may not always be fully effective, and voters may leave ballots or sealed envelopes containing ballots in voting compartments, drop them on the floor, or otherwise misplace them.

It is prudent to have procedures in place to cover such control failures. Ballots or sealed ballot envelopes left in this fashion in the voting station by voters should never be placed in the ballot box by any other person, especially voting station officials.

In maintaining supervision over the voting compartment and ballot box area of the voting station, voting station officials should always be watching for ballots (or where relevant, sealed ballot envelopes) left by voters. These should be marked as "cancelled" and each placed into a separate special "cancelled" or "discarded" ballot envelope as soon as found, and kept under security by the voting station manager for inclusion in ballot or envelope reconciliations following the close of voting.

These envelopes containing cancelled or discarded ballots or ballot envelopes should have recorded on them similar information as for spoilt ballots, except that where e multiple voting materials are issued the table of issue will not be known. Special envelopes used for this purpose could be designed to function for both spoilt and discarded or cancelled ballots

Declined Ballots

Under some election systems, voters, after being issued a ballot, may indicate their refusal to vote in the election by declining the ballot, and handing it back unmarked to the voting official who issued it.

To ensure that reconciliations of ballots in ballot boxes to voters marked as having voted can be accurately conducted, these ballots should:

• Immediately, in the presence of the voter, be cancelled by the official by writing "declined" on the ballot or using any stamp provided for this purpose;

• be sealed individually in special envelopes, one ballot per envelope, and maintained under the security of either the ballot issuing official or the voting station manager until the close of voting.

Declined and discarded ballots (or ballot envelopes) must be fully accounted for in ballot reconciliations following close of the voting 

Informing and Assisting Voters

Information Issues

The role of voting station officials in providing information to aid voters in their participation in the election is an important part of providing voter service; all eligible voters should be provided with the most informed opportunity to cast their voter correctly.

Information should be restricted to implementation of election procedures; voting station officials should politely refrain from engaging in any discussion with voters about the merits of political participants, candidates, or the appropriateness of election policies and procedures.

(For further discussion of voter information services that may effectively be provided in voting stations, see Voter Service)

Designated Information Officers

Consideration should be given to assigning a specific official, or officials, to voter information duties. This will generally be effective in voting stations where:

• of larger size, other officials may be fully pressed in undertaking other voter service duties;

• significant proportions of the voters expected are from minority cultural or language groups, are elderly, or are first-time voters;

• there have been significant changes in voting procedures;

• computer or machine voting has been introduced which may require taking each voter through a trial run using the computer or voting machine to ensure that they understand the operations required for voting.

Particularly in transitional environments, voting station officials with specific voter information duties may well need to undertake a broader voter education role.

Guidelines for Providing Information

General guidelines for providing information to voters in voting stations include:

• Information for voters must be provided in an open and transparent manner and must allow monitoring by party or candidate representatives and other observers in the voting station.

• All voting station officials should be ready to answer courteously and promptly any inquiries by voters about voting procedures; where the official does not know the answer, assistance from the voting station manager or other senior voting station officials should be sought.

• Except where the voters are authorised to receive assistance in marking their ballots, any information for voters should be provided before voters enter the voting compartment.

If voters require further information after having commenced to mark the ballot, they should be requested to step outside the compartment.

• All voting station officials should pay particular attention to the needs of voters from minority language and cultural groups; employment of multi-lingual voting station officials will assist in this regard.

• Voters requiring assistance to vote should be identified as soon as possible after entering the voting station and directed to the appropriate officials for assistance

Proactive Methods

Information is more effectively provided, and voter service enhanced, if a proactive stance is taken by voting station officials. The use of a static voter information officer, seated behind a table, both disrupts voter flow and may well not encourage contact with those who need further information the most.

Voting station layouts may provide for a separate information table or area for storage of information pamphlets and other materials (if the voting station is of sufficient size) or store such materials on the voting station manager's table. Such a static facility is generally required for voters with complex inquiries or difficulties.

However, maximum effectiveness is obtained if voters' information needs can be ascertained and satisfied while they are queued waiting to vote, through pro-active inquiry by entry control or queue control officials (see Crowd and Queue Control) and use of roving information officials.

Voting station managers and any other supervisory officials assigned to the voting station should also take an active interest in providing information to voters. The better voters are informed before they reach the eligibility checking and voting materials issuing tables, the more efficient the issuing of ballots is likely to be.

Assistance to Voters

Where voters with certain disabilities are allowed assistance in marking their ballots, voting station officials should do everything possible to assist such voters to participate in voting with the same high level of service provided to other voters.

Categories of voters who would normally be eligible for assistance in marking the ballot would include:

• voters who have a temporary or permanent physical disability that prevents then from marking the ballot;

• voters who are blind or severely vision impaired;

• voters who are not sufficiently literate in the language used on the ballots for the election.

Time Allowed to Vote

Voting station officials should not assume that because a voter is taking a long time to complete marking the ballot they require assistance.

However, officials issuing ballots and monitoring the voting compartments should be aware of voters obviously having difficulty in understanding the ballot and advise them of assistance that may be available.

In all cases, both for voters requesting assistance and for those whom voting station officials believe may need assistance, it is appropriate that the voting station manager be the person legally delegated to make the decision as to whether the voter is eligible for an assisted vote.

Assisted Voting

Wherever possible, voters seeking or requiring assistance should be identified and directed to the voting station manager as soon as they enter the voting station.

This may not always be possible, particularly with non-literate voters in more advanced societies where admission of non-literacy may be embarrassing. In some systems such voters must make special application to be allowed assistance, but this would seem generally excessive for maintenance of a reasonable standard of integrity.

Under equitable systems, a voter eligible for assistance would be able to designate a friend or other person to complete their ballot, or, if no such person is available, could be assisted by a voting station official.

While this is generally a task specifically given to the voting station manager, it would be useful if the voting station manager possessed the power to delegate the actual assistance in marking the ballot for such voters to other senior voting station officials, to prevent delays during peak periods or in large voting stations.

Assisted by Friend

Steps in implementing assisted voting will vary according to who assists the voter. If the voter brings with them or nominates another person to complete the ballot for them, the voting station manager should ensure that:

• the person qualifies for an assisted vote under the rules for the election;

• the person chosen by the voter to mark the ballot is not excluded from providing assistance by the legislation or rules governing the election--qualifications defined in electoral legislation of minimum age, or being registered to vote at that voting station, or restricting persons to assist only one voter, can enhance the integrity of the process;

• the voter's eligibility is checked as for any voter, and if eligible for a ballot, is issued a ballot and goes with the person designated to complete the ballot in a vacant voting compartment to mark the ballot, and from there deposits the ballot in the ballot box in accordance with the normal prescribed procedures.

In such cases here should be no requirement, nor is there any real need, for anyone else to witness the marking of the ballot.

Assistance by Voting Station Official

Where the voter does not designate anyone to assist, assistance (where allowable under the legal framework) could be provided by a duly authorised voting station official. The method used is essentially the same, except that the integrity is better served if the legal framework requires that there is one or more witnesses.

This would often be specified in the legal framework as either one (and preferably more) party or candidate representatives, or alternatively, another official or even a person chosen by the voter. The voter must be informed of and understand this condition, and reasonably then be again given the opportunity to designate a person of their choice to assist in their vote, rather than having their vote witnessed by party or candidate representatives.

The witness (es) must be able to hear any oral instructions or see any written instructions given by the assisted voter, and observe the ballot being completed by the official.

Where an assisted voter provides written instructions for marking the ballot, the voting station official should check to be certain the voter understands and agrees with the content of these instructions. If voters are not literate in the language used on the ballot and in the voting station, but literate in some other community language, wherever possible the help of any official literate in the voter's language should be sought.

In those jurisdictions where voting station officials are political appointments rather than independent, a balance of interests from amongst the officials should together assist the voter to vote, rather than a single official.

It is very important that assisted votes are still completed in a voting compartment and the ballot remains secret from any person not authorised to assist or observe the assisted vote.

Those assisting the voter and any authorised witnesses must not disclose to any other person the instructions which the voter gave for marking the ballot. To ensure this, it can be useful to require that persons assisting voters complete a formal declaration binding them to keep the vote secret (where they have not already done so for the election).

Visually Impaired Voters

As an alternative to being assisted to vote, templates could be provided for blind or vision impaired voters that can allow them to complete their vote themselves. This will allow these voters the option of keeping their vote totally secret. Where paper ballots are used:

• the voter's eligibility is checked as for any voter;

• when issued a ballot, the voter is also issued a template that fits over the ballot, with holes cut out that line up with the parts of the ballot paper where the voter may mark a preference, and is instructed on its use--the template may also include braille script indicating the party or candidate relevant to each of the holes in the template;

• a voting station official accompanies the voter to the voting compartment but does not enter it, but would then read to the voter the party or candidate names in the order they appear on the ballot, to assist the voter in marking preferences correctly through the holes in the template;

• the voter removes the template from the ballot before leaving the voting compartment, folds the ballot, hands the template back to the voting station official, and from there deposits the ballot in the ballot box in accordance with the normal proscribed procedures.

Where computers are used for voting, such arrangements are more difficult; however, templates fitting over the keyboard (for keyed voting) or monitor (for touch screen voting) could be used.

Other Assistance to Voters

Other categories of voters that may often require assistance from voting station officials, but who may not need another person to complete their ballot for them, would include those who:

• have limited understanding of the language used on voting material and in the voting station;

• have physical disabilities or are elderly or frail sufficient to make entering the voting station difficult.

Voters with Language Difficulties

Where significant numbers of voters from minority language groups are expected to attend a voting station, all effort should be made to employ at least some staff fluent in these minority languages. In some cases, staff appointed specifically as interpreters may be justifiable; more cost-effectively, some officials engaged for tasks involving information provision, entry and queue control, eligibility checking, and ballot issuing would have skills in the relevant minority language(s).

If officials with these minority language skills are not available, every effort should be made to assist the voter in explaining required actions, through slow, clear speech, simplifying language, and using diagrams, illustrations, or gestures to demonstrate what is required. This would apply equally to all voters with literacy difficulties.

Elderly and Frail Voters

Voting station staff should in general be aware of the needs of elderly, frail, and disabled voters, as well as other classes of voters such as pregnant women and nursing mothers, to ensure that they do not have to endure long waits in queues to vote.

Bringing such voters to the head of queues to vote and providing them with a high level of information and/or physical assistance to ensure that they are not disadvantaged in voting is an integral part of voting station service.

For the elderly, frail, and physically disabled, election rules may allow the voter to vote outside the voting station, from the area outside the voting station or from a vehicle parked outside (so-called "kerbside voting"). Systems for allowing such votes would normally provide for:

• a maximum distance from the voting station entrance within which such voting is allowed;

• voting station officials, on application by the voter, to check the voters eligibility and mark the voters list inside the voting station and then bring to the voter the ballot(s), ballot envelope (if required), and a portable voting compartment or screen within which the voter can mark the ballot in secrecy;

• the folded (or enveloped), completed ballot, and voting equipment, to be brought back into the voting station by the voting station official who, without attempting to look at the manner in which the voter has marked the ballot, deposits the ballot in the ballot box.

It would be best if this process only be undertaken in the presence of party or candidate representatives, but other voters should not be allowed to observe the marking of the ballot.

Whether voters need to make prior application for this assistance is more a matter of practicality than integrity. Large numbers of such voters needing such assistance may require additional staffing in the voting station or advice to political participants of additional monitoring requirements.

The utility of adding this service to the range of voting station services will depend on factors such as:

• the potential disruptions of service to other voters;

• the ability to provide transparency;

• the availability of other methods of voting of equal integrity for disabled and frail voters.

Special Provisions with Regard to Voting Locations

As an alternative to or extension of the "kerbside voting", legislative provision may be made for disabled or frail voters to vote on voting day at a voting station other than that to which they have been assigned to attend to vote.

In systems where a general system of in-person absentee voting is in operation on voting day, these voters would be serviced according to procedures for absentee voting.

In systems more restricted as to voting methods and locations, special provisions for disabled or frail voters to vote at a voting station other than the one(s) to which they have been assigned, if this (or these) do not offer easy access to the disabled and frail, could be provided. These would normally entail:

• an application prior to voting day by the voter, or someone authorised by the voter, for the voter to vote at a specified voting station other than the one(s) to which the voter has been assigned;

• examination of the request by the electoral management body and, on approval, issue of a certificate to the voter enabling the voter to vote at the voting station requested;

• the voter producing this certificate when attending to vote during eligibility checking, and the voter's attendance being specifically noted in voting station records.

Depending on the sophistication and complexity of any general systems for absentee voting, this facility may have to be limited to allow the voter to choose an appropriately accessible voting station within the voter's electoral district of registration.

Consideration could also be given to providing special facilities for disabled, infirm, and frail voters, rather than insisting they attend a normal voting station. These could take the form of:

• locating voting stations in care institutions that are restricted to residents or patients (and possibly staff) at the institution and/or the elderly and infirm within a specified geographic area;

• where the legal framework allows, providing mobile voting stations within care institutions or for home visits to elderly and infirm voters.

These facilities could be provided in advance of voting day (where allowed by legislation) or on voting day itself. Where these facilities are provided in advance of voting day, these voters should also be allowed the opportunity to vote at their normal assigned voting station on voting day, if they did not participate in the early voting. Reliable mechanisms to prevent multiple voting would be required.

Voters not Found on Voters' Lists

Basic Issues Varying methods of treatment of voters who are not found on the voters list at a voting station can have a marked affect on:

• the equity of the election process;

• Potential disruption in the voting station;

• Voting operations costs.

In general, people do not turn out to vote unless they genuinely believe that they are entitled to be part of the process. Methods for including in the election process, in some manner, all who turn out to vote, facilitate building democratic processes.

Apart from this ideal, there is always the possibility that voters are not on the voters list at the voting station because of an administrative error, or because they have come to vote at the wrong voting station. At the very least the opportunity to overcome such errors should be provided.

Facilities available and procedures used for persons not on the voters list attempting to vote will generally be dependent on the voter registration legal framework and the manner of maintaining the certified voters list, particularly on the methods adopted for it’s revision.

Reasons for Omission from Voters Lists

Voters may not be found on the voters list in a voting station for a number of reasons, including:

• the voter has correctly registered and is entitled to be on the voters list for that voting station, but due to administrative error the voter's information has been recorded incorrectly on the certified voters list, or has been omitted in preparing the voters list for the voting station;

• the voter is correctly registered, but on another area’s list;

• the voter has not registered;

• the voter has been officially and accurately removed from the certified voters list by due process;

• the voter has had an application for registration rejected.

Service to Omitted Voters

So as not to unduly delay the voter queue, voters with such problems would be better directed to the voting station manager or officials with specific voter information duties, rather than being fully investigated by staff conducting eligibility checks and issuing voting materials.

Wherever possible, proactive questioning by officials controlling voter queues and voting station entry should attempt to identify voters with more easily recognisable problems, such as attending the wrong voting station, before the voter has waited for too long in the queue (see Crowd and Queue Control). A map of the voting station area and its adjacent voting station areas placed at the voting station entrance will also help voters in determining immediately if they have come to the incorrect voting station.

Voters who cannot be found on the voters list are as deserving of service in the voting station as other voters. In providing this service, voting officials should make every effort to assist voters in determining if they are in fact eligible to vote, whether at that voting station or elsewhere.

It may not be possible to fully investigate all such voters at the voting station itself; however, the basic steps listed in the next section should be followed by voting station officials to attempt to determine the voter's status.

Investigative Measures

In dealing with apparently unregistered voters who cannot be found on the voters list by voter eligibility checking voting station officials (see Determination of Eligibility to Vote), voting station managers and information staff should pursue a thorough line of investigation by questioning voters to establish if there is any basis for their belief that they are eligible to vote. Questioning may be effectively pursued in this order:

Determine whether the voter is qualified for and did apply to register on the voters register for the election.

Establish the voter's address for the purposes of registration and assess whether this is within the area that would allow the voter to vote at that voting station, or in another area.

If it is within the voting station's area, further investigation may be required; if not, the voter should be directed to the correct voting station (or if allowable under the voting system, directed on how to cast an absentee ballot at that voting station or at any special voting stations set up for voting day absentee voting). Voting station managers should be provided with maps of surrounding electoral units, voting station areas and lists of voting station locations for this purpose.

If the voter claims to be living in and having registered for the relevant voting station area, further investigation of the voters list entries to determine if the voter's details have been incorrectly entered in the list should be undertaken.

Potential misspellings and reversals of or omissions from name or address information should be investigated. If the voter is found on the list with incorrect details, equitable systems would allow the voter still to vote, having provided an oral, or, to give greater integrity, a written declaration that they are in fact the person represented by the incorrect list entry.

If a voter claiming to be living in the voting station area still cannot be found on the list, procedures for unregistered voters will need to be implemented. There are wide variations in the basis and content of such procedures. Possible alternatives are discussed below.

The alternatives available will very much depend on the legal framework for the certified voters list, whether it is a closed document which must remain unchanged following its certification for use in the election to the close of the election period, or whether it is open to further revision under certain defined circumstances during the voting period.

Where permanent, continuous voter registration systems are maintained by electoral authorities, it is preferable that facilities should be made available in the voting station for persons not found on the voters list to complete a voter registration form.

This will enable their participation in future elections, even if there are no voting day registration provisions to allow them to vote at the current election. In any situation, information on how to register should be provided to these persons.

Denial of Vote

The simplest administrative solution, yet one that does not encourage participation or accessibility, is to deny the person a vote. Where certified voters lists are closed documents, this can often be the option taken. However, while administratively simple, it has a number of negative features on both equity and operational grounds:

• it provides no safety net to deal with administrative errors in compilation of voters lists.

The onus is on the voters to have ensured that their registration has been correctly processed. This is not a fully effective method, even where provisions for compilation of voters’ lists allow for public inspection, close to voting day, of the certified voter lists by voters, and amendment of defects found.

• It does not admit any possibility of error in production/printing of voters lists used in voting stations.

• Particularly where registration systems are not of high quality, or not well understood by the public in general, use of this method may lead to problems at the voting station in controlling voters denied a vote.

Where voters not found on the list are denied a vote, at the very least the voter should be referred to an electoral management body information officer for further investigation. This will help in dealing with electors who may be registered elsewhere.

Implementation of telephone systems by which voting station managers can access a central voters list information bureau to check on a voter's registration status should only be undertaken with extreme caution.

Experience with such systems has often been that they become easily overloaded, thus tying up voting station phone lines and voting station officials' time in attempting to make contact.

Issuing of Voting Certificates

More equitable solutions would at least allow voters an opportunity to determine if they had been omitted from the voters list because of administrative error and an opportunity to redress this.

Where voter registration is a function under the control of electoral authorities, such solutions would allow a person omitted from the voters list in error to obtain on voting day a certificate from the electoral management or voter registration body attesting to the error and, on presentation of this at the appropriate voting station, to be allowed to vote.

Where voters lists are extracts of civil register data, civil registries would preferably remain open throughout all hours of voting to enable voters who believe that they have been incorrectly omitted from the voters list to check records held at the civil registry, and be allowed to vote at their correct voting station on presentation of a similar certificate issued by the civil registry.

It would enhance transparency to allow representatives of parties or candidates running in the election to observe the issue of such certificates, whether by electoral authorities or by a civil registry.

Such certificates should be:

• authenticated, when presented by the voter, by the voting station manager or another senior voting station official;

• Surrendered by the voter to the voters list checking officials;

• Maintained securely by the voters list checking officials for use in close of voting reconciliations

It may also be useful for officials checking voters list to maintain a supplementary list of those voters not on the original list but who prove their eligibility to vote on voting day.

Under such systems, these voters, after establishing their entitlement to vote through presentation of the required certificate, would be issued voting material and vote in the normal fashion.

Use of Provisional or Tendered Ballots

An effective means of handling possible administrative errors in compilation of voters lists, for both voters and voting station officials is to allow a provisional or tendered ballot to any voter who cannot be found on the voters list and who claims to be living in the area covered by the voters list for the voting station.

Under such systems, the voter's ballot will be enveloped with a declaration of relevant details by the voter, kept separate from other ballots, and after the close of voting the eligibility of the voter will be checked against voter registration records.

If the voter is then found to have been eligible to vote in the election, even though not found on the voters list for that voting station on voting day, the voter's ballot will be included in the count.

There are both advantages and disadvantages in using this method. Major advantages include:

• accessibility to all voters wishing to vote;

• reduced risk of disruption in the voting station;

• greater accuracy in checking voter eligibility in such doubtful cases than that available in the pressured atmosphere of the voting station;

• maintenance of voting integrity. The ballots of these voters are only included in the count if it is established following checking of the registration records that the voter was eligible to vote.

Thus, the risks of election challenges on the basis of ineligibility of ballots completed by voters not found on the list are avoided.

Disadvantages of this method are mainly related to the increased complexity inherent in using such a system, and the additional resources required for implementation. These would include:

• provision of special materials, e.g., envelopes and other documents for recording voter information;

• additional training of staff in issuing provisional ballots;

• additional controls required for voting material;

• additional staff expenses in checking the eligibility of these voters prior to determining if their ballots should be admitted to counts;

• possible delays in finalisation of counts due to the time taken for such checks.

It is important that where systems of provisional or tendered ballots are implemented, these ballots are later assessed for eligibility and, if eligible, counted.

It has been the practice in some environments that the tendered ballot is a useful method of eliminating a source of stress on voting day, but it is too difficult to undertake later full investigations to determine if the voter was eligible to vote, and thus these voters' ballots are ignored during counts. Such an attitude is dangerous, both to the integrity and reputation of the electoral management body, and also in terms of voter reaction if it were learned that tendered or provisional ballots had not been properly examined.

In determining eligibility of provisional ballots to be included in the count, strict guidelines are required as to what administrative errors, or other conditions, must be satisfied.

These methods still will only allow the admission to counts of ballots from voters who have registered but have been affected by administrative error in the compiling or production of voters lists.

Voting Day Registration

Voter accessibility can be greatly enhanced if there are facilities for voters to register to vote on voting day itself. Provision of such facilities will depend on the legal frameworks for allowing voters lists to remain open during voting.

This method can make planning and resourcing of voting station activities difficult, particularly if relatively low proportions of the estimated voting age population have registered to vote prior to the election. It, therefore, needs careful examination of its effects on the administration of the voting process before being considered.

It can also be a process of less transparency and integrity as it does not allow for the checks, through objection or revision proceedings, which would be normal in high integrity registration systems.

 Where implemented, systems allowing voting day registration will require some specific procedures in voting stations themselves.

The exact nature of the procedures will depend on whether the registration is done in the voting station or at an office of the electoral management body.

Registration by Declaration in Voting Station

A simple means of allowing voters not found on the voters list to vote is by means of a declaration by the voter allowing on-the-spot registration in the voting station. This would require the voter to:

• produce documents proving identity and address of residence;

• make a sworn declaration, administered by the voting station manager, that they are eligible to vote at that voting station.

An additional measure of integrity can be applied to such declarations if:

• the declaration is required to be witnessed by a voter or voters on the voters list at that voting station;

• party or candidate representatives may object to the eligibility of such voters and have these objections officially recorded, with such challenges being required to be taken into account in any recount or judicial application to have the election overturned.

The voter is then issued a certificate of entitlement to vote by the voting station manager ; on surrendering of the certificate to the appropriate voting station official, a ballot is issued in the normal manner and the ballot is deposited in the ballot box and counted with all other ballots.

A supplementary list of such voters should be maintained, and the certificates retained for use in voting material reconciliations following close of voting.

There are a number of advantages to this method in its simplicity of operation; however, it may raise questions about election integrity, particularly in environments where there is some history of election manipulation or where voters do not have a high level of knowledge of the requirements of voter registration. Its advantages would include:

• Better access for all voters wishing to vote. (This may be limited by the strictness of any requirements for witnessing of declarations required for voting day registration.)

• Reduced risk of disruption in the voting station, since voters not found on the voters list may still have an opportunity to vote.

• Simplicity of administration, both in the issuing and counting of ballots, requiring little in the way of additional materials or processes. However, the disadvantages in terms of perceptions of election integrity can also be substantial:

• The onus is put on party or candidate representatives in the voting station to issue objections to the voter's entitlement to vote, rather than the eligibility of all such voters being checked officially by electoral authorities and subject to public scrutiny.

• Ballots of such voters may be admitted to counts without any prior official check or opportunity for public challenge of the voter's eligibility to vote.

This is a weaker system of control than that which applies to other voters and may raise questions about election integrity if there are substantial numbers of such voters.

• The only redress available is through official challenges to the count or judicial review of whether the election should be overturned. This can be a less effective method than determining voter eligibility before admission of ballots to any count.

Whether such a method would be appropriate would depend on careful analysis of the level of risk of manipulation of voting that it may engender. If societal mores are such that the risk is very low, it can be a service-oriented and cost-effective manner of dealing with unregistered voters.

It will also work with higher integrity if voting stations cater to small numbers of voters from distinct local communities, where party or candidate representatives and voting station managers are more likely to be aware of who is eligible to register to vote in that area.

Higher integrity could be satisfied by having these ballots enveloped with the registration certificate and further confirmation of eligibility obtained before accepting the voter's ballot for counting.

Voting Day Registration at Electoral Authority Office

Alternatively, voters not found on the list could be directed to electoral management body offices to apply for voting day registration. As for registration in a voting station, the voter would produce identity and other documentation normally required for voter registration. It would enhance transparency by allowing representatives of parties or candidates running in the election to observe these proceedings.

If registration requirements are satisfied, the voter would be issued with a certificate which must be presented at the relevant voting station to evidence eligibility to vote.

These certificates should be surrendered to the voting station manager, the voter's name would normally be entered on a supplementary list of voters, and arrangements made to issue voting material to the voter.

Similar advantages and disadvantages as those for voting day registration in a voting station apply.

Reconciliation of Material

Where voting day registration or provisional voting may occur, care must be taken when the quantity of liable voting material issued to voters is reconciled to voters marked on the voters list as having voted to include those voters registering on voting day or issued provisional ballots.

Voting Station Staff Management

Basic foundations of voting station staff management on voting day include:

• Supervision, to ensure accuracy and service in staff performance;

• A commitment to staff welfare, to motivate staff through this long day.

Professionalism in Management

Voting day is a long and generally arduous day for voting station staff, often under pressure, in which they perform tasks for which they have received some training but may never have had to undertake in a real environment before. Without a commitment to professionalism in management of voting station staff, voter service and procedural accuracy are likely to slip below acceptable levels.

Establishment of a good rapport with voting station staff, supporting their efforts in taxing conditions, and offering encouragement are important aspects for voting station managers to remember if they wish to get the most out of their staff.

Electoral District Management

Management responsibilities for voting station activity are not confined to the voting station itself.

Electoral district managers must also play their part in supervising voting hours operations. Working through an operations centre structure  is an effective means of integrating management responses.

There will be specific requirements to ensure effective management of voting stations by electoral district managers' offices, including:

• establishment of a voice communication reporting schedule with voting stations at set intervals on voting day--staggered so as not to overload administration communication capacities (critical points, such as the commencement and closing of voting, should be covered in this schedule);

• ensuring open and swift communication with voting station managers, particularly in answer to any queries;

• providing reliable support to remedy materials or staff shortages or security problems;

• inspection of voting stations during voting hours to ensure that voting station managers are correctly applying required procedures and management practices.

Visits to Voting Stations

It is important when scheduling supervisory visits to attempt to cover all voting stations within the first two hours of voting:

• even a brief visit can identify and remedy voting station set-up shortcomings, misinterpretation of procedures, or materials delivery problems.

• a visit early in the day will also allow early identification of the weaker voting station managers, who may require more frequent visits and management support.

• to wait until later in the day to inspect any voting station would run risks of a considerable number of voters whose processing has been flawed, or the formation of long, slow voters queues through inefficient application of procedures

Scheduling of such visits should also attempt to maximise support for less experienced or lower performing voting station managers throughout voting day.

The use of roving senior voting station officials for voting station inspections and emergency materials supply will enhance the management supervision capabilities within electoral districts. This will be easier to implement in more densely populated areas. In rural areas, the distances between voting stations may make this useful field supervisory capacity impracticable.

Staff Supervision within Voting Stations

One of the major tasks of voting station managers is managing the performance of voting station staff to ensure that service, integrity, and procedural accuracy are maintained at a high standard throughout the voting day.

In voting stations with larger numbers of staff, this may require additional supervisory staff, with assistant manager or second-in-command status, for effective monitoring of staff performance

Appointing as voting station managers staff without supervisory skills, no matter how good their technical knowledge, will create problems on voting day. In managing and supervising staff effectively, voting station managers need to take a proactive role rather than waiting for problems to arise. Essential elements of supervising staff within voting stations include:

• staff performance is continuously monitored throughout the hours of voting (see Monitoring Voting Station Staff Performance);

• attention is paid to staff welfare issues (see Staff Welfare on Voting Day).

Understanding of Duties

All voting station staff must have a clear understanding of their assigned duties. This requires that the voting station manager clearly assigns specific duties to all staff before the commencement of voting, and at any times when staff are rotated through different functions in the voting station.

Before the commencement of voting, the voting station manager should also brief staff as a group and, where necessary, individually, to refresh staff of voting station procedures and advise them of any service or procedural matters specific to that voting station and available amenities (see Preparations for Commencement of Voting). A similar briefing should be provided to ballot counting staff before commencement of the count.

Settlement of Disputes

Voting station managers should be on the alert for any indications that disputes are arising between voters or observers and voting station officials, and intervene swiftly, calmly, and courteously to resolve such differences.

Management Support for Voting Station Officials

An objective and detached attitude must be taken by voting station managers and electoral administrators towards any complaints about the actions, service, and attitudes of voting station staff.

In the sometimes heated emotions of voting, honest errors can be perceived by political participants as bias and the necessary strict application of the integrity requirements of voting procedures appear to voters as bureaucratic lethargy.

Voting station officials often work long hours under taxing conditions that would try any person's patience.

Where voting station officials are following their procedures and endeavouring to serve voters to the best the conditions will allow, they deserve their managers' support in the face of complaints. When their departures from standard procedures may threaten voting integrity, clear powers of discipline must be available to and used by the voting station manager.

Monitoring Voting Station Staff Performance

Monitoring of Performance

Voting station officials' performance of their duties needs to be actively monitored throughout voting day by the voting station manager, assisted by any other supervisory staff available.

This will mean undertaking regular checks and close observation of staff in all areas of the voting station, to ensure that high standards are being maintained at all times, and to provide early warning of any impending difficulties.

Voting station managers cannot effectively manage by sitting at a desk and waiting for problems to be brought to them.

Activities that are important to monitor include:

• free passage through entrances and exits;

• voter queues controlled in an orderly and effective manner;

• fraud and multiple voting prevention controls are correctly applied to all voters --such as (where required by procedures) identity checks, collection or stamping of identity or other documents, marking of voters with ink, taking statements or declarations from voters-- (see  and Integrity Controls);

• voters lists correctly and accurately marked;

• ballots issued correctly, with clear, impartial instructions provided to voters on how to vote in a valid manner ;

• security measures on ballot and other election materials consistently implemented;

• ballot boxes or equipment for recording votes constantly kept under alert supervision;

• voting station officials treatment of and communications with voters not perceived as showing bias toward any political participant, or discrimination against any individual or classes of voters on gender, nationality, religious, or other grounds;

• voting compartments occupied by one person at a time (unless allowable assistance is being provided) and there is no marking of ballots (or choosing of the preferred ballot) occurring outside the voting compartments.

• correct information provided in response to voter inquiries 

• procedures for unregistered voters attempting to vote being correctly applied 

• the voting compartment area kept free of rubbish, writing equipment remaining available in all voting compartments (if card or paper ballots are used), and any spoilt, discarded, or declined ballots collected and treated correctly 

• voting station officials and accredited observers wearing identification badges at all times, and unauthorised persons are not allowed inside the voting station.

Where voting station officials are not certain as to how to complete their tasks, voting station managers or other supervisory staff must be able to provide them with clear, consistent, and accurate advice.

Task Re-allocation

If monitoring shows that particular staff are making errors or are too slow in performing more demanding tasks, the voting station manager should attempt to raise overall effectiveness by re-allocating these staff to less demanding duties.

The ability to do this will depend on how broad voting station official training has been. There are a number of duties, such as guarding ballot boxes that may be suitable for less able or slower working voting station officials.

Performance Evaluation

Voting station officials are entitled to expect that, at the completion of their duties, the voting station manager will provide them with an objective evaluation of their performance. This should be included with the voting station manager's report on voting.

Undertaking a brief assessment of each staff member's performance will aid future election recruitment assessments and, hopefully, contribute to staff motivation.

Staff Welfare on Voting Day

Apart from poor training, staff fatigue is the most common cause of errors in voting stations. Voting station managers need to be aware of the fatigue factor in managing their staff.

The most effective way of limiting staff fatigue would be to reduce voting hours to a reasonable work day rather than the all too often 12-15 hours of voting, followed by a count; but this is often not within the powers or discretion of voting station managers.

Management of fatigue may be assisted at the staff allocation level by allocating part-day staff available to assist with peak periods, or, where voting stations are also used for the count, using different shifts of voting station officials or employing unskilled staff to set up the count centre layout and clean up the voting station while voting station officials have a break between voting and the count. Within the voting station, voting station managers can assist in combating staff fatigue by:

• if any allocated staff do not report for duty, attempting to obtain replacement reserve staff, rather than attempting to show superior management skill by making do with less resources;

• formulating meal break and rest break rosters for voting station officials, and ensuring that staff takes at least one break during the day.

Even though a 15 minute break for each staff member might at times slow voter service, staffs without a break are likely to provide slower and progressively less accurate service throughout the second half of the day. (It is, of course, sensible to schedule staff breaks to avoid expected peak voting periods.)

• ensuring that there are water/drink supplies available to staff during the day;

• where voting station staff are trained for and capable of doing multiple tasks, rotating staff through these tasks during the day (the different competencies to be applied in different tasks can be revitalised);

• ensuring that where the same staffs conducting voting are used for the count, they have a break before counting commences.

Staff Welfare

Other staff welfare measures to be taken by electoral administrators and/or voting station managers that will promote staff motivation during voting day include:

• no gender or other discrimination in the allocation of staff tasks, nor harassment of any staff member due to gender, nationality, religious, or other considerations;

• reliable transport arrangements made for staff to get to and from the voting station;

• adequate security protection within the voting station environment;

• staff payments and other entitlements provided on time and according to agreed schedules. This last consideration is a highly important factor in the retention of good staff.

Effective organisation of payroll for voting station officials is a massive exercise and requires intensive application of management resources for it to proceed accurately and on schedule, but it should be a priority.

Integrity Controls

The integrity of voting rests on assurances that:

• votes are completed only by those persons eligible and entitled to vote at a particular voting location and in a particular election;
• each voter votes only once and in his or her own name only (unless specific provision is made otherwise in election legal frameworks for forms of proxy voting);
• voters make a free and secret choice when voting;
• accountable voting materials are issued only to those authorised to use them;
• the use of all liable voting materials can be accounted for.

It must be made very clear to voting station managers and staff during their training that they are responsible for ensuring that voting integrity is not breached within the voting station.

While the basic integrity controls necessary within voting stations have been dealt with in some detail in sections such as Preparations for Commencement of Voting, it is useful to summarise these in brief.

Particular care may need to be taken in systems requiring a minimum voter turnout for election validity to watch for ineligible persons attempting to vote and attempts at introducing unauthorised material into ballot boxes.

 
Voting Site Controls

Effective management of the voting area will limit the potential for breaches of other integrity controls.

Major issues for the voting station manager to consider in controlling the voting site are that:

• entry to the voting station is restricted to authorised persons--voters attending to vote, officials, and other properly-accredited persons;
• there is no politically partisan activity (to the extent that this is defined in election legal framework--see (Role of Party/Candidate Representatives) within the voting station;
• any required restricted access or activity perimeters around the outside of the voting station are set up and enforced;
• signs, barriers, and staff resources are used effectively for crowd and queue control;
• voting station officials and observers have a clear view of all activity within the voting station, particularly of areas used for accountable voting materials issue, voting compartments, and ballot boxes.
  

Voter Identity Controls

Before being issued liable voting material, voters should prove that they are entitled to be issued the material. To prevent impersonation of another voter, this would normally require the voter to produce, for examination by voting station officials, an identity document.

Identity cards acceptable for this purpose should be of high integrity, bearing a photograph or other easily recognisable personal characteristics of the voter. Where national identity card systems of high integrity exist, these may be cost-effectively used.

Alternatively, where high integrity identification controls are applied during voter registration, a voter identification card issued as a receipt for registration (or at a later date) could be used.

 

Voter Eligibility Controls

The major control on the eligibility of a voter to vote at a particular voting station, at a particular election, is the accuracy of preparation and of use by voting station officials, of voters’ lists in the voting station. Accurate matching of voters with entries on the voter’s list and marking of the entries of voters who have voted is essential.

Additional controls in the form of voter identification cards denoting each voter's correct voting station may also apply.

These controls may be supplemented by similarly well-controlled systems to allow those eligible to vote, but through administrative error not on the voters list to vote, and/or, where allowable under the legal framework, voting day registration of voters.

 

Voting Secrecy

Controls on voting secrecy go to the heart of principles of free choice in voting. Within the voting station, voting station officials must ensure that:

• voters are alone in voting compartments (except when assisted voting is authorised);
• ballots are appropriately folded or enveloped to conceal the voter's vote before they leave the voting compartment;
• no one attempts to ascertain from a voter within the voting station how they intend to vote or have voted.

The question of exit polls conducted by media or political participants may also cause concern and such activity needs to be carefully monitored to ensure that voters are not harassed.
 

Materials Controls

Strict control of liable voting materials should be enforced at all times before, during, and after voting. Particular attention needs to be paid to:

• keeping accountable materials under strict security at all times (tables or storage containers in which there are accountable voting materials should never be left unattended; and any accountable material not currently in use should be kept in secure containers);
• witnessed sealing of empty ballot boxes before use;
• supervising ballot boxes (or voting machines and computers) to ensure that each voter casts only a single vote, that only valid materials enter the ballot box, and that seals remain intact and materials are not removed from the ballot box during voting;
• careful accounting for and reconciliation of all accountable voting materials received, issued and unused, and of voting materials issued to voters recorded as having voted.
   

Intimidation Controls

Voting station officials must be aware of the atmosphere within the voting station and alert to prevent any intimidation of voters.

Strict control of entry to only authorised persons and of removal of weapons from persons entering the voting station will assist this. Voting station managers must be alert to:

• state or security officials remaining in the voting station having an intimidatory affect on voters;
• attempts to influence voting of subordinates by supervisory staff (in military or other hierarchical establishments) attending to vote with their subordinates;
• party or candidate representatives, observers, or voting station officials attempting to communicate with or influence voters on a partisan basis;
• intimidation of officials by party or candidate representatives, for example, through loud challenges, threats, influence of earlier public criticism (e.g., at an earlier round of the elections), or by officials of the state present in the voting station;
• establishment of close liaison with security forces allocated to the voting station (see Security in Voting Stations).

 

Multiple Voting Controls

Strict application of controls to prevent multiple voting is much more effective than attempting to investigate and remedy its effects after its occurrence:

• the basic and most effective control is to use unique, accurate voters lists at each voting location and have tight procedures to confirm voter identity.
• tight integrity controls on voter registration, particularly if coupled with production for all voters of a voter identification card that must be presented for voting, will support the integrity checking of voter identity and prevention of multiple voting.

Where there are doubts about the quality of voter identity procedures, the accuracy of voters lists, or the accuracy of marking of voters lists by voting station officials, or voters lists used in each voting station do not contain a unique set of voters, other multiple voting controls will be required to maintain high voting integrity standards.

Common additional controls would include:

• cancelling or stamping voter identification cards specifically issued for the election to indicate the voter has voted--this control depends on the integrity, and potential transferability, of the voter identification card;
• marking any general identity card to be used as proof of identity to denote the voter has voted--the effectiveness of this again depends on the integrity, and potential transferability, of the voter identification card;
• marking voters with special ink when they vote. 

 

Party/Candidate Representatives

Monitoring by party/candidate representatives in the voting station not only aids transparency, but can also assist in maintaining the integrity of voting by bringing matters to the attention of voting station officials. Voting station layouts should enable a clear view of all voting activity--including entrances, eligibility checking, voting materials issue areas, and voting compartments, ballot boxes--to voting station officials, party and candidate representatives, and observers present.

Party/candidate representatives must have the right to observe all activity in the voting station, from the pre-voting checks of apt voting materials and sealing of ballot boxes to the post-voting materials reconciliations and packaging of materials.

Party/candidate representatives would preferably have the right to challenge both the eligibility of voters and actions of voting station officials where these are not in accordance with procedures.

Challenges to voters and voting procedures may assist voting integrity where party/candidate representatives suspect that:

• voters believed ineligible to vote are being allowed to vote, or believed eligible to vote are being denied a vote;
• voters believed to have already voted are being allowed to vote;
• unauthorised additional ballots are being introduced into the ballot box;
• ballots are being removed from the voting station for marking outside, then brought back into the voting station by other voters to deposit in the ballot box;
• the ballots or ballot envelopes being used by voters are not those officially printed;
• there is any intimidation of voters;
• ballots or ballot envelopes are being handled by other party/candidate representatives during voting;
• unauthorised assistance is being provided to voters marking their ballots.
  

Security in Voting Stations

Effective maintenance of security in voting stations during voting is a cooperative effort between voting station managers and their voting station officials, security forces, and electoral management body administrators.

In higher security risk environments, coordination centres at the regional and electoral district level or local level will assist integrated decision making on security-related issues and will ensure the integration of election administration and security forces operations during voting.

Involvement of Security Forces

The required level of involvement of security forces in maintaining security during voting will depend on results of risk assessments of the security situation. Where elections have a peaceful history, voting station officials may be able to handle all security requirements themselves, with no need for anything but formal liaison arrangements to engage security forces support for any emergency.

In relatively secure environments, and where the law allows, it may be useful to arrange for one or more voting station officials at each voting station to be sworn in as special constables for voting day, with their authority limited to the voting station and its immediate vicinity--extending as far as any area around the voting station within which legislation prohibits political activity.

Where security risk assessments show a higher level of risk of political or physical transgressions, or where elections have the potential to result in radical changes in the control or structures of government, engagement of security forces for protection of voting station operations will often be required.

Security Prior to Commencement of Voting

Prior to the commencement of voting, security may need to be provided at voting stations during the period between delivery of election materials and equipment to the voting station and the commencement of voting. Wherever possible, voting stations would preferably be set up on the day before voting commences.

• In areas of minor security risk, normal security precautions for the premises--locking, setting of security alarms, dependence on checks by security personnel who would normally visit the premises--can be sufficient.

• In higher security risk areas, a permanent security force presence from the time materials arrive would be advisable.

Accountable voting materials- ballots and/or ballot envelopes, voters lists, voting machines or computers-or any valuable or vital equipment, such as radios or other communications equipment, should under no circumstances be left unsecured on voting station premises following delivery. How and where security is required for these will depend on the methods and timing of delivery and the security risk assessments for the area.

If they are to be delivered to the voting sites prior to voting day, a security presence must be arranged through to the commencement of voting. This presence should be continuous. How many security personnel will be required on-site and whether security duties will be undertaken by police or armed forces will depend on assessed security risks.

If apt materials are not delivered to the voting station until voting day, as is common in many lower security risk environments where voting station managers collect or have custody of liable materials before voting day, consideration can be given to alternatives such as:

• safekeeping in local police, bank, or other secure storage facilities, where there is community trust in such institutions;

• secure safekeeping by voting station managers at their own premises--a cost-effective method, but one that should only be contemplated in very low risk situations;

• in urban areas, requiring collection of such accountable materials by the voting station manager from secure storage at the electoral management body's local offices only on the morning of voting day.

Voting materials and equipment should not be left unattended anywhere. In situations where voting station managers are responsible for the collection and delivery of voting material, this may need to be particularly reinforced with voting station managers in regard to leaving voting materials in their vehicles.

Voting Day Security Deployment

Where security plans call for security forces to be present at voting stations or at mobile/fixed bases covering voting locations, all required security personnel should be in place no later than the required time of arrival of the voting station managers.

As part of the pre-voting checks at the voting station, the communication links established between voting stations and security forces, mobile security forces and joint operations centres should be thoroughly checked.

Voting station managers must ensure before the commencement of voting that any security forces assigned to the voting station have a full understanding of the division between security force and voting station official responsibilities with respect to the voting station, and how high a profile they are required to take in their activities in and around the voting station. Where there have been any threats to voting locations, security forces should thoroughly check the voting station for explosive devices before staff enter.

Security during Voting Hours

During voting hours, security forces may be required either to provide continuous security for voting locations or be on alert to respond to any emergencies, depending on the assessed security risks of the environment.

What is important to emphasise is that, apart from situations that endanger the life of those present in or around the voting station, security forces should act only on the request of the voting station manager or other electoral management body officials.

For them to have a role in directing any aspect of the voting would raise grave questions about election integrity.

Specific actions to be taken by security forces during voting hours need to be carefully matched to the security risk environment; too intensive an approach in relatively peaceful environments may discourage attendance by voters or raise doubts about who is controlling the voting process.

On the other hand, in higher security risk environments, lack of a security presence risks endangering voting materials or allowing intimidation of voters and voting station officials.

Where security forces are not present at voting stations, rapid response by security forces to any voting station emergencies must be a reality, backed by operational readiness and sufficient resource allocation.

Voting station managers should, as a component of a regular scheduled operational verbal report to electoral district managers, report on the security situation.

Potential Roles for Security Forces

In all situations, security forces should be available to assist voting station managers by removing from voting stations persons who refuse to obey lawful directions from voting station officials 

Specific additional roles that may need to be undertaken, depending on risk assessment of the environment, include:

• ensuring that voters are not harassed or intimidated on their journey to or from the voting station;

• maintaining checkpoints outside the voting station to search for weapons and store confiscated weapons from voters while they are in the voting station;

• providing evacuation and safety management in the event of disasters;

• control of disturbances within or near the voting station;

• enforcement of any security perimeter established around the voting station.

High Risk Environments

In some environments of high security risk, there may also be a need for security forces to maintain general monitoring throughout their areas of responsibility to ensure that no illegal voting stations, not authorised by the electoral management body and intended to siphon off voters from legitimate voting stations, have been set up.

In some specific circumstances of high security risk, security forces may have to take a more active role in assisting voters to attend and return from voting and the protection of voting station officials.

Where threats to participants in voting processes in general are high, secure transport may need to be provided for both voters and officials. In respect to voters, any secure transport arrangements are more effectively organised as convoys, rather than protection of individual voters or small groups.

Attention is required to appropriate scheduling of such services and ensuring that these services are provided equally to all communities at risk, so as not to raise questions of potential political bias in these arrangements.

Security after Close of Voting

In situations where security forces are assigned to voting stations, they will generally have a continuing role after the close of voting:

• They may be useful outside the voting station in assisting to turn away voters arriving after the close of voting.

• They may also be required to provide security during the count or for transportation of ballots to counting centres.

Crisis Management

Voting station managers and staff may need to react quickly in the face of a crisis during voting day to safeguard their own personal safety and/or the integrity of voting:

• Contingency planning must consider potential crises.

• Training exercises for voting station managers should also test their reaction and judgment in the face of potential crises.

Possible Crisis Environments

Major problems could occur during the hours of voting as a result of:

• non-delivery of critical materials or equipment;

• inability of the voting station location to cope with voter crowds;

• natural disaster, such as fire, flood, lightning strikes in or around the voting station;

• public violence or disturbance in or around the voting station;

• threats to the safety of voting station officials or voters whilst in the voting station, such as bomb threats.

Effective Communications

Effective crisis management requires reliable communication systems between voting stations and election operations centres or other supervisory administrative offices. While initiative on the part of voting station managers may defuse a local crisis, the relevant operations centre or elections administration office should always be informed immediately.

Communications strategies that include:

• a regular reporting schedule for each voting station,

• the use of roving voting station supervisors, and

• effective availability of contingency reserves of materials and staff can assist in averting management crises.

Duty of Care

Voting station managers would in many situations have a legal duty of care towards their staff and any voter in the voting station area. They should be provided with emergency evacuation plans by the electoral management body; their training should ensure that they are familiar with these; and their staff should be briefed on these procedures prior to the commencement of voting.

Adjourned Voting

There are some situations in which it would be impossible for a voting station to remain open for voting, or in which it would be impossible to continue with voting at a particular voting station, while still giving potential voters a reasonable opportunity to vote.

Responsible action, and possibly saving the election from challenge, can be assisted if the legal framework allows the voting station manager or other specified officers of the electoral management body to adjourn voting, for a short time, or to another date, and to another location if necessary, in such situations.

Reasons for Adjourning Voting

The circumstances under which voting may be adjourned and responsibility for such decisions need to be clearly specified in legislation, and the chain of command necessary to make and ratify decisions to adjourn voting laid down in electoral management procedures:

• It would be reasonable that, wherever possible, there be consultation between the voting station manager and senior electoral management body staff (and with regard to disturbance or natural disaster, security force management) in the region, before any decision to adjourn voting.

• Where there is no time for such consultation, senior electoral management body staff must be informed as soon as possible by the voting station manager, and a decision made as to where and whether voting which has been adjourned can be quickly commenced again.

The circumstances could include:

• natural disasters--fire, flood, storm--that would prevent voters on the voters list for a voting station from attending to vote;

• riot or public disturbance of sufficient severity to prevent voters from attending the voting station

• unavailability of vital voting materials;

• serious threats, such as those of bombs, leading to the necessity to evacuate locations used for voting.

Length of Adjournment

If at all possible, voting should be adjourned only for as long as it takes for the crisis to abate. The identification of alternative nearby contingency sites that could be used for voting in such emergencies will assist this.

In some situations--such as where a low intensity fire occurs in the voting station during voting hours--it may be possible to use areas outside or around the voting station to continue voting, depending on security requirements and the ability to quickly replace any materials and equipment lost.

Adjourning voting to another day should be a step of last resort, but may be necessary to preserve personal safety or in situations such as major flooding in the voting station area.

Where voting has to be adjourned to another day, the legal framework should specify a reasonably brief period of days within which voting should be scheduled anew.

Postponement of Voting

In some circumstances, voting at a voting station may be delayed before it commences, for example where:

• it  is obvious that voters will not be able to attend a voting station throughout the specified hours of voting and no alternative locations provide satisfactory accessibility to voters;

• vital materials are unavailable.

This information needs to be transmitted to voters in as effective a way as possible; radio and television media or other public broadcasting methods are often the only immediate option.

Adjournment during Voting Hours

Where voting has commenced, and later needs to be adjourned, voting station managers should act under the direction of security and emergency forces in implementing emergency evacuation or other safety plans.

The voting station manager should announce the adjournment of voting, and consistent with preserving the safety of voters and voting station officials, secure and move voting material and ballot boxes, voters’ lists and other election material out of the voting station.

As far as possible, the voting station should be closed down and materials packaged normally--procedures similar to those for multi-day voting or for mobile voting stations could apply.

As far as possible, the same materials should be used when voting begins again; that is voters' lists, ballots, ballot boxes, and the like not destroyed or lost during the adjournment--. Alternatively, the re-start of voting could be treated as a fresh election with fresh ballot boxes and materials. This may make the procedure of final reconciliation of material more complex.

Where ballot boxes, ballots, or voters’ lists were lost during the crisis that caused the adjournment a complete re-run of the election in that voting station could be appropriate Where voting resumes it would be more usual that only those voters who had not voted before voting was adjourned should be entitled to vote.

This will require additional care in publicity for the additional voting day or period of time and may require great tact and vigilance in the processing of voters turning out to vote when voting begins again.

Secure storage for the affected materials, ballot boxes and equipment, separate from other used voting materials, will need to be arranged until the restart of the voting, and arrangements made for reserving, staffing, and securing a voting location on the new date.

Ballot Counts

The legal framework also needs to consider the position of the count for other voting stations in the same electoral district as any voting station where voting has been adjourned.

The need, for integrity and transparency reasons, for these figures to be announced has to be set against any influence public knowledge of these count totals may have on the voting behaviour of voters in those voting stations where voting will occur at a later date.

Role of Party/Candidate Representatives

Freedom to observe all voting processes by representatives nominated by parties and candidates in the election is a necessary safeguard of the integrity and transparency of the election.

The rights and conduct responsibilities of candidate and party representatives in voting stations would normally be defined in the legal or regulatory framework for the election 

(For further discussion of these, see Rights and Conduct Within Voting Stations.

For further discussion of the roles of party/candidate representatives during and after voting, see Preparations for Commencement of Voting, Voter Service)

Observation/Monitoring Role

What must be clear to such representatives is that they are attending the voting station to observe proceedings, not to campaign or otherwise participate in voting. All legal restrictions on campaigning within the voting station area must be strictly and equitably enforced for representatives of all parties and candidates. These may be restrictions on:

• communication with voters,

• distribution of partisan material,

• wearing of badges or apparel,

• public broadcasts that can be heard within the voting station.

Voting station officials must also ensure that party/candidate representatives do not handle any liable voting materials.

Whilst within the voting station party and candidate representatives should be subject to the authority of the voting station manager and staff, and may be removed from the voting station on direction of the voting station manager if their conduct breaches any of the standards laid down in the regulatory framework, including any code of conduct.

While candidate and party representatives should have the right to immediately question decisions made by voting station officials or the implementation of voting procedures, by requesting review by the voting station manager or if still unsatisfied by electoral management body officials, they should not be permitted to influence voters, to disregard voting station officials' directions, or to otherwise disrupt voting.

Assistance from Voting Station Officials

Voting station officials should, within reasonable bounds, assist candidate and party representatives in the conduct of their observations. This would include undertaking all actions in a manner that is visible and senior voting station staff providing explanations to representatives of why particular actions or decisions have been taken.

Requests by candidate and party representatives to slow down voter processing or the compilation of documentation are more problematic as they can impinge on the efficiency of voter service.

Where staffs are following standard procedures correctly, such requests should generally be refused; voting station officials cannot allow the effectiveness of their service to be limited by the effectiveness levels of the representatives provided by parties or candidates.

Party/Candidate Representatives Authorisation

Transparent voting systems would allow representatives of all parties or candidates running in an election to nominate representatives to represent their interests in all voting stations in which voting will take place for that election.

This need not extend to political groups not contesting the particular election. All representatives of parties and candidates present in voting stations should hold formal accreditation from the electoral management body and be accredited by their party or candidate.

Application forms for accreditation should be made available through electoral management body offices during the election campaign period

Party/candidate representatives should present evidence of accreditation before being allowed to enter the voting station area. This evidence could be in the form of a badge or a formal letter of accreditation issued by the electoral management body.

In some systems the candidate or party may issue accreditation without requiring the approval of the electoral management body. While this may provide greater flexibility, it would place a greater burden of control on voting station managers.

Voting station staff controlling voter entry to the voting station or voter queues must undertake accreditation check as part of their duties.

Particular care needs to be taken where representatives are accredited to a particular location or locations only, or where there are different categories of party/candidate representatives, that their accreditation is valid for the specific location.

On Entry to Voting Station

On entry to the voting station, representatives should immediately present their accreditation and introduce themselves to the voting station manager. Representatives should also advise the voting station manager whenever they leave or re-enter the voting station. The voting station manager should keep note of the representatives present and the political interests that they represent.

This is useful in general, and particularly important in systems where there are regulatory restrictions on the number of representatives representing any one party or candidate who may be present in a voting station at the same time. Claimed excess numbers of representatives may be seen as a ground for challenging the conduct of voting.

Identifying Badge or Sticker

While within the boundaries of the voting station, representatives should prominently wear a badge or sticker identifying their role.

Where letters of accreditation, rather than badges identifying party/candidate representatives, are issued by the electoral management body, each voting station should be supplied with a stock of identifying badges for this purpose.

Eligibility of Candidates

There is also the question of whether candidates themselves should be restricted from acting as voting station representatives.

As the continued presence of a candidate within a voting station could be considered "campaigning" it is often seen as prudent that this restriction, as with other restrictions on political campaigning within voting stations, be applied in the election rules.

Numbers of Representatives Present

Legal frameworks for the election may restrict the numbers of representatives that any one candidate/party may have present in a voting station at any time. The balance has to be struck between transparency of the process and the capacity of voting stations to take large numbers of representatives.

Where there are large numbers of candidates/parties, and hence large numbers of representatives present, voting station managers may need to have powers to restrict movement of representatives within the voting station so as not to interfere with voting processes. This should be done by a process of negotiation, rather than by edict, and in such a way that preserves transparency of voting official actions.

Where different voting stations share the same site, additional controls on party/candidate representative numbers and movement may be required. Special arrangements may need to be made for mobile voting stations (see Representatives at Mobile Voting Stations).

Recording of Complaints and Challenges

Any challenges to voters by party or candidate representatives, and any complaints from them regarding the operations of the voting station, must be recorded in writing by the voting station manager (and preferably countersigned by the relevant observing representative) and included with the voting station manager's reports on voting submitted to the electoral management body (see Close of Voting).

Removal from Voting Station

In briefings to representatives, the need to follow the spirit as well as the letter of the law should be stressed. A cooperative attitude between representatives and officials will make activity more comfortable within the voting station. Where breaches of conduct requirements are detected, the voting station manager should act immediately.

Depending on the seriousness of the breach, a warning or removal of the offending party/candidate representative(s) from the voting station could be justified. If party/candidate representatives ordered to leave the voting station refuse to leave, the voting station manager should request security officials' assistance in removing them.

All breaches by representatives of their code of conduct or other election rules should be recorded in writing by the voting station manager and included with the reports on voting submitted to the electoral management body (see Close of Voting). It will decide whether further action to seek penalties under electoral law should be instituted.

Removing a party/candidate representative from a voting station for misconduct has the potential to disadvantage a party and its voters through the behaviour of one individual.

Equity is maintained if there is provision in the election framework that a party or candidate can replace any representative who has been removed from a voting station with another appropriately accredited person.

Voter Information

The practice that is common in some jurisdictions of party workers outside the voting station assisting voters by providing them with information on their serial number on the voters list, or information as to whether they are in fact on the list can be a dangerous practice for the following reasons:

• Material supplied to party/candidate workers may not be an exact replica of the voters list being used in the voting station.

• Party workers may attempt to discourage or misinform voters who they believe will be supporting contestants from other parties.

• Errors in identifying voters from the lists of voters used may occur.

While this practice could assist voting station officials in redirecting voters, unless party workers are well trained, impartial in their advice towards supporters of all election contestants, and provided with accurate data, it can cause confusion among voters.

Rights and Conduct Within Voting Stations

While the specific manner in which their observation duties are undertaken may vary according to the voting systems used, open and transparent voting processes would generally provide the following rights to party/candidate representatives in voting stations:

• to observe all activity, with the exception of the marking of ballots by voters, within the voting station, from the check counting of ballots and sealing of ballot boxes prior to the commencement of voting to the final packaging of material after close of voting;

• to challenge the right of any person to vote;

• to question any decisions made by voting station officials with the voting station manager and election management officials;

• to witness the marking of ballots for physically impaired or non-literate voters by a voting station official, where such assistance to voters is allowed;

• to make notes of any occurrences, make copies of any official documents, and record any statements freely offered by voters.

These rights are exercised subject to:

• being validly accredited to the voting station;

• remaining within the voting station while lawfully carrying out their functions;

• any restrictions on the number of representatives representing one party or candidate that may be present.

Campaigning within Voting Station

Different jurisdictions have widely differing definitions in law of what constitutes "campaigning." Preventing party or candidate representatives from campaigning within a voting station is a restriction that attempts to allow voters some distance from any political pressures at the time when they actually cast their vote.

Open attempts within the voting station to influence voters in their vote by displaying or distributing political literature or otherwise communicating with voters, including public broadcasts that can be heard from within the voting station, are barred.

There is often also an exclusion zone around the voting entrance within which the distribution of political material by anyone is banned. The area of this zone varies widely among different jurisdictions, dependent on factors such as:

• the security environment;

• cultural attitudes towards voters being left in peace on voting day to determine their vote;

• past harassment of voters outside voting stations.

This exclusion area may be as little as five metres from the voting station entrance or up to a kilometre. Where wider security areas are established around voting stations , it may also be appropriate for the legal framework to ban any political campaigning within this area on voting day.

Some jurisdictions additionally ban party or candidate representatives within the voting station from wearing any apparel or badges that could be identified with any candidate or party running in the election. (This may be particularly sensible where there is a potential for conflict during voting.) Others ban the distribution of any materials attempting to influence voters' choices on voting day.

Conduct of Party and Candidate Representatives

As a condition of accreditation to voting locations, party and candidate representatives must have formally accepted the code of conduct applicable for their behaviour.

If a full code of conduct has not been developed, then at the very minimum a formal declaration that their actions will maintain voting secrecy, follow the directions of voting station officials, not interfere with election processes, and be bound by the legal framework for the election should be sought from each party/candidate representative as a condition of accreditation.

While within voting stations, party or candidate representatives are expected to adhere to the conditions of the code of conduct, and of any requirements imposed on them by the legal or regulatory framework for the election. Specific requirements may again vary according to the details of the voting system; however, in principle, conduct required of party or candidate representatives while within the voting station area would include:

• not attempting to influence or intimidate any voter;

• not attempting to intimidate, harass, otherwise threaten or interfere with the work of any voting station official;

• communicating with voting station officials and voters only as necessary for the conduct of their duties;

• not marking or handling any official election material (except to witness records of the vote), or attempt to have it removed from the voting station or destroyed, or attempt to introduce any purported official election material into the voting station;

• obeying all lawful directions by the voting station manager and voting station officials delegated to issue directions to representatives;

• not campaigning for votes within the voting station area;

• not providing any person turning out to vote with false information regarding their eligibility to vote at that voting station or in the election;

• not entering the voting compartments, except (if allowable under the law) when nominated by a voter to assist in voting or to witness the vote of a voter who is assisted by a voting station official.

Some jurisdictions would also bar party and candidate representatives from using any communication device--mobile phones, telephones, radios--from within the voting station while voting is in progress.

Representatives at Mobile Voting Stations

Party or candidate representatives should be given the opportunity to observe the conduct of any mobile voting facilities that are used for home visits to voters, voting in hospitals or other institutions, such as prisons, or in remote areas. Dates, locations, and hours of mobile voting must be announced by the electoral management body to parties and candidates in advance to allow them this opportunity.

For mobile voting in remote areas, reachable only by air charter transport, it may be useful for promotion of the integrity of the election for the electoral management body to allow party or candidate representatives to travel with the mobile voting station, where practicable. In such situations the issue of some contribution by representatives towards the costs of their transport may need to be addressed.

Whatever arrangements are made in terms of assisting representatives must be equitable towards all parties or candidates contesting the relevant election.

Rights and responsibilities of party and candidate representatives in observing mobile voting stations are those applicable to static voting facilities (see Rights and Conduct within Voting Stations and Role of Party/Candidate Representatives).

Mobile voting officials must ensure, particularly where mobile voting stations are servicing elderly or frail voters, that the behaviour of party and candidate representatives is not such that may, even unintentionally, intimidate voters.

Party or candidate representatives observing mobile voting stations operating in voters' homes or in hospitals or other care institutions must act with common sense and courtesy; where it is obvious that their presence may discomfort a voter, they should withdraw.

Particularly where mobile voting stations are visiting voters' homes, sensitivity is required; large numbers of representatives entering a voter's home could be regarded as invading the voter's privacy.

Relaxation of Campaigning Restrictions

In more complex voting systems, particularly those that require the electors to mark multiple preferences on the ballot, there may be some advantages in the legal framework allowing distribution, either by party/candidate representatives present or the mobile voting station officials, of party voting guides on request by voters.

In some situations, such as where voters are bedridden in medical institutions or homes, in prisons, or in remote areas, the voters may otherwise not have access to such information. It would be the responsibility of the party or candidate, not the electoral management body, to ensure such information was available for use.

Close of Voting

Basic Issues

The close of the voting station can be an intensely pressurized period for voting station officials, especially if:

• there are considerable numbers of voters still waiting to vote at the appointed time for closure;

• there is pressure to commence counts quickly.

Clear systems and instructions, backed by checklists of actions to be taken, will aid correct decision-making during this period.

Use of Roving Supervisors

Where roving voting station supervisors are used, they should ensure that they are at a voting station, rather than in transit, at the time of close of voting and preparation for and commencement of the count.

It will be most effective if they adjust their schedule to ensure that they are present at voting stations where management has been less effective during voting hours.

Preparation for Close of Voting

Under normal circumstances, the voting station should close exactly at the time specified in legislation. It is essential that voting station managers synchronise their watches and clocks with an official time source, so that there can be no later argument as to whether the voting station closed at the correct time.

During the last hour the voting station is open, there may be actions that can be taken in preparation for the close of voting:

• If there are few voters turning out during this period, it may be possible to commence dismantling or packaging some excess equipment and material.

• If the count is to take place at the voting station, some furniture can be reorganise to the layout required for the count.

However, this should only be done if it will not adversely affect voter service during the remainder of voting hours, and no preparation of accountable voting material for the count should occur until voting has closed. Where staffs are eligible to vote at their voting station, voting station managers should ensure that they have had the opportunity to do so before voting closes.

Voters Still Queued to Vote at Time of Closing

Equitable voting procedures will contain provisions that allow all voters inside the voting station area at the time of close of voting to vote. If large crowds of voters are still waiting to vote at the time of close of voting; this would be the result of inadequate voting station resourcing or efficiency, rather than any fault of the voters.

As a service to voters, voting station managers should ensure, wherever possible, that voting station officials move any voters still waiting outside the voting station inside the designated voting station area before the time for close of voting.

If those waiting cannot fit inside the voting station premises (so the doors may be closed), it may be possible to designate the end of the line of voters who arrived before close of voting with rope, tape, or a similar barrier, or the stationing of a voting station official or security officer at the appropriate point.

In compulsory voting systems, an additional service can be provided to voters if voting station officials guarding entrances to the voting station at the close of voting note the details of those voters who arrive after close of voting, for reference during any action regarding failure to vote.

Extension of Voting Hours

Election rules and regulations should define the circumstances under which the hours of voting may be extended and who is accountable for making such a decision. Extension of voting hours can be a very contentious decision.

Voting station managers should not take it upon themselves to decide to extend the hours of voting. To do so will be to invite almost certain challenge to the result of the election.

If considerable numbers of voters are still outside the voting station area waiting to vote or are arriving to vote after the time of close of voting, guidance must be sought from senior electoral management body officials regarding any possible extension to voting hours.

Reasonably effective monitoring of and reporting from voting stations would identify the probabilities of this well before the time for close of voting.

It may be prudent that the electoral management body extends voting hours, or extend voting to a further day. This should be done in accordance with any provisions within the election rules, which would require consultation with all political participants and government executive authorities, and possibly with judicial authorities.

There may be situations threaten the personal safety of voting station staff, or the security of voting materials, and security forces are insufficient to offer protection or unable to provide rapid response. Common sense and self-preservation must prevail in such situations.

If the only way to preserve safety is to allow those who were not at the voting station at the time of close of voting to vote, efforts should be made to keep their ballots and voting records separate, pending a decision on extension of voting or for later adjudication as to their validity.

 

Actions at Close of Voting

At the exact time of close of voting, the voting station manager should officially announce that voting is closed, and the entrances and exits to the voting station should be closed and secured (if the voting station is not within a building, the perimeter of the voting station area will need to be secured).

In environments of low security risk, this could be done by voting station officials; in situations of higher security risk it would be more prudent for security forces to guard entrances/exits.

At the same time, external signs identifying the voting station should be taken down, and voters still in the voting station should be moved outside courteously as soon as they have finished voting. From this time on (unless any extension to voting hours is approved) the only persons who should be in the voting station are those holding official authorisation to be there under the election rules. This would normally include:

• Voting station officials assigned to that voting station;

• Accredited representatives of political parties/candidates

• Accredited independent observers;

• Authorized law enforcement/security force officers;

• Authorized electoral management body staff or other official observers.

This restriction must be rigorously enforced to provide integrity of the materials collecting and packaging processes.

Whether ballots are to be counted at the voting station itself, or at another location, at the close of voting, the following procedures should be followed:

• Ballot box slots should be closed and sealed immediately upon the close of voting.

Where machines or computers are used for voting, check numbers for the last vote or transaction recorded at close of voting should be recorded and witnessed, the machines locked and sealed, or computer vote entry screens securely closed to prevent further use.

• All voting materials should be collected and ballot issue records reconciled in preparation for the start of counting (see Collection of Ballots).

• Any special votes (absentee, provisional/tendered or similar) accepted in the voting station should be collected and reconciled with their ballot issue records (see Closing Arrangements for Special Voting).

• Reports on voting activity should be completed by the voting station manager.

• All other voting material not required for the count should be collected to be packaged and prepared for return to the electoral management body (see Verification and Packing of Materials).

Where counts are to be conducted at the voting station itself:

• Staff involved in the count will need to be organised and briefed.

• Count equipment and the voting station physical layout will need to be prepared for the count (see Preparation for Ballot Count).

Where counts are to be conducted at another location:

• Provisions for the secure transport of all voting station material and records to the count centre need to be implemented.

• All staff attendance and payment records should be correctly completed. If payments are made on conclusion of duty, the voting station manager should make correct payments to staff.

• All voting equipment and additional furniture should be prepared for collection or disposal.

• Any arrangements for retrieval of voting station staff should be executed

• Following collection of all election material, the premises should be tidied, locked and secured, and premises keys should be returned according to agreements made.

Additional special procedures may be required for voting locations dealing solely with special votes (see Closing Arrangements for Special Voting) and for mobile voting stations (see Close of Voting for Mobile Voting Stations).

Variable Closing Times

Some election systems allow discretion to voting station managers to close the voting station earlier than the advertised hours of voting if they believe that all voters on the voters list for that voting station have already voted.

This can be a dangerous practice, however, and where implemented has led in some instances to allegations of abuse. Even if allowed by electoral law, it is not to be encouraged by electoral management bodies. "All registered voters having voted," can too easily turn into "all registered voters that we think will vote have voted." It also does not allow for errors in voters lists, or any further service in redirecting voters turning out at the wrong voting station.

Voting Station Managers' Reports and Voting Records

It is important that following the close of voting, the voting station manager compiles a report on activities at the voting station. This report would be returned to the electoral management body with other apt voting station materials.

If ballot counts are to be conducted at another location, it should accompany the ballot material to the count.

Contents of the report would include:

• records related to voting in the voting station;

• voter service records;

• staffing and payment information;

• Reports on premises and occurrences during voting hours. If ballot counts are undertaken at the voting station, records of the counts could also be included in the same report.

(For discussion of the detail useful to include in voting station managers' reports, see Voting Station Managers' Reports.)

Collection of Ballots

Liable Materials

The immediate concern after the close of voting is to ensure that all apt voting materials in the voting station are collected, accounted for, and secured in preparation for conduct of the count. The focus of this will be on the following areas:

• securing of ballot boxes (or, if used, voting machines or computers);

• collection of other accountable voting materials--unused ballots or ballot envelopes, spoilt, or otherwise cancelled ballots or envelopes, certified voters lists, and any supplementary records of persons voting;

• Reconciliation of ballots (or envelopes) and their issuing records. Where the prime integrity control mechanism is the ballot itself, reconciliations of ballot stocks are necessary. Where the prime integrity control mechanism is a ballot envelope issued to eligible voters, reconciliations will instead involve these ballot envelopes.

Collection and accounting for ballots (or ballot envelopes where relevant) should not begin until all voters and any other unauthorized people have been moved outside the voting station.

Where there are no observers or party/candidate representatives present, it may be useful to request that a small number of voters remain to witness this accounting. If this is done, it is preferable that these voters first signed the same oath or conduct declaration required of accredited observers.

The voting station manager should collect official seals or stamps used to authenticate ballots or ballot envelopes (at the same time as the ballots are being collected). They should be formally accounted for and held under security until packaged.

Initial Reconciliations

No matter whether the count is undertaken an initial reconciliation of ballots (or ballot envelopes) received at to ballots (or ballot envelopes) that should be on hand after voting must be undertaken at the voting station. This is to establish the number of ballots or envelopes that should be in the ballot boxes.

This reconciliation should occur before any material is packaged for transportation to the counting centre, or before any ballot boxes are opened if the count is to occur at the voting station.

It is a useful control process for the integrity of voting and the count. It is also a process that is often recorded incorrectly, and can thus cause later disputes. Accuracy of reconciliations requires emphasis in voting station manager training and care in execution.

Where voting machines or computers are used, accurate internal integrity check mechanisms or software to prevent illegal exclusion or addition of votes must be installed.

For further details of this reconciliation, see Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Received.

Reconciliation of Ballots Issued to Voters

The other major integrity check on ballots that needs to be implemented is a reconciliation of records of the number of voters who voted to records of the number of ballots issued or ballot envelopes issued (see Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Issued).

Later reconciliations at the count should reconcile the number of voters recorded as having voted against the number of ballots extracted from the ballot box.

Discrepancies in Ballot or Ballot Envelope Accounting

Discrepancies in close of voting ballot (or ballot envelope) and voter numbers accounting can occur for a number of reasons apart from fraud. However, any discrepancy, for whatever reason, will arouse suspicion about the integrity of voting station operations.

Strict controls, care, and perhaps a little additional time spent at each stage of the ballot (or ballot envelope) handling process can prevent embarrassing and inexplicable ballot (or ballot envelope) accounting and reconciliation discrepancies.

Common non-fraudulent reasons for discrepancies in ballot/ballot envelope and voter number accounting include:

Ballots or ballot envelopes received at the voting station were not correctly and accurately counted before use. Even counter foiled, numbered, ballot booklets can have missing ballots. Loosely packed ballots or ballot envelopes, particularly without numbered counterfoils, are even more susceptible to error in post-production packaging.

It is essential that ballots, or ballot envelopes received at each voting station are counted and any discrepancy between delivery advices and actual stocks received is noted in ballot accounting records. The voting station manager should endorse the results of the check and these figures be used in all subsequent ballot/ballot envelope accounting calculations.

Failure to record properly any official movements of unused ballots or ballot envelopes to and from the voting station during voting day.

Voting station official errors in maintaining records of voters who voted. This is a task that requires continual monitoring during voting to ensure that each voter issued a ballot (or ballot envelope where this is the control mechanism) is recorded as having received a ballot or ballot envelope, and that this is done in the correct, consistent manner to aid counting of total figures. Where ballots are the integrity control mechanism, spoilt or discarded/rejected ballots not being immediately sealed/secured in an envelope or container and kept under security so that they cannot be later placed in the ballot box.

Counting and calculation errors. Each count and calculation required for accounting should be rechecked by another voting station official before being entered into the ballot account and voter reconciliation records.

Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Received

In voting systems whose prime control on the integrity of ballots is control of issue of the ballots to voters, all ballot stocks received at the voting station will need to be accounted for. Accounting for ballots at the close of voting is most effectively undertaken if it follows a series of simple steps.

All steps in this process should be recorded on official ballot account forms that are endorsed by the voting station manager and by any party/candidate representatives present.

While this reconciliation is being done, the voting station should be thoroughly searched, particularly the areas around the voting compartments; checking at floor level under furniture, in any cracks between tables, and in any areas that could be used for storage, would ensure that all ballots at the voting station are included in the accounting.

This important reconciliation of ballots can be undertaken using the following steps:

• establish Number of Ballots Received;

• establish Number of Ballots Issued to Voters;

• count Spoilt/Discarded/Rejected Ballots;

• calculate Number of Ballots Apparently in Ballot Box;

• count Unused Ballots;

• preliminary Reconciliation.

Where voting machines or computers are used the reconciliation will be entirely different (see Automated Voting below).

Where the liable item is the ballot envelope (and not the ballot itself) the procedures will also differ (see Ballot Envelope Reconciliation below).

Establishing Number of Ballots Received

The first step is to establish the total number of ballots that should be on hand in the voting station This is done by counting the number of ballots received before or during voting (adjusted for any discrepancies found during delivery checking and subtracting any ballots officially removed from the voting station (in some systems this may occur if emergency re-supply for other neighbouring voting stations is necessary).

It is important that this figure is correctly calculated. At the conclusion of the count this figure for total ballots on hand should be equal to the number of votes counted during the count (including any spoilt or otherwise cancelled ballots) and the unused ballots.

Any discrepancy between the initial calculation of total ballots at the voting station and the figure calculated at the end of vote counting would suggest tampering or error in the election, and will require thorough recount of all ballots and investigation at the count.

Establishing Number of Ballots Issued to Voters

The second step is to establish the number of ballots issued to voters. If there is more than one table issuing ballots to voters in the voting station (e.g., if there are different issuing tables according to an alphabetical split of voters' names), this figure should be first established separately for every issuing table, and only when these figures are endorsed by the voting station manager, added up to a total for the voting station.

Depending on the style of the ballot, and the control systems for ballot material in the voting station, the methods of doing this will vary:

• Where ballots have numbered stubs or counterfoils, and there is only one ballot issuing table, or a separate counterfoil number range has been given to each issuing table, ballot issues may be established by subtracting the number on the stub of the first ballot issued from that on the stub of the next remaining unused ballot at close of voting. This simple method should only be used if there is strict control over ballot issuing during voting to ensure ballots are issued in strict numerical order of the stubs.

• Where counter foiled ballots have been issued out of strict numerical order, which may particularly occur if there is more than one table for issuing ballots or if there has been a re-supply of ballots to the voting station during voting, the number of stubs/counterfoils from which ballots have been torn off should be counted at each issuing table.

• Where ballots without counterfoils/stubs are used, staff at each issuing table should count the number of unused ballots left at the end of voting, and subtract that from the number of ballots provided to that issuing table during voting day.

It is thus important that all supply of ballots to issuing tables (including any from voting station reserves during voting hours) is carefully recorded during the course of voting day.

Counting Spoilt/Discarded/Rejected Ballots

The third step is to count the number of ballots that have been retained by voting station officials as:

• spoilt-that is, the voter surrendered the ballot before placing it in the ballot box and requested a fresh ballot to complete, or the ballot was damaged and could not be issued;

• discarded or rejected-that is, the ballot was issued to a voter but was then left by the voter somewhere in the voting station other than the ballot box, or rejected when issued.

Many systems may treat such ballots as a single category of cancelled ballots.

Calculating Number of Ballots Apparently in Ballot Box

The fourth step is to calculate the number of ballots that should be in the ballot box. This is calculated by subtracting the number of spoilt, discarded, and rejected ballots from the total number of ballots issued to voters.

Where absentee ballots from voters registered to vote at that voting station are merged on voting day with normal ballots cast at the voting station, these will also need to be included.

It is vital that this figure is correctly calculated, as it is the figure to which the initial count of ballots in the ballot box, on opening of the ballot box at the count, must reconcile. Any discrepancy would suggest tampering or error in the election, and will require thorough recount and investigation at the count.

Counting Unused Ballots

The fifth step is to count the unused ballots. Again, the method of doing this, whether by simple subtraction of counterfoil numbers, counting of unused ballot counterfoils, or of the ballots themselves, will depend on the ballot style and control methods within the voting station.

It is important that all unused ballots are accounted for, not just those remaining at the voting materials issuing tables, but any reserves held by the voting station manager.

Preliminary Reconciliation

The sixth step is a preliminary reconciliation: The figure for total ballots at the voting station should equal the sum of ballots issued to voters, plus spoilt/discarded/rejected ballots, plus unused ballots. Any discrepancies between these two figures should be noted and investigated.

Automated Voting Reconciliation

Where voting machines are used, reading the start and finish numbers on an automatic counter of voters using the machine is an integral part of reconciling the numbers of votes completed.

Similarly, for computer voting, a log totalling the number of relevant voter transactions entered into the computer must be maintained.

Ballot Envelope Reconciliation

In systems where the primary control on the issue of ballots to voters is an envelope in which voter must place their ballot, the focus of reconciliation is rather on envelopes received at the voting station and those remaining at the close of voting. Procedures for ensuring accuracy of accounting for use of these ballot envelopes must be implemented.

Similar to procedures based on accountability of the ballot itself, these procedures would involve:

• accurate recording of the numbers of ballot envelopes received at the voting station, including adjustments for any authorised further stocks received or despatches to other voting locations during the hours of voting;

• establishing how many ballot envelopes have been issued to voters during the course of voting;

• establishing the number of ballot envelopes remaining unused at the close of voting.

If envelopes are stubbed or counter foiled, this may be calculated by counting the torn off stubs or counterfoils. If not, it should be calculated by subtracting the ballot envelopes remaining unused at the close of voting from figures for ballot envelopes received at the voting station.

All steps in this process should be recorded on official ballot envelope account forms which are endorsed by the voting station manager and which party/candidate representatives present are invited to endorse.

Where there are multiple tables issuing ballot envelopes to voters, these calculations should be done individually at each issuing table and verified before adding them up.

The figure derived for ballot envelopes issued should be the same as the number of ballot envelopes found in the ballot box. It is vital that this figure is correctly calculated, as it is the figure to which initial counts of ballot box contents must be reconciled. Any discrepancy would suggest tampering or error in the election, and will require thorough recount and investigation at the count.

Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Issued

In systems where control of ballots issued is the primary integrity mechanism, the number of ballots issued, accounting for any spoilt ballots (those surrendered by the voter and a new ballot issued in its place), should equal the number of voters recorded as having voted.

In those systems using control of issue of ballot envelopes as the prime integrity mechanism, envelopes issued to voters should equal the number of voters recorded as having voted.

This reconciliation would preferably take place at the voting station and be formally recorded by the voting station manager and be countersigned by any party/candidate representatives present.

Often, due to time pressures, this is done on a national basis following return of materials from the count.

This method often leads to disputes about eligible and actual voter numbers, which are more difficult to resolve without those responsible for the issuing of ballot material being present.

Where automated methods for calculating voter numbers can be used, such as where voting is by computer, or optical scannable voters lists are used, it may more effectively be undertaken at a central location.

Data Sources

Figures for the number of ballots issued, or of ballot envelopes issued, should already be obtainable from the ballot or envelope accounting records.

Records of the number of voters apparently issued ballot material could be obtainable from a number of sources, depending on the recording methods used, for example:

• by counting the number of voters marked as having voted on the voters list(s) plus records for the number of voters not on the voters lists(s) who established an entitlement to vote and were issued ballots at the voting station;

• by counting the entries on any separate lists of voters issued ballots, or check sheets/score cards of numbers of voters issued with ballots, where these are maintained by ballot issuing officers during voting;

• by counting applications from voters for ballots, where these are used;

• by counting the number of voter identification cards surrendered, where this control is used.

Generally, the most effective source of numbers of ballots (or envelopes) issued is from counting those voters marked on the certified voter’s list as having voted, adjusted for any voters voting from a supplementary list compiled from:

• voting day registrations, or

• by provisional/tendered ballots, or

• using certificates issued where it has been established voters have been wrongly omitted from the voters list.

Where voters must provide applications for votes, counting the applications may be a preferable primary reconciliation figure source.

Where neither voters lists are used, nor applications required, some other method, such as maintaining a list of voters issued ballots, will need to be implemented.

Multiple Data Sources

Maintaining multiple sources of such information creates a greater possibility of error and thus perceptions/allegations of malpractice. Voting station officials are not perfect. If required to maintain the same information in two or more different ways, it is highly likely that there will be discrepancies at the end of a long working day.

For example, where voters lists are used and marked, the practice of also manually maintaining a separate list of voters issued ballot papers is an inefficient use of resources and can create problems during voting station reconciliations or later checks where the two records differ.

Even where check sheets or score cards marked to indicate voter flows and service levels at varying times of voting day are maintained, they should be clearly unofficial records of the number of voters who have voted.

Discrepancies

Any discrepancy between figures for ballots issued (or, where relevant, ballot envelopes issued) and voters recorded as having voted requires immediate investigation and report on the resolution by the voting station manager (or electoral management body officials, if this check is done after voting day).

• Where discrepancies are found to be the result of error, such a finding would preferably be countersigned by party/candidate representatives.

• Where discrepancies are significant and inexplicable, further investigation is required before any count can be finalised.

Later reconciliations during the count of number of ballots actually in the ballot box plus the number of any discarded/rejected ballots compared to the total number of voters recorded as having voted will refine this integrity check.

Verification and Packing of Materials

Following the completion of accounting for voting materials or simultaneously, if sufficient staff are on hand, all materials in the voting station need to be sorted and organised for packaging.

A thorough search of the voting station should be undertaken to ensure that no material has been placed or left during the day in obscure or unusual places.

Accountable materials, those required for voting, electoral or financial integrity purposes, should be verified wherever possible against supply or other records to ensure that none are missing. Such materials would include:

• receipts for ballots or ballot envelopes;

• other ballot accounting records;

• official seals or marks for ballots;

• ballot or ballot envelope issue records maintained by voting station officials;

• information on voters including any voting day registrations;

• records of challenges and disputes;

• financial and staff attendance records.

Time of Packaging

Where counts are to be conducted at a different location, all voting station material should be packaged immediately following accounting for and reconciliations of ballot material and their verification, and despatched with the ballot boxes to the counting centre 

As a precaution against any apt material being misplaced, it is preferable that all packages of material from the voting station go to the counting centre.

Where counting is to take place at the voting station, all materials should be sorted following the close of voting. Accountable materials not needed during the count--unused ballots or prone envelopes, voters lists, and the like--should be packaged and sealed immediately following the completion of any reconciliations for which they are required.

If access to these packages is required during the count (e.g., in searches for any missing or wrongly packaged material) breaking of the seals of these packages, and resealing, should be formally recorded (including a note of the reasons) and witnessed by party/candidate representatives.

If there is confidence in the professionalism and integrity of count officials, and the security situation is favourable, it may be preferable not to fully package and seal other materials until the count at the voting station has been completed, to make searching for any missing items needed during the count considerably easier.

Rather, after sorting, material not required for the count could be maintained under appropriate security in an area separate from the counting area.

Packaging

Packaging of voting station materials is an activity that is often regarded as an unimportant adjunct to voting. It occurs at the end of the day when major tasks appear to have been completed and staffs are likely to be fatigued. However, incorrect packaging can cause considerable dysfunction and suspicions of improper practices, especially at counting locations or at later challenges where much time can be wasted and emotions aroused looking for missing material that has been mispackaged.

It is important that the packaging of voting station materials be governed by clear guidelines and is undertaken in a professional and efficient manner under strict supervision by senior voting station officials. Care must be taken during packaging that all material is retrieved from within the voting station and packaged.

One common reason why packaging of voting station material is incorrectly implemented is that the packaging systems used are too complex.

Systems requiring a series of envelopes within larger envelopes within other envelopes within boxes within other boxes within bags, all too often distinguished only by strikingly similar identifying labels or numbers, can become bewildering to staff at the end of a very long day, no matter how intensive their training. Simple packaging systems that separate and identify essential accountable material, and, where affordable, are based on a colour-coded system, will assist correct packaging of material after voting or the count.

Packaging System

The packaging system for voting station materials has a number of basic objectives:

• to separate materials relevant to the count and integrity of voting from other materials;

• to separate materials relevant to different elections held at the same voting station, be they elections for different representative structures in the same electoral district, or where a voting station issues ballots for more than one electoral district;

• to logically group materials so that packages contain related material;

• to protect materials during transport to counting centres (if required), for transport to any later check counts, and for storage of ballot material until the period for challenge to the election has elapsed.

Depending on local costs, the amount of material to be packaged, and the security environment, the packaging system may use envelopes, cartons, high density plastic bags, locked containers or a combination of these.

Non-Accountable Materials

The easiest materials to deal with are those with no relevance to the count or integrity of the election. Given that the major priority at the time is the count, these materials could be all packed in the one, clearly labelled container, for later sorting.

Such materials would include:

• manuals and procedural guides used by voting station officials;

• posters, signs, and other voting station official and voter information and reference materials;

• unused non-accountable forms, such as those for voter challenges, voter service monitoring and complaints, voter registration (possibly including ballot envelopes, but only where these are not accountable materials used as a control for ballot issue);

• other minor voting equipment, such as badges, pens, pencils, note paper, unused ballot box and package seals, tape, string, torches, lamps for checking if a voter has been marked with ink and so forth.

Apt Materials

It is very important that appropriate materials are sorted in a consistent, disciplined fashion for packaging. It is possible to logically group such materials to aid retrieval.

Each separate material classification requires a clear distinguishing and easily recognisable label to be attached to or on the package. Each label should bear the contents of the package (type(s) of material and number of articles of each type). Where more than one package is used for a single classification of material, the labels should bear standard part-consignment notations. The voting station manager must ensure that these package content notations are accurately completed by voting station officials and formally endorse their accuracy.

Each package must be sealed in such a fashion that any tampering with the package will be noticeable, using a method and packaging materials robust enough to prevent accidental breakage of the package during normal transport and handling. Depending on the packaging container used, this may be by using plastic or metal seals (with appropriate recording of their numbers) paper seals or packaging tape.

Where seals or tape are used, the voting station manager should sign over the top of the seals. Political party/candidate representatives and independent observers present should be invited to sign endorsement of the contents and sign over the seals of the packages.

The details of the types of liable material to be packaged will depend on the voting system and procedures used. The following classifications provide a sound basis for categorising particular types of materials within a logical framework

1. Ballots deposited by electors in the appropriate ballot boxes. If ballots are to be counted by hand, these will remain in the ballot boxes until they are required for counting.

If machine counted at another location, they may need to be partially processed at the voting station  and replaced in the ballot box or another container. These must be sealed, and political party/candidate representatives and observers present invited to formally witness the sealing. Following counts, these ballots should remain bundled or packaged as sorted by candidate preference, for repackaging in either a ballot box (if the security situation warrants) or other sealed containers.

This post-count packaging of ballots should also be formally recorded and witnessed by political party/candidate representatives and observers.

1. Other ballot material. For voting systems in which the ballot itself is the prime integrity control, and thus all ballots must be accountable, this could include:

• unused ballot papers or cards;

• stubs of ballots issued (if detached on issue);

• spoilt ballots (those for which a voter has requested and been issued a fresh ballot);

• discarded or rejected ballots (those that voters have been issued but which were not placed by the voter in the ballot box);

• official marks or seals used to authenticate ballots when issued;

• voting machine keys. In systems where issue of a ballot envelope to a voter is the prime integrity control, rather than the ballot itself, this category would include unused ballot envelopes, discarded ballot envelopes, stubs or counterfoils of ballot envelopes issued (if detached on issue). It may be useful to package each of these sub-categories in separate packages within the one container.

1. Records of voters turning out at the voting station. This would include:

• all copies of voters lists issued to the voting station;

• applications for ballots completed by electors (except where these are attached to the ballot itself in the ballot box);

• any records compiled in the voting station of ballots issuedto voters ;

• details of and forms for voting day registrations where electors were issued a ballot or certificates from civil authorities certifying that voters were incorrectly omitted from the voters list;

• voting machine or computer readings and reports on numbers of voters voting;

• completed forms relating to challenged voters.

1. Voting station managers reports and voting records. By whatever name, poll books, voting reports, voting records, or in whatever format, as an integrated booklet or series of forms, this category contains all data relevant to management of the voting station's operations. This will include:

• receipts for material;

• ballot accounting records and reconciliations;

• records of issue of any special ballots;

• ballot box sealing records;

• reports on any challenges, incidents, and disputes over voting;

• staffing and attendance, payment, expense, and evaluation records;

• voter service and premises suitability reports.

1. Records of any special votes issued.
2. Voter and political party/candidate representative and observer information. Depending on the electoral system, relevant contents (if any at all) will vary widely. It could include data such as accreditation documents that political party/candidate representatives or observers are required to hand over or information on or from voters relevant to their registration.

In packaging these materials, voting material relevant to elections for different representative bodies or different electoral districts held in the same voting station should be kept clearly separate, by colour coding package labels or envelopes, for example, according to different colours of ballots used. When packaged, all material should be securely prepared for transport, and any transport control documentation completed.

If at all possible, all materials packages from a voting station should be secured in a single container (ballot boxes may need to be handled separately). Such containers should enclose material from one voting station only. Each package and outer container from a voting station must be clearly marked with the voting station identity (name and/or number) and the electoral district to which it belongs. Care needs to be taken in this regard when there is more than one voting station occupying a voting location.

Storage of Voting Station Materials

Following finalisation of counts of ballots, arrangements for sorting of election materials and equipment into those to be stored, and those to be destroyed, need to be implemented.

The periods, for which election materials must be in storage, the manner of their storage, and the accountabilities for their maintenance or destruction would usually be specified in the electoral legal framework. 

Preparation for Ballot Count

Reorganising for the Count

Where voting stations are used for the count, in addition to dealing with materials (see Collection of Ballots and Verification and Packing of Materials) and party/candidate representative issues (see Role of Party/Candidate Representatives), there are some preparatory actions that need to be undertaken to turn the area into an efficient facility for counting.

The exact preparatory actions taken and the nature of the reorganisation will depend on the manner of voting--manually, by machine or computer--whether a single or multiple elections have occurred, and the method of the count.

Preparatory Actions

Where paper or card ballots are used, there are some general guidelines within which these actions should be undertaken:

• collection and reconciliations of voting materials (see Collection of Ballots and Verification and Packing of Materials);

• following a thorough check for any ballot materials left in the area, the voting compartments should be dismantled and moved to an area out of the way of counting staff;

• any crowd control barriers within the voting station should be dismantled to provide an uncluttered count space;

• if all ballot boxes are not opened simultaneously, set up an area for secure holding of ballot boxes not yet being counted;

• reorganise available furniture in the configuration required for the count;

• distribute and set up any equipment required for the count--ballot counting machines, calculators, tally boards--according to the requirements of the count;

• where special ballots are also being counted, set up the facilities required for counting these.

If large numbers of party/candidate representatives and/or observers are present, there may be a need to place some barriers to allow free movement of count officials around the count tables and prevent party/candidate representatives and observers from handling ballots or intimidating voting station officials. If this is necessary, barriers should not be erected at such a distance to prevent party/candidate representatives from fully observing count processes.

Reorganisation of Furniture

Furniture will need to be reorganised to provide a counting area, a table from which the voting station manager can supervise the count, an area for party/candidate representatives, and a rest area for staff. The count area configuration will vary according to the count method.

When using efficient production line-style count methods, with the ballot papers progressing through areas for emptying of ballot boxes and unfolding of ballots, sorting to candidate/party, counting, counting and recording, and parcelling, an elongated double "T" formation for count tables is effective. An example of this style of layout is shown below.

The layout of the count area will also depend on:

• whether there are ballots for more than one election to be counted (e.g., president and legislative body, or multiple legislative bodies);

• whether the elections use a single ballot or multiple ballots;

• whether counts for different elections are to be held simultaneously (in which case extreme care needs to taken that ballots from different elections are not mixed) or consecutively.

Where different ballots from the same voters are counted simultaneously, and particularly where ballots for different parts of a representative body or representative bodies have been placed in the same ballot box, a U-shaped table layout can be effective. An example of this type of layout is shown below.

Where voting machines or computers are used, radical reorganisation of the voting station furniture will generally not be necessary if the count is to take place in the voting station. Count totals taken from the machines can be added and processed at a single table.A small area set up for reconciliations of voter records to ballots counted, with any required count area for special votes, should also be set up.

Voting Station Staff

No matter what the pressure for an immediate start to the count, the voting station manager should ensure that all staff who have been working all day on voting station duties have an opportunity for a break between close of voting and commencement of the count.

This may be achieved by the employment of unskilled or junior staff for a short period to reorganise furniture and clean up the voting station.

Prior to the count commencing, all staff should also be briefed by the voting station/count manager. A quick review of essential features of the procedures and any specific instructions for the particular count location should be given. Observers and party/candidate representatives present for the count should also be invited to attend this briefing.

Role of Party/Candidate Representatives

Transparency of Action

At the close of voting it is important that candidate and party representatives present are clear as to the proceedings and their rights.

Actions to be taken at the close of voting need to be clearly explained to party/candidate representatives present, so that these representatives are aware of the basis of activities like:

• the rights of voters in the voting station to vote,

• the barring of voters who arrive after the closing time,.

• any preparations for counting occurring before the voting closing time.

It can be of assistance to have an information sheet:

• explaining briefly the actions at close of voting, rules and procedures to be applied during the count, and

• defining the roles of party/candidate representatives at the count, prepared for distribution to all candidate/party representatives attending the count.

Accreditation of Party/Candidate Representatives

Where the count is to be conducted at the voting station, there may be different or additional party/candidate representatives accredited to the count.

Their accreditation needs to be checked by voting station officials, and it must be ensured that no unaccredited persons enter the voting station count area. Whether candidates for a particular election can themselves act as a party/candidate representative during its count is a matter generally addressed in election law.

It would be a reasonable legal requirement that only parties or candidates running in an election should have their representatives present at the count. The number of representatives that each party/candidate may have present at a count location at any one time varies under different election frameworks:

• Ideally, each party/candidate would be allowed an equal number of representatives to the number of counting staff. Any more restrictive provisions than these would, prima facie, appear to be a restriction on the ability to observe all that is occurring during the count.

• Space restrictions in counting locations may lead to legal restrictions on the number of party/candidate representatives allowed to be present. Any such restrictions should still ensure that each party or candidate in the election may have at least one representative present.

One criterion for the identification of suitable count locations would be that there is sufficient room for party/candidate representatives and observers. The issue of available space should not be used to manipulate the observation of the count.

Invitation to Staff Briefings

It is useful to invite party/candidate representatives present to listen to any briefing provided by the voting station manager to voting station officials prior to the commencement of the count (see Preparation for Ballot Count):

• Informed party/candidate representatives are a necessary part of the transparency and integrity measures for the count.

• With a refreshed knowledge of the procedures to be used, they are less likely to delay proceedings with challenges to approved procedures.

The alternative would be to brief them separately.

Behaviour of Representatives

The rights and responsibilities of party/candidate representatives at ballot counts would normally be defined in the legal framework for the election. In any case:

• It is important that party/candidate representatives understand, before the count begins, that they have a duty to maintain election integrity in their handling of all election material, particularly ballot material, but also any other election materials being packaged for return or undergoing counts.

• It is also important to reinforce to these representatives that they must not communicate with counting officials about progressive count totals or results.

• Party/candidate representatives should be made aware that breaches of their responsibilities will lead to sanctions on their activities, which may include their removal from the voting station.

Party/candidate representatives present should be invited to witness, formally, the completion of ballot issue reconciliation records and the unsealing of ballot boxes, and provide comment where they believe correct procedures have not been followed.

They should be reminded that, at this stage of proceedings, and during the count, the decision of the voting station or count centre manager will prevail. Not all disputes will be capable of resolution on the spot.

Where party/candidate representatives do not agree with a decision of the voting station or count centre manager, they can be reminded of their right to lodge a formal complaint in writing to the electoral management body or other authorities that are legally charged with resolving electoral disputes.

Count at Counting Centres

Where the count is to be conducted at a location other than the voting station, it should also be made very clear to party/candidate representatives present that:

• they are not permitted to handle any election materials, and particularly ballot materials, while they are being, or after they have been, packaged for transport,

• or during transport, and

• that breaches of this requirement will be dealt with according to sanctions under the election law.

As with counts held in voting stations, party/candidate representatives present should be invited to witness, formally, any preliminary ballot reconciliation documents of total ballots received at the voting station and of ballots issued to voters shown as having voted.

Additionally, when ballot material has been packaged for transport to the counting centre, party/candidate representatives should be invited to witness the sealing of all packages and endorse their disclosed contents; a similar invitation should be extended to formally witness seals and contents of packages of other election materials.

Where party/candidate representatives refuse to endorse or witness the contents, they should be provided with the opportunity to state their reasons in writing and have these included with the voting station manager's report on voting.

Arrangements should also be made for party/candidate representatives to be invited to accompany ballot materials during their transport to the counting centre.

Closing Arrangements for Special Voting

The specific additional measures that need to be taken at the closing of voting for special voting facilities will depend on:

• how restrictive these facilities are in terms of pre-qualifications and applications required;

• the method of issue of ballots;

• whether special voting facilities are located with normal voting stations or occupy separate locations;

• for which electoral districts they issue ballots;

• whether these facilities are open for a single day or multiple days;

• whether the ballots they issue are to be counted at a voting station or taken to special counting locations for special ballots.

The type of special voting facilities offered will also affect the procedures at close of voting. For details of procedures see the following:

• Provisional or tendered votes: Close of Voting for Provisional Votes.

• Early voting: Close of Voting for Early Voting.

• Absentee voting: Close of Voting for Absentee Voting.

• Mail voting: Close of Voting for Mail Voting.

• Voting in a foreign country: Close of Voting for Votes Cast Outside the Country.

• Mobile voting stations: Close of Voting for Mobile Voting Stations.

Special Voting Location Managers' Reports

The general content of voting station reports is discussed at Voting Station Managers' Reports.

Where special voting facilities are provided in normal voting stations, reports on special voting activities, such as ballots and materials reconciliations, record of different types of special votes issued and for which electoral districts, can be included in the overall report of the voting station manager to avoid unnecessary additional documentation.

Where special voting facilities are provided at separate locations, their reports can still be based on those for a normal voting station, with modified forms, where necessary, for:

• ballot accounting--for reconciling ballots for different electoral districts received and issued;

• records of votes issued for each electoral district;

• where operating for more than one day, progressive daily ballot issue and reconciliation forms and modified forms on which to record sealing and unsealing of ballot boxes at the commencement and completion of voting for each day.

Close of Voting for Provisional Votes

Where provisional or tendered votes have been issued to voters not on the voters list at a voting station, at the close of voting these ballots will need to be totalled and reconciled separately against any application forms required and records of issue.

If voter details are attached to or within provisional ballot envelopes they may require checking against voter registration data prior to the ballot being accepted for counting . They are more effectively counted at a central administration location for the whole electoral district.

Thus, after reconciling with issue records they would be parcelled separately from normal ballots. During voting, use of a ballot box for provisional ballots separate from that used for normal ballots will assist this.

Where the same ballot stocks are used for provisional ballots as for normal ballots, ballot accounting records may need to be adjusted for the number of provisional ballots issued, if these will not be found in the ballot box for the voting night count.

If separate ballot stocks are used, a full accounting must be completed for provisional ballot stocks and included with other ballot accounts with the voting station manager's report. The accounting should be done in a style similar to that for normal ballots.

Ballot Envelopes

Where envelopes used for containing provisional or tendered ballots are also strictly accountable, reconciliations will need to be undertaken for:

• stocks of these on hand at the close of voting to stocks received, less envelopes recorded as issued;

• Envelopes issued to voters listed as having been issued provisional or tendered ballots.

Close of Voting for Early Voting

Procedure Factors

Actions at close of voting will depend on whether early voting locations:

• Can issue ballots only for the electoral district within which the early voting station is located, or whether ballots for other locations can be issued.

Are open for a single day, or several days; this will affect the format of the records to be completed during voting and at close of early voting.

The following discussion deals with early voting in person. (For close of voting procedures for mail voting, see Close of Voting for Mail Voting.)

Ballots Issued for Same Electoral District Only

Procedures at close of the early voting, whenever that is legally determined, can follow those for a normal voting station:

• where an early voting station can only issue ballots for the electoral district within which it is located, and

• Issues these votes by reference to a voters list for the electoral district.

If applications for an early vote are required, these should also be reconciled to ballot issues. Material can be returned to the voting operations administration office following closure of early voting, and ballots may be stored in the ballot box until counted after the close of voting on voting day. They should not be counted earlier than this.

With this method of issue, it would be more efficient to count these ballots at a single location in the electoral district, rather than distribute to relevant normal voting stations for the count.

If early ballots are issued for the home electoral district only, but as special enveloped ballots with accompanying elector details, rather than by reference to voters lists, the same ballot and/or envelope accounting methods can be used at close of voting, and voter eligibility and counting undertaken at a single counting location. While eligibility checking of the voters' identity information can usefully occur before voting day, the ballots should not be counted before close of voting.

Ballots Issued for Multiple Electoral Districts

Ballot accounting at close of voting becomes more complex when early voting stations can issue ballots for multiple electoral districts.

Separate ballot accounting records will need to be completed for each electoral district for which ballots may be issued.—District reconciliations should be done for:

• ballots issued;

• unused ballots;

• applications for early ballots received (if required);

• ballot issue records;

• envelopes (where used);

• voters marked on lists as having voted.

Where early voting stations issue ballots for multiple electoral districts from lists of early voters for each electoral district, it can be effective to count all early ballots issued at the early voting stations or at a location in that electoral district (particularly if these counts can be combined with counts of similarly-issued absentee ballots on voting day).

In such cases, early ballots can be stored under security in their ballot boxes until the count. Advice of counts should be transmitted to relevant electoral districts as soon as counts are completed, with supporting ballots and documentation despatched by secure transport to the relevant electoral districts following the packaging of all count material.

However, it can also be efficient to package and return these ballots immediately following the close of voting to a central location for sorting to electoral district and counting.

Where early voting stations issue ballots for multiple electoral districts as special enveloped ballots with accompanying voter identification information, rather than by reference to voters lists, it can be more cost-effective, and easier to maintain integrity controls, to despatch all early ballots, in their ballot boxes, and accompanied by ballot issue records, for voter eligibility checking and counting at a single central location for all electoral districts.

This will require high quality, centralised voter registration data, a fairly complex count centre set-up, and, if electoral districts are dealt with consecutively, may cause delays in some count results.

If early voting is conducted using special enveloped ballots, but they are not all to be counted at one central location, at the close of early voting:

• Envelopes containing all early ballots issued in an electoral district will need to be removed from the ballot box(es), sorted according to electoral districts, counted by electoral districts, and reconciled with ballot issue records. This should be done in the presence of and witnessed by party/candidate representatives.

• Secure packages of ballots for each electoral district (sealed lightweight ballot boxes could be used for this) should be prepared for secure transport to the relevant electoral districts for voter eligibility checking and counting. If a long period is allowed for early voting, more than one such despatch may be required.

• Notices of the early ballots to be sent to each electoral district should be prepared and sent under separate immediate cover to the relevant electoral districts.

• On arrival, reconciliations of ballot envelopes received to despatch notices should be instituted by the receiving electoral districts, and when reconciled, officials could proceed to check the ballot envelopes for voter eligibility and counting of ballots.

 Unless relatively costly, very well-controlled, and accurate recording and despatch systems are implemented, it is all too easy for this cross swapping of ballots to break down. Manual systems are generally not up to the task. Centralised counting and transmission of results to the relevant electoral district requires considerably less complex logistical controls and can concentrate resources.

Multiple Day Early Voting

If early voting locations are open for more than one day,

• a count of ballots issued and remaining unused, reconciled to total ballots received at the voting station, and

• a count of applications processed during the day (where applications are required) and records of ballot issues, reconciled to actual ballot stocks remaining, Should be progressively undertaken at the end of each day to retain control over ballot accounting and make reconciliations at close of voting easier.

Where early voting stations can issue ballots for multiple electoral districts, this progressive ballot accounting will need to be a more complex document containing separate ballot accounting records for each electoral district.

Close of Voting for Absentee Voting

Where absentee voting in person is allowed on voting day, close of voting procedures will depend on:

• the method adopted for voting (from pre-prepared absentee voters lists or enveloped ballots, in designated absentee voting stations or at any normal voting station) and

• the number of electoral districts for which ballots may be issued at any voting station.

The following discussion relates to absentee voting in person on voting day. (For close of voting issues relating to absentee voting by mail, see Close of Voting for Mail Voting and absentee early voting at Close of Voting for Early Voting.)

Special Absentee Voters Lists Used

Where absentee votes are issued from a list of absentee voters at special absentee voting stations, close of voting procedures can be similar to those for a normal voting station.

However, separate ballot accounting records must be completed for each electoral district for which voters were registered to cast absentee votes. Reconciliations should be done for:

• ballots issued;

• unused ballots;

• ballot issue records;

• voters marked on lists as having voted.

As for early voting, there can be speed and control advantages in counting these ballots where they were issued, if management at absentee voting stations is sufficiently robust and skilled.

Particularly where ballots for large numbers of electoral districts have been issued, it can be safer, and more effective, to securely package all absentee voting material immediately following the close of voting and despatch it securely to a central facility for sorting to electoral district and counting.

Enveloped Ballot Systems

Where absentee voting procedures allow anyone to claim an in-person absentee vote on voting day, through a system of special enveloped ballots, close of voting ballot accounting should reconcile:

• ballots issued;

• unused ballots;

• ballot issue records;

• any applications required for absentee voting in relation to each electoral district.

If all absentee ballots are to be sent to a central location for voter eligibility checking and ballot counts, following close of voting, absentee ballots can be despatched in their sealed ballot boxes, and accompanied by ballot issue records, to the central count centre.

However, if these absentee ballots are to be returned to the voter’s home electoral district for eligibility checking and counting, a system parallel with that described at Close of Voting for Early Voting for dealing with early votes under similar circumstances will need to be implemented at close of voting.

Again the logistical complexity of such an exercise makes this method generally inadvisable.

Close of Voting for Mail Voting

Basic Issues

Close of voting procedures for absentee voting by mail will vary according to:

• When the cut-off date for return receipt of mail ballots is defined, prior to voting day, as at close of voting on voting day or at some later date;

• Whether mail voting facilities in electoral districts can issue mail ballots for their own electoral district only, or for all electoral districts;

• The return addresses to which mail ballots are sent.

Regardless, there are some general guidelines that should be followed, both for the close of issuing of mail ballots and for the deadline for receipt of returned mail ballots.

Progressive Reconciliations of Material Issued

Ballot accounting records should be maintained on a daily basis and final reconciliations of ballot stocks conducted following the closing time for issuing mail ballots. Records that should be kept daily include:

• A count of ballots and any special return envelopes issued and remaining unused, reconciled to total ballots (and envelopes if applicable) received at the voting location;

• Mail ballot applications processed during the day and/or mail ballot issues from permanent mail voter lists reconciled to records of ballot issues and to actual ballot stocks remaining.

Where mail ballots can be issued from the one location for multiple electoral districts, ballot accounting records would need to be maintained for each electoral district for which ballots are issued.

Returned Mail Ballots

From progressive daily records of returned mail ballots received, the total mail ballots that should be in the ballot box must be calculated for reconciliation at the count.

Where mail ballots may be issued within an electoral district for that electoral district only, and the return address is to that electoral district, this is a simple process of marking returned ballots against issue records.

Where voting locations in an electoral district may also issue mail ballots for other electoral districts, and particularly if mail ballots are returned to a location other than the issuing location, this may be a process of considerable complexity requiring very strict control systems.

If the return address for mail ballots from all electoral districts is to a central location, a system for matching issue records to returned ballots will be needed. The structure of this system will depend on whether mail ballots are retained at the central location, or returned to the electoral district of registration for the count.

If mail ballots can be issued from locations in an electoral district on application by voters from any electoral district, with the ballots returned to the voters electoral district of registration, a complex system of monitoring advice between electoral district administration offices, and for forwarding mail ballot applications to the voters' own electoral district office, and then reconciling these to ballots returned will need to be implemented.

It is also essential that at the deadline for receipt of returned mail ballots, mail-clearing procedures be implemented:

• In particular, any mail boxes used as return addresses for mail ballots should be cleared at the time specified as the closing time for receipt of ballots by mail.

• Additionally, all mail ballots returned need to be time and date stamped immediately on receipt; time stamps need to clearly distinguish between returned mail ballots received before and after the legal deadline for return.

Packaging and Transport

Procedures for packaging and transport of mail ballots and issue records following the deadline for mail ballot return will depend on where these ballots are to be counted.

If the deadline is before voting day, and particularly if each electoral district can only issue mail ballots to voters registered in that electoral district, it may be possible for returned ballots to be security delivered on voting day to the voting station relevant to each voter's registration for inclusion with the normal count. This, however, will add further complexity to sorting and transport requirements.

If mail ballots are to be counted in the electoral district in which each mail voter is registered, and return deadlines are on or after voting day, where the return mail address for mail ballots is to a single central location, security distribution arrangements must be implemented to deliver mail ballots to the appropriate electoral district office. More than one such shipment may be required, depending on the length of time allowed for return of mail ballots.

Where the return mail address is to the voter's electoral district administration office, ballot envelopes may remain in ballot boxes until the close of voting.

If mail ballots are to be checked and counted at a single central location, the return mail address for all mail ballots would preferably be that location, with returned ballots sorted on arrival to a ballot box for their relevant electoral district in preparation for the count.

Timing of Count

Checking of voter details accompanying the ballot to determine eligibility of the vote can usefully occur before voting day to determine which ballots will be accepted for counting. Counts of mail ballots, however, should not begin until after the close of voting.

Close of Voting for Votes Cast Outside the Country

Basic Issues

Following close of voting in voting stations in a foreign country, the measures to be taken will depend on the manner of the controls placed on issuing ballots.

Special Foreign Voters Lists Used

If voting is from lists of voters located in other countries, the counts of foreign votes for each relevant electoral district could be undertaken at the foreign location, with results electronically communicated to the electoral management body.

Material can be packaged for secure courier return to the electoral management body in a similar fashion as a normal voting station after the count, except that ballots and any supporting documentation for each electoral district should be separately bundled within packages.

Counts at foreign locations would be better regarded as preliminary only, with a thorough recheck of all ballot and other liable materials, in the presence of party/candidate representatives, being undertaken following return of the material to the home country.

However, as it is unlikely that there will be opportunity for party/candidate representatives to be present at these counts, for integrity reasons it may be more prudent that following close of voting all election material is packaged and sealed at the foreign location and returned to the home country for counting, either at a central location or for distribution to the relevant electoral districts for counting.

Other Ballot Controls Used

For all other methods of issue, if the foreign location acts as a mail ballot issue and return point, or a location for early or absentee voting in person without the use of a special foreign voters lists, at the close of voting, reconciliations of ballots (and special ballot envelopes if used), ballot issue records, voter applications, and completed mail or other ballots received should be carried out in the same way as for a local absentee, mail, or in-person early voting location issuing ballots for multiple electoral districts (see Close of Voting for Early Voting and Close of Voting for Mail Voting).

Advice to Electoral Management Body

Ballot issue and reconciliation records should be transmitted electronically to the electoral management body immediately after close of voting. Arrangements should also be made for fast and secure courier transport of ballots and supporting material back to the electoral management body for eligibility checking and counting.

Voting Equipment

It would generally be cost-effective for voting equipment--ballot boxes, voting compartments and the like--not to be returned to the home country but maintained at the nearest diplomatic mission office.

Close of Voting for Mobile Voting Stations

Basic Issues

Mobile voting stations undertake a series of closing of voting at each location that they visit. Procedures for closing voting at each of the locations visited will generally require the same actions as at other types of voting stations (see Close of Voting), but some variations may be required.

Schedules

Mobile voting would preferably be carried out according to a pre-determined and advertised schedule, rather than in response to ad hoc voting day requests . It may also be allowed to operate during a specified period prior to the normal voting day.

If voters are still waiting to vote at a mobile location at the time scheduled for the close of voting at that location, scheduling arrangements should be flexible enough to allow those present to vote.

In terms of flexibility, the following are useful guidelines:

• Mobile voting stations should remain longer at locations than scheduled, if necessary, to allow all those wanting to vote to vote (except, of course, allowing voting at any location after the time for the general close of voting on voting day itself; mobile voting stations should be bound by normal closure procedures at that time).

• Mobile voting stations should not leave any location before the scheduled and advertised time of cessation of voting.

• Where a mobile voting station, through transport or other delays, arrives late at a voting location, it should remain there at least for the full number of hours scheduled and advertised, and not cut this time short by closing voting at the scheduled time; any potential late arrival at a location should be announced, wherever possible, to the community or institution concerned.

Care of Ballot Boxes

To use a separate ballot box for each mobile voting location would be wasteful.

Ballot slots in ballot boxes used will need to be sealed at the conclusion of voting at each location, and the sealing witnessed (by party/candidate representatives, if present, by voters), opened at the next location with the opening witnessed, and so on.

Numbered

seals--polypropylene ties or similar--on a slot closure mechanism, rather than plain paper seals over the slots will provide more effective control. It is important that sealing and unsealing of ballot box slots is rigorously implemented, recorded, and witnessed by party/candidate representatives, observers, or some other witness.

Ballot Accounting

In maintaining ballot accounting, it will be more effective to account for ballots issued at the conclusion of voting at each location, in a progressive table, rather than leaving ballot accounting until the conclusion of the mobile voting station's activities.

This will allow earlier detection and resolution of any problems and is most important when a mobile station's activities extend over several days.

Mobile voting stations visiting hospitals and other institutions may also be dealing with voters registered for a wide variety of electoral units. Where mobile stations may issue absentee ballots, careful accounting for these by electoral district will be required.

Counts of Ballots

It is more practicable for ballot and other material from mobile voting stations to be returned to another location for counting. This could be a voting station or a more central counting centre. For accountability purposes, it is useful that ballots from each mobile voting station should be counted and parcelled separately.

However, where only small numbers of votes are taken by a mobile voting station, it is highly preferable that these be amalgamated, either with a normal voting station's or other mobile voting stations' ballots, before actual counting of ballots commences, to ensure voting secrecy is preserved.

Return of Material

Mobile voting station schedules should be arranged to allow return of material for counting as soon as possible after the time for closing of voting on the general voting day.

As for normal voting stations (see Verification and Packing of Materials), care should be taken in packaging material to ensure that electoral material is securely and separately packaged.

Mobile voting stations (particularly those operating in remote areas) may have considerable amounts of non-election material to be returned, such as camping gear, provisions, and other equipment. This material also needs to be carefully checked on return; however, this should not occur at a location or time that would interfere with ballot material checks and counts.

Mobile Voting Station Managers' Reports

At the completion of a mobile voting station's itinerary, and before returning all material to the district electoral officer or other authorised person at the voting operations administration centre, managers of mobile voting stations should complete a report.

The content of the report will vary, depending on what type of area the mobile voting station was covering. The report may be a series of separate forms, or, more effectively, be combined in a single stapled or bound booklet.

In addition to the items common to other voting station reports (see Voting Station Managers' Reports), further information should be recorded regarding:

• mobile voting station itinerary and whether there were any variations from planned schedules;

• record of ballots issued at each mobile voting location;

• progressive ballot accounting (see Collection of Ballots) recorded following conclusion of voting at each place visited and at the end of each day's voting, if the mobile voting station is in operation for more than one day;

• particularly if operating in remote areas, a communications schedule or checklist and time of communications with base;

• diary commenting on facilities and conditions at mobile voting locations, noting disputes, and incidents, travelling time, other useful data for future mobile voting station planning;

• records of reimbursable expenses. 

Voting Station Managers' Reports

Content of Reports

While supervising close of voting activities, the voting station manager may be able to commence the completion of the voting records and a report on voting activities.

The contents of these reports will vary, particularly between voting stations where counts are to be conducted, where the count details may be included in an overall report, and those where ballots are counted at a different location.

The voting records and reports may be a series of separate forms, or, more effectively, be combined in a single stapled or bound booklet for each voting station. The reports should be fully completed before the voting station manager leaves the voting station, and information required should be clearly identified in the voting station manager's activity checklist.

The content of  these reports falls into two broad categories: accountable information and service information.

Apt Information

The liable information to be provided in voting station managers' reports would normally cover:

• witnessed records of the sealing and, if the count takes place at the voting station, unsealing of ballot boxes, with the numbers of the seals or locks placed on each ballot box recorded;

• where paper or card ballots are used, an accounting record for ballot stocks received at the voting station against those on hand at the close of voting (see Collection of Ballots) (where issue of ballots to voters is controlled through envelopes, this accounting would relate to envelope, rather than ballot stocks);

• a reconciliation of total numbers of ballots issued (or registered on a machine/computer) with total numbers of voters marked on voters lists as having voted at the voting station (see Collection of Ballots) (in some partially or semi-automated ballot information systems, reconciliation may be more efficiently and accurately done centrally by computer rather than at each voting station);

• if the voting station is used for any form of special voting, a summary of the special votes received, by category (if any of these are votes for another electoral district, this summary should be categorised by electoral district);

• where applications are required to be completed for the issue of any vote, a reconciliation of numbers of completed applications received with numbers of ballots issued;

• reports and statements on any challenges, disputes, accidents, involvement of security forces, and interruptions to voting.

Where the count is conducted at a different location, the accountable information should accompany the voting material, under security, to that location (or if a centralised count of computer or machine votes is undertaken, to the computer processing centre). Where the count is undertaken at the voting station itself, these completed reports should be returned at the conclusion of the count, under security with voting materials, to the electoral district manager at the voting operations administration centre.

Service Information

The service information to be provided in voting station managers' reports would include:

• correctly completed attendance records (and if paid at the voting station, payment records) for voting station staff to provide an audit trail;

• performance evaluations of all staff employed at the voting station, indicating their suitability for future voting station employment, including suitability for higher responsibilities;

• voter service, length of voting queues and time voters had to wait to vote, effectiveness of voter information provided in the voting station, any need to provide assistance in future to voters with lower literacy, different languages, or physical disabilities;

• the premises used, its facilities, and suitability for continued use as a voting station;

• any petty expenditures for reimbursement;

• any appointments of substitute officers, in the event of illness or other absences, to voting station staff.

Where the count is conducted at a different location, it may be preferable to send this material to the counting centre with the liable materials. While it may seem that this would result in irrelevant information being sent to the counting centre, a split of information destinations runs the risk of material not being at the counting centre when required.

Where the count is undertaken at the voting station itself, these completed reports should be returned, at the completion of the count and under security, with other voting materials to the electoral district manager at the voting operations administration centre.

Records of Multi-Day Voting

If voting is conducted over more than one day, some issues covered in voting station manager's reports and voting records will require separate recording at the end of each day. This will include essential areas such as:

• reconciliations of ballots, voters marked as having voted and any applications for votes, to allow early identification of any errors or suspicious figures;

• reports on challenges, interruptions, disputes.

The design of form or report formats provided to managers of multi-day voting locations must cater to this need.

Management of Challenges and Complaints

Treatment of Complaints

Effective and transparent mechanisms for dealing with complaints about and challenges to voting operations promote the accountability of the electoral management body and can assist in enhancing the acceptability of election outcomes by political participants and the public in general.

It is important for maintaining standards of accountability and transparency that all complaints about and challenges to operations of voting stations are investigated, not just those sufficiently serious to raise doubts about the validity of election outcomes. Even apparently vexatious complaints, if not openly and publicly answered, can be manipulated to raise doubts about voting operations integrity.

Effective and transparent complaint resolution and challenge mechanisms can identify and combat not only any fraudulent activities or wrongdoing, but can ensure that any errors made by voting station officials in the course of their duties can be identified and corrected.

For further discussion of dispute management frameworks, see Complaint Procedure.

Types of Complaints

Complaints on the operation of voting stations would generally fall into the following broad categories:

• challenges to the rights of specific voters to cast a vote, and complaints by intending voters that they have been omitted from voters lists or otherwise denied a vote (see Challenges to Voters and Challenges to Voting Operations Management);

• challenges to validity of ballot papers

• complaints about or challenges to the actions of parties, candidates, and their representatives (see Challenges to Party/Candidate Representatives' Actions);

• complaints about or challenges to the administration of voting stations, either regarding the materials available and logistics issues, or the decisions/actions of voting station officials, election administrators, or security forces.

Correct Implementation of Procedures

It is important that it is reinforced both during training and whilst on duty, to all election administration officials and all officials working in voting stations and in counting ballots that:

• All actions they take may be subject to challenge or may need to be justified in the course of investigating election-related complaints or legal actions.

• It is vital that all officials implement the actions required by the procedures, manuals, and checklists provided by the electoral management body.

• It is also necessary that any significant occurrences or decisions taken that may affect the election outcomes (such as disturbances, unavailability of necessary materials, voters turned away or denied votes) be recorded at the time in writing.

• Records of voting and the count are official records that may be required by judicial authorities in relation to challenges to election outcomes or other legal action regarding voter fraud or other alleged election irregularities.

• It is essential that all documentation of voting operations be maintained in the manner prescribed by the electoral management body.

Principles of Complaint Resolution

Transparency and public confidence in the election process are considerably aided if:

• voting station managers have the powers, ability, and training to enable resolution of minor complaints and disputes at the voting station level;

• there is no undue limitation on the classes of persons who may make officially recognised and formally investigated complaints regarding voting operations, including voters, political participants, independent observers, and officials of the electoral management body itself;

• there is no undue limitation on voting issues about which formal complaints and challenges may be made;

• complainants are protected from any intimidation or harm that may be perceived as resulting from their complaints or challenges;

• procedures for lodging complaints are simple, equitable, affordable to complainants, and publicised;

• complaints and challenges are handled in a courteous, open, and professional manner;

• complaints and challenges are handled at as local a level as possible;

• resolution of complaints and challenges is swift (time frames for resolution would preferably be defined in the election framework), and decisions and their basis are openly available to the public.

These principles hold as true for minor, local complaints about voting station operations as they do for later challenges to election outcomes. 

Systems for Handling Complaints and Challenges

Given the usually tight time frames during election periods, complaint and challenge handling systems for voting activity work better in a simple, quick-response system, following a single hierarchical line. Without this, resolvable minor complaints may grow into major challenges to election outcomes.

Multiple avenues of initial complaint or appeal, to voting operations administration and judicial bodies, may not only confuse but delay resolution of complaints or challenges, as aggrieved parties "shop" for a favourable forum of decision.

In general, administrative review mechanisms should be used before recourse to judicial intervention is available; though in systems where there is little confidence in the professionalism or independence of electoral management, handling all complaints through a judicial system may be the only reasonable option.

A practicable complaint resolution and review chain would see complaints and challenges handled in the following ways:

• On the operations of a single voting station, wherever possible, by the voting station manager, in consultation with the electoral district management, where necessary.

Complaints of this nature could be related to issues such as the behaviour of voting station officials or party/candidate representatives or observers in the voting station, lack of necessary supplies, or incorrect opening and closing times.

• On general issues surrounding voting station operations, to the appropriate electoral management body administrative level--local, regional, or national. Complaints of this nature could be related to such issues as the overall accuracy of voters’ lists or consistent patterns of procedural implementation across voting stations that appear not to be in accord with the law.

• Where a satisfactory outcome to the complaint is not achieved, immediate review is available at the next level in the administrative hierarchy, either within electoral management body administrations, or specially-appointed administrative tribunals. This could include review by electoral district management of complaint decisions made by voting station managers; by regional electoral authorities of electoral district managers' decisions; by national electoral authorities of regional decisions.

• Judicial review, through normal courts or specially appointed tribunals, of decisions endorsed at the national electoral management body authority level. To ensure that election outcomes are not unduly delayed by successions of appeals, electoral legislation may sensibly provide for a single, non-appellant judicial authority to hear such reviews.

Challenges to election results, based on perceived voting operations deficiencies, would be better determined by judicial authorities. Where internal investigations by the electoral management body show that these deficiencies are significant enough to have had a possible affect on an election's outcome, it is prudent for the electoral management body itself to challenge the election's result.

In publicly recognising these deficiencies it can help the future promotion of its image as a professional, impartial body.

Voting Day Complaints

On and around voting day, there will be intense pressure on complaint resolution mechanisms.

To prepare for this, voting operations administrators at local and other levels must ensure that they have:

• access to legal and specialist technical, conflict resolution, and operational advice;

• consulted with judicial and administrative review bodies to ensure that their officers will be available, and facilities are in place, to allow swift complaint resolution.

Documentation of Complaints and Challenges

It is best that all complaints and challenges concerning voting operations be accurately documented by the official to whom the complaint is made. Without such documentation, defences against any later challenge will be based on what may be imperfect recollections of occurrences in a pressured atmosphere.

At the voting station level, standard forms for generic or specific complaint purposes could be provided to voting station managers, particularly where widespread challenges or complaints may be expected on issues such as eligibility of voters. Alternatively, documentation could be included in the voting station manager's report on voting.

Documentation should:

• state the time and location of the complaint/challenge;

• give the substance of the complaint;

• note the action taken by voting station officials or other election staff;

• be signed off by the voting station manager or other supervisory staff;

• be witnessed, wherever possible, by the complainant.

Complaint records should be treated as apt documents to be securely maintained, as they may be later required in any challenges to election outcomes.

Court Challenges to Election Results

While some challenges and complaints regarding voting operations may be resolved satisfactorily by administrative means prior to the declaration of election results by the electoral management body, where aggrieved parties are not satisfied by such measures, they may be able to challenge an election's result before a court or a legally designated special election tribunal. It is important that such courts are not unduly limited in the directions and determinations they may make. Possible outcomes would preferably include:

• confirming the election result;

• determining a different result;

• directing that the election be voided and a new election held;

• making orders binding on election participants, including administrators, candidates, and parties.

In relation to ballot paper counts, they should also include powers to direct that certain ballot papers formerly included in counts be excluded, or certain ballot papers formerly excluded be included, and a new result calculated by the electoral management body.

Legal Specifications

Issues that could come before the courts fall into two distinct categories:

• those that allege breaches of criminal or electoral law by individuals or groups, but do not challenge election outcomes;

• those that challenge the outcome of the election through alleged breaches of electoral law. With regard to challenges to the election results, electoral legislation needs to be specific as to:

• judicial authorities with jurisdiction over challenges and any appeal rights;

• grounds available for challenge;

• procedures for challenge;

• required actions by complainants in terms of nature of evidence and necessity for affidavits;

•who may initiate court challenges--whether this may be done by individual complainants, the electoral management body, or whether it requires judicial order;

• the role of the electoral management body and other state agencies in investigations, preparation, and presentation of evidence. The legal framework should also give clearly stated deadlines for lodging and resolving challenges to election outcomes.

Unless determined quickly, challenges to election results can disrupt systems of governance since they can leave in doubt the validity of any decisions taken by the challenged representative body. However, the time period for lodging such challenges should be sufficient to allow the complainant to gather evidence to support the challenge.

 For such challenges, it would be usual for legislation to require the complainant to prepare and present formal legal documentation of the challenge (or a judicial order to be prepared) within a specified time period after the results of the election have been announced, and argue the case before the court or tribunal. It is preferable that the electoral management body also has the power to make application to the relevant judicial authorities that an election be set aside.

The electoral management body is likely to have access to a wider range of data on the election than individual complainants.

It is best that judicial bodies have the power to examine all relevant election material, including ballots, ballot boxes and seals, voters lists and supporting documents, election forms, voting station reports and records. In the interests of justice and transparency complainants should have access, under security conditions if necessary, to original or certified copies of such material held by the electoral management body.

Storage of Material

All information that may be relevant to challenges to election results must be kept securely until any time limit for such challenges has passed.

Care must be taken that during counts or post-voting day administrative actions, no marks are placed on ballots or voters lists, and other material is not amended or defaced in a manner that obliterates the original record. It is vital that this material is kept under secure conditions sufficient for the electoral management body to be certain that it cannot be tampered with or destroyed.

In determining which material may be relevant to challenges, and should be maintained under security, it is better to err on the side of safety:

• all ballots, ballot boxes and seals/locks, voters lists and supporting documents, ballot paper reconciliations and count records, voting station and incident reports would fall into this category.

• it is better to maintain secure storage of all possibly relevant material than be embarrassed by the inability to produce material required for a court challenge or later recount.

A formal materials destruction schedule should be developed by the electoral management body that ensures that election material is not destroyed before the lapse of any period during which it may be required for legal or further administrative action. In some systems, where recounts are used to replace resigned or deceased representatives, ballot material may need to be kept under secure conditions for the term of the elected representative body.

Challenges to Voters

 

Basis of Challenges

Challenges to or complaints regarding voters in voting stations could be made about the following:

• the behaviour of the voter within the voting station;

• the issuing voting material to a voter believed to be ineligible to vote at that voting station;

• the denial of a vote to a voter believed to be qualified to vote at that voting station.

Voter Behaviour

Regarding voter behaviour, the voting station manager must be given and be prepared to use powers to remove or arrange for the removal from the voting station of persons who:

• are intimidating or otherwise threatening other voters, officials, or observers;

• are intoxicated;

• refuse to surrender weapons when entering the voting station (excepting security forces undertaking their voting operations security duties);

• are not authorised to enter the voting station;

• are in any way threatening the security of election materials or the secrecy of voting;

• remain unauthorised in the voting station following completion of their vote;

• are distributing political material or in any way advertising political allegiance or attempting to influence other voters' ballot choices.

Voting station officials should take a proactive role in monitoring behaviour within the voting station. They also must be prepared to react swiftly to investigate any complaints about the behaviour of other persons in the voting station made by other voters, party/candidate representatives, or observers.

In societies emerging from conflict, or in the midst of bitter political dispute, voters, and particularly party/candidate representatives, may have very sensitive perceptions about the behaviour of others in voting stations. In such environments, some training on conflict management and resolution techniques would be appropriate for voting station managers, if not all voting station staff, during their operational training sessions. 

The voting station manager's report on voting activity should include details of complaints about voters' behaviour and instances where persons were removed from the voting station.

Voters threatened with removal from the voting station must first be given the opportunity to behave in an acceptable manner.

If a voter refuses to leave the voting station or any designated area around it on request by the voting station manager, assistance should be sought from security forces.  Voting station officials should not generally attempt to remove voters by force themselves.

Official Verification of Voter Eligibility

All voters should be questioned, by voting station officials prior to being issued a ballot, as to their identity and eligibility to vote in the election and at that voting station.

Where, as a result of such questioning, the voter is denied a vote, details should also be recorded, as this issue may be relevant in any later challenge to election results (and in evaluations of voter information programs, particularly regarding voters who have turned out to vote at the wrong voting station).

Challenges to Voters

It would be usual that the legal framework gives voting station officials the power to challenge or formally object, in the voting station, to a voter being issued a ballot. This may be on the grounds of eligibility to vote, multiple voting, or impersonation of another voter. In some systems, party/candidate representatives may also have this right.

This may have some practical additional effect where voting stations are servicing relatively small numbers of voters in a distinct community.

However, allowing challenges in the voting station by party/candidate representatives may lead to retributive, rather than fact-based, challenging by all party/candidate representatives. This would disrupt voting without enhancing voting integrity.

Resolution at Voting Station

Where challenges to voters are resolved at the voting station level, there needs to be provisions for a formal statement giving reasons for a challenge, formal response by voters, and determination of eligibility by voting station managers.

Where this method is used, arrangements should be made for voters who can satisfy the voting station manager of their right to vote to resume their original place in the voting queue.

Resolution Following Close of Voting

It would generally be regarded as less disruptive to the voting process that such objections are recorded and resolved following the close of voting. Methods by which this could be implemented include:

• allowing the voter to vote in the normal fashion after providing a formal declaration of eligibility to vote, officially recording the objection or challenge, and requiring such objections to be considered in any ballot recount or result challenge proceedings;

• issuing the voter with a provisional or tendered ballot, which is enveloped with the voter's identity information, to be checked after the close of voting to determine if the voter was eligible to vote.

Records of challenges to voters must be treated as highly accountable material, as they may be relevant to any post-voting day challenges to election outcomes.

Area for Dealing with Challenges

To minimise disruption to the service being provided to other voters, challenges to voters within the voting station should, if at all possible, be dealt with away from the tables or areas used for issuing and marking ballots.

Dealing with these at the voting station manager's table and (if allowable under election frameworks) a special area for taking declarations from voters or issuing provisional or tendered ballots is preferable.

Validity of and Omissions in Voters Lists

The validity of the entries on the voter’s lists used in voting locations is an aspect of voting operations that can be highly contentious. The issue is whether validity should be subject to complaint and challenge. In some jurisdictions challenges to validity are barred.

There are two issues here. The first is the accuracy of the compilation of the voter’s lists, that is, whether the processing of voter information to produce the voters’ lists has either:

• omitted or incorrectly recorded details of valid registered voters;

• included details of persons not entitled to be registered.

In systems where voters’ registers are open, that is, there is a method available to voters who have been omitted from the register to vote through means of a declaration as to their eligibility or by provisional ballot, or where voting day registration is available, this can be dealt with in the context of the voting procedures.

In systems where the voters’ registers are regarded as closed, that is, unless the voters' information can be found on the voters list they are denied a vote, it would seem that this would be a valid basis for challenging the election results, to determine if errors in compilation of the voters list were sufficient to affect election outcomes.

The second issue relates to the validity of claims to registration by those voters who have been accepted for registration and who consequently appear on the voters list:

• Where there has been reasonable public opportunity for challenge and equitable resolution of challenges to the acceptance of a person's claim for voter registration, through objection, revision court, or other facilities, at the voter registration stage, this would seem to be an issue no longer capable of challenge.

• Where such reasonable opportunity has not been provided, it would seem that it should be legally allowed as an issue capable of challenge during and after voting.

Complaints about voters’ registers inaccuracies are not something to be resolved on the spot by individual voting station managers. Where significant problems in this regard are encountered, they should be immediately relayed to voting operations administrators. Once voting has commenced amendment of the actual voters lists being used is generally not practicable, and may be a questionable exercise at best. However, omissions or incorrect information on voters’ lists can be dealt with by allowing, within the legal framework means of provisional voting, voting following a formal declaration of eligibility or additional registrations being accepted on voting day.

Where voters’ lists are based on civil registry records, provision can also be made for voters omitted from their correct voters list to receive, on voting day, certificates from the civil registry attesting to their eligibility to vote in a particular area and use these to establish their eligibility at the voting station. The success and equity of this method will depend on the accessible locations of civil registry offices and the costs and capacities of civil registries to handle this workload.

Post-Voting Day Challenges

Challenges to election outcomes may be based on complaints about the accuracy of voters’ registers (see above), significant levels of impersonation of voters, voting by ineligible persons, and multiple voting (see Management of Challenges and Complaints).

It is vital that all records relevant to voter eligibility, persons voting, and challenges to persons voting remain under strict security at least until any time limitations for election challenges has elapsed.

 

Challenges to Validity of Ballots

Basis of Challenges

Challenges to validity of ballots are more likely to occur during the counting phase rather than during voting itself.

However challenges may occur during voting where it is suspected that:

• unauthorised additional ballots are being introduced into the ballot box;

• ballots are being removed from the voting station for marking outside, then brought back into the voting station by other voters to deposit in the ballot box;

• the ballots being issued by voting station officials are not those officially printed or authorised;

• ballots are being handled by unauthorised persons (e.g., party/candidate representatives) during voting;

• unauthorised assistance is being provided to voters in marking their ballots.

Complaints about ballot validity issues in voting stations should, in the first instance, are directed to the voting station manager. Details of these should form part of the voting station manager's report on voting day proceedings.

Introduction of unauthorised ballots into the voting station will generally require the intervention of security forces.

Suspected unauthorised ballot handling and assistance to voters will require intensified control by voting station officials and the removal from the voting station of offenders.

Where complainants are not satisfied with the action taken at a voting station level, there should be right of complaint to and immediate response from voting operations administrators.

Post-Voting Day Challenges

Challenges to election outcomes may be based on complaints about the validity of ballots issued or found in ballot boxes (see Management of Challenges and Complaints)

It is vital that all records remain under strict security until any time limitation for election challenges has elapsed. These would include:

• receipts of ballots at voting stations, both prior to and during voting;

• reconciliations of ballots at close of voting;

• statements from staff, party/candidate representatives, other observers, or voters regarding any suspicious occurrences in relation to ballots during voting.

Challenges to Party/Candidate Representatives' Actions

Basis of Challenges

Complaints and challenges based on the behaviour of political participants may result from the following:

• perceived intimidation of voters, voting station officials, or other political participants by party officials, candidates, or their representatives;

• campaigning at prohibited times and places;

• publicising false or misleading statements about voting procedures or other political participants;

• campaigning within voting stations;

• party or candidate representatives in voting stations attempting to influence voters or assist them to complete their ballots;

• party or candidate representatives in voting stations handling ballots or marking election material in an unauthorised fashion. In carrying out their duties, voting station officials should be preventing such actions from occurring.

However, where they have not, or there is collusion between political participants and officials, political participants and voters must have the opportunity to lodge and have resolved challenges to such actions.

Immediate resolution may be available by lodging complaints at the voting station level and voting station managers removing such persons from voting stations, with the aid of security forces if necessary.

Direction may be required from voting operations administrators for application of sanctions under the legal framework, including any legally sanctioned codes of conduct.

Post-Voting Day Challenges

Challenges to election outcomes by voters, political participants, independent observers, and voting operations administrators may be based on complaints about intimidation or illegal influencing of voters and voting station officials by political participants (see Management of Challenges and Complaints).

It is vital that all records relevant to complaints about political participant behaviour in and around voting stations, including voting station managers' records, party/candidate representative statements, security force records, statements from voters and independent observers, remain under strict security until any time limitations for election challenges has elapsed.

Challenges to Voting Operations Management

Voting Operations Materials and Logistics

Logistics, production, or planning failures, if not sufficiently remedied by contingency planning may result in inequitable opportunities for voters to record their votes and, therefore, significant complaints.

There could be many causes, including:

• late or non-arrival of ballot boxes, ballots (or voting machines), or other necessary material at particular voting locations;

• errors in quantities of or candidate/party details on ballots;

• errors in voters lists (see Challenges to Voters);

• early or mail voting materials not arriving in time for the voter to vote;

• inadequacy of voting station facilities to cope with the voter turnout;

• advertised voting stations not opening on time or at all;

• claimed inaccuracy or failures in the operation of computers or other voting machines.

These are avoidable complaints which adequate planning and quality controls during the lead up to voting day should prevent.

Recourse in such situations requires immediate notification of deficiencies to voting operations administrators from voting station managers and well developed contingency plans. Depending on the framework for the election these could include:

• possible extension of voting hours;

• delivery of emergency stocks of reserve materials and equipment;

• transport of voters to other voting stations.

Even where such remedial action is taken, such deficiencies could be an allowed basis for requesting judicial invalidation of any election, if it can be shown that the number of voters denied the opportunity to vote could have affected the election's outcome.

Legal Limitations

It can be prudent that election legislation specifies what actions taken by voting station officials to counter emergencies that arise on voting day are subject to challenge. In general, restrictions on such challenges should be limited to breaches that, while they may not be allowable normally, could not be considered to have a material affect on the fairness and integrity of the election.

An example of such circumstances could be where a voting station exceeds a legally defined limit on the numbers of voters allowed at a voting station. Similarly, adjournment of voting to another location or time due to natural disaster or civil disturbance should be covered by legislative provisions.

In general, however, it would be better to leave open to challenge and determination by the relevant judicial authority whether actions taken by voting station officials and administrators in the face of emergencies, while taken in good faith, sufficiently affected the voting processes to warrant the result of the election being set aside.

Voting Operations Staff

Complaints about the attitudes, service, and perceived bias of voting station officials may be received from political participants and voters. Causes for complaint could include:

• partisan actions by voting station officials;

• selection of voting station officials with known partisan affiliations in systems where independence is a requisite for selection;

• a preponderance of voting station officials of one particular political bias in systems where voting station officials are supposed to represent a balance of partisan interests;

• poor service, long voting queues, and lack of procedural knowledge shown by voting station officials;

• late opening or early closing of voting stations;

• intimidation of voters by voting station officials or allowing others in the voting station to intimidate voters or deny voting secrecy;

• errors in assessing voters' eligibility to vote and in issuing of correct ballots.

Wherever possible, such matters should be handled at the voting station level, through discipline, and, if necessary, termination of staff by the voting station manager.

Party/candidate representatives and independent observers should, however, be encouraged to report voting station irregularities to voting operations administrators.

Service complaints, in particular, may be resolved by the attendance of a roving senior voting station official.  However, where any pattern of systemic bias, or violation of correct procedures is detected by party or other observers in voting stations, there should be the opportunity for relief measures to be sought from an independent judicial body.

There will also be many decisions made by electoral management bodies during the voting period that could be the subject of complaints, such as in the preparation of voters lists , decisions on registration of parties and acceptability of candidate nominations

Where electoral management bodies have a history of independence, such complaints could initially be investigated and dealt with internally. Equity would demand that opportunities for external administrative or judicial review of such decisions should be available.

Post-Voting Day Challenges

Challenges to election outcomes may be based on complaints about unavailability of ballot materials, required services, and lack of impartiality and professionalism of staff (see Management of Challenges)

It is vital that all records relevant to voting station operations remain under strict security until any time limitation for election challenges has elapsed.

Relevant records would include:

• inventories, materials supply, and distribution records, including delivery receipts;

• records of opening and closing of voting stations, including sealing of ballot boxes;

• recruitment and staff selection records;

• code of conduct violations;

• voter service records.

Voter Follow-Up

Investigation

Following the completion of voting, there may be a need for further investigation of and action on records of those who voted:

• In all systems, investigations of apparent fraudulent attempts to vote will be necessary 

• In compulsory voting systems, action will be required to determine and investigate instances where registered voters apparently did not vote.

Continuous Voter Registration Systems

Where voter registration systems are not dependent for their data on a civil registry and are based on a permanent, continuously updated voters register, voting operations can provide a wealth of data for purging, adding or amending entries on the voters register.

Particularly in systems that allow provisional ballots or forms of voting day registration , there can be considerable data gathered on voters who have changed their name through marriage or otherwise, changed address, had their information transcribed incorrectly onto the voters register, or who were not previously registered to vote.

Efficient continuous register updating systems would allow the collection of updated registration data while such persons are voting, for later processing.

Information on registered voters may also be received from other voters while they are voting, with regard to recent deaths, changes of address, and the like. Such information should be recorded by voting station officials and later followed up by the voter registration authorities to determine accuracy and any action required.

Compulsory Voting System

Investigation

Following the completion of voting, there may be a need for further investigation of and action on records of those who voted:

• in all systems, investigations of apparent fraudulent attempts to vote will be necessary.

• in compulsory voting systems, action will be required to determine and investigate instances where registered voters apparently did not vote.

Continuous Voter Registration Systems

Where voter registration systems are not dependent for their data on a civil registry  and are based on a permanent, continuously updated voters register, voting operations can provide a wealth of data for purging, adding or amending entries on the voters register.

Particularly in systems that allow provisional ballots or forms of voting day registration  there can be considerable data gathered on voters who have changed their name through marriage or otherwise, changed address, had their information transcribed incorrectly onto the voters register, or who were not previously registered to vote.

Efficient continuous register updating systems would allow the collection of updated registration data while such persons are voting, for later processing.

Information on registered voters may also be received from other voters while they are voting, with regard to recent deaths, changes of address, and the like. Such information should be recorded by voting station officials and later followed up by the voter registration authorities to determine accuracy and any action required.

Voter Fraud

Investigations

Where voter fraud is suspected, intensive investigations would generally be undertaken after the close of voting. The framework within which these investigations take place would be determined by the legal provisions relating to challenges to election outcomes and investigation and prosecution of voter fraud. The methods by which the electoral management body responds to any responsibilities given to it under the legal framework will be governed by its management framework for dispute and challenge resolution.

 

Electoral Management Body Responsibilities

While decisions on and conduct of prosecutions of voter fraud would generally, and more appropriately, is the responsibility of civil law enforcement authorities, the electoral management body requires systems in place to fulfil two specific responsibilities:

• Detect and document all attempted cases of voter fraud, so that suspected perpetrators may be identified and subject to the appropriate processes under electoral or other legislation and regulations;
• Determine, if at all possible before the finalisation of counts and the announcement of election results, if the extent of any detected fraud regarding voting is sufficient to have a possible effect on the results of any election.

 

Election Challenges

All results of electoral management body investigations into suspected cases of voter fraud must be made public as swiftly and in as open and transparent a manner as possible.

This will maintain confidence in the integrity of the election management system and allow challenges to the election results by political participants or by the electoral management authority itself.

(For further discussion of challenges to election results, see Management of Challenges and Complaints.)

If the extent of fraud detected is sufficient to have possibly affected an election's results, the electoral management body itself making application to the relevant judicial authorities that an election be set aside will aid in projecting the image of the electoral management authority's vigilance, professionalism, and integrity in the face of attempts to manipulate election outcomes.

 

Security of Materials

Where investigations of suspected voter fraud are undertaken prior to the expiration of any period for challenging an election's results, care must be taken in handling any relevant ballot materials.

They should be maintained in a secure area, and the unsealing and resealing (when not in use) of relevant materials into their packages should be scrupulously undertaken and witnessed.

Strict care must be taken during investigations that no markings are placed on any election materials used during voting.

 

Multiple Voting

Detection and investigations of multiple voting will depend on:

• The integrity, accuracy, and sophistication of methods used to compile voters lists;
• Whether, to enhance accessibility, voters have a choice of voting locations or methods which they use, and whether each voting location and method uses a unique voters list to establish voter eligibility;
• The strictness of voter identity controls at voting locations;
• The quality and accuracy of voting records maintained, and the professionalism of voting station officials in strictly applying voter identification requirements, marking of voters lists, and enforcing ballot issue controls;
• The integrity and comprehensiveness of system and access controls on computer systems or other machines used for vote recording or result calculation.

Where there are no strict controls against duplicate entries on voters’ lists (for example a lack of thorough identity checks prior to being registered, and/or of systems for automatically deleting the previous entry in the voter’s register when registration is updated under continuous voter registration systems), the potential for multiple voting is high.

If election frameworks do not compel unique voters’ lists for every voting location and method, detection of multiple voting will require the implementation of systems to enable consolidations of the records of all voters who cast votes, and examination of this consolidation to determine if more than one ballot has been cast in any voter's name.

Where different types of identity cards may be produced to verify voter identity, additional controls, such as marking the voter with non-removable ink, will be required.

If voters’ lists are not used for an election, it will be difficult to investigate, or even detect, multiple voting.

 

Suspected Multiple Voting

Multiple voting could be suspected where voting show:

• during ballot paper reconciliations, greater numbers of ballots cast at a voting location than names marked off the voters lists for that location;
• during any consolidation of voting records (e.g., of votes cast in a foreign country, or absentee votes with voting station attendance records, where separate voter registers for each method of voting are not maintained) the same voter is detected as having voted by different methods in different locations.

 

Documentation and Investigation of Apparent Multiple Voting

Documentation of suspected multiple voting cases for assessment and further investigation by civil law authorities should show:

• the location of places where multiple voting is suspected to have occurred and relevant statements from voting station staff at these locations;
• complete and accurate records of ballot or system reconciliations to voter numbers. if it is suspected that ballots have been illegally introduced into ballot boxes, or computer/machine voting systems;
• certified copies of voters lists and other documents (e.g., voter eligibility declarations for mail, absentee, or other special ballots) indicating that a voter may have cast more than one ballot.

Preliminary investigation before referral to civil law authorities should be thorough and tactful. There may well be instances where errors by voting station officials, or confusion, particularly on the part of elderly or less-literate voters faced with multiple methods of voting, rather than any fraud, were the cause of apparent instances of multiple voting.

 

Impersonation

A voter casting one or more ballots in the name of other voters, when not authorised by any proxy voting provisions to do so, is difficult to detect after the event. The best defence against it is accurate voters’ lists combined with rigorous voter identity integrity controls within each voting location  and insistence on voters marking their ballots individually and in secrecy.

Impersonation, however, may be suspected and should be investigated in cases where:

• inaccuracies in voters registers have allowed deceased persons' names to have remained on the registers, and people have voted in their names;
• voter registration systems allow persons known to be in distant locations or out of the country to remain registered at their former address, and their names have been marked on voters lists as having voted in their former locality of residence;
• mail ballots have been apparently completed by a person other than the voter to whom they were officially provided;
• voters have been challenged as to their identity in a voting station, and election systems allow them to cast a sealed ballot pending further investigation.

Impersonation in voting by mail may be detected on checking voter eligibility/identity statements accompanying the returned mail ballots and discovering difference in details or handwriting from mail ballot application or vote registration applications.

Similarly, irregularities may be detected where a number of mail ballots originate from the same location (e.g., aged persons' nursing institutions, armed forces bases, hospitals) bearing similar handwriting.

All such occurrences should be carefully and tactfully investigated by voting operations administrators prior to any referral to civil law authorities. As with multiple voting, voting station official error could be the cause of seemingly irregular voting patterns.

Documentation provided to civil law authorities for further investigation would normally include:

• certified copies of any relevant voters’ lists;
• certified copies of challenged voters' statements and relevant death certificates, ballots, statements accompanying mail or other special ballots;
• statements by voting station officials and other witnesses.

Annexes

Contributors

The Voting Operations Topic area was originally written by Alan Wall and updated by Louise Olivier under the supervision of EISA from 2005-2006. The topic area also contains contributions from Sa Ngidi. Work on this topic area has been supported by the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation.

Alan Wall is an election consultant with over 20 years of electoral administration and democracy advisory experience. From 1984 to 1994 he held various senior management positions with the Australian Electoral Commission. He has since managed IFES projects in Azerbaijan in 1999 and in Indonesia between 2000 to 2004, been a senior electoral official for the United Nations in  Eastern Slavonia in 1996 and Nigeria in 1998, and was an advisor to the South African electoral authorities for the local government elections of 1995. During 2005 and 2006 he has been Senior Advisor to Democracy International, directing their local government election support programs in Indonesia. Consultancy projects he has undertaken include evaluating voter registration processes in Iraq and in Ukraine, and the preparation of a Handbook of Electoral Management Design for International IDEA.

 
Louise Olivier is a lawyer by training who has more than six years experience in the field of election management beginning with the Electoral Commission of South Africa where she worked in recruitment and training, legal services and research. She is based in Johannesburg, South Africa where she works as a consultant and conducts legal research for the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. She has undertaken electoral consultancy work for the African Union and the Commonwealth.

Ms Sa Ngidi is an elections practitioner with qualifications in law. She has worked for EISA managing EISA’s assistance to election practitioners in the SADC Region. Ms Ngidi gained her electoral experience at the Electoral Commission of South Africa where she was responsible for electoral matters in the volatile Kwazulu Natal Province for just under 5 years. She is based in Johannesburg, South Africa where she manages electoral matters for the Electoral Commission of South Africa, Gauteng Province. She has observed elections in Europe, Australia and Southern Africa.

Elections in Ethiopia

Background and Electoral System

Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa (East Africa) and has a majoritarian first-past-the-post electoral system where members of the House of People’s Representatives are elected on the basis of the majority of votes cast in single-member constituencies.

In terms of the constitution Ethiopia has a bicameral parliamentary system; the House of People's Representatives (HPR) and the House of the Federation. Members of the HPR are elected for five year terms on the basis of universal suffrage by direct elections held by secret ballot. The Prime Minister is elected from among the members of the HPR.

The House of the Federation (HF) is the upper house and is composed of representatives of “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples”. Each Nation, Nationality and People is represented by at least one member, with each Nation or Nationality represented by one additional representative per each one million of its population.

Members of the HF are chosen by their respective Regional Councils. Alternatively, the Constitution provides for the Regional Councils to have direct elections to the upper house. This option has never been exercised and there is no legislation at regional level providing for direct elections of representatives of the HF.

The two federal level houses combine to choose the President of the Federation who is the Head of State. The President has mainly honorary powers and serves a six year term.

Elections for the Regional Councils of the nine regions are also conducted under a majoritarian system. These constituencies are multi-mandate. The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) conducts all government elections.

Establishment of Voting Stations

The law provides for the establishment of polling stations at locations suitable for security. Polling stations can be established at Office and Assembly Halls of Urban Dwellers Associations or Peasant Associations or Producer’s Cooperative Associations. Polling stations may not be established at military camps, police stations, places of worship, hospitals, places where alcohol is sold, buildings of political and religious organizations and places of residence.

When arranging the layout of the polling station provision must be made for a booth where the voter can vote in secret and cannot be observed by anyone else. The ballot box must be able to be observed for security reasons. Seven days before voting day each polling station must have a ballot box, electoral roll, ballot papers, ink and ink pads, ballot box seals, indelible ink, a box for storing ballot papers that have not been marked properly and report forms.

Voting Station Observers

Ethiopian electoral law provides for the election of five observers for each polling station. These observers must be independent and not affiliated to a political party and must be residents of the area where the polling station is situated. The role of the polling station observers is to observe the elections and report any irregularities in the voting process to the person in charge of the polling station. In Ethiopia presiding officers are called Chief Officers of the polling stations.

Provision is also made for candidate’s observers at each polling station.

At the Voting Station

Each polling station has three staff and a Chief Officer (the presiding officer). The Presiding Officer is responsible for all voting day activities at his or her polling station. They are assisted by the other staff that supports the voting process. The Presiding Officer also has the responsibility of security at the polling station. No one can come within a 500 metre radius of the polling station if they carry a weapon, are drunk or are disturbing the peace in any way. The Presiding Officer determines whether they require police to assist them in ensuring security of voters and can police assistance through the electoral commission offices.

Representatives from the media are permitted to be in the polling stations on condition that they present their credentials and do not interfere with the voting process.

The Presiding Officer must arrange the polling station to accommodate the following:

• seats for candidates' representatives,
• seats for public observers,
• a seat for Registrar No. I,
• a seat for Registrar No. II,
• a place for applying the voter marking-ink,
• a place for handing out ballot papers,
• a secret voting booth/shelter,
• a place for the ballot box,
• a place for giving briefings on the voting process to voters and observers at the entrance to the polling station.

Each polling station must be clearly marked and each stage of the voting process identified through placards or tags. Polling station should also contain posters with information on the candidates’ symbols, and a pictorial illustration of the voting process. Special consideration is given to the prevailing circumstances in each polling station. The Presiding Officer is required to find a secure space for election material that is free from pests and rodents, and from humidity.

Presiding Officers must give a full briefing on the voting process and all the tasks and functions that must be carried out on election day. All the officials who will be present at the polling station will receive this briefing.

Voting hours are from 6h00 – 18h00.

Before Voting Begins

The Presiding Officer opens the sealed bag received from the Constituency Electoral Office and counts out the election documents and materials inside and verifies that the quantity and the variety tallies with the checklist. The tag number of the ballot box and of the padlocks is recorded by the observers and the party and candidates' representatives. The sealed bag is opened in front of the observers and representatives.

The Presiding Officer sorts the ballot papers into piles for the different types of elections and signs on the reverse side of each ballot paper. He/she then counts out ballot papers equal to the number of registered voters and places then in sight of the observers. The remaining ballot papers are kept aside as reserve ballots.

The ballot box is checked and sealed in the presence of the observers and representatives.

The Voting Process

Before voters enter the polling station the Presiding Officer takes them through a briefing on the voting process. He/she waits until a group of voters is gathered and gives these briefings throughout election day. The briefing includes an explanation of the ballot papers and an explanation of who is contesting the elections without showing any favouritism for or bias against the candidates or parties. The briefing also contains information on how a ballot should be marked and what constitutes a spoilt ballot.

After prospective voters receive their briefing they enter the polling station and produce their elector’s card. This card was issued to them at registration and identifies them as people who have registered to vote. Their card is checked to see if they are at the correct polling station and to identify which voters’ roll they are on. Both the elector’s card and their identification document are checked against the voters’ roll.

Once they have been checked against the voters’ roll and their fingers have been examined for voter’s ink, their elector’s card is destroyed and their identity document is returned.

The voter is required to sign, or in the case of illiterate voters make a thumb mark, in a column of the voters’ roll that is designated for this purpose.

The left hand thumb of the voter is inked to prevent double voting.

The voter is handed the ballot papers and directed to a voting booth. In the voting booth the voter marks his or her ballot by placing an X next to his or her choice or, if the voter is illiterate, places a thumb mark next to the preferred choice.

The voter folds the ballot paper and places it in the ballot box and leaves the polling station.

Voters who are blind or physically disabled may be accompanied by a person of their choice to assist them in casting their ballot.

If a voter inadvertently spoils their ballot paper they can return this ballot and request another ballot. The spoilt ballot will be marked by the electoral official with the words "spoilt and returned" and be kept in a special box.

People who are not allowed to vote are those:

• without an electors card and whose name is not on the voters’ roll,
• who are not willing to have their thumb inked, and
• whose thumb is already inked.

At the end of the voting process

At 18h00 the gate of the polling station must be closed. People who are at the gate and in the queue at the time of closing will be allowed to cast their vote if they meet all the legal requirements for voting.

Election wardens are stationed at the gate to ensure that no further people try and enter the area.

After the last voter has cast his or here vote the ballot box/es are sealed with a special seal in front of all the observers and party and candidate representatives The tag number of the padlock of the ballot box is recorded by the election officers, observers and party and candidates' representatives.

The Grievance Hearing Committee

Grievance Hearing Committees (GHC) are established at each electoral office and polling station. Their role is to make administrative decisions on complaints and grievances received about the electoral process.

The Polling Station Grievance Hearing Committee is chaired by the Chief Officer of the Polling Station and has two of the polling station observers as it’s members. All decisions made must be majority decisions.

Complaints to the GHC can be made by:

• a person who has been denied registration,
• a person who request cancellation of registration, and
• a person who is prohibited from voting.

A complaint may be submitted in writing or orally. A complaint made in writing must be made in triplicate and provide all the information related to the complaint including:

• the name of the GHC to which the complaint is brought;
• the date on which the complaint is made;
• full name and address of the complaint;
• the facts constituting the cause for complaint and the remedy requested;
• list of evidence and documents;
• where there is witness evidence, the list of witness.

The complainant is required to produce the witnesses.

Oral complaints are recorded by the GHC. Where a complainant is illiterate the record of his or her complaint is read to them in the presence of the committee members and the complainant verifies the complaint with their signature or thumb mark.

The GHC examines each complaint and makes a decision which is conveyed to the complainant. The decision of the GHC is made in triplicate; one copy goes to the complainant, one copy to the party or body that needs to execute the decision and the third copy is kept on record.

A person who complains that their right to vote has been denied has five hours to make the complaint to the GHC or they forfeit the right. The GHC has five hours to respond to the complaint and if they do not do so within five hours it is assumed that the person has a right to vote and may proceed with voting.

An appeal to the decision is made to the Appellate Committee and on further appeal to the courts.

Elections in Palestine

Electoral System and Electoral Management

1. The Constitution (Basic Law) provides for a government that is democratic and representative, based on political and party multiplicity. The National Authority President is directly elected by the people. The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) is the parliament of Palestine. Presidential and PLC elections are held concurrently.

The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are divided into 16 electoral districts with multiple seats. Each electoral district has its representatives and candidates. The candidate who receives the highest number of votes wins the elections. In the constituencies in which seats are reserved for Christians (Jerusalem, Ramallah, Gaza,Bethlehem), the seats are taken by the Christian candidates who receive the most votes. There is a similar provision for Samaritans in the Nablus constituency.

The Central Elections Commission (CEC) has the overall responsibility for the management of elections. It responsibilities are:

• Supervising the polling and counting process.
• Approving all polling and counting procedures, forms, plans, ballots, and all polling and counting materials.
• Stopping, canceling, or repeating polling at one or more polling stations or districts if needed.
• Announcing final election results nationwide.
• Implementing the decisions of the Elections Appellate Court.

Recruitment and Training of Voting and Counting Workers

Recruited electoral officers are supplemented by school teachers from the Ministry of Education and Training.

Training of the electoral officers focuses on polling and counting procedures, filling in the relevant forms accurately and clearly, how to deal with voters and polling materials during and after the polling and counting procedures. It also provides guidelines for dealing with candidates’ agents and representatives, domestic and international observers and media representatives.

Each electoral officer is provided with a comprehensive training guide with practical steps for the functions that they perform and examples of the forms and codes of conduct for the various stakeholders. e.g. party and candidate representatives.

Domestic and International Observers

Domestic and international observers play an important role in Palestinian elections. In the 2005 Presidential elections over 22 000 international and local observers were accredited by the CEC. The CEC regards their presence as being an essential indicator of the integrity of the electoral process.

Political party and candidate representatives are also accredited by the CEC. Each party or/and candidate is entitled to one agent per polling station.

Journalists and representatives of the media may attend and cover the elections and are required to show their press cards. They have to adhere to a code of conduct.

The Role of Security Services

Palestinian police and security personnel guard and protect polling and counting centres and stations. Each venue is allotted a specific number of police personnel to maintain order. Security personnel and police are required to adhere to the following guidelines:

• Security personnel may not obstruct the polling process or interfere in procedures or in the choice of the voters or try to influence them in any way.
• Security personnel must be present in the vicinity of the polling and counting centre, near the polling centre manager in order to respond to his or her needs immediately.
• Security personnel are not allowed to enter the polling centre unless summoned by the polling centre manager to maintain order and only for the duration specified by the polling centre manager. They must leave as soon as they have achieved the purpose of their entry.
• Security personnel may not bring firearms into the centre unless requested to do so by the polling centre manager and only for the purpose of maintaining order. . Journalists and media representatives

Requirements for Voters

Voters participating in the election process must adhere to the following requirements:

• Voting must be done in the centre/station where the voter’s name appears on the voters’ list.
• Must have proof of identity. If a voter is unable to produce their registration slip they must determine where their name appears on the Final Voters List. The Final Voters List is available in each centre, outside the voting stations. - Follow all instructions provided by the polling station staff.
• People with special needs and people unable to read and/or write may be accompanied by only one person to help them fill the ballot.
• Voters must conduct their voting peacefully.
• Voters must leave the polling station immediately after voting. 4. Security and police

Supervising the electoral process- The responsibilities of the Electoral District Offices:

1. Training polling and counting staff.
2. Providing polling and counting centres with the necessary polling and counting materials.
3. Supervising polling and counting centres within each office’s jurisdiction by assigning one supervisor for every 12 centers in order to monitor work and cover needs.
4. Communicating with the National Elections Office and implementing its instructions without delay.
5. Handling problems that may arise on polling day at centres within the office’s jurisdiction and forwarding them to the Central Elections Office when necessary.
6. Receiving and handling the complaints and remarks of candidates and parties and/or their representatives and agents and forwarding them to the Central Elections Office where they will be handled by a permanent operations room responsible for receiving complaints and remarks and providing solutions to the district offices.
7. Retrieving all polling and counting protocols and materials from centres and stations at the close of the process and transporting them to the National Elections Office.

The Responsibilities of the Voting and Counting Staff:

1. Polling and counting staff are the polling centre manager and the polling station committees.
2. The polling station committees comprise the polling station presiding officer and four officials responsible for implementing polling and counting procedures at their station.
3. Their responsibilities are to facilitate the voting and counting process.

Their tasks are:

• Check the identity documents of voters, cross their names on the Final Voters List, and ink the voters’ finger to indicate that they have voted.
• Issue voters with ballots.
• Control the ballot box.
• Ensure the smooth flow of voting and control access to the polling station.

Before Election Day

On the morning of the day before polling, District Office officials distribute the polling and counting kits to polling centres and stations. Centre managers and polling station staff must be present at the centres/stations on the morning before polling day to:

1. Receive polling and counting materials
2. Finalise internal preparations to receive voters.
3. Prepare polling stations and remove any irrelevant materials.
4. Prepare the station to facilitate smooth running of the process.

At the Voting Station

Polling centres are located at the venues that were used for registration. Each centre has up to five polling stations. Voting is between 7h00 and 19h00. Five electoral officers work at each polling centre. They are the:

• Station Supervisor – responsible for overseeing the voting station.
• Registry Officer – accurately records the voters, enters their names on the list of voters, and applies the ink.
• Ballot forms officer –stamps the voting papers and hands them to voters, directs them to the polling booth.
• Box Officer – checks that the voters put their ballot papers in the ballot boxes.
• Queue officer – controls the entry of voters into the polling station.

Other People Who are allowed into the Voting Station

− Relevant employees of the CEC.

− Voters coming to cast their vote.

− Candidates, party representatives and their deputies.

− Domestic and international observers.

− Media representatives.

− Security officials, at the request of the station official only.

Special Security Measures for Voting Material and Equipment

Ballot Boxes

Semi-transparent ballot boxes are used.

Ballot Papers

Ballot papers have a unique watermark were used and the papers are not uniformly sized. The designated design for the paper is kept secret.

Voting Ink

The electoral ink cannot be wiped from the thumbs of voters for at least 24 hours.

Spoilt ballots

If a voter makes a mistake when marking their ballot, the voter returns the ballot paper to the electoral officer. The officer invalidates the ballot by writing “SPOILED” on the back, without opening the ballot, and places in the designated envelope for spoiled ballots.

The officer takes out a new ballot, stamps it on the back, and hands it to the voter.

Assistance for Special Categories of voters

Procedures for illiterate or blind people who are unable to vote without assistance are entitled to bring a person of their choice to assist them in casting their ballot.

The presiding officer must confirm that the voter is unable to mark their ballot without assistance. The companion must be chosen by the voter, and the presiding officer must confirm this by questioning the voter.

The centre manager, station officials, and accredited representatives and observers are not allowed to help voters or watch as they vote.

Complaints about the Voting Process

Party and candidate representatives and observers many submit written complaints and remarks about the electoral process. The presiding officer must address the complaints immediately and convey their decision to the complainant.

The presiding officer must attach the remarks or complaints form must be attached to the protocol at the end of voting day and sent to the district office.