The Question
This question was posted on behalf of a member of the ACE Practitioners' Network who wishes to remain anonymous.

How can the problem of early online publication of unofficial election results during election day, and while voting is still taking place, best be dealt with? What strategies are implemented in other countries? Legislation is often tough, but practical ways of implementing it are hard to find. I’m therefore looking for practical measures which could be implemented, for example, on Twitter, Facebook or blogs.

Summary of responses
A number of the replies questioned what exactly the nature of the problem was. As one points out, online publication of exit polls while voting is still taking place need not necessarily be a problem; it can rather act as “a good check on the performance of the electoral system.”

There is consensus that the borderless and instantaneous nature of the Internet has now made any attempt to restrict or control the reporting of exit polls while voting is still taking place elsewhere practically meaningless. Even the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada (where reporting results from one electoral district is not permitted in other districts where voting is still underway) has admitted that this prohibition has become very difficult to enforce.

Rather than trying in vain to enforce legislation against such reporting, one view is that a better approach is to invest in educating voters, so that their voting will not be unduly influenced by exposure to exit polls from other areas.  Another is that election management bodies (EMBs) need to focus on announcing official results as expeditiously as possible.

If the “early online publication of unofficial election results” does not refer to exit polling, but rather to parallel vote tabulation (PVT) conducted by observers, then the focus should be on proper training of observers and the timely release of official results by the EMB as two ways to dissuade observer groups publishing their results early. 

Examples of related ACE Articles and Resources
Encyclopaedia:
• Exit polls
• Reporting exit polls

Comparative data:
• If exit polls are permitted, when can the results be disseminated via the media?

Names of contributors
1. Sean H Gralton
2. Alexandre Michaud
3. Monte McMurchy
4. Julian Nundy
5. Andy M.A. Campbell
6. Rindai Chipfunde Vava
7. Lawrence Lachmansingh
8. Chris Kyriakides

I think you need to specify what the "problems" are to which you refer.  Are you trying to prevent the publication of unofficial results by exit polling organizations?  Are you trying to keep parties from publishing what may be flagrantly fraudulent results?  Are you concerned about these activities prior to the close of polling or afterwards? 

Unofficial results, if properly collected and tabulated, can be a good check on the performance of the electoral system... wide deviances between a reliable exit poll tabulation and official results can indicate possible fraud or misconduct, and can be an important part of election observation.  For that reason, any attempted restrictions on publication of unofficial results should be tightly linked to a real and specified problem. 

However, as you point out in your question, social media makes any attempt to restrict publication difficult... so rather than try to restrict the flow of information, it might be better to try to raise the quality of the information through training of observers, etc.

I can share the Canadian experience with what we call 'the blackout period' set out in section 329 of the Act (although if you are thinking about developing countries, things may be different as pointed out in the answer before me):

329. No person shall transmit the result or purported result of the vote in an electoral district to the public in another electoral district before the close of all of the polling stations in that other electoral district.

Although this may not be what you are looking for exactly, some reasoning supporting these kinds of blackout may be similar to the transmission of unofficial results (normally, only the EMB is in a position to transmit official results).  In principle, the section above prohibits the transmission of results from an electoral district that has completed the tabulation to another district where poeple are still voting.  The purpose is to prevent an elector from being influenced by the results of another electoral district where polls are closed, especially in countries where you have different time zones (and therefore different hours for voting, althought staggered hours can help resolve the matter).  A person who does not comply with this prohibition can be found guilty of an offence under the electoral legislation.  This provision has passed the Human Rights Charter test of the Supreme Court of Canada (R. v. Bryan; Supreme Court of Canada, March 15, 2007).  However, there are two siginificant challenges to enforce this provision with the age of internet 2.0: 1-anonymous communication of results on internet (who did it for enforcement purposes?) and 2-strong opposition from the media who calls it the gag law (freedom of speech + right to information + they contest the presomption that the results in one part of the country will influence the way voters vote where polls are still open should they know these results already).

The CEO of Canada has recently mentioned to Parliament that the prohibition has become very difficult to enforce (notwithstanding the issue concerning communication of results from another country to Canadians, which falls outside Canada's jurisdiction and enforcement capacity).

In brief, it appears that internet 2.0 has made these kinds of prohibition obsolete in developed countries because it can be very difficult to enforce.  The same may apply to developing countries if the problems you are referring to is similar (not talking here about communication of false results; the broadcast of false results when voters are still voting may be a worrisome perspective if one believes that they can influence the way voters vote).

Hope this helps, although I would also need to know what kind of problems you are referring to in order to make my answer as pertinent as possible.

Alexandre Michaud (the above answer is my own and does not represent/involve the views of EC)

My initial thinking is whether the question posed has any fundamental ontological value insofar as legislation and or regulation concerning the propriety and evidence of advance electoral information being provided on election day is close to being of absolute impossibility in terms of control and regulation enforcement.

In France, the problem comes from Belgium and Switzerland. Until a few years ago, the publication of opinion poll results was banned for the last week of all French election campaigns. But a news website in Switzerland started publishing them in defiance of French law. Eventually, the French Parliament repealed the law and now opinion polls are allowed in France right up to the last day of campaigning.

Similarly, Swiss and Belgian websites publish exit polls (whose publication by French media are banned until all voting has ended) during election day. So far, the French authorities do not seem to have come up with any way to counter this.

It seems to be a pretty intractable problem.

"

Is not this question really about the use of mass PVT with advance technology thus enabling what some might see as contradiction to offical EMB results?

it posits that early and unofficial is a negative - let us not forget - as Sean pointed out and if expanded upon more fully that trained observers both domestic and international are a bulwalk to sloppy results - which in my experience can readiliy come from a domestic observation group !

the correct training of observer group in the right way to use technology will overcome this challenge - if the donors have the $$$ to spare, and then has to be asked would it not benefir the EMB more then the observer if use of technology was employed to enhance the capability of the host nation EMB

regardless you really have to have to have legislation with teeth, one that can over come the nation-state border issue, which in some locations will result in electoral instigated violence if the 'wrong results'are published - real or false.

More traing, more information fromt he EMB to counter new media is what is needed as well

The only way to avoid this happening is to increase transparency by an EMB by continuous releasing of results as they come in in an open  manner rather than causing unnecessary delays.The delay would result in domestic observer groups and political parties agents leaking their own PVT projections inorder to avoid manipulation

Crowd sourcing may be another angle to consider, used as a means of aggregating results from various interested groups, such as domestic observers, journalists and political parties.  It is theoretically possible to establish a central website, with maps, that gathers polling station data via SMSs (or online entries) from multiple sources.  The trick, as others have already noted, is to validate the integrity of data received from such varied sources. 

One answer may be in the planning: if the discrete groups (party A, party B, EMOs etc) are able to pre-identify their data collectors (e.g. cell numbers numbers, usernames etc) then the database created with the results should be able to a) create queries based on group inputs, b) compare and contrast results received across data sources. 

These techniques could have the effect of increasing confidence around the integrity of data coming in (e.g. if we agree that should the ruling party and main opposition party results coincide, there is a good chance that those results are "good"). 

I am not aware of any multi-stakeholder election result system that includes political parties, but perhaps others have heard or worked on these and can share examples. 

Alexander Michaud mentioned an extract in the Canadian Electoral Law and raised the concern that early announcement of electoral results (in electoral districts that have already closed their polls) may potentially affect voters in other electoral districts where polling stations are still open. I would like to point out however that this matter may concern also countries spanning single timezones. Numerous countries are making use (or considering to make use) of out-of-country voting by means of their Embassies. In effect, such “single-timezone countries” will now end up having out-of-country Polling Centers spanning multiple time zones.

Furthermore, the simple truth is that the way people communicate now has changed from the way people communicated in the past. Mobile Internet on smartphones and services such as Tweeter, Facebook and even email (straight from your mobile) has changed the communication landscape; such messages and communications are truly global and instantaneous. Such services may not be that new  -- however, unlike in the past, these are now ubiquitous. Rightly or wrongly, EMBs must face the reality that, going into the future, such communication cannot be restricted, controlled or delayed at the will of the EMB. Rightly or wrongly, it is not the world that must change but rather the EMBs that must evolve to adapt to this changing world! 

As with any unregulated medium there is concern that incorrect results may be announced by unofficial channels out of lack of due diligence or possibly even for nefarious political reasons. Early announcement of results by the EMB is a must!

The simple truth is that speedy announcement of results by the EMB will curb the impact/need/appeal of unofficial results channels. Where appropriate, IT Solutions (Results Management Systems) that can aid the EMB in speeding up this results verification and aggregation process should be considered.