Original question:

Are there specific situations when international election observation missions are less suitable than domestic observation missions or vice versa? Are there any general guidelines for determining this beforehand?

How can the two different kinds complement each other? Should they or should they not be coordinated?

What would you say are the most salient risks of the observation mission affecting the election or the democratic development in the country negatively? Can these risks be found primarily during the observation, reporting or follow up phase?

Summary of responses:

International and domestic observation missions have their respective advantages and disadvantages that can mainly be applied regardless of the situation. International observation missions are more expensive, they usually cover only a short time period and a limited geographical area and the observers are most often not very familiar with the country's culture or local languages. At the same time the international missions have a high level of comparative election expertise and they often attract media attention both internationally and within the country in question. Domestic missions can have problems of legitimacy as they can be seen as supporting one side in the political race and the fact that the observers live in the country could also be problematic as they can be more susceptive to threats and coercion by political actors and others. On the other hand, the domestic observers know the languages of the country, they are able to observe bigger parts of the election cycle and of the country and they are much less costly than international missions.

In addition to these general advantages and disadvantages, it can be mentioned that international missions may be less useful than domestic missions in elections organized by the international community while in highly contested and violent elections during transitions, the international missions may be able to play a very important role.

Coordination between international and domestic missions and between the organizations within these two categories is difficult due to the fact that the different missions are by nature independent and few if any like to be coordinated by somebody else. Instead, what is possible and many times useful is cooperation rather than coordination, especially in the data gathering stages of the observation when information can be shared between different groups in a formal or informal way to facilitate analysis and avoid duplication. In the analysis, evaluation and reporting stages, even cooperation is usually much harder.

Election observation may sometimes have limited or no effect, but is very rarely damaging to the country in question. The one risk of both domestic and international election observation missions that can be identified however is in the reporting stage, when - if reporting is done based on insufficient data or political agendas - the value of the other missions can be undermined. 

Replies were received, with thanks, from:

Links to related resources:

• ACE Encyclopaedia: Organized National Election Observation
• ACE Encyclopaedia: Efficacy of National Observation
• ACE Encyclopaedia: International Election Observation
• ERIS domestic observation handbook including case studies 
• OSCE/ODIHR domestic observation handbook
• EU handbook for international observers
• Article by Jorgen Elklit on election observation

Individual replies to the question:

Staffan Darnolf:

My assumptions here are that both international election observation missions (IEOMs) and domestic election observation missions (DEOMs) are well trained, observing all relevant parts of the electoral process using a sound methodology and make their statement public in a timely manner.

IEOMs tend to be less useful when the international community has the mandate to organize the poll. This seems to be self-evident, but there are several cases where IEOMs were present in spite of UN/OSCE organizing the election. In my mind, this should be avoided. Better to spend the money on technical assistance to the domestic election observation missions and its logistics.  

On the other hand, the presence of a smaller IEOM in a country undergoing a transitional process which is marred by violence might actually perform a much more important role than a large scale mission in a country holding its second or third election. Having said that, the million dollar question is of course if elections should be held in the first place if violence is still a common feature in that society in question.

The level of coordination between domestic and international election observation missions are predicated on the methodology used to observe and report. The minimum level of coordination would be to share deployment plans for long term observers (LTOs) and short term observers (STOs), while the maximum would be that the two missions are fully integrated using the very same reporting form, sharing information during the observation and presents joint statements. By doing so each of the two missions would benefit from each other’s strengths and thereby further enhance the overall observation of the election.

The gravest risk we are still facing is the deployment of unprofessional observation missions using a flawed methodology resulting in statements based on political factors/pressure rather than the reality on the ground. This is relevant for both DEOMs and IEOMs. It is enough to have one such rouge election observation mission in theatre to split and dilute the value of all other professional election observation missions as this gives the opportunity to national/international actors to do cherry-picking.

In general I would say that the follow-up phase is too late to identify the risks. Ideally it could be done during the pre-deployment stage but as the political scene on the ground is fluid and you don’t know what other missions will arrive in-country. Ideally there would be an agreed international standards that all the major player would sign-up to and adhere to. However, that is not likely to happen anytime soon. 

Paul Guerin:

International Observation:

Domestic Observation:

Tim Meisburger:

When resources are limited, in most cases you will have the most possible positive impact on the quality of the process by supporting domestic observation, as you might be able to deploy local observers at a cost of as little as $10 each, while international observer costs can average about $600, and as high as $1000 dollars a day. In some cases however, particularly where trust in local actors is limited or non-existent, a few international observers may have more impact than many domestic observers. So, it depends...

Domestic observers can usually gather much more information than international observers, but international observers can often say things about parties and candidates that locals (who will after all have to live there after the election) would be uncomfortable saying. International observers are often much higher profile as well, with better access to the media, and their statements (sometimes regrettably) can have more impact through media and donors than those of domestic observers, so an informal cooperative relationship can benefit both.

Coordination is a sticky issue. The word, when used by most people, is intended and interpreted as a control mechanism. Because organizations involved in observation are by nature independent, and because they often feel they know their business better than those trying to "coordinate" them, they don't seem to accept coercive coordination very well. "Coordination" has such a bad connotation that I never have coordination meetings. Instead I have "information sharing" meetings, where everyone sits at the table an equal participant. I find that mechanisms that facilitate information flow naturally lead to coordinated action, as consensus is reach on key priorities and overlap and duplication naturally avoided.

It is not only domestic organizations that are sensitive on this issue: some of the largest international organizations feel it is their right to always be the "coordinator"; while others adamantly refuse to ever be coordinated (or even cooperate).

I don't think there is much risk of an observation having an actual negative effect on a country. Although observers can sometimes be pawns in a political game, that game would go on with or without them. Much more likely they would have limited or no impact, than actually damage the process, and I guess that in all the observations I have seen that observers have had at least some positive impact.

Michael Meadowcroft:

If you have time, I suggest you look at the two short papers:

• Response to: The Declaration of Principles of International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers; and
• European Commission Conference on Electoral Assistance and Observation Projects, Brussels 28 & 29 September 2004

Both were written to address the broad topics you raise, and can be found on my website. 

Maja Tjernström:

Secondly, national observers know the local language(s) and culture(s) and can gather information that international observers have less access to.

Thirdly, national observers have the possibility to observe a much longer time span than even the long-term international observers.

Fourthly, national observation builds local capacity.

On the other hand, national observers (as Tim mentioned) have to stay in the country after the elections and might need to be careful with who they criticize. They might also have more difficulties accessing areas of the country marred by violent conflict (their ethnicity can for example make them a target or they are perceived to supoort one side or another). International observers are usually seen as more impartial, even if there are many examples of where they have been perceived as supporting one party or candidate.The biggest risks as I see it is that observation missions can "legitimize unfair elections or de-legitimize fair elections".

This can happen when the observation mission has too limited resources (or for other reasons can cover for example only less "troublesome" areas or the urban areas to a greater extent than the rural areas). Experienced observation missions account for the systematic statistical errors that this quota causes, but it can be difficult to get that information out in the days after the election.

Secondly it might be more common that local observers with less international experience want to focus their reports on irregularities and fraud (or electoral violence) even though the election ran "well enough" according to international standards. In those cases, the observation reports can lead to the losing parties/candidates questioning the outcome of the elections even though they do represent the will of the people.

Horacio Boneo:

Differences between international and domestic observation

The deconstruction of the electoral process into its components, and the analysis of effective approaches to observing each one, suggest that most components of the electoral process can be adequately covered with qualitative assessments by small teams of experts. The two main exceptions--requiring large numbers of observers--are the observation of freedom of assembly, movement, nonexistence of fear and intimidation, and observation of the events on Election Day, including counting at polling stations. Although present techniques of observing voter registration also require large numbers of observers, there are alternative and more efficient approaches based on expert analysis. Given these different resource requirements, what are the relative advantages of international and domestic observation for the different observation targets?

One almost obvious conclusion is that international observers are not particularly cost-effective for information gathering, with the exception of certain areas where expertise is important. The observation of the respect for basic freedoms is the typical focus of long-term, regionally deployed international observers. However, success in information gathering depends on the ability of observers to establish effective networks of contact with their national counterparts. The main impact of long-term observers, regionally deployed, is that their presence will probably have a deterrent effect and significantly contribute to confidence building. This aspect is more appreciated by opposition parties than by the government and cannot be easily replaced by national observers.

The differences between international and domestic observation concerning information gathering are particularly evident on Election Day. The typical mobile international operation has the advantage of an element of surprise, which can deter fraud and abuse. International observation can be based on well-designed samples that might be a reliable representation of the universe. However, the data collected during the short visits to polling stations during the day are largely impressionistic and provide reliable quantitative data for only a very limited number of variables.  Evaluations based on statistical criteria tend to appear as quite obscure to the general public, thus having limited impact on conferring legitimacy.

The typical national static observation allows collection of complete information on events in the polling station being observed. Since domestic organizations are usually able to cover all or most of the polling stations, their presence results in both accurate data and widespread deterrence.

Differences between domestic and international observation of aspects of the electoral process requiring expert knowledge depend on the characteristics of the country where the observation is being conducted. In developed countries like Mexico or South Africa, most of the expertise required for specialized analysis abounds and can be part of the national observation methodology. On the other hand, there are countries where some types of specialized national expertise are quite scarce, making the expertise provided by international observers necessary.

Another important difference between domestic and international observation concerns the impact of their reporting. Domestic observers are listened to mostly inside the country, while the opposite is true of international observers. It is important to remember that the impact on legitimization is not always achieved by carefully thought out reports, based on the information collected by the observers and carefully analyzed and chronicled by the media. Nor should it be assumed that the higher the quality and accuracy of the information on which the report is based, the greater will be its impact on public opinion. In far too many cases, opinions are shaped by mission statements issued shortly after polls close and based more on an overall political evaluation of the after-poll situation than on a careful and detailed analysis of the information collected by the mission. Media coverage is frequently based on the timing of the statement and the name recognition of the head of the mission, rather than on the quality of the information on which it is based. These aspects should be as much an integral part of the planning of the mission as the technical requirements.

Last, but most important, international observation is very costly, and its use should be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis. International observation began as a demand phenomenon: a response to pressing needs in difficult situations. As time went by, it developed some of the distinguishing features of a supply phenomenon: the existence of a request is the main consideration, and not much attention is paid to either the situation on the ground or the effective need for a costly tool like international observation.

Coordination and cooperation

Each of the “kinds” of observation is not a single entity.  International observation is conducted by a very large number of organizations, up to 100 or more in especially interesting cases. The number of relevant domestic observers tends to be smaller, because they tend to set up networks, but in most cases there are at least a few domestic organizations. Therefore, eventual coordination and complementarities cannot be discussed between “kinds or types” of observation (ie. national/ international) but rather between specific observer organizations.  The experiences tend to be rather poor, and the issue of coordination is discussed in the next paragraphs from a different angle.  Observation involves four different sets of activities - data gathering, analysis, evaluation, and reporting – and the problems of coordination are quite different for each of these activities.

Coordination should be especially important in relation to information-gathering activities, as it is the aspect of observation that requires the largest share of resources. The subsequent analysis of the raw data is essential for making an informed judgment on the adequacy of the electoral process. Analysts require skill at extracting conclusions from raw data, identifying trends from a large number of isolated facts, differentiating between irregularities and systematic attempts to manipulate some aspect of the electoral process, identifying underlying problems, and relating the electoral information to its social and political context. Analysis is less resource intensive than data gathering, but it requires definite skills. Evaluation--the next activity--is even less resource intensive but requires the use of standards that are, in most cases, nonexistent, fuzzy, or difficult to apply. The last, but by far the most important, activity involved in observation is reporting. Who issues the report, and how and when the "message" of the mission is voiced, count at least as much as the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the information on which the report is based.

Achieving effective coordination becomes increasingly difficult as we move from data gathering to reporting. There are practical and theoretical incentives for cooperation among nonpartisan observers, whether international or domestic, in the gathering of information. Working together facilitates larger samples and more adequate coverage in areas like registration or voting, and it also leads to significant labor and cost savings in the collection of raw data concerning the remaining components of the electoral process. Better retrieval of media information becomes possible, events can be witnessed at more public meetings, and more people can follow the processing and adjudication of complaints.

Cooperation in analysis and evaluation is significantly more difficult. The first problem is that not much analysis is done, given the pressure of time. Both analysis and evaluation involve multiple dimensions and require the definition of standards. Even the usual concept of "free and fair" elections involves a bi-dimensional judgment. The issues are further complicated by the fact that each of the two dimensions involves several "components." For example, the dimension "free" involves the freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and movement; equal and universal suffrage; the absence of impediments to standing as a candidate; freedom from fear and intimidation; the opportunity to participate in the poll; and legal possibilities of impartial treatment of complaints and petitions. It is thus entirely possible and legitimate that different organizations employ dissimilar criteria for their final evaluation. An organization that gives considerable weight to malfunctioning aspects will have a poorer opinion of the elections than one that attaches priority to a different set of aspects that had performed normally.  The absence of standards of "normality" introduces an additional complication. Is 5 percent inconsistency in an electoral roll acceptable? Some might claim that it is too high, while others might think it quite normal under the circumstances.

The last activity of the observation cycle--reporting--is by far the most difficult to coordinate. Unless organizations are in full agreement in analysis and evaluation, they will find it difficult to issue joint reports. Even if there is full agreement, most organizations have a strong interest in separate reporting, since that allows them to reinforce their organizational identity. The pressure for separate reporting is far stronger in the case of post-polling statements and press conferences. There is much less interest in the publications issued two or three months after the elections--they rarely make the best sellers' list.

Therefore, one could expect that cooperation and coordination would be easier to achieve in data gathering. Two organizations have made efforts to improve coordination among observers. The United Nations has developed the so-called “coordination and support” approach, as a limited response to the dispersion of efforts and the trend to concentrate international observation on Election Day. The approach is based on the establishment of an “electoral assistance secretariat” to identify organizations and countries sending observers; to convince donors to send more long-term observers and fewer short-term observers; and to provide effective logistic and technical support to arriving observers. When successfully implemented, an electoral assistance secretariat develops a core network of long-term observers and organizes a “joint international observer group” to standardize and coordinate approaches and share information. The secretariat usually makes an effort to recruit volunteer observers among international residents, including the diplomatic community. The UN’s initial design foresaw the participants in the group sharing information and performing joint analysis, while having the freedom to evaluate and report individually. The approach included joint discussion after the elections among the different observer organizations included in the Joint International Observer Group concerning the approach they would take to reporting. Although such meetings might help in achieving independent but consistent reporting, the UN’s aim was not to force consensus.

While the UN considers its approach as better employed in cases that do not receive  excessive international attention, International IDEA has been involved in coordination issues in cases like Russia, where a plethora of observer organizations was expected. IDEA's approach involved providing a neutral ground where different organizations can meet in advance, discuss their operational plans, and establish arrangements to increase the efficiency of their operation, like coordination of observers' routes, employment of compatible forms for the observation of events on election day, joint debriefing, and so on. IDEA has complemented these meetings with two international gatherings for an overall discussion of coordination problems.

However, it has been difficult to achieve effective coordination. The UN has encountered situations where diplomatic representatives have pressed for a joint report with a favorable evaluation. IDEA's cooperation arrangements have concentrated on the deployment of observers on Election Day. Experience shows that observer organizations are reluctant to lose their identity, which tends to be a side effect of coordination.   In short, coordination is like most virtues, advisable but difficult to achieve.

Effects of election observation

While in some special cases the impact of observation might have a profound impact, in most specific individual cases it is like the butterfly effect: a butterfly flattering its wings in Japan affects the weather on the west coast of the United States.

One of the positive long-run impacts of electoral observation is that it might help build and reinforce democratic practices and institutions.  In many cases the presence of international observers might result in the introduction of changes that will outlast the electoral process. If previously nonexistent freedoms are allowed to flourish during an electoral process, a regime might find it difficult to withdraw them at a later stage.

On the negative side, there is the risk that observers might attempt to assume roles that correspond to the electoral authorities, proclaiming assumed results of the election.  In some cases, the electoral authorities might be biased and might have manipulated the results, but in other cases, it might be just the reluctance of observers or parties to accept results that do not favor them.

The table below provides a comparison of national and international observers:

THANKS TO ALL WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED!
 
The opinions expressed by members of the ACE Practitioners' Network do not necessarily reflect those of the ACE Partner organizations.