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Elections and Technology Case StudiesAn Electoral Register from Scratch: The Palestinian Elections of 20 January 1996 Russia - The State Automated Elections System The Use of GIS Software for Redistricting in the U.S. during the 1990s An Electoral Register from Scratch: The Palestinian Elections of 20 January 1996An Electoral Register from Scratch: The Palestinian Elections of 20 January 1996
Following the signing of the 1993 Declaration of Principles between the Palestinians and Israel in Oslo, planning started towards the holding of elections for the President and Legislative Council in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The realisation of the Declaration of Principles required further detailed negotiation and agreement: many of the issues related to the elections were included in these negotiations, which lasted until September 1995 when the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement was signed. The political timetable then dictated that the elections should take place as soon as possible: 20 January 1996 was the date chosen. The European Commission signed an agreement with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to provide funding and technical assistance for the elections.
No elections of any kind had taken place in the Gaza Strip since the 1940s, and none were held in the West Bank since elections in some major cities in the 1970s. Israeli occupation was withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and Jericho in May 1994 and from some major West Bank urban centres in late 1995, but continued elsewhere. The new PNA had no registration information or infrastructure of any kind. The electoral registration system had to be devised from scratch.
The system was created under a variety of constraints and difficulties:
Creating the register
The polling hours and the voting procedure were determined by the PCLGE at an early stage, leading to a target maximum of 750 electors per polling station. From their existing estimates of the average household size in the West Bank and Gaza, PCBS calculated a figure for the maximum number of houses per polling district. PCBS then undertook the Community Survey for Elections, which gathered demographic information and which generated hand-drawn maps indicating all buildings within each town, village and hamlet (no other maps being available). The maps were used to define residential polling districts with boundaries that were clear on the ground, each of which was allocated a five digit code consisting of two digits identifying the constituency and three digits identifying the polling district within the constituency.
Qualified electors were required to be Palestinian as defined in the election law, 18 or older on the day of election, and not disqualified for reason of criminal offense or mental incapacity. In order to maximize registration and as part of the process of civic education leading to first elections, the registration in each polling district was conducted through active canvassing by a five member Polling Station Commission (PSC), who were later also responsible for the poll and the count. At least three visits were made to each house to ensure all potential electors were contacted. A registration form for each elector was completed and signed by the elector. In addition, the elector was given a Confirmation of Provisional Registration.
The central computer centre for the registration was established at and run by PCBS on behalf of PCLGE and the Palestinian Central Election Commission, the successor body to PCLGE which assumed responsibility for the election process after the passage of the election law. Each PSC transferred the information from the registration forms on a weekly basis to computer input forms which were designed for both Optical Mark Reader (OMR) and manual use.
The use of OMR machines was an experiment. Although it had been hoped that the bulk of input would take place through the three OMR machines installed, the speed of input in practice was lower than expected. The computer centre was also equipped with 48 manual input terminals designed both for the processing of additions and amendments and as a backup system to the OMR equipment. These terminals were operated on three full shifts over the period of initial register entry, about five weeks, and the task was completed against the very tight deadlines. The importance of a backup system when using what was at that time still developing technology was strongly demonstrated. At the same time, what was a disappointment also gave valuable experience for the possible use of future development of the technology.
During the first five weeks of input, about 1 million entries were made, each consisting of constituency and polling district identifier, name (up to four components), address, date of birth, sex, ID number (nine digits), and ID type (single digit code). In the two weeks before polling day, a provisional register of electors was printed and published on the two heavy duty dot matrix printers installed. As a result of the short time available and the state of the art of technology at the time, this printed register contained only the numeric details (polling district details, sequential elector registration number within the polling district, date of birth, sex, ID number and ID type). The Arabic alphabetic characters—the names and addresses—were written in by hand by the PSC before the publication of the register.
Over the remaining three weeks up to polling, some 30,000 additions and amendments resulting from the submission of claims and objections to the provisional register were input. The final pre-publication draft register was compared with the Israeli population register as contained in the negotiated agreement, and entries that did not match were resolved between Palestinians and Israelis. The final register for the election was then printed, dispatched to PSCs for the hand entry of alpha characters. It was available in all 1700 or so polling districts on the day—only 10 weeks after the first day of the registration canvass.
The purchasing process
The purchasing of equipment for the implementation of the computerised register was funded by European Commission (EC) money and was therefore subject to the EC’s procedural requirements. The description that follows reflects the way in which these procedures worked in this particular instance. While the underlying principles of transparency and financial accountability are still of the essence, it should not be assumed that the detailed requirements of this process would now remain the same.
Step 1: Initial budget
A series of contracts were drawn up and signed by the European Commission and the Palestinian Commission for Local Government and Elections (PCLGE), governing the provision of funding for different aspects of election planning and working within the overall budget allocation for support to the elections approved by the appropriate committee of EC member states. Budget lines for the purchase of computer equipment were included in one such contract, based on outline costings established by the EC with PCLGE and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) as part of the initial detailed planning of the EC election support.
Step 2: Tender list
General EC tender requirements provided that suppliers should be drawn from companies registered either in the Palestinian territories or within EC member states. In view of the constraints and difficulties that pertained at the time to supply of goods and customs clearance to the Palestinian territories through Israel, EC approval was obtained to draw up a restricted tender list of companies based within the Palestinian territories. From their knowledge of local computer suppliers, PCLGE and PCBS drew up a list of nine potential suppliers for the equipment and submitted it to the EC for approval.
Step 3: Proposal document
The Proposal Document was drawn up by PCBS and dispatched to the companies on the restricted tender list, giving the companies three weeks to respond. This document contained the technical requirements of the system to be purchased.
The technical specifications included:
The detailed specifications offered were to be entered on Technical Data Sheets supplied.
The tenders were also required:
Tenders were to be accompanied by a Bid Bond of 5% of the value of the tender, a Performance Bond of 10% of the value of the tender and a Warranty Period Bond of 10% of the value of the tender. The Performance Bond would be retained until the final payment of the purchase price had been made. The Warranty Period Bond would be retained until the warranty period on each piece of equipment supplied had expired.
Payment was to be made in three instalments; 25% within 15 days of signature, 50% within 90 days of delivery, installation and commissioning as evidenced by a Document of Acceptance, and the final 25% only after the complete system had operated satisfactorily for two successive months. The Performance and Warranty Period Bonds would remain in force through this period, and the Warranty Period Bond also afterwards.
Step 4: Evaluation
The interinstitutional agreement between PCLGE, PCBS and the Ministry of Local Government provided for a Joint Procurement Committee (JPC), with three members from PCBS, two from PCLGE and one appointed by the EC. Before opening the replies to the tender, the JPC developed a set of standard evaluation criteria for all bids, scoring 50 points for the hardware and software offered (broken down between all the different items to be supplied), 12 points for the experience and support offered by the company, 18 points for provisions for delivery timetable, installation, documentation and training. The decision was taken to adopt the best technical solution offered as long as it met the criteria of the tender document and the price was within the agreed budget. It was also decided that following further technical consideration after the issue of the tender, the purchase of Oracle would be better made directly from an Oracle agent, and the element of each tender (including the price) relating to the supply of Oracle was therefore ignored.
Tenders were received from all nine short listed companies: two companies submitted two options each, making a total of eleven bids to be evaluated. The tenders were opened and initiated. Six of the eleven tenders were eliminated as not complying with the technical specifications issued.
There were several points of clarification required in relation to the remaining five tenders. A clarification form was accordingly issued in relation to each of the five apparently compliant tenders, with a one week deadline for its return. Following return of these forms, the JPC undertook the evaluation, scored each item of each tender, and placed the five tenders in order.
The negotiation of the final contract between the PNA and the successful tender followed. Minor amendments were made to the originally published payment schedule. More detailed provisions for regular preventative maintenance (to take place every two weeks), 24 hour emergency maintenance cover, the availability without cost of replacement equipment should the equipment supplied fail for more than 24 hours, and the guarantee provisions were agreed.
Step 5: Supply and installation
The contract was signed with the successful tender on 26 August 1995. While there were the inevitable small problems, the success of the system is probably best measured by the fact that electoral registration started on 12 November 1995, with the first registration forms arriving at the newly commissioned election computer at PCBS in the few days following: and that a register of over one million names was completed, printed, reviewed, amended and made available for use on polling day only ten weeks later on 20 January 1996.
Russia - The State Automated Elections SystemThe Central Electoral Commission of The Russian Federation
Introduction
In Russia, recent advances in democratization have created the need for a new approach to elections. Thus the Central Electoral Commission of The Russian Federation is seeking a modern approach to the running and organizing of elections.
The country's unique conditions, such as its huge territory, large number of time zones, uneven distribution of population,and various regions with differing levels of infrastructure and transport development have all influenced the search for a solution to the organization of elections.
There are at present 105 million voters in Russia. More than 90,000 voting centres are set up during elections, and over one million people take part in the organization and conducting of elections. As a result, the electoral commission faces many organizational and technological problems associated with the preparation and conduct of transparent democratic elections, as well as large financial costs. Of major importance is the preparation of voters lists, running the pre-electoral campaigns, processing and distributing the election results, and insuring transparency of elections. Complications which are unavoidable without the use of modern technology would lead to serious political and economic consequences.
The decree by the President of the Russian Federation to establish a State Automated System Elections was issued on August 23, 1994. From this date an intense development of new Russian election technologies and stage-by-stage implementation of a new electronic system has taken place. The first components of the System were used during the elections of deputies to the Russian State Duma on December 17, 1995.
In June 1996, during experimental exploitation of its first stage, the System was used to prepare and conduct the Presidential elections for more than 80 percent of the subjects of the Russian Federation. The System was used primarily to prepare voters lists and summarize the preliminary results of voting. However, it was effective during this period.
During the elections for heads of executive branches of power, deputies of legislative bodies, and local administrations (October-December 1996), the System was used in 75 (out of 89 total) subjects of the Russian Federation. The operational experience of the System in the subjects of the Russian Federation confirmed its efficiency, comprehensibility and adaptability for solving local specific problems, when new software products had been developed with consideration for specific local conditions and local legislation..
The State Programme of the Development of the State Automated System Elections took place from 1996 to 2000. At the time of writing, it was already implemented in 88 subjects of the Russian Federation, i.e. almost the total Russian territory. The scale of its usage and number of technical equipment and technological solutions rank it as the largest computer network in the country. From the point of view of its functional potential, software, and universal structural composition, it is considered the leading information and telecommunication system in Russia.
Possibilities and resources of the System
More than 6000 computers have been configured to form a single system. Out of these, 90 local networks have been created which, in turn, unify more than 300 automated workstations.
The System can provide verification of ballot validity, protect voting results from fraud, and display election results in all regions of the country in real-time mode. On the day of elections, the use of scanners allows the tallying of results of different types of voting with a delay of only 20-25 minutes.Then the intermediate results of voting can be transferred to the Central Electoral Commission as statistics, schemes, text, audio and visual information and, after processing, be promptly forwarded to the media.
In order to provide a high level of sustainability and versatility, various auxiliary components were built into the system. These auxiliary technologies and equipment compose a long list, ranging from various kinds of complex internal furnishing for voting places and centres, to technologies for high-quality printing production with a high level of fraud protection, electronic fingerprint identification devices (dactyloscopy) and ballot-counting equipment.
Between elections these resources are used primarily for:
Principles and characteristics of composition, maintenance
The System Elections has a multi-level hierarchical structure, in which automated equipment is linked via email into a single information network. Utilization of different communication channels (including digital and satellite channels) allows the System to operate in a real-time mode.
The first cycle of the System serves as a technical basis for computer networks at the four major levels: Central Electoral Commission, Electoral Commission of the Subjects of the Russian Federation, District Electoral Commission, and Regional Electoral Commission (see scheme 1).
The hierarchical structure of the System duplicates the organizational structure of Electoral Commissions:
Although local networks at lower levels have unified software and telecommunication bases, their characteristics and configuration differ from each other. For example, primary (low-level) networks for the Regional Electoral Commissions can be manufactured in six different models differing from each other in their terminal characteristics and number of printers, depending on the intensity of information flow and the number of voters in a region.
The Systems composition is based on the module principle, which allows the development of the System, without affecting the operation of its basic networks. This principle also allows the use of components of the network autonomously in certain areas for conducting different kinds of elections and serving other local needs.
Today, the System Elections is one of the largest information systems in Russia and provides reliable and sustainable electronic communication with the most distant regions of the country. It provides email services for more than 3000 clients in almost all cities and regional centres of the Russian Federation.
The System is operated and maintained by more than 3000 system administrators. Technical maintenance is supervised by 25 internationally certified technical consultants, who have permission from the government to work with the System. Twelve regional service centres provide training of personnel and maintenance of technical equipment.
The second cycle of the System Elections will include modernization and automatization of the Divisional Electoral Commissions. As a result of this work, the total number of local networks and terminals integrated into the System will reach 100,000 units. It is anticipated that the System "Elections" will be unified with other information systems in Russia, which are currently being developed through various federal development programmes.
Technical solutions
The communication system and data transformation project was developed in accordance with the current state of the Russian communication channels, using foreign and domestic technologies and equipment, and taking into consideration the specific administrative and territorial composition of the country, local geography, and a relatively low level of computer literacy among the population.
Major criteria for selecting technical and computer hardware were a high level of reliability during the exploitation period and the universality of its composition.
The local network is composed according to the Ethernet 802.3 and 802.12 technologies, which will also facilitate local video conferences. In addition, eight file-servers and three email servers are used. Standard Compaq computers, ProLiant and ProSignia servers, and DeskPro and ProLinea workstations were used as components of the System.
Using telecommunication channels, information about voting is collected in the Central Electoral Commission, thereafter it is processed by "Itogi" (Results) and Kartographia (Cartography) programming tools, and subsequently sent to the Elections Information Centre.
The Elections Information Centre uses the system of information display for prompt distribution of information about the process of elections and voting results.
The information display system is a combination of software and hardware unified into a local computing network. One of the elements of the system is a Toshiba videowall—a screen four metres in diagonal. The information display system allows the protection of a picture covering the whole screen, as well as different pictures only covering parts of the screen. Depending on specific tasks, it is possible to display information in poly-screen mode, i.e. to display information on a single segment of the screen or on four, nine or sixteen segments or to combine two pictures.
Data is transferred to the information display system through digital communication channels. This kind of hardware support provides maximum flexibility and dependability of the system with minimal supervising personnel. Transfer of sound, pictures and data in "video-conference" mode complies with the ISO Ethernet standards.
Technologies of data collection and processing
From the beginning of the voting procedure until the signing of final protocol by the Central Electoral Commission, the System Elections is used for monitoring the election process and receiving preliminary voting results by transferring data from subordinate Electoral Commissions to superior ones. The technology for data collection from subordinate Electoral Commissions includes:
Programme Complex Itogi (Results) allows information to be summed up and presented as tables, including subjects of the Russian Federation, Regional and District Electoral Commissions, and the percentage of processed bulletins compared with overall numbers.
Programme Complex Kartographia (Cartography) presents election results on in [CONFUSING] cartographic forms using colours, graphics and diagrams. After each session of data processing, slide series are produced. Using communication channels, tables and cartographic information are later transferred to the information display system.
High quality technology was used during the election of the President of the Russian Federation and the elections for the state authority bodies in 1996, when the State Automated System "Elections" was used for summarizing preliminary voting results.
System of communication and data transfer
A digital automated station and leased communication channels are used at the upper level of the System. They provide reliable voice communication and data transfer (19,2 Kb/sec) using "each-to-each" principle, and compose the departmental communication network of the Central Electoral Commission.
Introduction of new communication equipment and digital communication channels will speed up the data transfer up to 64 Kb. Implementation of a wide-line telephone and communication system with moving objects is also planned. At present, a half-duplex mode for data transfer and a duplex mode for telephone communication are used.
Direct telephone, facsimile, modem and teleconference communications are used by the upper level of the System for communicating with the Electoral Commissions. The System can interact with other networks, and is able to use additional number capacities of the Moscow City Telephone Network, non-state Russian networks Rosnet, Rospak and others.
During preparation and conduct of federal elections, all available channels of communication are used for data transfer, ranging from commuted telephone channels (switch-boards) to apportioned digital and satellite channels. Commuted telephone channels and regional and/or other local networks of data transfer are used at the lower level.
Data (information) protection
Information in the System is protected from unauthorized access by means of organizational and technical/software.
One of the Systems administrators in each section of the System has additional responsibilities for data protection. The System's administrators have software and hardware capabilities for data/information protection in each section. A routine for data/information protection from unauthorized access provides:
Software
The System software is composed of general and special software, which allows automated data collection, processing and analysis on all levels of the System.
General Software of the System Elections is composed of software for usual operation. General Software includes:
Special Software of the System Elections is a package of multi-functional programs developed in Russia. It provides solutions for a complexity of tasks of the System during elections, summarizing the voting results as well as being used between elections. The package consists of the following major software:
Scanners for voting bulletins
Scanners for voting bulletins is an optical electronic peripheral device for scanning and processing ballots in voting centres. They were first introduced and broadly used during the elections in the Russian Federation in 1996. During the election of the President in June 1996, scanners were used in 15 Moscow voting centres for the preliminary processing of ballots.
During the election of the Governor of St. Petersburg in the same year, the number of scanners used reached 60. For the elections to bodies of local self-governance of 600 Leningradskaya oblast and 10 in Saratov. It is expected that scanners will be one of the most important election technologies used in Russia.
They allow the automation of the following operations:
Utilization of special software in scanners allows for effective usage according to local conditions, especially in remote regions.
Saint LuciaInfrastructure considerations
Saint Lucia has good microwave, satellite, cable, television and Internet connections.
Equipment in unprotected areas can be subject to undesirable effects from heat, humidity and rust (because most large communities are near the sea and Saint Lucia lies in a hurricane-prone zone).
Main power is generally reliable in supply but subject to major fluctuations. For this reason voltage regulators protect the equipment. The IBM AS/400 mainframe computer is attached to an uninterrupted power source (UPS) with a one-hour electrical backup time, supported by two generators on a dedicated electrical circuit.
The PCs, dumb terminals and printers are maintained in-house but AS/400 repairs are supported from the neighbouring island of Barbados. The systems are all developed and maintained in-house. Except for back-ups, very little operator intervention is required. The infrastructure required to support and maintain our current and proposed equipment and systems is therefore quite good.
Technology acquisition
The decision to acquire our current equipment was made by a Steering Committee of four set up for that purpose. This Committee was given clear terms of reference and a three month deadline to produce reports on tenders received and a recommendation on the preferred equipment. Three possible suppliers were invited to tender and after extensive demonstrations and questioning one was recommended.
The choice of the IBM AS/400 system was determined by a number of factors:
a) It was clearly the most advanced mainframe of the three, since it was the only one whose architecture was specifically designed to support a relational database.
b) It was the only machine whose combination of vertical and horizontal machine interfaces ensured that it would not become obsolete for a very long time. That is, these interfaces render the underlying hardware of the AS/400 transparent to the user.
c) The operating system (OS/400) is sufficiently complex to obviate the need for Systems Programmers or highly trained operators.
d) The logical layout of the OS and the programming tools supplied made it easier to concentrate on WHAT to do rather than HOW to do it.
e) The system has excellent and easily implemented security features at various levels—from physical workstation location down through object and field levels.
f) The system compels object-oriented programming.
g) Many large organisations (such as General Motors, Citibank, etc.) have spent huge amounts of money to switch to this system and even Microsoft uses it to run its business.
Saint Lucia is forced to purchase their own hardware because there are no bureau services within the country. For security reasons, this would have been the case even if there where any bureau services. A policy of developing software in-house was adopted because this meant that trained people with a thorough understanding of the systems would easily be available. Also, this meant that it was possible to get an exact fit for the needs at that time and to maintain that fit as the requirements change. The transfer of technology this entails, as opposed to the "no-brainer" of merely running a package was also a factor in this decision.
The communications systems are direct twin-ax cabling and leased lines. The direct cabling is a feature of the specific machine and leased lines, rather than dial-up, were chosen for security and availability considerations. PCs are used for Internets, email, etc., and an IBM product, Client Access, is used to connect PC Local Area Networks to the AS/400 via direct twin axial cabling.
Minimizing the risks in using technology
The mainframe is housed in a special computer room within the computer centre. There are numbered keypads for access to both the computer centre and the computer room within it. These codes are regularly changed. A security guard is also posted at the entrance to the building. Physical security of workstations located at user sites other than in the computer centre is the responsibility of the various users.
Access to data is limited in several ways:
a) All classes of users can only sign in at their specific physical locations.
b) Passwords are required for all users and the system forces password changes on a regular (though variable) basis.
c) Upon signing-on, users get menus enabling them to perform certain tasks and some tasks are restricted to certain users. Users may not exit these menus.
d) All major objects (files, data areas, programs, etc.) on the system are accessed according to the users specific level of authorization to each object. These levels are read only, read/write, update and delete. While data entry and validation are on-line, all master file updates are run in batch after a log of the additions, changes (before and after images) and deletions has been produced for scrutiny by a supervisor.
e) Each individual command or program call indirectly issued by each user is monitored in that users job log.
The software code is contained in files and is secured in much way the same way as data. The AS/400 does not lend itself to infection by viruses, and all PC used in our Local Area Networks are protected by North and Macaffee anti/virus software. The reliability of registration data is clearly crucial. This data is mainly collected from birth certificates and certification by Justices of the Peace in the area in which the potential voter resides.
From time to time voter location checks are carried out and the names of voters who cannot be located are published in the press. This system is fairly reliable but the absence of a direct link with the Registry of Births and Deaths is a major existing deficiency. There is clearly a need for some sort of permanent identification number that will follow each person from birth to death. This number should not be meaningless (as the voter registration number now is) but should be based on date-of-birth, sex and any other relevant factors. Apart from its usefulness for voter registration maintenance, this number can be used throughout Saint Lucia for National Insurance, Drivers Licences, etc.
The SAVCHGOBJ (save changed objects) command is used to perform daily backups of all changed objects in the system. This is done on a grandfather, father, and son basis. In other words, one set of tapes are used to backup changed objects on Monday, a second (different) set on Tuesday and yet a third set on Wednesday. The Monday tapes are used again on Thursday and so on. In addition, monthly saves of the entire system are carried out. The system is not available if the AS/400 is down but, since this machine is so reliable (it has only been down once in nine years), this is not a major concern. However, it may be useful to create a simple data entry system on a PC to allow unvalidated data entry to proceed if the system is down. This data can then be uploaded and validated in batch when the system comes back up. There are plans to implement mirroring on the new AS/400 Model 170. The RAID (Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Disks) technology used by this model clearly lends itself to this approach.
The AS/400 hardware has its own diagnostics that warn of hardware problems both predicted and actual. It also provides the ANZPRB (Analyze Problem) procedure, which greatly facilitates dealing with any problems that may arise. This procedure takes a user step-by step through the process of identifying the problems, ascertaining their probable cause and taking the steps required to correct them. In addition, the System Arbiter, in combination with the Performance Tools package, continuously tunes the system by dynamically allocating storage, maximum activity, wait states, job time slice, etc. The problems that have arisen in the past have almost always been with third-party peripherals but the core system has been exceptionally reliable—even though it is never shut down.
Monitoring of and reporting on system communications is automatic. Because of the basically non-numeric nature of electoral data, only simple totals and changes to these totals can be directly tested by computer staff. The users carry out more comprehensive testing on a random basis.
The hardware is insured but there is no insurance against contingency loss.
The various political parties, and indeed the public at large, appear quite comfortable with the level of accuracy of the voters lists so public assurance measures are not an issue at the moment. All the information currently held in the Voter Registration System is essentially in the public domain, so the issue of privacy does not arise.
Using technology for voter registration
The Voter Registration System is used for recording eligibility for voting, prevention of impersonation, and planning for polling. The voter registration qualifications are uniform throughout the state. All voters must be registered and must be in possession of a Voter ID card. This is a laminated card carrying the following information: name; date of birth; nationality; address; sex; height; voter registration number; national insurance number; date of birth; date of registration; distinguishing marks (if any); and a colour photograph of the voter.
The Electoral Commission fixes a cut-off date for registration before each election. The information on the card (except the photo) is entered into the electoral register kept on a central AS/400 computer. Certain other information not appearing on the card is also collected and entered including occupation, constituency and polling district.
The computer system allows authorized persons to enter, change and delete information from the electoral register but keeps a record of the date and time of any changes and the user profile name of the person involved. The system produces lists of voters in alphabetical order within a polling district in the constituency. A similar list in registration number order is also produced. From time to time the electoral office carries out an ID confirmation exercise and publishes lists of people who are on the electoral register but cannot be located by the enumerators for their district. These people then have ninety days to present themselves to the enumerator to confirm their existence. Failing this, they are deleted from the register. Deletion does not involve the actual removal of the voter record from the computer system but merely means that the record is marked as deleted.
On Election Day, the voter registration lists are used by the polling clerks and the agents representing the various candidates, in conjunction with the ID cards, to determine voter eligibility. The ID cards, while required, do not by themselves necessarily confer the right to vote.
United StatesAlthough many countries are considering the adoption of Geographic Information Sytems (GIS) software for redistricting, and a few are very close to being able to use this software in an upcoming round of redistricting (Australia and Canada, for example, are well on their way to developing GIS capabilities for redistribution purposes), very few countries to date have actually used GIS software specifically for redistricting. New Zealand is an example of one country that employed GIS software for their last redistribution in 1998. The country with the longest experience using GIS software for redistricting purposes, however, is the United States.
Although the number of states in the United States that were employing computers for redistricting purposes had been steadily growing since 1970, two important changes led to the dramatic increase in the number of states that used computers for redistricting during the 1990s:
· the diffusion of affordable GIS software
· the introduction of a new computer database by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1990
Prior to 1990, most states used a low-tech approach to redistricting: staff and legislators, in stocking feet, used grease pencils to mark proposed district lines on acetate overlays over large census maps spread out on the floor. Adding machines or handheld calculators were used to aggregate the population counts of the census areas that were being combined to create proposed districts. If computers were used at all, they were used as giant adding machines.
By the 1990s round of redistricting, however, every state in the United States used computers for redistricting, and almost every state used GIS software for redistricting. The major reasons for this shift was the increasing availability of GIS software, some explicitly designed for redistricting purposes, and the advent of a computerised map base of the entire nation by the U.S. Census Bureau.
In the United States, the U.S. Census Bureau is required to conduct an enumeration of the population every ten years and to supply the states with this population data for redistricting purposes. States, as well as local entities such as counties and cities, are required to redraw legislative lines on the basis of this data prior to the first election after the census.
The redistricting data produced by the Census Bureau is referred to as PL 94-171 data. It includes population counts for several different levels of census geography—units as large as whole counties, and units as small as census blocks (usually the equivalent of one city block), are reported in PL 94-171. Although the Census Bureau collects data on a large number of population characteristics, only a few items are included in the data files sent to the states for redistricting. These items are total population, voting age population, and subtotals of the population for persons of Hispanic origin and for five major racial groups: white; black; Asian and Pacific Islander; American Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut; and "other" races. This data has been available in electronic format since the 1980 round of redistricting.
In addition to population counts of the entire country, the Census Bureau also maintained a master set of 26,000 maps of varying sizes and scales of the country. These maps were drawn by hand, and were often difficult to read and filled with errors. In preparation for the 1990 census, however, the Census Bureau created a computerised database of the entire country called TIGER (Topographically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing). The TIGER database depicts visible geographic features such as roads, rivers, and railroads; a whole hierarchy of census geographic units (for example, census blocks, block groups, and census tracts) for the collection and reporting of population data; the boundaries of administrative subdivisions such as counties, cities and towns; and political geography such as congressional districts and, in some cases, voting areas—referred to as election precincts in the United States. Maps produced from the TIGER database provided U.S. redistricters with uniform, digitised maps for the entire country for redistricting purposes in the 1990s.
As the TIGER files became available, GIS software was also increasing in availability. A number of commercial companies offered GIS software that was customised specifically for redistricting purposes. These GIS software packages were able to relate information on population demographics, taken from the census, and political data from previous elections to the computerised TIGER base maps showing geographic census units, election precincts, street networks, natural and built landscapes, other jurisdictions boundaries and other geographic features.
The implications of these new products was overwhelming for those involved in redistricting: affordable GIS software and a consistent nation-wide computerised database that included both census data and digitised maps was available for both those charged with the task of redistricting and for those simply interested in evaluating proposed plans and producing alternative plans.
One of the substantive results of this confluence of events was the active and informed participation of numerous interest groups that had previously been excluded from the redistricting process in the United States. The participation of civil rights groups, in particular, led to the adoption of redistricting plans in many states that gave minority groups much greater representation in the halls of government. For example, 24 new minority congressional —districts in which minority voters made up a majority of the voters—were created and more minorities elected to Congress than ever before. To create these districts within the tight population equality constraints imposed, however, a number of other districting values had to be compromised—in particular, the geographic compactness of these districts.
This case study illustrates some important points to be made about the use of GIS software for redistricting.
· The availability of electronic data and computerised maps makes the adoption of GIS software for redistricting a relatively simple task. Because the U.S. government provided the electronic data and computerised maps for the entire country—and at a very low price—redistricters were able to make use of GIS software without having to be concerned with creating an electronic database.
· Many public interest groups were also able to purchase the electronic data and GIS software because of the affordable price. These groups used the data and software to evaluate proposed redistricting plans and to create alternative plans. This information was used to hold the redistricters accountable and certainly had a democratising influence on the process in many instances. (Clearly, the increase in the number of minority districts drawn during the 1990s round of redistricting is directly attributable to the active monitoring of the process by minority and civil rights groups.)
Although there is potential for GIS software to "democratise" the redistricting process, this is possible only if the boundary authority is truly non-partisan or if all parties and interest groups interested in the redistricting process can gain access to the necessary data and technology. As computers and GIS software become more affordable, this is becoming less of a problem. But in many countries, the necessary hardware and software may still be prohibitively expensive to most groups. In addition, training on the use of GIS may be difficult to acquire. |
