Electoral Dispute Resolution

According to both, legal-electoral theory and political science, the “System for the Resolution of Electoral Disputes” refers to the system of appeals through which every electoral action or procedure can be legally challenged. Legal appeals related to electoral issues can be submitted before judicial or political agencies. Such a system aims at ensuring regular and completely legal elections. Legal elections depend on legal corrections of any mistake or unlawful electoral action. Therefore, the system’s aim is to ensure a real protection for and an effective enforcement of the political rights to elect or to be elected. To do so, the system ensures to all participants (political parties, citizens and candidates) that the voter’s decision will prevail. The system aids in the protection of certain values that support every electoral action and every electoral procedure as follows:

• Legality;
• Certainty;
• Objectivity;
• Impartiality;
• Authenticity;
• Clarity, and
• Justice.

The whole system is based on a capital principle: the judicial agents in charge of sorting out electoral controversies must be independent, impartial and proficient from a technical point of view in order to ensure constitutional resolutions.

The system for the resolution of electoral disputes in modern democracies is fundamental to build up stable political systems and to build up a regular legal system as well. The system’s contribution to protect fundamental rights and to strengthen the democratic governance of any country is evident.  

As a matter of fact, the judicial resolution of electoral disputes has become a fundamental feature of any electoral democracy, not only for those countries undergoing democratic transition and consolidation, but also for those countries whose democracies can be seen as both advanced and mature.

From a historical point of view, the initial trend within democratic constitutionalism to empower parliamentary electoral colleges in both Europe and America has been diverted: electoral controversies are now sorted out by judicial institutions.  

In Latin America for instance, the Uruguayan Electoral Court and the Chilean Electoral Qualifying Court were created in 1924 and 1925, respectively; in the decades following those years, especially during the second half and last quarter of the twentieth century under the so-called “third wave”, other countries in this region of the world, followed the Uruguayan and the Chilean examples. Mexico created the Federal Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch in 1996.

 In Europe, since 1879 the British system empowered a couple of judges of the King’s (currently Queen’s) Bench Division at the High Court of Justice to solve electoral disputes. In 1919, according to its own constitution, Austria provided the Court of Constitutional Justice with such powers. Besides, France empowered its Constitutional Council in 1958 and Spain, when civil rights where involved, empowered the Constitutional Tribunal in 1978 for this matter.

Indonesia empowered its Constitutional Court to sort out electoral disputes in 2003.

The relevance of electoral courts in charge of reviewing the constitutionality and legality of elections can be fully understood by mentioning some of their rulings:

In Mexico, elections aimed at electing governors (Tabasco in 2001 and Colima in 2003) were declared null and void, and historical fines were imposed upon national political parties (2003). The Argentinean Supreme Court of Justice nullified the primary elections of the Justicialista Party (2003). A ruling from the Electoral Tribunal of Paraguay adjusted the percentage and location of electronic voting machines to be used in general elections (2003). The electoral courts of Guatemala reviewed the presidential aspiration of Efraín Ríos Montt (2003), just as the electoral courts of Venezuela did in respect to the presidential referendum aimed at removing the President from office (2003-2004).

The United States Supreme Court of Justice played a decisive role at the 2000 presidential contest, which can also be recalled. In the same line of reasoning the Spanish courts in charge of sorting out electoral disputes, delivered important rulings such as declaring both illegal and unconstitutional those political parties apparently related to terrorist groups (2003). The role played by the Central Electoral Agency between March 11^th and the election day (2004) is also worth mentioning. The Supreme Court of Justice of the Russian Federation made a very important distinction between broadcasting general information and electoral advertisement (2003-2004).

The previous precedents fully prove the significant role for the democratic societies of the 21^st century played both by the electoral justice system and the protection of the fundamental right to legal elections

It can be said that judicial systems for electoral disputes resolution uphold many judicial principles established by the rule of law, such as the existence of independent and impartial judges or tribunals, legally empowered and in charge of reviewing legal appeals. Such principles are recognized by international rules aimed at protecting human rights, such as those contained in articles 2, section 3, paragraph a) and 14, section 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or  those contained in article 8, section 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

It must be said that even those countries that have not provided courts with electoral reviewing powers are nonetheless supposed to accomplish the aforementioned duties. Such is the case of Nicaragua and Dominican Republic where the electoral reviewing powers are vested in executive but independent agencies. It is also the case of Argentina, where some cases are sorted out by executive agencies and reviewed by political institutions.

Election Nullification

To guarantee the legality of the election and electoral procedures the law sets different causes for their nullification (this as a sanction for violating the law). In this section we are going to analyze only the nullification of electoral results, comparing between nullifying a vote, one election or the general elections (in electoral law, as in public law, the violation of a legal regulation does not produce the same effect, it depends on the consequence established for that sort of legal violation that can lead to nullity).

According to specific regulations in different Latin American countries, nullity can be pronounced only as a result of the exact causes prescribed by the law (for instance: Bolivia and El Salvador). Some systems grant certain discretionality to the revising electoral authority to declare nullity if they allow, for instance “to file an appeal and ask for the nullification of the election in reason of actions that have corrupted it”, provided that “the actions, flaws or irregularities… influence the general results of the election” (Uruguay), or after regulating in a declarative way the grounds for nullifying an election in a given voting station or voting site, among which it includes “any other action that can reasonably alter the outcome of the election” (Guatemala).

An election can be declared null when such an action can determine the election’s result or when it causes a clear harm (Chile, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela). The filing of an appeal does not suspend the effects of the challenged resolution or action. If no nullifying appeal is filed within the established deadlines, the corresponding resolution is definitive. It is important to mention that whenever doubt arises in Ecuador, the election’s validity will be taken for granted. All this rules are based on a legal principle according to which public orders and public actions that have been issued in a valid way have to be preserved. The Latin aphorism utile per inutile non vitiatur refers to such principle, which is not only particularly relevant for the Latin American electoral law, but has also been enforced by electoral courts in the region (Costa Rica and Mexico).

It is worth mentioning that, according to Latin American electoral laws, an election’s nullity cannot be demanded by whoever has provided the reasons to support it (Mexico and Paraguay). Such a rule is based on a legal principle according to which no one can benefit from his own clumsiness. Such principle is contained in the Latin expression nemo admittitur aut auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans.

a) Nullifying a single vote

All electoral laws that have been analyzed allow the nullification of single votes.

Broadly speaking, any vote that has been unlawfully issued will be nullified (Mexico). Many countries set down all the conditions that can produce the nullification of individual votes. Among such conditions we find some as follows: the use of unofficial or unsigned ballots; the use of ballots that have not been signed by the voting station’s officials (Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela); the partial destruction, mutilation, alteration or amendment of electoral ballots (Argentina, Peru and Venezuela); the inscription of marks in more than one name or one team in the ballot (Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela); the existence of more than two ballots containing different parties to elect one post (Argentina); the intention to enclose more than one ballot in a single envelope (Colombia) or to enclose a ballot completely different to those authorized (Bolivia); the inscription or the repetition of names which are different to those authorized to appear on the ballots (Argentina and Peru); the unintelligibility of ballots (Colombia); the inclusion of the word “null” (Bolivia); a candidate’s death, or the substitution of candidates which has not been done in time (Chile); the substitute candidate has not expressed his consent on time (Colombia); the voter fails to keep his vote’s confidentiality (Bolivia); and the voter signs the ballot or leaves any mark on it which can be used to identify him (Peru).

All the cases already mentioned are different from the case of unmarked ballots, which is known as the so-called blank vote. Such a difference might be relevant in those systems that oblige political parties to reach certain threshold to keep their registry, to access proportional representation, or to be entitled to receive public funds.

Even though in many countries voting sites have the sole power to evaluate and nullify an individual vote, without any restriction whatsoever, in some cases votes can be appealed when there is a serious doubt on the voter’s legitimacy and identity. Such appeals are solved by superior agencies (Argentina and Uruguay).

The nullification of individual votes refers to the votes issued by individual voters, and affect neither the rest of the votes received at the affected voting site, nor the general result obtained at that particular voting point. However, some electoral laws link a significant number of nullified votes to a potential election’s nullification. Such is the case when more nullified votes than valid ones are found at a voting site (El Salvador), when nullified votes represent more than half of a particular election (Brazil and El Salvador), or when two thirds of the votes received are either nullified or blank votes (Peru).

b) Nullifying votes received at a voting site

The reasons on which the votes received at a voting site can be nullified are separated into three different groups: irregularities committed during the integration of the voting site; irregularities committed during the voting process; and irregularities committed while counting the votes or drafting the voting site’s certificate.

i) Irregularities committed during the integration of a voting site: Broadly speaking, any voting site integrated in an unlawful way can be nullified (Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela). Unduly integrations of voting sites, which are derived from mistaken appointments of voting site members (Costa Rica, Mexico, and Chile), must be distinguished from those cases in which a voting site is installed in an unauthorized location and in an unjustified way (Brazil, Costa Rica, Peru, Mexico and Venezuela).

ii) Irregularities committed during the voting process: Among this kind of irregularities, we can find some as follows: the electoral registration of a voting site is forged, unauthorized or altered (Colombia and Ecuador); the names of the candidates have been mistakenly written down on the ballots (Colombia); the political parties’ symbols are mistakenly written down on the ballot (El Salvador and Chile, even though in the alter case, the nullification will be valid if such mistakes disoriented the voters or affected the result); the rightful voter was not allowed to vote (Mexico, as long as such a prohibition affects the final result, and Peru); voters not appearing on the voters’ registry do vote (Mexico, as long as such a prohibition affects the final result, and Paraguay); unidentified voters do vote (Brazil); multiple votes by a single voter have been authorized (Paraguay); political parties’ representatives are not allowed to observe the election (Brazil, as long as the affected party complains about such a situation, Mexico and Paraguay).

Besides, nullification will also be valid under the following circumstances: When members of a voting point have exerted any kind of pressure upon voters up to a point which drives voters to abstain, to vote against their will or to vote without legal formalities (Venezuela); when violence has been inflicted upon members of voting sites (Colombia, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela as long as such violence has altered the election’s result); when violence, pressure or menaces have been inflicted on voters (Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Paraguay, as well as El Salvador and Mexico, as long as such situation modifies the election’s result); when fraud, bribery, intimidation of any kind or violence to benefit some candidate has taken place (Chile and Peru); when violence has prevented free and pacific voting (Paraguay); when voting’s confidentiality has been breached (Brazil and Paraguay); when falsehood, frauds or pressure upon voters have taken place (Brazil and Chile); when electoral campaigning or voting have been undertaken illegally (Brazil); when some authority has used its power or has spent money to curtail voters’ freedom (Brazil); any other action which could have changed the electoral result in a reasonable way (Guatemala).

Other irregularities committed during the voting process can be recognized on situations as follows: when the election day is actually other than the one fixed by electoral authorities (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela); when voting sites are installed before seven o’clock in the morning and closed after five o’clock in the afternoon (Ecuador); when voting sites are installed in a schedule different to the one established by electoral authorities in an unjustified way (El Salvador); when a voting site is either installed later or closed before the fixed schedule in order to deprive voters from their legitimate right (Argentina); when voting starts after one o’clock in the afternoon in an unjustified way or when voters are not allowed to vote (Peru); when voting starts after two o’clock in the afternoon and less than fifty percent of voters vote (Panama); when voting is stopped before five o’clock in the afternoon (Brazil); when voting is carried out in a place different to the authorized one (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Venezuela); when votes are received by unauthorized persons (Mexico, Paraguay and Peru); and when serious irregularities affect the election’s clarity and have determined the final result (Mexico).

iii) Irregularities committed while counting the votes: Latin American electoral laws establish different grounds to nullify the counting of votes. Some of those grounds can be described as follows: to undertake the counting in a non-authorized place (Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama and Paraguay). In some countries (Colombia and Mexico) the counting can be carried out elsewhere as long as it is justified to do so. In Chile, such situation can be considered as a fraud. Counting can also be nullified when violence has been exerted upon members of voting sites as long as such violence has affected the election’s result (Venezuela); when it has been performed in a malicious way to help one or more candidates in order to change the election’s result (Mexico); when there is a difference of five or more between the number of voters and the numbers of envelopes used (Argentina); when the actual number of voters is higher than the number of registered ones (Colombia); when there are more nullified votes than valid ones (El Salvador); when the number of electoral ballots that have been used is higher than the number of registered voters at the electoral board (El Salvador), when the electoral counting has been mistakenly done (Colombia and Peru);  when the wrong counting is derived from wrongdoings (Chile), from arithmetic mistakes or from plain alterations (Colombia, Mexico and Panama).

Likewise, electoral counting can be nullified when electoral acts are either filled up or signed by unauthorized individuals, (Bolivia and Panama); when unauthorized formats have been used (Bolivia and Ecuador); when such formats are modified or falsified (Panama and Paraguay); when electoral documents have been destroyed or cannot be found (Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay); when signatures of the president, the secretary or at least three juries are missing (such are the cases in Bolivia and Ecuador. However, in Bolivia fingerprints are admitted as substitutes); when the president’s signature is missing (Argentina), and when the so-called electoral bag has been violated (Guatemala). Likewise, electoral counting can be nullified when electoral materials are not delivered in time (Colombia and Mexico) or when the counting memo has not been delivered in time (Chile).

In many countries, electoral counting is seen as an activity that is performed once and for all, which means that in many countries it cannot be repeated (Bolivia and Peru). However, in some places a new counting can be done legally. Such is the case of Mexico where a new counting must be performed by district councils when results written down in the scrutiny act of the voting site do not match those written in that same voting site’s file, when the scrutiny act contains clear mistakes or alterations, or when neither a file nor memo can be found regarding one voting site.

Besides, it is very important to bear in mind the effects that nullifying the electoral counting can bring about. First, the nullification of the electoral results from a single voting site  only affects such an election, i.e., it does not affect other electoral results or the electoral process as a whole. To nullify an election brings about the exclusion of all votes gathered by in the voting site from the global counting of the election as a whole. However, it is possible to imagine that nullifying the counting of several voting sites can affect the election as a whole. According to all analyzed electoral laws, new elections have to be organized if the final result is changed as a consequence of nullifying the counting of different voting sites.

Some electoral laws express such a command in negative terms, saying that new elections will not be organized if the final result is not affected in a dramatic way once the nullifications have taken place (Uruguay and Venezuela). Other countries express such a command in positive terms, saying that new elections must be organized when the final result can be modified in a dramatic way (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama) or when changes can be enough to determine whether a political party’s registry is still valid or not (Panama).

Usually, there are certain symptoms suggesting that new elections are necessary once the counting of voting sites has been nullified. If the nullified counting affects more than a half of all voting sites (Argentina and Guatemala), new elections are needed. If the nullified counting affects more than a half of all votes (Brazil) or at least one third of the national valid votes (Peru). In Mexico, nullification thresholds are lower because congressional elections can be nullified when the counting of at least 20% of the voting sites (for deputies) or at least 20% of the corresponding federal entities have been nullified.  Such is also the case in Paraguay (20% of voting sites).

While some countries partially authorize new elections to be undertaken just in the voting sites that have been nullified or have not been installed (Chile, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela), others authorize new elections to take place in both the whole electoral districts or states (Mexico).

There is a difference between the nullification of a whole election as a result of nullifying the results of voting sites, and the nullification of the electoral results of voting sites that do not affect the election as a whole. The latter can have, however, some effects such as counting adjustments (which can alter the number of congressmen elected by proportional representation). As a matter of fact, in Mexico the nullification of a voting site results can even produce a winner’s declaration of a congressional race to be revoked. In such a case, a new declaration will be issued and then delivered to the new winners.

In Colombia, the votes obtained by a particular candidate must be nullified when relatives of a candidate up to the second grade have worked in the voting site. In such a case, electoral results are nullified only in respect to the candidate whose relatives committed such a wrongdoing.

Finally, it is important to notice that some countries empower electoral authorities to order thorough evaluations of the reasons on which a nullification of a particular election can be based (Argentina, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Dominican Republic). In Mexico, such power is reserved to electoral courts and must be used once many voting site’s individual cases of nullification have been accumulated and can support the nullification of an entire congressional election. In Mexico, such power can also be used to nullify an entire congressional election when fundamental violations, which can change the final result, have taken place once and again during the election day. Such power is based on public interest considerations (which is more important than the interest defended by contesting parties). Since electoral issues are basically oriented by public interest considerations, electoral authorities are in charge of its protection. Public interest is also known as law’s interest, which means that every single electoral action, and every single electoral process, has to be both legal and constitutional. As a matter of fact, some Mexican electoral authorities are even empowered to complete insufficient appeals from both a formal and an argumentative point of view.

A ground rule in the majority of Latin American countries can be put as follows: judicial resolutions must me derived from the reasons supporting the appeal and the defense. No judicial resolution is authorized to analyze more reasons to nullify an election than those drawn by whoever filed the appeal. A basic principle of the rule of law demands from judges to decide legal issues based on the so-called legal principles, and one of such principles prohibits judges to proceed on their own (Ne procedat judex ex officio); another principle prohibits to resolve procedures which have not been started off by an agent who is authorized to ignite the judicial process (Nemo judex sine actore). Other principles prohibit judges and rulings to go beyond the issues contained in the case’s file (Ne eat judex ultra petita partium y Sentencia debet ese conforms libellum).

c) Nullifying an election

In Latin America elections can be nullified on three grounds: the election has been modified as a direct consequence of nullifying the electoral results of many voting sites; at least a candidate is not subject to be elected; and the election was not legally undertaken.

i) The election has been modified as a direct consequence of nullifying the electoral results of many voting sites: As mentioned above, there is a difference between those cases in which the nullification of an election affects more than a half of all voting sites (Argentina and Guatemala), those cases in which more than a half of all votes are nullified (Brazil), those cases in which a third of the valid national election is nullified (Peru), and those cases in which the votes are nullified in at least 20% of either all voting sites or federal entities (Mexico and Paraguay).

ii) Candidates are not subject to be elected: Almost all Latin American electoral laws authorize an election to be nullified when running candidates are not legally qualified to run (Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela) or when a candidate has faked the fulfillment of the legal conditions required to be elected (Nicaragua and Venezuela).

iii) The election was not legally undertaken: In Panama, the use of violence against voters or the exertion of pressure upon them is against the law. Such violations, which infringe fundamental rights, can be seen as groundings for the nullification of electoral results. In Mexico, permanent wrongdoings committed in a district or in a state, which can modify the general electoral result, and committed during the election day can be used to ground the nullification of electoral results. In Uruguay, any action which has harmed the election, can ground the nullification as long as such harm may change the entire result. In both Paraguay and Honduras, elections can be nullified when votes are counted in a mistakenly, maliciously or violent way. In Venezuela, fraud and bribery are also considered as reasons to nullify an election, while in Peru, serious irregularities which, according to an authorized judicial authority can modify an election’s result, do have a similar effect.

Brewer-Carías has warned us that the reasons previously analyzed are based on many legal and undefined concepts (such as “required guarantees”, “substantial violations”, “malicious actions which have harmed the election”, “generalized distortion of electoral counting”, “serious irregularities”), which do not support a judicial discretional activity (seen as a power to resolve in a free and prudential way, whatever is more convenient), but an electoral judicial activity based on good judgment (seen as the way in which judges solve legal controversies evaluating all the circumstances around the case under the law). Judicial activity based on good judgment requires a technical application of the so-called legal and undefined concepts, which require from judges a precise application of legal conditions, a legal evaluation of the case in face of such a condition, and the use of evidence which has to be in line with the legal condition aims to support the resolution.

As mentioned above, the nullification of an election by relative majority brings about the undertaking of a new election. On the contrary, the nullification of an election by proportional representation does not arise a new election. In Mexico for instance, if a candidate does not fulfill the legal requirements to be elected, the election’s nullification will only affect him and the next candidate in line will replace him.

d) General nullification of elections

Few countries authorize a general nullification to take place. If that is so, though, a new election will be undertaken. As a matter a fact, some countries explicitly prohibit that scenario (in Bolivia, for instance, neither general nor municipal elections can be nullified on any grounds; such a prohibition is based on principles such as filing appeals within deadlines and validating every single vote).

Some countries authorize a general nullification of elections when the electoral summoning was not issued by an unauthorized agency (Panama and Venezuela), or when the election day is different to the one officially set by the law (El Salvador). In Panama, general nullification is authorized when violent acts or pressure exerted upon voters have changed the final result. In that country a similar effect will be produced by a violation of legal formalities to undertake elections.

Finally, for the great majority of Latin American electoral laws, filing a nullification appeal have both a public and a free nature. Peru is the only exception to this rule. There, the plaintiff has to deposit one hundred thousand soles at the Nation’s National Bank in order to file the appeal.  Such a deposit will be reimbursed to the plaintiff if the appeal is successful.

Different Systems

The electoral laws around the law establish different systems for the resolution of electoral disputes.  Such diverse systems can be classified according to the nature of the top institution in charge of undertaking the legal revision of electoral actions and electoral procedures alike.

Therefore, we can distinguish different systems as follows:

• Systems for the resolution of electoral disputes which are based on a system of judicial appeals (which can be used to challenge the planning, the undertaking and the results of both legislative and presidential elections);
• Systems for the resolution of electoral disputes which are carried out by political institutions (congresses or representatives which can undertake their duties by reviewing whether the elected officials’ history can be considered legal or not, and by ruling over electoral appeals), and
• Those which can be seen as alternative systems of resolution of electoral disputes.

Therefore, based on the methods and institutions established by modern electoral legislations, there are two distinguishable models of resolution of electoral disputes: political systems are those carried out by political assemblies, and judicial systems are those carried out by judicial institutions. Besides, there are alternative systems for the resolution of electoral disputes that have been usually adopted by emergent democracies. Such systems involve the intervention of international agencies empower to solve electoral disputes.  

The judicial systems can be also be distinguished from each other. To do so, the criteria is based on the nature of the Court empowered to sort out electoral disputes brought before it. There are, thus, systems in which ordinary courts (i.e. the judicial Branch of government) review electoral disputes. In some other places, specialized tribunals (external or internal to the Judicial Branch of Government) undertake such a responsibility (such is the case of so-called electoral courts or tribunals prevailing in Latin America). Finally, there are some places in which constitutional courts are empowered to sort out electoral disputes. Anyway, it is important to mention that the idea of vesting the powers to sort out electoral disputes in non-ordinary courts is aimed at preventing ordinary judges from getting involved in political disputes or being subject to political parties’ pressure as well.

Electoral Judicial Review must be generally seen as composed by the legal disputes derived from electoral actions or resolutions taken by executive officials. Such disputes are brought by two contesting parties before a court or before a tribunal that is empowered to act as a referee in order to sort out such disputes in an imperative and impartial way.

As it has been mentioned, there is a clear trend aimed at setting down different systems of judicial review on elections. Such systems can be distinguished according to the nature of the court that is empowered to sort them out. Electoral disputes can be brought before ordinary judges (as is the case for Canada and Great Britain); before an specialized area within the Judicial Branch of Government (as is the case for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela); before specialized and independent courts (as is the prevailing case for so-called electoral courts in Latin America); or before constitutional courts (as is the case for Austria).

Legislative Model

According to some legislations that have not followed the dominating trend towards a full judicialization of electoral processes (which demands that electoral disputes must be sorted out by an impartial referee), either Congresses or elected legislators are empowered to validate the contested election. In France, such faculties are known with many different names such as “power verification”, “election qualification” or “certification”. In Mexico, such empowerment was erroneously known as “self-qualification”. The verification of powers, also known as election qualification refers to the examination of the legality and validity of a certain election, which starts without any appeal whatsoever. Such verification is aimed at reviewing the electoral results and whether the elected candidate fulfills all eligibility requirements to be legally elected or not. Besides, such verification must be distinguished from the appeal used to challenge any unlawful activity performed during elections.

There is a historical argument behind the legislative model based on the principle of checks and balances, which can also help us distinguish that model from the judicial one. According to such principle whereby all branches of government must be seen as independent from each other, no branch of government can intervene in the integration of the others. Bearing this in mind, the argument runs as follows. Since the legislative branch has to be independent, it must be protected from any kind of intervention of the executive. Likewise, the aforementioned principle aims at preventing any kind of damage against the judicial branch, which has to be kept outside the political arena. The objective of the judicial branch is to sort out all legal disputes submitted before it by means of its technical skills.

Such is the classic political model. However, we can find a judicial perspective at the origin of British parliamentarianism. Electoral appeals in the fifteenth century under Henry the Fourth of Lancaster were sorted out by the Chancery (which can be seen at the origin of the equity courts). The Chancellor was a high ranking officer of the Crown and was the King’s Counselor. Eventually, the Chancery’s Courts had the power to modify electoral counting. However, in 1604, the Parliament nullified an electoral ruling issued by the Chancery tribunals (in doing so, the Parliament ignored King Jacob the First’s inconformity), thus establishing a precedent according to which members of Parliament were empowered to judge their own elections. Such powers were valid until a legal reform came into force in 1868.

In the meanwhile France adopted the system for verification of powers vested in a political assembly. Such system ruled in that country from the general states (in the eighteenth century) to the fifth republic’s Constitution in 1958. The United States framed the Federal Constitution in 1787, which empowered political institutions to sort out electoral disputes. Such a regime was adopted by many emergent democracies at both the nineteenth and twentieth century. During those centuries, Latin American countries adopted the political system from the Cadiz Constitution’s model. The Mexican Constitutional Laws of 1836 and the Colombian Constitution of 1886 were the only cases in which the Cadiz Constitution’s model was not adopted. Mexican Laws provided the so-called Supreme Conservative Power with the faculty of sorting out electoral disputes. On the other hand, the Colombian Constitution vested such power in counting judges.

Nowadays, there are almost no systems with an exclusively political model for the resolution of electoral disputes. As a matter of fact, even those countries that have preserved features of a traditional political control system, have also allowed different kinds of judicial intervention to take place, either ex-ante or ex-post. Such addition has turned them into mixed systems.

Among those mixed systems we can consider that of the United States. Federal elections in the United States, which are regulated and organized by state authorities, usually set down a system of legal appeals submitted to ordinary courts (in some cases specialized) which are reviewed by a political institution such as the House of Representatives (if a Representative’s election is at stake), the United States Senate (if a senator’s election is at stake) or the Electoral College (if the presidential election is at stake).

A similar design rules in Italy and Switzerland. On the one hand, article 66 of the Italian Constitution of 1948 establishes that both the House of Representatives and the Senate are empowered to judge not only on the “admission titles of their members”, but also on the reasons by which an unlawful election might happen. All complaints derived from executive orders are sorted out by the National Electoral Central Office which has the faculty to organize elections. On the other hand, once the counties’ governments have finished both the electoral counting and the result’s verification, the Swiss Federation empowers the National Council and the States’ Council to sort out the elections of their members in a definitive way.

Regarding legal challenges against legislative and presidential elections, Argentina is another example of a mixed political-executive system for the resolution of electoral disputes. There, once the national electoral boards (which can be seen mainly as executive agencies composed by judicial officers) have ruled on the electoral results, a political institution is empowered to review their work. The Constitutional amendment of 1994 empowered the Congress to rule on the direct elections of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. The congressional elections are reviewed by both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, which in those cases are turned into “electoral courts for the validity of the rights and titles of their members”. The rulings issued by those institutions cannot be further challenged.

Moreover, some Central European and Eastern European countries, such as Hungary, have preserved the self-qualification system, in spite of recent and sensitive political changes from socialism to democracy undertaken by them.

Judicial Court Model

The model of ordinary justice, also known as the English model, provides ordinary judges of the Judicial Branch with the power to resolve electoral disputes. Sometimes, ordinary judges resolve the disputes submitted to them. However, some other times, ordinary judges can also review electoral rulings issued by other institutions.

In 1868 a Parliamentary Act was enacted, aimed at preventing the abusive resolutions from the House of Commons, and was then modified in 1879. Such Act empowered two judges from the King’s (Queen’s) Bench Division of the High Court of Justice to judge on electoral disputes. The House of Commons came to terms with the ruling of the appointed judges.  

This model is based on the independence of the judiciary. The basic principles of the judicial independence can be found not only in some parliamentary acts, but also in several international instruments such as: The Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well.  

As in England, this is the system prevailing in Canada where the ordinary jurisdiction is in charge of solving electoral disputes. The electoral authority of the judiciary is combined with the functions of Elections Canada and the corresponding Commissioner of Canada Elections in organizing the elections.

Those who support the judicial model consider that the task of judging and qualifying elections has a judicial nature, and as such, it must be done by a judicial authority. This, in order to guarantee the authenticity, regularity and validity of the election, preventing the officials in charge of organizing the election from acting as the qualifying authority as well. The risk becomes clearer if most of the officials carry out their duties according to political and party interests, ignoring law and justice considerations. From the perspective of the rule of law, the convenience of such an exclusive political control results somewhat dubious.

Electoral Tribunal Model

The characteristic feature of the Latin American model of electoral tribunals is the establishment of specialized electoral tribunals (courts, juries, boards or councils) in charge of solving disputes on electoral results. The nature of these tribunals can be either judicial or executive and they can function as higher or lower courts. This can be considered as a major Latin American contribution to political science and electoral law as an important condition of recent democratic processes in this region, and it validates as well the rule of law and the dispute resolution through legal bodies.

The jurisdiction to solve electoral disputes granted to these specialized Latin American electoral tribunals (courts, juries, boards or councils), which in some cases have autonomy with similar powers than the judiciary, has fulfilled the need of guarding the judicial nature of qualifying the election. In this way, resolutions are made in accordance with constitutional and legal principles, and without exposing neither the judiciary nor the Supreme Court to frequent criticism at their response to political or party interests. This competence has been extracted from political assemblies whose members were not impartial, allowing their political interest to influence their resolutions.

During the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the following one, electoral systems for dispute resolution in Latin America were politicized. In contrast, in the last seventy years we can gradually find in the region those specialized electoral tribunals (courts, juries, boards or councils) in charge of solving electoral disputes, and in some cases even in charge of organizing the election. These electoral authorities have an executive or judicial nature (some of them are independent and others are part of the judiciary or executive power). Two early examples of this model are the Electoral Court of Uruguay, which was first introduced in the law in 1924, and the Qualifying Tribunal of Elections in Chile included in the Constitution since 1925.   

The gradual establishment of these specialized electoral tribunals (courts, juries, boards or councils) in the region comes after the politicized system of conflict resolution. They are firstly introduced –generally and taking into account that each country has its own history–by means of an administrative electoral organ prescribed by law and with a temporal character. This organ is made up by representatives of the political parties and the executive power. The next step entails awarding these organs a constitutional level and granting them protection to guarantee their autonomy and impartiality (political parties are less present and in contrast citizens participate more in their integration; qualified majorities are also required in the organ that finally designates its members). Most of the time, such a transformation also implies that these models of electoral authority become permanent, specialized and aimed at solving conflicts (yet keeping administrative powers or establishing parallel electoral authorities, some of them in the judiciary).    

Autonomous

The autonomous tribunals are specialized organs prescribed by the Constitution that are not part of any of the three branches of power.

The fact that tribunals are not included neither in the judiciary nor into the executive power, does not exclude them from the judicial review that guarantees a fair trial. On the contrary, the removal of the traditional powers, especially those elected by the voters, guarantee their independence in the resolution of electoral disputes and the qualification of the election.

The existence of an autonomous electoral tribunal is a huge step forward for those countries where the powers themselves were in charge of qualifying the lawfulness of their own elections.This is the first step to overcome the traditional model of conflict resolution based on political debate and become a new judicial system of dispute resolution based on legal procedures.

Autonomy can also be the following step after the integration to the judiciary. If that is the case, autonomy is beneficial if it is required by circumstances,, provided that it does not affect the principles of the jurisdictional process. Thus, one of the benefits would be to prevent the judiciary from interfering in political matters.

In Latin America, judicial agencies are established in sixteen out of the eighteen continental countries. Nine of those sixteen electoral courts are autonomous (Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay).

Part of the Judiciary

The electoral tribunals that belong to the judiciary power are judicial institutions specialized in electoral issues and ruled by a due process of law considerations.

However, such tribunals can be independent from any superior court. In Mexico for instance, not even the Supreme Court of Justice has powers to undertake further revisions of the electoral tribunal’s rulings. Therefore, ordinary courts must not interfere in electoral disputes.

The judiciary’s authorization to solve electoral disputes derives from a clear aspiration: electoral disputes have to be solved from a procedural approach, which sticks with a commitment regarding binding, universal and fundamental principles.

Any tribunal located within the judiciary is vested with more powers than any tribunal that is not. Belonging to the judiciary power provides any tribunal with a higher degree of efficacy, which makes it more reliable.

Therefore, once a tribunal that belongs to the judiciary is empowered to solve electoral disputes in an independent, autonomous, impartial and professional way, it ensures authentic, free and legal elections, and this is also the way in which a legitimate and democratic integration of government must be achieved. Bearing this in mind, two different kinds of judicial principles can be distinguished. Firstly, we have the so-called organic principles, which are those related to both the Tribunal itself and the officials working there. Secondly, we have the procedural principles which are related to the electoral jurisdiction.

Constitutional Courts Model

The so-called Austrian model is characterized by the existence of a constitutional tribunal empowered to solve judicial appeals in a definitive way. Sometimes, the Austrian system is combined with appeal systems either political or judicial, which sort out appeals ex ante.The Austrian model empowers a Constitutional Court to sort out electoral disputes.

Many European Constitutions framed after World War One followed the model used to frame the Weimar Constitution (1919) and the Austrian Constitution (1920) and empowered constitutional courts to solve electoral disputes.

As a matter of fact, the Austrian Constitution empowered the Constitutional Court to verify the elections of representative institutions at both the National Council and every single Land. The powers vested in the Constitutional Court have been extended in order to validate other democratic events (such as referendum, since 1929, and presidential elections, since 1931).

Both France in 1958 and Spain in 1978 empowered the Constitutional Council and the Constitutional Court to solve all the disputes derived from parliamentary elections in a definitive way. Besides, France empowered the Constitutional Council to solve appeals derived from presidential elections in a combined system which authorizes administrative courts to solve electoral disputes in a preliminary way. It must be said that Spain does not recognize any jurisdiction as independent from the judiciary power to solve electoral disputes.

Germany provides a clear example of organization in which a political system and a judicial one are combined to solve electoral disputes. In Germany the Constitutional Court can review the parliamentary validation made on elections.

It is also worth mentioning that many Central and Eastern European countries, such as Romania, have empowered Constitutional Courts to sort out electoral disputes.

Alternative Dispute Resolution

The alternative models for the resolution of electoral disputes are structured in both a temporal and alternative way. The existence of alternative models implies the existence of an ordinary one which is not working, an ordinary one which is not producing the expected results.

Usually, an alternative model for the resolution of electoral disputes is integrated by special agencies composed by experts and endorsed by international agencies under the United Nations jurisdiction.

Under such circumstances those in charge of solving electoral disputes have to take into account the legal and political customs from every single region. However, we must not ignore, neither the due process of law considerations, nor the democratic principles such as individual rights to free and fair elections.

Alternative models for the resolution of electoral disputes have been successfully implemented in Cambodia, Bosnia and South Africa.

Appeals and Other Challenging Means

The analysis of every single electoral appeal is a complex task. Such a state of affairs is derived from the confusion that prevails not only in legislation but also in the academic arena in respect of it (many times for instance, a clear differentiation between a mere appeal and a complete trial is not made). Besides the fact that the naming process for all reviews and appeals is both anarchic and inaccurate (there are several examples which can be used to explain such an anarchic situation: sometimes appeals used to solve similar disputes have different names, some other appeals do not have a name, the expression used in some countries to refer to an “administrative review” is used in other countries to designate a judicial process). Electoral appeals find in the vague regulation applied to them another conceptual weakness, just as the one derived from the fact that many aspects of such appeals are regulated by different electoral or procedural legislations.

According to many opinions, electoral appeals are legal instruments which have to be used under the law to correct, modify, revoke or nullify executive orders or judicial resolutions that are deficient, mistaken or illegal.

Among the main characteristics distinguishing electoral appeals, we can find some as follows:

1. Classes

Broadly speaking, electoral appeals can be grouped within two different classes: administrative appeals and judicial appeals. In order to avoid the anarchic situation, which we have already referred to, we will use formal criteria in what follows. According to such criteria, both ruling agency nature and denomination will be used to determine whether each single appeal is administrative or judicial.

a) Administrative

Administrative appeals are all legal instruments that can be used by an administrative agency in order to solve electoral appeals filed by political parties, candidates and citizens against executive orders issued by electoral authorities. Administrative appeals are solved either by the same authority or by a superior one.

Many countries authorize administrative agencies to solve all the appeals filed against their decisions (the National Registrar for the Civil State in Colombia in charge of issuing of revoking citizenship cards is an example just as the Electoral Supreme Council of Nicaragua can do in respect to the appeals filed against its electoral counting). Some other countries authorize a superior authority to solve the reviews filed against the orders issued by administrative agencies. Such is the case of the General Director of the Registrar for Citizens in Colombia who can review the orders issued by other departments under the General director’s command. Such is also the case for the counting commissions of Colombia, which can review the appeals filed against the actions made by voting juries. Such is also the case in Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute, where a superior official can review orders issued by the Executive Secretary or by local or district offices.

b) Judicial

Judicial appeals on electoral issues are procedural instruments used under the law to file before a court any appeal aimed at challenging a deficient, mistaken or illegal order issued by an electoral authority.

Judicial appeals can be divided into three groups: procedural remedies, procedural reviews and appealing processes.

i) Procedural remedies: Legal instruments aimed at correcting judicial resolutions, which are filed before the judicial authority that issued such a challenged resolution. A typical procedural remedy is the clarification of a judicial opinion. Article 78 of the Internal Regulation of the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Power in Mexico, empowers such Tribunal’s courts to either clarify a concept within the opinion or to provide a precise explanation on the resolution’s effects, whenever such a clarification does not imply a substantial alteration of the resolution. In a very similar way, the Tribunal in charge of qualifying the elections in Chile, and the Electoral Tribunal of Panama are empowered to clarify their resolutions. The Electoral Tribunal of Guatemala can also do so, whenever someone asks it to clarify a resolution that is hermetic, contradictory or not clear.  

ii) Procedural reviews: Appeals that can be filed within a procedure, usually before a superior court, against both procedural and definitive violations derived from a judicial opinion. Procedural reviews are the most important group of judicial appeals. They can be filed within a trial or just after its conclusion. According to the prevailing doctrine, procedural reviews can be divided into three separated groups: ordinary reviews, extraordinary reviews and exceptional reviews.

- Ordinary reviews: The classic ordinary review, which has a universal aspiration, is the simple known as “appeal”. Through an appeal, a superior court that is usually a collegiate one, reviews the decision made by an inferior one. The superior court reviews all the files as well as all procedural and non-procedural wrongdoings in order to uphold, modify or revoke the challenged resolution. In doing so, the superior court can issue a substitutive ruling or a direct order to the inferior court which has to issue a new, valid and legal resolution.

Some examples within this group are listed as follows: the appeals filed against electoral judges and electoral boards which are solved by the National Electoral Chamber of Argentina; the appeals filed against electoral departmental courts which are solved by the Electoral National Court of Bolivia; the appeals filed against criminal judges’ resolutions on the denial of electoral registration or electoral exclusion which are solved by the Chilean Court of Appeals; the appeals filed against the local juries for elections, which are solved by the National Jury for Elections of Peru; and the appeals filed against the electoral boards’ resolutions which are solved by the Electoral Court of Uruguay.

- Extraordinary Reviews: Extraordinary reviews are those that can only be filed on grounds that are authorized by procedural laws. Such reviews aim at determining whether a particular procedure or a judicial resolution has been legal or not. Extraordinary reviews aim at challenging the legal reasons supporting the contested resolution.

There are many examples of countries in which extraordinary reviews are used. One of them is the so-called reconsideration review filed against the regional courts’ resolutions and which are solved by the Superior Court of the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Power of Mexico. The reconsideration review is used to challenge the judicial resolutions already made on trials filed against the results of elections of both deputies and senators. Such trials’ lawsuits are only admitted when the final resolution can actually modify an election’s result.

Those countries in which the unconstitutionality of electoral courts’ resolutions can be appealed before a Supreme Court of Justice, as it is the case in Argentina, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Panama and Paraguay, provide other examples. The appeals filed before the Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia and the so-called constitutional electoral review filed before the Electoral Tribunal of Mexico to challenge the unconstitutionality of local electoral authorities’ orders can also be located within this group.

- Exceptional Reviews: Exceptional reviews are those that can be filed to solve quite complicated cases. Such reviews are filed against definitive rulings after new and previously unknown circumstances that can nullify the reasons supporting such a definitive ruling do appear. Article 148 of the Costa Rican Electoral Code provides us with an example of an exceptional review as follows: “An election which has been already declared as a valid one can be challenged nonetheless if new grounds showing the winner’s inability to stay in Office appear”. Article 228 of the Venezuelan Voting Act seems to endorse an exceptional review as well. According to such an article a nullification appeal can be filed at anytime on grounds of the winner’s inability to stay in office or whenever fraudulent actions, bribery or violence during the electoral registration, the elections or the electoral counting have taken place. The appeal will be admitted when from such circumstances or wrongdoings a change in the electoral result can be predicted.

iii) Appealing Procedures: Appealing procedures are legal instruments used to set off a new trial in which the resolution taken in a previous one will be reviewed. The main difference between appealing procedures and procedural reviews can be explained as follows: whereas a procedural review can be seen as an extension of an already existent trial, an appealing procedure is a whole new one. As a matter of fact appealing procedures are derived from the challenge filed against the resolution made in previous executive procedure.

The lawsuits that can be filed against executive orders related to electoral results issued by the Argentinean National Electoral Council are as worth mentioning as the lawsuits that can be filed before the Fifth Section of the Chamber for Administrative Litigation of the Colombian State Council. Other important cases are the so-called “voter lawsuit” in Argentina or mandato de segurança in Brazil, which can be filed against every action aimed at curtailing the constitutional right to vote. The Argentinean lawsuit can be filed before the closest magistrate. The Brazilian lawsuit can be filed before an electoral judge, a regional electoral court or the Electoral Supreme Court. It is also worth mentioning the Chilean case where an appeal can be filed before the Electoral Qualifying Court against the final resolutions made by political parties in an internal way. In Mexico, a couple of trials are worth mentioning. On one hand the so-called inconformity trial, on the other hand the trial aimed at protecting citizens’ political and electoral rights. Both trials are filed before the Superior Court or the regional courts of the Federal Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch. The inconformity trial is activated to challenge every district counting or every state counting. The trial aimed at protecting the citizens’ political and electoral rights can be activated to challenge any violation against any citizen’s right to vote, to be voted, to associate to others, or to be registered in any civic association. In Venezuela the appeal used within the so-called “electoral litigation”, which is filed before the Electoral Court of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, aims at challenging the resolutions made by the National Electoral Council.

2. Reviewable Resolutions

Broadly speaking, there a two different kinds of resolutions that can be challenged by electoral appeals. On one hand, we find those resolutions related to both the electoral registration and the voter identity; those related to the administration of political parties, which includes, of course, any resolution related to a political party regime and its internal democracy; those related to preliminary activities for the election day; those related to electoral results; those related to electoral procedures different to those aimed at electing representative officials; and those related to any order issued by electoral authorities. It must be clarified that this classification has been made on analytical grounds, and does not match any particular electoral regulation. As a matter of fact, some resolutions related to the electoral registry can also be seen as a preliminary instance of the election day.

a) Electoral Registry and Voting Card

Among all the resolutions within this classification that can be appealed, we can include all those made by the electoral officials in charge of registering voters, issuing ID cards (whenever such cards may have electoral effects) or voting cards (whether such a card includes the voter’s photography or not), building-up the voters’ registry (especially when the resolution unduly approves or dismisses a citizen’s request to be included in the registry) .  

Electoral registries are different to voters’ lists. The system of appeals of the resolution of electoral disputes is aware of such a distinction. As a matter of fact, whereas citizens are authorized to file appeals against electoral registries, political parties are authorized to file appeals against voters’ lists.

b) Political parties regime and their internal democracy

In respect to political parties regimes, we can discriminate among reviewable resolutions as follows:

i) Declaration on the unconstitutionality or illegality of a political party and Resolutions on the approval, denial or nullification of a political party registry. Reviewable resolutions are those related both to the foundation, existence or extinction of political parties and to political parties’ registry. The resolutions that deny, suspend, or revoke a political party’s registry can also be appealed.

Inspired by the German model, articles 15 and 82 of the Chilean Political Constitution empower the Constitutional Tribunal to declare unconstitutional any organization, including of course political parties, as long as such organizations are against democracy as well as against the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, a political party’s dissolution can take place whenever its members legally agree to do so according to the internal regulation of the party itself. Besides, a political party’s registry can be revoked by a judicial resolution issued under the law. There are several legal reasons according to which a political party’s registry can be revoked; one of them is when a political party no longer fulfills the legal requirements to be registered. Among such failures we can find some as follows: to have, at some point, less members than those required by law in order to be registered; to breach in a serious and systematic way specific legal duties; to present no candidates for one federal election (Mexico) or more (three elections in a row in Argentina); to receive less than the minimum percentage of votes required in an ordinary election (3000 votes in Costa Rica, 2% in Mexico, 3% in Bolivia, 4% in Nicaragua, 5% in Chile, 5% in Panama); to gain no congressional seats (Colombia); to undertake no primaries for some time (4 years in Argentina).

In Paraguay, some other grounds to support a political party’s extinction are listed as follows: to organize illegal armed forces; to attack democratic principles set down in the Constitution, the Electoral Code, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international treaties ratified by the country; to follow the commands of a foreign organization or a foreign government. Likewise, Bolivia revokes the registration of any political party whose participation in a military coup has been proved.

ii) Funding and auditing of political parties’. Any determination taken with regard to a political party’s public funding can also be appealed. Appeals can also be filed to challenge any ruling regarding a political party’s financial auditing process, whether such auditing is made on the source or the application of the financial resources. Financial auditing resolutions are also challengeable if they are related to campaign spending, or to any campaign spending indictment. Any fine derived from financial wrongdoings can also be appealed.

iii) Political parties’ internal democracy. All the Latin American constitutions and electoral legislations analyzed so far set down a system of appeals to ensure a democratic regime to rule political parties. In doing so, courts (electoral, constitutional or ordinary) are empowered to solve political parties’ decisions related to their internal democracies. Appeals can also be filed to challenge any violation committed by any political party or endorsed by any electoral authority, against the civil and political rights of any of its members.    

- Nullity or rejection of non-democratic internal regulations. A majority of Latin American constitutions and electoral laws within the region not only establish democratic principles that have to be followed by political parties. They also allow political parties to determine a structure and a democratic internal regime on their own. Usually, those regulations can be seen as grounding some other political parties’ obligations such as the registration of the party’s statutes or the notification made upon the party’s statutes which has to be notified to electoral authorities and which is normally used by those authorities to review the statutes’ constitutionality and the statutes’ legality.

Usually, electoral courts (courts, councils, boards or juries) are empowered to solve constitutional and legal controversies related to political party’s statutes. In those countries where the rulings issued by electoral tribunals are not definitive, the solving powers are vested in the Supreme Court of Justice or in a constitutional tribunal.

Broadly speaking, any constitutional or legal regulation aimed at ruling the internal democratic regime of political parties as well as any court in charge of enforcing it face a clear challenge: a balance between the right of all members to participate within the party’s administration and the party’s right to organize itself in a free way, must be found. Of course, public powers must be prevented from exerting any kind of intervention within political parties’ internal affairs. However, the party’s members who are entitled to participate at the party’s administration restrict such a basic right.

- The election of political parties’ leaders and candidates. Frequently, political parties have a right to choose leaderships and candidates on their own in a free and democratic way. However, there are sometimes some basic rules and principles that have to be followed according to any political party’s internal regulation.

Among such basic principles, we find that sometimes the electoral authority is empowered to intervene within any political party’s primaries and internal elections. Some other times, courts are empowered to solve the appeals filed against resolutions issued by political parties’ authorities.  

- Punishments and Expelling members. According to due process of law any member of a political party is empowered to file appeals before a particular court (in Guatemala first the courts of appeals and then the Constitutional Court have powers to solve such controversies) against illegal decisions taken by political parties that violate one of his rights, especially the right to associate with others. Whenever a member of a political party is expelled from it, due process of law demands from political parties to allow him to file internal appeals before he does so at ordinary tribunals.

The judicial review of disciplinary rules applied by political parties has not been deeply explored from an academic point of view. However, it can be said that such a review has to be overreaching from a formal point of view and limited from a material point of view.

Disciplinary rules applied by political parties must be seen not only as composing such parties’ right to administrate themselves in a free way, but also as composing the party’s right to free association. Those rights aim at protecting the political party from any unduly interference from any branch of government.

Anyway, all the members of a political party are also entitled to the party’s right to free association and, therefore, they can only be expelled from it in a justified way, otherwise, the affected member of a political party is authorized to file a formal judicial appeal against any wrongdoing whatsoever. Since political parties play a fundamental role in promoting the political activism of citizens and the development of democratic life, they are clearly obliged to protect individual rights.

From a procedural point of view, the court in charge of solving the unfair separation of a member of a political party has to decide on different issues. The court has to decide on the constitutionality and the legality of the regulation applied by the party. Then the court has to determine whether the partisan authority that ruled on the case at hand had powers to do so or not. The court has also to determine whether different rights of the member such as the right to be informed about the charges against him, or the right to a due process were honored or not from a procedural point of view.

Unfairness within a disciplinary procedure means to leave the affected member of the political party with no defense whatsoever. Such a situation would represent a clear violation to a fundamental right.

At first sight, the review made on the content of the appealed decision seems to be aimed at determining whether the grounds on which the party’s decision was made are fair or not, are reasonable or not (such decision has to be proportional, never arbitrary) from both a legal and a statutory point of view. However, such a restriction to judicial review has an exception: whenever the political party’s decision violates at least one fundamental right for the affected member (such as the right to be voted, or the right to privacy or even fundamental social rights), courts can interpret and evaluate all relevant circumstances, even those which were not internally considered by the political party.

c) Preparation for the election day

All orders related to electoral ballots, the candidates’ registry and the composition and location of voting sites can also be appealed.

d) Electoral results

Both electoral results and declarations on the inability of a particular candidate to be elected can be appealed. The validation of the election results and the declaration of winners can also be appealed. In some countries, the appeals filed against electoral results can be filed and must be solved before the final counting, the election’s validation and the declaration of winners ruled by electoral tribunals (Costa Rica, Chile and the presidential election of Mexico) or by a political agency (Argentina) have taken place. Any appeal filed after such events have taken place will not be admitted. For the majority of the systems of electoral litigation, the orders related to declaring winners or validating the election can be appealed after they have been issued. The resolution of such appeals is under the jurisdiction of autonomous electoral authorities or judicial authorities.

e) Other appeals

Many electoral authorities, such as the regional ones, are empowered to both review and resolve the appeals filed against different kinds of elections (the election of municipal authorities, for instance). Even in some federal cases, local systems of electoral litigation are centralized while federal systems of electoral litigation (to solve disputes derived from congressional or presidential elections) are vested in the federal authorities empowered to solve the disputes derived from local or state officials, such as mayors or councilmen (as it is the case of the electoral regional courts in Brazil, the Electoral Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, and the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina which can solve extraordinary constitutional reviews regarding local elections). The Mexican case is an instance of an opposite situation. In Mexico, each state is authorized to organize a system of electoral litigation to solve state electoral disputes. Since 1996, every Mexican state has an Electoral Tribunal whose resolutions can be appealed using the so-called unconstitutionality appeal.

Many electoral tribunals in the region are empowered to solve appeals filed against democratic procedures such as referendum or popular voting. The Chilean case of the regional electoral tribunals is interesting. Such tribunals are empowered to solve the appeals filed against  orders affecting individuals entitled to run for a seat in the regional development councils or in the community development councils. It is also worth mentioning that the Superior Tribunal for Electoral Justice of Paraguay and the Electoral Court of Uruguay are empowered to validate different sorts of elections such as university elections. The Federal Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch in Mexico is empowered to solve labor disputes between electoral authorities and their workers.

3. Who can file electoral appeals?

Within the region, citizens are entitled to file appeals against any determination aimed at including or excluding them from the voters registry and the voters list. Such a right can also be used against a decision refusing the issuing of electoral IDs. Some countries entitle political parties, candidates, district attorneys and electoral prosecutors, to appeal any resolution issued with regard to the inclusion or the exclusion of any individual in or from the voters’ resgistry (Argentina, Bolivia and Costa Rica). Mexico entitles political parties to file appeals against the report made by the electoral authority regarding the final observations made by such political parties on publication of the voters’ registry.

Usually, electoral authorities’ decisions on the approval or denial of registry to a new political can be appealed by other political parties or by citizens.

Appeals against political parties’ statutes can be filed either by their members or by other political parties (when the appeal is filed against a resolution taken by an electoral authority). In Colombia “every citizen will be entitled to file appeals at the National Electoral Council to appeal any statutory provision which is against the Constitution, the law or the National Electoral Council’s resolutions. Such a right will last for twenty days after a decision on the matter has been made.”

Many countries authorize political parties to appeal illegal resolutions issued by the electoral authorities related to them (political associations are also entitled to do so in both Argentina and Mexico). Such countries also authorize political parties to appeal electoral resolutions related to the preparation stage for the election day, to electoral results and to inabilities of elected candidates.

In Argentina, representatives and elected representatives can file appeals against a representative’s election at the political institution in charge of solving them. Senators and elected senators have the same right to appeal senatorial elections. Moreover, the Senate can entitle any individual or any institution to file such appeals.

Some countries authorize their qualified institutions to carry out a review on the lawfulness of electoral results. Other countries authorize candidates to do so (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela are among them. In Uruguay candidates are authorized to challenge congressional elections while the appeals on presidential elections are reserved for political parties’ authorities that are registered before the Electoral Court). Some countries provide candidates with an accessory role (Mexico, where they can only file appeals related to candidate’s inabilities, and Paraguay), while others do not authorize candidates to file appeals in an explicit way (Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala and Dominican Republic). In each case, the candidates’ right to file appeals depends on how developed political parties are. It is also related to the evolution and characteristics of the party system and to the possibility of having independent candidates.

Besides, some countries allow collective lawsuits to be filed in order to appeal either electoral results or candidates’ inabilities to perform their duties (Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. Uruguay allows the existence of such lawsuits to appeal congressional elections). Citizens are also authorized to file appeals against such issues. Such an authorization is fundamental to ensure an adequate access to the electoral judicial system for all, even though such openness can result in the filing of too many appeals (even as a political strategy performed either by a small political party or by a political party that is loosing an election). Such openness can also affect not only the preparation stage but also the resolution of electoral appeals, which can then affect the reliability and legitimacy of elections.

Judicial review of electoral issues is free in the majority of Latin American countries. In Mexico, for instance, free access for all to the judicial system is a constitutional right, while Peru taxes the access to judicial review (in Peru it is compulsory to make a deposit to support the appeals filed against a political party’s registration, candidate’s abilities or electoral results. The reimbursement of such deposits will be only derived from successful appeals). Access to a judicial system is related to the common need of making the access to courts even wider as well as to the common need of preventing electoral litigation from becoming an abusive device aimed at affecting the elections’ trustfulness. In some countries, political parties that file completely unsound or malicious appeals have to pay a special tax (Paraguay), while in others, futile appeals produce judicial fines.

Finally, some countries open the appeal processes to others who can be interested in them, such as the electoral prosecutor or the Attorney General who represents public interests (Argentina, El Salvador, Panama and Paraguay).

Terms

Deadlines are not always set down in an explicit way. However, there is a general trend according to which the periods during which electoral appeals can be filed have been reduced. Such a trend is derived from a couple of needs. On one hand, it is necessary to renew public offices without any delay whatsoever. On the other hand, it is necessary to spend less and less time campaigning.

Two different appeals that can be distinguished from each other produce different filing deadlines. On one hand, deadlines are very different for those appeals used to challenge voters’ registries. We can find three-daydeadlines (Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Panama), four-day deadlines (Mexico), five-day deadlines (Chile, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay), fifteen-day and twenty-day deadlines (Argentina) and even thirty-day deadlines (Colombia). With regards to the preparations for the election day, we find three-day deadlines (Brazil and Guatemala), four-day deadlines (Mexico) and five-day deadlines (Argentina and Uruguay). Some countries’ deadlines are farther, such as the appeals against the registration of political parties (ten days in Peru and thirty days in Paraguay).

On the other hand, there are also different deadlines to file appeals against electoral results. We have those which can be filed within twenty four hours after the counting has been done at the voting sites (Bolivia and Colombia); we have “claims” and “complaints” which can be filed before superior electoral authorities (before elections are validated), which have to be filed within two days at the most (Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador and Dominican Republic); we have some other cases in which electoral results must be appealed within three days (Brazil and Costa Rica), within four days (Mexico) and five days (Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay). In Chile, electoral deadlines are set at the fifteenth day, while in Venezuela they are set at the twentieth or even the thirtieth day (with respect to the presidential contest). Peru decided to leave a more open deadline. Appeals can be filed there until a candidate has been declared as the winner.

Concerning electoral results, it must be noticed that some systems for electoral litigation authorize departments within their electoral authorities to solve appeals within different deadlines, such as those three days established in both Brazil (when the Supreme Electoral Tribunal solves the appeals filed against the rulings issued by regional electoral tribunals) and Mexico (when the Superior Court of the Electoral Tribunal solves the appeals filed against the rulings issued by regional courts on the inconformity appeals derived from congressional elections); as well as in Bolivia, without a specific deadline (when the National Electoral Court solves the appeals filed against the department electoral courts); and another option is an appeal filed within the same superior electoral authority (Guatemala and Nicaragua). In addition, some systems include the possibility of appealing before a non electoral judicial authority for constitutional reasons (Bolivia; Brazil, three days; Guatemala, five days to fill a constitutional review in the Supreme Court and two more days for an appeal at the Constitutional Court, like in Honduras or Panama), legality reasons (Colombia, eight days), or even a revision before a political authority (Argentina, with no specific deadline).

Deadlines to solve electoral appeals are not always regulated, and those that indeed are, have great variations. Regarding the appeals against the electoral registry, the deadlines to solve them fluctuate between six (Chile and Mexico), eight (Guatemala) and ten days (Uruguay). Appeals against the creation of new parties vary from three (Costa Rica), four (Peru), six (Mexico), ten (Argentina) and fifteen days (Chile). Also the appeals filed against acts to prepare the election must be solved within three (Guatemala), five (Argentina) or six days (Mexico).

There are also some systems that do not specify a deadline, but they establish a point of reference such as before the declaration of the election (Costa Rica), before the elected authority takes the office or before the installment of the state congress (Mexico for state elections), or finally a deadline marked by an specific date (Mexico, which means twenty days for regional electoral tribunals to solve appeals filed against congress elections and ten to fifteen days for the superior electoral authority in the Electoral Tribunal for reconsidering appeal against congress election or sixty days for presidential election).

Deadlines granted to jurisdictional bodies to solve appeals filed against autonomous electoral authorities in the matter of electoral results vary from three days (for the Supreme Court of Guatemala to solve trials related to the violation of fundamental rights), five (for the Constitutional Court of Guatemala to solve appeals), to fifty days (Colombia).  

In Argentina, regarding the appeals against electoral results filed at political agencies, there are no deadlines. As a matter of fact, with regard to congressional elections, appeals can be filed even after Congress is opened for business (which means that congressmen hold their seats in a provisional way. In other words, they can be removed and replaced by other candidates after an appeal has been solved).

Evidence

Broadly speaking, evidence provisions are not very detailed by electoral laws. Many times, no clear rules can be found at all. In some cases, the rules contained in traditional procedural statutes (Civil Code, Administrative Code) are used in electoral litigation, especially, to admit and evaluate evidence brought by contesting parties (Bolivia, Guatemala, and Paraguay). Besides, those countries that allow filing electoral appeals at ordinary courts, usually allow the use of traditional procedural statutes to manage evidentiary issues. We can think of some conclusions as follows:

a) Evidentiary mechanisms

In many countries, it is compulsory to include all documentary evidence within the appeal (Costa Rica, Chile –in those cases in which the voters’ registry is challenged–, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru). While some countries authorize both the plaintiff and the defendant to offer evidence to prove their claims (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama), only a couple of countries establish limits such as considering just electoral documents as valid evidence. In Colombia any kind of evidence can be used to support any appeal filed at the Fifth Section of the Chamber for Administrative Litigation of the State Council. Mexico authorizes the use of public and private documents, technical evidence, judicial files, the so-called human and legal assumptions, confessions, testimonies and experts’ declarations to support electoral appeals.

Most of the cases allow electoral authorities to gather all evidence that can help them in reaching a more satisfying decision (Argentina, Colombia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay in some cases).

Electoral appeals must be solved within specific deadlines and the representative agencies of a nation must be renewed in time. Therefore, electoral authorities have established rules according to which they will only admit evidence which can be used to support the contenders’ claims and which has been attached to the appeals whithin the corresponding time limit. Evidence such as the one provided by witnesses can hardly provide courts with relevant evidence for solving electoral issues. The reason is clear: contenders can offer as many witnesses as they can gather, whose testimonies then could result in many contradictions.

Bearing all this in mind, it is important to highlight that Latin American systems for the resolution of electoral disputes are similar among themselves. While those countries in which admissible evidence is restricted to few cases allow judges to expand the number of things that can be used as evidence (Colombia and Mexico), those other countries that have wider rules for the admission of evidence allow judges to restrain the number of things that can be used as evidence. From both points of view, evidence is a tool that must be used to reach a more satisfying decision before meeting the established deadline.

b) Evaluating evidence

From a theoretical point of view, there is a very influential procedural trend according to which different systems to evaluate evidence can be listed as follows: i) System of legal evidence: legislative texts establish how effective evidence can be; ii) System of free evaluation: courts are free to evaluate all the evidence attached to the appeal, in order to reach a satisfactory resolution in a free way. In such a system, judges are free to evaluate evidences from their personal, rational, or moral beliefs. No constraints are imposed upon judges in charge of solving appeals; iii) System of rational evaluation: In such a system courts are empowered to determine how effective a proof can be considered. To do so, judges have to use logic and base their decisions on their experience. The system of rational evaluation is somewhere in between the other two; and iv) Mixed System: Elements of the previous systems are combined.

Very few electoral laws define the way in which evidence has to be evaluated to resolve electoral disputes. Three countries establish a system of free evidence (Colombia, where the National Electoral Council and its delegates are free to evaluate factual evidence; Chile, where the Tribunal for the Validation of Elections will work as a jury to evaluate factual evidence; and Peru, where the National Jury for Elections is empowered to solve appeals evaluating evidence on their own). Two countries demand rationality from their electoral authorities (Costa Rica and Panama), while a single country establishes the system of legal evidence (El Salvador sets down not only that no more than three witnesses can be called to testify, but also that testimonies will never be enough to nullify an electoral order). Mexico follows a mixed system, because not only public documents are recognized there as the most valuable evidence. Electoral authorities are also compelled to be rational.