Vote Counting

Vote Counting Index

Vote Counting Quiz

The Vote Counting section deals with the counting of votes, an important, but often overlooked area of elections which requires accuracy, speed and security.

A discussion of eight fundamental principles of vote counting, (transparency, security, professionalism, accuracy, secrecy, timeliness, accountability, and equity), is presented in Guiding Principles of Vote Counting. For more general information on this topic area, please select Overview of Vote Counting.

This topic area also addresses issues relating to cost and administrative considerations of vote counting, the effects of a choice of ballot on the count, and vote counting at voting stations as opposed to counting votes at centralised counting centres.

Overview of Vote Counting

The objectives of the Vote Counting section are to:

• provide guidance to organizations responsible for preparing rules for and conducting the counting of votes;

• outline principles of "best-practice" for vote counting procedures;

• describe the various methods of vote counting used in a variety of common electoral systems;

• assist electoral management bodies to maximize the credibility and integrity of the vote counting process, by outlining ways to minimize opportunities for fraud and manipulation, and ensuring that the public perception of the counting of votes is one that enhances the integrity of the electoral process;

• equip electoral management bodies with strategies to avoid the serious problems encountered in many elections caused by vote counting deficiencies;

• emphasize the importance of intensive training and organization of vote counting staff;

• make provision for the various types of challenges to unprocedural or unlawful vote counting.

The Importance of Vote Counting

Vote counting is one of the most crucial stages in the election process. Failure to complete the count and transmit results in a quick, transparent and accurate manner can jeopardize public confidence in the elections and will directly affect whether candidates and political parties accept the final results.

Frequently, the importance of detailed planning, training, and organization is overlooked, or is considered of secondary importance.

There are situations when a well run electoral process is severely compromised because of problems experienced during vote counting.

Designing Vote Counting Procedures

The type of electoral system used will largely determine the specific measures needed to successfully conclude an election count. (See Electoral Systems and Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count for more on this topic.)

However, several general principles apply to all electoral systems. Counting procedures should take account of available resources, such as staff, training, premises, transport, logistics, planning, communications, and equipment. For example, a computerized method of counting votes would not be suitable for locations with unreliable power supplies or a shortage of skilled computer operators.

A balance may need to be struck between integrity, accuracy, and speed. Often the more checks and balances there are, the slower the process. Where results have to be announced soon after election day, there may be a greater chance that there has been a compromise in accuracy. This is not necessarily true in each case as some jurisdictions are able to provide an accurate and speedy vote count and announcement of results. In each case, the systems designer must decide which of these guiding principles is most important.

There are a variety of ways that counting can take place, including manually, mechanically, or electronically. The counting location may be at the voting station or at counting centres.

More complicated systems may require that the vote counting is conducted at several locations. First-Past-the-Post or majority system counts can normally be completed at the electoral district level. In a proportional representation system a final centralized count may be necessary to translate votes into seats, see Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count.

Who Should be Responsible for Vote Counting?

The count is one of the key areas where fraudulent practices can occur. To minimize the possibility of fraud, vote counting should be the responsibility of an independent electoral management body.

Monitoring mechanisms should be built into the process, through observation processes by national and international observers and political party and candidate representatives.

An independent media plays an important role in the monitoring of vote counting.There should be checks, balances, and audit trails throughout, as well as clearly defined processes for complaints and appeals.

Counting Rules Must be Clearly Understood

Counting rules should be clear, known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general public, political parties, candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national/international electoral observers.

In addition to this, some jurisdictions have legislated processes that need to be adhered to in the vote counting process. Also, it is desirable that information and training programmes on the count itself be provided to all participants in the electoral process.THese include vote counting officers, electoral officials, political parties, candidates, international and national observers and the media.

Counting Must be Open and Transparent

It is of great importance to the legitimacy of the elections that the counting process be open and transparent. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and national and international electoral observers should be allowed to witness the process and be permitted to copy the statement of the count documenting the results of the counting process.

In a system that provides for vote counting, or a portion of the vote counting, to take place behind close doors, the public perception will be that the election is compromised and its integrity affected.

Training is Essential

Detailed and intensive training of election officials, as well as representatives of political parties and candidates (see Electoral Integrity) and national and international electoral observers is essential to ensure consistency of approach, and especially to determine what constitutes a valid ballot and a rejected ballot.

Voting station officers and counting officers must be non-partisan in their actions, thorough in their procedures, and committed to treating electoral materials with care and respect. They must understand, for example, that even after ballots have been counted, the ballots remain legal documents in some jurisdictions. The identification of voters and their votes, especially voters receiving special assistance, must be kept secret at all times.

Publicizing Election Results

The political parties and the media should be given the opportunity of publicizing the unofficial results, but the responsibility and authority to announce the official election results should rest with the electoral management body. Some jurisdictions have limitations on the publication of exit poll results or parallel counts until an official result is announced.

Each country needs to determine the affect that the publication of an unofficial result will have on the population and whether such publication, that is later changed when the authorized results are announced, may be a catalyst for unrest and conflict.

Guiding Principles of Vote Counting

To establish and maintain public confidence in the electoral process, vote counting systems and procedures should incorporate the fundamental principles of vote counting in a democratic election.

These fundamental principles are:

• Transparency

• Security

• Professionalism

• Accuracy

• Secrecy

• Timeliness

• Accountability

• Equity

Transparency

For the counting process to be open and transparent, representatives of political parties and candidates should be allowed to witness and/or participate in the process, and be permitted to copy the statement of the results of the counting process. National and international electoral observers should also be allowed to witness the process and be permitted to copy the statement of the results of the counting process.

In some countries, ordinary citizens are encouraged to watch the counting process. Jurisdictions will often require that the observers to the counting process do not have access to people outside the counting location and are unable to communicate via mobile telephones or through other methods, until the vote counting is concluded.

Manual counting is by its nature more transparent than computerized counting. If vote counting is computerized, new mechanisms for ensuring transparency, such as external audits, need to be introduced.

Security

The security of the ballots and the ballot boxes, from the time voting begins to the completion of the count, is fundamental to the integrity of the counting process.

Voting station and counting officials, representatives of political parties and candidates, and national and international electoral observers should carefully watch the ballots and the boxes at all times, and accompany them if they are moved from one location to another. Individually numbered, tamper-proof seals or bags should be used to ensure the secure transport of ballots. Transparent ballot boxes can also be used to counter the susceptibility for fraud.

There is a perception that ballots that are moved from the voting station to a central counting venue are more vulnerable to tampering and fraud. All observers, including political party and candidate representatives should be permitted to accompany the ballot boxes to the central counting venue.

Professionalism

Voting station and counting officials are expected to conduct their duties and responsibilities in a professional manner. They should be thoroughly trained in the counting process, as distinct from the voting process; thorough in their procedures; and committed to treating electoral materials with care and respect.

Once a person accepts work as a counting official, he or she must be non-partisan throughout the entire process. Some jurisdictions require that all counting officials (as well as voting station officials) sign an oath to this effect, creating awareness that they can be legally prosecuted if their work or conduct is proved to be partisan. The oath should also include a confidentiality clause that ensures that sensitive information and the identify of voters is not divulged.

Accuracy

Accuracy is directly related to the integrity of the count, and of the elections themselves. Later discovery of errors and correction of mistakes can lead to accusations of manipulation or fraud.

The accuracy of the count will depend on clear procedures and manuals, adequate staff training, and their commitment to the process. Clear audit trails of ballots and ballot boxes, as well as checking and rechecking mechanisms, will contribute to the accuracy of the results. Whilst mechanical voting or computerization may enhance accuracy, this must be balanced against the resulting apparent loss of transparency.

Secrecy

Secrecy of the vote is important because it ensures that voters cannot be victimised for the way they vote, or intimidated into voting a particular way. To preserve the secrecy of the vote, voters' identification must be protected during the count. If their identity and choice on the ballot is determined as a result of counting procedures, it must be kept confidential and never revealed by any of the people involved in the electoral process.

If the secrecy of the vote of individuals or a community is a concern, measures such as counting at counting centres, rather than at individual voting stations, or mixing ballots from different elections, can be considered. Numbered ballot papers corresponding to matching stubs with the voter details, while facilitating accountability and clear audit trails, compromise secrecy and are best avoided.

Timeliness

Delays in completing the count and in the release of unofficial preliminary results can negatively affect the level of integrity and confidence in the voting process.

The responsible electoral management body should carefully plan all stages of the counting process to facilitate the early announcement of results, or at least to realistically assess when results can be announced, taking into consideration the communications and transport infrastructure.

It is best practice to inform the public if there are time delays in the announcement of the results. If the process is slow updates should be given regularly to reassure the public that the integrity fo the count is being maintained.

Accountability

Clear responsibility and accountability for each stage of the counting process are important. At the national level, the electoral management body should be accountable. At the electoral district level, it may be a senior election officer or commission official.

At voting stations, specified voting station officers may be responsible for voting and counting. Clearly defined complaints and appeals processes are also important. There should be structures in place with the authority and competency to address complaints and appeals. These may include political party liaison committees, conflict management and resolution bodies and legal structures.

Counting rules, including criteria for rejecting ballots, should be clear, agreed upon and known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general public, political parties, candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national and international electoral observers. Clear audit trails are essential in ensuring accountability.

Equity

Equity means that the rules are the same for all participants in the electoral process, and that they accept these rules. The proper training and non-partisanship of counting officials and voting station officials, and the presence of political party representatives and candidate representatives, observers will help to ensure that counting is conducted in a fair and correct manner.

 

Context of Vote Counting

Each jurisdiction will need to consider best practices that suit its particular circumstances and context, and ensure that the fundamentals of a vote counting process are maintained and that the integrity of the election is not compromised due to deficiencies in the vote counting.

Social and Political Context

The social and political context is important to consider when choosing an electoral system and vote counting process. For example, local political considerations will determine whether it is desirable to sacrifice some accuracy for speedy transmission of results, or whether security should be tight or less restrictive. One of the most important criteria is to ensure that the citizens, political parties and candidates understand the process and have faith in it.

Security

Security is an important factor in every election, but more so in a country emerging from civil strife. It is important to ensure that every stage in the electoral process, including the crucial vote count, is secure, transparent, and reliable.

If security or accuracy considerations permit, it may be desirable to hold the count as close to the citizens as possible, for example with a manual count at the voting station level in full view of voters, national and international electoral observers, and party and candidate representatives. If this is not possible, the count should be as transparent as circumstances allow.

Security provisions included in legislation and procedures should include security of the vote (and voter) and security of the process. If there is a possibility of repercussions to the voter for voting in a certain way, then the mixing of ballot boxes from different areas before counting should be seriously considered (see Procedures for Vote Counting at Counting Centres).

Security of the voting station may necessitate its guarding by the military and the police. Security of the ballot boxes, especially for those counted at counting centres, may warrant the use of armed convoys. Sensitive election materials should never be left solely in the care of the police or military, however, but should be accompanied at all times by an election official, political party and candidate representatives and national and international electoral observers.

Legislation should ensure that elections are not jeopardized, even if individual voting stations come under attack, or need to be closed for any reasons. Provisions should be made for the speedy rerunning of elections in those stations.

Literacy

Low literacy levels are important to factor into training and counting procedures. Where literacy is a problem, a simple electoral system will facilitate accuracy, but recount and rechecking procedures should be included in the process. Information and education material will need to be considerate of illiterate or semi-literate members of the public, to ensure that the electoral messages and information are conveyed to the largest number of members of the public.

Communication of Results

In an increasingly fast-paced world, election management bodies are feeling the pressure to deliver rapid (if not immediate) transmission of results. Technical innovations in electronic voting, counting, and transmission are facilitating speedy results. Speed, however, should be carefully balanced against other important considerations such as:

• Voter convenience and inclusiveness, for example citizens away from home or unable to visit a voting station (tendered votes, voting by mail, and other means that delay results),

• The infrastructure of the country,

• The importance of transparent (often manual; step-by-step) procedures,

• The dangers of a premature (incorrect) result.

• The complexity of certain electoral systems (such as the alternative vote, the single transferable vote), which in turn affect the speed of the count,

• The confirmation that voting was conducted correctly across the country, that is, the absence of challenges to the voting process that could affect the results.

Historical Review

Vote counting has progressed from a simple showing of hands, or standing in front of a chosen candidate, to secret paper ballots. Current trends in vote counting are towards secrecy, complexity (for reasons of accuracy and representation), electronic options, and rapid transmission of results.

The development in vote counting naturally follows voting procedures and techniques. Before the paper ballot, other means were used. In ancient Greece pieces of ceramic, ostraka, were used. Today, similar systems are still used in developing countries to indicate their choice of candidate. However, the paper ballot is most common, although technical means such as voting machines are provided for in some legislation. During recent decades, technical support for vote counting has made rapid progress.

The manual count remains the most common and widespread method of vote counting. However, depending on the general level of development, calculators or computers are used to calculate results, and computers are used for the distribution of seats. For a discussion of machine-assisted vote counting, see Application of Technology.

Administrative Considerations

Clear vote counting procedures, careful planning, thorough training, good facilities, and appropriate equipment are essential administrative considerations. As vote counting is the final step in the election process, it is often given a lower priority than it deserves. Considering its importance in ensuring confidence in the result of an election, it is critical to give vote counting high administrative priority to ensure success.

What is administratively expedient can vary greatly between countries. Here are some generic truisms regarding the administrative implications of choices in vote counting procedures:

• The simpler the system, the easier to organize and administer the vote counting.

• The greater the use of existing infrastructure, the simpler to administer at a lower cost.

• Permanence and continuity (of the counting process) between elections provides for a more routine and professional conduct of vote counting.

A complicated vote counting formula or system will have administrative implications in terms of increased training needs, additional personnel, longer hours, and additional venues for counting. Using of voting station staff for counting may be easier as it can simplify recruitment, training, and payment.

Infrastructure Requirements

Planning for vote counting procedures needs to take into account the infrastructure, including facilities for transporting essential items, security provisions and communicating results. Premises used for vote counting need to be secure and suitable for their purpose.

Plans should include the care and treatment of personnel, such as the provision of food and water, ablution facilities, as well as suitable lighting and temperature. This is especially important when the count is conducted by voting station officials who have worked hard all day managing and conducting the voting process, or when heavy volume calls for the count in a counting centre that will continue for many hours.

Personnel and Training Requirements

The effectiveness of any vote count process depends upon the counting staff. Recruitment of counting staff must ensure impartiality, professionalism and integrity, as the services that they will provide are essential to the overall perception of the elections.

Sufficient staff should be employed to efficiently complete the count, and every staff member should be appropriately trained. It is extremely important that the counting staff not be too tired when the count begins. If voting station staff conduct the count they will need rest breaks during the day. The counting staff's remuneration and training should be an important part of the election management body’s budget.

At the Management Level

At the management level, it is desirable to have a permanent electoral management body with sound skills. Professional, knowledgeable, experienced, and neutral staff will contribute to the success of an election and will provide benefits in all areas of electoral management, including vote counting and publicizing results.

Usually, the electoral management body will be responsible for developing training materials and procedures. They should use and build on the best examples of local and international experience. If possible, it is desirable to test the materials and procedures in pre-election small-scale activities (such as partial elections or simulations) before holding a national election or referendum.

At the Local Level

Usually, local electoral management staff are employed only when an electoral event is called. Some countries have permanent local election officials who have other duties, such as maintaining the register of voters.

Where local election officials and support staff are employed for each electoral event, it is desirable to recruit these staff well before the election or referendum is called, and provide them with comprehensive training on counting procedures and other aspects of the election or referendum. It may be appropriate to pay these staff for attending training sessions and related costs (such as travel, accommodation and food).

It is usual to provide local election officials and other senior management officials with a reference guide explaining all aspects of the administration of the electoral process. This could include procedures for opening and closing a local office; guidelines on hiring local staff, including job descriptions, minimal qualifications and desired skills; and the protocol for dealing with candidates and representatives of political parties.

Detailed procedures for vote counting and reporting results should be specified well in advance, so that proper preparations can be made. The importance of the final count, and the necessity of careful record-keeping in order to provide fully accurate official results, should be emphasized.

The level of responsibility given to local election officials will vary from place to place. Often, local election officials are responsible for recruiting and training the local staff needed for conducting the election. Ideally, these staff should be identified and recruited well in advance of the election. Other administrative staff may be needed to perform the many tasks associated with running an election, such as dealing with public inquiries, and ordering, storing, and distributing electoral materials.

Recruitment and training of all the voting station staff needed for election day (and for vote counting after election day, if necessary) should be done as soon as possible after the election is called. As a contingency measure, more voting station staff than are necessary should be selected and trained, to have surplus personnel available, in the event some workers cannot fulfil their duties on election day. A stand-by fee could be given to such substitute personnel if they are not required to work.

Recruitment Criteria

Men and women should be recruited on an equal basis, according to their ability to carry out the required duties in an unbiased and professional manner. Other criteria may include speaking at least one of the local languages and previous electoral experience. In a jurisdiction that is emerging from conflict, these requirements may not be appropriate and it may be expedient to have people from outside the area working as voting station and counting staff.

Some jurisdictions require that voting station staff be qualified voters and/or live within the same electoral district where they will be working on election day. These criteria should be publicized and known to all candidates and political parties involved, to preserve the transparency of the process.

The electoral laws may restrict who can be recruited as a voting station and/or counting staff. In some jurisdictions, voting station and/or counting staff are nominated by political parties in proportion to the number of votes or seats won at the previous election. The parties draw up lists and refer the names of acceptable personnel to the responsible local election official.

Workers who are nominated by a political party, but appointed by the local electoral management body, must agree to carry out all their duties in a neutral and non-partisan manner. Local customs and circumstances will decide the desirability of involving political parties in the appointment of election officials. Where a population is highly politicized, and most candidates for employment can be expected to hold a strong political allegiance, this practice may be desirable to ensure that there are checks and balances built into the process.

The voting station and/or counting official recommended by one political party can be watched by the voting station and/or counting official recommended by the opposing political party, and vice versa.

The voting station and/or counting officer generally understand the importance of being non-partisan, once they are appointed by the local electoral management body, especially if they have been required to take an oath assuring their neutrality. Where a population is less politicized, and sufficient employees can be found who do not have a strong political allegiance, it may be desirable to employ staff who can be expected to be neutral. In some countries, persons who are seen to be politically active are not permitted to work as voting station and/or counting officials.

Whether or not political parties become actively involved in the recruitment process of the voting station and/or counting staff, they should still appoint representatives of the political party/monitors/observers at the voting station, if provision for such is made by law. Accreditation provided in advance by the electoral management body is common practice.

People recruited as voting station and/or counting staff should be suitably qualified, able to attend training, and work long hours on election day. They should be literate, numerate, and able to communicate well verbally. In places where several languages are spoken, it is important to recruit staff with appropriate language skills. Senior students, civil servants, teachers, health workers, and retired people are often recruited because they satisfy these requirements.

Appointment of civil servants can raise questions about whether they are non-partisan, depending on the professional reputation and public perception of the public service, and whether positions are filled on merit or on the basis of partisanship. Even if well-qualified civil servants are recruited, they will still need training in counting procedures and other aspects of their duties in the electoral process.

Training Requirements

The level of training provided to voting station and/or counting staff will vary according to local conditions and the seniority of their position. Local election officials, electoral managers in charge of voting stations and counting centres, and other senior officers usually receive more detailed training than more junior officials.

Senior officials should be trained well before voting day. Ideally, junior officials should be trained before voting day, with a briefing session on voting day, before voting starts.

Where voting station officials conduct counting, training for the count will take place in conjunction with training for voting. The type of training will depend on the available budget and the ease with which staff can be given face-to-face training.

A typical training programme for senior officials will include face-to-face training conducted by a qualified instructor, audio-visual training aides (if available), training manuals, and simulation exercises.

In some cases, voting station staff will receive training manuals to read and sample exercises to complete at home before attending training. More junior officials can be trained in a similar manner, or trained by their supervisors after the supervisors have been appropriately trained.

Locations for face-to-face training should be carefully chosen and equipped. Suitable equipment will include chairs and tables, and, as appropriate, equipment such as white boards, black boards, or overhead projectors, and video and television where available. A microphone and speakers might be needed for larger groups. All the materials used on election day (such as ballot papers, ballot boxes, seals, forms, etc.) should be available and their uses demonstrated. The locations should be large enough to accommodate the officers being trained in comfort, and large enough to set up a simulated voting site.

Conducting a counting simulation is a very effective learning tool that helps to visualize the counting process, and pre-empt problems that may arise, by including examples of dubious ballots, and by practising filling in forms.

It is desirable to make attendance at training a mandatory condition of employment of voting station and/or counting staff. In order to encourage people to attend training, it is usual to pay them an appropriate allowance or fee.

In some countries, professional trainers will be used instead of the local election officials to conduct voting station and counting staff training sessions. Sometimes a small group of professional trainers will train other trainers, who will then go into the field to conduct the training directly to the voting station and counting staff on behalf of the electoral management body. Salary, travel, and accommodation expenses for such trainers will need to be included in the budget.

Application of Technology

While the use of manually counted paper ballots is still the most common method of voting, automated methods of voting and vote counting are becoming more accessible and effective, and more countries are opting to use them. Automated technology can be cheaper, faster, and more accurate than manual counting. It can also improve the democratic process by making the counting of complex electoral systems easier to use.

Technological approaches can be used to replace traditional paper ballots. Voting directly using mechanical or electronic devices, or using machine-readable ballots, can eliminate the need to count ballots manually and greatly speed up the counting process.

Before deciding to implement a computerized voting and/or counting system, an electoral management body might consider these questions:

• Is it difficult to recruit qualified voting station and/or counting staff?

• Have there been problems with irregular vote counts?

• Is there a need to reduce the number of election workers?

• Is the ballot becoming more complex?

• Is the vote count coming in too slowly?

• Do voters have to wait too long to cast their ballot?

If the answer is yes to most of these questions, it may be worth studying the costs and benefits of a machine based voting system. However, these drawbacks should also be considered:

• The cost of acquiring the hardware, software, and technical support needed for machine-based voting may be prohibitive.

• Election officials and voters will need specific training programmes on the use of the system/machine.

• Technological support will be required for every electoral event, and may come only from the system vendor, possibly from outside the country and at high cost.

• As paper ballots are no longer used in the voting process, voter’s and candidate’s confidence in the system may decrease.

• Absentee ballots may still need a separate voting and counting system.

• Maintenance and storage costs may be onerous.

• Voting technology is still evolving rapidly and any system purchased may be obsolete within a few years.

Environmental factors, such as humidity, may not allow machines to operate properly.

(For further information see Elections and Technology)

Using Technology to Assist Manual Vote Counting

Computing technology is often used to count the results of manual ballot counts, to produce summaries at the counting centre, and regional, or national level. Standard off-the-shelf office software products, such as spreadsheet or relational database software, can be used to aggregate individual counts and produce summary totals and various reports, either in paper or electronic format. Computer vote counting systems require care to function correctly. Faulty calculations, data entry errors, or loss of data can seriously compromise the conduct of an election.

Rigorous testing is necessary to ensure electronic election systems work flawlessly before they are placed in production, even if they are to be used only to compile preliminary results, or used only for a short time.

Data entry forms should be designed to minimize error and to facilitate the data entry process. It is common practice to design data input forms so that they mirror the data entry screen. Training of persons who manually complete these forms must stress the importance of legibility and arithmetic accuracy.

As with any vote counting process, it is crucial that checks and balances be built into any computerized counting system. Clear audit trails should be in place to track the progress of the count. Balancing figures should be used to check that output results are consistent with inputs. For example, it should not be possible to calculate a total vote figure for any level of counting that is higher than the number of ballot papers issued to voters at that level.

Data entered into a computerized vote counting system should always be checked against the original input data. This can be done by checking figures after data entry against the input documents, or by entering each set of data twice, using different operators to produce a parallel count.

Contingency plans should also be built into any computerized vote counting system. Data should be regularly backed up (and stored off-site if the counting proceeds for some time). Spare hardware should be available in case of hardware failure.

Where a network server is used, it is common to have a duplicate server set up that can take over if the main server fails. Technicians should be on hand if problems arise. Back up power supplies should be available to guard against power failure, even in the most developed countries.

Power supplies should be protected against power surges that can corrupt or destroy computer files. Even simple steps, such as regularly saving live data from RAM memory to hard disk, are sometimes overlooked, and can cause serious problems.

Worst case scenarios should also be anticipated. It is wise to be able to switch to a completely manual operation if the computer system fails and cannot be recovered. Portable calculators are valuable emergency devices.

Technology for Voting and Counting Processes

Over the last thirty years, various voting machines have been developed using the available technology. In the 1950s and 1960s, punch-card machine systems were developed. Voters punched cards (with a supplied punch device) opposite the candidates' names they selected. The cards were placed into a sealed ballot box and, after the the close of voting, tabulated by card counters.

In the 1970s, optical-scanners or Optical Mark Reading (OMR) systems were developed. Using this system, voters make a mark on a paper ballot to indicate their choice of candidate or issue. A scanning device reads the marked entries and calculates vote totals. These systems can count ballots as they are deposited, or count ballots only after the close of voting.

More recently, a new type of system, called the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting system has been developed. This system records votes by means of a ballot display provided via mechanical or electro-optical devices that can be activated by the voter. Once the voter has made his ballot selections, the device processes the data with a computer programme, and records voting data and ballot images into internal memory devices. It can produce a tabulation of the voting data as a hard copy printout, or store it in a removable memory device.

Telephone voting is a variation on the DRE system, where the telephone is used by the voter to record his vote. This system removes the need for voting stations. By calling a specific phone number, the voter authenticates his identity by entering a Personal Identification Number (PIN) on the key pad of the telephone. The PIN is used to confirm the voter's eligibility and presence on the voters' list.

Prompted by a computer-synthesized voice, the voter enters his choice by pressing a key corresponding to the candidate, party, or option they wish to vote for. Once this step is completed, the computer asks the voter to confirm his choice. The voting results are stored in a computing device (or multiple devices) linked to the telephone network. Results can be instantly counted once voting closes.

Technology and Complex Electoral Systems

Voting directly, using mechanical or electronic devices, or machine-readable ballots, is relatively straightforward where simple electoral systems are used, such as first past the post or list systems. In these cases, voters are able to indicate their choices in a relatively simple way, for example, by making one mark or pulling one lever.

It is more difficult to use these methods in complex electoral systems that permit many multiple choice responses, or require candidates or parties to be ranked in numerical preference. As technology improves, it is likely that effective methods will be available to meet the needs of these systems. However, mechanical or electronic devices that cater for complex systems are not yet in widespread use.

A compromise solution currently in use is to continue to use ordinary paper ballots, and to employ data entry operators to input all the valid marks made by voters into a database. A computer programme then takes the raw data and performs the necessary calculations to arrive at an election result. This system eliminates the need to manually count or sort ballot papers, and can be faster and more accurate than manual counting.

Deciding to Use Technology to Communicate Results

Some jurisdictions have experimented with communication systems that use computer-assisted technology, where the voting station official enters the election results on the key pad of a telephone when prompted by a results-counting computer located at a remote centre. A paper-based balloting system and manual counting procedure are still used; automation is limited to the communication and collection of results from polling stations.

Using this system, the electoral official dials a specific phone number and, prompted by a synthesized voice, enters his PIN provided by the electoral management body on the telephone key pad. Once the computer confirms the validity of the PIN, its synthesized voice asks the electoral official to enter the district and voting station code.

The computer's voice then lists the candidates' names in the order they appeared on the ballot. At the end of each name, the electoral official enters on the key pad the number of ballots cast for the candidate. The synthesized voice repeats the numbers entered and asks the electoral official to confirm the numbers by pressing a specific key on the key pad. If the electoral official detects an error, the transaction can be cancelled and repeated with corrected figures. This process continues until all the results for the voting station have been transmitted.

The advantage of this technology is its speed in delivering the aggregated preliminary results for an entire district (or country) and the reduction in the personnel needed to receive phone calls made by electoral officials and count the aggregated results.

The main constraint is the requirement to have digital network telephones with key pads (touch-tone technology) in all voting stations. In some areas, this may be a problem as rotary-type analogue telephones are still widely in use and digital networking technology is not yet available. Also, some electoral officials may not be familiar or comfortable with this type of technology and will require thorough training in order to build confidence in such a process.

Furthermore, significant costs will be incurred and time required to instal the computer system and customize it to the electoral management body's needs. These costs may well exceed the short-term cost of hiring and training the staff required to gather the results given verbally over the phone.

Internet and World Wide Web

As access to public computer networks increases, electoral officials may post future election results directly on the World Wide Web, or other interface on the emerging information highway. Already tested in some jurisdictions with varying degrees of success, election results can be posted instantaneously to a global audience using the Internet.

In future, voting itself may also be done via the Internet or through automated teller machines (ATMs). However, the issue of verifying the identity of each voter presents a significant security challenge. Some cost-effective and simple methods of personal identification will need to be developed and implemented before voting via the Internet or some similar computing/communications interface becomes commonplace.

Cost Considerations

The cost of elections is a concern to governments and election management bodies alike, regardless of the country's level of development. A prohibitively high cost election system that the country cannot afford can jeopardize the entire democratic process.

To minimize the cost of an election, the vote counting system and procedures chosen should make use of the existing infrastructure, such as transport and communication networks, as much as practicable, and take into account literacy levels and the sources for the recruitment of officials.

What is affordable, expensive or feasible can vary greatly between countries. Here are some generic guidelines regarding costs:

• the simpler the system, the lower the vote counting costs;

• the greater the use of existing infrastructure, the lower the cost;

• the more permanence and continuity between elections, the higher the savings in materials and training costs;

• the lower the political stability, the higher the cost in terms of added security measures.

Specific Needs for Vote Counting

The local environment and political situation may add to specific needs for vote counting at voting stations.

Such local factors might include the need for additional security measures during counting or specific communications technology that is not readily available.

Higher than expected turnout may affect the counting duration, and additional staff may be required to cope with the additional ballots to be counted. Expected budgets may be exceeded if such contingencies have not been planned for. Worst (or best) case scenarios (for example, expecting 100 percent of registered voters to turn out to vote) are frequently used when election budgets are planned in order to build in sufficient capacity.

The selection of a specific counting technology may also increase costs or reduce them, depending on the choices made in terms of manual or machine counting. Costs will vary depending on the methods chosen for communicating voting results.

Transmitting results by telephone is often cost-effective, depending on distance and availability.

Transmitting results by facsimile is also cost-effective and can be more accurate, as it is easier to make a mistake verbally than it is in writing. Where facsimiles are used, budgets should account for related supplies and services such as toner cartridges, maintenance, and the cost of fax lines.

Where conventional fixed telephones or facsimiles are not available, mobile phones or radios may be used. Results may also be sent by electronic mail where access is available. Where no electronic options are available, results may have to be delivered by courier.

The communication costs for conveying election results will need to consider the infrastructure in each country. Developing countries may have unreliable communications technology and mobile telephone reception may be sporadic, particularly in rural and remote parts of the country.

Human Resources versus Cost of Technology

Use of technology for counting votes may reduce the overall cost of an election and be more effective under certain conditions.

However, depending on local factors, the process of manually counting paper ballots may be comparatively less expensive. Whether a technological solution is cost-effective will depend on a range of local circumstances, including;

• the complexity of the voting system,

• the number of ballots being counted,

• the relative cost of labour compared to technology, and

• whether counting is centralized or decentralized.

In general, a mechanical or computerized method of counting paper ballots (as opposed to systems where votes are cast electronically or mechanically) may be cost-effective, where large numbers of ballots are being counted centrally, where a voting system is used that lends itself to mechanical counting, and where labour costs are relatively high.

Cost considerations aside, election management bodies should be aware that mechanical or computerized counting methods might be faster and more accurate than manual methods.

While the use of technology might appear a costly option, if the technology acquisition costs can be spread over several elections, the investment may be worthwhile.

On the other hand, rapid advances in technology tend to cause electoral technology to age quickly and for technology to become defunct between one election and the next. Availability of technical support during the electoral period is another important aspect that should be considered.

A detailed cost-benefit analysis, accompanied by a study of the legal impacts and management risks associated with the adoption of a particular technological solution, may be worthwhile before any final decisions are made to adopt technological vote counting methods.

Cost Components

Budget

The budget costs associated with vote counting are linked to the larger process of establishing and running the voting and counting stations.

The following information relates to the considerations that should be taken into account in planning an election budget.

Personnel Planning

The salaries and fees paid to staff and voting station and/or counting staff usually constitute the largest part of the election's voting day budget. Personnel costs can include:

• electoral management body staff based at national headquarters (regular and temporary),

• regional, electoral district and local electoral officers

• field offices staff (regular and temporary),

• election officials,

• voting station and/or counting staff,

• substitute voting station and/or counting staff on stand-by,

• security personnel,

• training fees for voting station and counting staff,

• travel fees (to attend training or to reach duty station),

• food and water or meal allowance, if long hours are required,

• overtime pay.

Using civil servants or citizens who are either volunteers or on civic duty, are ways in which to save salary costs to voting station and counting centre officials. Using the same officials in subsequent elections will decrease training costs.

Materials

Many kinds of materials must be developed and mass-produced for use in voting stations and counting centres. These include:

• training materials, which can include printed manuals, audio-video presentations, posters, pamphlets, role-cards, sample materials, home workbooks, and training simulations for mock elections;

• ballot papers,

• ballot boxes,

• voters' lists,

• voting screens,

• forms,

• information posters and signs,

• security devices, such as invisible ink and UV readers, if appropriate,

• any electronic devices used in voting stations or counting centres,

• information for candidates and party representatives,

• stationery items such as pens, pencils, rulers, rubber bands, envelopes, writing paper, and labels.

Choosing materials carefully can save costs. Materials that can be re-used for several electoral events, such as metal ballot boxes, may lead to cost savings, but the cost of storing materials must be taken into account.

Alternatively, materials which cost less to produce, but which may only be used once, such as cardboard ballot boxes, do not have to be stored and may be cheaper.

There will also be a freight component in the cost of most electoral materials. Items made locally may be cheaper than items made elsewhere, when freight is taken into account.

Ballot papers are usually expensive. Some ballot papers incorporate a security device to discourage fraudulent voting. Recent advances have reduced the cost of security printing. It is worth exploring the available options to minimize the cost of ballot papers.

Some high-tech materials, such as audio-video presentations and computers, may improve processes, but they are also usually expensive. The electoral management body will need to determine whether the advantages of high-tech equipment are worth the cost.

Rental of Premises

Renting space for use as voting stations or counting centres can be a significant budget item.

In some jurisdictions, the electoral laws allow the electoral management body to use schools and other public locations as voting stations at no cost. However, some regions may not have available public facilities, and the budget should plan for additional funds required to rent voting and counting locations.

In some countries, the electoral management body may be able to negotiate with the relevant authorities to get free access to schools and other public locations.

Otherwise, there will be a need to rent space for voting stations and counting centres. The budget should provide adequately for this.

Office Equipment and Communications Fees

Necessary office equipment, such as chairs and tables, must be procured. In some cases, this equipment will be supplied by the school or other location. The election budget should cover the cost of hiring this equipment if needed.

If required, more advanced equipment such as office desks, fax machines, personal computers, and phone lines for local offices, may also need to be rented and budgeted for accordingly.

In addition, telephones, including fixed phones and mobile phones, fax machines, radios, and computer lines may need to be included in the budget. Ideally, each voting station and counting centre should have the means to quickly communicate with the electoral management body to report problems, seek advice if needed, and transmit counting results.

Transport

Local conditions and common sense will indicate the most appropriate and cost-effective transport for the region concerned.

Election management bodies must ensure that electoral material is transported securely, so that it is not tampered with, stolen, or destroyed. For this reason, it may be desirable to avoid public and commercial transit systems, although these can be used if appropriate.

Electoral material may be transported by motor vehicles, boats, helicopters, light aircraft, commercial aircraft, or even animals that can carry loads, depending on local circumstances. Transport is particularly difficult in remote areas, and can be very expensive.

Vehicles may be supplied by a government agency, the military, the police, or national or international organizations. If vehicles are not supplied, they may need to be rented. If necessary, the budget should include ancillary costs to cover maintenance, fuel, and insurance. The budget may also need to allow for drivers or crew. If no vehicles are available, money for taxis and public or commercial transport should be considered.

If electoral materials have to be transported from voting stations to counting centres, or to a central location, these costs must be included in the budget.

Voter Education Programmes

Voter education programmes can be a large part of an election budget, depending on the methods chosen and the location.

Methods can range from newspapers, radio and television advertising, to posters, pamphlets, direct mail, community seminars, and the internet.

Voters' Lists

The compilation or maintenance of voters' lists must be included in the budget of the relevant management body, although they may not be included in election costs.

At election times, costs will be incurred in printing and distributing voters' lists for use in voting stations.

Some jurisdictions process these lists after voting day to identify examples of multiple voting and, in compulsory voting countries, failure to vote. This can be done manually or electronically. These costs must be included in the budget if appropriate.

Postage and Freight

The budget must include the cost of mailing out and receiving mailing ballots (postal ballots), if they are provided for under the electoral law. Many jurisdictions provide reply-paid envelopes for ballot material.

The budget should also allow for other mail to voters, such as information pamphlets, and for courier fees for sending official materials between various locations.

Software and Hardware

If specific software is developed to process or count ballots, or to process election results, development, testing, documentation, and training costs must be budgeted. The hardware required to operate the software, its deployment in the field, and the technical support required to maintain and service it will need to be included.

Operational support costs, such as staff, office space and facilities, should be included as necessary.

Election Funding of Candidates and/or Parties

Some jurisdictions provide election funding to candidates and/or parties to cover some of the cost of campaigning. If appropriate, these costs should also be included in the budget.

Results Centres or Counting Rooms

Many jurisdictions have regional and/or national results centres or counting rooms. These are useful to communicate the election result to the public, the candidates, the parties, and the media, and are an important element in making the election process open and transparent.

Counting rooms can be simple, with manual count boards and simple communication links by telephone or fax, or they can be very sophisticated, with computer links, displays and analysis. In this electronic age, election results may also be distributed electronically by computer feeds or the internet, with no need for a physical counting location.

In some cases, counting rooms are organized and funded by media organizations. In others, counting rooms are funded by the election management body. The election budget should include the cost of results centres or counting rooms as appropriate.

Miscellaneous Costs

Petty cash for small purchases or emergencies should be provided to the local offices of the electoral management body.

Contingency measures for bigger items such as relocation of offices in case of disaster, re-deployment of electoral management body staff, and backup electrical generators should be budgeted according to local risk factors and the general operating environment.

Audit Procedures and Accountability

Suitable audit procedures should be in place to ensure that staff responsible for managing funds are fully accountable and are not able to appropriate funds illegally. Records of all valuable assets should be kept to ensure that assets are not disposed of illegally or go missing Election officials should be aware that they are accountable for the funds and goods under their control, and they should be aware of the penalties for misusing their position.

Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count

 

This section discusses how the electoral formula and chosen ballot type might affect vote-counting procedures.

What Vote Counting Means

It is necessary to carefully distinguish between counting the votes and determining the winner (See Transforming Votes to Seats).

Counting the votes consists of opening the ballot boxes, sorting their contents, determining the validity of ballot papers, and counting ballot papers counted. Except in countries using voting machines, this is a very concrete operation, based on actual objects (ballot papers and, if applicable envelopes), and is often done manually. It is a labour intensive operation. In some countries mechanical or electronic devices are used to facilitate the counting.

Counting votes requires concentration, literacy, and honesty. Those who count votes are not highly paid and in some countries the literacy requirement excludes many applicants.

Vote counting involves the preliminary operation of checking the validity of ballot papers. Electoral legislation normally outlines detailed grounds for rejecting ballot papers. Election officials must be fully familiar with those provisions.

This operation requires a higher skill level than simply counting the votes. Decisions on the validity of ballot papers may be made collectively (for example, by a majority decision of all election officials present) or hierarchically (by the presiding officer). The decision may also be "referred to higher officials". Decisions of that nature must be subject to judicial review to prevent abuses.

Vote counting results normally produce the following information for each counting unit:

 

 

1. How many voters have voted?
2. How many ballot papers were rejected?
3. How many ballot papers were valid?
4. How many votes went to each party and/or candidate, and in the case of the referendum how many votes went to each option.?

 

 

Counting the votes can be accomplished by counting officials, usually at the voting station level, but also at the electoral district level, or on a national level.

The final stage of vote counting is the aggregation of figures for electoral districts. Electoral districts are the territorial units for which representatives, in a first-past-the-post system, are elected and where votes are added before the electoral formula is to be applied to determine who is elected. If the counting centre is smaller than the electoral district, the figures included in the statements of votes for each counting unit must be aggregated for all the counting units in the electoral district.

This operation involves gathering the results from each counting centre, checking whether all statements are in, and aggregating the figures included in each statement. Only once the totals are available for the electoral district is vote counting over. The next step is applying the electoral formula to determine who is elected.

Electoral Formula

An electoral formula may be defined as the criterion that determines the winner(s) of an election. For legislative elections, the electoral system is the rule whereby members of a legislative house are elected and votes transformed into seats. For presidential elections, the electoral system is the benchmark a candidate must reach to be declared elected: e.g. a plurality or a majority of the popular vote.

Electoral formulas are outlined in Transforming Votes to Seats. The electoral formula will affect many other variables of the election process. In particular, it has some effect on the ballot type and on the counting procedure.

Influence of Electoral Formula over Ballot Type

The variables of ballot type are outlined in greater detail in file Ballot Type Counting Requirements.

 

 

1. Ordinal or Categorical Ballots The main effect of the electoral formula on the ballot type is whether a categorical or an ordinal choice will be required from voters.

 

 

A categorical ballot is one where the voter makes a straight choice, either for a candidate or for a party list, or for a party and a candidate at the same time. An ordinal ballot is one where the voter indicates his preferences among the various candidates or parties by numbering their respective names, in declining order (1, 2, 3) or by cumulating votes on certain candidates. On an ordinal ballot a voter is able to alter his vote between the first and second round of an election.

Most electoral formulas require voters to make a categorical choice, which means that categorical type ballots are the most common occurrence. Ordinal ballots only account for one-quarter of the world total of ballots. They can be required for four formulas:

 

 

• The Alternative Vote,
• The Single Transferable Vote,
• The Block Vote, and
• The Two-Round System 

 

 

 

 

Ballot Structure: The Australian Ballot, the "Ballot and Envelope System," and the French Ballot

Another important dimension of the ballot paper is its structure. Two broad options exist: an "Australian ballot" (named after its country of origin) on which the names of all-competing parties and candidates are grouped on a single sheet of paper, to be marked by the voter.

 

 

The other option, the "ballot and envelope" system, requires printing a distinct ballot paper for each of the competing parties or candidates, and inviting voters to insert a single paper into an envelope, which is to be dropped into the ballot box.

Between those two types exists an intermediary solution: the French ballot, which lists the candidates to be marked by the voter. This type of ballot is used in some jurisdictions where proportional representation (PR) is combined with the right for voters to express preferences for individual candidates within the party list. Most electoral formulas are fully compatible with either ballot structure option (see "group 1" in the appendix). However, some electoral formulas (First Past the Post, Two-Round, or PR) in multi-member electoral districts with panachage or preferential voting within a list, are compatible with both.

Australian ballots are clearly advisable as a simpler format of ballot paper and for the cost factor of producing less ballot papers, especially if the number of members to be elected is high: (see "group 2" in the appendix.) Finally, some electoral formulas are only compatible with Australian ballots, and cannot be operated with the ballot and envelope system. This is the case for the alternative voting and STV (see "group 3" in the appendix), because both require an ordinal choice which cannot be expressed with enough clarity under the ballot and envelope system.

Influence of Electoral Formula over Vote Counting

The most important influence of the electoral formula over vote counting is to determine what must be counted. Some formulas simply require counting the votes for candidates or parties. Other formulas require counting the votes both for parties and for candidates within each party list.

If the electoral formula requires voters to express an ordinal choice, then vote counting is performed in a very different way.

Another influence of the electoral formula is the determination of which territorial level (the voting station, the electoral district, or the nation as a whole) votes must be counted and aggregated.

Appendix

This is a discussion of the compatibility of various formulas with the Australian ballot paper and the ballot and envelope system.

Group 1 - The following formulas are compatible with both the Australian ballot and the ballot and envelope system:

 

 

• First-past-the-post (FPTP) in single-member electoral districts;
• FPTP in multi-member electoral districts, with no panachage allowed (akin to the Party Block Vote;
• FPTP in multi-member electoral districts, with panachage allowed, and with distinct individual competitions for each seat (the Block Vote);
• Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) 
• Two-Round System in single-member electoral districts;
• Two-Round System in multi-member electoral districts, with closed lists no panachage allowed 
• Two-Round system in multi-member electoral districts, with panachage allowed, and with distinct individual competitions for each seat;
• PR with closed lists.

 

 

Group 2 - The following formulas are compatible in theory with both the Australian ballot and the ballot and envelope system. However, in practical terms, it is advisable to use Australian ballots, especially if the number of votes to be cast in the district is high.

 

 

• The Block Vote;
• Limited Vote;
• Two-Round system in multi-member electoral districts, with panachage allowed, but no distinct competition for each seat;
• PR list with panachage allowed.

 

 

Group 3 - The following formulas are compatible only with Australian ballots:

 

 

• Alternative voting in single-member electoral districts;
• Alternative voting in multi-member electoral districts;
• Single Transferable Vote (STV).

 

 

 

Electoral Systems Counting Requirements for Different Electoral Systems

Which electoral formula is in force has an effect on how vote counting is carried out, what has to be counted, and where the counting is to be done is examined.

1. What has to be counted? Following is a summary of the counting requirements for each electoral formula:

• First-past-the-post (FPTP) in single-member districts - count the votes for each candidate.

• FPTP in multi-member districts (the Party Block Vote) - count the votes for each party list.

• Limited vote - count the votes for each candidate.

• Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) - count the votes for each candidate.

• Proportional representation (PR) with closed list, no panachage between list - count the votes for each list.

• PR list with panachage allowed - count the votes for each candidate. If voters are allowed to cast a single list vote instead of voting for individual candidates, also count the number of votes cast for each list.

• Two-Round System in single-member districts - count the votes for each candidate. If a second ballot is necessary, count the votes again for each candidate standing at the second ballot.

• Two-Round System in multi-member districts, with closed lists - count the votes for each party list. If a second ballot is necessary, count the votes again for each party list standing at the second ballot.

• FPTP in multi-member districts (the Block Vote), with panachage allowed, there are two possible ballot arrangements: a. Each seat in the district is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat "A", Seat "B", etc.), with one distinct competition for each seat, and each elector has a vote for each seat.

1. There is no distinct competition for each seat and the voter has as many votes as there are members to be elected in the district.

In both cases, count the votes for each candidate.

• Two-Round system in multi-member districts, with panachage allowed. There are two possible ballot arrangements:

1. Each seat is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat "A", Seat "B", etc.), with one distinct competition for each seat.
2. No distinct competition for each seat, voter has as many votes as there are members to be elected. In both cases, count the votes for each candidate. If a second ballot is necessary, count the votes again for each candidate standing at the second ballot.

PR list when preference votes for individual candidates are allowed.

• Scenario A - Voters must vote for a single individual candidate, and this vote is also deemed to be a vote for the party sponsoring that individual. In this case, count the votes for each candidate.

• Scenario B - Voters may vote either for a party list or for one individual candidate within a party list. In this case, count the votes for each party list and count the votes for each candidate.

• Scenario C - Voters must vote for a party list and may, in addition, vote for one or many of the candidates within that list. However, individual preferences cast for the candidates sponsored by a given party will be taken into account only if 10 percent of the ballot papers cast for that party are so marked. In this case, first count the votes for each party list. Second, count for each party the number of ballot papers which bear preference votes for candidates. Third, count individual preference votes for each candidate.

• Scenario D - Voters must vote for a party list and they may vote for one of the candidates within that list. They may, in addition, cross out the name of a candidate within that list. In this case, first count the votes for each party list. Second, count the votes for each candidate. Third, count the number of ballots where the name of a candidate was crossed out.

• Alternative voting in single-member districts: Count only first preferences for each candidate. If necessary, count second or other subsequent preferences expressed on eliminated candidates' ballots (the latter count must be done at the electoral district level, though Australia provides for a preliminary unofficial counting of second and subsequent preferences at the lowest level).

• Alternative voting in multi-member districts: Each seat in the district is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat "A", Seat "B", etc.), with one distinct competition for each seat. Count the first preferences for each individual candidate for each seat. If necessary, count the second or other subsequent preferences expressed on eliminated candidates' ballots.

• Single Transferable Vote (STV): Count only first preferences for each candidate. If necessary, count second or other subsequent preferences expressed on eliminated candidates' ballots (the latter count must be done at the electoral district level).

• Mixed Member Proportional Systems: Count the votes for each party, and the votes for each candidate. If the two cannot be done simultaneously, count party votes first as these are the most decisive.

• Parallel Systems: Count votes for each candidate and votes for each party. If the two cannot be done simultaneously, start with the category of members that is the most numerous.

• Mixed Coexistence Systems: In each district, use the relevant counting procedure, depending on which formula is used in the district.

1. Where are votes to be counted?

Determining at which level of electoral administration, i.e. national, provincially or regionally, at electoral district level or at the voting station, counting will take place is determined by national legislation.

The simplest option is to count the vote at each voting station. This is generally recommended since the officials who perform the operation are already at the location and there is no need for transport of the ballot boxes, which supports transparency of the count.

Counting at voting stations also has an impact on timing: voters and candidates are anxious to know the results.

Votes can also be counted at counting centres, at the electoral district level or even nationally.

This necessitates safety precautions to overcome the security and public trust considerations mentioned above: ballot boxes must be sealed carefully so that their contents cannot be emptied or tampered with during transportation. Reliable officials must transport the ballots. A worthwhile precaution is to require representatives from the various parties to sit in, or when there are a number of party or candidate representatives to accompany, the vehicle transporting the boxes. In politically volatile countries, armed protection of the vehicles transporting ballot boxes and party inspectors may be necessary.

While counting the votes at a location other than the voting station is often not the best alternative, there may be sound reasons for selecting this option:

1. Protecting voting secrecy: All voters, or a number of voters in a given voting station vote for the same candidate or party, in which case their vote is known to all. Counting the votes at another venue, where the contents of numerous voting stations are mixed together, minimizes the likelihood of such an occurrence.
2. Protecting voters: if the elected party representative or candidate knows which voting stations supported him or her and which did not, there is a risk of retribution during his or her term of office against those parts of the district that voted "the wrong way".
3. Protecting national or social cohesion: If electoral districts include communities sharply differentiated by language, social class or otherwise, making the results available for smaller subdivisions within each district may reveal sharp differences within the electorate. In highly charged political situations, this may lead to victimisation, by losing candidates, of a particular sub-group (for example, an ethnic or linguistic minority). Counting the votes at a location other than the voting station helps to conceal those differences and, presumably, to preserve national and social cohesion.
4. Material considerations: Voting stations may be ill-equipped physically to count the votes. For example, if they are located in open-air spaces due to the unavailability of appropriate buildings, or are too poorly lit for the operation to be done in an efficient way. In such cases, it may be better to count the votes in larger counting centres located in public buildings (like schools or administrative offices) that are better equipped and better protected against intruders.
5. Size considerations: In very small countries, it may be deemed easier to centralize counting in view of the small distances to be traveled.
6. Ensuring that the rules governing the rejection of ballot papers will be uniformly and fairly applied: While counting the votes for individual candidates or parties is a simple and straightforward operation, which does not require high skills, deciding on the validity of each ballot paper demands higher qualifications. Even trained judges may have difficulty in deciding some specific cases. Further, the rules governing ballot validity may be understood differently by numerous voting station and/or counting staff. Presumably, making such decisions at the electoral district or national level ensures they will be made by trained officials and that the law will be applied the same way in all dubious cases.
7. Electoral systems requirements: While national electoral legislation often differs on the location of the vote counting, electoral formulas impose minimal constraints to legislators in this regard. In other words, whichever of the above-mentioned formulas is chosen, it is possible for vote counting, as distinguished from determining the winner(s), to be done at voting stations, or at alternative locations.

Alternative Vote (AV) and Single Transferable Vote (STV) impose only one important constraint with regard to vote counting: while counting of first preferences can be done in voting stations, the transfer of second and other subsequent preferences must be done at the electoral district level.

It is only on the basis of the aggregate figures for the whole district that the decision can be made as to whether any transfer will be necessary, and as to which candidates, if necessary, will be eliminated and have their second preferences counted and transferred.

The crucial point to be ascertained before deciding to count second or subsequent preferences is whether or not a candidate has obtained a majority of first preferences in the electoral district. This decision can only be made on the basis of district-wide figures. If such a majority has been reached, counting stops there and second or subsequent preferences will never be counted.

If the opposite is found, then it is up to the officials for the electoral district to eliminate the weakest candidates, to count second preferences on the ballots where first-preference votes have been given to such candidates, and transfer them to the remaining candidates, until one candidate secures the required majority or quota.

This implies that the winner(s) of the election will be known later under both AV and STV. This is one of the drawbacks pointed out by the opponents of these formulas.

Ballot Type Counting Requirements

An explanation and description of the types of ballots (single ballot, open and closed lists) takes into consideration the following three variables:

• Whether voters must make a categorical or ordinal choice;

• The structure of the ballot paper;

• The number of offices to be filled.

Ordinal vs. Categorical Ballots

A categorical ballot is one where the voter makes a straight choice either for a candidate or for a party list. An ordinal ballot is one where the voter is required to indicate preferences among the various candidates or parties by numbering their respective names, in declining order (1,2,3...).

Preferential ordinal ballots make ballot counting more complex. The chief rule is that only "first preferences" i.e. the number of ballots where the name of a given candidate are marked with the figure "1", are normally counted on election night, assuming that counting takes place directly after voting. Subsequent preferences are to be counted only if no candidate is found to have obtained a majority (more than 50 percent) of first preferences. In this case, the weakest candidate is eliminated and the second preferences expressed on his or her ballots are counted and transferred to other candidates.

The Structure of the Ballot Paper

The simplest option is the so-called "Australian ballot", which groups the names of all candidates for a single office on a single ballot paper, to be marked by the voter. Another option is the French "ballot paper and envelope system" where there is one ballot paper for each candidate, voters collect each candidate's ballot and insert one in an envelope to be dropped into the ballot box, and dispose of all other unused ballots.

“Australian ballots” are easier to count, as they are simply taken out of the ballot box, unfolded and sorted. A supplementary advantage is that the results of the count are easier to check after the election. Once counting is completed, the ballot papers marked for each party or candidate are placed in distinct sealed envelopes and archived. If the results of the election are later challenged, the envelopes may be reopened before a judge and their contents counted again. Further, rejected ballot papers may be re-examined to determine whether they ought to have been rejected or not.

Under the ballot and envelope system, the first step is to count the unopened envelopes to determine how many votes were cast. Then each envelope can be opened, the ballot paper taken out and the name of the candidate or party on the ballot read aloud and recorded by counting officers.

From this moment, nothing distinguishes a ballot paper which has been cast, and the only evidence of how many votes were cast for each party or candidate is the tally sheet used by counting officers, and the final statement of the votes cast. Only the latter has any official value and is kept for recording purposes. Normally more than one copy of the statement is made.

If conflicting figures are found in the various copies of the statement for any voting station, there is no authoritative evidence as to what the right figures are, because the ballot papers are not kept. Even if the ballot papers are kept and put into sealed envelopes, nothing distinguishes a ballot paper actually cast for a candidate or party from any other ballot paper that was not actually cast. Only ballot papers and envelopes that were rejected are kept and annexed to the statement of votes.

This system makes it difficult for judges to recount the ballot papers subsequently, or even to decide whether a ballot paper has been lawfully rejected. For example, if a vote has been rejected because the envelope was found to include no ballot, or because a ballot paper was inserted in the box without being put into an envelope first, or because the envelope included ballot papers for different candidates, the only evidence available, apart from suitable mentions on the minutes of proceedings of the counting station, is an empty envelope or isolated ballot papers.

Sometimes legislation provides for a mix of both schemes. Voters can be required to insert the list of candidates representing a single party into the envelope, but in addition, allow voters to mark the name of one or more candidates on that list. This kind of hybrid can be found notably in some proportional representation (PR) countries where preferential voting for some candidates is allowed.

The Number of Offices to be Filled

In most countries, an election involves a single set of elective offices, e.g. Members of Parliament. This requires a single ballot paper.

Sometimes numerous offices are to be filled at the same time such as President, member of Parliament, etc. This raises numerous issues, both political and technical. a. Straight ticket vs. Split ticket: One option is to oblige voters to give a single vote for a party, which is deemed to count for each of the candidates sponsored by that party for the various offices to be filled. For example, the Venezuelan ticket, whereby a single vote is valid for all the candidates sponsored by a party at the local, state and national level, is an extreme example of this. Another option is to allow voters to have a distinct vote for each office.

Counting implications: When voters are required to cast straight tickets, vote counting is simplified because ballot papers cast for each party simply need to be counted. When voters are granted a distinct vote for each office to be filled and which allows them to "split their ticket", counting is much more complex. Separate tally sheets must be used for each office to be filled, which makes vote counting a lengthy operation.

In such cases, the use of mechanical or electronic voting machines may appear the only solution that ensures a quick determination of the winner(s).

1. A single multi-office ballot paper vs. numerous single-office ballot papers. The former option allows for both straight and split tickets. The latter is compatible only with split tickets.

Counting implications: Same as above. If numerous ballot papers, one for each office, are used, it is recommended that the ballot papers for each office be printed on paper of a distinctive colour to avoid confusion during the count. This is particularly relevant if all ballot papers, irrespective of the office to which they relate, are put into a single ballot box.

Transforming Votes to Seats

Determining the winner(s) is usually accomplished at the electoral district level, though it may be done also at the national level. Most often senior electoral officials, with specific technical skill conduct the votes to seats formula application.

The rules governing the determination of winner(s) (the electoral formula) can be complex, especially if a scheme of proportional representation is in force. Further, determining the winner is an important political responsibility: any serious error made at this stage might generate a political crisis. Any suspicion of fraud will have the same consequence. There are various electoral formulas that fall into three main clusters:

• Plurality-majority,

• Proportional representation (PR), and

• Semi-PR systems.

However, each of these clusters includes different formulas.

Plurality-Majority Formulas

• First-past-the-post (FPTP) in single-member districts. The candidate with the highest number of votes is elected.

• FPTP in multi-member districts, with no panachage allowed (the Party Block Vote): The candidates on the party list with the highest number of votes are all elected.

• FPTP in multi-member districts, with panachage allowed (the Block Vote):

There are two possible ballot arrangements:

1. No distinct competition for each seat, voter has as many votes as there are seats to be filled in district. The candidates with the highest number of votes are elected.
2. Each seat in the district is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat "A", Seat "B", etc.), with one distinct competition for each seat, and each elector has a vote for each seat. In this case, the candidates with the highest number of votes for each seat are elected.

• Two-Round system in single-member districts: On the first ballot, the candidate with a majority of the vote is elected. If no candidate obtains a majority, a second ballot is held at a later date.

There may be no restriction as to who may stand [at the second ballot], there may be a threshold eliminating the weaker candidates, or only the two strongest candidates may stand [at the second ballot]. In each instance the candidate with the highest number of votes is elected.

• Two-round system in multi-member districts, with closed lists, no panachage allowed: Voters cast a vote for a party list. On the first ballot, the candidates on the party list with a majority of the vote are all elected. If no party list obtains a majority, a second ballot is held at a later date.

• There may be no restriction as to who may stand at the second ballot, there may be a threshold eliminating the weaker party lists, or only the two strongest party lists may stand at the second ballot. In any case, the candidates on the party list with the highest number of votes are all elected.

• Two-round system in multi-member districts, with panachage allowed.

There are two possible ballot arrangements:

1. Each seat is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat "A", Seat "B", etc.), with one distinct competition for each seat. Voters cast one vote for each seat. Votes are counted separately for each seat. On the first ballot, the candidate with a majority of the vote is elected. If no candidate obtains a majority, a second ballot is held at a later date (e.g. one or two weeks later).

There may be no restriction as to who may stand at the second ballot, or there may be a threshold eliminating the weaker candidates, or only the two strongest candidates may stand at the second ballot: in any case, the candidates with the highest number of votes are all elected.

1. No distinct competition for each seat; voter has as many votes as there are seats to be filled. In this case, candidates who have a majority of the vote are elected. If some seats remain unfilled after the first ballot, a second ballot is to be held later, with voters casting as many votes as there remain seats to be filled.

There may be no restriction as to who may stand at the second ballot, or there may be a threshold eliminating the weaker candidates. In either case, voters cast as many votes as there are members to be elected at this second ballot, and the candidates with the highest number of votes are elected.

• Alternative voting in single-member districts; Voters express preferences for each candidate by numbering each one consecutively (1, 2, 3, etc.). The candidate who obtains a majority of first preferences is elected. If no candidate obtains a majority of first preferences, the weakest candidate is eliminated and the second preferences on his or her ballot papers are transferred to the candidates for whom they are expressed. If necessary, this process is repeated until a candidate obtains a majority of the vote.

• Alternative vote in multi-member districts: Each seat is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat "A", Seat "B", etc.), with one distinct single-member competition for each seat. For each seat, voters express preferences for each candidate by numbering each one consecutively (1, 2, 3, etc.). For each seat, votes are counted, preferences eventually distributed and members elected as if it were a single-member seat with alternative voting (see above).

Semi-Proportional Systems

• Limited vote: Takes place within multi-member districts. Voters cast a number of votes that are lower than the number of seats to be filled. The candidates with the highest number of votes are elected.

• Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV): Takes place within multi-member districts. Same as for the limited vote, except that irrespective of the number of seats to be filled, voters cast a single vote.

• Parallel Systems: This system combines members elected in local districts by plurality or majority, and regional or national members elected by PR. Both plurality (or majority) and PR apply throughout the country. Both systems operate independently of each other. Notably, PR seats are filled without any consideration of the results in single-member districts.

• Parallel-Mixed coexistence systems: In this kind of mix, some districts within the country use either a plurality or majority formula, while in the other districts some form of PR is used. No formula applies to the whole country.

Proportional Representation (PR) - Multi-Member Districts

• PR with closed list, no panachage between lists: the party on the party list ranks candidates. Voters cast a single vote for one of the parties. Seats are distributed in proportion to the votes cast for each party list. Within each party list, seats go to the candidates ranked higher on the party list.

• PR list with panachage allowed: Voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled. They distribute those votes as they wish among candidates, irrespective of parties. The votes cast for candidates from each party are aggregated, and seats are distributed in proportion to the votes cast for the candidates of each party. The seats won by each party go to those candidates who obtained the highest number of personal votes. It is also possible to cast a single party vote, which is deemed to be one vote for each candidate sponsored by that party.

• PR list where preference votes for individual candidates are allowed: This is a diverse group with a general principle that voters vote for a party, but may register a preference for one or many individual candidates within that list, or cross out the name of one or many individual candidates within that list. Some jurisdiction’s legislation provides that individual preference votes will not be considered if they amount to less than a given percentage (e.g. 10 percent) of all ballots cast for that party, and that candidates will be elected according to their position on the party list.

At least five different scenarios have been found:

1. Scenario A - Voters must vote for a single individual candidate only. This vote is also deemed to be a vote for the party sponsoring that individual. Seats are first distributed among parties on the basis of the total number of votes cast for all candidates sponsored by that party. Thereafter, within each list, seats go to the candidates obtaining the highest number of individual votes.
2. Scenario B - Voters can only vote for a single individual candidate, and this vote is also deemed to be a vote for the party sponsoring that individual. Seats are first distributed among parties on the basis of the total number of votes cast for all candidates sponsored by that party.

Thereafter, for each party, a "list quota" is computed. This is the result of the division of the number of votes cast for the party by the number of seats it won. Candidates whose personal preference votes are equal to or higher than the quota are elected. The votes obtained by these candidates surplus to the list quota are then transferred to the other candidates in the order of listing. However, candidates who obtained more than half of the list quota are given priority when votes are transferred, irrespective of their position on the list. The other candidates remain in the order in which they originally appeared on the ballot papers. Candidates are then elected on the basis of the order in which they appear on the amended list.

1. Scenario C - Voters may vote either for a party list or for one individual candidate within a party list. Seats are first distributed among parties on the basis of the total number of votes cast for that party and for each of the candidates representing that party. The total number of votes cast for a party and its candidates is divided by the number of seats won by that party, plus one. The result is an "eligibility number". As party votes are deemed to indicate an acceptance by the elector of the rank-ordering of candidates determined by the party, party votes are then transferred to the highest-ranking candidate on the list, and added to his or her personal votes.

The surplus of party votes (i.e. the difference between the total number of party votes and the eligibility number) is then transferred to the second candidate on the party list and added to his or her personal votes, and on and on until all party votes have been allocated to individual candidates.

Then, the candidates with the highest number of votes, both party and personal, are elected.

1. Scenario D - Voters must vote for a party list and may, in addition, vote for one or many of the candidates within that list. Seats are first distributed among parties on the basis of party votes. Then, within each list, seats will go to the candidates obtaining the highest number of individual votes, provided that at least 10 percent of the ballots cast for the party include individual preferences. Otherwise, seats go to the highest-ranked candidates.
2. Scenario E - Voters must vote for a party list. In addition, they may vote for one of the candidates within that list or cross out the name of a candidate within that list. Seats are first distributed among parties on the basis of party votes. Each candidate's personal votes are increased by the number of votes cast for his or her party, and decreased by the number of ballots on which his or her name was crossed out. Then, seats go to the candidates who got the highest figures after those computations have been made.

• Single Transferable Vote (STV): Voters express preferences for candidates by numbering each one consecutively (1, 2, 3, etc.). The number of first preferences obtained by each candidate is counted. A quota is ascertained by dividing the total number of first preference votes cast for all candidates by the number of seats in the district, increased by one. Candidates who obtain a number of first preference votes higher than the quota are elected. If seats remain to be filled, the second preferences on the ballot papers of elected candidates are transferred to other candidates, in proportion to the number of votes they obtained in excess of the quota. If seats remain to be filled after that operation, the weakest candidates are eliminated and the second preferences expressed on their ballot papers are transferred to other candidates

• Mixed Member Proportional Systems. This system also combines members elected in local districts by plurality or majority, and regional or national members elected by PR. Both plurality (and majority) and PR apply throughout the country. However, PR seats are distributed to provide each party with an overall number of seats proportional to its share of the vote.

Different Types and Requirements for Vote Counting

This file introduces the two files dealing with the differences in where vote counting can take place, viz. the voting station or at another centrally located counting centres, and, the differences in how vote counting occurs.

Where the vote counting takes place

Vote counting takes place either at:

1. the voting station,
2. centrally located counting centres, or
3. a combination of voting stations and counting centres.

Most jurisdictions count votes at the voting stations, rather than transport them to a central counting venue. This enhances transparency as there is no need to transport the ballot boxes and there can be no perception of ballot box tampering during the transportation. It also provides for timeous counting as there is no delay transporting and delivering the ballot boxes. Counting at counting centers may be a cost determining factor as fewer counting officers will need to be recruited and paid.

However, in jurisdictions vulnerable to electoral fraud, counting at centrally located counting centers may be perceived as providing for opportunities to tamper with the ballot boxes, during the period when the ballot boxes are transported.

Some jurisdictions may use a combination of both locations for vote counting, giving the electoral management body the discretion to determine when it may be necessary to count some voting stations’ votes at a centrally located counting centre.

One such reason may be that the voting station is in a politically volatile area and it may be difficult for the security forces to protect the voting station staff once results are announced.

How counting occurs

Each jurisdiction determines, in their legislation, the process of vote counting that will be undertaken. Generally accepted best practice requires that vote counting has the following elements:

• verification and reconciliation of the ballots and other voting material,
• sorting of the ballots into piles representing the different political parties, candidates and, in the case of referendum, choices,
• counting of the ballots,
• completion of the results sheets or statement of votes,
• capturing the results,
• announcement of results.
   

Each jurisdiction will determine the combination of counting elements, and the content and process of each element, in their vote counting process.

Some jurisdictions will choose to conduct their vote counting manually, others will use and automated process and others, a combination of the two, e.g. where the results are tallied manually but captured and conveyed to a central point electronically.

In determining the process of vote counting it is important to maintain the integrity of the electoral process. Too frequently vote counting is not given the attention that it needs by electoral administrators and managers, whereas it is the most fundamental element of the electoral process, as it is most vulnerable to fraud and manipulation.

It is during vote counting that an election can be won or lost and unless it is conducted in a transparent and accountable manner by the electoral management body, it may be perceived by the public and international observers as being flawed.

Throughout each step of the counting process there needs to be a series of checks and balances to ensure the integrity of the process and to allow for objections and challenges by those contesting the elections; political parties and candidates. A process of checks and balances is seminal to a professional, effective and reflective vote counting process.

 

Image:

Timor-Leste Holds Second National Village Elections Under UNMIT Supervision by United Nations Photo is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.0 Generic.

Differences in terms of Where the Counting is Held

The counting of votes can take place at the site that is used for voting (voting station) or a more centralized counting location, either at the district level, municipal level or regional level. In some jurisdictions all counting takes place centrally at the national level.

Advantages of Counting at the Voting Station

The main advantages of vote counting at voting stations are speed, cost effectiveness and transparency. As the vote counting can start as soon as the voting station closes, interim results can be released faster than at a counting centre. For an average estimate, a poll of four hundred voters, counted categorically, could take less than two hours. Since the same staff receive, count, and transport the ballots from and to the local office, fewer personnel are involved in the overall process.

This reduces the pressure of logistics, eliminating the need to identify counting centres, recruit and train additional personnel, develop or procure specific materials. Also, physical requirements are mostly identical to those used for the voting procedures: table, chairs, forms, pencils, calculator, fasteners, seals, etc.

Since the ballot boxes are kept at the same place where the vote took place, the same voting station officers, national and international electoral observers, party representatives and candidates stay during the counting process.

This makes supervision easier for the person in charge of the voting station. Counting at voting stations indirectly promotes participation of the population since the process is closer to their home, making the results more tangible. The process then tends to be regarded as open, accessible, and legitimate.

Not only does it demonstrate transparency, but it can also enhance public confidence, especially if voting station officers are carrying out their duties in the same area in which they live.

There is no need to move the ballot boxes from the voting station to the alternative counting centre. The integrity of the voting and counting process may be severely affected if there is a perception that the ballot boxes may have been/or were tampered with during the transit to the counting centres.

Opportunities for fraud will always exist, but safeguards can be developed to make them difficult when votes are counted at a voting station and transmitted in duplicate to local offices.

Disadvantages

One disadvantage of counting at voting stations is the long hours required of the personnel involved in the process. It is quite common for voting to open at 6h00 and close at 20h00 or later, followed by a two hour or longer counting process. This would mean a very long working day for the voting and counting officers.

Since they are not allowed to leave the voting station during the day, this may increase the possibility of mistakes when the time comes to count the ballots and fill out the forms. To avoid this adequate food, water, and sanitary facilities should be provided.

In terms of security, it is harder to protect many voting stations than one or several counting centres. This can be an important issue in highly contested elections taking place in a violent area or politically charged environment. However, this factor may not be important if security is already provided during voting day/s.

The presence at the voting station of people with high political profiles from the community can be intimidating for some workers in the voting station during the count.

In some circumstances, counting at a voting station may also affect the secrecy of the vote, once the results are known. Post-election intimidation and threats to voters from a voting station can be made by political parties, if it is known that nearly all voters voted in a particular manner. This factor is minimized, but not entirely eliminated, in the case of counting centres based on electoral districts.

There is a risk that the counting criteria for rejecting ballots and reporting results will be inconsistent between voting stations The risk of these problems arising decreases when effective and detailed training and instruction is provided.

A reliable communication system is required for transmission of voting station statements of the votes to a central location. Depending on the number of voting stations, the local office may need the capacity in their communication system to handle several voting station results coming in at the same time. If a system failure occurs, then all the results are delayed.

This affects the speed of releasing the results, which may generate uncertainty in the political environment. In some countries where telecommunications networks are not well developed, this can be a major problem leading to mistrust of the system and accusations of manipulation or fraud.

Counting at Counting Centres

Some jurisdictions conduct their counting at central counting centres.

Rationale for Counting Centres

A counting centre approach may be used in the following situations:

• when voting stations are not properly equipped for counting;

• when there are very few party or candidate representatives or observers available to observe the count in a large number of voting stations;

• when a complex ballot makes the count too time-consuming and complicated for the voting station officers to manage after the close of the station, warranting the specially trained personnel and facilities that a counting centre can offer.

A complicated ballot could be one on which several questions are posed on the same ballot; or when voters have to prioritise their choices;

• when the secrecy of the vote preference of an individual may be compromised by the announcement of results in voting stations with very few voters;

• when the secrecy of a community's vote preference needs to be safeguarded due to the threat of violence, repercussions, or intimidation in politically volatile situations;

• when security conditions are such that it is deemed easier to secure the protection of a smaller number of counting centres rather than of a large number of voting stations;

• when a mechanical or computerised counting system requires centralisation.

In a counting centre approach, where ballots from two or more elections are mixed together, with results published by counting centre instead of by voting station, it is more difficult to link communities with affiliation.

This may help to protect the secrecy of the voting pattern, especially in some small communities (normally the ballots are counted by voting station but the centre approach will give the possibility to merge).

Even in countries where the count is predominantly done at voting stations, one or more counting centres can ease administration for certain types of ballots.

This includes absentee votes, mail votes from armed forces, diplomatic missions, refugees, incarcerated persons or persons residing outside their electoral district which may come from various voting stations, local or abroad, or directly from the voters (by mail).

Such ballots can be forwarded to the appropriate counting centre and added to the ballots from applicable voting, making counting easier to organise and easier to protect the secrecy of such absentee votes.

There may be many counting centres or there may be only one national counting centre.

The limit to the level of centralisation will be the level at which votes are translated into a number of legislators or seats. In a First Past the Post (FPTP) system the counting centre may be at the electoral district level (at a town hall, for example) but not at the national level.In a proportional representation system based on regional lists, a counting centre may not be more centralised than the region that the list is based on.

Differences in terms of How the Counting is Done

Irrespective of the method of vote counting; manual or automated, each jurisdictions vote counting process should consist of the following:

• verification and reconciling of the ballots and other voting material,
• sorting of the ballots into piles representing the different political parties, candidates and, in the case of referendum, choices,
• counting of the ballots,
• completion of the results forms or statement of results,
• capturing the results,
• announcement of results.

Verification

Verification includes:

• Recording the number of unused ballots and spoiled ballots. (Spoiled ballots are those that a voter has inadvertently spoiled by marking it incorrectly, and then exchanged for a new blank ballot, or ballots that are improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote secrecy):
• Determining the total of number of voters who voted according to the voter’s list;
• Unsealing the ballot box and counting the number of ballots;
• Reconciling the number of ballots in the box with the number of voters according to the voters' list or other record of the total number of persons who cast ballots.

Sorting

The ballots are sorted according to political parties or candidates (in the case of referendums, by choices).

In some jurisdictions party and candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the sorting by objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in writing, as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the counting will then have to determine action on the objection (see Criteria to determine when votes should count as valid).

Counting

The counting officers then count the number of votes cast for each party or candidate.

In some jurisdictions party and candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the counting by objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in writing, as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the counting will then have to determine action on the objection.

The counting officer will set aside challenged ballots and determine acceptance or rejection of challenged ballots according to established rules. (see Criteria to determine when votes should count as valid).

Completing the results sheet or statement of the vote and capturing the results

The statement of the vote, or the results sheet, is compiled, signed, and transmitted to a local office before being transmitted to the regional or national level. Representatives of political parties and national and international electoral observers can copy the results.

There is no interruption in the process until the statement of the vote of the voting station is released and sent to the local office of the electoral management body. Once the counting process is completed, electoral materials are taken to a local office for secure storage.

Interim results are also sent to the national level and publicized. Special measures and procedures need to be followed during the entire counting process in case results are challenged.

As with all other aspects of conducting an election, there are administrative considerations which are directly or indirectly related to vote counting at voting stations. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with it.

Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the ballots, and if they do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, be allowed to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count.

Using a count sheet, all valid ballots are recorded, as well as spoiled and rejected ballots. All ballots are counted and none are destroyed. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote.

The ballot box can then be re-sealed (with the new seal number duly noted by party and candidate representatives and observers), and appropriate counting documentation can either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope.

Party and candidate representatives should have the opportunity affix their seals or signatures to the resealed ballot box/es.

The results recorded on the statement of the vote will be communicated by the counting official to the local/national office of the electoral management body by telephone or other means. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers, if present, can make a copy of the statement, where the law provides for such.

The count at the voting station itself is now over, and all the electoral materials may be transported to a secure local storage room. In the event of a recount, all the prepared documents are needed, so elaborate precautions, and sealing the ballot box contents, are important.

The local/national office of the electoral management body totals the results transmitted by all voting stations of the electoral district, as well as results of any special ballots, advance polls, mobile voting stations, etc.

Interim results should include all types of ballots, so as to avoid discrepancies between interim results and final results. In addition, these results should be for each political party and candidate and posted on a wall, board, or spreadsheet, as they become available.

Unofficial interim results should be publicized as soon as possible. This is often done by the media or political parties, leaving the announcement of final results to the electoral management body.

In the following days, the local offices of the electoral management body may perform the final count and prepare the official results. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply.

Manual or automated vote counting, or a combination of both?

While the use of manually counted paper ballots is still the most common method of voting, automated methods of voting and vote counting are becoming more accessible and effective, and more countries are opting to use them.

Automated technology can be cheaper, faster, and more accurate than manual counting.

It can also improve the democratic process by making the counting of complex electoral systems easier to use.

Technological approaches can be used to replace traditional paper ballots. Voting directly using mechanical or electronic devices, or using machine-readable ballots, can eliminate the need to count ballots manually and greatly speed up the counting process.

Computing technology is often used to count the results of manual ballot counts, to produce summaries at the counting centre, and regional, or national level. Standard off-the-shelf office software products, such as spreadsheet or relational database software, can be used to aggregate individual counts and produce summary totals and various reports, either in paper or electronic format.

Computer vote counting systems require care to function correctly. Faulty calculations, data entry errors, or loss of data can seriously compromise the conduct of an election.

Rigorous testing is necessary to ensure electronic election systems work flawlessly before they are placed in production, even if they are to be used only to compile preliminary results, or used only for a short time.

Data entry forms should be designed to minimize error and to facilitate the data entry process. It is common practice to design data input forms so that they mirror the data entry screen. Training of persons who manually complete these forms must stress the importance of legibility and arithmetic accuracy.

As with any vote counting process, it is crucial that checks and balances be built into any computerized counting system. Clear audit trails should be in place to track the progress of the count. Balancing figures should be used to check that output results are consistent with inputs.

For example, it should not be possible to calculate a total vote figure for any level of counting that is higher than the number of ballot papers issued to voters at that level.

Data entered into a computerized vote counting system should always be checked against the original input data. This can be done by checking figures after data entry against the input documents, or by entering each set of data twice, using different operators to produce a parallel count.

Contingency plans should also be built into any computerized vote counting system. Data should be regularly backed up (and stored off-site if the counting proceeds for some time). Spare hardware should be available in case of hardware failure. Where a network server is used, it is common to have a duplicate server set up that can take over if the main server fails.

Technicians should be on hand if problems arise. Back up power supplies should be available to guard against power failure, even in the most developed countries.

Power supplies should be protected against power surges that can corrupt or destroy computer files. Even simple steps, such as regularly saving live data from RAM memory to hard disk, are sometimes overlooked, and can cause serious problems.

Worst-case scenarios should also be anticipated. Provision should be made to switch to a completely manual operation if the computer system fails and cannot be recovered. Portable calculators are valuable emergency devices. (See Elections and Technology).

Basic Criteria and Procedures for Vote Counting

In every jurisdiction there are basic criteria and procedures for vote counting that the electoral management body needs to adopt and implement, to ensure that vote counting is accurate and a true reflection of the votes cast by the voters.

Simplicity of the counting system

Counting rules should be clear, known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general public, political parties, candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national and international electoral observers.

In addition to this, some jurisdictions have legislated processes that need to be adhered to in the vote counting process. Also, it is desirable that information and training programmes on the count itself be provided to all participants in the electoral process, these include vote counting officers, electoral officials, political parties, candidates, international and national observers and the media.

Counting rules, including criteria for rejecting ballots, should be clear, agreed upon and known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general public, political parties, candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national and international electoral observers.

Checks and balances in the vote counting process

Clear responsibility and accountability for each stage of the counting process are important. At the national level, the electoral management body should be accountable. At the electoral district level, it may be a senior election officer or commission official.

At voting stations, specified voting station officers may be responsible for voting and counting. Clearly defined complaints and appeals processes are also important. There should be structures in place with the authority and competency to address complaints and appeals. These may include political party liaison committees, conflict management and resolution bodies and legal structures.

Observers, both national and international, and the media, can play an important role in the oversight of the counting process and provide an essential perception that the counting takes place in an open and transparent manner. Clear audit trails are essential in ensuring accountability.

Competent and well trained staff

The success of vote counting rests on the competency, professionalism and non-partisan conduct of the counting officers. Best practice requires that counting staff undergo vigorous recruitment and training.

Men and women should be recruited on an equal basis, according to their ability to carry out the duties required in an unbiased and professional manner. Other criteria may include speaking at least one of the local languages and previous electoral experience.

In a jurisdiction that is emerging from conflict, these requirements may not be appropriate and it may be expedient to have people from outside the area working as voting station and counting staff. Some jurisdictions require that voting station staff be qualified voters and/or live within the same electoral district where they will be working on election day. These criteria should be publicized and known to all candidates and political parties to ensure the transparency of the process.

The electoral laws may restrict who can be recruited as counting staff. In some jurisdictions, counting staff are nominated by political parties in proportion to the number of votes or seats won at the previous election.

The parties draw up lists and refer the names of acceptable personnel to the responsible local election official. Workers who are nominated by a political party, but appointed by the local electoral management body, must agree to carry out all their duties in a neutral and non-partisan manner.

The level of training provided to voting station and/or counting staff will vary according to local conditions and the seniority of their position. Local election officials, electoral managers in charge of counting and counting centres, usually receive more detailed training than more junior counting officers.

Senior officials should be trained well before voting day. Ideally, junior officials should be trained before voting day, with a briefing session on voting day, before voting starts.

Where voting station officials conduct counting, training for the count will take place in conjunction with training for voting. A typical training programme for senior officials will include face-to-face training conducted by a qualified instructor, audio-visual training aides (if available), training manuals, and simulation exercises.

In some cases, voting station staff will receive training manuals to read and sample exercises to complete at home before attending training. More junior officials can be trained in a similar manner, or trained by their supervisors after the supervisors have been appropriately trained.

Conducting a counting simulation is a very effective learning tool, that helps to visualize the counting process, and pre-empt problems that may arise, by including examples of ballots that may be open to objection, and by practising filling in forms.

It is desirable to make attendance at training a mandatory condition of employment of counting staff. In order to encourage people to attend training, it is usual to pay them an appropriate allowance or fee.

In some countries, professional trainers will be used instead of the local election officials to conduct voting station and counting staff training sessions. Sometimes a small group of professional trainers will train other trainers, who will then go into the field to conduct the training directly to the voting station and counting staff on behalf of the electoral management body.

Processes for appeal and review

In addition to being able to object to a decision of the counting officer during verification and reconciliation, sorting and counting, it is important that political parties and candidates are given an opportunity to appeal to higher authorities.

The legislation may provide for appeal and review mechanisms to the most senior structure within the electoral management body, to be decided within a defined time period, and the decision to be conveyed to the person bringing the appeal or review.

A further appeal to the decision of the electoral management body may go to the ordinary court structure or to a specially convened electoral tribunal or court, such as an electoral court, staffed with qualified, non partisan judges.

In a highly contested political environment the legislation should stipulate a time period wherein a decision should be made. If legislation allows for an indefinite period, the uncertainty of electoral result may result in conflict and violence.

Criteria to Determine when Votes should Count as Valid

Invalid Votes

Generally accepted principles stipulate that the following categories of votes should be regarded as invalid and should not be counted:

• votes that are blank (there is no marking on the ballot),
• votes that identify the voter,
• votes that contain markings for more than one choice (this depends upon the electoral system used and will be expected where the voter has to make more than one choice or rank his or her choices),
• votes that do not reflect the intention or choice of the voter.

This last category of invalid vote is often very difficult to evaluate and assess and it may be open to different interpretations depending on who the counting officer is. It is thus important that the training of counting officers includes documentation (visuals) of ballot markings that are valid and those that are not valid.

The overall rule that should be followed is whether the counting officer can reasonably determine the intention of the voter. An example of such would be when a voter, instead of placing a mark next to his or her intended choice, writes “yes” next to the party or candidate’s name. This could reasonably be seen as an intention to vote for that party or candidate.

The rules for criteria to determine a valid vote need to be clear, yet the counting officer who makes the decision whether to accept a ballot or not should not apply the rules dogmatically, but should allow for a degree of flexibility if the voter’s intention can be reasonably assessed.

Examples of valid and invalid votes

Some examples of valid and invalid ballots follow:

1. - the marking extends into the space for another candidate or party. If most of the marking is placed next to one candidate or party it should be taken as valid for that candidate or party.

Special Considerations for Counting Votes Cast Outside the Country

In some jurisdictions provision is made for voting outside the country. The legislation will provide for the requirements of each jurisdiction. Generally categories of voters outside the country include people working at embassies, consuls and trade missions, soldiers and personnel on security duty outside the country, people studying or working outside the country, those traveling outside the country and, in some instances people who are resident outside the country.

Votes cast by people outside the country are called special ballots. Special ballots are usually returned to the national office of the electoral management body. In some legislation, absentee voting takes place in embassies. If this is the case, then ballots are counted locally in the foreign country, following the same procedures as ballots counted in the country, and results are then communicated directly to the head office of the electoral management body.

Depending on the rules of the system used, the legal framework and the logistics in place, the ballots returned by mail might be received only five days prior to voting day, or up until voting day itself. If special ballots are accepted until election day, counting procedures should be designed so as not to let the count delay the publication of interim results. 

Envelopes received at the nation office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. If different types of ballots are used, different colours of return envelopes for each category of voters using the special ballots are recommended. This helps to speed up the sorting of the envelopes at reception.

Once at the national office, a first verification for creating the audit trail is done: receipt of ballots, comparison of the identity of the voter, signature and bar codes (if used), etc. The voter should have been provided with three envelopes: a pre-addressed return envelope, an outer envelope on which the signature of the voter appears, and finally, the secrecy envelope or inner envelope containing the ballot. This secrecy envelope has no marks on it, in order to protect the secrecy of the vote.

First, the returned envelope is opened on receipt, and the outer envelope (containing a secret envelope) is removed. If the identification of the voter is positive, the external envelope is opened, and the secrecy envelope (but not the ballot) is then removed from and inserted into a ballot box.

Depending on the deadline given to return the special ballots, the counting may start before election day, or at the beginning of election day, or at the close of voting on election day.

However, counting these ballots may take a very long time, depending on the volume of ballots to process and the procedures used. Counting special ballots before election day is common and generally recommended, but special security is necessary to ensure the results are only released when the results of ordinary elections are known. For the advance voting, and sometimes, for incarcerated voters, counting procedures are quite different.

If the advance voting takes place over several days, a reconciliation may be done at the end of each day. Some jurisdictions require that the ballot box be opened at the end of each advance voting day, and unused ballots, used ballots (which are not counted) and spoiled ballots be sealed in separate envelopes, as well as the voter's list and the voting book. This measure is mainly for control and creation of a full audit trail of ballot usage.

For incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance voting may also be applied, but only if the vote took place prior to election day.

The ballot boxes for advance voting are kept safely until the closing of ordinary voting on election day. The counting process for these ballots starts at the same time as for the ordinary voting. If possible, the same voting officers who took the votes for the advance voting should be there for the counting. Counting of these ballots should take place at the regional/district office of the electoral management body in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates. The counting procedures are virtually identical to the ones used for counting at ordinary voting.

For the purposes of creating separate audit trails, and for properly reporting the results of advance voting, and special ballots, these unique voting procedures should not be confused with ordinary voting. This difference should be made very clear with distinctive statement of the votes forms used for these types of ballots.

Transport Arrangement for the Transport of Votes from Outside the Country

Transportation of ballots across national boundaries and throughout the world will require a different approach from domestic arrangements and involve very careful planning. Time zones, customs, carrier's schedules, and other types of delays in transport may impact the starting date and hour of the counting process.

If the vote abroad takes place in embassies and consulates only, diplomatic bags may be used, avoiding delays at customs. However, such deliveries may not be made as frequently or rapidly as is required.

If the international vote is highly decentralised and takes place in major cities where expatriates are found, then a world-renowned courier firm with extensive worldwide coverage would be more suitable for the transport of ballots. Carriers that have divisions specialising in transporting securities should be approached as they are able to provide well designed tracing mechanisms including logs to control and secure packages throughout the route to their final destination.

They also tend to possess a broad knowledge of diverse customs regulations and practices, which may alleviate many of the potential delays related to them.

Once the electoral management body agrees with a carrier on security measures during transportation, an intimate knowledge of the pick-up and delivery schedules is recommended since this is essential in planning the activities for receiving ballots at the counting centre.

Ideally the counting centre location should be close to the airport/hub where the selected carrier intends to deliver the ballot boxes to minimise transportation delays once the ballots arrive in the country of destination. If appropriate, political party and candidate representatives and electoral management body officials should be at the airport/hub to deal with unexpected delivery problems and expedite processing. In some jurisdictions the ballots will be delivered to the central counting centre, that may not be near the delivery hub.

Publicity around the transit facilities should be limited to those who require this knowledge. Throughout the process, the electoral management body should designate a specific individual or unit to deal with the carrier and to resolve contracting, logistical and security problems as they arise.

For ballots that are sent by mail, arrangements should be made with the national postal service to conduct a special sorting of overseas ballots before the ballot return deadline. In addition, special deliveries should be planned to the designated counting centre to maximise the number of ballots received before the deadline date and hour. A specific code on the return address may facilitate such activity and should be planned with the national postal service authorities, according to their practices, well before printing the address on the mail vote return envelopes.

Procedures for Vote Counting at Voting Stations

In general, the major process components of vote counting at a voting station are:

• opening the ballot box,

• sorting ballots,

• reconciling the ballots,

• counting the ballots,

• transmitting the results to the local office or the headquarters of the electoral management body.

Following the closing of voting, ballot boxes are kept at the voting station for vote counting. The following procedures are executed:

• recording the number of unused ballots and spoiled ballots. (Spoiled ballots are those that a voter has inadvertently spoiled by marking it incorrectly, and then exchanged for a new blank ballot, or ballots that are improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote secrecy.)

• determining the total of number of voters who voted according to the voter’s list;

• unsealing the ballot box and counting the number of ballots;

• reconciling the number of ballots in the box with the number of voters according to the voters' list or other record of the total number of persons who cast ballots;

• sorting the ballots by candidate or party;

• counting the ballots; and

• setting aside challenged ballots and determining acceptance or rejection of challenged ballots according to established rules.

The statement of the vote, or the results sheet, is compiled, signed, and transmitted to a local office before being transmitted to the regional or national level. Representatives of political parties and national and international electoral observers can copy the results.

There is no interruption in the process until the statement of the vote of the voting station is released and sent to the local office of the electoral management body. Once the counting process is completed, electoral materials are taken to a local office for secure storage.

Interim results are also sent to the national level and publicized. Special measures and procedures need to be followed during the entire counting process in case results are challenged. As with all other aspects of conducting an election, there are administrative considerations which are directly or indirectly related to vote counting at voting stations. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with its respective processes.

At the closing of the voting station, voting station officers and other authorized persons such as party and candidate representatives and observers remain in the voting station and start the counting process.

In some jurisdictions the voting station layout is changed to reflect a layout more conducive to the counting process.

A first reconciliation of ballots may be done before opening the ballot box. Spoiled ballots are counted and put aside. Once the ballot box is emptied of its contents, the validity of each ballot is verified and the ballots are sorted into different piles reflecting the choice of the voter.

The votes are then counted into valid ballots (by candidate/political party) and rejected ballots (a ballot found in the ballot box is rejected because it was improperly marked, or is not marked at all when a mark is required) (see Criteria to Determine when Votes should Count as Valid). Clear rules of interpretation or guidelines regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting staff in advance, to facilitate the decision-making process regarding rejections.

Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the ballots, and if they do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, be allowed to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count.

Using a count sheet, all valid ballots are recorded, as well as spoiled and rejected ballots. All ballots are counted and none are destroyed. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote. The ballot box can then be re-sealed (with the new seal number duly noted by party and candidate representatives and observers), and appropriate counting documentation can either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope. Party and candidate representatives should have the opportunity affix their seals or signatures to the resealed ballot boxes.

The results recorded on the statement of the vote will be communicated by the counting official to the local/national office of the electoral management body by telephone or other means. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers, if present, can make a copy of the statement, where the law provides for such.

The count at the voting station itself is now over, and all the electoral materials may be transported to a secure local storage room. In the event of a recount, all the prepared documents are needed, so elaborate precautions, and sealing the ballot box contents, are important.

The local/national office of the electoral management body totals the results transmitted by all voting stations of the electoral district, as well as results of any special ballots, advance voting, mobile voting stations, etc. Interim results should include all types of ballots so as to avoid discrepancy between interim results and final results. In addition, these results should be for each political party and candidate and posted on a wall, board, or spreadsheet, as they become available.

Unofficial interim results should be publicized as soon as possible. This is often done by the media or political parties, leaving the announcement of final results to the electoral management body. In the following days, the local offices of the electoral management body may perform the final count and prepare the official results. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply.

Training

Appropriate training is essential to be able to implement such vote counting procedures at voting stations. Training requirements, as well as all other administrative considerations, need to be included in the budget for the election or referendum.

Non-partisanship

An important aspect of free and fair elections is the requirement that voting station and counting officers are non-partisan. Once a person agrees to work as a voting station or counting officer on election day, he/she also agrees to be non-partisan throughout the entire process. Most jurisdictions require that all voting station and counting officers sign an oath to ensure that they conduct their responsibilities in a non-partisan and unbiased way.

The importance of non-partisanship remains critical during the counting process. Counting staff should not make any remarks or mention any personal political affiliation or affinity, nor wear or use any partisan materials, during the counting process. Since the counting officers will have to handle disputes over any rejected ballots, he/she will be the first person to deal will representatives of political parties and candidates. This person will also have to take the final decision in validating or rejecting any ballot. Neutrality and non-partisanship are imperative in this decision-making process. The legislation may provide that voting station and counting staff can be legally prosecuted if it can be proved that their work is partisan.

Political parties and candidates should be represented at voting stations during counting and the rules must be the same for all political parties and candidates. Usually, political parties' candidates designate a representative to be present in each voting station to witness the voting and counting processes.

However, it remains the choice of each party as to whether they send a representative. Many jurisdictions consider their presence to be essential to ensure integrity, guarantee consistency, and provide witnesses to the transparency of the process. When the time comes to make an important decision during the voting and counting process, such as modifications to previously completed forms, all party and candidate representatives should sign the forms to demonstrate that they are informed, and agree with the decision. Careful application of such procedures provides tangible evidence that the rules are consistent and the process transparent.

Finally, the electoral management body needs to record the history of each ballot box and seal numbers where applicable, from initial distribution to final collection and storage. The electoral management body should be able to retrace the history of each ballot box, from the moment it leaves the local office of the electoral management body until it returns with the counted ballots.

A proper audit trail will allow the electoral management body to maintain full control, and ensure that possibilities of fraud via ballot box tampering are extremely limited, and can be detected if attempted.

Numbering each voting station, and using the same number for the corresponding ballot box, is one simple method of implementing such a control system. Additionally, the same number should appear on each form used at the voting station. The importance of recording the history of each ballot box (recording ballots book number, serial number of the seals, ballot box number, etc.) becomes clear in cases of judicial recount.

Opening/Closing Ballot Boxes

Several tasks need to be carried out at the opening of the voting to facilitate the vote counting at the closing of voting. The first is to count the total number of ballots originally received (provided by the electoral management body). In countries using one ballot per political party and where envelopes are used, it is important to verify if all parties' ballots are available to voters.

This represents an important aspect of the audit trail, as this figure will be needed to reconcile the number of ballots used/unused after the voting takes place. When the ballots are delivered, prior to the commencement of voting, all ballots (and envelopes where applicable) should be counted, and serial numbers on the counterfoils or ballot book numbers (where applicable) should be verified as well, via inspection of the ballot booklets to ensure completeness. The officer who delivered them should witness the counting of the ballot quantities. He/she should sign a receipt, and a copy should be attached to the voting record book.

In all cases, the information should be written on the ballot accounting form. Depending on the country, and the type of information needed by the electoral management body, in order to reduce duplication of effort, the same information may not need to be recorded in more than one place unless required.

Once the ballots are counted, and proper observations or indications on the appropriate forms are made (if needed), the electoral manager at the voting station should show everyone present that the ballot box is empty, before placing security seals on the ballot box.

The serial number(s) of the seal(s) should be written in the voting record book and in any other appropriate form. The party and candidate representatives present should be given an opportunity to affix their seals or signatures on or next to the security seals of the ballot box. These procedures are very important, as they constitute the start of an important audit trail.

Many mistakes can be prevented by following these procedures. If discrepancies occur, steps can be retraced to the beginning of ballot marking. At no time should any voter remove ballots from the voting station.

Closing the Ballot Boxes

At closing time, the electoral manager in charge of the voting station should announce the official closing of the vote. The electoral manager in charge of the voting station should ensure that only authorized persons allowed to process or witness the count remain inside the voting station. Voting station and/or counting officers, observers, party and candidate representatives should be permitted to stay for the counting process.

If no one except the counting officers are present, the last voters may be asked to stay and witness the counting. All other persons should wait outside the voting station for the interim results.

To facilitate the counting process, the voting station may need to be physically reorganized. Tables are generally placed together for a larger working surface, and chairs, pencils, and a board to post results are put in place.

Summary of Process

At the close of voting, authorized persons and counting officers stay in the voting station and start the counting process. Generally, an average of two hours is needed to complete a count of approximately four hundred to five hundred ballots, if no serious objections are encountered. The time taken to count ballots will depend on the number of staff and the complexity of the voting system and counting procedures.

While the ballot box is still sealed, a reconciliation is done by checking the number of counterfoils (if applicable) indicating ballots given to voters, unused ballots, and spoiled ballots against the total number of ballots issued. The number of voters who voted on election day/s is also counted in order to verify against the number of ballots used (used counterfoils). All discrepancies must be resolved or reported to the electoral management body. The figures are written on a ballot paper account.

Once the first steps are complete, the person in charge of counting can open the ballot box and empty its contents in the centre of the table. The table may have been used during voting, or if no table was used during voting, the electoral management body should ensure that one is present for counting. It is important that the table is large enough so that no ballots will fall on the floor when the ballot box is emptied of its contents.

Seals are verified before ballot boxes are opened in the presence of counting officers, representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers. If only the counting officers are present then the last voters may be asked to stay in order to act as witnesses. Another reconciliation is done once the ballot box is emptied.

A further reconciliation may take place if requested by the representatives of parties and candidates. In all cases, the number of ballots in the box is compared with the number of voters who have voted. No ballots should be missing, nor should the number of ballots in the box exceed the number of voters.

All discrepancies should be reported to the electoral management body and proper modifications or changes made to the forms. As far as possible, everybody involved in the counting process should sign the forms, in order to confirm that the accounting for the ballots was satisfactory, or that they are aware of the source of discrepancy, and that they agree with the decision taken by the counting officer in charge of the count.

The usual forms required for the count are a count sheet, a voting record book, a statement of the vote, and the ballot account form. Envelopes, or bags for ballots, and seals to close the ballot box, or to put on the envelopes are also required. 

Reconciling Ballot Accounts

At the opening of voting, ballots (and envelopes where applicable) received from the electoral management body are counted, and corresponding figures written in the ballot paper account form

At the closing of voting, the first thing to do before sorting and counting the ballots is to count the numbers of used counterfoils (as applicable) and unused envelopes (as applicable), unused ballots, and spoiled ballots. At this stage, the ballot box remains closed.

This total number of ballots should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening. Verification with the number of voters who voted on election day/s should also be done using the marked-up voter's list, and the entries in the voting record book.

It is important that accurate records are kept of the number of ballots used at each voting station. This will enable the electoral management body to demonstrate that all ballots used at each voting station are genuine and that ballots have nor been fraudulently deposited in ballot boxes or removed from the voting station.

Discrepancies

If there are discrepancies in the reconciliation process, the count should be repeated by verifying the observations made in the voting record book for the spoiled ballots, and recounting the unused ballots and the used counterfoils (if applicable).

If discrepancies remain, then verification with a higher authority (with the district electoral officer or the electoral management body) of the number of ballots (and envelopes) sent to the voting station should be done to verify their figures and to inform them of the situation. Keeping higher authorities informed of any problem is part of the transparency required in an election or any electoral event.

If no solution is found, modifications or changes to the voting record book, ballot account forms, count sheets, and statement of the vote forms should be completed in order to reflect the appropriate numbers of ballots. To validate these new figures, and to make sure that everybody who should know is informed of the situation and agrees with it, voting station and counting officers, party and candidate representatives, present at the voting station for the vote count should sign the forms and the voting record book.

Once this first reconciliation is done, the counting officer will verify if the seal is still unbroken and if the serial number is the same as the one recorded at the opening of the voting station. If locks are used, then the person in charge should ask the person with a set of keys to assist in the opening of the ballot box.

This information should be written in the voting record book. The ballot box is then opened and the contents emptied onto a table. These ballots (or envelopes) are counted as well, and compared to figures obtained earlier.

The number of ballots (or envelopes) in the ballot box should match with the number of voters who voted, a number that can be obtained by counting the number of counterfoils as applicable (number of ballots used), unused ballots less the number of spoiled ballots. There should be another reconciliation after the count of the ballots for each candidate/party/option in order to verify that all figures total correctly before making the statement of the vote for the voting station.

In case of discrepancies, the counting process should be repeated ones or twice until the missing ballot or ballots - or an explanation for the discrepancy - are found.

If, after verification, the missing ballots are still not found, then the electoral management body should be informed of the problem, and verification of their ballot accounts should be done (especially verification of the number of ballots sent to the voting station). Once again, if no solution is found, appropriate changes should be made on the forms signed by counting officers and party and candidate representatives. This new figure should become the official one for the voting station.

In some jurisdictions, counting of ballots which cannot be reconciled, or which are not within a certain acceptable variation (i.e. difference is not more than two, three or five ballots), legislation, regulations, or directives may prohibit proceeding with the count. If significant discrepancies are discovered, local rules could apply to the level of action taken.

In some cases, if significant fraud is suspected, it may be necessary to delay opening and counting the contents of a ballot box until the electoral management body investigates the problem and decides what to do with the ballot box. Voting station and counting officers should be made aware of these provisions through their training.

In the case of multiple elections held on the same day, such as presidential elections, municipal elections, and legislative assembly elections, finding ballots in the wrong box is a frequent occurrence. In such cases, the counting officer should transfer the ballot to the appropriate box, reconcile all the ballots, and make a report for each case. This should be followed by a reconciliation count of the ballots and, if no discrepancy is found, the counting officer can proceed with the count.

Sorting

Where there are multiple ballot elections taking place at the same time (presidential, national legislature, and municipal elections on the same day for example), there should be an order of priority for the counting of the ballots, so as to avoid mistakes and confusion in the counting process. This should be part of the rules given to the counting officers during training and in the documentation and training manuals for counting.

Instructions should also be given for procedures to be used when ballots are found in the wrong box. Only one person should handle the initial sorting of ballots; this is often the electoral officer who provided the ballot to each voter on election day. This is particularly important if initials are added on the back of the ballot.

Spoiled ballots should have been separated and counted as part of preparing the ballot paper account. A spoiled ballot is simply one that a voter marks incorrectly, or is somehow unusable, and hands back to voting station officers in exchange for a new ballot. Spoiled ballots should never be placed in the ballot box. In some countries, spoiled ballots are put in a separate envelope and are clearly marked as such. This is to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, as the voter may have indicated how they wanted to vote on the spoiled ballot.

Sorting Procedures

One way of sorting is as follows. Once the ballot box is opened, the counting officer verifies the validity of each ballot in the process of counting. As they proceed with the task, he she needs to be able to distinguish between a valid ballot and a counterfeit (by the watermark or other identifying mark on valid ballot papers). Any identified counterfeit ballots should be set aside, counted, and reported to the electoral management body as an attempt at fraud.

The counting officer will divide up all ballots in terms of the political party or candidate voted for. At the same time, the counting officer can separate all potentially rejectable ballots. After the count of valid ballots is complete, the counting officer must go one-by-one through the pile of potential rejected ballots, and decide on the validity of each one (see Criteria to Determine when Votes should Count as Valid).

Party and candidate representatives will observe the process and have an opportunity to object to the decision made by the counting officer. These objections will form part of the record and will be used if the result is challenged after the announcement of the results.

Potential rejected ballots that are determined to actually be valid are separated by candidate/party/option. All invalid ballots, as well as any counterfeit ballots, are counted and set aside. The counting officer will then add the additional valid ballots decided to the initial number of valid ballots for each candidate/political party/option, and make a total count for each candidate/political party/option.

Rules of interpretation, guidelines, and illustrations regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting officer, and be known in advance by all representatives of parties and candidates and observers, to facilitate the decision making process. In all cases, rejected ballots should be put aside and kept. No ballots may be destroyed.

The separation of rejected ballots is important to create an audit trail of the count, and is an essential component if there is to be a recount of the ballots. Rejected ballots must be closely examined, and the counting officer should announce the reason for rejection of each such ballot.

Political party or candidate representatives should be able to examine the rejected ballots. If party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting officers, they should be able to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. There must be clear rules for recording objections made by representatives of political parties or candidates.

Once the spoiled, counterfeit (if any), and rejected ballots have been separated, the valid ballots can be counted. The counting officer can call out the choice of each voter, and show the ballot, so the political party or candidate representatives, and other persons allowed in the voting station for the counting, are able to see the ballot and make their own count. The various representatives and observers witnessing the count must also be able to see each counted ballot. For greatest efficiency, other counting officers can assist. However, it must be very clear who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot.

Checking Validity of the Ballot

When ballots are sorted, the counting officer needs to distinguish a valid ballot from a counterfeit. Each ballot in the ballot box needs to be verified.

In some jurisdictions, security paper is used for ballots. This paper contains a watermark or other form of unique identification (special colour, lines, symbols, markings or logos) making the ballot virtually impossible to counterfeit. The texture, thickness, colours, size, and format of the ballot are also indicators that separate a valid ballot from counterfeits.

The counting officer should know where to look on the ballot to be sure of its authenticity. If he or she does not recognize the ballot, or the ballot does not have the official identification, then it should not be included in the count. It should not be destroyed but kept in an envelope or file for that purpose.

Authenticating Ballots

To speed up the process of authenticating the ballots, certain jurisdictions require that the counting officer adds his/her initials in a space provided at the back of the ballot before handing it to the voter.

Other jurisdictions provide a validating stamp at the voting station for every ballot to be stamped before handing it to the voter. During counting, a ballot without a stamp is rejected. If the initial system is used and the initials on the ballot are not from the counting officer, then it should be set aside and not counted as a valid ballot. If no initials are on the back of the ballot, but the counting officer recognizes that he or she issued the ballot, he or she can then initial it, and the ballot can be counted as valid.

This measure of adding the counting officer’s initials at the back of the ballot can help to identify valid ballots from counterfeit. The counting officer should always use the same colour of pen or pencil when adding his or her initials. This problem will not exist when a validating stamp is used as described above.

All ballots must be kept, even if they are not valid. No ballots should be destroyed, as an audit trail of all ballots considered must be assembled in such a way that the count can be fully reconstructed.

If there is any doubt, and before taking the decision to reject a ballot as counterfeit, the counting officer should be able to verify the basis of his orher decision with the electoral management body. Rejecting a ballot on the basis that it is counterfeit is an important decision and should be made after careful consideration, as it may have political consequences.

Separating Spoiled and Rejected Ballots

Separating rejected ballots from spoiled ballots is important as the significance of these ballots is very different. Mixing them may seriously impact the audit trail.

Spoiled Ballots

Spoiled ballots should never find their way into the ballot box. A spoiled ballot is generally one that a voter has inadvertently spoiled by marking it incorrectly; it is handed back to the voting station officers in exchange for a new blank ballot that is then marked by the voter and placed in the ballot box.

A spoiled ballot may also be one that is improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote secrecy.

Rejected Ballots

A rejected ballot is one that has made its way into the ballot box, but has been rejected at the count because it was improperly marked, or is not marked at all when a mark is required. The most common criteria to reject a ballot are:

• a ballot with no mark,

• a ballot with a mark for more than one candidate or political party when only one was supposed to be chosen,

• a ballot marked with a type of pen or pencil other than the one provided at the voting station,

• an unofficial mark according to the law or unusual marks,

• a ballot marked so the voter could be identified, or

• a ballot marked in a location prohibited by legislation (outside the circle, etc.)

• a ballot that does not clearly reflect the choice of the voter.

In some jurisdictions, blank ballots (ballots with no marks) are counted separately (and may be considered as protest votes), in others, they are considered to be rejected ballots. In all cases, all ballots are to be kept, and none should be destroyed.

Ballot Envelopes

In countries using envelopes, since marks are not made on the ballot itself, the way to identify a rejected ballot from a valid ballot is different. For example, a rejected ballot will be an envelope with two ballots, an empty envelope, or a ballot in an envelope marked in a way that the secrecy of the voter is compromised, etc.

In many jurisdictions, if the intention of the voter is clear, all types of marks can be accepted. In others, the legislation is very clear on which specific types of marks are to be accepted, even on a write-in ballot.

For these specific cases, those marks should be clearly demonstrated during the training of counting officers and documented in their manual or in the operational guidelines in order to help the counting officer in making his/her decision.

A card summarizing the marks that are to be accepted or rejected, with pictures of sample ballots showing those marks, is a very useful tool that can be inserted in the counting officer’s kit.

Separating Valid Ballots

All ballots are unfolded (if envelopes are used, then all ballots need to be taken out of the envelopes), one by one, and the counting officer makes sure that the ballot is valid.

The counting officer may call out the name of the candidate or political party for whom the ballot has been marked and hold up the ballot for all to see. If several persons are separating and counting the ballots, and identifying those that may be potentially rejected, the practice of calling out names may not be useful. It may, in fact, be more efficient to separate the ballots according to choice (without counting them), setting aside the potentially rejections, and then establish which ballots should be rejected. After the rejections are finalized, the piles of valid ballots for each candidate or party can be counted quickly.

In all cases, only counting officers should handle ballots, and it is the counting officer who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot.

The advantage of showing the ballot and calling out the result of each ballot is that it allows the representatives of political parties and candidates and observers to make their own count. The disadvantage is that the process is interrupted each time a rejected ballot is discovered, which tends to make the count of valid ballots very inefficient and slow.

Whichever method is used, the valid ballot papers are put in separate piles on the table: one pile per candidate or per political party, or per option (in the case of a referendum).

The ballots should be examined in such a way as to permit observers, representatives of political parties or candidates, and other persons allowed in the voting station during the counting process, to see the ballot and ensure that it is appropriately separated according to choice. They should have controlled access to contents of sorted ballots.

If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, they can make official objections. These objections may form the basis of a further challenge to the overall results.

While transparency of the process is important, there should be proper controls on the movement of ballots to ensure that the integrity of the count is not compromised.

Counting

Ballots (and envelopes where applicable) are bundled by groups of ten, for example, in order to facilitate keeping a record of the votes counted. Depending on the number of political parties or candidates, and depending on the number of counting officers, each counting officer can be responsible for receiving and counting all ballots cast for one or more political party or candidate, Later, counting officers can exchange all ballots cast that they were counting and verify each other's totals.

Counting officers count all ballots, including spoiled and rejected ballots. Even if not counted as valid, these ballots are important for the audit trail and will be needed in case of a recount.

To eliminate possible objections over the validity of ballots, the counting officers should be provided with clear rules of interpretation of accepted marks on the ballot, and all reasons that should lead to the rejection of a ballot. Minimizing the interpretation made by the counting officers makes it easier to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots.

If the validity of a ballot is challenged or objected to, then the counting officer should be the only person entitled to make a decision, even if the other counting officers are involved in the counting process. In order to be more consistent in his/her decisions, the counting officer can put all questionable ballots in one separate pile, decide on all rejected ballots following the count of valid ones, and then add any additional valid votes to the appropriate candidate or political party.

Alternatively, the ballots can be separated first, the questionable ones decided, and then each pile can be counted. For each disputed ballot, the ballot should be numbered at the back. The same number should be written in the voting book along with the decision made by the counting officer.

To count the ballots, the counting officers use a count sheet. The representatives of political parties and candidates, and the observers observing the count may have count sheets as well. The official one is the one used by the counting officer in charge of the count.

The count sheet is used to facilitate the count. For each vote for each candidate or party a mark is made on the count sheet. Periodically, the marks for each candidate or party are added together. If a mistake is made during the process, comparison with the count sheets of other counting officers can be made. If the mistake is still not found, the count should be restarted from the last point of agreement.

A verification of the count should be done once the ballots are counted. This verification is usually done before transmission of the interim results to the regional or local district electoral office. Verification is important to make sure that no votes were changed in favour or against one candidate or party. The total number of ballots cast for each candidate or party, plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total of ballots received at the opening of the voting station.

Once the counting process is over, the ballots are bundled and put back into the ballot box along with all relevant forms. The statement of the vote should be in a separate envelope, outside the ballot box. Both the envelope and the ballot box should be sealed before being transported to a secure local storage room. All these documents are needed in case of a recount and the use of precautions for sealing the ballot box contents are important to ensure that al these materials will be available if a recount is required or officially ordered.

For greater security, the counting officers, as well as a representative of the political parties or candidates should sign the seal. The counting officer should keep one official copy in case of loss.

Count of Spoiled and Rejected Ballots

Spoiled, rejected, and unused ballots need to be counted to create a complete audit trail. These ballots remain official documents, even if not counted as valid. Additionally, rejected ballots are essential in case of a recount.

Rules of Interpretation for Rejected Ballots

To eliminate possible objections to the validity of a ballot, the counting officer should be provided with clear rules of interpretation, and illustrations of acceptable and unacceptable marks on the ballot, including the rationale for rejection of a ballot.

Minimizing the interpretation needed by the counting officer makes it easier to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots. In the event of a close margin in favour of one candidate, a recount is likely to be requested, and rejected ballots will be carefully analyzed.

Handling Disputes Regarding Rejections

In some jurisdictions, the counting officer is the only person qualified to make the final decision regarding the validity of a ballot, even if all counting officers are involved in the counting process. He/she is also the person handling disputes regarding objections.

If a representative of a candidate or a political party disagrees with the counting officer on the validity of a ballot, he/she may challenge the decision. In most cases, the counting officer must immediately make a decision on whether or not the ballot is valid. In order to make more consistent decisions, the counting officer may put all contested and questionable ballots in a separate pile while counting valid ballots.

The counting officer can then decide which of the potential rejected ballots will actually be rejected, and count the total number of rejections. The rest of the valid ballots can then be added to the count for each political party or candidate.

Alternatively, all potential rejected ballots can be identified and decided on first, and then the valid ballots can be counted.

One way of accounting for rejected ballots is to number them on the back. The same number will be written in the voting record book or the statement of the vote (or a separate form can also be used), along with the decision made by the counting officer.

All rejected and spoiled ballots are counted and recorded in the statement of the votes as well as on the ballot account form.

Count of Valid Ballots

The counting officers often use a count sheet to count the ballots. The representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers observing the count may have a count sheet as well. The official sheet is the one used by the counting officer in charge of the count.

The proper information regarding the voting station number and the electoral district should be written at the top or bottom of the form. Each column should show the names of the candidates or party or option as they appear on the ballot.

There are two common types of count sheets: one where each square represents a vote for a candidate or party, and the other where you draw a square with a diagonal mark denoting five votes

In the first case, each square may be marked with a tick for each vote for a candidate or party. At the end, the total for each will be easy to count. In the second case, four vertical marks and a diagonal one are made. Each square represents five votes for a candidate or party.

To correct mistakes, if several count sheets are used at once then there is only a need to correct errors when the results of the count are no longer synchronized.

Establishing correlation between count sheets requires a pause for consensus as to how many votes are recorded per candidate at certain set times (every one hundred ballots for example). Restarting the count at the last point of correlation is much more efficient than beginning the entire count all over again.

Verification of Count

Once the ballots are counted, a verification of the count is recommended.

This verification usually takes place before the interim results are transmitted to the local office of the electoral management body. This final verification is important to make sure that no ballots have been introduced or removed that would modify the results in favour of or against one candidate or party.

This last verification should include a comparison with the reconciliation done previously, before opening the ballot box. The total number of ballots for each candidate or party, plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station.

Where envelopes are used, they should be recounted as well in order to match with the number of voters who cast their ballots. If errors are detected, the count sheet should be verified against count sheets of other counting officers. If the error is still not found, then all the ballots counted per candidate or party should be re-examined and recounted.

Sealing the Ballots

To secure their contents, the ballot boxes should be re-sealed, with all the ballots considered during the count inside, before returning the box to a local secure storage room. This measure is very important in case of a recount.

In certain jurisdictions, forms such as count sheets, the voting record book, and the voter's list are also sealed in the ballot box along with the ballots.

The statement of the vote should not be sealed with the other documents, but should be put in a separate envelope and attached to the outside of the ballot box. However, this envelope should itself be sealed to ensure that no unauthorized person has access to the results and that any changes that are attempted can be detected by senior authorities.

A copy of the statement of the vote should already have been transmitted to the electoral management body separately from the ballot box before the ballot box is moved for secure storage. Many jurisdictions require delivery of all materials to the responsible authority.

The question of whether or not the voting record book should be sealed in the ballot box, or placed with the statement of the vote, is an important one. If the voting record book is used to record transactions that fall outside ordinary voting, then it can be useful to have it available for inspection if requested by the electoral management body without having to go before a judge (which is the case in some jurisdictions.

Access to it will help to understand any mistakes that have been made regarding the preparation of the statement of the vote, or other procedures related to vote counting.

Since representatives of political parties and candidates are allowed to witness the official count, they could consult the record book. The voting record book is an important document, and should be safely kept, sealed in the box, or placed on the outside of the ballot box in the envelope with the statement of the vote.

Ballots (and envelopes where applicable) should be placed in bundles, by category (candidates, rejected ballots, spoiled ballots, unused ballots, etc.) in the ballot box.

Once all the ballots and relevant forms are in the box, the box may be sealed and transported to the local storage room. The seal number, if applicable, should be written on the statement of the vote or on the acknowledgement of receipt of the ballot box when delivered to the local storage place. In some jurisdictions the number of the voting station is written on the outside of the ballot box. This is only possible if the material used for the ballot box, e.g. cardboard, can be written on.

Even if all the envelopes or plastic bags are sealed, it is still important to re-seal the ballot box before it is moved. In the event of a recount, all these documents are needed which explains why elaborate precautions for sealing the ballot box are important.

If a paper seal is used, for additional security, some jurisdictions require that the ballot box seal be signed by the counting officer as well as representatives of political parties and candidates.

Transmitting Voting Station Results

Once the vote counting process is over, the counting officer prepares the statement of the vote for a voting station.

This form indicates the election results and should include standard information, such as the name of the electoral district, the name and/or number of the voting station, and election date.

Specific information on the count should include:

• number of ballots received at the opening of voting from the electoral management body,

• number of spoiled ballots,

• number of unused ballots,

• number of valid ballots for each candidate or political party,

• number of rejected ballots,

• total number of valid ballots, and the

• total number of voters who voted on election day.

The counting officer and the representatives of political parties and candidates sign the form. They should provide their printed names, addresses, and telephone numbers, if any, along with their signatures. If there is a problem, it will then be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them.

Some jurisdictions require all counting officers present at the voting station to sign the statement of votes.

Once the form is completed, the results should be given orally, or transmitted electronically, to the local office of the electoral management body to allow them to gather interim results as soon as possible. The counting officer is responsible for communicating the interim results.

The transmission can be done by telephone, cellular phone, modem, or fax, using a unique security code to ensure the proper identification of the person transmitting the results. However, the communications infrastructure in parts of some countries does not permit oral or electronic reporting of interim voting results. In such locations, the use of the counting officer or other officially designated person carrying the statement of the vote may be the only available alternative.

After the results have been reported orally or electronically, the original of the statement of the votes should be transmitted to the same office of the electoral management body by hand in a sealed envelope.

This measure is essential to prevent fraud and provide evidence of any tampering with results.

Representatives of a political party and candidates should be allowed to copy the results.

The counting officer should keep a copy of the statement of the votes and another is posted at the voting station. The original is placed in a sealed envelope and attached to the ballot box for use by the electoral management body. Observers and party and candidate representatives should have the right to transcribe the results from the official statement of the vote for the voting station or the counting centres.

As print or electronic media are considered a key element in a free democratic society, it is recommended that they be given access to the results, either at the voting stations or at the offices of the electoral management body where results are being reported, unless there are valid security considerations related to the release of partial and unofficial results. This is especially important if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question.

The electoral management body is responsible for proper accreditation of personnel allowed at the voting station or results collection office during the counting phase. The media representatives on site should wear identification proving this accreditation.

Issue of Transparency

Transparency is very significant, particularly at the time of the release and transmission of interim results. Representatives of political parties and candidates should sign and have a copy of the statement of the vote and should be allowed to witness the transmission of the corresponding results to the electoral management body.

Such transparency of actions is essential in the acceptance of the general outcome of the election.

Importance of Contingency Plans

Communications technology plays an increasingly important role in the transmission of voting results. If the supporting systems used by the electoral management body fail, postponement of interim results can ensue, creating numerous administrative, technical, and logistical problems. In addition, such failures tend to be politically embarrassing to the electoral management body.

To avoid such failures, a contingency plan should be implemented, and fully tested prior to election day. Identification of a second telephone in close proximity to each voting station can be made prior to election day, and can represent an economical alternative in case of technology failure. Computerized call answering machines can be linked and duplicated in the event that one fails.

Radio hand sets can also be used. Finally, a manual alternative to electronic transmission of results, such as the use of couriers or hand delivery, can be used as a final back-up plan.

The selection of a contingency plan is driven by local context and circumstances in that particular jurisdiction. In some circumstances, prior agreement with security forces to use their communications equipment can be negotiated, or partnership or collaboration with private companies to use their facilities can be made as a backup plan.

Voting Station Statement of Votes

The voting station statement of the votes is the interim results form. The counting officer normally completes this form. One statement of the votes form should be filled out per voting station, even in the case of voting locations housing multiple voting stations.

The statement of the votes form could include the following general information:

• the name of the electoral district,

• the number or name of the voting station,

• the date, and

• the signatures of the counting officer. Representatives of political parties and candidates should also write their signatures on the form.

Specific information on the count should include:

• number of ballots received at the opening of voting from the electoral management body,

• number of spoiled ballots,

• number of unused ballots,

• number of valid ballots for each candidate and political party,

• number of rejected ballots,

• total number of valid ballots, and

• total number of voters who voted on election day according to the voter's list.

It may be necessary to look at the voting record book as some jurisdictions authorize registration of voters on voting day, and these may be added using the voting record book. Other jurisdictions use separate forms.

Additional detailed information, such as the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box, or of the ballot box itself, is required in some jurisdictions.

In several jurisdictions, this form is an important document since it provides the information used by the electoral management body to release both interim and final results. The counting officers responsible for the counting should complete this form with utmost care.

Issuing of the Statement of Votes

The statement of the votes for a voting station should be prepared with care since it represents the interim and final (unless subjected to a recount) results of the election for a voting station.

This form is usually prepared and signed by the counting officer. The form should then be signed by representatives of political parties and candidates. Their signatures are very important in order to reflect and demonstrate that they agree and acknowledge the results. They should include their printed names, addresses and telephone numbers, if any, on the form along with their signatures.

In case of any problems, the electoral management body will then be able to contact these individuals more easily.

For the sake of transparency, observers, and representatives of political parties and candidates, should be permitted to make a copy of the statement of the votes.

Communicating Results

Once the statement of the votes of the voting station is completed, the counting officer should communicate the interim results to the local offices of the electoral management body (and in certain cases, to the national electoral management body directly).

In the case of voting locations housing multiple voting stations, the person responsible (known in some jurisdictions as the central voting supervisor) should obtain the results from each counting officer and transmit them to the local offices of the electoral management body.

In many countries the electoral management body maintains local or regional offices during the electoral period. The interim results are generally communicated to the local office, which, in turn, communicates a cumulative statement of the votes for the electoral district to the national headquarters office.

Communicating Interim Results

The interim results for each voting station, using the statement of the votes, should be transmitted to the office of the local electoral management body by phone (cellular or fixed line), or other means such as radio hand sets, if such exists.

It is recommended that a unique password or code be provided to the person who will transmit the results. For security reasons, this unique password or code should be given to the responsible person by the electoral management body on the day of the election itself.

This code will reduce the possibility of impersonation, and prevent unauthorized persons from transmitting incorrect or biased election results to the local office of the electoral management body.

If a fax machine is available on the counting premises, it can be used to send a copy of the statement of votes to the electoral management body. Specific measures should be taken to control access to the fax machine and number, to reduce the risk of any transmissions of unofficial statements of the votes.

In all cases, the statement of the vote sent by fax should be signed by the counting officer and by representatives of political parties and candidates present at the count. If the party and candidate representatives refuse to sign this does not render the statement of votes invalid or inaccurate.

For greater security, and to detect any attempts at fraud, the original form should be sent separately to the local electoral management body in a sealed envelope. This envelope should be sent along with the electoral materials by hand or by courier. By sending the original, the local electoral management body can verify the results against the one previously sent by telephone or electronically, and ensure that they are the same.

If there is no available phone (cellular or fixed) at a voting station or the cellular or fixed line phone is not working, alternative methods should be considered. Walkie-talkie or radio emitting devices do not require the installation of a phone line and are flexible and simple in their use. However, their deployment should take into consideration the topography of the area to identify in advance any black-out regions where it is impossible to receive or transmit messages.

Again, appropriate training and identification codes should be provided to voting station and counting offciers before deployment.

If it is not possible to use any means of wireless communication, the last resort is hand-to-hand delivery by election official/s of the results to the local electoral management body. If an electoral official is unavailable a suitably designated person should be used as a messenger.

This messenger should be a credible person and the choice of such person should be accepted by counting officers, as well as representatives of the political parties and candidates. When using this method, the messenger could also bring the ballot box and its contents, eliminating the need for additional transport arrangements.

A tamper-evident bag is recommended, in order to ensure that results are not changed in transit. This is often a thick plastic bag, signed by the persons at the original location that, once sealed, cannot be opened without damaging the bag. Consequently, the receivers can be confident that the bag is the same upon its arrival at headquarters. A trail of signatures of those handing over the materials, and those receiving them, is essential, and constant accompaniment of the materials by election staff, as well as observers is recommended.

Role of Media

News agencies and media organizations will likely compete to provide their forecast of the election results as quickly as possible after the close of voting. They will dispatch their representatives as to the scene of the electoral action. The offices of the electoral management body are the most likely media targets, mainly for efficiency reasons.

At a centre for collecting results for voting stations, one representative can cover a wide area, and can report for a reasonable number of voting stations.

Route of "Official" Statement of Votes

Copies of the voting results should be provided to the electoral management body by the counting officer, and the right to copy the results should be given to representatives of political parties and candidates, and to observers. Such extra copies can be made with a multi-part carbon copy form, or a photocopy machine. Alternatively, multiple copies can be prepared by hand.

The original statement of the vote should be attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope. This is particularly important to processing a recount of the ballots, if required.

Once the statement of the vote for a voting station is fully prepared and transmitted to the local electoral management body, a copy can be posted at the outside of the voting station. The same information and results are then made available for everybody, and at the same time.

Because witnesses are permitted to observe and scrutinize the counting process, results are public. The statement of the vote becomes a public document; this is made especially evident once it is posted. However, it is important to mention that these results are not official yet, but are only interim results: official final results will always take legal precedence.

Consolidating Voting Results

At the national level, as well as at the local level, logistics should be carefully planned for receiving results from several locations at the same time. When possible, efficiency is improved if one phone number or fax number is given to people transmitting the interim results to the local office of the electoral management body. Most telephone systems now allow for calls to a single number to automatically search for the next available phone unit on that line.

A form with spaces for pre-printed information needed during vote result collection should be provided to staff answering the phone. For example, one team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit them to the data entry person or person in charge of gathering the results for the electoral district.

A wall chart, chalkboard chart, or spreadsheet listing each voting station should be prepared and then completed as the results come in. Once all the information for each election is received, the combined result for the entire electoral district should be updated. This summary will be sent to the national level.

National Level

At the national level, the same type of logistics should be used, but on a larger scale. Fax communications are easier at the national level. Since the information needed is already written, it can help to speed up the process for data entry or manual tabulation. Also, similar spreadsheets should be used at the national level listing all electoral districts.

A first quality control check should be done to verify if the results appear to be correct.A more exhaustive quality control checking procedure for each electoral district and its voting stations, will need to be done when the final, official results are compiled.

If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election). The required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when they are needed to compile the national interim results.

For interim results, all types of ballots (if possible) should be included to avoid any major discrepancy between interim results and final results.

Special ballots, write-in ballots, mail ballots, as well as ballots cast on ordinary voting, advance voting, and mobile voting should be part of the count for interim results.

Depending on the amount of delay that is acceptable, special ballots can be counted a few days prior to election day, or after the close of voting on election day. If the latter is the case, then the counting procedure should be designed carefully, so it will still be possible to include special ballot results in the interim results.

For the special ballots (mail and write-in ballots), envelopes received at the head office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. Different coloured envelopes will facilitate the sorting by category.

For mail ballots, three envelopes are originally sent to the voter: a return mailing envelope containing an outer envelope (on which may appear the bar code and signature of the voter or other administrative information), and a secrecy envelope containing the ballot.

After verification of proper registration and no previous voting having been taken, and the creation of the audit trail, the secrecy envelope is put into a ballot box with its ballot still inside.

If the special ballots are counted a few days prior to election day, the results should be securely kept and only released at the close of the election. In some jurisdictions special ballots are counted after the election day, and in others, on election day.

If advance voting take place over several days, a reconciliation can be done at the end of each day, but the ballot choices are not counted. This reconciliation measure is done to create an audit trail of ballot usage.

The advance vote ballot boxes are then kept safely until voting day, and counting should take place at an office of the electoral management body at the closing time of the ordinary voting. The counting of advance voting ballots should be done in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates and observers. The counting procedures are nearly identical to those used for ordinary voting.

Counting for mobile voting stations may take place at the last place visited, or at an office of the electoral management body. To count the votes of incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance voting may be applied, but, of course, this will only be possible if voting by incarcerated or imprisoned voters takes place prior to election day.

If ballot boxes and results are delivered simultaneously (i.e. where telephones, fax etc. are not available), the local office of the electoral management body should carefully plan the reception of the ballot boxes and the results.

Planning must ensure that provision is made for all the ballot boxes and results arriving at the same time. First, to respect the order of arrival, a receiving official could immediately give a number to the person arriving from a voting station with the ballot box and the results.

Then, in chronological order, the identity of each delivery person should be verified, the voting station identified, and the results should immediately be taken and placed in a specified area ready to be compiled.

The receiving official should then verify the ballot box, and the authenticity of its seals, and prepare a receipt for the person who delivered the materials, as well as one for the electoral management body. The ballot box should then be removed from the reception area and be placed in a secure storage room where more detailed verification can be done.

Use of Technology

Phones and faxes are widely used in the transmission of electoral results. To ensure the identity of the person transmitting results via phone, they should be required to provide an identification number or code. A password may also be considered for fax transmissions. This is a simple and efficient way to avoid unauthorized people calling in and giving false results.

Transmission of results by modem and computer can also be done. Once again, safeguards and passwords must be built in to restrict the transmission of results to authorized persons who are permitted access to the system.

For all types of transmission, the systems must be tested prior to voting day to verify their capacity under the heavy use they will encounter on election night. A technical specialist should also be available at any time, in case of system failure. A contingency back-up system should also be created, tested, and fully available.

Receiving Result Counts

The local electoral management body will receive the results directly from the voting station after counting is completed. They will then compile the results for the electoral district and send it to the national electoral management body by fax (or other means).

The counting officer will contact the local level of the electoral management body directly to communicate the results of each vote. For greatest efficiency, one general phone number or fax number should be given to counting calling the local electoral management body. It is important, however, that the phone system be installed in such a way that the calls follow-on to the next available device on that line.

Adequate phones or fax machines (as well as other electronic links) to cope with peak demands should be installed.

For more efficiency, the staff answering the phone at the local level should have a pre-printed form for recording results with the names of candidates and parties in the same order as they appear on the ballot paper. This will prevent confusion and mistakes in the data entry.

A list of the identification codes or passwords associated with the various voting stations should be provided to the staff as well. This means that the phone operators and those receiving the results need to have signed a confidentiality contract as they are dealing with sensitive information. Only the counting officers should communicate to the local/regional/district electoral management body office to transmit the results of the voting stations.

At the point where the results are received, one team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit the information to the data entry person or the person in charge of combining all the results for the electoral district. A spreadsheet or a board listing each voting station should be prepared and completed as the results are received. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and the media should have access to this spreadsheet or board, so that they can observe the results as they come in.

Special measures should be taken so as to make sure that the same results are not given twice. Numbering the voting stations and corresponding ballot boxes is a simple way to avoid such confusion. If such a measure is taken, it should be done at the beginning of the election process, and this number should be used consistently on all forms used for the election, as well as on the ballot box. The use of this number will also facilitate the creation of an audit trail.

The local office of the electoral management body should send its compiled results to the national electoral management body in several stages to accelerate the process of releasing interim results. Then, the national electoral management body will compile, for each electoral district, a summary of interim results for the country.

Since interim results are not official results, in some countries it is not necessary for the electoral management body to compile preliminary indications of the voting figures. The media, exit poll organizations and non-governmental organizations compile and publicize the interim results while the electoral management body concentrates on compiling the official results and communicating them formally.

National Level

At the national level, the same type of logistics for receiving the results should be used, but on a larger scale. Also, when all the results are coming in at the same time, the staff responsible for the incoming results should first make a quick quality control check in order to verify if the results make sense or not, for example, whether or not the totals are correct.

A comparison with the number of voters registered on the voter's list to the number of voters who cast their vote is a simple and effective way to identify major mistakes.

A more exhaustive quality control procedure, for each electoral district and voting station, will be done when the final official results are compiled. Some electoral districts might need more attention than others, especially those that are the subject of intense political campaign activities, or those with a higher degree of administrative difficulties, such as a very high concentration of registered voters (the core of a large city, for example). On election day, these electoral districts might need to be monitored more closely by the national electoral management body.

At national level, receiving results from local/regional/district offices by fax is easier and more efficient than by phone. Whatever form is used for transmission of the results it should be standard in order to facilitate the collection of summary interim results.

The need for data entry source documents is critical if a computerized system is used to tabulate results. A global spreadsheet, either manual or electronic, with all the electoral districts listed can be completed as the results come in.

If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election), and the required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when needed.

In case of an emergency, the head office of the electoral management body should always be able to reach their local offices, especially when results are coming in.

Whenever possible, a direct phone line should be set up within each local electoral management body, so that the national electoral management body will be able to reach the person (generally the district electoral officer) in charge at any time. The phone number should not be the same one used by the counting officers calling in their interim results.

Votes Cast at Mobile Voting Stations

The counting of votes from mobile voting stations may take place at the last station visited by the voting station officers, or at a local office of the electoral management body. These ballots should not be counted until the regular closing time of the voting on election day.

The location of the count of mobile voting stations should be known by representatives of political parties and candidates, and they should be present for the counting.

Cumulative Audit Trail

Once the count is finished in each voting station, all the electoral materials (the ballot box with all the used, unused, rejected, spoiled ballots, the electoral list, unused seals, and other unused materials), as well as relevant forms needed (especially the statement of the vote, the count sheet, the voting record book) for the count audit trail will be transported to a secure local storage room which may be at the local office of the electoral management body.

At this point, a first verification of the electoral materials received, using a check list and an acknowledgement of receipt form, should be done by officials of the electoral management body to make sure that each ballot box and everything associated with the audit trail is delivered, and that forms are properly completed and signed.

The sealed envelopes (if applicable) containing the statement of the vote of each voting station are opened, in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates, and the contents verified. In the event of a mistake, the counting officers are still available, so if a form is not signed or properly completed (wrong number of voting station for example), proper modification can be done immediately in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates.

A more exhaustive quality control can take place in the following days, but it should be done as soon as possible, so that an audit trail of final results is carefully verified and completed.

A table chart, with the number of each ballot box (if any) is frequently created by the electoral management body, and used to verify that every ballot box that was issued to voting stations has been returned.

Numbering the ballot boxes is a simple and effective way to keep track of them. If this method of ensuring the return of ballot boxes is used, it is preferable that the same persons remain responsible for receipt of the ballot boxes until all the ballot boxes are received.

Clear problem-solving procedures must be established to track down any ballot boxes that are late in arriving, or are not delivered within a reasonable amount of time.

For each electoral district, a cumulative statement of the votes is produced by the local office of the electoral management body. This cumulative count usually includes information such as:

• the name of the electoral district,

• the number or code (if any),

• the date,

• the names of persons in charge of completing the form,

• the number of votes for each candidate or party,

• the total number of votes cast,

• total numbers of rejected ballots, and

• the total number of voters for each voting station and voting option, ballot-box-by-ballot-box.

A detailed report needs to be prepared for the official results of each electoral district, recording each voting stations’ results and this cumulative statement of votes is the basis for that report.

Using the interim results that are collected (especially if they are captured in computer readable form), and cross-checking the statement of the votes for each ballot box for complete accuracy, results in increased efficiency.

Checking Count Results Received

Ability to subsequently check the interim count results received against separate documentation is essential to avoid mistakes, and prevent any fraudulent manipulation of electoral results. A copy of the original statement of the votes of each voting station should be sent separately to the local office of the electoral management body, in a sealed envelope, and a comparison with first results received should be done, once the original is received.

If serious fears of fraud exist, a special paper can be used for the statement of the votes of each voting station. This dark coloured paper (dark blue for example) immediately indicates that the initial inscription is modified. The colour around the modified area will fade. A pencil should be used for this type of paper.

If modification marks appear on the paper, then special attention can be given to that specific voting station, and the results of the count. The voting record book should be checked carefully. If the counting officer made a mistake in completing the form at the voting station, then he/she should add his/her initials, or signature, as well as those of party and candidate representatives to denote agreement with the correction.

Results per Party/Candidate

For greater transparency, and to allow people to have access to interim results from all voting stations, results counted and available at the end of election day/s can be posted on a wall/chalkboard/spreadsheet at each local office of the electoral management body .

This allows the media and the public to see the interim results as they come in, if no periodic report is available to be provided to them.

On voting night, interim results should be counted for each candidate or party for each voting station. The local office of the electoral management body will compile these results and create a summary report per candidate or political party to send to the national electoral management body. They will then count the total electoral district results per political party or candidate and indicate these to be the final interim results when forwarding the summary to the national office of the electoral management body.

After the final count, the national office will receive the official final results from each voting station and compile them into a national publication.

In all cases, a double counting procedure should be used, even if it is computerized, before the results are publicly posted.

After each five to ten voting stations, a comparison should be made between the two persons responsible for the counts. If results no longer match, the previous few additional figures can easily be verified and corrected.

If a computerized system is used, two people should enter the same data at separate computer workstations. The computer systems can be programmed to immediately point out when and where entries do not match exactly for a specific voting station. This makes the process of verification much simpler.

Consolidating Results: List Systems

Consolidating results in list systems can be very simple and straightforward or highly complicated, depending on the system and the legal framework.

In some cases, it is sufficient to count the votes once, either in the voting station or in a counting centre, but in other cases a recount can be necessary. In such cases, the first count is normally in the voting station and the recount in a counting centre.

In closed list systems, with no possibility for preferential votes, cumulating etc. and just one list per party, one count is normally sufficient. The numbers per list are added up per electoral district, and the seats are allocated to candidates according to list order.

In more complex systems, when a party has more than one list per electoral district, or when the voter may cross out, add candidates, or make preferential marks, cumulate etc., the counting and consolidating of the results are more complicated.

The exact number of votes for each list and candidate, including cross-outs, additions etc. must be determined before implementing the electoral formula for allocating seats to parties and candidates. A common procedure in such systems is a preliminary count per party in the voting stations at the close of voting, and a recount later in counting centres at the electoral district or regional level.

In some systems a final compilation of the results must be carried out at national level, for example, to allocate national "equalizing" seats.

The more complex a system, and the more complicated the electoral formulas to be implemented, the more crucial transparency of the count is. Count sheets, reports from the count, and compilations must be clear, comprehensive, complete, and designed in such a way that the entire process can be followed and controlled by the political parties and the electorate.

All relevant information must be published without delay. However, it is essential to make realistic plans for the last phase of the electoral process, and not create exaggerated expectations when it comes to the time of announcement of the final results.

When the final results are published by the election authorities, instructions on how to appeal and object to the results must be included in the announcement.

Publicising Election Results

Publicising election results is a process that must be handled with great care. As the first results available are usually interim results that may need amending or adding up later in the process, careful consideration needs to be given to how and when results are published.

Votes are counted in many different ways. In most cases, votes are counted for the first time at the voting stations on election day, after the close of voting. In other cases, votes are taken to counting centres before they are counted.

In some jurisdictions, these first counts are the only counts made, and the ballot papers are looked at again only if the election result is challenged or a recount is requested by a candidate, a party, or a court.

In some jurisdictions, votes counted once at the voting station level are taken to a counting centre after election day, and rechecked and recounted, recognizing that mistakes are common in the initial count.

Votes may be recounted again and again at several stages in the process, depending on the complexity of the electoral system, the need for accuracy, and whether the result is challenged.

Election results can be released at various stages in this process. In some cases, results are announced progressively on election night, as each local/regional/district office reports its count. When results are released for each voting station as they come in, close results can change from one likely outcome to another. While this makes for an exciting event, this level of uncertainty might not be desirable in a more volatile country.

In other countries, results for each electoral district are not announced until all of the voting stations have reported their results to the district electoral officer, so that the first published interim results will be close to the final outcome.

While some jurisdictions permit voting at voting stations only on a fixed day, others permit voting by several different methods, to cater for voters who are unable to be at a voting station on election day. These can include absentee, mail ballots, or advance voting ballots, or mobile voting stations, where voters are visited by elections officials in remote locations, hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, or even their own homes.

It is not always possible to count these types of votes on or before election night, so that the tallies of these votes have to be added to any interim results announced on election night.

With more complex electoral systems, particularly those that involve distribution of preferences, counting may take days, weeks, or in extreme cases, months. In these cases, results are usually released progressively at each stage of the process.

Publishing Interim Election Results

When a decision is taken to publish interim results, it is desirable to do so as quickly as possible. A few hours to a day after the close of voting is considered a reasonable amount of time to release the first interim results, depending on the local political, logistical circumstances and the electoral system.

Where counting takes place over several days, updates are often published at the end of each day's counting.

Where votes are counted progressively, or are recounted several times, and interim results are published before the final result is determined, interim results could be misleading. For example, interim results could indicate that a candidate or party was winning a seat, or a particular number of seats, but the final result might be different. Consequently, special precautions are needed to ensure that confusion or civil strife does not occur.

The release of interim results should include cautionary language. The authority responsible for releasing results should explain that they are not official final results, and that changes and corrections may be necessary in the process of determining the official final counts.

The electoral management body does not necessarily have to release the interim results. In some jurisdictions it is seen as more appropriate for the media, exit poll organisations or non-governmental organizations to release and announce preliminary indications of the vote. However, in the interests of demonstrating transparency and accounability, it is desirable that the electoral management body take responsibility for publishing interim results.

Depending on the local situation, it may be desirable to include all types of ballots (such as absentee, mail, advance vote, and mobile voting station) used in the election when interim results are released, to avoid discrepancies between interim and final results. Whatever decision is taken on the ways of releasing interim results, the conditions must be clearly explained. For example, are all votes included? Are the votes subject to recounts?

In other cases, it may not be possible to wait for these figures to be available without unduly delaying publication of interim figures. In this case it is important to qualify the interim results by pointing out that the results do not yet include these other types of ballots.

In some jurisdictions it may be possible to count absentee, mail ballots, advance vote, or mobile voting station results before election day, to enable these results to be included in interim results published on election day.

If these special ballots are counted a few days prior to election day, these results should be kept very secure, and access to them should be prohibited until the close of voting on election day.

This approach has advantages and disadvantages. While it allows more complete interim figures to be published, it may also seriously compromise the integrity, turnout, or outcome of the vote if any results are publicly released before the close of voting. As it is usual for candidate and party representatives to be present when any votes are counted, this is a real risk.

Publication of interim results in countries with multiple time zones before the close of voting in some areas may have an undesirable impact on voting behaviour.

For countries with multiple time zones, staggered voting hours or a black-out on releasing results may be considered, to allow all voters to vote before knowing the election outcome or trends in other parts of the country. In some circumstances, these measures may not be seen as appropriate or necessary. Staggered opening and closing times might be seen as discriminatory in some countries.

Discrepancies between Official and Interim Results

Discrepancies between interim results and final official results are generally small, if procedures are well designed and carefully followed. While discrepancies may affect particularly close races in individual electoral districts, they rarely affect the outcome of a general election.

Where discrepancies do occur, the electoral management body should issue statements explaining the reasons for the discrepancies, to ensure that public confidence in the system is maintained.

Deciding not to Publish Interim Results

If a political situation is unstable, the electoral management body could consider not announcing interim results, but only final results, in order to avoid any confusion and to prevent the exacerbation of conflict. This option has its risks, as any delay in publishing final results may itself cause instability.

This option is not very practicable where party or candidate representatives are present at the counts, as these counts is effectively in the public domain. Attempting to suppress information from the counts until the announcement of final results in this case is generally not a realistic option.

If political or security concerns are acute, consideration could be given to conducting the count in secret, with only counting officers present, or by swearing candidate and party representatives to secrecy until the counting is final.

In general, it is preferable to announce interim results, wherever possible, to enhance the transparency of the election process.

Security Considerations The electoral management body needs to take special security measures in order to avoid fraud during the process of compiling interim and final election results.

Only authorized persons should have access to the processes used to compile election results.

Publicising Official Final Results

Publication of Official Final Results

The appropriate authority should make the official final election results available as soon as possible after the counting process has been concluded.

Generally, the local or national office of the electoral management body will be responsible for announcing and releasing the official results, unless the courts have a role in certifying the results.

Some electoral laws stipulate a fixed day for announcing the official results.

Depending on the country and the electoral system used, an average of one to two weeks is generally needed before detailed preparations are complete for making an official announcement. Often the legislation will provide for the designated period in which the results should be publicized.

In many cases the official count can only be concluded once all the ballot papers have been returned to the local electoral management body and all counting steps have been completed, including resolution of any disputes about vote counting (which may result in recounts).

Depending on the geography of the country, the communication networks in place, and the electoral system, this process can take from a few hours to several days, weeks, or months to complete.

Great care must be taken to ensure that the figures are accurate. Procedures must be in place to ensure that all appropriate checks and balances have been taken into account before the final results are announced.

Formal documents showing the results of the count are normally prepared, certified, and signed by the responsible electoral district officer, or other appropriate official. These documents are usually officially published, such as in a Government Gazette, tabled in Parliament, or presented to an appropriate official.

Also, copies of these documents are usually provided to candidates and party representatives. Often, formal election results are declared at a public ceremony. Candidates, political party representatives, the media, observers, other interested persons, and the general public are often invited to attend these ceremonies. In some cases, candidates and political party representatives, are given the opportunity to make speeches.

It is desirable to produce detailed publications of election results showing the results of the counting at all levels of voting, from voting stations to regions or electoral districts, and the national level. Most often these are done electronically and the specific result breakdown is provided to parties and candidates. However, in some cases it is desirable to merge some results.

Merging Results to Protect the Secrecy of the Vote

It may be desirable to merge or amalgamate results from several voting stations to protect the secrecy of the vote. This is generally done if the publication of results at a detailed level might identify the names and votes of particular individuals. This can happen if the number of votes at a voting station is so small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate or party.

This can also be done in cases where there is a real risk that publishing the voting results at a particular voting station could result in retribution against the persons who voted there. This problem can be mitigated by mixing the ballots from two or more voting stations from different areas.

Merging results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other categories of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body, results can easily be merged with other results in order to protect the secrecy of the vote. For internal use only, a special notation can be made in order to keep the audit trail clear.

Role of Judicial Courts

In some countries, judicial courts are only involved in the electoral process after the election, when offenders against the electoral law are brought to trial, or when an electoral result is challenged.

In other jurisdictions, the courts may have a significant role to play in confirming the outcome and official results of the election, where the results are official only when the court has confirmed them. Such confirmation should be done as soon as possible, in order to avoid political instability and potential delays associated with a transition from one government to another.

The courts may also be directly involved in the official count, along with the electoral management body.

This will generally be the case if final approval of the count must come from the courts.

Challenging Results

Mechanisms for Challenging Results

A mechanism for challenging results is desirable at every stage of the vote counting process. This helps to ensure that the election process is transparent, that election authorities are accountable, and that the election outcome is acceptable to all parties.

Aggrieved parties and candidates must be able to challenge results based on factual information and are entitled to an independent and fair hearing on the merits of their case.

Effective mechanisms for challenging results add to the credibility of an election outcome. If a party to an election is not satisfied that an election has been properly conducted, the ability to effectively challenge the election result will ensure that any genuine errors are corrected, and that any fraudulent activities are identified and dealt with.

Conversely, if concerns are baseless, the process of challenging an election outcome should provide the public with this information. This will enhance the credibility of the outcome.

If an election cannot be challenged to the satisfaction of all parties, then it is possible that the election outcome will not be accepted, leading to civil or political tension and violence.

It is also important that election challenges do not unreasonably delay the election process. Delays in the formation of parliaments and governments may lead to civil or political unrest, or exacerbate such if it already exists.

Election results can be challenged in several ways, and at several points in the process.

Opportunities for challenging results will depend on whether paper ballots, mechanical, or computerized ballots are used.

Challenging Results During the Vote Count

At the first stage of the counting process for paper ballots, when ballot boxes are opened, and ballot papers counted for the first time, party and candidate representatives are often given the right to challenge whether a ballot paper is genuine, whether a ballot paper is formal or informal, or whether it has been correctly sorted to a candidate or party.

The counting officer in charge of the counting will have the authority to rule on disputed ballot papers, or ballot papers can be set aside so that a more senior electoral official can rule on them at a later time.

Similarly, if ballot papers are recounted at a regional or central counting centre, party and candidate representatives may again challenge decisions taken during the count. At this stage, it is usually possible to reverse a decision on a disputed ballot paper that was made at an earlier count.

Where mechanical or computerized voting methods are used, political parties and candidates and observers should have the right to inspect audit trails and any source documents used, and have the opportunity to challenge any alleged irregularities.

The methods of disputing the count at this stage will vary from place to place. In many cases challenges may be made verbally. In some circumstances, it may be desirable to have a more formal, written process.

Where ballot papers are set aside for the decision of a more senior officer at a later time, these ballot papers should be bundled separately, and clearly labelled, so that they can be identified later. Also, these bundles of disputed ballot papers may be kept separate, so that a court or tribunal can rule on them if necessary.

The categories of individuals able to challenge a counting decision will vary. Representatives of candidates and/or parties are often given the right to challenge the counting process. In some cases, local or international observers may also be given this right.

Recounts by Electoral Bodies

Where paper ballots are used it is usual to allow candidates and/or political parties the right to apply for a recount, once counting is completed and a result has been obtained.

This means recounting some or all of the ballot papers to satisfy all parties that the correct outcome has been achieved. Depending on the technology used, it may also be feasible to recount an electronic ballot by, for example, reprocessing the original input documents.

Written Requests for Recounts

As recounts can be time-consuming and expensive, the responsible electoral official may be given the discretion to decide whether or not to grant a recount.

Generally, recounts are only conducted if there is a small difference between the winning and losing party and/or candidate, and there is some doubt as to the accuracy of the count.

In some jurisdictions, recounts are automatic if the result is within a certain margin. In some jurisdictions, recounts may be mandatory whenever a result is challenged, regardless of the margin.

If the initial result is a tie, it is wise, as a general rule, to automatically conduct a recount to determine whether any mistakes were made that, if corrected, could break the tie.

Otherwise, the definition of a "close" election result will depend on local circumstances, and the estimated margin of error in the first count. The most important consideration is to ensure that all parties are satisfied with the outcome. If failure to conduct a recount will lead to one or more parties not accepting the election result, a recount should be conducted.

A recount can either be a full recount or a partial recount. Depending on the circumstances, it may be possible to select some categories to recount, rather than conduct a complete recount. For example, a representative random sample might be chosen to give an indication of the accuracy of the initial count.

A recount may be undertaken simply as a check that all ballot papers have been correctly sorted. Or a recount may involve retracing one or more steps and conducting the recount as if it were the original count.

Thorough records of any recounts conducted should be kept. These will be necessary to satisfy all parties that proper procedure has been followed, and may be needed if the election result is challenged at a later stage.

There should be a time limit on applying for a recount. In most cases recounts will only be permitted within a short time after the completion of counting. For example, there may be a 24 hour or 48 hour limit.

In some cases, recounts may be requested only before the official declaration of the election result. After that time, recourse may only be permitted to a court or tribunal.

If the responsible officer decides not to do a recount, a candidate or party may have the right to appeal that decision to a higher authority. That authority, such as a more senior electoral official or the board of the electoral management body, may in turn decide whether or not to do a recount.

Communicating Election Results

Before an election result can be challenged, the individuals entitled to make a challenge must be equipped with the necessary information. At each stage of the counting process, it is important to communicate the progressive election results to party and candidate representatives and observers.

It may also be appropriate to communicate progressive results to the media and the general public. When the election count is concluded, and the election result is officially declared, it is customary to publish an official set of election results.

Because challenges may lead to changes in final official results, the election management body should stress that the first published results are preliminary and may change at a later time.

This process of communicating the progressive and final election results facilitates the transparency of the electoral process and allows representatives of political parties and candidates, for example, the opportunity to challenge the results, if they wish, on the basis of all available information.

Challenging Election Results before a Court or Tribunal

After any administrative recounts are resolved and the electoral authority has officially declared the election result, there may be further opportunity to challenge the election result by appeal to a court or a special election appeal tribunal.

Some jurisdictions establish special electoral tribunals or courts specifically during election periods.

A challenge to a court or tribunal is generally made in a formal legal petition. Challenges may be made by candidates, parties, persons eligible to vote in the election, or by the electoral administration. Those mounting a challenge usually have to argue a case for challenging an election result.

There will generally be a time limit on challenging election results before a court or tribunal. This limit is usually longer than that applying to an administrative recount, as the legal nature of court or tribunal proceedings require greater preparation. In addition, the court or tribunal may be required to hand down its decision within a specified time.

At this stage, any aspect of the election may be questioned, including:

• the accuracy of the voter's list,

• whether voters were intimidated, bribed, or prevented from voting,

• whether electoral officers acted in a biased, partisan way,

• whether candidates or parties acted improperly,

• whether candidates were eligible to be elected,

• whether votes were fraudulently cast, or

• whether there were any errors or irregularities in the vote counting process.

Some jurisdictions limit the petition to a judicial body to complaints or appeals that affect the result only. Then the complainant or applicant will be required to show that their complaint would have an affect on the result of the election.

Courts or tribunals considering disputed elections may have the power, given to them by legislation, to examine ballot papers and other election documents, or order recounts of ballot papers. They are usually given the power to decide to confirm the original election result, or to overturn the election result and declare a different result. They may also have the power to order that another election must be held.

Courts and tribunals may be bound by precedents set by previous election challenge rulings. To maintain the integrity of the electoral process, it is important to consistently interpret electoral laws. In particular, each electoral system will have a set of rules defining acceptable marks that may be used on ballot papers and other crucial parts of the electoral process.

In some cases it may be possible to appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal to a higher authority. In other cases, statutes specify that there cannot be appeals against the decision of an election court or tribunal. This helps to prevent election results and the formulation of parliaments and governments being unduly delayed by legal processes.

How Long should Election Materials be Kept?

As a minimum, relevant electoral materials should be securely stored until the last opportunity for challenging an election result has passed. In some cases, this may mean storing electoral materials for the entire life of a parliament.

In other cases, electoral materials may be destroyed, once the time for challenging a result before a court or tribunal has passed, or if a challenge has been lodged, after the challenge has been finally dealt with. Some jurisdictions provide a legislated limit on the period of time that election material should be kept. The minimum period for maintaining election material is normally about six months.

Only materials relevant to an election outcome need be kept. This will usually include ballot papers, voters' lists, any declarations completed by voters, election results, and any records related to disputed results. If in doubt, it is better to store materials rather than destroy them.

Any stored materials must be kept secure from tampering. Ballot papers that may be recounted at a later time cannot be relied upon if the responsible body cannot be sure that they have not been tampered with.

Once the decision to destroy electoral materials is taken, the responsible electoral management body should ensure that the materials are destroyed appropriately. Any electoral materials that might identify the preferences of an individual voter should be destroyed in such a way as to keep that individual's vote secret. If possible, paper materials should be recycled.

Election Challenges and the Political Process

Election challenges can be quite disruptive to the electoral and political processes. They can delay the finalization of election results, which in turn can delay the first meeting of the new parliament and the formation of a government.

This situation can destabilize a sensitive political environment, and lead to civil unrest. For these reasons, it is important that election challenges are dealt with quickly, efficiently, and with maximum transparency and accountability.

The election process is aimed at electing representatives to parliaments that reflect the wishes of the people who voted for them. The processes for challenging election results should be aimed at ensuring that the wishes of the people are accurately reflected in the outcome.

Recount at the Voting Station

Paper Ballots

When ballot boxes are opened and ballot papers counted for the first time at the first stage of the counting process for paper ballots, authorized witnesses are often given the right to challenge whether a ballot paper is genuine or whether it has been correctly allocated to a candidate or party.

Usually, the counting officer in charge of the vote counting has the power to rule on disputed ballot papers, or ballot papers can be set aside so that a more senior electoral official can rule on them at a later time.

Similarly, if ballot papers are recounted at a regional or central counting centre, someone may again challenge decisions taken during the count. At this stage it is usually possible to reverse a decision on a disputed ballot paper made at an earlier count.

Mechanical and Computerised Ballots

Where mechanical or computerized voting methods are used, representatives of a political party or candidate should have the right to inspect audit trails and any source documents used, and have the opportunity to challenge any alleged irregularities.

The methods of disputing ballot papers at this stage of the count will vary from place to place. In many cases challenges may be made verbally. In some circumstances, it may be desirable to have a more formal written process.

Where ballot papers are set aside for the decision of a more senior officer at a later time, these ballot papers should be separately bundled and clearly labelled, so that they can be identified later. These bundles of disputed ballot papers may also be kept separate so that a court or tribunal can rule on them if necessary.

The categories of individuals able to challenge a counting decision will also vary. Representatives of candidates and/or parties are often given the right to challenge the counting process.

Recount at District/National Level

Some systems have a recount as a normal part of the counting system. This normally happens for more complex systems such as preferential or parallel systems. Other systems have recount as a way to solve disputes and challenges.

Once counting is completed and a result has been obtained, it is usual where paper ballots are used, to allow candidates and/or political parties the right to apply for a recount. This means recounting some or all of the ballot papers to satisfy all parties that the correct outcome has been achieved.

Depending on the technology used, it may also be feasible to recount an electronic ballot by, for example, reprocessing the original input documents.

Requests for recounts are usually made in writing. As recounts can be time-consuming and expensive, the responsible counting officer usually has the discretion to decide whether or not to grant a recount.

Generally, recounts are conducted only if an election result is close, and there is some doubt as to the accuracy of the count. In some jurisdictions, recounts are automatic if the result is within a certain margin. In other cases, recounts may be mandatory whenever a result is challenged, regardless of the margin.

If the initial result is a tie, it is wise, as a general rule, to automatically conduct a recount to determine whether any mistakes were made that, if corrected, could break the tie. Otherwise, the definition of a "close" election result will depend on local circumstances and the estimated margin of error in the first count.

The most important consideration is to ensure that all parties will be satisfied with the outcome. If failure to conduct a recount will lead to one or more parties not accepting the election result, a recount should be conducted.

A recount can be either a full recount or a partial recount. Depending on the circumstances, it may be possible to select some categories to recount, rather than conduct a complete recount. For example, a representative random sample might be chosen to give an indication of the accuracy of the initial count.

A recount may be undertaken as a check that all ballot papers have been correctly sorted. A recount may involve retracing one or more steps and conducting the recount as if it was the original count.

Thorough records of any recounts conducted should be kept. These will be necessary to satisfy all parties that proper procedure has been followed, and may be needed if the election result is challenged at a later stage. There should be a time limit on applying for a recount.

In most cases recounts will only be permitted within a short time after the completion of counting. For example, there may be a 24 hour or 48 hour limit. In some cases, recounts may only be requested before the official declaration of the election result. After that time, recourse may only be permitted to a court or tribunal.

If the responsible officer decides not to do a recount, a candidate or party may have the right to appeal that decision to a higher authority. That authority, such as a more senior electoral official or the board of the electoral management body, may in turn decide whether or not to do a recount.

Judicial Recounts

After any administrative recounts are resolved, and the electoral authority has officially declared the election result, there may be further opportunity to challenge the election result by appeal to a court or a special election appeal tribunal.

A challenge to a court or tribunal is generally made in a formal legal petition.

Challenges may be made by candidates, parties, individuals eligible to vote in the election, or by the electoral administration. Those challenging usually have to argue a case for challenging an election result.

There will generally be a time limit on challenging election results before a court or tribunal. This limit is usually longer than that applying for an administrative recount, as the legal nature of court or tribunal proceedings require greater preparation. In addition, the court or tribunal may be required to hand down its decision within a specified time.

Some jurisdictions limit the petition to a judicial body to complaints or appeals that affect the result only. Then the complainant or applicant will be required to show that their complaint would have an effect on the result of the election.

At this stage any aspect of the election may be questioned, including:

• the accuracy of the voter's list,

• whether voters were intimidated, bribed, or prevented from voting

• whether electoral officers acted in a biased, partisan way,

• whether candidates or parties acted improperly,

• whether candidates were eligible to be elected,

• whether votes were fraudulently cast, or

• whether there were any errors or irregularities in the vote counting process.

Courts or tribunals considering disputed elections may have the power, given to them by legislation, to examine ballot papers and other election documents or order recounts of ballot papers. They are usually given the power to decide to confirm the original election result, or to overturn the election result and declare a different result. They may also have the power to order that another election must be held.

Courts and tribunals may be bound by precedents set by previous election challenge rulings. To maintain the integrity of the electoral process, it is important to consistently interpret electoral laws. In particular, each electoral system will have a set of rules defining acceptable marks that may be used on ballot papers.

In some cases it may be possible to appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal to a higher authority. In other cases, statutes specify that there cannot be appeals against the decision of an election court or tribunal. This helps to prevent election results and the formulation of parliaments and governments being unduly delayed by legal processes.

Procedures for Vote Counting at Counting Centres

In some jurisdictions, for reasons outlined in Different Different Types and Requirements for Vote Counting, votes are initially counted at voting stations; in some cases they are subsequently recounted at counting centres. There are cases, however, where no counting is done at voting stations, but ballots are transported directly to centralised counting centres after the close of voting.

In a counting centre approach, where ballots from two or more voting stations are mixed together, with results published by counting centre instead of by voting station, it is more difficult to link communities with affiliation. This may help to protect the secrecy of the voting pattern, especially in some small communities (normally the ballots are counted by voting station but the centre approach will give the possibility to merge).

Even in countries where the count is predominantly done at voting stations, one or more counting centres can ease administration for certain types of ballots. This includes absentee votes, mail votes from armed forces, diplomatic missions, refugees, incarcerated persons or persons residing outside their electoral district which may come from various voting stations, local or abroad, or directly from the voters (by mail).

Such ballots can be forwarded to the appropriate counting centre and added to the ballots from applicable elections, making counting easier to organise and easier to protect the secrecy of such absentee votes.

There may be many counting centres or there may be only one national counting centre. The limit to the level of centralisation will be the level at which votes are translated into a number of legislators or seats. In a First Past the Post (FPTP) system the counting centre may be at the electoral district level (at a town hall, for example) but not at the national level.

In a proportional representation system based on regional lists, a counting centre may not be more centralised than the region that the list is based on.

Transportation to the Counting Centre

At the close of voting, voting station officers seal the ballot boxes and prepare them to be transported to a counting centre along with related documents such as the ballot account form.

Each ballot box is then sorted and tallied. The content of the ballot box can be counted separately or mixed with two or more boxes together, after reconciliation, to protect the identity of voters.

The statement of the vote for each counting centre is sent to a regional or national counting centre and the representatives of political parties. Observers are allowed to copy the results.

Releasing interim results is generally much slower when ballots are counted at counting centres. There are several reasons for this:

• the counting process can normally only start once all ballot boxes arrive at the centre;

• more personnel are involved in the process (required for the reception; storage and dispatch of ballot boxes);

• counting may be delayed if several days are required to receive and count all ballots;

• more elaborate procedures need to be followed (due to volumes of materials and personnel);

• more control mechanisms must be introduced (controlling access to location by observers, candidates, party representatives, etc.)

The logistical complexities of moving ballot boxes and related materials to the counting centre can be an obstacle if transportation is difficult or not readily available.

Systems are required to receive and store the ballot boxes efficiently while the need to transport the ballot boxes may make it difficult to maintain transparency and retain confidence in the voting system, the counting system and the election body concerned.

Resulting delays in the announcement of the results can lead to accusations of manipulation or fraud during the delivery of boxes or the consolidation of the results of the count.

To ensure the success of the counting process, there are administrative considerations and training requirements related to vote counting at counting centres which need to be addressed early in the electoral process and once decided, they must be respected.

Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with their respective processes.

Procedures for counting at counting centres

At the closing of the voting station authorised persons and counting officers stay in the voting station and prepare the ballot box for transportation from the voting station to the counting centre.

The slot of the ballot box is closed and sealed and the first reconciliation of ballots is done before completing the ballot account form. The seals on the ballot box are then verified along with all forms in sealed envelopes attached to the ballot box. The waybill or transport form is completed according to the type of transportation used.

Important security measures need to be taken to ensure that the ballot boxes will arrive safely at the counting centre. Once at the counting centre, unloading of ballot boxes should be carefully planned and supervised and movement of all ballot boxes should be tightly controlled.

All forms related to transportation and movement of the ballot boxes will be completed and verified so that any ballot boxes that are missing can be traced.

The ballot box is checked by an electoral official and then sent to a planned location in the counting centre for ballot boxes ready to be counted. From there individual ballot boxes are delivered to the appropriate counting table.

The ballot box is opened and once the contents of the ballot box are emptied, the validity of each ballot is verified and sorted into different piles before being tallied: valid ballots (by candidate or political party), and rejected ballots. To facilitate the decision making process, clear rules of interpretation or guidelines regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting official, and known in advance.

Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the rejected ballots and, if they do not agree with the decision of the counting official, be allowed to make formal objections which can form the basis for contesting the results of the count.

Using a count sheet, all valid ballots, spoiled ballots, and rejected ballots are counted - none should be destroyed at this stage of the process.

A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote for each ballot box. The ballot box can then be re-sealed and appropriate counting documentation can be completed and either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope.

The ballot box is then transferred to a pre-planned location in the counting centre where counted ballot boxes are securely stored. Once there, the person in charge will verify, count, and label each ballot box creating the cumulative audit trail for the counting centre. All the ballot boxes are safely kept at the counting centre until further notice from the electoral management body.

The results recorded on the statement of the vote for each ballot box will be communicated to the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre. While preparing the cumulative statement of the vote for the entire counting centre, progress reports will also be prepared and sent to the central office of the electoral management body as results for electoral districts are available. Results will be transmitted directly to the national electoral management body so they can be released as they come in.

Representatives of political parties and candidates and observers, if present, should be allowed to make copies of the progress reports, the statement of the vote for each ballot box, and the cumulative statement of the votes.

The national office of the electoral management body adds the results transmitted as well as results of special ballots, advance votes, mobile voting station votes, etc. All results should be tallied per political party or candidate and publicised as soon as possible. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply.

Effective training for counting officers

To be able to implement such procedures regarding vote counting at counting centres, it is essential that appropriate training be conducted. Training requirements, as well as all other administrative considerations (see Context) will need to be forecast in the budget for the election or referendum.

During training and managing a counting centre it is important to emphasise non-partisanship in the conduct of the work.

Numerous jurisdictions require that all counting workers sign an oath and a confidentiality clause to make this point clear, documented, and understood by all personnel involved. Counting workers should not make any remarks or mention any personal political affiliation or affinity, nor wear any badge or clothing with political slogans or logos.

Since the counting officer at each table will have to handle disputes over any rejected ballots, he will be the first person to deal with representatives of political parties and candidates.

This person (if applicable according to the legislation) will also have to make the final decision in validating or rejecting any ballot. Neutrality and non-partisanship are imperative in this decision-making process.

In many jurisdictions, counting officers can be legally prosecuted if their work is proven to be partisan during the counting process.

Presence of party and candidate representatives at counting centres.

To ensure that the level playing field concept is adhered to, it is recommended that all political parties and candidates designate a representative to be present in each counting centre and assign these representatives to scrutinise the counting process. It remains the choice of each party as to whether they send a representative to every counting table or not.

Many jurisdictions consider the presence of political party representatives to be essential to ensure integrity, guarantee consistency, and provide witnesses to the transparency of the process.

When the time comes to make an important decision during the counting process, such as modifications to previously completed forms, then all party representatives involved should sign the forms to demonstrate that they are informed and agree with the decision.

Careful application of such procedures provides tangible evidence that the rules are consistent and the process transparent.

Record the History of Each Ballot Box

At the counting centre, just as at the voting station, the election management body should be able to retrace the history of each ballot box from the moment it leaves the local office of the electoral management body until it returns with the counted ballots (especially important when the ballot papers of two ballot boxes or more are mixed together).

An adequate audit trail will allow the electoral management body to maintain full control and ensure that possibilities of fraud via ballot box tampering are extremely limited and can be detected if attempted. Numbering each ballot box is a simple method of implementing such a control system.

The same number should appear, as well, on each form used at the voting station and at the counting centre. The importance of recording the history of each ballot box may be used as evidence in cases of judicial recount.

Summary of counting processes at counting centres

In general, the major process components of vote counting at counting centres are the following:

• preparation of the ballot boxes before transportation from the voting station to the counting centre;

• transportation of the ballot boxes to the counting centre;

• provision of party, candidate, or observer accompaniment of the ballot boxes;

• reception and regulation of the ballot boxes at the counting centre,

• opening the ballot box,

• reconciling ballots in each box with number of voters;

• sorting and counting the ballots so the results can be transmitted to the next level of the electoral management body that compiles them and further transmits until the results are publicised.

Preparation for Ballot Box Transport

The preparatory process related to transportation of any ballot box is very important. This is particularly so if counting takes place at a counting centre.

When ballot boxes are transported from the voting station to the counting centre, important security control must be provided prior to transportation such as verification of the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box and on the slot.

In addition, ballot boxes must be accompanied from the departure from the voting station to the arrival at the counting centre. Those accompanying the ballot box may include security, party and candidate representatives and observers.

The ballot boxes should never be left without supervision at any time. Fear of manipulation of the ballot box contents during transportation must be procedurally addressed, and measures to ensure that the contents of the ballot boxes remain intact must be respected, communicated, and enforced.

Ideally, counting officers, as well as two or more party or candidate representatives should accompany ballot boxes and supplies. These measures are designed to prevent fraud and ensure that any tampering that occurs will be easily detected.

The control measures should be publicised and known in advance by all participants in the process, including the public, as an indication of transparency. Controls on the movement of ballot boxes are essential to maintain the integrity of a democratic electoral process.

The selection of the carrier, private or public sector, (belonging to the Armed Forces or the Police), should be decided before the election is called and should take into consideration several factors:

• reliability,

• speed,

• coverage of the territory,

• availability of contingency measures, etc.

The choice of transportation methods as well as the organization assigned to perform transport will be a key determinant in the success of the operation. The confidence in the entire election can be affected if the transportation is not entirely secure and properly carried out.

At the close of voting, the slot of the ballot box should be sealed so that no additional ballots can be put into the ballot box during transportation.

The serial numbers of the official seals used should be written in the respective election books and/or on the transportation forms. Then the counting officer counts the numbers of used ballots by counting the used counterfoils (the ballot box remains sealed), unused ballots, and spoiled ballots.

This total should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station.

If any discrepancies are found, the counting officer should recount until the missing ballots are found or make the appropriate amendments to the forms (ballot account form, transportation forms, and the election book) noting the discrepancy.

All the forms are put into sealed envelopes and attached to the ballot box. Representatives of political parties and candidates can append their signatures on the seals used by the counting officer or can use their own seals. The ballot box is then ready to be transported to the counting centre.

The transportation form should be completed in multiple copies and given to authorised persons.

Representatives of political parties and candidates, the electoral officer in charge of reception of the ballot boxes at the counting centre, the electoral management body and the electoral officer responsible for the ballot boxes during transportation should each have a copy of the transportation form.

Creation of Ballot Account

Reconciling Ballots

Before the start of voting, the number of ballots received from the electoral management body must be counted.

In countries where each party has its own ballot and where envelopes are used, it is important to count ballots and envelopes and to verify that all party's ballots are available to the voters.

This is an important aspect of the audit trail, as this figure will be needed to reconcile the number of ballots used/unused after the voting has taken place.

To ensure completeness, all ballots received should be counted, and serial numbers on the counterfoils (as applicable) should be verified through inspections of the ballot booklets.

It is appropriate, especially if ballots are delivered by hand, that the ballot quantities be counted in the presence of the officer who delivered them. A receipt can be signed with a copy then attached to the voting record book. More important, however, is that the count be done at the voting station, in the presence of all representatives of political parties and candidates.

n all cases, the information should be written in the ballot accounting form.

Once the ballots are counted and proper observations are made on the appropriate forms, then all persons present at the voting station should be shown that the ballot box is empty before placing security seals on the ballot box. Party and candidate parties should be given the opportunity to affix their seal or signature to the seal on the ballot box.

The serial number(s) of the seal(s) should be written in the voting record book and on any other appropriate form. These procedures are very important, as they constitute the start of an important audit trail. Many mistakes can be prevented if these procedures are followed. If discrepancies occur, steps can be retraced back to the beginning of ballot marking.

Once these preliminary procedures are completed, the person in charge may announce that the voting station is officially open to the first voter.

At closing time, the person in charge of the voting station should announce officially the close of voting. The voting station officer should ensure then that only pre-authorised persons are allowed to process or witness the procedures for preparing the ballot box for transportation to the counting centre.

Voting station officers, , observers, representatives of political parties and candidate should be permitted to stay. If no one except the voting station officers are present, the last voters may be asked to stay to witness the preparation.

The presence of the representatives of the political parties and candidates and electoral observers is an important element of the transparency that must be demonstrated in a democratic election.

Reconciliation and Procedures in Case of Discrepancies

During the close of voting and before starting the reconciliation, the electoral officer in charge of the voting station should seal the slot of the ballot box, using an official seal with serial numbers.

The electoral officer in charge of the voting station must count the numbers of used ballots by counting the used counterfoils (the ballot box remains sealed), unused ballots and spoiled ballots.

The total of these three categories should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station.

Verification of the number of voters who voted on election day should also be done using the marked-up voter's list and the voting record book entries. It may be necessary to look at the voting record book as some jurisdictions authorize registration of voters on electionday and these may be added using the voting record book. Other jurisdictions use separate forms.

This information can be written on a ballot account form signed by the voting station officer, as well as party and candidate representatives.

In case of discrepancies in the reconciliation process, the count should be repeated by verifying the observations made in the voting record book for the spoiled ballots.

This can also be accomplished by recounting the unused ballots and the used counterfoils. If discrepancies remain, then verification with a higher authority (the district electoral officer and/or the electoral management body) of the number of ballots sent to the voting station should be done to verify figures and to inform these authorities of the situation.

Keeping higher authorities regularly informed of any problems is an important part of the transparency required in an election.

If no satisfactory answer for the discrepancy is found, corrections and amendments to the voting record book, reconciliation form, or any other relevant form should be made to reflect the appropriate number of ballots.

To validate these new figures, everybody who should know is informed of the situation and agrees with it. Those who should be informed of the discrepancy are political party and candidate representatives present at the voting station for the vote count.

These parties should complete a report and sign the forms and/or the voting record book. This new figure should then become the official one for the voting station. All the documents and forms prepared should be put into a sealed envelope or plastic bag and attached to the ballot box.

To facilitate the transportation, a bag large enough to contain the ballot box and all the sealed envelopes attached to it can be used and sealed prior to transportation. If the ballot box is too big or heavy, the envelopes should be securely taped onto the ballot box while ensuring that the seals of the ballot boxes are still legible and intact.

For more details on opening procedures and closing procedures.

Providing Security Controls

Security controls should be in place prior to transportation;when ballot boxes are transported from the voting station to the counting centre. These measures can prevent fraud and ensure, that if tampering occurs, it will be detected. These controls are essential to the transparency and integrity demonstrated in the democratic electoral process.

Voting station officers must ensure adherence to the security procedures, and representatives of political parties and candidates should be encouraged to witness them.

The electoral officer in charge of the voting station should verify that the seal on the ballot box closure is still unbroken and that the serial number is the same as the one recorded at the opening of the voting station.

The serial number of the seal put on the slot of the ballot box after the close of voting should be verified as well. No ballot box should be transported without being sealed.

Maintaining records of the serial numbers of the seals, and allowing representatives of political parties and candidates to also maintain such records, is important and useful.

Representatives of political parties and candidates may wish to put their own seals on the ballot box or simply sign, or attach their initials on, the ones used by the electoral management body.

If political party and candidate representatives put their own seals on the ballot box, there has to be early consultation to ensure that the seals they use will fit on the ballot boxes and that the ballot boxes will be able to accommodate all the seals.

Some ballot boxes are made of material that facilitates the affixation of seals or signatures, whereas others preclude such affixation. The format and design of the seals should be specified to prevent them from using their seals as advertising stickers. The required strength of the seals should be specified and enforced: if this is not done, the seals may break or fall off while in transit, causing unnecessary complaints, see .

Controls on the process of manufacturing the official seals used by the electoral management body must provide adequate guarantees that seal substitution will not be possible. In addition, the seals must be strong enough to ensure that they will not break in transit due to the stress of movement of the boxes.

It is highly recommended that proper testing be done prior to the ordering and production of large quantities. The seals should be serially numbered.

The control measures should be publicised and known in advance by all participants to the process as well as by the public to provide indications of transparency and security.

However, an element of secrecy should be maintained regarding the exact design of materials to avoid illegal reproduction or copying. For example, when publicising the use of the seals, the exact design of the logo (if any) or other specific details about the seals should not be revealed. If reproduction copies are found, it should be easy to distinguish the official seals from counterfeit ones.

If the seals arrive broken, a report should be made and signed by officials and the representatives of political parties and candidates.

Creation of Transport Logs

Whenever ballot boxes are transported from voting station to counting center, records should be kept to ensure that security is tight and that an audit trail is in place.

That way, risk can be minimised, and if anything is missing or tampering is suspected, the problem can be properly investigated.

A movement or transportation form  should be used for the specific purpose of controlling the movement of ballot boxes. Information such as the list below could be included:

• the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box and on the sealed envelopes;

• the number of sealed envelopes that should be attached to the ballot box and brief details of their content (voter's list, ballot account form, etc.);

• the name, and if applicable the number, and address of the voting station;

• name, and if applicable the number, and address of the counting centre where it should be delivered including time and date of pick-up;

• name and signature of the person who authorized the transaction;

• name of the person who will receive the ballot box;

• signatures of other voting station officers (if needed) and representatives of political parties and candidates.

Moreover, space could be provided on the form to include basic information on the driver, type of vehicle used, and license plate number. If other means of transportation are used, such as aeroplane or boat, detailed information on the schedule, departure time, and flight number could be written on the form.

If needed, details on the itinerary can also be written on the form (such as overnight stops, for example, or if any other type of stoppage is needed).

Finally, the telephone number of a dispatcher at the electoral management body or the phone number of a contact at the destination could be indicated on the form should the driver need assistance to locate the counting centre destination.

Multiple copies of these forms could be produced for the following:

• the voting station officer;

• the electoral officer in charge of reception of the ballot box at the counting centre;

• the local and national offices of the electoral management body;

• the person responsible for the ballot boxes during their transportation.

Representatives of political parties and candidates and observers should be allowed to make their own copies.

Arrangement for Transport of Ballot Boxes to the Counting Centre

Domestic Arrangements

Arrangements for transport should be negotiated and planned before the election is called. The electoral management body must ascertain that the chosen carrier has the capacity and capability to make the ballot box deliveries within required time frames while using appropriate security controls.

The selection of the transport company (public or private) or organization (national or regional or international organization, police or army or other security service) will be dictated by the political, social and economical context of each country and depend on various risk factors.

It is recommended that factors of reputation, dependability, financial strength, coverage of the territory, shipment-tracing capability, speed of delivery, and availability of contingency measures be used as evaluation criteria for selecting the carrier.

When the election is called, a contract should be in place and fully negotiated as to the details of obligation and procedure. The contract should include specific performance clauses, with an applicable penalty for partial or non-delivery. For the sake of transparency the contract should be awarded through a tender process.

If it is not possible to select a single carrier, or if the political situation requires the presence of security forces or reliable and trusted persons, considerations should be given to allow political party and candidate representatives to accompany the ballot boxes. However, the right to accompany ballot boxes must be equally open to a cross-section of the parties and candidates concerned.

To limit the number of people participating in the transportation process, prior agreements between all parties involved are encouraged to assign two persons representing different political sides in the same vehicle along with the election or if this impracticable in a separate vehicle.

Observers should be allowed to accompany the ballot boxes, but for practical reasons, they might have to follow in a separate vehicle. Security forces may be required in certain political environments.

Agreements with security forces should be made prior to the election by the electoral management body to determine the extent and level of security required.

If this is not planned properly, the requirements can impose a burden on the security forces.

The security arrangements should also be made known to the political parties and candidates. This is particularly important if there is mistrust or lack of confidence in the security forces by the population or the political parties.

International Arrangements

Transportation of ballots across national boundaries and throughout the world will require a different approach from domestic arrangements and involve very careful planning.

Time zones, customs, carrier's schedules, and other types of delays in transport may impact the starting date and hour of the counting process.(see Special Considerations for Counting Votes Cast Outside the Country)

Transport of Ballot Boxes

The ballot boxes should be transported to the counting centre in a vehicle with a closed compartment and a lock that can be sealed. All the proper information on the vehicle, the driver, the numbers of the seals used on the closed compartment, etc. should be written on a waybill and given to the driver.

This same information should be communicated to the counting centre so that it can be checked upon receipt. Such measures promote efficiency of transport and prevent fraud.

In the process of transfer from one kind of transport method to another (when using more than one type of transportation such as from a truck to a boat and then back to a truck), the driver should verify the following: that all ballot boxes were transferred; that a new seal was placed on the lock of the compartment of the new transport vehicle; and note the number of the new seal on the waybill. The driver should sign the waybill indicating that the transfer was properly done.

Persons who accompany the ballot boxes (representatives of political parties and candidates and electoral officers) should sign as well.

In areas where potential violence may compromise the safe delivery of the ballot boxes, a vehicle escorting the carrying vehicle may be appropriate. Armed forces, police, or a national or international organization may be used to provide the needed security. An election official and representatives of political parties should accompany the ballot boxes and observers can follow in another vehicle.

The ballot boxes should not be left unattended at any time unless they are locked in secure storage. To demonstrate transparency during transportation, representatives of political parties and candidates should be encouraged to accompany the ballot boxes from the voting station to the counting centre.

Prior arrangements must be made regarding who is delegated as a representative of political parties and candidates during transportation, since it will not be possible to have representatives of many political parties and candidates accompanying the ballot box transport.

Once at the counting centre, the official responsible for the reception of the ballot boxes should collect the waybill from the driver and verify all information: numbers on the seals, driver identification, etc. The same information should be verified against information previously transmitted.

The official then breaks the seal and the ballot boxes are counted and removed from the vehicle to the planned location in the counting centre. All forms attached to the ballot box and the seals are verified before putting a sticker or colored tape on the ballot box indicating that the ballot box is ready to be counted.

The waybill is completed and signed by the official responsible for the reception of the ballot box, the driver, and representatives of political parties and candidates.

Copies should be given to the driver, representatives of political parties and candidates and the original should be kept by the electoral official who receives the ballot boxes at the counting centre.

Securing Ballot Boxes During Transportation

If one or more ballot boxes from the same voting station are to be transported directly to a counting centre, it is advisable to use just one vehicle.

If possible, at least two representatives of political parties and candidates, representing different political parties could be in the same vehicle along with the election official. Observers should be allowed to accompany the ballot boxes.

Since some ballot boxes are bulky and heavy, and it is more practical to have one vehicle carry the ballot boxes of multiple voting stations to a distant counting centre, it may be necessary to use a rented vehicle with a closed compartment at the back with a lock that can be sealed.

Once the lock is sealed, the serial number of the seal along with a brief description of the content (number of ballot boxes and their respective voting station numbers) and the name of driver and passengers can then be transmitted to the final destination by fax or phone and verified on arrival. This information should also be recorded on the waybill.

A new seal should be used, and the numbers of the previous seal recorded, each time more boxes are added to a shipment. Usually, these measures will be sufficient to deter any tampering of the ballot boxes.

In areas where potential violence may compromise the safe delivery of the ballot boxes, a vehicle escorting the carrying vehicle may be appropriate. Depending of the safety of the area, military or police forces may provide the escorting vehicle(s).

Their presence may be an advantage as their vehicles generally have communication capabilities, which could be used in case of emergencies.

Transmission of transport details to the counting centre or electoral management body prior to the departure of vehicles is recommended and representatives of political parties and candidates and observers should be allowed to travel, according to previously settled arrangements, with the escorting vehicles.

The transportation of ballot boxes in the most dangerous and violent areas can be done with the assistance of military/police vehicles.

Armed vehicles equipped with radios or phones may be necessary to provide the security required. However, agreements with all political parties and candidates should be obtained prior to election day, especially in areas where the role of the military in the political process has been questioned.

To address any potential criticism, and as far as practically possible, voting station officers, political party and candidate representatives, and observers should be assigned to travel in the same armed vehicles according to arrangements negotiated in advance by the electoral management body.

If, at the destination, it is found that any ballot boxes have been tampered with or are missing, the matter should be reported directly to the electoral management body. The electoral authorities must be ready to begin an investigation, as soon as possible, and conduct interviews with the driver to recollect the sequence of events and, if necessary, confirm this with the passengers.

To facilitate the recollection of events, a log book should be provided to the driver to note all departure/arrival times and other events occurring during the transportation (fuel stops, breaks, overnight stays, etc.). At no time should a ballot box transport vehicle be left unattended.

During unavoidable stops the driver and assistant/passengers should take turns to guard the ballot boxes.

Unloading of Ballot Boxes

Once the vehicles transporting the ballot boxes arrive at the counting centre, designated officials should unload in the order of arrival.

If a queue of vehicles is forming, an attendant could distribute tickets indicating the time of arrival. This will maintain a sequential order of priority in processing the vehicles/teams, and also allow an accurate recording of the time of arrival in the receipt log.

The waybill and/or the transportation form should be collected from the driver (see Completion of Transport Logs) and verified: the driver's identification, numbers of the seals, etc.

The documentation should also be verified against information previously transmitted to the counting centre from the voting station. The seal on the vehicle should only be broken once proper verification is completed and an exact count of the number of ballot boxes to be received is known.

The ballot boxes are then unloaded, one-by-one, from the vehicle and moved to the planned destination in the counting centre. This operation should be under constant supervision from officials of the counting centre. The official responsible for reception of the ballot boxes should verify that the seals are unbroken, and that sealed envelopes are attached to the ballot boxes.

If all safeguards are in order, a sticker, coloured tape, or other type of symbolic identification could be placed on the ballot boxes as they are removed from the vehicle. This will indicate that these ballot boxes are verified and ready to be counted. This measure can also help to prevent the counting a ballot box twice, or missing a ballot box in the count.

The ballot boxes that are ready to be counted should be in a location where they will not be mixed with ballot boxes already counted.

Once all the ballot boxes are unloaded from the truck, a last verification count of the number received against the number expected via the transport logs should be done. A receipt form can be issued to the driver to verify delivery completion, and the designated officials in charge of receiving the ballot boxes should keep a copy.

If the seals on ballot boxes are broken or there is any sign of possible fraud, these ballot boxes should be set aside in a separate area, and not mixed with others. A report for each of them should be written and signed by officials, drivers, representatives of political parties and candidates , etc.

These ballot boxes should be clearly identified as not to be opened, with a label or other form of sticker, to ensure they will not be confused with ready-to-be-counted ballot boxes. Any matter of possible fraud should immediately be addressed to the electoral management body so they can start an investigation.

Until further notice from the electoral management body, these ballot boxes should be left untouched and secured.

Completion of Transport Logs

A document or other type of communication informing the counting centre of the departure of the vehicle from a voting station should be made.

This communication, whether it be through phone or fax, should provide the counting centre with the following information:

• name of driver,

• name of passengers,

• number of ballot boxes and respective voting station numbers,

• ballot box seal numbers,

• compartment seal numbers,

• departure time,

• the route that the vehicle is taking,

• type of vehicle, etc.

This document/information will be checked against actual information provided at the time of unloading the vehicle.

Quantities of ballot boxes and their voting station numbers should be carefully checked. If discrepancies are found, they should be noted on the log and the electoral management body should be informed immediately.

If ballot boxes are missing, verification should be made with the departure point to ensure that the information provided at the time of departure did not change. It is possible that a ballot box may have been routed through another vehicle.

If the vehicle transporting the ballot boxes has a separate sealed compartment, the serial numbers of the seals should be verified against the information provided prior to departure.

The driver should not break the seal unless an election official of the counting centre is present and has verified the number. All other steps mentioned above apply.

Once all the information is checked and verified, the official responsible for the receipt of the ballot box should sign the waybill and indicate the arrival and completion times and date.

The driver and representatives of political parties and candidates who accompanied the ballot boxes should also sign this waybill. Each of them should be allowed to keep a copy. If the driver cannot produce the waybill or the transportation form for the election official, special measures should be taken.

Identification of the driver and passenger(s) should be verified against the information transmitted by phone/fax or other means. The license plate and the number of the seal on the vehicle compartment should be verified as well.

If all this information is confirmed, the officials may proceed with the opening and closing of the ballot boxes. However, an entry regarding the absence of the waybill/transportation form should be made in a log book kept by the official responsible for receipt of the ballot boxes at the counting centre. In all cases, discrepancies should be promptly reported to the electoral management body.

Opening and Closing of Ballot Boxes

Before the ballot boxes are opened, a check could be made that there are only authorised persons present in the counting centre. In some instances the list of authorised persons might include members of the armed forces and media.

Once the ballot boxes are at the counting centre and ready to be counted, the counting officer will verify the seals on the ballot box and open it. The contents are emptied on a table in the presence of counting officers, representatives of political parties and candidates, observers, etc.

Sealed envelopes attached to the ballot boxes are opened and verification of the reconciliation done at the voting station is made.

The ballots on the table are counted to establish quantity. The number of ballots in the ballot box should match the number of voters who voted. This figure should be compared to the one written on the ballot account form completed at the voting station.

A last reconciliation is done once all ballots are sorted and tallied by candidate and party to verify that all totals are correct before making the official entries and completing the statement of the vote for the ballot box.

Everybody (observers and security personnel may be excluded) involved in the counting process should sign the forms to confirm that the accounting of ballots was satisfactory, or to state that they are aware of the source of the discrepancy (if any) and that they agree with the decision taken by the counting official. Once the forms are completed and the ballots bundled, the ballot box will be closed and re-sealed with all the ballots inside.

In case of discrepancies, the counting process should be repeated until the missing ballots are found, even if only one ballot is missing.

If, after verification, the missing ballots are still not found ,the electoral management body should be informed of the problem and verification of their ballot accounts should be done (especially verification of the number of ballots sent to the voting station). Keeping higher authorities informed of any problem is part of the transparency required in an election.

If no solution is found, appropriate amendments should be made on the ballot account forms (and on any form on which this information is required) and on the statement of the vote signed by the counting official and representatives of political parties and candidates. This new figure should then become the official one for the ballot box.

In some jurisdictions, counting of ballots that cannot be reconciled or that are not within a certain tolerance, (i.e. difference is not more than 2, 3 or 5 ballots, legislation, regulations, or directives may prohibit proceeding with the count. If significant discrepancies are discovered, local rules could apply to the level of action taken.

In some cases, if significant fraud is suspected, it may be necessary to delay opening and counting the contents of a ballot box until the electoral management body investigates the problem and decides what to do with the ballot box. Electoral officers and others involved should be aware of these provisions through their training.

Merging Results to Protect Secrecy

In some situations, electoral management bodies will combine, merge, or amalgamate results of several ballot boxes. This is generally done if the voting procedure makes it possible to identify every person whose vote has gone into a particular ballot box; or if the number of votes in the ballot box is so small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate or party.

In such cases, the secrecy of the vote could be compromised. Results should be combined (mixed or amalgamated) with another ballot box. This can also be done in cases where it appears that the secrecy of individual votes can be secured. There is real risk arising from the fact that a particular voting station, having voted predominantly in a particular way, could result in retribution being visited on the persons who voted at that voting station.

Mixing the ballots from two or more boxes from different areas, and then attributing all the votes to one ballot box with proper notation in the results form can mitigate these problems. The counting centre approach is appropriate for making this type of modification effective in counting procedures. For internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers per box can be made to keep the audit trail clear.

Combining (merging) results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other category of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body or in a specific counting centre, results can easily be combined (merged) with other results to protect the secrecy of the vote.

Once again, for internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers by category can be made to keep the audit trail clear.

Sorting of Ballots

General Overview

In the case of multiple ballot elections (for example, presidential, national legislature, and municipal elections on the same day) an order of priority for counting these ballots should be given to avoid mistakes and confusion in the counting process.

This should be part of the rules given to the counting officers during the training sessions and in the documentation of operational procedures for counting. Instructions should also be given for procedures to be used in cases where ballots are found in the wrong box.

Only one person should handle the initial sorting of ballots from a ballot box, usually the counting official in charge of that ballot box. Spoiled ballots should already have been separated and sealed in an envelope attached to the ballot box. A spoiled ballot is simply one that a voter marks incorrectly and hands back to voting station officers in exchange for a new ballot.

Spoiled ballots should never be found in the ballot box.

Once the ballot box is open, the counting officer or representative of political parties and candidates verifies the validity of each ballot in the process of counting. The counting officer must be able to distinguish between a valid ballot and a counterfeit one by the watermark or any other mark made to identify valid ballot papers. Any counterfeit ballots identified should be set aside, counted and reported to the electoral management body as an attempt at fraud.

The counting official will divide all ballots by candidates and political party as they are counted. At the same time, he/she can determine all potentially rejected ballots and sets them aside. After the count of valid ballots is complete, the counting officer must go through the pile, of potential rejected ballots and decide on the validity of each one.

Potential rejected ballots, which are determined by the counting officer to actually be valid, are separated by candidate and party. All invalid ballots, as well as any counterfeit ballots, are counted and set aside. The counting officer will then add to the initial number of valid ballots for each candidate and political party the additional valid ballots, and make a total count for each candidate and political party.

Rules of interpretation, guidelines, and illustrations regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting officer, and be known in advance to facilitate the decision making process. In all cases, rejected ballots should be put aside and kept. No ballots are to be destroyed at this stage.

The separation of rejected ballots is important to create an audit trail of the count and is an essential component if there is to be a recount of the ballots.   Rejected ballots must be closely examined and the counting official should announce the reason for rejection of each such ballot.

Political party or candidate representatives should be able to examine the rejected ballots. If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting official, they should be able to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. Clear rules must exist for recording objections made by representatives of political parties or candidates.

Once the spoiled, counterfeit (if any), and rejected ballots have been separated, the valid ballots can be counted. The representatives of political parties/candidates/ options, and other persons allowed in the counting centre for the counting, should be able to make their own count.

The various representatives and observers witnessing the count must also be able to see each ballot that is counted. For more efficiency, other counting officer could assist the counting official. It must, however, be very clear who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of any ballot in question.

Checking Validity of the Ballot

When ballots are sorted the counting officer must distinguish valid ballots from counterfeits. Each ballot in the ballot box needs to be verified. In some jurisdictions, security paper is often used for ballots.

This paper contains a watermark or other form of unique identification (special colour, lines, symbols, or logos) making the ballot virtually impossible to counterfeit. The texture, thickness, colours, size, and format of the ballot are also indicators that will differentiate a valid ballot from a counterfeit.

The counting officer should know where to look on the ballot to be sure of its authenticity. If he/she doesn't recognise the ballot or the ballot was not issued at the voting station, it should not be included in the count and should be put aside.

To speed up the process of authenticating the ballots, certain jurisdictions require that the voting station offcer append their initials in a provided space at the back of the ballot before handing it to the voter.

If the initials at the back of the ballot are not from the voting station officer or are missing, then it should be set aside and not counted as a valid ballot. These initials should appear on the ballot account form, transportation form, the seals, or voting record book. If no initials are on the back of the ballot, the ballot should not be counted as valid.

This measure of appending a voting station officer’s initial at the back of the ballot can help to identify valid ballots from counterfeit ones, but the official's initial should always be identical to protect the voter's secrecy of the vote. The voting station officer should always use the same colour of pen or pencil to append his/her initials.

In all cases, all ballots are kept, even if they are not valid. No ballots should be destroyed (at this stage of the process, see Challenging Results for more details on how long ballots should be kept) as an audit trail of all ballots considered must be assembled so that the count can be fully reconstructed.

If there is any doubt, and before taking the decision to reject a ballot as counterfeit, the counting officer should be able to verify the basis of his decision with the supervisor of the counting centre and/or with the electoral management body. Rejecting a ballot on the basis that it is counterfeit is an important decision and should be done when there is certainty.

Separating Spoiled and Rejected Ballots

Separating rejected ballots from spoiled ballots is important since the significance of these ballots is very different. Mixing them may seriously impact the audit trail.

Spoiled ballots should never end up in the ballot box and should be secured in a sealed envelope attached to the ballot box. A spoiled ballot is generally one that a voter has inadvertently spoiled by marking it incorrectly; it is handed back to the voting station officer in exchange for a new blank ballot that is then marked by the voter and placed in the ballot box.

A spoiled ballot may also be one that is improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote secrecy.

A rejected ballot is one that has made its way into the ballot box but has been rejected because it was improperly marked, or was not marked at all when a mark was required. The most common criteria to reject a ballot are:

• ballot with no mark;

• ballot with mark for more than one candidate or political party when only one was supposed to be chosen;

• ballot marked with a type of pen or pencil other than the one provided at the polling station;

• unofficial mark according to the law;

• unusual marks;

• ballot marked so the voter could be identified; or

• ballot marked in a location prohibited by legislation (outside the circle, etc.).

In some jurisdictions, blank ballots (ballots with no marks) are counted separately (and may be considered as protest votes); in others, they are considered to be rejected ballots. In all cases, all ballots are to be kept and none should be destroyed at this stage of the electoral process.

In countries using envelopes, since no marks are made on the ballot itself, the identification of a rejected ballot from a valid ballot is different. For example, a rejected ballot will be an envelope in which there will be two ballots; an empty envelope; a ballot in an envelope marked in a way that the secrecy of the voter is compromised,etc.

In many jurisdictions, if the intention of the voter is clear, all types of marks can be accepted. In others, the legislation is very clear on which specific types of marks are to be accepted, even on a write-in ballot

For these specific cases, those marks should be clearly demonstrated during the training of counting officials and documented in their manual or in the operational guideline to help the counting official in making his decision.

A card summarising the marks to be accepted or rejected, with pictures of sample ballots showing those marks, is a very useful tool that can be inserted in the counting officials' training kit.

Separating Valid Ballots

One way to separate valid ballots is to unfold all ballots, one by one.

The counting officer makes sure that the ballot is valid (see Separating Spoiled/Rejected Ballots for a discussion about spoiled and rejected ballots).

The counting officer may call out the name of the candidate or political party for whom the ballot has been marked and hold up the ballot for all to see. If several persons are involved with separating and counting the ballots and identifying those that are potentially to be rejected, the practice of calling out names may not be useful.

It may be more efficient to separate the ballots according to choice (without counting them), setting aside those potentially to be rejected, and then establish which ballots are actually to be rejected. After the rejections are finalised, the piles of valid ballots for each candidate or party can be quickly counted.

In all cases, only counting officers should handle ballots and it must be made very clear that the counting official is the only person entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot.

The advantage of showing the ballot and calling out the result of each ballot considered is that it allows the representatives of political party and candidates and observers to make their own count. The disadvantage is that the process is interrupted each time a rejected ballot is discovered; this tends to make the count of valid ballots very inefficient. It can also create a very noisy environment and it could confuse counting officers working at another table.

Whichever method is used, the valid ballot papers are put in separate piles on the table; one pile per candidate, political parties, or option (in the latter case for a referendum).

The examination of the ballot should allow observers, representatives of political parties and candidates to see the ballot and ensure that it is appropriately separated according to choice. They should have controlled access to contest the validity of sorted ballots.

If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting officers, official objections can be made.

While transparency of the process is important, controls on movement of ballots should always be the first concern of the counting officer.

Counting

Summary of the Process

To facilitate the process of counting, ballots can be bundled by groups of ten, for example, to facilitate keeping a count of the votes counted. It is desirable for every bundle of ballots to be counted at least twice, with one officer checking the work of the other official.

For example, depending on the number of political parties or candidates and also on the number of counting officers, each counting officer can be responsible for receiving and counting all ballots cast for one or more political parties or candidates. Later the counting officers can exchange all ballots cast that they are counting for ballots counted by another counting officer and verify each other's totals.

All ballots are counted, including spoiled, rejected, and unused ballots. Even if not counted as valid, these ballots are important for the audit trail and will be needed in case of a recount.

To eliminate possible objections over the validity of ballots, the counting officer should be provided with clear rules of interpretation of accepted marks on the ballot and all reasons that should lead to rejection of a ballot.

Minimising the interpretation that is needed by the counting officer makes it easier for him to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots.

If the validity of a ballot is objected to or challenged, the counting officer should be the only person able to make a decision, even if other counting workers are involved in the counting process. To be more consistent in his decisions, the counting officer can put all questionable ballots in one separate pile, decide on all rejected ballots following the count of valid ones and then add any additional valid votes to the appropriate candidate or political party.

Alternatively, the ballots can be first separated, the questionable ones decided, and then each pile can be counted.

Each disputed ballot should be numbered on the back. The same number should be written on the statement of the vote (or other form, as prescribed) for each ballot box along with the decision made by the counting officer.

To count the ballots, a count sheet is often used by the counting officer. The representatives of political parties and candidates and observers may have a count sheet as well. The official one is the one used by the counting officer in charge of the count for a particular ballot box.

The count sheet is a tool used to facilitate the count. For each vote for each candidate or party, a mark is made on the count sheet. Periodically, the marks for each political party or candidate are added together.

If a mistake is made during the process, comparison with the count sheets of other counting workers can be made. If the mistake is still not found, the count should be restarted from the last point of agreement.

A verification of the count should be done once the ballots are counted. This verification is usually the last one made. It is important to make sure that no votes were changed during the count in favour or against one candidate or party. It should include a comparison to the previous reconciliation (the one done at the voting station and the one done once the ballot box was opened).

The total number of ballots cast for each candidate or party plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. This information should be duly noted on the ballot account form completed at the voting station. If it doesn't, any discrepancies should be investigated by the counting officer. Discrepancies may be a reflection of mistakes made at an earlier stage.

Once the counting process is over, the ballots are bundled and put back into the ballot box along with all relevant forms. A copy of the statement of the vote should be in a separate envelope, on the outside of the ballot box. Both the envelope and the ballot box should be sealed before being transferred to the planned location in the counting centre for the counted ballot boxes.

In the event of a recount, all these documents are needed. This explains why elaborate precautions about sealing the ballot box contents are important. For more safety, the seal could even be signed by the counting officer and the party and candidate representative. The counting officer should keep one official copy in case of loss.

Count of Spoiled and Rejected Ballots

Spoiled ballots, rejected, and unused ballots must be counted to create a complete audit trail. Spoiled and unused ballots were supposed to be counted at the voting station, before the ballot box was transported to the counting centre.

These ballots remain official documents even if not counted as valid. Additionally, rejected ballots are essential in case of a recount.

Rules of Interpretation for Rejected Ballots

This is one of the most challenging aspects of vote counting, as each counting officer brings his/her subjective decision making abilities to the task, irrespective of how effective their training was.

In an attempt to eliminate possible objections to the validity of a ballot, the counting officer should be provided with clear rules of interpretation and given illustrations of acceptable and unacceptable marks on the ballot, including the rationale for any rejection of a ballot.

Minimizing the interpretation that is needed by the counting officer makes it easier for him/her to take the necessary decisions and will reduce disputes over the validity of ballots. In the event of a close margin in favor of one candidate or party, a recount is likely to be asked for and rejected ballots will be carefully analyzed.

Handling Disputes Regarding Rejections

In several jurisdictions, the counting officer is the only person qualified to make the final decision on the validity of a ballot. He is also the person handling disputes regarding objections.

If a representative of a candidate or political party doesn't agree with the counting official on the validity of a ballot, he may object to the decision. In most cases, the counting officer has to immediately make a decision on whether or not the ballot is valid. To be more consistent in his/her decisions, the counting officer may put all questionable and contested ballots in a separate pile while counting valid ballots.

He/she can then decide which of the potential rejected ballots will actually be rejected, and count the total number of rejections. Remaining valid ballots then be added to the count for each political party or candidate.

Alternatively, all potential rejected ballots can be pre-identified, decided on, and counted first, and then valid ballots can be counted subsequently.

For each objected ballot, the ballot will be numbered on the back. The same number will be written on the statement of the vote (the voting record book or a separate form can also be used) for each ballot box along with the decision made by the counting officer.

All rejected and spoiled ballots are counted and recorded in the statement of the votes for each ballot box as well as on the ballot account form.

Count of Valid Ballots

To count the ballots, the counting officer can use a count sheet. The representatives of political parties and candidates and observers may have a count sheet as well. The official one is the one used by the counting officer.

The proper information regarding the ballot box number and the constituency or electoral district should be written in at the top or bottom of the form. In each column, the names of each candidate or party as they appear on the ballot should be written.

There are two usual types of count sheet: one where each square represents a vote for a candidate or party and one where square is drawn with a diagonal mark denoting five votes

For the first one, each square may be marked for each vote for a candidate or party. At the end, the total for each will be easy to count. For the second, four vertical marks and one diagonal one are made. Each completed square equals five votes for a candidate or party.

Establishing correlation between count sheets requires a pause for consensus as to how many votes are recorded per candidate or party at certain set times (every 100 ballots for example).

Restarting the count at the last point of correlation is much more efficient than beginning the entire count.

Verification of Count

Reconciling to Ballot Account Totals

It is recommended that a verification of the count should be done once the ballots of one ballot box are counted.

This verification is usually the last one made before preparing the statement of the vote for the ballot box and transmitting the information to the person in charge of making the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre.

This last verification is important to make sure that no ballots have been introduced or removed that would modify the results in favour or against one candidate or party.

This last verification includes comparison of the reconciliation done previously, both before opening the ballot box and when the ballot box was opened.

The total of ballots for each candidate or party plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. This information was provided on the ballot account form completed at the voting station.

If errors are detected, the count sheet should be verified against count sheets of other counting officers working at the same table on the same ballot box. If the error is still not found, then all the ballots counted per candidate/party/option should be reexamined and recounted.

Sealing of Ballot

To ensure the safety of its contents, the ballot boxes should be resealed, with all the ballots inside, before returning the boxes to the planned location for ballot boxes already counted. This is very important in case of a recount.

In certain jurisdictions, all forms such as count sheets, the voting record book, and the voter's list are also put into the ballot box along with the ballots before sealing. The ballot box's statement of the vote should not be added to the other documents, but put in a separate envelope and attached to the outside of the ballot box.

However, this envelope should itself be sealed to make sure that no unauthorised person has access to the results and any attempted changes can be detected by higher authorities. A copy of the statement of the vote should already have been transmitted to the person in charge of combining the results for the counting centre.

Ballots are placed in bundles, by category (candidates, parties, rejected ballots, spoiled ballots, unused ballots, etc.) in the ballot box.

Once all the ballots and relevant forms are in the box, the box may be sealed and transferred to the planned location in the counting centre for ballot boxes already counted. The seal number should be written on the statement of the vote and attached, in a sealed envelope, to the ballot box.

Even if all the envelopes or plastic bags are sealed, it is still important to reseal the ballot box. In the event of a recount, all these documents are needed; thus the elaborate precautions for sealing the ballot box contents.

If a paper seal is used, for additional security, some jurisdictions require that the counting officers as well as representatives of political parties and candidates sign the ballot box seal.

Transmitting Counting Centre Results

Summary of Process

Once the counting process is over, the counting officer prepares the statement of the vote for each ballot box. Progress reports for each counting centre will also be sent to the national office of the electoral management body.

The electoral management body releases the results as they come in. A cumulative statement of the vote will also be prepared for the counting centre.

Statement of the Vote for Each Ballot Box

This form indicates the results of election day and should include standard information such as the name, and if applicable, the number of the electoral district, the number of the ballot box and date.

Specific information on the count should include:

• number of ballots received at the opening of voting from the electoral management body;

• number of spoiled ballots;

• number of unused ballots; and

• total number of voters who voted on election day.

This information should correspond to the ballot account form completed at the voting station. Then, the number of valid ballots for each candidate and political party, number of rejected ballots and total number of valid ballots should be recorded.

The counting officer signs the form, as does the representatives of political parties and candidates.

Along with their signatures, the following information could be found: printed names, addresses, and telephone numbers. If there are later investigations, it will be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them. Some jurisdictions require all counting officers present at the counting table to sign the statement of the vote.

A transcribed copy, carbon copy, or a photocopy of the statement of the vote for the ballot box is given to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre. Representatives of political parties and candidates are allowed to make their own copies of the statements of the vote by transcribing the contents.

Any observers should also have access to make a copy of the results or transcribe them. The original is attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope.

Progress Reports

Once all the ballot boxes for an electoral district are counted, these results should sent directly to the central office of the electoral management body. The purpose of these reports is to allow the electoral management body to release results as they are ready. The same information is needed for the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre is used.

Cumulative Statement of the Vote for Counting Centre

Once the vote statement form for a ballot box has been completed, a copy should be transmitted to the person in charge of combining results and creating a cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre. The same information is needed from each ballot box that is added into the cumulative statement.

The person in charge of combining results will transmit the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre to the national office of the electoral management body as soon as it is completed to allow the national office to gather the national results as soon as possible. The transmission can be done by telephone, cellular phone, modem or fax, using a unique security code to ensure the proper identification of the person transmitting the results.

It is recognised that in rural and remote parts of some countries the communications infrastructure does not permit oral or electronic reporting of voting results. In such locations, an election officer should hand deliver the cumulative statement of the vote to the national office.

After the results have been reported orally or electronically, the original of the cumulative statement of the votes for the counting centre should be transmitted to the national office of the electoral management body by hand or by courier in a sealed envelope. This measure is essential to prevent fraud and to provide evidence of any tampering with results.

A carbon copy or a photocopy of the statement of the vote for each ballot box; the cumulative statement for the counting centre; as well as periodic progress reports; are given to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre. Another copy is posted at the counting centre.

Any observers and representatives of political parties and candidates, are allowed to make their own copy of the results by transcribing the information.

As the print and electronic media are considered a key element in a free and democratic society, it is recommended that they be given access to the results at either the counting centre or at the national offices of the electoral management body where results are being reported.

Some jurisdictions make special provision for the media at the counting centres, facilitating live electronic broadcasts. This is especially important if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question and to ensure transparency of the work of the electoral management body, during the counting process.

To control who is allowed at the counting centre or at the electoral management body offices, proper accreditation must be given by the electoral management body. The media representatives on site should wear accreditation identification.

Progress Reports; Cumulative Statement of Votes

Statement of the Vote for a Ballot Box

The statement of the vote is a form on which results are written. The counting official completes this form for each ballot box counted at the counting centre.

On the statement of the vote for each ballot box the following general information could be found:

• name, and if applicable the number, of the electoral district;

• number of the ballot box;

• name, and if applicable the number, of the voting station;

• whether the contents of several ballot boxes were added (or merged) to this ballot box;

• date;

• signature of the counting officer.

Representatives of political parties and candidates present at the counting table should also append their signatures on the form.

Along with their signatures, the following information should be found: printed names, addresses and telephone numbers. In case of any investigations or complaints it will then be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them.

Specific information on the count should include:

• information found on the ballot account form completed at the voting;

• number of ballots received at the opening of the election from the electoral management body;

• number of spoiled ballots;

• number of unused ballots;

• the total number of voters who cast their vote on election day according to the voter's list.

The following information should be added:

• number of valid ballots for each candidate;

• political party or candidate;

• number of rejected ballots;

• number of total valid ballots.

Additional detailed information - such as the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box or numbers of the ballot box itself - is required to appear on the statement in some jurisdictions.

This form is an important document since it provides the information used by the electoral management body to release the results. The counting officer responsible for the processing of the ballot box and contents should complete this form with utmost care.

Progress Report

Once all the ballot boxes for an electoral district are counted, the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre should prepare a progress report to be sent to the electoral management body.

The progress report should contain the same information as the statement of the vote for each ballot box, or consist of a summary for the entire electoral district.

Cumulative Statement of the Vote for a Counting Centre

Once the statement of the vote for a ballot box is completed, a copy is given to the person responsible for combining the results for the counting centre. Each statement of the vote for each ballot box counted in the counting centre is included on this cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre. The same general information is needed:

• name, and number, of the electoral district;

• date;

• signature of the person in charge of the cumulative statement of the vote;

• signatures of representatives of political parties and candidates present.

The figure for each ballot box is reproduced on the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre. Specific information could include the number of the ballot box and the total number of valid ballots for each candidate/political party/option; total number of rejected ballots; total number of spoiled ballots; total number of valid ballots for each ballot box. The total for each column is added, creating the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre.

Issuing the Statement of Votes

The statement of the vote for each ballot box, the progress reports and cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre should be prepared with care since it represents the final results of the election for a counting centre, unless subject to a recount.

Statement of the Vote for Each Ballot Box

The statement of the vote for each ballot box is usually prepared and signed by the counting officer.

Representatives of political parties and candidates present at the counting table should then sign the form. Their signature is very important as it reflects and demonstrates that they agree and acknowledge the results.

The printed name, address, and telephone number, if any, could also be on the form along with the signature of voting station officials and representatives of political parties and candidates. In case of any future complaint or investigation, the electoral management body will then more easily be able to contact these persons.

Concerning principle of transparency, it is strongly recommended that the observers as well as political party and candidate representatives each be able to transcribe the contents or obtain a copy of the statement of the votes.

Statement of the Vote for the Counting Centre

The progress report and the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre should be completed by the person responsible for combining the results for the counting centre. The statement for the counting centre should be signed by representatives of political parties and candidates.

Information contained on this form should also be made available to them, and to any observers present, to transcribe, or a copy of the actual form should be provided.

Communicating Results to National Level

Once the statement of the vote for each ballot box is completed, the counting officer should give a copy of the results to the person responsible for combining the results at the counting centre.

For greater transparency, periodic progress reports should be sent to the central office of the electoral management body. These progress reports should be sent by the electoral district officer and will enable the electoral management body to release results as they come in.

Once all ballot boxes in a counting centre have been counted, a cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre needs to be transmitted to the national office of the electoral management body.

Communication of the Results

The progress report and cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre should be transmitted to the office of the national electoral management body by phone (cellular or fixed line), by fax, or other electronic means.

For security reasons, a unique password or code should be provided to the person who will transmit the results. The electoral management body should issue this password or code on the day of the election itself. This code will reduce the possibility of impersonation, which will screen out unauthorised persons from transmitting incorrect or biased election results to the national office of the electoral management body.

If a fax machine is available at the counting centre, it should be used to send progress reports and the cumulative statement of votes to the electoral management body. Specific measures should be taken to control access to the fax machine and number to reduce the risk of any transmissions of unofficial results. These control measures should also be in place at the receiving end to ensure that the reports and cumulative statement of results are not tampered with.

In all cases, progress reports and the cumulative statement of the vote for each counting centre sent by fax should be signed by the person in charge of combining the results for the counting centre and by representatives of political parties and candidates present.

For more security, and to detect any attempts at fraud, the original cumulative statement of the vote form should be sent separately to the central office of the electoral management body in a sealed envelope. This envelope should be sent by hand or by courier.

By sending the original, the electoral management body can verify the results against the one previously sent by telephone or electronically and ensure they are the same.

Alternative Methods for Communicating to the Electoral Management Body

If cellular or fixed line phones are unavailable at a counting centre, alternative methods should be considered. Walkie-talkie or radio emitting devices do not require the installation of a phone line and are flexible and simple in their use.

However, their deployment should take into consideration the topography of the area to identify in advance any blackout regions where it is impossible to receive or transmit messages.

Again, appropriate training and identification codes should be provided to counting centre workers before deployment.

If it is not possible to use any means of wireless communication, the last resort is hand-to-hand delivery by election officials of the results to the electoral management body. If this is not possible the last alternative is to designate a messenger, who should be a credible, authorised person.

The choice of such person should be accepted by counting officers as well as representatives of the political parties and candidates.

Role of Print/Electronic Media

The media will likely compete to provide their forecast of the election results as quickly as possible after the counting process begins.

The counting centres are most likely locations for the media to base their reporting activities. Since the print or electronic media is considered a key element in a free and democratic society, it is recommended that they be given controlled access to counting centres, especially if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question.

To keep control of who is allowed at the counting centre, proper accreditation should be given in advance by the electoral management body and media representatives should wear corresponding identification.

It is important that the disruption of counting activities is minimised.

Should the media decide to station their representatives at the national office of the electoral management body offices or at the counting centres, specific physical areas should be set aside to accommodate them.

If they require specific installations such as telephones or fax lines, they should make their needs known well before election day and appropriate cost sharing arrangements and payments should be made in advance.

Usually, media should be allowed to have access to the same results provided by the electoral management body to representatives of political parties and candidates.

Route of Statement of the Vote for Each Ballot Box

Copies of the statement of the vote for each ballot box should be provided to the counting officer, to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre, and one should be in a sealed envelope attached to the ballot box.

Representatives of political parties and candidates present at the counting table, and observers should be allowed to make copies. Such copies can be made from a multi-part carbon copy form, or through the use of photocopy machine. Alternatively, multiple copies can be prepared by hand.

The original copy of the statement of the vote for a ballot box should be attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope. This is particularly important for the processing of a recount of the ballots, should it be required.

Route of Statement of Votes for Counting Centre

Copies of the voting results should be provided to the electoral management body (often the original sent in a sealed envelope), to the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre, and one posted outside the counting centre.

The representatives of political parties and candidates present, and observers, should be permitted to make their own copies by transcribing the information.

Once the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre is fully prepared and transmitted to the national office of the electoral management body, a copy can be posted at the outside of the counting centre. This way, the same information and results are made available for everybody, and at the same time. Because witnesses are permitted to observe and scrutinise the counting process, results are public. The statement of the vote becomes a public document that is made evident once it is posted.

Consolidating Voting Results

Summary of Process

At the national level, logistics should be carefully planned for receiving results from several counting centres at the same time.

Some suggestions to improve the efficiency of the process are discussed below. These suggestions might need to be modified depending on the country's infrastructure, or depending on other factors that might affect the implementation of these suggestions.

For greatest efficiency, one general phone number or fax number should be given to people transmitting the results to the national office of the electoral management body. Most telephone and fax systems now allow for calls to a single number to automatically search for the next available phone/fax unit on that line. For example, one team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit the information to the data entry person or person in charge of gathering the results.

A wall chart, chalkboard chart or spreadsheet listing for each electoral district should be prepared and then completed as the results come in. Once all the information for each counting centre is received, the combined results for the country should be finalised.

If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election). The required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when they are needed to compile the national results.

Special ballots, write-in votes, mail votes as well as ballots cast in ordinary elections, advance elections, and mobile voting stations should be part of the count and should be released as soon as possible.

Depending on the amount of delay that is acceptable, special ballots can be counted a few days prior to election day or after the close of voting on election day. If the later is the case, then the counting procedures should be designed carefully so it will not delay releasing the final results. 

For the special votes (mail and write-in votes), envelopes received at the head office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. If different colours of envelopes are used, it will facilitate the sorting by category.

For mail votes three envelopes are originally sent to the voter: a return mailing envelope containing an outer envelope (on which may appear the bar code and signature of the voter) and a secrecy envelope containing the ballot.

After verification of proper registration and no previous voting having taken place, and the creation of the audit trail, the secrecy envelope is put into a ballot box with its ballot still contained.

If the special ballots are counted a few days prior to election day, the results should be kept highly secure and only released at the close of voting on election day.

These special ballots can be used for absentee voting if no mechanism is in place for voting outside the country, in embassies for example 

For the counting process, the same rules for vote counting in the country should be followed. 

If advance elections take place over several days, reconciliation can be done at the end of each day, but the ballot choices are not counted. This reconciliation measure is for creating an audit trail of ballot usage.

The advance voting ballot boxes are then kept safely until election day and counting should take place at the closing time of the ordinary election.

The counting of advance votes should be done in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates and observers. The counting procedures are nearly identical to those used for ordinary elections.

For counting the votes of incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance voting may be applied but, of course, this will only be possible if voting by incarcerated voters takes place prior to election day.

Use of Technology

The use of phones and faxes are common for transmission of electoral results. To ensure the identity of the person transmitting results via phone or fax, an identification number or code should be given to them.

This method is a simple and efficient way to avoid unauthorised people calling in and providing false results.

Transmission of results by modem and computer can also be used. Once again, safeguards and passwords must be built into restricting the transmission of results to authorised persons who are permitted access to the system.

For all types of transmission, systems must be tested prior to election day to verify their capacity under the heavy use they will encounter on election night. A specialist should also be available at any time in case of failure of the systems. A contingency back-up system should also be created, tested and fully available.

Receiving Results from Counting Centres

Receiving Results from Several Counting Centres

The national office of the electoral management body receives the results directly from the counting centres.

The person responsible for combining results from the counting centres will directly transmit the progress reports for each electoral district and the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre directly to the national office of the electoral management body. For greatest efficiency, one general phone number or fax number should be used.

It is important, however, that the phone and fax system be installed in such a way that the calls go to the next available device on that line. Adequate numbers of phones or fax machines to cope with peak demands should be installed.

A list of the identification codes or passwords associated with the various counting centres could be provided to the staff receiving the results.

One team could take care of the incoming results and transmit information to the data entry person or the person in charge of combining all the results for the country. A spreadsheet or a board listing each electoral district should be prepared and completed as the results are received.

Representatives of political parties and candidates/ as well as media should have access to this spreadsheet or board so they can observe the results as they come in. Special measures should be taken to ensure that the same results are not given more than once.

Numbering or creating unique codes for the electoral districts is a simple way to avoid such confusion. However, if such a measure is taken, it should be done at the beginning of the election process and this number should be used consistently on all forms used for the counting process. The use of such a number or code will also create an audit trail.

If a country is divided into several time zones the results will come in at different times of the day to the national level (depending on the closing hour of the counting centres). The staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when needed.

In case of an emergency, the head office of the electoral management body should have a consistent line of communication will all their counting centres, especially when results are coming in.

If needed, a direct phone line can be set up within each counting centre so that the national electoral management body will be able to reach the person in charge of combining the results at anytime.

Special Ballot Counts,Mobile and Advance Voting Counts

Special ballots are usually returned to the head office of the electoral management body where a special counting centre is established. These results will then be reported to the central collection point separately, as in all other counting centres.

Depending on the rules of the system used and the logistics in place, the ballots returned by mail might be accepted only five days prior to election day or right up until election day itself. If special ballots are accepted right until election day, counting procedures should be designed so the publication of results will not be delayed.

Depending on the deadline given to return the special ballots, the counting may start before election day, at the beginning of election day, or at the close of voting on election day. However, counting these ballots may take a long time depending on the volume of ballots to process and the procedures used.

Counting special ballots before election day is common and generally recommended, but special security is necessary to ensure the results are released along with the results of ordinary elections.

The ballot boxes for advance voting are safely kept at the counting centre until the closing of ordinary voting on election day. The counting process for these ballots starts at the same time as for the ordinary voting and are virtually identical to the ones used for counting the votes of ordinary votes.

The counting of votes from mobile voting stations may take place at the counting centre and ballots are counted as any other ballots. These ballots should not be counted until the regular closing time of voting on election day.

For all cases - advance votes, special votes, mobile voting stations, etc. - if the count takes place a few days prior to election day, representatives of political parties and candidates should be present for the counting.

For the purposes of creating separate audit trails and for properly reporting the results of advance voting, mobile voting stations, and special votes, these unique voting procedures should not be confused with ordinary elections. The difference should be made very clear with a distinctive statement of the vote forms used for these types of ballots.

Creating an Audit Trail

Once the count for each ballot box is over and the ballot box is sealed, all the ballot boxes will be transferred to the planned storage location for ballot boxes that have been counted.

This storage space should be secure. Ballot boxes will be kept at this place until final results are known and accepted by all participants. In the case of a recount, the electoral management body will send instructions to the counting centre about what to do with the ballot boxes that will need to be recounted. Until then, all ballot boxes stay in the counting centre.

A spreadsheet, with all the ballot box numbers, should be used to control the storage of all ballot boxes. The supervisor responsible for the ballot boxes (once they are counted) should verify that the seals are properly attached and that the statement of the vote is attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope.

A sticker or other form of identification should then be put on the ballot box to indicate that the control check was done and the ballot box is ready for storage.

The supervisor should append his initials or signature to both the spreadsheet and identification sticker indicating that the control measure has been taken.

Ability to Subsequently Check Results Received

Ability to subsequently check the results received against separate documentation is essential to avoid mistakes, and to prevent fraudulent manipulation of electoral results.

A copy of the cumulative statement of the vote of each counting centre should be sent separately to the national office of the electoral management body, in a sealed envelope, and a comparison with first results received should be done once the original is received.

If serious fears of fraud exist, a special paper can be used for the cumulative statement of the votes for each counting centre. This dark coloured paper (dark blue for example) immediately shows if the initial inscription is modified.

The colour around the modified area will fade. A pencil should be used for this type of paper. If alterations appear on the paper, then special attention can be given to that specific counting centre and the results should be checked carefully.

If the person simply made a mistake in completing the form at the counting centre, then he should append his initials or signature, as well as all representatives of political parties and candidates to denote agreement with the correction.

Tallying Results Per Party or Candidate

Results should be counted according to candidate or party for each ballot box and each electoral district. The national electoral management body will then count the total national results per political party or candidate and indicate this to be the final result.

In all cases, a double counting procedure should be used, even if it is computerised, before the results are publicly posted.

After each five to ten ballot boxes for example, a comparison should be done between the two persons responsible for the counts.

If results do not match, the previous few addition figures can easily be verified and corrected.

If a computerised system is used, it is recommended that two persons should enter the same data on separate computer workstations.

The computer systems can be programmed to immediately indicate when and where entries do not match for a specific electoral district. This makes the process of verification much simpler.

Publicising Results

Special security measures should be taken by the electoral management body to avoid fraud during the process of releasing results.

Only authorised persons should have access to the combined results (prior to public release) and modifications to these results should only be done with proper authorisation.

These measures should be in place both at the counting centres and at the national office of the electoral management body.

Access to the area where the results are being prepared should be limited.

The computerised systems used, if any, for combining the results should have safeguards such as passwords, etc. No one other than authorised persons should be able to access the computerised systems and change results. These persons should be carefully selected and identified in advance, and they should be required to sign a contract with a confidentiality clause.

Police, armed forces personnel, or private security officers should be available on request by the electoral management body and its electoral officials.

An electoral management body security contact person should be identified prior to voting day and should have all specific information needed if the assistance of security forces is required.

All counting participants, at the national level or at the counting centre, should wear proper identification to avoid any confusion.

Identifying badges or cards should be given to the staff of the electoral management body, the representatives of political parties and candidates, observers, the media,visiting dignatories etc. If practical, armed forces personnel may be present in the counting centre and should, as well, be required to wear proper identification.

Providing the Official Results

The electoral management body should include all type of ballots; mail votes (absentee votes and other special votes); advance votes; mobile voting stations; etc. before providing official results. If such ballots are received and counted a few days prior to election day, then the figures can easily be included in the results.

However, if such ballots are accepted by the electoral management body until the close of voting on election day, then the counting procedures for these ballots should be carefully designed so they will not hold up the process of releasing results within a few days after election day.

If special votes are counted a few days prior to election day, these results should be kept secure and access to them should be prohibited until the close of voting on election day. Often these ballots will represent a good statistical indicator of the final outcome of the election. If, by mistake, such results are released before the appropriate time, it could seriously influence either the election outcome or the turnout.

The official results should be released as soon as possible.

One to five days is considered a reasonable amount of time to release these results, but emphasis should be placed on preparing the results as quickly as possible. The national electoral management body can make the periodic progress report on the results available to the public as they come in.

In many jurisdictions it is considered to be more appropriate that the preliminary indications of the vote be released and announced by the media or non-governmental organizations. However, in the interests of demonstrating transparency, the electoral management body should make the results publicly available as they come in.

The electoral management body should consider the impact of multiple time zones on releasing results. If results are released in one part of the country while the voting stations are still open in other parts of the country in different time zones, it could create confusion or apathy among voters.

"Staggered" voting hours may be used to prevent this kind of situation. However, given the time required to transport ballot boxes to counting centres, this is not generally a problem. The counting can also be delayed if the hours of voting cannot be changed.

Once all results are received from each counting centre, they should be compiled for publication in the national official results for an election or referendum. Such results can also be compiled by region, by province, by political party, or as global national results.

A summary of the final results should be announced as soon as possible by the electoral management body and published in a report.

The electoral management body should be the only organization announcing and releasing the final, official results unless judicial structures have a role in certifying the results. In most cases it should be made clear that the only official source for any results is the electoral management body.

The Role of the Courts

In some countries, the judiciary is only involved in the electoral process after the election when it comes time to take to court offenders of the electoral law or when a judicial recount is needed.

In other jurisdictions, the courts may have a significant role to play in confirming the results of the election; the results only become official once the courts has confirmed them. Such confirmation should be done as soon as possible in order to avoid political instability and potential delays associated with a transition from a former government to the one elected.

In some jurisdictions the court may also be directly involved in the count with the electoral management body. This will generally be the case if final approval of the count must come from a judicial structure.

Publishing the Detailed Results

After the final results are released many jurisdictions require that detailed voting results be published in the official gazette of the government or another official publication.

Legally, they should be presented to the legislature, agency, department, or the administrative entity that the electoral management body reports to. A courtesy copy of the published report can be sent to the different political leaders who ran for the election and to all elected candidates.

Publishing this detailed report of the election may take several months of preparation and production. Due to financial constrains, in some countries candidates and all other persons, parties, or organization will buy their own copies of the results from the publisher.

Once the final results are known and publicised, the new government should be sworn in as soon as possible to limit the possible political instability and delays in the transition of one government to another. This can often take a week or more, depending on the type of political system used in the country.

Combining Results to Protect the Secrecy of the Vote

The electoral management body can merge or amalgamate results of several voting stations. This is generally done if the voting procedure was such that it may be possible to identify every person whose vote has gone into a particular ballot box, or if the number of votes in the ballot box is so small that there is a significant risk that almost all the votes will be for one candidate or party.

In such cases, the secrecy of the vote could be compromised. Results should be amalgamated with other voting stations. This can also be done in cases where it appears that the secrecy of individual votes can be secured, but there is real risk arising from the fact that a particular voting station, having voted predominantly in a particular way, could result in retribution to the persons who voted at that voting station.

Mixing the ballots from two or more boxes from different areas, and then attributing all the votes to one ballot box with proper notation in the results of this having been done can mitigate this problem. Such procedures must take place in the counting centre prior to the ballots being counted.

Merging results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other categories of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body, results can easily be merged with other results to protect the secrecy of the vote.

For internal use only, a special notation can be made to keep the audit trail clear.

Country Case Studies

Ghana: Vote Counting using Majoritatrian and First-Past-the-Post

Indonesia: Counting the Votes for the 1999 Elections

Russia: Counting Votes for Local Elections

Sweden: Counting Ballots

Mozambique: Vote Counting and Tabulation

Ghana: Vote Counting using Majoritatrian and First-Past-the-Post

Ghana practises both the majoritarian and First-Past-the-Post electoral systems. In presidential elections, the winner is the candidate who earns a majority percentage of the valid votes cast.

A second round election is conducted for the candidates who obtained the two highest numbers of votes, if no candidate earns a majority in the first round. In Parliamentary elections however, this majoritarian clause does not apply, and a candidate is declared the winner if he earns more votes than any other candidate. An issue for determination by referendum is taken to be determined if at least thirty-five percent of the persons entitled to vote at the referendum voted and, of the valid votes cast, at least seventy percent voted in favour of the issue.

The constitution of Ghana specifies when and where the counting of votes cast at an election should be carried out. It says: "Immediately after the close of the poll, the presiding officer shall, in the presence of such of the candidates or their representatives and their polling agents as are present, proceed to count, at that polling station, the ballot papers of that station and record the votes cast in favour of each candidate or question." Counting is done manually.

Appointment and Training of Election Officials

The electoral commission of Ghana employs permanent officers to manage its offices at the national, regional, and district levels. In addition, it appoints temporary staff whenever it embarks on an exercise involving registration of voters, demarcation of electoral boundaries, or elections (including referenda). The highest temporary electoral appointment is the electoral district officer who, assisted by two deputies, is in charge of a district.

There is a presiding officer and usually two polling assistants at each polling station. For a national election, therefore, the commission employs as many as 60,320 temporary officials to man the 120 districts and 20,000 polling stations. Most of the temporary staff are very senior public servants, especially teachers, and senior students.

Wherever possible, people with past experience at an election are considered for appointment. One important consideration for appointment is that a person has not shown any active affiliation with, or support for, a particular political party, candidate, or an issue to be determined at a referendum. As much as practicable, the officials are also appointed from the area they are to operate in. Public approval for their neutrality and ability to hold the office is sought by publishing the names of the electoral district officers in the national newspapers, and those of the junior officers in the areas where they will work.

The political parties are, in addition, given the names and addresses of all temporary staff. Both the political parties and the general public are allowed to make reasonable objections to a temporary staff appointment.

The officials must attend the training exercise, regardless of whether or not they have had election experience. The training of temporary staff is always carried out close to the election. The trainers are usually permanent senior staff of the commission and proven qualified electoral district officers. The trainers themselves undergo a training of trainers (TOT) exercise organized by the Public Education and Training (PET) division at the national level. The trainers for the TOT are professional (university) trainers and some members of the electoral commission (the Board of the Commission).

The training session is planned to allow the trainees or trainers to be able to go through the election operations manual, and role play the election. No training is carried out at the polling stations, but presiding officers are encouraged to hold briefing meetings with their staff at the polling station before the poll starts. (Copies of training and operations manuals are supplied.) Candidates' agents are allowed to attend the training sessions. In Ghana the term "election official" is used to mean the officer in charge of the poll taking and counting exercises.

The officer therefore doubles for both on election day. The training also involves both aspects of the election. It is normal to train a few more than the number of officials required, and some will serve on a standby basis. The polling station structure is such that the voter population per station is not so big as to require long periods of counting. Most polling stations have less than one thousand voters, and some actually have less than five hundred voters on their lists.

Vote Counting

Immediately after the polls close, the presiding officer, in the presence of those candidates or their agents, and any other persons permitted to attend the count:

• ensures that the seal on the ballot box is securely intact;

• opens the ballot box and takes out all the ballot papers in the box;

• makes a pile of the ballot papers cast for each candidate or issue;

• proceeds to count the ballot papers, sorting spoiled and rejected ballots separately; and

• records the total number of votes cast in favour of each candidate or issue.

During the count the presiding officer takes a ballot paper, announces for whom or which issue it was cast, and allows any representatives and observers present to check the proof of his announcement. If there is no disagreement, he adds it to the pile of the particular candidate or issue.

If there is any disagreement over the ballot, the presiding officer will pass it around for close examination by the agents, to reach a consensus decision, but the presiding officer has the final word. All rejected and spoiled ballot papers are put together in a separate pile.

Any of the following reasons cause rejection of a ballot paper:

• there is no mark made at all;

• it is not evident for whom or which issue the voter made the mark;

• the voter has voted for more than one candidate or issue; or

• the ballot paper does not carry a validating stamp of that polling station.

When the vote counting is completed, a candidate or his agent may require the presiding officer to have the votes recounted, and the officer must comply. However, a second request for a recount may be carried out only at the electoral district centre by the electoral district officer or his deputy.

At the end of the count, the presiding officer and the candidates or their representatives (agents) sign a declaration, stating:

• the total number of persons entitled to vote at the polling station,

• the number of ballot papers issued,

• the number of votes cast in favour of each candidate or issue, and

• the number of spoiled and rejected ballot papers. The presiding officer then announces the results of the voting at that polling station and gives copies of the results declaration form to each candidate (or agent), and posts another copy at the station.

As soon as possible after the announcement of the voting results at the polling station, the presiding officer in the presence of the candidates or their agents puts the ballots of each candidate or issue into separate packets and seals them with his own seal and the seals of the candidates or their agents if they so desire. The packets are then put into the ballot box, along with the following other documents:

• the unused, spoiled, and rejected ballot papers packaged together;

• the tendered ballot papers, the tendered voters' list, and any declarations made, packaged together; and

• the marked copies of the register and the counterfoils of the used ballot papers.

The presiding officer then puts his seal (and those of the candidates or their agents) on the ballot box and delivers the box to the electoral district officer.

Collation of Votes at Electoral District Centre

The electoral district officer makes arrangements for collating the votes in his electoral district in the presence of the candidates and or their agents as soon as possible after the close of the poll. The electoral district officer is required to give the candidates or their agents sufficient notice of the time and place of the collation of votes.

During the collation, the electoral district officer shall take the sealed ballot boxes from the various polling stations under his jurisdiction, and open them one at a time, after the candidates (or their agents) have inspected each to make sure the seals are intact.

He takes the recorded results of each polling station and reads it aloud in the hearing of everyone present. He then takes them to find the totals for each candidate or issue. He will also carry out a recount of any ballot box, if there was a request for a second recount at the polling station. At the end of the collation, the electoral district officer:

• announces the total number of votes cast for each candidate;

• publicly declares the winner of the election;

• endorses on the writ the name of the winner; and

• forwards the endorsed writ to the commission.

In a Parliamentary election, on receipt of a writ as prescribed by law, the commission publishes in the Gazette a notice stating the name of the person elected and the total number of votes cast for each candidate, and informs the Clerk of Parliament soon thereafter of the name(s) of the candidate(s) elected.

In the case of a presidential election or a national referendum, the results declared by the various electoral district officers throughout the country are collated to determine the national result. The commission then causes a Gazette notice to be published, stating the name of the candidate elected. No court certification is required.

Petition against Election Results

Within twenty-one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of an election result, a candidate, or a person who lawfully voted, or had a right to vote, or other qualified persons may present a petition to a High Court to declare the said result to be void, or grant any other relief sought by the petitioner.

Indonesia: Counting the Votes for the 1999 Elections

The significance in both the international and domestic public eye of the elections, following as they did 32 years of elections with a high degree of coersion, and low degrees of freedom and transparancy make a case study of the count especially relevant. Mechanisms were chosen to highlight the transparancy and correctness of these elections that could serve as a model for other transitional elections.

On the other hand, the notorious problems of the consolidation of the results, will be brought up as a cautionary reminder of the importance of planning and training as carefully for the count and results process, as for the polling process. The 1999 Indonesian transitional elections do not reflect procedurally the conduct of earlier elections, nor do they reflect necessarily the conduct of subsequent elections.

The main differences with previous elections were the increase in political participation (48 parties compared with 3 the 32 previous years), and the transparency built into the procedures. Accredited national and international observers were permitted, in unlimited numbers, to watch both the voting and the count. In addition, party agents (maximum one per party), were not only free to observe, but also to challenge elements of the polling or count.

The 7 June 1999 elections were for 3 levels - district, provincial, and regional legislatures. For the national elections, a total of 462 seats were at stake (with 38 reserved for the military and police, making a total of 500). These 462 seats were apportioned to the provinces on the basis of population, but with some favouring of the more sparsely populated outer islands over the densely populated Java.

Polling was conducted from 8 am to 2 pm in approximately 300,000 polling stations across the country - no mean logistical feat in a country of 17,000 islands, some mountainous, some densely forested.

Following the closing of the polls, votes were counted at the polling station, by the polling station officials. As 80% of Indonesia´s polling stations were outdoors, there was ample opportunity for not only the observers and party agents, but also the general public to watch (which they did! - the count across the country was characterised by a carnival like enthusiasm on the part of the onlookers).

The Voting Station Count

For the sake of this case study, a random sample polling station count is used to exemplify certain stages of the counting process, in this a village polling station in Sorkom Sub-District, North Sumatra.

Before opening the ballot boxes, the polling station officials prefilled the Official Reconciliation Forms to the extent possible (see example model C1 form). These forms were in the form of rather unwieldy, large books, a necessity considering that there were not only 48 parties times three elections, but also that all the polling station officials, as well as all the party agents present were to sign, endorsing the correctness of the documents. The C1 book/forms were to be filled out in 3 copies for the station, as well, each party agent had a copy.

The first entry on the form Ballots Recieved should have been filled out already at the opening of the polls. The ballot papers for the polling station were sealed in inside the ballot boxes upon reciept, and were to be opened, counted, and recorded as part of polling station opening procedures, in full view of all present, including the first voters the day.

The ballots received total should equal the amount of registered voters at the polling station, plus a 3% contingency (for spoilt ballots, or for persons added to the register with valid registration cards, or for persons registered elsewhere with a special authorisation form). The first ballot box, for national elections, was then opened, and ballots counted. The Indonesian 1999 ballots was small-poster size, and folded in a special way to ensure secrecy of the ballot. An official  ballot was one signed by the polling station chairman, the vice-chairman, and a third polling station member as well as affixed with an official hologram sticker.

The three levels of ballots had three different colours for differentiation; the ballot boxes were in corresponding colours. When the first ballot box was opened, a number of wrong colour ballots had crept in - a common problem for the count when several elections are held at the same time. With the approval of all the party agents present, the misplaced ballots were placed in the correct boxes. The expectation would be of course that any missing ballots for this count would be found in the boxes to be opened subsequently.

For this reason, the official reconciliation form results at each polling station were not to be filled in until the end of the count of all three boxes. Back to the opening of the ballot box - the first task upon opening was to sort out the most obvious invalid ballots, that is the inofficial ones, that were missing the three signatures or the official hologram, fake ballots, photocopies ballots, ballots larger or smaller than the official ballots, or ballots in a different colour, which were to be removed and not counted, should any exist.

The official ballots were then counted, the total noted, hopefully matching the amount recieved, minus unused and minus spoilt, and minus unofficial/invalid. If the numbers didn´t reconcile, chances are that this was because ballots for this election were still in the, as yet uncounted, other boxes. One by one, in front of all party agents, observers, and the general public, the ballots were unfolded, held up in full view, and the party called out by the chairman, and tallied on a large visible boards.

The party agents, and observers if they so wished, had forms to do a parallel tally at the same time. Interestingly for the Indonesian elections, ballots were punched with a hole rather than marked. Because of this, the back of the ballots were shown to all present, so that the hole would be clearly visible. As the ballot papers were thin, translucent, and the party symbols bright and easily visible from the back of the paper, this was fine except, had there been worse lighting, (mostly the count was done in the daytime, between 2-6 pm, but in some places delayed materials resulted in delayed counts, meaning the count was conducted in poor lighting) this could have been a problem.

When voters had not properly punched the cards, but rather just made a dent in the paper, these were considered valid if so approved by all present. Ballots marked with a pen, punched more than once, unclearly punched (ie on the line between two parties), or not punched were considered invalid, along with the inofficial ballots already removed.

The chairman made special effort with the invalid ballots to make sure that the invalidity was approved by all. This greatly added to the sense of transparancy, good will, and participation. Valid votes were both tallied during the count, and the ballots divided into piles, subsequently counted and checked against the large tally board. The parallel count by the party agents and observers present served as a triple check for accuracy.

Following the tally, and the determination of votes per party, the ballots were rubberbanded together on a party basis, and placed into an official envelope that was then sealed. Invalid ballots, were placed into another envelope, recorded and sealed. These two envelopes, plus the envelope with the spoiled ballots were placed in a plastic bag. This procedure was repeated for the provincial and district level ballots.

After the ballots were tallied for each election, the polling station chair asked the vice chair to count the number of votes for each party, for each election, on each tally sheet. The chair announced the total number of votes for each party so that party agents and observers could hear. The vice chair and another polling station member then record the number of votes for each party on the official reconciliation form (3 copies). Another polling station member recorded the numbers at the same time on a large, visible form on the board.

The three copies were signed by all polling station officials, and all party agents present. One form was to be kept sealed, with the other election material, another to be posted publicly at the polling station, and the third to be given to the village level election committee for the consolidation of the results.

The sealed envelopes were locked inside one of the ballot boxes, other materials placed in a second, and all the materials accompanied by the polling officials, party agents, observers, and general public, to the location designated by the village level election committee for safekeeping overnight.

The Consolidation of the Results

The village election committees, known as the PPS, were each responsible for between 2 and 9 polling stations, depending on the population of the area. The Indonesian elections were organised based on a hierarchy of 6 (!) levels: the national election committee and commission (KPU/PPI), Provincial (PPD1), Regency/Municipality (PPD2), District (PPK), Subdistrict/Village (PPS) and polling station levels.

Official reconciliation forms were consolidated at each level - that is, the PPS (Village) consolidated its polling station results, which were sent to the Sub-district (PPK) level. The District level consolidated and sent official forms to the next level up (Municipality), but also sent the results directly to an electronic parallel counting centre in Jakarta, run largely by internationals (Australia). The official manual results, following consolidation at the provincial and national levels. was a process scheduled to take approximately 2 weeks, followed by a legalisation process and official announcement. The computerised count, though inofficial, provided considerably quicker results. Certain observer groups also conducted parallel tallies.

Under the current electoral law, candidates are allocated seats on a constituency basis (the constituency, but within a proportional representation system. List of candidates for each party/constitutency are posted in advance.

If a party is allocated 3 seats in The use of reconciliation of numbers was an important feature of the election forms, and yet one area that many election officials seemed to have difficulty with. Using the sample polling station as an example, the results were spread over 11 parties, with 2 parties neck in neck, resulting in a marginal victory for Golkar, the party that only a few yearts before had garnered over 90% of the vote. This gives an indication of the changes that a new electoral law, free campaigning, and clear and transparent procedures can bring to a small village.

Mozambique: Vote Counting and Tabulation

Electoral System

Mozambique’s electoral system for Parliamentary elections is proportional representation, with a five percent threshold for representation. The candidate elected as President receives the majority of votes cast. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the votes cast, run-off elections are held where the weakest candidates are eliminated and the candidate that receives the most votes is elected.

Concurrent Presidential and Parliamentary elections are held every five years.

The Counting Process

Counting takes place at the voting stations after the close of voting. Counting is conducted by the presiding officer in the presence of candidate and party agents, observers and counting officials.

There are three phases to counting votes in Mozambique.

Partial Counting and Verification

Partial counting and verification takes place at the voting station and begins directly after the voting has been completed.

The electoral officer in charge of the voting station closes the voters’ roll, which has to be signed by all the party and candidate representatives. The remaining ballot papers are counted and verified against the number people who voted at that voting station.

The ballot boxes are opened and the ballots are counted. Ballots are then returned to the ballot boxes and ballot boxes are closed until they are once again counted in the verification phase.

The number of ballots counted are announced publicly and the results displayed in a form of a publication. In the event that there are discrepancies between the number of ballots in the ballot boxes and the number of voters that voted, the ballots will be taken as the true figure unless the ballots exceed the number of voters registered. If ballots exceed the number of registered voters the votes are considered null and voting will take place on the second Sunday after the final decision of nullification of the vote.

The voter verification at the voting station takes place in the following manner:

1. The presiding officer opens each ballot and announces the name of the candidate or party that was voted for;
2. The secretary registers the votes attributed to each candidate or party on sheets of white paper or on a big board, if one exists;
3. the second scribe places the votes separated by lots which will correspond with each candidate or party including spoilt ballots;
4. the two scribes counts each of the lots;
5. the presiding officer announces the number of votes that each candidate or party has received.

It is only after the counting that party representatives have the right to examine the lots of ballots and if necessary present their complaints to the presiding officer.

If a decision was challenged, the challenge was noted on the back of the ballot and signed by the presiding officer and the agent making the challenge. The challenge does not affect the result at this stage but is sent (within 24 hours) to the National Electoral Commission for a final decision.

An edict is completed showing the number of registered voters, the number of ballots in the ballot box, the number of ballots each party or candidate received and the number of blank and invalid votes. The edicts must be signed by the polling officials. The result edicts are then displayed publicly at the voting station.

The ballot boxes, the minutes, the published results, the voters’ roll, the number of contested votes, any problems experienced and any remaining documentation is delivered to the district or city Election Commission, who in turn have to ensure that all this material is received by the Provincial Election Commission within a period of 48 hours.

Party representatives have the right to accompany the transportation of the materials. Security is also present when ballots are transported.

Provincial Verification

Provincial verification is the responsibility of the Provincial Election Commission which has to centralise the results of each district including all the voting stations within the respective district. This verification is based on the minutes, published results and any other documentation produced at the respective voting stations.

All ballots that have been challenged or considered null have to be submitted to the National Election Commission (CNE) within a period of 24 hours.

The final lists of centralised results per district have to include the following:

1. total number of registered voters;
2. total number and percentage of voters that did vote in relation to the number of registered voters;
3. total number and percentage of voters that did not vote in relation to the number of registered voters
4. total number and percentage of valid votes in relation to the number of votes cast;
5. total number and percentage of blank ballots in relation to the number of votes cast;
6. total number and percentage of null votes in relation to the number of votes cast;
7. total number of votes that each candidate received in relation to the number of the valid votes cast.

Verification of the votes is finalised by producing minutes and lists of results. Copies of these documents have to be signed and stamped and given to the party and candidate agents. Observers and journalists can also request copies of these documents.

At the provincial level results are entered into a results data base. All party and candidate agents are given access to the database to compare their tallies recorded at the voting stations to those entered into the database.

National Verification

It is the responsibility of the CNE to reevaluate the ballots that have been challenged and those that have been declared invalid. The CNE is responsible for centralizing all the results. This stage of the counting takes place in the capital city, Maputo.

The sealed transport bags are organised by province. The bags are opened and every ballot is reviewed by two CNE members appointed by different parties. The regulations allow for a wide interpretation of what constitutes a valid ballot.

A document is filled out for each polling station, specifying the number of invalid votes that have been reclassified as valid and to which party or candidate they have been assigned. The results are then tallied for the whole province on a separate form.

Other CNE members review the problematic edicts that had been forwarded by the Provinces. Whenever the problems are resolved, the number of votes is entered into the database. The summarised results of the reclassification of invalid and contested votes are added to the databases with the provincial results. This tabulation is then calculated according to a formula to determine the distribution of parliamentary seats.

To determine the outcome of the presidential race, the figures are added together for nation-wide results. The official results must be publicly announced, within 15 days after the close of the poll, by the CNE. There is no provision for recounting. Challenges to the results may be made through the court system; the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Council.

Russia: Counting Votes for Local Elections

The following is a step-by-step account of vote counting procedures in Russia.

Repeated by-election of a Duma deputy in Monchegorsk District - December 3rd 2000. Polling station no 163 in Apatity.

This polling station was shared and used as two polling stations in the same big room. The room was divided in the middle. Most polling stations were schools, culture houses or daycares.

Voter turnout in this particular polling station was approximately 25% compared to the regional average on 37%. It was common throughout the vote counting process that more than one activity took place at the same time. For example the unused ballotpapers were counted at the same time as the number of signatures on the voter register.

The vote counting procedures at this election went generally very well and smooth. We did not witness any major violations worth mentioning. This case study represents a typical vote counting procedure from a local election in Russia. The same electoral law is used all over the country with very minor changes. The vote counting procedures at federal elections as well as local are very similar.

As far as the domestic observer could tell as well as ourselves, we know could not witness any unusual circumstances during this procedures. The only thing we reacted to was the fact that at some other polling stations at other elections in Russia it had been allowed to come in and go for visitors during the process, however this was not the case at this polling stations. The polling officials were very experienced and seemd to know the full process by heart.

Present at the polling station are:

• Seven polling station officials including the chairman.

• One police officer (responsible for both polling stations).

• One local observer representing one of the candidates in the election.

• Two international observers:

1) The chairman pronounces that the voting has closed and as a physical symbol she pulls down some curtains.

2) Before they start any counting she asks her staff to remove all pens so that there is no possibility to change numbers on the ballot account form or marks on the ballot papers.

3) The unused ballot papers are counted at the same time as the signatures on the voter register are counted. Each polling station receives a few less ballotpapers than the number of registered voters for that pollingplace, but they can easily have more delivered during the day should they run out of ballot papers.

4) When all the unused ballot papers are counted the number is announced and they are destroyed by cutting off a corner of each. During this time the polling boots are taken apart by the some of the polling officials to save time since they are not all needed for that one task.

5) The signatures on the electoral roll are now counted. The registers are put on a pile and sown together with thick thread and a needle with the experienced sowing hand of an old woman. The pile is signed by the Chairman on a smaller piece of paper put at the back of the pile.

6) The number of applications by voters that wished to vote in their homes are counted and the number is announced.

7) The movable ballot box which is used for these voters is examined and opened and the ballot papers in it are taken out and counted.

8) Each ballot paper is held up and it is proclaimed for each and every ballot paper which candidate received this vote.

9) A big table is now set up for the votes from the main ballot box. The votes from the movable ballot box are on another table which is actually not allowed because they should by now all be mixed on the big table.

10) The ballot box from this polling station is examined and opened. The votes are put on the big table by turning the box upside down.

11) After we all had a chance to look in the box, it is proclaimed that the ballot box is empty.

12) Before they start counting the votes the polling officials ask the chairman whether they should all stick to the same piles or if they should all have seven piles each. The chairman decided that they should all have their own piles.

13) Every polling official begins to sort the ballot papers in piles after candidates. That gives each polling official seven piles. Five for the different candidates, one for votes "against all candidates" and one for invalid votes.

14) Only the polling officials are allowed to touch the votes. Observers are allowed to stand very close, ask questions and to take photos but not touch the votes.

15) While counting is going on one of the officials is wrapping in the unused, destroyed ballot papers in brown, thick paper and seals it with thick broad tape and the package is stamped.

16) Every now and then during counting the polling officials comment on the votes with surprise. For example "There are not that many invalid votes this time" or "Candidate X seems extremely popular".

17) When all the votes are counted (approximately 1300) all the piles for the same candidate is put on a large pile.

18) Each invalid vote is proclaimed invalid and held up so that everyone present at the polling place could see. The chairman also mentions the reason for why this vote was invalid. 19) Now the pile with "against all candidates" votes is dealt with the same way. Each and every vote is held up and it is proclaimed that this is a vote "against all candidates".

20) All the invalid votes are now put in an envelope. The number of invalid votes that the envelope contains is written on it and the envelope is stamped and signed by the chairman. The envelope is not sealed as yet.

21) Among the "against all candidates" the polling officials have found yet another vote that they proclaim invalid. This vote is given to the official who is holding the envelope containing all the invalid votes.

22) Now the chairman moves towards the piles of votes with votes for candidates. The chairman starts with one pile and holds up every vote and proclaims that this a vote for candidate X. The chairman asks the observers to feel free to stand right behind her when she is counting each vote for the candidate so that they can see that it is a vote for that candidate and so that the Chairman wouldn´t have to proclaim each vote loudly.

23) This procedure is repeated for the other four candidates. Sometimes the counting of the different piles/candidates overlaps. Before any polling official starts counting a pile he/she announces that these are votes for candidate X etc.

24) The number of votes for the candidate that was counted first is announced.

25) The piles with votes are put in piles in alphabetical order on the table, which is the same way they are listed on the balance sheet and on the posters on the wall at the polling station. (they can be sorted in any way according to the law, not necessarily in alphabetical order.

26) The Chairman takes the pile with the last candidate. It seems this candidate received many more votes than any of the other and therefore the votes are divided up in piles by 50. There was a comment on this among the polling officials about this candidate receiving many votes but the Chairman asks the official to stop talking like that and comment on such political things since they have to be neutral and only deal with the process.

27) A former polling official at this polling stations comes in to the polling stations to say hello to his old colleagues. The chairman told him that he could not be here as just a visitor, he would then have to be registered before the vote counting process started. An interesting note is that at another local election in Tula, south of Moscow visitors were allowed to come and go as they wished.

28) One of the ballot papers had a little signature on it made by the voter. But the Chairman declared the ballot valid.

29) As soon as the number of votes is declared for each candidate the pile of votes for him/her is put in separate envelopes/packages and the number is written on the package together with the candidate´s name. The package is, like all other packages signed by the Chairman and stamped.

30) One of the polling officials has been sitting down all the time writing down the numbers that have been announced, like an accountant keeping the balance numbers. Together with other polling officials writing the same numbers on the poster sized ballot account form on the wall. This ballot account form also contains information about the address for the polling station etc. At the same time some other material is being taken down and packed, such as posters, scissors, chairs etc.

31) The polling official who fills in all the numbers is continuously checking with the regulations concerning adding votes so that they do it the right way.

32) All the envelopes and packages are put in a larger brown box.

33) They have wrapped the registers in thick brown paper and tape. The polling officials are discussing whether the voter registers should be put in the same box. They decide to not put them in the same box.

34) The large box is closed and brown tape wrapped around it.

35) The polling official that filled in all the numbers is now double checking them together with another colleague. They agree after going through it that everything seems correct.

36) The Chairman had a binder where she wrote down how many local and international observers were present. She also needs to write this down at another place if the observers want to have copies of the ballot account form. All polling officials have to sign all the balance sheets that are distributed.

37) The poster sized ballot account form on the wall is now filled in by the Chairman with the last numbers after adding and subtracting votes. The Chairman reads all the numbers out loud. The numbers are read with double numbers. Forexample, the number 2033 is read twenty, thirty-three.

38) The large box containing the votes is on the table all this time. The voter registers are on top of the box together with a binder with some information on for example how many observers there were present during vote counting etc. The doors have been closed but not locked all the time. Only those that were present at the pollingstation before closing and registerd their presence are allowed to be there, other people not allowed in after the voting hours have been proclaimed closed.

39) Every polling official has to sign each of the ballot account form that the observers want and also the three official ones that goes to the Election Commission.

40) The Chairman then asked one of the polling officials to call for the car.

41) Those observers that asked for a copy of the balance sheet have to sign a list to confirm that they received it.

42) The Chairman numbers the three official balance sheets with 1, 2 and 3. 43) The Chairman never officially declares the vote counting process finished but by filling in all the balance sheets and signing them, the Chairman makes clear that it is over.

44) The box containing votes and the voter registers are kept on a pile on the large table. Some polling officials stays and watches the pile while some other polling official goes off to fetch jackets and private bags etc.

45) A police officer arrives. The Chairman, the vice chairman and the secretary of the polling station go with him down to the car which is parked outside the polling station. The policeman carried the box with votes and the Chairman was carrying the voter registers and the balance sheet. Some polling stations are not able to find a free police officer that can assist, so they simply walk to the regional electoral office.

46) The box and registers were placed in the car and all four went in the car to the regional election commission where they were supposed to hand in their box, the registers and the balance sheets.

47) Most transports were with a police car but some were with private or borrowed cars. Public services such as the police and other guards have to assist in the electoral process.

48) At the regional electoral office the polling officials from each different polling station were lined up outside the office. There was a security guard in the room and local as well as international observers are allowed to be present. The police officer that accompanied the polling official from this particular polling station has left and is on his way to the next polling stations.

49) When it is the turn of the polling officials from our polling station the balance sheets are gone through. This is the first step. If they are not correctly filled in and stamped and signed they are sent back to correct them. In our case all seemd correct and our Chairman could hand in the box with votes and the voter registers. 50) The box is carried away to a separat archive room to be gone through later on.

51) The balance sheets and other documents are carried up to a computer room where all the numbers are plugged in to the computer. After it has been written they print it out for the Chairman to sign.

Sweden: Counting Ballots

Summary

In Sweden there are three elections (parliamentary, county council, and municipal) on the same day. The votes are counted, by party only, in the polling stations immediately after the closing of the poll.

Interim results are reported by telephone from the polling station to the local election committees who report to the regional office of the Regional Tax Board. From the Regional Tax Board, a computer transmits the parliamentary results to the National Tax Board, where a preliminary distribution of seats in parliament is carried out, and the interim results are published.

The ballots and reports are delivered to the Regional State Administration where a recount is carried out. Based on the recount, the final distribution of seats for the municipal and county levels is made, and the final results published by the State County Administration. The distribution of seats for parliament is made by the National Tax Board and the final results officially published, based on reports from the State County Administration.

Electoral System

Sweden has a proportional list system, with a possibility for preferential vote for one candidate on the list.

There is a separate list for each alternative (the party can have more than one list in each electoral district).

The voter inserts the ballot, with or without preferential mark, in an envelope, using a separate ballot for each election. The ballots have different colours for each election, and separate ballot boxes are used.

There are around six thousand polling stations in Sweden, with a separate voters' register for each polling station.

Normally, voters choose to vote at the polling station where they are registered. However, absentee voting is permitted at post offices up to eighteen days before election day, and during a more limited period at Swedish missions abroad. About thirty-five percent of the electorate vote using the absentee ballot.

The voter can vote either in person or by proxy. Limited mail-in voting is allowed in special cases. Most of the absentee votes are sent to the polling station where the voters are registered and counted there. However, a small proportion of "late" absentee votes and mail-in votes are counted by the local election committees.

Vote Counting in Voting Stations

Immediately after the closing of the polls, the votes are counted in the voting stations in this order:

• parliament,

• municipal, and

• county council.

First, the absentee votes are put in the ballot boxes.

The number of voters who have cast their votes according to the voter register is determined. The envelopes in the ballot box are counted and compared with the numbers according to the voters' register.

If there is a discrepancy, a recount is carried out. If there still is a discrepancy, this is written in the polling station report and the count continues. The envelopes are opened, and the ballots are sorted according to party. Spoiled ballots are set aside and counted.

A ballot is spoiled if:

• the ballot is marked so the voter can be identified;

• there is more than one ballot for different parties (if ballots are for the same party one ballot is valid);

• if there is more than one party name on the ballot; or

• if there is no party name on the ballot.

The ballots are then counted per party and the numbers are written in the polling station report. The ballots are put in special plastic envelopes. A separate envelope is used for each party, and for spoiled ballots, and the envelopes are sealed. The ballots, voters' register, and reports are delivered to the local election committee, and from there, to the state county administration for the recount.

Reporting of Interim Results

As soon as the parliamentary election is counted in the polling station, the results are reported by telephone to the Regional Tax Authority. The parliamentary results are forwarded to the National Tax Board where a preliminary distribution of seats is carried out and published.

The results from the municipal and county council elections are reported in the same way, but the procedures end at the Regional Tax Authority, where preliminary distributions of seats are carried out and published.

Predictions of the parliamentary results are made by the media based on sample results delivered by the National Tax Board. The media bear the responsibility for these predictions. However, the accuracy of the predictions has improved, and normally the predictions are very close to the actual result.

Counting of Absentee Votes and Mail-in Votes

The local election committees are responsible for "late" absentee votes (that have not been sent to the polling stations), and mail-in votes. This count takes place three days after election day, and by and large, the same rules apply as in counting at the polling stations.

The election materials are delivered to the State County Administration for a recount immediately after the count is finished.

Final Count at the State County Administration

At the final count, all ballots are examined and decided on once again. The ballots are counted, not only by party, but each list within the party, and preferential votes for candidates. The numbers are entered into computers, the results are calculated, and seats distributed among parties and candidates. These operations start the day after the election.

The final parliamentary results are published after a little more than a week later. The final county council and municipal council results are published approximately three weeks after the election. All ballots, reports, and voters' registers are kept in case of complaints.

Vote Counting Glossary

Categorical Ballot

Voters make a straight choice. 

Collation

The transmission of results from a particular polling site to the next level  to be collated with other results to give the outcome for a wider area to establish the overall national result. 

Contestation

An administrative or any other objection to activities and decisions of an electoral nature or to the electoral process and results. 

Counting Centre

A central or regional place where the votes for more than one polling stations are counted. Counting of the votes and marked in a way that does not allow to determine the choice of the elector or that divulges the identity of the voter. Not to be confused with spoiled ballot. 

Counting of the Votes

The activity consisting of counting the votes case for each candidate or political party after the close of the polls. This activity determines the winners. Consists of opening the ballot box, sorting their contents, determining the validity of ballot papers and counting the valid ones. Produces the result.  

Declined Ballot

A ballot which an elector has chosen not to mark for any party of political party, generally with a view to express his dissatisfaction in the choice of candidates or parties.  

Electoral Dispute (Recourse)

A system to resolve complaints, disputes, claims, recalls and contestations relating to the electoral process. 

Electoral Quota

The number of votes or the proportion of the votes required to win a seat in a proportional representation system. 

Exit Poll

An unofficial poll, especially for the media, the parties and candidates, in which voters leaving a polling station are asked how they voted.  

Mark-Choice Ballot

Where alternate candidate/parties appear on the same ballot and the voter places only a single mark to mark his or her preference. 

Official Results

Results published by the appropriate electoral official containing all the information required by law.  

Ordinal Ballot

A ballot where the voter is required to indicate preferences amongst the various candidates or parties by numbering their respective names, in declining order. 

Panachage

A device used in a small number of jurisdictions to add additional flexibility to open-list systems. It is the capacity to vote for more than one candidate across different party lists. It is categorized as a free list system.  

Plurality of Votes

The result of an election during which a candidate or a political party receives more votes than the opponents, but less than 50% of all votes cast.  

Preferential Distribution

A system in which votes counted are used to redistribute the preferences of the electors to establish a winner (in alternative vote and single non transferable vote systems).  

Quick Count Results

Results obtained through a quick count process used where the collation of the overall results can take a lengthy period. 

Rejected Ballot

A ballot paper found in the ballot box during the Counting of the votes and marked in a way that does not allow to determine the choice of the elector or that divulges the identity of the voter. Not to be confused with spoiled ballot.  

Results

Information as to the successful candidate or candidates or party or parties.  

Seat

A position within a legislature or parliament, usually filled by an elected person.  

Seat Allocation

The process of distributing the seats of a legislative assembly to the political parties or candidates on the basis of the number of votes they have obtained.  

Spoiled Ballot

A ballot which cannot be used.  A spoiled ballot is one that is returned to the voting officer at the voting station and is not put into the ballot box. The voter may have marked their ballot incorrectly and requires another ballot to give effect to their vote. 

Statement of the Vote/ Results Slip/ Results Form

The statement of the vote is a form on which results are written. The counting official completes this form for each ballot box counted at the counting centre. This form indicates the election results and should include standard information, such as the name of the electoral district, the name and/or number of the voting station, and election date.  

Tendered Vote Two-Round Electoral System

A system in which the election takes place in two rounds, often a week or a fortnight apart. First round is conducted as First Past the Post election. If a candidate receives absolute majority, the election is over. If not, a second round of voting is conducted and the winner is declared elected. Also referred to as run-off or double ballot system.   

Unmarked Ballot: see Rejected Ballot.

Unofficial Results

Results published by the media.  

Unused Ballot

Any ballot in excess of the number required which has not been used during the election.  

Valid Ballot

A ballot that is not spoilt  or unmarked or invalid and is completed correctly in terms of legal requirements (if applicable) and that shows the intention of the voter. A valid ballot may be open to interpretation but still provides a satisfactory indication of the voter’s choice.

Contributors to Vote Counting

The Vote Counting Topic area was written by Dominique-Christine Tremblay, and updated by Louise Olivier under the supervision of EISA during 2005-2006.

Ms Tremblay is a former Project Officer with Elections Canada. Dominique is a political scientist who began her work in election administration as a research analyst for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing.

She has experience in voter education, and has also worked in the office of returning officer. She has been involved in elections as a trainer or an observer in South Africa, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin and Mali. Dominique is now working in strategic communications for the Government of Canada

Louise Olivier is a lawyer by training who has more than six years experience in the field of election management at the Electoral Commission of South Africa where she worked in recruitment and training, legal services and research. She is based in Johannesburg, South Africa where she works as an elections consultant and provides legal research for the Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa.

Other contributors to this topic area are Therese Laanela Pearce, Phil Green, Ron Gould, Harry Neufeld, Louis Massicotte and Jim Hult.

Additional Resources

Published Resources

Cassidy, Michael. "Les droits démocratiques et la réforme électorale au Canada" in the Collection d' tudes de la Commission Royale sur la r forme lectorale et le financement des partis, 10. Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1991.

Dundas, Carl W. Dimensions of Free and Fair Elections, Frameworks Integrity, Transparency, Attributes, Monitoring. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1994.

Dundas, Carl W. Organizing Free and Fair Elections at Cost-Effective Levels. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993.

Edgeworth, Linda et al, Election Official Training in Bangladesh: Project Overview and Recommendations, October-November 1995, Country reports, Washington, DC: IFES, 1995.

Elections Canada. Compendium of Canadian Electoral Legislation. Ottawa: 1996

Electoral Commission of India. Procedures of Counting of Votes by Mixing of Ballot Papers - Revised Instruction. New Delhi: 1996.

Federal Election Commission. The Electronic Transmission of Electoral Materials. Innovation in Election Administration N 12, Washington, DC: 1995.

Raynolds, Andrew, and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: International IDEA, 1997.

Trudel, Linda. The Pollworker Training Handbook. Washington, DC: IFES, 1997.

Electronic Information Resources

• Stanford University: http://cs-education.stanford.edu/classes/cs201/current/Projects/electronic-vote-counting/background.htm

• Ballot Access News: http://www.ballot-access.org/

• Elections NCP: http://www.craph.org/election/elhome.htm