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Results Management SystemsThe requirements and demands on an EMB's results system have increased considerably. Stakeholders demand results significantly faster than they used to. In addition, they demand transparency during the entire results process and not just the vote count. Concerns over less than accessible transportation of critical count-related material by election management bodies, opaque tabulation procedures and tardy release of results have sometimes threatened the integrity of the vote count. As a result, EMBs can no longer solely focus on the vote count. The EMB must now have an integrated results management system incorporating all key aspects from vote counting to the certified results being announced with relevant complaints having been properly adjudicated. In the end, each jurisdiction will need to consider best practices that suit its particular circumstances and context, and ensure that the fundamentals of a results process are maintained and that the integrity of the election is not compromised due to deficiencies in the various steps of a results process. IntroductionContextEach jurisdiction will need to consider best practices that suit its particular circumstances and context, and ensure that the fundamentals of a results process are maintained and that the integrity of the election is not compromised due to deficiencies in the various steps of a results process. The manual count remains the most common and widespread method of vote counting. However, depending on the general level of development, calculators or computers are used to calculate results, and computers are used for the distribution of seats. For a discussion of machine-assisted vote counting, see Application of Technology. Social and Political Context The social and political context is important to consider when choosing an election results system. For example, local political considerations will determine whether it is desirable to sacrifice some accuracy for speedy transmission of provisional results, or whether security should be tight or less restrictive. One of the most important criteria is to ensure that the citizens, political parties and candidates understand the process and have faith in it. In addition, local conditions and recent electoral history can affect the level of anti-fraud measures to be deployed, and determined the place where counting and tabulation of results will take place. If the risk of fraud and intimidation of voters are substantial, the results management system must be designed to overcome these challenges. In addition, if either the EMB’s impartiality or professionalism is in doubt, the results generating process must pay special attention to transparency-promoting actions, as well as plan for an effective training program of all staff categories making up the results system teams at national, regional and local levels. Security Security is an important factor in every election, but more so in a country emerging from civil strife. It is important to ensure that every stage in the electoral process, including the crucial results process, is secure, transparent, and reliable. As such, this part of the electoral cycle often warrants special attention in the EMB’s security plan. In its liaison with relevant security providers for the results process, security risks must be identified. Besides voting stations, a sufficient and appropriate security umbrella is also extended to include transportation of sensitive results material and stationary security of counting centres. The National Media Centre, which sometimes doubles up as the EMB’s national results centre, must have special attention given its strategic importance to the results process. Furthermore, this Centre is often frequented by national and international dignitaries requiring a heighten level of security, in addition to a special protocol for VIP delegations arriving with armed close protection teams. Security permitting may be desirable to hold the count as close to the citizens as possible, for example with a manual count at the voting station level in full view of voters, national and international electoral observers, and party and candidate representatives. If this is not possible due to threat levels directed at the facility, the count could be conducted at ward or district level instead. If there is a possibility of repercussions to the voter for voting in a certain way at voting station level, then the mixing of ballot boxes from different areas before counting could be considered (see Procedures for Vote Counting at Counting Centres). Security provisions included in legislation and procedures should include security of the vote (and voter) and security of the process. In some countries, the police force is under the command of the EMB during election period while in other societies the standard operating procedures for police is developed in close collaboration between Ministry of Interior and the EMB. An international best praxis is emerging as to the security protocol in voting stations. The local police force, or any security personnel that is responsible for security in election day, is responsible for area security in the vicinity of voting stations and is only allowed inside upon request by a presiding officer, thereby avoiding concerns of potential intimidation of voters by security personnel. Unless security personnel are formally part of the chain of custody protocol for sensitive election material it should never be left solely in the care of the police or military. Normal praxis is that sensitive material be accompanied at all times by an election official, while political party and candidate representatives and national and international electoral observers can be present. Legislation should ensure that elections are not jeopardized, even if individual voting stations come under attack, or need to be closed due to fire, flooding, or any other legitimate reasons. Provisions should be made for the speedy rerunning of elections in those stations shortly after the emergency. Protocol on how to proceed in these situations should be part of the EMBs training to electoral officials. In some countries, emergency preparedness is part of the electoral legislation, for example, in the United States; eleven states have emergencies during elections clauses in their legislations[1]. Literacy
Low literacy levels and limited exposure to ICT-solutions are important factors to consider when designing the results system. Where such limitations exist, a simple paper-based results system will facilitate accuracy, but recount and rechecking procedures should still play in integral part of the process. Both information and education material will need to be considerate of illiterate or semi-literate members of the public, to ensure that the electoral messages and information are conveyed to the largest number of members of the public. In addition, party agents and national observers need to be able to understand and follow the results process observed, unless in cases where the transparency could be undermined. Communication of Results In an increasingly fast-paced world, election management bodies are feeling the pressure to deliver rapid (if not immediate) transmission of results. Technical innovations in electronic voting, counting, tabulation and transmission are facilitating speedy results. Speed, however, should be carefully balanced against other important considerations such as:
Administrative Considerations
Clear vote counting procedures are instrumental for credible results system. Achieving such an objective often requires essential administrative considerations, such as careful planning thorough training, good facilities, and appropriate equipment. Unfortunately, the results process is often given a lower priority than it deserves. Considering its importance in ensuring confidence in the result of an election is critical to give the results-generating process high administrative priority to ensure success. What is administratively expedient can vary greatly between countries, not the least due to the EMB’s own organizational structure and capabilities that varies considerably from country to country. In addition, the results management system to be used often depends on the time and resources available, as well as the EMB’s assessment of the results system utilized in the most recent election. Here are some generic truisms regarding the administrative implications of choices in vote counting procedures:
A complicated results system will have administrative implications in terms of increased training needs, additional personnel, longer hours, more elaborate voter education and public information campaigns, and a proficient command and control capability. Introducing ICT- solutions to a results system often impact across all of the EMB’s departments, as it affects operational planning, procedures and regulations developments, budget (capital and recurrent), new training requirements, changes to public outreach material and potentially the fraud risk profile of the results system. Infrastructure Requirements Planning for a results process needs to take into account the available assets in a given country. The infrastructure, such as road network, airport facilities and transportation capabilities within private and public sectors are important factors when developing the operational plan. In some instances the EMB can tap into the motor pools of state institutions, as well as access the defence force’s aircrafts. In other countries, the EMB is largely depending on the private sector. However, accessibility to various parts of a country can vary significantly due to seasonal conditions. During the rainy season, or the winter, the infrastructure situation could be vastly more restrictive than during more favourable parts of the year, something planners must keep in mind. Given the increasing use of Internet, email and mobile phone services during the results generating process, the availability of various telecommunication networks across a country forms an important part of the results management system. EMBs need to factor in reliability of the networks in question, as Election Day often experiences peak traffic and therefore could prove less reliable than during normal workload when the networks are less stressed. Availability of electricity can also vary greatly within a country. If procurement of generators is considered as back-up power-source, it can have significant budgetary implications, as generators and fuel need to be procured, service contracts awarded, and transportation obtained. Election is a national event and often tens of thousands of voting stations are opened. The material used for voting, counting and tabulation is not only numerous but often bulky thereby requiring significant warehousing capacities across the country. Even if the system used is predominately paper-based, the storage specifications are still rigid as water damaged results forms and soaked ballot papers could effectively stop election from moving forward. Depending on the type of results system used, an EMB might also require significant space for its counting and tabulation of results operations should these processes be conducted at constituency or provincial levels. These centres often require a canteen, ablution facilities, praying rooms as well as suitable lighting and temperature enabling a suitable working environment for staff. Obtaining suitable buildings at sub-national levels can prove challenging in some situations and therefore require significant lead-time, especially if buildings must be refurbished. EMBs introducing ICT-solutions might find server rooms specifications particularly challenging to meet, as such equipment require a controlled environment both in terms of an air-conditioned and dust-free environment.
Media Results Centres have their own requirements, beyond an extra-ordinary strain on electric power and wiring. These centres will cater for 100s of individuals representing political parties, media, observers, VIPs and EMB personnel of which all need access to internet, power, toilets, space to sit and work. The press conference area often requires some refurbishments. In some instance also a catering facility need to be arranged. Telecommunications requirements at such facilities are significant – both cellular phone capacity and Internet connectivity must be significantly increased. Personnel and Training Requirements The credibility of any election results process depends largely upon the performance of its staff. The challenge facing an EMB is to identify, recruit, train and supervise a large and diverse set of staffing categories across the width and breadth of a country. As more ICT-equipment and solutions are introduced the recruitment training programs must evolve accordingly. Having said that, irrespective of position to be filled and staff member to train certain fundamentals remain constant. All staff must ensure impartiality, professionalism and integrity, as the services that they will provide are essential to the overall perception of the election results process.
Based on the result system’s operational plan the EMB leadership will determine the types of personnel categories to be hired and the number of positions. Jointly with its Training and Human Resource Departments, and with input from line-departments responsible for the staffing category in question, the EMB develops two important documents: a recruitment plan and training plan. Recruitment Plan A recruitment plan often describes how the EMB will ensure a transparent recruitment process resulting in suitable individuals commence work according to timelines outlined in the overarching operational plan. A distinction is often made between filling permanent positions and the many ad-hoc personnel required during an election year. The former process is often significantly more time-consuming and regulated, while hiring temporary workers on short- term contracts often offer more flexibility. In societies affected by large number of unemployed and a state bureaucracy alleged to hire staff based on patronage EMBs are well-advised to ensure a transparent recruitment process. The commission could advertise widely for the various positions utilizing media and traditional means of disseminating information. Terms of references, qualification requirements, duration and remuneration packages, as well as how to apply are information often included in such communications. As part of its recruitment planning exercise, the EMB needs to figure out how to pay tens of thousands of people in a timely manner. If not, ad hoc workers can threaten to down tools, be demotivated and do a poorly job during election day, or refuse to hand over documents of critical importance to the results process before they are satisfied with the payment and payment mechanism. Men and women should be recruited on an equal basis, according to their ability to carry out the required duties in an unbiased and professional manner. Other criteria may include speaking at least one of the local languages and previous electoral experience. Special attention should also be made to offer employment to persons with disabilities, or other previously disadvantaged groups. Some jurisdictions require that voting station staff be qualified voters and/or live within the same electoral district where they will be working on Election Day. These criteria should then be publicized and known to all candidates and political parties involved, in order to preserve the transparency of the process. In a jurisdiction that is emerging from conflict, these requirements may not always be appropriate and it may be expedient to have people from outside the area working as voting station and counting staff. However, the visiting staff must be properly trained and made aware of social and cultural context. Local customs and circumstances could also impact the recruitment process as men and women traditionally interact in a more formalized setting thereby necessitating teams exclusively made up of men and women-only. In places where several languages are spoken, it is important to recruit staff with appropriate language skills. Senior students, civil servants, teachers, health workers, and retired people are often recruited because they satisfy these requirements. Appointment of civil servants can raise questions about whether they are non-partisan, depending on the professional reputation and public perception of the public service, and whether positions are filled on merit or on the basis of partisanship. Even if well-qualified civil servants are recruited, they will still need training in counting procedures and other aspects of their duties in the electoral process. The electoral laws may restrict who can be recruited as a voting station and/or counting staff and can thereby affect the recruitment plan mentioned above. In some jurisdictions, voting station and/or counting staff are nominated by political parties in proportion to the number of votes or seats won at the previous election. The parties draw up lists and refer the names of acceptable personnel to the responsible local election official. Workers who are nominated by a political party, but appointed by the local electoral management body, must agree to carry out all their duties in a neutral and non-partisan manner. The Code of Conduct is particularly relevant and important under such regulatory framework. In some countries, persons who are seen to be politically active are not permitted to work as voting station and/or counting officials. In some countries, the EMBs are legally required to publish the names of presiding officers and poll workers, while in other jurisdictions the EMB voluntarily publishes this information. Publishing names of personnel recruited to perform important tasks in the election results process increases the level of transparency. Furthermore, this gives the general public and other stakeholders an opportunity to inform the EMB about concerns they might have related to certain recruitments. Societies emerging from conflict, the publication of names might be security concern and therefore the integrity and safety of the recruited staff must be weighed against the need for transparency. Recruiting tens of thousands of ad hoc workers across the country is a daunting challenge for most election authorities. As a result many EMBs often focus on identifying and recruiting the exact amount of workers required. Experiences have shown that EMBs are better served by recruiting an average of ten per cent of the staff needed. Some people will not show up for the training because they are sick or found another job; and in spite of a rigorous screening process a number of individuals will not perform satisfactory during the training and thus are not employable. As the EMB recruited a surplus it will not be forced to resort to emergency trainings in the midst of final preparations for Election Day. In addition, if ad hoc workers know they are not guaranteed a slot on the team they tend to focus more diligently on the training to ensure they pass the test. Training Plan The training plan developed for the various processes of the results system incorporates requirements both for affected permanent staff of the EMB, as well as ad hoc personnel. The former training requirements are often part of the long-term human resource efforts to continuously improve officers’ professionalism. However, also permanent EMB officials would require refresher training prior to election as 4-5 years could have passed since the most recent election was held. In general, the more extensive the changes are to the results managements system the more exhaustive the training must be for both permanent and ad hoc workers. Even if EMBs strive to simplify forms and streamline procedures and regulations elections in general, and election results processes in particular, are often highly structured requiring officials to complete tasks in a specific order and fill out multiple forms correctly. The success of a training program is dependent on the quality of trainers, training methodology applied and training materials used. Large-scale training programs mostly utilize a cascade-style program based on a train-the-trainer approach. The EMB’s Training Department will train its Masters Trainers who will be responsible for training Trainers in the provinces. These trainers will subsequently be training a vast majority of the ad hoc workers in the field. The cascade-based training program can train very large number of individuals within a relatively short period of time, in some instances 400.000 – 500.000 poll workers are being trained in four weeks. The main concern raised against the cascade training approach is the difficulty to ensure trainings of sufficient quality. EMB leadership needs to include several management tools enabling them to effectively monitor the training program. Each training must report statistics (number of successfully trained by position and gender, at a minimum). This can be done via a form, phone call or a simple SMS-application. Based on this information the EMB can track if the training is on track, or not. However, unannounced spot-checks at actual trainings continue to be an effective quality control. During these mandatory training sessions ad hoc workers ought to be informed about their Code of Conduct and sign that document, which will be stored by the EMB. Experiences have shown that hands-on simulations, using the very same materials they will use during the actual work is probably one of the most effective pedagogical techniques to use. By working in smaller groups and actually conducting the very tasks to be performed, trainees are obtaining and retaining the required skill-sets. Combining simulations with interactive lecture-style modules is an efficient method of increasing the success rate of the training. The group-size is often recommended not to exceed thirty, as the interaction of the sessions is hampered when the group-size is larger. In order to standardize certain segments of the training a training video can be produced. It can also be made available online should trainees wish to refresh their minds at a later stage. However, the most common cornerstone of cascade-style training programs is the training manual. As a result, training departments spend a significant amount of time developing manuals that are user-friendly. The language is simple, examples numerous and visual aids included. One important aspect sometimes overlooked is the importance of pre-testing training programs, including the training manual. EMB officials developing training programs and training tools are often extremely well-versed in the subject matter and can therefore often overlook issues and miss certain challenges that the temporary worker would face as a trainee. It’s therefore advisable to always test the actual training program, materials and tools on the intended target audience before printing tens of thousands of copies of a training manual and order a large number of training kits.
The election results process often rely on non-EMB personnel for parts of the process, such as the security forces for point and area security, as well as during transportation. Therefore, it is often advisable to collaborate with their respective training unit to ensure that the trainings offered to their personnel is in accordance with the rules and regulations governing the results management system process. [1] National Association of Secretaries of States. "NASS Summary of State Emergency Response Statutes Pertaining to Elections". February 2013. http://www.nass.org/elections-voting/nass-task-force-on-emergency-preparedness-for-elections/ OverviewThe objectives of the Results Management System section are to:
The Importance of Results Management System In recent times, the requirements and demands on an EMB’s results system have increased considerably. Stakeholders demand results significantly faster than they used to. In addition, they demand transparency during the entire results process and not just the vote count – so- called “end to end transparency”. Concerns over less than accessible transportation of critical count-related material by EMBs, opaque tabulation procedures and tardy release of results have sometimes threatened the integrity of the vote count. As a result, EMBs can no longer solely focus on the vote count. The EMB must now have an integrated results management system incorporating all key aspects from vote counting to the certified results being announced and relevant complaints have been properly adjudicated. The starting point for a successful EMB is to first take stock of the existing results management system. Based on an honest and exhaustive review it can identify areas of improvements. Naturally, changes to the EMB’s own infrastructure and communications capabilities, as well as the adaptation and availability of external means of communication in the society at large, will guide the review process as changes are identified. However, as developments are rarely linear, EMBs cannot assume that ICT-infrastructure procured and utilized during the previous election are still operational, or that current staff know how to properly operate the equipment. Legal or regulatory changes since the initial introduction of technology may render the old technology unfit for use. Once the EMB has internally agreed what the necessary improvements are and how these could be achieved a draft operational plan will be developed. The operational plan will not only describe all the processes and steps of the results management system, but also indicate time and resource requirements. Given the result systems importance to election stakeholders, it is important that political parties, candidates, media and election-related NGOs are consulted when developing the result system. If not, the lack of transparency and limited inclusiveness could be construed as a precursor to fraud, systemic manipulation or malpractices by the EMB itself. A results management system's operational plan often overlooks that it must cater to two distinct yet intertwined processes: tabulation and reporting. Given the intense interest in the election results from political stakeholders, media and the electorate, EMBs realize that they no longer have the luxury of waiting until the legal results forms arrive and results are verified before announcing final results. An EMB’s results system must include mechanisms whereby both provisional and final results are catered for. Most EMBs are therefore cognizant of the importance of releasing timely provisional results, as this will give the election authority sufficient time to process the final results. Equally important, if the release of provisional results is not forthcoming the EMB could soon find itself being accused by some parties and candidates of altering the results. Having said that, it is instrumental that EMBs are not pressured into releasing results prematurely. The EMBs must take sufficient time to properly transmit, tabulate and check results before releasing both interim and final results. In order to manage such expectations, EMBs must clearly and repeatedly reinforce the expected timeline for release of results during the lead-up to Election Day. Thereafter it’s too late. Given the intense focus on supplying early provisional results, EMBs are sometimes focusing almost exclusively on this process generating interim results at the expense of the final, legally binding, results stream. This could be devastating as in a tight race, the EMB might decide midstream it cannot announce an outright winner, or the need for a second round, before it has verified the provisional results with the actual results forms. Thus, the time lag between provisional and final results should not be excessive. In some countries, a maximum period of time between Election Day and the publication of certified results is dictated by the legal framework. However, if timeliness and accuracy are of the essence for provisional results, accuracy and chain of custody are essential for final results. Not only could the EMB leadership’s own confidence in the results be compromised if the results forms have not always been in the custody of an authorized election official, but chain of custody is instrumental when adjudicating a challenge to the election results. The EMB’s election results management system must therefore include procedures and regulations clearly stating how sensitive election material must be handled to avoid compromising the chain of custody while moving or storing physical evidence. The chain of custody commences when the presiding officer in the voting station signs for the election material until the very same material is presented in a court of law.
If the results management system introduces new ICT solutions for counting, transmission, tabulation or improved command and control capabilities the operational plan must take into consideration any such improvements to amend regulations and procedures. In addition, the operational plan is to allocate sufficient time for procurement, testing, and training on the new technologies introduced. It is common for EMBs to significantly underestimate the time required to properly plan and procure complex technical solutions. Furthermore, to avoid suspicion and increase acceptance, any changes made to the politically sensitive results system must be accompanied by a public information campaign for the broader audiences and face-to- face interactions with key stakeholders. Common Components of a Results Management System The election results management system varies from country to country given local infrastructure conditions, available resources, political context, EMB structure and electoral systems. Still, in general, common components of the results system can be identified irrespective of model used. The common starting point for all results management systems is the development of an operational plan, based on the assessment of system used during previous election, integrity risks identified and controlled, and new requirements. Introduction of any new technologies need to follow established best practices for conducting feasibility studies and introducing ICT-solutions.[1] The main segments of the electoral process captured in such a plan are: Appropriate training programs for all categories of staff involved in any part of the results management system:
Designing Vote Counting Procedures The type of electoral system used will to a certain extent determine the specific measures needed to successfully conclude an election count. (See Electoral Systems and Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count for more on this topic.) However, several general principles apply to all electoral systems. Counting procedures should take into account available resources, such as staff, training, premises, transport, logistics, planning, communications, and equipment. For example, a computerized method of counting votes would not be suitable for locations with unreliable power supplies or a shortage of skilled computer operators. A balance may need to be struck between integrity, accuracy, and speed. Often the more checks and balances there are, the slower the process. However, the accuracy of the count cannot be compromised as it is the foundation upon which a credible results system is built. There are a variety of ways that counting can take place, including manually, mechanically, or electronically. The counting location may be at the voting station or at counting centres. More complicated systems may require that the vote counting is conducted at several locations. First-Past-the-Post or majority system aggregation of the results can normally be completed at the electoral district level. In a proportional representation system a final centralized result may be necessary to translate votes into seats, see Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count.
[1] see IFES’ publication “Electronic Voting & Counting Technologies: A Guide to Conducting Feasibility Studies”. Guiding PrinciplesTo establish and maintain public confidence in the electoral process, results management systems should incorporate certain fundamental principles governing a democratic election. These fundamental principles are:
Transparency Traditionally EMBs almost exclusively associated transparency with the actual counting process by allowing representatives of political parties and candidates to witness and/or participate in the process, as well as granting them permission to receive an official copy the statement of the results of the counting process. National and international electoral observers should also be allowed to witness the process and be issued an official copy of the statement of the results. The concept of transparency has become much broader as EMBs take a holistic approach in the vote counting process and see it as one integral part of the results management system. Subsequently transparency must also be ensured when developing the overall concept of the results management system, as well as its individual components including: counting of votes, tabulation of results solutions, communication systems for transmitting interim results, transportation of sensitive election results material, storage of the legal statement of counts and other election-results related material. Just as access to the counting of votes by non-EMB officials is essential for transparency guaranteeing accessibility for party agents and observers to the tabulation of results is equally important. International best practice now requires that where EMBs present aggregated results they should also disclose the results from individual voting stations and thereby enable accredited observers, party agents and media representatives to track results from a voting station through the entire results process. Utilizing the EMB’s website is a fast and accessible means for distribution of nation wide voting station-based results. Voting station breakdowns of results should also be readily available for the constituency in question where results are tabulated and interim results announced at constituency levels. Manual counting is by its nature more transparent than computerized counting. If vote counting, transmission of results and aggregation of results are based on ICT-solutions, then new mechanisms for ensuring transparency need to be introduced. However, is important to look at cases were ICT-solutions have reduce the possibility of committing fraudulent activities. In Brazil, when the e-boxes were introduced in the electoral process, there was a decrease in fraudulent activities that were possible before, such as changing ballots to different boxes, or altering partial results in each electoral section[1]. Moreover, the EMB must have an active campaign explaining citizens how the ICT-solutions will be strengthening the system. [1] Filho Brunazo, Amilcar. "Voto Electrónico - Las nuevas tecnologías en los procesos electorales". 2005: http://www.brunazo.eng.br/voto-e/textos/CIPPEC-Brunazo.htm Security The security of a results process encompasses a broad range of considerations and actions. An EMB would often include the following considerations in its security plan for the results system:
Today there exist numerous security features to control access to and movement of sensitive material. The more common features are barcoding voting station kits prior to distribution for proper tracking, plastic security seals with unique numbers to detect unauthorized access to sensitive material while in transit, use of tamper evident bags to transport completed results forms and ballots when not resealed in a ballot box. While materials are in the voting station, sensitive material is always in the custody of the authorized election officials and often, translucent ballot boxes locked with uniquely numbered security seals. In centralized counting facilities or results aggregating centres access control is instrumental for the security of the facility. This is valid for personnel, materials, as well as vehicles. Depending on the threat level, various measurements are taken to ensure safety, such as compulsory ID card checks, metal detectors, mandatory searches of all vehicles and material prior to entry to the compound. Inside the facility, only authorized personnel is in charged of movement of sensitive material. The chain of custody is as follows: check-in, temporary storage, quarantine area, counting or aggregation and permanent storage (see chain of custody for additional details). In other societies the major security concern could be related to the data system and communications systems used to transmit, tabulate, aggregate and release results. As such, extensive security features such as firewalls, preparations for denial-of-service attacks are performed, strict use of passwords enforces, and encrypted data communications are introduced. Regular offsite backups of data are another method to avoid catastrophic loss of data due to hacking, flooding, fire or malfunctioning hardware.
One of the more difficult security risks facing an EMB is the protection of its staff members. Election Commissioners, the Chief Election Officer and a handful of other key permanent officials of the EMB can often be enveloped by a security umbrella, but an EMB often employs hundreds of permanent staff and tens of thousands of temporary workers during peak season. Election officials, or a close family member, are all susceptible to threats or intimidation. Procedures and actions to be taken in such a case could form an integral part of the mandatory training all election officials receive, irrespective of their position in the organization. Professionalism EMBs have come to recognize that one of their most valuable assets is its staff. However, it can also be its weakest link, as even the best laid plan utilizing the simples forms and most user-friendly technologies risk failing of the staff is not properly trained and motivated. For a long time, EMBs primarily focused its training to voting station and counting officials, as they were expected to conduct their duties and responsibilities in a professional manner. They should be thoroughly trained in the counting process, as distinct from the voting process; thorough in their procedures; and committed to treating electoral materials with care and respect. However, as the requirements for what constitutes a credible election results processes have grown so has the staffing categories expected to display professionalism when executing their respective duties. In addition, as new technologies are introduced into the electoral process, greater emphasis could be put on the computer literacy skills of staff recruited. Traditionally, older, more experienced election workers lack the computer and smart phone literacies, while younger more technology literate recruits lack the electoral experience. In order to meet the increasing demands put on election officials (both permanent and ad hoc workers) training programs need to be more sophisticated and specialized. Subsequently, extensive preparations by the EMB are required to meet the expanding training demands. Awareness of the electoral process in general and knowledge of the task at hand are two important traits of a professional election official. However, once a person accepts work as a counting official, he or she must be also non-partisan throughout the entire process. Some jurisdictions require that all election officials sign an oath to this effect, creating awareness that they can be legally prosecuted if their work or conduct is proved to be partisan, or if they violate laws, regulations and the EMB’s code of conduct. The oath should also include a confidentiality clause that ensures that sensitive information and the identity of voters is not divulged. Having a signed code of conduct on record, can be particularly important when investigation accusation of malfeasance by an election official (see Integrity subsection below for additional information). Accuracy Accuracy of the election result is directly related to the integrity of the count, tabulation and aggregation process. Later discovery of errors and correction of mistakes can lead to accusations of malpractices or even fraud. The accuracy of the count will depend on clear procedures and manuals, correct software programs and communications system that are properly tested, adequate staff training, appropriate checks and balances, and officials' commitment to the process. Clear audit trails of ballots, ballot boxes, statement of result and tabulation forms, as well as checking and rechecking mechanisms, will contribute to the accuracy of the results. Whilst ICT solutions may enhance accuracy, this must be balanced against the resulting apparent loss of transparency. Secrecy Secrecy of the vote is important because it ensures that voters cannot be victimised for the way they vote, or intimidated into voting in a particular way. To preserve the secrecy of the vote, a voters' identity should never be linked to his/her choice. However, in a voting station with a very small number of registered voters, the secrecy of the vote can easily be violated, should they all vote for the same party. If the secrecy of the vote of individuals or a community is a concern, measures such as counting at counting centres, rather than at individual voting stations, or mixing ballots from different voting stations, can be considered. Sequentially numbered ballot papers corresponding to matching stubs with the voter details compromise secrecy and are best avoided. However for audit purposes, it is sufficient if ballot papers and counterfoils are printed with the numerical range contained in the booklet of ballot papers in question and, thus, avoid violating the secrecy of the vote. Alternatively, if numbers are used, they could also be random on ballot stub and ballot paper – but matched in a database only available to EMB and judicial authorities. Timeliness EMBs need to cater to two distinct yet intertwined processes: tabulation and reporting. Each of these must generate timely election results. Delays in completing the count and in the release of unofficial preliminary results, and subsequent final results, can negatively affect the level of integrity and confidence in the voting process. The responsible Electoral Management Body should carefully plan all stages of the counting process to facilitate the early announcement of results, or at least to realistically assess when results can be announced, taking into consideration the communications and transport infrastructure.
However, it is instrumental that EMBs are not pressured into releasing results prematurely. The EMBs must give themselves sufficient time to properly transmit, tabulate and check results before releasing both interim and final results. In order to manage such expectations, EMBs must clearly and repeatedly reinforce the expected timeline for release of results during the lead up to Election Day, as well as informing voters if the process is going according to schedule, or if the schedule has changed. Accountability Clear responsibility and accountability for each stage of the election results process are important. The legal electoral framework and the EMB’s own Code of Conduct outline the general responsibilities that all election officials must adhere to. The Terms of Reference for each position clarifies in more detail what is expected of individual officers, as do procedures and regulations governing the various stages of the results system. All election officials have a duty of care responsibility. At the national level, the EMB should be accountable for ensuring that all necessary preparations are completed and the results system put in place is suitable for the tasks at hand. At the electoral district level, it may be a senior election officer or commission official who is accountable for ensuring that the results process is operationalized within their respective area of responsibility. At voting stations and centralized counting/tabulation facilities, specified officers may be responsible for voting, counting and tabulation. The very same is the case for transportation, of sensitive results related material, communication of interim and final results. Clearly defined complaints and appeals processes are also important. There should be structures in place with the authority and competency to address complaints and appeals. These may include political party liaison committees, conflict management and resolution bodies and legal structures.
Counting rules, including criteria for rejecting ballots, should be clear, agreed upon and known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general public, political parties, candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national and international electoral observers. If a results form is incorrectly completed by a voting station and the deficiency spotted during tabulation, unambiguous and well-known procedures as who and how corrections can be made must be in place in order to avoid accusations of tampering with the results tabulation by the EMB (for additional information regarding this very topic, see the 2008 Kriegler report on the 2007 Kenyan elections). Thus, clear audit trails are essential to ensure accountability. Uniformity
Uniformity means that all rules and regulations treat all voters equally and are applied equally to all voters and stakeholders. Ensuring uniformity across the entire country would require that all officials making up the results management system are well trained and non-partisan, as well as the EMB has an effective command and control capability in place to supervise compliance. The presence of political party representatives and candidate representatives, and observers will help to ensure that various steps of the results system are conducted in a fair and correct manner. Integrity The credibility of the results management system is directly related to the integrity of the entire results generating process, and not just the count itself. Subsequently EMBs must make every effort to safeguard the integrity of the results management system by pro-actively combat electoral fraud risks, as well as systemic manipulation and electoral malpractices (See Chad Vickery and Erica Schein (2012) for additional information). By conducting a comprehensive fraud risk assessment of the results management system the EMB will be better positioned to identify potential vulnerabilities. Based on the identified fraud risks, the EMB will be able to rank the risks based on the plausibility of the vulnerability occurring and potential impact if it takes place. This ranking will be an important instrument and effectively guide the EMB as it develops a fraud risk control plan enabling it to deter, detect and overcome fraud risks (For additional information see Darnolf 2011). However, all EMB officials and officers also have an individual duty to protect the integrity of the results process and could be held responsible for unintentional breaches of their duty of care. If they have been negligent and violated the code of conduct, or the rules and regulations of which they have been trained they may have committed malpractice. EMBs are therefore often recommended to introduce a Code of Conduct and integrate the duty of care concept in the induction training of all its officers, irrespective if they are Commissioners or ad hoc poll workers. Chain of Custody A chain of custody is instrumental when adjudicating a challenge to the election results. The EMB must therefore handle its sensitive election material in such a way that the chain of custody is not compromised while moving or storing physical evidence from the time it is obtained until the time it is presented in court. Election authorities often utilize a special form logging the movement of election material from the central warehouse to the voting station in question. Based on such a form, authorities will know who was in possession of the material during any stage of the process. EMBs use the same system for retrieval of the material from a voting station to its storage facility, as well as to the counting/tabulation facility where applicable. One of the main challenges to the chain of custody is often experienced at central counting and tabulation facilities.
Inside the facility, movement of sensitive material from check-in, temporary storage, potential quarantine area, counting or aggregation, and permanent storage is to be performed only by authorized personnel and properly documented. In some cases where sensitive materials and ID cards are barcoded, a log is established by using hand-held scanners. Alternatively, procedures identifying who is authorized to obtain, and how to move, materials from the various areas of the facility is to be established. A log sheet should clearly identify the person who signed for the material in question. A similar procedure is used for the return of material. Application of TechnologyWhile the use of manually counted paper ballots is still the most common method of voting, automated methods of voting and vote counting are becoming more accessible and effective, and more countries are opting to use them. Automated technology can be cheaper, faster, and more accurate than manual counting. It can also improve the democratic process by making the counting of complex electoral systems easier to use. Technological approaches can be used to replace traditional paper ballots. Voting directly using mechanical or electronic devices, or using machine-readable ballots, can eliminate the need to count ballots manually and greatly speed up the counting process, as well as ensuring and increasing accuracy.
Before deciding to implement a computerized voting and/or counting system, an electoral management body might consider these questions:
If the answer is yes to most of these questions, it may be worth studying the costs and benefits of a machine based voting system. However, the following drawbacks should also be considered:
Environmental factors, such as humidity, may not allow machines to operate properly. (For further information see Elections and Technology) Using Technology to Assist Manual Vote Counting Computing technology is often used to count the results of manual ballot counts, to produce summaries at the counting centre, and regional, or national level. Standard off-the-shelf office software products, such as spreadsheet or relational database software, can be used to aggregate individual counts and produce summary totals and various reports, either in paper or electronic format. Computer vote counting systems require care to function correctly. Faulty calculations, data entry errors, or loss of data can seriously compromise the conduct of an election. Rigorous testing is necessary to ensure electronic election systems work flawlessly before they are placed in production, even if they are to be used only to compile preliminary results, or used only for a short time. It is precisely because electronic voting systems are used on a single day that they must be exhaustively tested. By contrast, voter registration exercises typically run for 30 or 60 days and offer some opportunity for mitigation of issues that arise (for example - software updates in the field or modifications of processes notified by bulletin). Data entry forms should be designed to minimize errors and to facilitate the data entry process. It is common practice to design data input forms so that they mirror the data entry screen. Training of persons who manually complete these forms must stress the importance of legibility and arithmetic accuracy. As with any vote counting process, it is crucial that checks and balances be built into any computerized counting system. Clear audit trails should be in place to track the progress of the count. Balancing figures should be used to check that output results are consistent with inputs. For example, it should not be possible to calculate a total vote figure for any level of counting that is higher than the number of ballot papers issued to voters at that level, or at least the system should flag this anomaly for investigation by the EMB or other certifying authority. Data entered into a computerized vote counting system should always be checked against the original input data. This can be done after the data has been imputed, by checking this data against the input documents, or by entering each set of data twice, using different operators to produce a parallel count. Contingency plans should also be built into any computerized vote counting system. Data should be regularly backed up (and stored off-site if the counting proceeds for some time). Spare hardware should be available in case of hardware failure. Where budgets allow, disaster recovery sites, where core election information systems can be up and running quickly, in the event of a total loss of the main EMB site can be considered. IT support staff should be on hand if problems arise. Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) and long duty-cycle standby generators with adequate fuel should be available to guard against power failure, even in the most developed countries. Power supplies should be protected against power surges that can corrupt or destroy computer files. Even simple steps, such as regularly saving live data from RAM memory to hard disk, are sometimes overlooked, and can cause serious problems.
Worst-case scenarios should also be anticipated. It is wise to be able to switch to a completely manual operation if the computer system fails and cannot be recovered. Portable calculators are valuable emergency devices. Technology for Voting and Counting Processes Over the last thirty years, various voting machines have been developed using the available technology. In the 1950s and 1960s, punch-card machine systems were developed. Voters should punch cards (with a supplied punch device) opposite the candidates' names they selected. The cards were placed into a sealed ballot box and, after the close of voting, tabulated by card counters. In the 1970s, optical-scanners or Optical Mark Reading (OMR) systems were developed. Using this system, voters make a mark on a paper ballot to indicate their choice of candidate or issue. A scanning device reads the marked entries and calculates vote totals. These systems can count ballots as they are deposited, or count ballots only after the close of voting.
More recently, a new type of system, called the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting system has been developed. This system records votes by means of a ballot display provided via mechanical or electro-optical devices that can be activated by the voter. Once the voter has made his ballot selections, the device processes the data with a computer programme, and records voting data and ballot images into internal memory devices. It can produce a tabulation of the voting data as a hard copy printout, or store it in a removable memory device. Technology and Complex Electoral Systems Voting directly, using mechanical or electronic devices, or machine-readable ballots, is relatively straightforward where simple electoral systems are used, such as first past the post or list systems. In these cases, voters are able to indicate their choices in a relatively simple way, for example, by making one mark or pulling one lever.
It is more difficult to use these methods in complex electoral systems that permit many multiple-choice responses, or require candidates or parties to be ranked in numerical preference. As technology improves, it is likely that effective methods will be available to meet the needs of these systems. Deciding to Use Technology to Communicate Results
Some jurisdictions have experimented with communication systems that use computer-assisted technology, where the voting station official enters the election results on the key pad of a telephone or similar device connected to a results-counting computer located at a remote centre. A paper-based balloting system and manual counting procedure are still used; automation is limited to the communication and collection of results from polling stations. Internet and World Wide Web
As access to public computer networks increases, electoral officials may post future election results directly on the World Wide Web, or other interface on the emerging information highway. Already tested in some jurisdictions with varying degrees of success, election results can be posted instantaneously to a global audience using the Internet. Cost ConsiderationsThe cost of elections is a concern to governments and election management bodies alike, regardless of the country's level of development. A prohibitively high cost electoral process that the country cannot afford can jeopardize the entire democratic process. Traditionally, to minimize the cost of an election, the results management system, processes and procedures chosen should make use of the existing infrastructure, such as transport and communication networks, as much as practicable, and take into account literacy levels, infrastructure challenges, and the sources for the recruitment of officials. As of late, EMBs have increasingly learned that introducing ICT-solutions can expedite results reporting, but depending on IT-solutions chosen, that could also significantly increase costs. Sustainability over more than one electoral cycles of such an investment sometimes has become paramount for the actual decision to upgrade a results system, as much as transparency, speed and reduced fraud risks in the actual counting and tabulation processes.
What is affordable, expensive or feasible can vary greatly between countries. Here are some generic guidelines regarding costs:
Alternative technology-focussed questions include:
Hidden Costs Frequently Overlooked or Underestimated in Elections Technology Procurement
Do not reinvent the wheel While Results Management Systems cannot reasonably be considered COTS (Commercial-Off-The-Shelf) technologies, by and large, the hardware and software components of such systems are typically familiar, mature and cheaply available. Laptop computers, their smaller and more mobile replacements, software such as operating systems, database management systems, data capture, services such as mobile data communications - these are all widely available even in developing countries. However, the expertise required to integrate these familiar components into effective results management systems is far from commonplace and comes at a premium cost. Even the expertise necessary to properly analyse the electoral voting and counting processes of the EMB and turn this into sufficiently detailed specifications. Specific Needs for Vote Counting and Aggregation of Results The local environment and political situation may add to specific needs for vote counting at voting stations, or at central locations. Such local factors might include the need for additional security measures during counting, transportation requirements, or specific communications technology that is not readily available. Higher than expected turnout may affect the counting duration, and additional staff may be required to cope with the additional ballots to be counted. Expected budgets may be exceeded if such contingencies have not been planned for. Worst (or best) case scenarios (for example, expecting 100 percent of registered voters to turn out to vote) are frequently used when election budgets are planned in order to build in sufficient capacity. The selection of a specific counting, tabulation and communication technologies may also increase costs or reduce them, depending on the choices made. However, if not planned properly and when sustainability and local ownership are considered, the cost saving argument used to justify an ICT-upgrade could prove faulty. Before properly tested, the old manual system often needs to be in place as a fall-back and thereby add additional transitional costs. Transmitting results by telephone is often cost-effective, depending on distance and availability, but could negatively affect the accuracy given increased error rate. As a result, EMBs are beginning to introduce various SMS solutions to convey interim results from voting stations. SMS is a relatively inexpensive communications solution, both in terms of software development and hardware requirements. Having said that, given its extremely important functionality – transmitting provisional results – extensive testing of the system, targeted training of users and a proactive EMB command and control capability are necessary additional components adding costs.
Where conventional fixed telephones or facsimiles are not available, mobile phones or radios may be used. Results may also be sent by electronic mail where access is available. Where no electronic options are available, results may have to be delivered by courier. Human Resources versus Cost of Technology Use of technology for counting votes may reduce the overall cost of an election and be more effective under certain conditions.
However, depending on local factors, the process of manually counting paper ballots may be comparatively less expensive. Whether a technological solution is cost-effective will depend on a range of local circumstances, including:
In general, a mechanical or computerized method of counting paper ballots (as opposed to systems where votes are cast electronically or mechanically) may be cost-effective, where large numbers of ballots are being counted centrally, where a voting system is used that lends itself to mechanical counting, and where labour costs are relatively high. Cost considerations aside, election management bodies should be aware that mechanical or computerized counting methods might be faster and more accurate than manual methods. However, some systems have proven insufficient transparency as lacking a paper trail and thereby the actual results stemming from some voting machines cannot be verified in a recount. While the use of technology might appear a costly option, if the technology acquisition costs can be spread over several elections, the investment may be worthwhile. Experience has shown, however, that many systems do not deliver the hoped-for lifespan that would make the original investment worthwhile. On the other hand, rapid advances in technology tend to cause electoral technology to age quickly and for technology to become defunct between one election and the next. Availability of technical support during the electoral period is another important aspect that should be considered.
A detailed cost-benefit analysis, accompanied by a study of the legal impacts and management risks associated with the adoption of a particular technological solution, may be worthwhile before any final decisions are made to adopt technological vote counting methods. [1] Rial, Juan. "Posibilidades y límites del voto electrónico". Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales de Perú. http://www.web.onpe.gob.pe/modEscaparate/caratulas/rial.pdf Cost ComponentsBudget The budget costs associated with vote counting are linked to the larger process of establishing and running results management system.
The following information relates to the considerations that should be taken into account in planning an election budget. Personnel Planning
The salaries and fees paid to counting and tabulation staff usually constitutes one of the largest part of the election's voting day budget. Personnel costs can include:
Using civil servants or citizens who are either volunteers or on civic duty, are ways in which to save salary costs to voting station and counting centre officials. Using the same officials in subsequent elections will decrease training costs. Materials
Many kinds of materials must be developed and mass-produced for use in voting stations and counting centres. These include:
Choosing materials carefully can save costs. Materials that can be re-used for several electoral events, such as metal ballot boxes, may lead to cost savings, but the cost of storing materials must be taken into account. Alternatively, materials which cost less to produce, but which may only be used once, such as cardboard ballot boxes, do not have to be stored and may be cheaper.
There will also be a freight component in the cost of most electoral materials. Items made locally may be cheaper than items made elsewhere, when freight is taken into account. Rental of Premises Renting space for use as voting stations, counting centres, tabulation facilities and national results centre can be a significant budget item. In addition, storage of necessary material for the count process prior to its commencement, as well as warehousing of results related material from thousands of voting stations, require substantial warehouse capacity at national and sub-national levels. In some jurisdictions, the electoral laws allow the electoral management body to use schools and other public locations as voting stations at no cost. However, some regions may not have available public facilities, and the budget should plan for additional funds required to rent voting and counting locations. In some countries, the electoral management body may be able to negotiate with the relevant authorities to get free access to schools and other public locations. Otherwise, there will be a need to rent space for voting stations and counting centres. The budget should provide adequately for this.
Premises in which high-technology equipment will be stored, even for a short time, may have to offer control over temperature, humidity or dust. This has significant cost implications often overlooked by EMBs when they consider the introduction of technology into vote counting and result management systems. Office Equipment and Communications Fees Necessary office equipment, such as chairs and tables, are often sufficient when counting is conducted at voting station level. However, when centralized count is utilized these large venues also require industrial-strength and sized shelving system, forklifts, large generators to ensure reliable power-supply, ablution facilities, canteen, security and safety arrangements. If required, equipment such as personal computers, scanners, Internet service, intranet, and cell phones may also need to be budgeted for accordingly. Ideally, each voting station and counting centre should have the means to quickly communicate with the electoral management body to report problems, seek advice if needed, and transmit counting results. Transport Local conditions and common sense will indicate the most appropriate and cost-effective transport for the region concerned. Election management bodies must ensure that electoral material is transported securely, so that it is not tampered with, stolen, or destroyed. For this reason, it may be desirable to avoid public and commercial transit systems, although these can be used if appropriate. Electoral material may be transported by: motor vehicles, boats, helicopters, light aircraft, commercial aircraft, or even animals that can carry loads, depending on local circumstances. Transport is particularly difficult in remote areas, and can be very expensive. Even well packaged technology is at risk of damage if not properly handled and transported. While the hard case often supplied with elections technology offers standard protection, it is not a guarantee against all impacts. Vehicles may be supplied by a government agency, the military, the police, or national or international organizations. If vehicles are not supplied, they may need to be rented. If necessary, the budget should include ancillary costs to cover maintenance, fuel, and insurance. The budget may also need to allow for drivers or crew. If no vehicles are available, money for taxis and public or commercial transport should be considered.
If electoral materials have to be transported from voting stations to counting centres, or to a central location, these costs must be included in the budget. Voter Education Programmes Voter education programmes can be a large part of an election budget, depending on the methods chosen and the location. Informing the general public about the results management system and processes often form an integral part of the public information activities of an EMB. This would improve people’s and political stakeholders’ understanding of the results generating process and thereby increase transparency and reduce rumours and misconceptions, which could undermine the credibility of the results.
Methods can range from newspapers, radio and television advertising, to posters, pamphlets, direct mail, community seminars, and the Internet. Software and Hardware If specific software is developed to process or count ballots, or to process election results, development, testing, documentation, and training costs must be budgeted. The hardware required operating the software, its deployment in the field, and the technical support required to maintain and service it will need to be included.
Operational support costs, such as staff, office space and facilities, should be included as necessary. Results Centres or Counting Facilities Many jurisdictions have regional and/or national results centres or counting rooms. These are useful to communicate the election result to the public, the candidates, the parties, and the media, and are an important element in making the election process open and transparent. Counting rooms can be simple, with manual count boards and simple communication links by telephone or fax, or they can be very sophisticated, with computer links, displays and analysis. In this electronic age, election results may also be distributed electronically by computer feeds or the Internet, with no need for a physical counting location. In some cases, counting rooms are organized and funded by media organizations. In others, the election management body funds these. The election budget should include the cost of results centres or counting rooms as appropriate. Miscellaneous Costs Petty cash for small purchases or emergencies should be provided to the local offices of the electoral management body.
Contingency measures for bigger items such as relocation of offices in case of disaster, redeployment of electoral management body staff, and backup electrical generators should be budgeted according to local risk factors and the general operating environment. Financial Audit Procedures and Assets Control System
Suitable audit procedures should be in place to ensure that staff responsible for managing funds are fully accountable and are not able to appropriate funds illegally. Records of all valuable assets should be kept to ensure that assets are not disposed of illegally or go missing. An assets control system clearly outlines how to track procured goods, inventory regulations, areas of responsibilities, and how the organization can dispose of assets. Election officials should be aware that they are accountable for the funds and goods under their control, and they should be aware of the penalties for misusing their position. Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the CountThis section discusses how the electoral system and chosen ballot type might affect vote counting procedures. What Vote Counting Means It is necessary to carefully distinguish between counting the votes and determining a winner (See Transforming Votes to Seats). Counting the votes consists of opening the ballot boxes, sorting their contents, determining the validity of ballot papers, and counting ballot papers counted. With the exception of countries using voting machines, vote counting is a concrete operation, based on actual objects (ballot papers and, if applicable envelopes), and is often done manually. It is a labour intensive operation. In some countries mechanical or electronic devices are used to facilitate the counting process. Counting votes requires clear procedures, concentration, literacy, and honesty. Those who count votes are not highly paid and in some countries the literacy requirement excludes many applicants. Given the delicate nature of this process, the EMB management is advised to pay close attention to this activity. Is important to introduce a set of checks and balances reducing the risk of electoral malpractices or fraud. Vote counting involves the preliminary operation of checking the validity of ballot papers. Electoral legislation normally outlines detailed grounds for rejecting ballot papers. Election officials must be fully familiar with those provisions. This operation requires a higher skill level than simply counting the votes. Decisions on the validity of ballot papers may be made collectively (for example, by a majority decision of all election officials present) or hierarchically (by the presiding officer). The decision may also be "referred to higher officials". Decisions of this nature must be subject to judicial review to prevent abuses.
Vote counting results normally produce the following information for each counting unit:
Counting votes can be accomplished by counting officials, usually at the voting station level, but also at the electoral district level, or on a national level.
Counting officials can count the votes, usually, at the voting station level, but they can also do it at the electoral district level, or on a national level. The final stage of vote counting is the aggregation of figures for electoral districts. Electoral districts are the territorial units for which representatives, in a first-past-the-post system, are elected and where votes are added before the electoral formula is to be applied to determine who is elected. If the counting centre is smaller than the electoral district, the figures included in the statements of votes for each counting unit must be aggregated for all the counting units in the electoral district. It is fundamental that observers, party agents, and accredited journalists can witness this process. Transparent tabulation enables stakeholders to verify individual polling station results in the aggregated result. This operation involves gathering the results from each counting centre, checking whether all statements are in, and aggregating the figures included in each statement. Once the totals are available for the electoral district, the vote counting is over. The next step is applying the electoral formula to determine who is elected. Electoral Systems An electoral system determines how parties and candidates are elected to a body as representatives. Depending on the electoral system used, the electoral formula – the actual mathematical formula translating votes into seats - may vary. For legislative elections, the electoral system is the rule whereby members of a legislative house are elected and votes transformed into seats. For presidential elections, the electoral system is the benchmark a candidate must reach to be declared elected: e.g. a plurality or a majority of the popular vote. Electoral systems and formulas are outlined in Transforming Votes to Seats. The electoral system chosen will affect many other variables of the election process. In particular, it has some effect on the ballot type and on the counting procedure. Influence of Electoral System over Ballot Type The variables of ballot type are outlined in greater detail in file Ballot Type Counting Requirements. Ordinal or Categorical Ballots: The main effect of the electoral system on the ballot type is whether a categorical or an ordinal choice will be required from voters. A categorical ballot is one where the voter makes a straight choice, either for a candidate or for a party list, or for a party and a candidate at the same time. An ordinal ballot is one where the voter indicates his or her preferences among the various candidates or parties by numbering their respective names, in declining order (1, 2, 3) or by cumulating votes on certain candidates. On an ordinal ballot a voter is able to alter his or her vote between the first and second round of an election.
Most electoral systems require voters to make a categorical choice, which means that categorical type ballots are the most common occurrence. Ordinal ballots only account for one-quarter of the world total of ballots. They can be required for four electoral systems:
Ballot Structure: The Australian Ballot, the "Ballot and Envelope System," and the French Ballot Another important dimension of the ballot paper is its structure. Two broad options exist: an "Australian ballot" (named after its country of origin) and "the ballot and envelope" system. The Australian ballot is a ballot on which the names of all competing parties and candidates are grouped on a single sheet of paper, to be marked by the voter. The "ballot and envelope" system, requires printing a distinct ballot paper for each of the competing parties or candidates, and inviting voters to insert one single paper into an envelope, which is to be dropped into the ballot box. Between those two types exists an intermediary solution: the French ballot, which lists the candidates to be marked by the voter. This type of ballot is used in some jurisdictions where proportional representation (PR) is combined with the right for voters to express preferences for individual candidates within the party list. Most electoral systems are fully compatible with either ballot structure option (see "group 1" in the appendix). However, some electoral systems (First Past the Post, Two-Round, or PR) in multi-member electoral districts with panachage or preferential voting within a list are compatible with both.
The Australian ballot system is sometimes the preferred option as it is a simpler format of ballot paper and for the cost factor of producing less ballot papers, especially if the number of members to be elected is high: (see "group 2" in the appendix.) Finally, some electoral systems are only compatible with Australian ballots, and cannot be operated with the ballot and envelope system. This is the case for the alternative voting and STV (see "group 3" in the appendix), because both require an ordinal choice, which cannot be expressed with sufficient clarity under the ballot and envelope system. Influence of Electoral System over Vote Counting The most important influence of the electoral formula over vote counting is to determine what must be counted. Some electoral systems simply require counting the votes for candidates or parties. Other electoral systems require counting the votes both for parties and for candidates within each party list. If the electoral system requires voters to express an ordinal choice, then vote counting is performed in a very different way.
Another influence of the electoral system is the determination of which territorial level (the voting station, the electoral district, or the nation as a whole) votes must be counted and aggregated. Appendix This is a discussion of the compatibility of various electoral systems with the Australian ballot paper and the ballot and envelope system. Group 1 - The following electoral systems are compatible with both the Australian ballot and the ballot and envelope system:
Group 2 - The following electoral systems are compatible in theory with both the Australian ballot and the ballot and envelope system. However, in practical terms, it is advisable to use Australian ballots, especially if the number of votes to be cast in the district is high.
Group 3 - The following electoral systems are compatible only with Australian ballots:
Electoral Systems Counting Requirements for Different Electoral SystemsWhich electoral formula is in force has an effect on how vote counting is carried out, what has to be counted, and where the counting is to be done is examined. What has to be counted? Following is a summary of the counting requirements for each electoral formula: • First-past-the-post (FPTP) in single-member districts - count the votes for each candidate. • FPTP in multi-member districts (the Party Block Vote) - count the votes for each party list. • Limited vote - count the votes for each candidate. • Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) - count the votes for each candidate. • Proportional representation (PR) with closed list, no panachage between list - count the votes for each list. • PR list with panachage allowed - count the votes for each candidate. If voters are allowed to cast a single list vote instead of voting for individual candidates, also count the number of votes cast for each list. • Two-Round System in single-member districts - count the votes for each candidate. If a second ballot is necessary, count the votes again for each candidate standing at the second ballot. • Two-Round System in multi-member districts, with closed lists - count the votes for each party list. If a second ballot is necessary, count the votes again for each party list standing at the second ballot. • FPTP in multi-member districts (the Block Vote), with panachage allowed, there are two possible ballot arrangements: a. Each seat in the district is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat "A", Seat "B", etc.), with one distinct competition for each seat, and each elector has a vote for each seat.
• Two-Round system in multi-member districts, with panachage allowed. There are two possible ballot arrangements:
PR list when preference votes for individual candidates are allowed. • Scenario A - Voters must vote for a single individual candidate, and this vote is also deemed to be a vote for the party sponsoring that individual. In this case, count the votes for each candidate. • Scenario B - Voters may vote either for a party list or for one individual candidate within a party list. In this case, count the votes for each party list and count the votes for each candidate. • Scenario C - Voters must vote for a party list and may, in addition, vote for one or many of the candidates within that list. However, individual preferences cast for the candidates sponsored by a given party will be taken into account only if 10 percent of the ballot papers cast for that party are so marked. In this case, first count the votes for each party list. Second, count for each party the number of ballot papers which bear preference votes for candidates. Third, count individual preference votes for each candidate. • Scenario D - Voters must vote for a party list and they may vote for one of the candidates within that list. They may, in addition, cross out the name of a candidate within that list. In this case, first count the votes for each party list. Second, count the votes for each candidate. Third, count the number of ballots where the name of a candidate was crossed out. • Alternative voting in single-member districts: Count only first preferences for each candidate. If necessary, count second or other subsequent preferences expressed on eliminated candidates' ballots (the latter count must be done at the electoral district level, though Australia provides for a preliminary unofficial counting of second and subsequent preferences at the lowest level). • Alternative voting in multi-member districts: Each seat in the district is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat "A", Seat "B", etc.), with one distinct competition for each seat. Count the first preferences for each individual candidate for each seat. If necessary, count the second or other subsequent preferences expressed on eliminated candidates' ballots. • Single Transferable Vote (STV): Count only first preferences for each candidate. If necessary, count second or other subsequent preferences expressed on eliminated candidates' ballots (the latter count must be done at the electoral district level). • Mixed Member Proportional Systems: Count the votes for each party, and the votes for each candidate. If the two cannot be done simultaneously, count party votes first as these are the most decisive. • Parallel Systems: Count votes for each candidate and votes for each party. If the two cannot be done simultaneously, start with the category of members that is the most numerous. • Mixed Coexistence Systems: In each district, use the relevant counting procedure, depending on which formula is used in the district. Where are votes to be counted? Determining at which level of electoral administration, i.e. national, provincially or regionally, at electoral district level or at the voting station, counting will take place is determined by national legislation. The simplest option is to count the vote at each voting station. This is generally recommended since the officials who perform the operation are already at the location and there is no need for transport of the ballot boxes, which supports transparency of the count. Counting at voting stations also has an impact on timing: voters and candidates are anxious to know the results. Votes can also be counted at counting centres, at the electoral district level or even nationally. This necessitates safety precautions to overcome the security and public trust considerations mentioned above: ballot boxes must be sealed carefully so that their contents cannot be emptied or tampered with during transportation. Reliable officials must transport the ballots. A worthwhile precaution is to require representatives from the various parties to sit in, or when there are a number of party or candidate representatives to accompany, the vehicle transporting the boxes. In politically volatile countries, armed protection of the vehicles transporting ballot boxes and party inspectors may be necessary. While counting the votes at a location other than the voting station is often not the best alternative, there may be sound reasons for selecting this option:
Alternative Vote (AV) and Single Transferable Vote (STV) impose only one important constraint with regard to vote counting: while counting of first preferences can be done in voting stations, the transfer of second and other subsequent preferences must be done at the electoral district level. It is only on the basis of the aggregate figures for the whole district that the decision can be made as to whether any transfer will be necessary, and as to which candidates, if necessary, will be eliminated and have their second preferences counted and transferred. The crucial point to be ascertained before deciding to count second or subsequent preferences is whether or not a candidate has obtained a majority of first preferences in the electoral district. This decision can only be made on the basis of district-wide figures. If such a majority has been reached, counting stops there and second or subsequent preferences will never be counted. If the opposite is found, then it is up to the officials for the electoral district to eliminate the weakest candidates, to count second preferences on the ballots where first-preference votes have been given to such candidates, and transfer them to the remaining candidates, until one candidate secures the required majority or quota. This implies that the winner(s) of the election will be known later under both AV and STV. This is one of the drawbacks pointed out by the opponents of these formulas.
Ballot Type Counting RequirementsAn explanation and description of the types of ballots (single ballot, open and closed lists) takes into consideration the following three variables: • Whether voters must make a categorical or ordinal choice; • The structure of the ballot paper; • The number of offices to be filled. Ordinal vs. Categorical Ballots A categorical ballot is one where the voter makes a straight choice either for a candidate or for a party list. An ordinal ballot is one where the voter is required to indicate preferences among the various candidates or parties by numbering their respective names, in declining order (1,2,3...).
Preferential ordinal ballots make ballot counting more complex. The chief rule is that only "first preferences" i.e. the number of ballots where the name of a given candidate are marked with the figure "1", are normally counted on election night, assuming that counting takes place directly after voting. Subsequent preferences are to be counted only if no candidate is found to have obtained a majority (more than 50 per cent) of first preferences. In this case, the weakest candidate is eliminated and the second preferences expressed on his or her ballots are counted and transferred to other candidates. The Structure of the Ballot Paper The simplest option is the so-called "Australian ballot", which groups the names of all candidates for a single office on a single ballot paper, to be marked by the voter. Another option is the French "ballot paper and envelope system" where there is one ballot paper for each candidate, voters collect each candidate's ballot and insert one in an envelope to be dropped into the ballot box, and dispose of all other unused ballots. “Australian ballots” are easier to count, as they are simply taken out of the ballot box, unfolded and sorted. A supplementary advantage is that the results of the count are easier to check after the election. Once counting is completed, the ballot papers marked for each party or candidate are placed in distinct sealed envelopes and archived. If the results of the election are later challenged, the envelopes may be reopened before a judge and their contents counted again. Further, rejected ballot papers may be re-examined to determine whether they ought to have been rejected or not. Under the ballot and envelope system, the first step is to count the unopened envelopes to determine how many votes were cast. Then each envelope can be opened, the ballot paper taken out and the name of the candidate or party on the ballot read aloud and recorded by counting officers. From this moment, nothing distinguishes a ballot paper, which has been cast, from the final statement of the votes casts, which becomes the only evidence of how many votes were cast for each party or candidate is the tally sheet used by counting officers. Only the latter has any official value and is kept for recording purposes. Normally more than one copy of the statement is made. If conflicting figures are found in the various copies of the statement for any voting station, there is no authoritative evidence as to what the right figures are, because the ballot papers are not kept. Even if the ballot papers are kept and put into sealed envelopes, nothing distinguishes a ballot paper actually cast for a candidate or party from any other ballot paper that was not actually cast. Only ballot papers and envelopes that were rejected are kept and annexed to the statement of votes. This system makes it difficult for judges to recount the ballot papers subsequently, or even to decide whether a ballot paper has been lawfully rejected. For example, if a vote has been rejected because the envelope was found to include no ballot, or because a ballot paper was inserted in the box without being put into an envelope first, or because the envelope included ballot papers for different candidates, the only evidence available, apart from suitable mentions on the minutes of proceedings of the counting station, is an empty envelope or isolated ballot papers.
Sometimes legislation provides for a mix of both schemes. Voters can be required to insert the list of candidates representing a single party into the envelope, but in addition, allow voters to mark the name of one or more candidates on that list. This kind of hybrid can be found notably in some proportional representation (PR) countries where preferential voting for some candidates is allowed. The Number of Offices to be Filled In most countries, an election involves a single set of elective offices, e.g. Members of Parliament. This requires a single ballot paper. Sometimes numerous offices are to be filled at the same time such as President, member of Parliament, etc. This raises numerous issues, both political and technical. a. Straight ticket vs. Split ticket: One option is to oblige voters to give a single vote for a party, which is deemed to count for each of the candidates sponsored by that party for the various offices to be filled. For example, the Venezuelan ticket, whereby a single vote is valid for all the candidates sponsored by a party at the local, state and national level, is an extreme example of this. Another option is to allow voters to have a distinct vote for each office. Counting implications: When voters are required to cast straight tickets, vote counting is simplified because ballot papers cast for each party simply need to be counted. When voters are granted a distinct vote for each office to be filled and which allows them to "split their ticket", counting is much more complex. Separate tally sheets must be used for each office to be filled, which makes vote counting a lengthy operation. In such cases, the use of mechanical or electronic voting machines may appear the only solution that ensures a quick determination of the winner(s).
Counting implications: Same as above. If numerous ballot papers, one for each office, are used, it is recommended that the ballot papers for each office be printed on paper of a distinctive colour to avoid confusion during the count. This is particularly relevant if all ballot papers, irrespective of the office to which they relate, are put into a single ballot box.
Transforming Votes to SeatsDetermining the winner(s) is usually accomplished at the electoral district level, though it may be done also at the national level. Most often senior electoral officials, with specific technical skill conduct the votes to seats formula application. The rules governing the determination of winner(s) (the electoral formula) can be complex, especially if a scheme of proportional representation is in force. Further, determining the winner is an important political responsibility: any serious error made at this stage might generate a political crisis. Any suspicion of fraud will have the same consequence. There are various electoral formulas that fall into three main clusters:
However, each of these clusters includes different formulas. Plurality-Majority Formulas
Semi-Proportional Systems
Proportional Representation (PR) - Multi-Member Districts
Different Types and Requirements for Vote CountingThis section introduces the two files dealing with the differences between where vote counting can take place, viz. the voting station or at another centrally located counting centres, and, the differences in how vote counting occurs. Where the vote counting takes place Vote counting takes place either at:
Most jurisdictions count votes at voting stations, rather than transport them to a central counting venue. This enhances transparency as there is no need to transport the ballot boxes and there can be no perception of ballot box tampering during the transportation. It also provides for timely counting, as there is no delay transporting and delivering the ballot boxes. Counting at counting centres may be a cost-determining factor, as fewer counting officers will need to be recruited and paid. In addition, a central count could be easier to supervise and prevent malpractice of fraud from taking place during counting and tabulation of results. However, in jurisdictions vulnerable to electoral fraud, counting at centrally located counting centres may be perceived as providing for opportunities to tamper with the ballot boxes, during the period when the ballot boxes are transported, and this risk ought to form an integral part in the EMB’s fraud control plan. Some jurisdictions may use a combination of both locations for vote counting, giving the electoral management body the discretion to determine when it may be necessary to count some voting stations’ votes at a centrally located counting centre. To the largest extent possible, such decisions should be made well in advance of voting day thereby enable the EMB’s field structure to plan properly, as well as enable election stakeholders to accept a non-uniform results management system.
One such reason may be that the voting station is in a politically volatile area and it may be difficult for the security forces to protect the voting station staff once results are announced. How counting occurs Each jurisdiction determines, in their legislation, the process of vote counting that will be undertaken. Generally accepted best practice requires that vote counting has the following elements:
Each jurisdiction will determine the combination of counting elements, and the content and process of each element, in their vote counting process. Some jurisdictions will choose to conduct their vote counting manually, some will use an automated process and others, a combination of the two, e.g. where the results are tallied manually but captured and conveyed to a central point electronically. In determining the process of vote counting it is important to maintain the integrity of the electoral process. Too frequently vote counting is not given the attention that it needs by electoral administrators and managers, whereas it is the most fundamental element of the electoral process, as it is vulnerable to fraud and manipulation. It is during vote counting that an election can be won or lost and unless it is conducted in a transparent and accountable manner by the electoral management body, it may be perceived by the public and international observers as being flawed. Throughout each step of the counting process there needs to be a series of checks and balances to ensure the integrity of the process and to allow for objections and challenges by those contesting the elections; political parties and candidates. A process of checks and balances is seminal to a professional, effective and reflective vote counting process.
Timor-Leste Holds Second National Village Elections Under UNMIT Supervision by United Nations Photo is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.0 Generic. Differences in terms of Where the Counting is HeldIrrespective of the method of vote counting; manual or automated, each jurisdictions’ vote counting process often consist of the following:
Verification Verification includes:
Sorting The ballots are sorted according to political parties or candidates (in the case of referendums, by choices). In some jurisdictions party and candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the sorting by objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in writing, as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the counting will then have to determine action on the objection. (see Criteria to determine when votes should count as valid). Counting The counting officers then count the number of votes cast for each party or candidate. In some jurisdictions party and candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the counting by objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in writing, as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the counting will then have to determine action on the objection. The counting officer will set aside challenged ballots and determine acceptance or rejection of challenged ballots according to established rules. (see Criteria to determine when votes should count as valid). Completing the results sheet or statement of the vote and capturing the results The statement of the vote, or the results sheet, is compiled, signed, and transmitted to a local office before being transmitted to the regional or national level. Representatives of political parties and national and international electoral observers should receive an official copy of the results. A copy of the statement of the vote should be made public to the electorate by posting it at a public and easily accessible spot at the voting station thereby adhere to the transparency requirement as per international best practise. There is no interruption in the process until the statement of the vote of the voting station is released and sent in a secure manner together with other election results relevant material to the local office of the electoral management body. The results forms are often transported in a tamper-evident bag, or sealed inside the ballot box with ballot papers, voters list and other pivotal material. This material is transported by a pre-determined EMB official, who ought to be accompanied by observers and party agents. Prior to departing the very same results are often communicated directly to the next level of the results system hierarchy and/or to the national tally centre in order to facilitate the release of interim results. As with all other aspects of conducting an election, there are administrative considerations, which are directly or indirectly related to vote counting at voting stations. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with it. Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the ballots, and if they do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, be allowed to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. In many countries, observers and party agents are not allowed to physically handle any official election material, including ballot papers. As a result, the counting process must be laid out in such a way that it facilitates visual access to the count. Using a count sheet, all valid ballots are recorded, as well as spoiled and rejected ballots. All ballots are counted and none are destroyed. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote to avoid any mathematical errors or inconsistencies. The ballot box can then be re-sealed (with the new seal number duly noted by party and candidate representatives and observers), and appropriate counting documentation can either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed tamper-evident bag. In some countries, party and candidate representatives have the opportunity affix their seals or signatures to the resealed ballot box/es. The count at the voting station itself is now over, and all the electoral materials may be transported to a secure local storage room. In the event of a recount, all the prepared documents are needed, so elaborate precautions, and sealing the ballot box contents, are important as not to break the chain of custody. The local/national office of the electoral management body totals the results transmitted by all voting stations of the electoral district, as well as results of any special ballots, advance polls, and mobile voting stations. However, observers, party agents and media representatives should always be able to trace the results from a single voting station through the tabulation process and verify that the results remain constant, unless a recount prove the results incorrect, or the results form contains mathematical errors. Interim results should include all types of ballots, so as to avoid discrepancies between interim results and final results. In addition, these results should be for each political party and candidate and posted on a wall, board, or spreadsheet, as they become available. Unofficial interim results should be publicized as soon as possible. This is often done by the media or political parties, leaving the announcement of final results to the electoral management body. In the following days, the local offices of the electoral management body may perform the final count and prepare the official results. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply. Manual or automated vote counting, or a combination of both? While the use of manually counted paper ballots is still the most common method of voting, automated methods of voting and vote counting are becoming more accessible and effective, and more countries are opting to use them, despite the sometimes high initial investment required. Automated counting, using appropriate technologies and properly procured can be cheaper, faster, and more accurate than manual counting. It can also improve the democratic process by making the counting of complex electoral systems easier to use. Moreover, in general, it makes the counting process safer from fraud, since less people are manipulating the ballots. Technological approaches can be used to replace traditional paper ballots. Voting directly using mechanical or electronic devices, or using machine-readable ballots, can eliminate the need to count ballots manually and greatly speed up the counting process. Computing technology is often used to tabulate the results of manual ballot counts, to produce summaries at the counting centre, and regional, or national level. Standard off-the-shelf office software products, such as spreadsheet or relational database software, can be used to aggregate individual counts and produce summary totals and various reports, either in paper or electronic format. However, more sophisticated software applications, using client/server or web architectures, customised data input screens, data validation, strict security, auditing and logging controls, are typically necessary to raise the standard and performance offered by generic database or spreadsheet applications. Computer vote counting systems require care to function correctly. Faulty calculations, data entry errors, or loss of data can seriously compromise the conduct of an election. Rigorous testing is necessary to ensure electronic election systems work flawlessly before they are placed in production, even if they are to be used only to compile preliminary results, or used only for a short time. Data entry forms should be designed to minimize error and to facilitate the data entry process. It is common practice to design data input forms so that they mirror the data entry screen. Training of persons who manually complete these forms must stress the importance of legibility and arithmetic accuracy. As with any vote counting process, it is crucial that checks and balances be built into any computerized counting system. Clear audit trails should be in place to track the progress of the count. Balancing figures should be used to check that output results are consistent with inputs. For example, it should not be possible to calculate a total vote figure for any level of counting that is higher than the number of ballot papers issued to voters at that level. Data entered into a computerized vote counting system should always be checked against the original input data. This can be done by checking figures after data entry against the input documents, or by entering each set of data twice, by different operators using what is known as double blind data entry. Contingency plans should also be built into any computerized vote counting system. Data should be regularly backed up (and stored off-site if the counting proceeds for some time). Spare hardware should be available in case of hardware failure. Where a network server is used, it is common to have a duplicate server set up that can take over if the main server fails. Trained support technicians should be on hand if problems arise. Back up power supplies should be available to guard against power failure, even in the most developed countries. Power supplies should be protected against power surges that can corrupt or destroy computer files. Even simple steps, such as regularly saving live data from RAM memory to hard disk, are sometimes overlooked, and can cause serious problems. Worst-case scenarios should also be anticipated. Provision should be made to switch to a completely manual operation if the computer system fails and cannot be recovered. Portable calculators are valuable emergency devices. (See Elections and Technology).
Differences in terms of How the Counting is DoneIrrespective of the method of vote counting; manual or automated, each jurisdictions vote counting process should consist of the following:
Verification Verification includes:
Sorting The ballots are sorted according to political parties or candidates (in the case of referendums, by choices). In some jurisdictions party and candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the sorting by objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in writing as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the counting will then have to determine action on the objection(see Criteria to determine when votes should count as valid). Counting The counting officers then count the number of votes cast for each party or candidate. In some jurisdictions party and candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the counting by objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in writing, as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the counting will then have to determine action on the objection. The counting officer will set aside challenged ballots and determine acceptance or rejection of challenged ballots according to established rules.(see Criteria to determine when votes should count as valid). Completing the results sheet or statement of the vote and capturing the results The statement of the vote, or the results sheet, is compiled, signed, and transmitted to a local office before being transmitted to the regional or national level. Representatives of political parties and national and international electoral observers can copy the results. There is no interruption in the process until the statement of the vote of the voting station is released and sent to the local office of the electoral management body. Once the counting process is completed, electoral materials are taken to a local office for secure storage. Interim results are also sent to the national level and publicized. Special measures and procedures need to be followed during the entire counting process in case results are challenged. As with all other aspects of conducting an election, there are administrative considerations, which are directly or indirectly related to vote counting at voting stations. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with it. Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the ballots, and if they do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, be allowed to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. Using a count sheet, all valid ballots are recorded, as well as spoiled and rejected ballots. All ballots are counted and none are destroyed. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote. The ballot box can then be re-sealed (with the new seal number duly noted by party and candidate representatives and observers), and appropriate counting documentation can either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope. Party and candidate representatives should have the opportunity affix their seals or signatures to the resealed ballot box/es. The voting recorded results will be communicated to the local/national office of the electoral management body by the counting official through telephone or other means. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers, if present, can make a copy of the statement, where the law provides for such. The count at the voting station itself is now over, and all the electoral materials may be transported to a secure local storage room. In the event of a recount, all the prepared documents are needed, so elaborate precautions, and sealing the ballot box contents, are important. The local/national office of the electoral management body totals the results transmitted by all voting stations of the electoral district, as well as results of any special ballots, advance polls, mobile voting stations, etc. Interim results should include all types of ballots, so as to avoid discrepancies between interim results and final results. In addition, these results should be for each political party and candidate and posted on a wall, board, or spreadsheet, as they become available. Unofficial interim results should be publicized as soon as possible. The media or political parties are often in charge of publicizing these interim results, leaving the announcement of final results to the electoral management body. In the following days, the local offices of the electoral management body may perform the final count and prepare the official results. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply. Manual or automated vote counting, or a combination of both? While the use of manually counted paper ballots is still the most common method of voting, automated methods of voting and vote counting are becoming more accessible and effective, and more countries are opting to use them. Automated technology can be cheaper, faster, and more accurate than manual counting. It can also improve the democratic process by making the counting of complex electoral systems easier to use. Technological approaches can be used to replace traditional paper ballots. Voting directly using mechanical or electronic devices, or using machine-readable ballots, can eliminate the need to count ballots manually and greatly speed up the counting process. Computing technology is often used to count the results of manual ballot counts, to produce summaries at the counting centre, and regional, or national level. Standard off-the-shelf office software products, such as spreadsheet or relational database software, can be used to aggregate individual counts and produce summary totals and various reports, either in paper or electronic format. Computer vote counting systems require care to function correctly. Faulty calculations, data entry errors, or loss of data can seriously compromise the conduct of an election. Rigorous testing is necessary to ensure electronic election systems work flawlessly before they are placed in production, even if they are to be used only to compile preliminary results, or used only for a short time. Data entry forms should be designed to minimize error and to facilitate the data entry process. It is common practice to design data input forms so that they mirror the data entry screen. Training of persons who manually complete these forms must stress the importance of legibility and arithmetic accuracy. As with any vote counting process, it is crucial that checks and balances be built into any computerized counting system. Clear audit trails should be in place to track the progress of the count. Balancing figures should be used to check that output results are consistent with inputs. For example, it should not be possible to calculate a total vote figure for any level of counting that is higher than the number of ballot papers issued to voters at that level. Data entered into a computerized vote counting system should always be checked against the original input data. This can be done by checking figures, after data has been entry against the input documents, or by entering each set of data twice, using different operators to produce a parallel count. Contingency plans should also be built into any computerized vote counting system. Data should be regularly backed up (and stored off-site if the counting proceeds for some time). Spare hardware should be available in case of hardware failure. Where a network server is used, it is common to have a duplicate server set up that can take over if the main server fails. Technicians should be on hand if problems arise. Back up power supplies should be available to guard against power failure, even in the most developed countries. Power supplies should be protected against power surges that can corrupt or destroy computer files. Even simple steps, such as regularly saving live data from RAM memory to hard disk, are sometimes overlooked, and can cause serious problems. Worst-case scenarios should also be anticipated. Provision should be made to switch to a completely manual operation if the computer system fails and cannot be recovered. Portable calculators are valuable emergency devices. (See Elections and Technology).
Basic Criteria and Procedures for Vote Counting
In every jurisdiction there are basic criteria and procedures for vote counting that the electoral management body needs to adopt and implement, to ensure that vote counting is accurate and a true reflection of the votes cast by the voters. Simplicity of the counting system Counting rules should be clear, known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general public, political parties, candidates, non- governmental organizations, and national and international electoral observers. In addition to this, some jurisdictions have legislated processes that need to be adhered to in the vote counting process. Also, it is desirable that information and training programmes on the count itself be provided to all participants in the electoral process, these include vote counting officers, electoral officials, political parties, candidates, international and national observers and the media.
Counting rules, including criteria for rejecting ballots, should be clear, agreed upon and known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general public, political parties, candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national and international electoral observers. Checks and balances in the vote counting process Clear responsibility and accountability for each stage of the counting process are important. At the national level, the electoral management body should be accountable. At the electoral district level, it may be a senior election officer or commission official. At voting stations, specified voting station officers may be responsible for voting and counting. Clearly defined complaints and appeals processes are also important. There should be structures in place with the authority and competency to address complaints and appeals. These may include political party liaison committees, conflict management and resolution bodies and legal structures.
Observers, both national and international, and the media, can play an important role in the oversight of the counting process and provide an essential perception that the counting takes place in an open and transparent manner. Clear audit trails are essential in ensuring accountability. Competent and well trained staff The success of vote counting rests on the competency, professionalism and non-partisan conduct of the counting officers. Best practice requires that counting staff undergo vigorous recruitment and training. Men and women should be recruited on an equal basis, according to their ability to carry out the duties required in an unbiased and professional manner. Other criteria may include speaking at least one of the local languages and previous electoral experience. In a jurisdiction that is emerging from conflict, these requirements may not be appropriate and it may be expedient to have people from outside the area working as voting station and counting staff. Some jurisdictions require that voting station staff be qualified voters and/or live within the same electoral district where they will be working on Election Day. These criteria should be publicized and known to all candidates and political parties to ensure the transparency of the process. The electoral laws may restrict who can be recruited as counting staff. In some jurisdictions, counting staff is nominated by political parties in proportion to the number of votes or seats won at the previous election. The parties draw up lists and refer the names of acceptable personnel to the responsible local election official. Workers who are nominated by a political party, but appointed by the local electoral management body, must agree to carry out all their duties in a neutral and non- partisan manner. The level of training provided to voting station and/or counting staff will vary according to local conditions and the seniority of their position. Local election officials, electoral managers in charge of counting and counting centres, usually receive more detailed training than more junior counting officers. Senior officials should be trained well before voting day. Ideally, junior officials should be trained before voting day, with a briefing session on voting day, before voting starts. Where voting station officials conduct counting, training for the count will take place in conjunction with training for voting. A typical training programme for senior officials will include face-to-face training conducted by a qualified instructor, audio/visual training aides (if available), training manuals, and simulation exercises. In some cases, voting station staff will receive training manuals to read and sample exercises to complete at home before attending training. More junior officials can be trained in a similar manner, or trained by their supervisors after the supervisors have been appropriately trained. Conducting a counting simulation is a very effective learning tool, which helps to visualize the counting process, and pre-empt problems that may arise, by including examples of ballots that may be open to objection, and by practicing filling in forms. It is desirable to make attendance at training a mandatory condition of employment of counting staff. In order to encourage people to attend training, it is usual to pay them an appropriate allowance or fee.
In some countries, professional trainers will be used instead of the local election officials to conduct voting station and counting staff training sessions. Sometimes a small group of professional trainers will train other trainers, who will then go into the field to conduct the training directly to the voting station and counting staff on behalf of the electoral management body. Processes for appeal and review In addition to being able to object to a decision of the counting officer during verification and reconciliation, sorting and counting, it is important that political parties and candidates are given an opportunity to appeal to higher authorities. The legislation may provide for appeal and review mechanisms to the most senior structure within the electoral management body, to be decided within a defined time period, and the decision to be conveyed to the person bringing the appeal or review. A further appeal to the decision of the electoral management body may go to the ordinary court structure or to a specially convened electoral tribunal or court, such as an electoral court, staffed with qualified, non-partisan judges.
After the appeal is introduced, the legislation should stipulate a time period wherein a decision should be made or those who appeal shall receive a response on the status of their appeal. If legislation allows for an indefinite period, the uncertainty of electoral result may result in conflict and violence. Criteria to Determine when Votes should Count as ValidInvalid Votes Generally accepted principles stipulate that the following categories of votes often be regarded as invalid and should not be counted:
This last category of invalid vote is often very difficult to evaluate and assess and it may be open to different interpretations depending on who the counting officer is. It is thus important that the training of counting officers includes documentation (visuals) of ballot markings that are valid and those that are not valid. The overall rule that should be followed is whether the counting officer can reasonably determine the intention of the voter. An example of such would be when a voter, instead of placing a mark next to his or her intended choice, writes “yes” next to the party or candidate’s name. This could reasonably be seen as an intention to vote for that party or candidate. The rules for criteria to determine a valid vote need to be clear, yet the counting officer who makes the decision whether to accept a ballot or not should not apply the rules dogmatically, but should allow for a degree of flexibility if the voter’s intention can be reasonably assessed. Special Considerations for Counting Votes Cast Outside the CountryIn some jurisdictions provision is made for voting outside the country. The legislation will provide for the requirements of each jurisdiction. Generally, categories of voters outside the country include people working at embassies, consuls and trade missions, members of the armed forces and personnel on security duty outside the country, people studying or working outside the country, those traveling outside the country and, in some instances people who are resident outside the country. Votes cast by people outside the country are called special ballots. Special ballots are usually returned to the national office of the electoral management body. In some legislation, absentee voting takes place in embassies. If this is the case, then ballots are often counted locally in the foreign country, following the same procedures as ballots counted in the country, and results are then communicated directly to the head office of the electoral management body. Depending on the rules of the system used, the legal framework and the logistics in place, the ballots returned by mail might be received only a specific number of days prior to voting day, or up until voting day itself. If special ballots are accepted until Election Day, counting procedures should be designed so as not to let the count delay the publication of interim results. Envelopes received at the nation office of the electoral management body are sorted by category. If different types of ballots are used, different colours of return envelopes for each category of voters using the special ballots are recommended. This helps to speed up the sorting of the envelopes at reception. Once at the national office, a first verification for creating the audit trail is carried out and includes the following steps: receipt of ballots, comparison of the identity of the voter, signature and bar codes (if used). The voter’s name will also be marked on the voters’ lists in order to avoid double voting. The voter should have been provided with three envelopes: a pre- addressed return envelope, an outer envelope on which the signature of the voter appears, and finally, the secrecy envelope or the inner envelope containing the ballot. This secrecy envelope has no marks on it, in order to protect the secrecy of the vote. First, the returned envelope is opened on receipt, and the outer envelope (containing a secret envelope) is removed. If the identification of the voter is positive, the external envelope is opened, and the secrecy envelope (but not the ballot) is then removed from and inserted into a ballot box. Depending on the deadline given to return the special ballots, the counting may start before Election Day, or at the beginning of Election Day, or at the close of voting on Election Day. However, counting these ballots may take a very long time, depending on the volume of ballots to process and the procedures used. Counting special ballots before Election Day is common and generally recommended, but special security is necessary to ensure the results are only released when the results of ordinary elections are known. For the advance voting, and sometimes, for incarcerated voters, counting procedures are quite different. If the advance voting takes place over several days, reconciliation may be done at the end of each day. Some jurisdictions require that the ballot box be opened at the end of each advance voting day, and unused ballots, used ballots (which are not counted) and spoiled ballots be sealed in separate envelopes, as well as the voter's list and the voting book. This measure is mainly for control and creation of a full audit trail of ballot usage. For incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance voting may also be applied, but only if the vote took place prior to Election Day. The ballot boxes for advance voting are kept safely until the closing of ordinary voting on Election Day. The counting process for these ballots starts at the same time as for the ordinary voting. If possible, the same voting officers who took the votes for the advance voting should be there for the counting. Counting of these ballots should take place at the regional/district office of the electoral management body in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates. The counting procedures are virtually identical to the ones used for counting at ordinary voting.
For the purposes of creating separate audit trails, and for properly reporting the results of advance voting, and special ballots, these unique voting procedures should not be confused with ordinary voting. This difference should be made very clear with distinctive statement of the votes forms used for these types of ballots. Transport Arrangement for Votes from Outside the Country Transportation of ballots across national boundaries and throughout the world will require a different approach from domestic arrangements and involve very careful planning. Time zones, customs, carriers' schedules, and other types of delays in transport may impact the starting date and hour of the counting process. If the vote abroad takes place in embassies and consulates only, diplomatic bags may be used, avoiding delays at customs. However, such deliveries may not be made as frequently or rapidly as is required. If the international vote is highly decentralised and takes place in major cities where expatriates are found, then a world-renowned courier firm with extensive worldwide coverage would be more suitable for the transport of ballots. Carriers that have divisions specialising in transporting securities should be approached as they are able to provide well-designed tracing mechanisms including logs to control and secure packages throughout the route to their final destination. They also tend to possess a broad knowledge of diverse customs regulations and practices, which may alleviate many of the potential delays related to them. Once the electoral management body agrees with a carrier on security measures during transportation, an intimate knowledge of the pick-up and delivery schedules is recommended since this is essential in planning the activities for receiving ballots at the counting centre. In some instances, the counting centre location could be close to the airport/hub where the selected carrier intends to deliver the ballot boxes to minimise transportation delays once the ballots arrive in the country of destination. If appropriate, political party and candidate representatives and electoral management body officials should be at the airport/hub to deal with unexpected delivery problems and expedite processing. In some jurisdictions the ballots will be delivered to the central counting centre, which may not be near the delivery hub. Publicity around the transit facilities should be limited to those who require this knowledge. Throughout the process, the electoral management body should designate a specific individual or unit to deal with the carrier and to resolve contracting, logistical and security problems as they arise.
For ballots that are sent by mail, arrangements should be made with the national postal service to conduct a special sorting of overseas ballots before the ballot return deadline. In addition, special deliveries should be planned to the designated counting centre to maximise the number of ballots received before the deadline date and hour. A specific code on the return address may facilitate such activity and should be planned with the national postal service authorities, according to their practices, well before printing the address on the mail vote return envelopes. Procedures for Vote Counting at Voting StationsIn general, the major process components of vote counting at a voting station are:
Following the closing of voting, ballot boxes are kept at the voting station for vote counting. The following procedures are executed:
There is no interruption in the process until the statement of the vote of the voting station is released and sent to the local office of the electoral management body. Once the counting process is completed, electoral materials are taken to a local office for secure storage. Interim results are also sent to the national level and publicized. Special measures and procedures need to be followed during the entire counting process in case results are challenged. As with all other aspects of conducting an election, there are administrative considerations, which are directly or indirectly related to vote counting at voting stations. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with its respective processes.
At the closing of the voting station, voting station officers and other authorized persons such as party and candidate representatives and observers remain in the voting station and start the counting process. In some jurisdictions the voting station layout is changed to reflect a layout more conducive to the counting process. A first reconciliation of ballots may be done before opening the ballot box. Spoiled ballots are counted and put aside. Once the ballot box is emptied of its contents, the validity of each ballot is verified and the ballots are sorted into different piles reflecting the choice of the voter. The votes are then counted into valid ballots (by candidate/political party) and rejected ballots (a ballot found in the ballot box is rejected because it was improperly marked, or is not marked at all when a mark is required) (see Criteria to Determine when Votes should Count as Valid). Clear rules of interpretation or guidelines regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting staff in advance, to facilitate the decision-making process regarding rejections. Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the ballots, and if they do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, be allowed to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. Using a count sheet, all valid ballots are recorded, as well as spoiled and rejected ballots. All ballots are counted and none are destroyed. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote. The ballot box can then be re- sealed (with the new seal number duly noted by party and candidate representatives and observers), and appropriate counting documentation can either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope. Party and candidate representatives should have the opportunity affix their seals or signatures to the resealed ballot boxes. The results recorded on the statement of the vote will be communicated by the counting official to the local/national office of the electoral management body by telephone or whatever technical solution the EMB has implemented as part of its Results Management System – including mobile phone, internet/web application etc. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers, if present, can make a copy of the statement, where the law provides for such. The count at the voting station itself is now over, and all the electoral materials may be transported to a secure local storage room. In the event of a recount, all the prepared documents are needed, so elaborate precautions, and sealing the ballot box contents, are important. The local/national office of the electoral management body totals the results transmitted by all voting stations of the electoral district, as well as results of any special ballots, advance voting, and mobile voting stations. However, observers, party agents and media representatives should always be able to trace the results from a single voting station through the tabulation process and verify that the results remain constant, unless a recount prove the results incorrect, or the results form contains mathematical errors. A proper audit trail will allow the electoral management body to maintain full control, and ensure that possibilities of fraud via ballot box tampering are extremely limited, and can be detected if attempted.
Numbering each voting station, and using the same number for the corresponding ballot box, is one simple method of implementing such a control system. Additionally, the same number should appear on each form used at the voting station. The importance of recording the history of each ballot box (recording ballots book number, serial number of the seals, ballot box number, etc.) becomes clear in cases of judicial recount. [1] Cornell University Law School. "What are challenged ballots?". https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/5/2422.24 Opening/Closing Ballot BoxesSeveral tasks need to be carried out at the opening of the voting to facilitate the vote counting at the closing of voting. The first is to count the total number of ballots originally received (provided by the electoral management body). In countries using one ballot per political party and where envelopes are used, it is important to verify if all parties' ballots are available to voters. This represents an important aspect of the audit trail, as this figure will be needed to reconcile the number of ballots used/unused after the voting takes place. When the ballots are delivered, prior to the commencement of voting, all ballots (and envelopes where applicable) should be counted, and serial numbers on the counterfoils or ballot book numbers (where applicable) should be verified as well, via inspection of the ballot booklets to ensure completeness. The officer who delivered them should witness the counting of the ballot quantities. He/she should sign a receipt, and a copy should be attached to the voting record book. In all cases, the information should be written on the ballot accounting form. Depending on the country, and the type of information needed by the electoral management body, in order to reduce duplication of effort, the same information may not need to be recorded in more than one place unless required. Once the ballots are counted, and proper observations or indications on the appropriate forms are made (if needed), the electoral manager at the voting station should show everyone present that the ballot box is empty, before placing security seals on the ballot box. The serial number(s) of the seal(s) should be written in the voting record book and in any other appropriate form. The party and candidate representatives present should be given an opportunity to affix their seals or signatures on or next to the security seals of the ballot box. These procedures are very important, as they constitute the start of an important audit trail.
Following these procedures can prevent many mistakes. If discrepancies occur, steps can be retraced to the beginning of ballot marking. At no time should any voter remove ballots from the voting station. Closing the Ballot Boxes At closing time, the electoral manager in charge of the voting station should announce the official closing of the vote. The electoral manager in charge of the voting station should ensure that only authorized persons allowed to process or witness the count remain inside the voting station. Voting station and/or counting officers, observers, party and candidate representatives should be permitted to stay for the counting process. If no one, except the counting officers, is present, the last voters may be asked to stay and witness the counting. All other persons should wait outside the voting station for the interim results.
To facilitate the counting process, the voting station may need to be physically reorganized. Tables are generally placed together for a larger working surface, and chairs, pencils, and a board to post results are put in place. Is important to have enough space to make different piles of ballots and to make it easier for observers and party representatives to observe the counting process. Summary of Process At the close of voting, authorized persons and counting officers stay in the voting station and start the counting process. Generally, an average of two hours is needed to complete a count of approximately four hundred to five hundred ballots, if no serious objections are encountered. The time taken to count ballots will depend on the number of staff and the complexity of the voting system and counting procedures. While the ballot box is still sealed, reconciliation is done by checking the number of counterfoils (if applicable) indicating ballots given to voters, unused ballots, and spoiled ballots against the total number of ballots issued. The number of voters who voted on election day/s is also counted in order to verify against the number of ballots used (used counterfoils). All discrepancies must be resolved or reported to the electoral management body. The figures are written on a ballot paper account. Once the first steps are complete, the person in charge of counting can open the ballot box and empty its contents in the centre of the table. The table may have been used during voting, or if no table was used during voting, the electoral management body should ensure that one is present for counting. It is important that the table is large enough so that no ballots will fall on the floor when the ballot box is emptied of its contents. Seals are verified before ballot boxes are opened in the presence of counting officers, representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers. If only the counting officers are present then the last voters may be asked to stay in order to act as witnesses. Another reconciliation is done once the ballot box is emptied. A further reconciliation may take place if requested by the representatives of parties and candidates. In all cases, the number of ballots in the box is compared with the number of voters who have voted. No ballots should be missing, nor should the number of ballots in the box exceed the number of voters. All discrepancies should be reported to the electoral management body and proper modifications or changes made to the forms. Modifications should only be made by authorized EMB officials. In some instances, a dedicated correction form is used and attached to the statement of the vote form. As far as possible, everybody involved in the counting process should sign the forms, in order to confirm that the accounting for the ballots was satisfactory, or that they are aware of the source of discrepancy, and that they agree with the decision taken by the counting officer in charge of the count. According to best international praxis, observers and party agents should receive official copies of statement of the votes forms and correction forms used.
The usual forms required for the count are a count sheet, a voting record book, a statement of the vote, and the ballot account form. Envelopes, or bags for ballots, and seals to close the ballot box, or to put on the envelopes are also required.
Reconciling Ballot AccountsAt the opening of voting, ballots (and envelopes where applicable) received from the electoral management body are counted, and corresponding figures written in the ballot paper account form. At the closing of voting, the first thing to do before sorting and counting the ballots is to count the numbers of used counterfoils (as applicable) and unused envelopes (as applicable), unused ballots, and spoiled ballots. At this stage, the ballot box remains closed. This total number of ballots should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening, which is why is important to record all the voting information and materials before and after the process starts. Verification with the number of voters who voted on election day/s should also be done using the marked-up voter's list, and the entries in the voting record book.
It is important that accurate records are kept of the number of ballots used at each voting station. This will enable the electoral management body to demonstrate that all ballots used at each voting station are genuine and that ballots have nor been fraudulently deposited in ballot boxes or removed from the voting station. Discrepancies If there are discrepancies in the reconciliation process, the count should be repeated by verifying the observations made in the voting record book for the spoiled ballots, and recounting the unused ballots and the used counterfoils (if applicable). If discrepancies remain, then verification with a higher authority (with the district electoral officer or the electoral management body) of the number of ballots (and envelopes) sent to the voting station should be done to verify their figures and to inform them of the situation. Keeping higher authorities informed of any problem is part of the transparency required in an election or any electoral event. If no solution is found, modifications or changes to the voting record book, ballot account forms, count sheets, and statement of the vote forms should be completed in order to reflect the appropriate numbers of ballots. To validate these new figures, and to make sure that everybody who should know is informed of the situation and agrees with it, voting station and counting officers, party and candidate representatives, present at the voting station for the vote count should sign the forms and the voting record book. Once this first reconciliation is done, the counting officer will verify if the seal is still unbroken and if the serial number is the same as the one recorded at the opening of the voting station. If locks are used, then the person in charge should ask the person with a set of keys to assist in the opening of the ballot box. This information should be written in the voting record book. The ballot box is then opened and the contents emptied onto a table. These ballots (or envelopes) are counted as well, and compared to figures obtained earlier. The number of ballots (or envelopes) in the ballot box should match with the number of voters who voted, a number that can be obtained by counting the number of counterfoils as applicable (number of ballots used), unused ballots less the number of spoiled ballots. There should be another reconciliation after the count of the ballots for each candidate/party/option in order to verify that all figures total correctly before making the statement of the vote for the voting station. In case of discrepancies, the counting process should be repeated ones or twice until the missing ballot or ballots - or an explanation for the discrepancy - are found. If, after verification, the missing ballots are still not found, then the electoral management body should be informed of the problem, and verification of their ballot accounts should be done (especially verification of the number of ballots sent to the voting station). Once again, if no solution is found, appropriate changes should be made on the forms signed by counting officers and party and candidate representatives. This new figure should become the official one for the voting station. In some jurisdictions, counting of ballots which cannot be reconciled, or which are not within a certain acceptable variation (i.e. difference is not more than two, three or five ballots), legislation, regulations, or directives may prohibit proceeding with the count. If significant discrepancies are discovered, local rules could apply to the level of action taken. In some cases, if significant fraud is suspected, it may be necessary to delay opening and counting the contents of a ballot box until the electoral management body investigates the problem and decides what to do with the ballot box. Voting station and counting officers should be made aware of these provisions through their training.
In the case of multiple elections held on the same day, such as presidential elections, municipal elections, and legislative assembly elections, finding ballots in the wrong box is a frequent occurrence. In such cases, the counting officer should transfer the ballot to the appropriate box, reconcile all the ballots, and make a report for each case. This should be followed by a reconciliation count of the ballots and, if no discrepancy is found, the counting officer can proceed with the count.
SortingWhere there are multiple ballot elections taking place at the same time (presidential, national legislature, and municipal elections on the same day for example), there should be an order of priority for the counting of the ballots, so as to avoid mistakes and confusion in the counting process. This should be part of the rules given to the counting officers during training and in the documentation and training manuals for counting. Instructions should also be given for procedures to be used when ballots are found in the wrong box. In some countries, only one person handles the initial sorting of ballots; this is often the electoral officer who provided the ballot to each voter on Election Day. This is particularly important if initials are added on the back of the ballot.
Spoiled ballots should have been separated and counted as part of preparing the ballot paper account. A spoiled ballot is simply one that a voter marks incorrectly, or is somehow unusable, and hands back to voting station officers in exchange for a new ballot. Spoiled ballots should never be placed in the ballot box. In some countries, spoiled ballots are put in a separate envelope and are clearly marked as such. This is to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, as the voter may have indicated how they wanted to vote on the spoiled ballot. Sorting Procedures One way of sorting is as follows. Once the ballot box is opened, the counting officer verifies the validity of each ballot in the process of counting. As they proceed with the task, the official needs to be able to distinguish between a valid ballot and a counterfeit (by the watermark or other identifying mark on valid ballot papers). Any identified counterfeit ballots should be set aside, counted, and reported to the electoral management body as an attempt at fraud. The counting officer will divide up all ballots in terms of the political party or candidate voted for. At the same time, the counting officer can separate all ballots that can be potentially rejected. After the count of valid ballots is complete, the counting officer must go one-by-one through the pile of potential rejected ballots, and decide on the validity of each one (see Criteria to Determine when Votes should Count as Valid). Political party or candidate representatives should be able to examine the rejected ballots. If party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting officers, they should be able to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. There must be clear rules for recording objections made by representatives of political parties or candidates. Potential rejected ballots that are determined to actually be valid are separated by candidate/party/option. All invalid ballots, as well as any counterfeit ballots, are counted and set aside. The counting officer will then add the additional valid ballots decided to the initial number of valid ballots for each candidate/political party/option, and make a total count for each candidate/political party/option. Rules of interpretation, guidelines, and illustrations regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting officer, and be known in advance by all representatives of parties and candidates and observers, to facilitate the decision making process. In all cases, rejected ballots should be put aside and kept. No ballots may be destroyed. The separation of rejected ballots is important to create an audit trail of the count, and is an essential component if there is to be a recount of the ballots. Rejected ballots must be closely examined, and the counting officer should announce the reason for rejection of each such ballot.
Once the spoiled, counterfeit (if any), and rejected ballots have been separated, the valid ballots can be counted. The counting officer can call out the choice of each voter, and show the ballot, so the political party or candidate representatives, and other persons allowed in the voting station for the counting, are able to see the ballot and make their own count. The various representatives and observers witnessing the count must also be able to see each counted ballot. For greatest efficiency, other counting officers can assist. However, it must be very clear who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot. Checking Validity of the Ballot
When ballots are sorted, the counting officer needs to distinguish a valid ballot from an invalid. Each ballot in the ballot box needs to be verified. The ballot paper can be excluded because the ballot is either a counterfeit, which is less common, or a genuine ballot that has not been properly authenticated by ballot paper issuer. Counterfit Ballots In some jurisdictions, security paper is used for ballots. This paper contains a watermark or other form of unique identification (special colour, lines, symbols, markings or logos) making the ballot virtually impossible to counterfeit. The texture, thickness, colours, size, and format of the ballot are also indicators that separate a valid ballot from counterfeits.
The counting officer should know where to look on the ballot to be sure of its authenticity. If he or she does not recognize the ballot, or the ballot does not have the official identification, then it should not be included in the count. It should not be destroyed but kept as invalid ballot in an envelope or file for that purpose. Authenticating Ballots To speed up the process of authenticating the ballots, certain jurisdictions require that the counting officer adds his/her initials in a space provided at the back of the ballot before handing it to the voter. Other jurisdictions provide a validating stamp at the voting station for every ballot to be stamped before handing it to the voter. During counting, a ballot without a stamp is rejected. If the initial system is used and the initials on the ballot are not from the counting officer, then it should be set aside and not counted as a valid ballot. If no initials are on the back of the ballot, but the counting officer recognizes that he or she issued the ballot, he or she can then initial it, and the ballot can be counted as valid. This measure of adding the counting officer’s initials at the back of the ballot can help to identify valid ballots from counterfeit. The counting officer should always use the same colour of pen or pencil when adding his or her initials. This problem will not exist when a validating stamp is used as described above. All ballots must be kept, even if they are not valid. No ballots should be destroyed, as an audit trail of all ballots considered must be assembled in such a way that the count can be fully reconstructed.
If there is any doubt, the counting officer should be able to verify the basis of his other decision with the electoral management body, before taking the decision to reject a ballot as counterfeit. Rejecting a ballot on the basis that it is counterfeit is an important decision and should be made after careful consideration, as it may have political consequences. Separating Spoiled and Rejected BallotsSeparating rejected ballots from spoiled ballots is important as the significance of these ballots is very different. Mixing them may seriously impact the audit trail. Spoiled Ballots
Spoiled ballots should never find their way into the ballot box. A spoiled ballot is generally one that a voter has inadvertently spoiled by marking it incorrectly; it is handed back to the voting station officers in exchange for a new blank ballot that is then marked by the voter and placed in the ballot box. Rejected Ballots A rejected ballot is one that has made its way into the ballot box, but has been rejected at the count because it was improperly marked, or is not marked at all when a mark is required. The most common criteria to reject a ballot are:
In some jurisdictions, blank ballots (ballots with no marks) are counted separately (and may be considered as protest votes), in others, they are considered to be rejected ballots. In all cases, all ballots are to be kept, and none should be destroyed. Ballot Envelopes In countries using envelopes, since marks are not made on the ballot itself, the way to identify a rejected ballot from a valid ballot is different. For example, a rejected ballot will be an envelope with two ballots, an empty envelope, or a ballot in an envelope marked in a way that the secrecy of the voter is compromised. In many jurisdictions, if the intention of the voter is clear, all types of marks can be accepted. In others, the legislation is very clear on which specific types of marks are to be accepted, even on a write-in ballot. For these specific cases, those marks should be clearly demonstrated during the training of counting officers and documented in their manual or in the operational guidelines in order to help the counting officer in making his/her decision.
A card summarizing the marks that are to be accepted or rejected, with pictures of sample ballots showing those marks are a very useful tool that can be inserted in the counting officer’s kit. In addition, a poster displaying the very same information at the voting stations could prove useful, both for counting officials and for voters. Separating Valid BallotsAll ballots are unfolded (if envelopes are used, then all ballots need to be taken out of the envelopes) one by one, and the counting officer makes sure that the ballot is valid. The counting officer may call out the name of the candidate or political party for whom the ballot has been marked and hold up the ballot for all to see. If several persons are separating and counting the ballots, and identifying those that may be potentially rejected, the practice of calling out names may not be useful. It may, in fact, be more efficient to separate the ballots according to choice (without counting them), setting aside the potentially rejections, and then establish which ballots should be rejected. After the rejections are finalized, the piles of valid ballots for each candidate or party can be counted quickly. In all cases, only counting officers should handle ballots, and it is usually the presiding officer who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot. The advantage of showing the ballot and calling out the result of each ballot is that it allows the representatives of political parties and candidates and observers to make their own count. The disadvantage is that the process is interrupted each time a rejected ballot is discovered, which tends to make the count of valid ballots very inefficient and slow. However, transparency and credibility of the count is paramount and often outweigh the efficiency aspect in many societies. Whichever method is used, the valid ballot papers are put in separate piles on the table: one pile per candidate or per political party, or per option (in the case of a referendum). The ballots should be examined in such a way as to permit observers, representatives of political parties or candidates, and other persons allowed in the voting station during the counting process, to see the ballot and ensure that it is appropriately separated according to choice. They should have controlled access to contents of sorted ballots, but are generally not allowed to handle official election material. If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, they can make official objections. These objections may form the basis of a further challenge to the overall results.
While transparency of the process is important, there should be proper controls on the movement of ballots to ensure that the integrity of the count is not compromised. CountingBallots (and envelopes where applicable) are bundled by groups of fifty, for example, in order to facilitate keeping a record of the votes counted. Depending on the number of political parties or candidates, and depending on the number of counting officers, each counting officer can be responsible for receiving and counting all ballots cast for one or more political party or candidate, Later, counting officers can exchange all ballots cast that they were counting and verify each other's totals. Counting officers count all ballots, including spoiled and rejected ballots. Even if not counted as valid, these ballots are important for the audit trail and will be needed in case of a recount. To eliminate possible objections over the validity of ballots, the counting officers should be provided with clear rules of interpretation of accepted marks on the ballot, and all reasons that should lead to the rejection of a ballot. Minimizing the interpretation made by the counting officers makes it easier to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots. If the validity of a ballot is challenged or objected to, then the presiding officer should be the only person entitled to make a decision, even if the other counting officers are involved in the counting process. In order to be more consistent in his/her decisions, the counting officer can put all questionable ballots in one separate pile, decide on all rejected ballots following the count of valid ones, and then add any additional valid votes to the appropriate candidate or political party. Alternatively, the ballots can be separated first, the questionable ones decided, and then each pile can be counted. For each disputed ballot, the ballot should be numbered at the back. The same number should be written in the voting book along with the decision made by the counting officer. Ballots (and envelopes where applicable) are bundled by groups of fifty, for example, in order to facilitate keeping a record of the votes counted. Depending on the number of political parties or candidates, and depending on the number of counting officers, each counting officer can be responsible for receiving and counting all ballots cast for one or more political party or candidate, Later, counting officers can exchange all ballots cast that they were counting and verify each other's totals. Counting officers count all ballots, including spoiled and rejected ballots. Even if not counted as valid, these ballots are important for the audit trail and will be needed in case of a recount. To eliminate possible objections over the validity of ballots, the counting officers should be provided with clear rules of interpretation of accepted marks on the ballot, and all reasons that should lead to the rejection of a ballot. Minimizing the interpretation made by the counting officers makes it easier to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots. If the validity of a ballot is challenged or objected to, then the presiding officer should be the only person entitled to make a decision, even if the other counting officers are involved in the counting process. In order to be more consistent in his/her decisions, the counting officer can put all questionable ballots in one separate pile, decide on all rejected ballots following the count of valid ones, and then add any additional valid votes to the appropriate candidate or political party. Alternatively, the ballots can be separated first, the questionable ones decided, and then each pile can be counted. For each disputed ballot, the ballot should be numbered at the back. The same number should be written in the voting book along with the decision made by the counting officer. To count the ballots, the counting officers use a count sheet. The representatives of political parties and candidates, and the observers observing the count may have count sheets as well. The official one is the one used by the counting officer in charge of the count. The count sheet is used to facilitate the count. For each vote for each candidate or party a mark is made on the count sheet. If a mistake is made during the process, comparison with the count sheets of other counting officers can be made. If the mistake is still not found, the count should be restarted from the last point of agreement. A verification of the count should be done once the ballots are counted. This verification is usually done before transmission of the interim results to the regional or local district electoral office. Verification is important to make sure that no votes were changed in favour or against one candidate or party. The total number of ballots cast for each candidate or party, plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. Once the counting process is over, the ballots are bundled and put back into the ballot box along with all relevant forms. The statement of the vote is often transported in a tamper-evident bag carefully attached to the outside of the ballot box. Both the envelope and the ballot box should be sealed before being transported to a secure local storage room. All these documents are needed in case of a recount and the use of precautions for sealing the ballot box contents are important to ensure that all materials will be available if a recount is required or officially ordered.
For greater security, the presiding officer, as well as a representative of the political parties or candidates sign the statement of vote form and seal the tamper-evident bag. The presiding officer should keep one official copy in case of loss. Count of Spoiled and Rejected Ballots
Spoiled, rejected, and unused ballots need to be counted to create a complete audit trail. These ballots remain official documents, even if not counted as valid. Additionally, rejected ballots are essential in case of a recount. Rules of Interpretation for Rejected Ballots To eliminate possible objections to the validity of a ballot, the counting officer should be provided with clear rules of interpretation, and illustrations of acceptable and unacceptable marks on the ballot, including the rationale for rejection of a ballot.
Minimizing the interpretation needed by the counting officer makes it easier to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots. In the event of a close margin in favour of one candidate, a recount is likely to be requested, and rejected ballots will be carefully analysed. Handling Disputes Regarding Rejections In some jurisdictions, the presiding officer is the only person qualified to make the final decision regarding the validity of a ballot, even if all counting officers are involved in the counting process. He/she is also the person handling disputes regarding objections. If a representative of a candidate or a political party disagrees with the counting officer on the validity of a ballot, he/she may challenge the decision. In most cases, the presiding officer must immediately make a decision on whether or not the ballot is valid. In order to make more consistent decisions, the counting officer may put all contested and questionable ballots in a separate pile while counting valid ballots. The presiding officer can then decide which of the potential rejected ballots will actually be rejected, and count the total number of rejections. The rest of the valid ballots can then be added to the count for each political party or candidate. Alternatively, all potential rejected ballots can be identified and decided on first, and then the valid ballots can be counted. One way of accounting for rejected ballots is to number them on the back. The same number will be written in the voting record book or the statement of the vote (or a separate form can also be used), along with the decision made by the counting officer.
All rejected and spoiled ballots are counted and recorded in the statement of the votes as well as on the ballot account form. Count of Valid BallotsThe counting officers often use a count sheet to count the ballots. The representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers observing the count may have a count sheet as well. The official sheet is the one used by the counting officer in charge of the count. The proper information regarding the voting station number and the electoral district should be written at the top or bottom of the form. Each column should show the names of the candidates or party or option as they appear on the ballot. There are two common types of count sheets: one where each square represents a vote for a candidate or party, and the other where you draw a square with a diagonal mark denoting five votes In the first case, each square may be marked with a tick for each vote for a candidate or party. At the end, the total for each will be easy to count. In the second case, four vertical marks and a diagonal one are made. Each square represents five votes for a candidate or party. To correct mistakes, if several count sheets are used at once then there is only a need to correct errors when the results of the count are no longer synchronized.
Establishing correlation between count sheets requires a pause for consensus as to how many votes are recorded per candidate at certain set times (every one hundred ballots for example). Restarting the count at the last point of correlation is much more efficient than beginning the entire count all over again. Verification of CountOnce the ballots are counted, a verification of the count is recommended. This verification usually takes place before the interim results are transmitted to the local office of the electoral management body. This final verification is important to make sure that no ballots have been introduced or removed that would modify the results in favour of or against one candidate or party. This last verification should include a comparison with the reconciliation done previously, before opening the ballot box. The total number of ballots for each candidate or party, plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station.
Where envelopes are used, they should be recounted as well in order to match with the number of voters who cast their ballots. If errors are detected, the count sheet should be verified against count sheets of other counting officers. If the error is still not found, then all the ballots counted per candidate or party should be re-examined and recounted.
Sealing the BallotsTo secure their contents, the ballot boxes should be re-sealed, with all the ballots considered during the count inside, before returning the box to a local secure storage room. This measure is very important in case of a recount and therefore the chain of custody must be remained intact. In certain jurisdictions, forms such as count sheets, the voting record book, and the voter's list are also sealed in the ballot box along with the ballots. The statement of the vote is often not be sealed with the other documents, but usually put in a separate tamper-evident envelope and attached to the outside of the ballot box. However, this envelope should itself be sealed to ensure that no unauthorized person has access to the results and that senior authorities can detect any attempted. A copy of the statement of the vote has sometimes already been transmitted to the electoral management body separately from the ballot box before the ballot box is moved for secure storage. Many jurisdictions require delivery of all materials to the responsible authority. The question of whether or not the voting record book should be sealed in the ballot box, or placed with the statement of the vote, is an important one. If the voting record book is used to record transactions that fall outside ordinary voting, then it can be useful to have it available for inspection if requested by the electoral management body without having to go before a judge (which is the case in some jurisdictions). Access to it will help to understand any mistakes that have been made regarding the preparation of the statement of the vote, or other procedures related to vote counting. Since representatives of political parties and candidates are allowed to witness the official count, they could consult the record book. The voting record book is an important document, and should be safely kept, sealed in the box, or placed on the outside of the ballot box in the envelope with the statement of the vote. Ballots (and envelopes where applicable) should be placed in bundles, by category (candidates, rejected ballots, spoiled ballots, unused ballots) in the ballot box. Once all the ballots and relevant forms are in the box, the box may be sealed and transported to the local storage room. The seal number, if applicable, should be written on the statement of the vote or on the acknowledgement of receipt of the ballot box when delivered to the local storage place. In some jurisdictions the number of the voting station is written on the outside of the ballot box. Even if all the envelopes or plastic bags are sealed, it is still important to re-seal the ballot box before it is moved. In the event of a recount, all these documents are needed which explains why elaborate precautions for sealing the ballot box are important.
If a paper seal is used, for additional security, some jurisdictions require that the ballot box seal be signed by the counting officer as well as representatives of political parties and candidates. Uniquely numbered plastic security seals are increasingly becoming the standard, as those are sturdier, cheap and easy to use. Transmitting Voting Station ResultsOnce the vote counting process is over, the counting officer prepares the statement of the vote for a voting station. This form indicates the election results and should include standard information, such as the name of the electoral district, the name and/or number of the voting station, and election date.
Specific information on the count should include:
The presiding officer and the representatives of political parties and candidates sign the form. They should provide their printed names, addresses, and telephone numbers, if any, along with their signatures. If there is a problem, it will then be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them. Some jurisdictions require all counting officers present at the voting station to sign the statement of votes. Once the form is completed the results should be given orally, or transmitted electronically, to the local office of the electoral management body to allow them to gather interim results as soon as possible. The presiding officer is responsible for communicating the interim results. The transmission can be done by telephone, cellular phone, or Internet using a unique security code to ensure the proper identification of the person transmitting the results. However, the communications infrastructure in parts of some countries does not permit oral or electronic reporting of interim voting results. In such locations, the use of the presiding officer or other officially designated person carrying the statement of the vote may be the only available alternative. After the interim results have been reported orally or electronically, the original of the statement of the votes should be transmitted to the pre-determined office of the electoral management body by hand in a sealed tamper-evident envelope. This measure is essential to prevent fraud and ensure chain of custody of the legal document based on which final results are verified. Representatives of a political party and candidates should be allowed to copy the results. The counting officer should post an official copy of the statement of the votes at the voting station. The original is placed in a sealed envelope and attached to the ballot box for use by the electoral management body. Observers and party and candidate representatives should have the right to a copy of the official statement of the vote for the voting station or the counting centres. Issue of Transparency Transparency is very significant, particularly at the time of the release and transmission of interim results. Representatives of political parties and candidates should sign and have a copy of the statement of the vote and should be allowed to witness the transmission of the corresponding results to the electoral management body.
Such transparency of actions is essential in the acceptance of the general outcome of the election. Importance of Contingency Plans Communications technology plays an increasingly important role in the transmission of voting results. If the supporting systems used by the electoral management body fail, postponement of interim results can ensue, creating numerous administrative, technical, security, and logistical problems. In addition, such failures tend to be politically embarrassing to the electoral management body, and often cause mistrust from constituents towards the EMB. To avoid such failures, a contingency plan should be implemented, and fully tested prior to Election Day. Identification of a second telephone in close proximity to each voting station can be made prior to Election Day, and can represent an economical alternative in case of technology failure. Where mobile phones are used, technical support staff can be deployed with replacements for failed units. Where multiple mobile networks are available, local roaming or alternative SIM cards can be provided to presiding officers. Where transmission of data from devices at the polling station or perhaps from tallying centres is planned, devices can be configured with a number of target servers offering redundancy at the back end and increasing the likelihood that results will reach at least one of the configured servers. Radio handsets can also be used. Finally, a manual alternative to electronic transmission of results, such as the use of couriers or hand delivery, can be used as a final back-up plan.
The selection of a contingency plan is driven by local context and circumstances in that particular jurisdiction. In some circumstances, prior agreement with security forces to use their communications equipment can be negotiated, or partnership or collaboration with private companies to use their facilities can be made as a backup plan. Voting Station Statement of VotesThe voting station statement of the votes is the legal document based on which results are tabulated and final results announced, once verified by the EMB centrally. The presiding officer normally completes this form. One statement of the votes form should be filled out per voting station, even in the case of voting locations housing multiple voting stations.
The statement of the votes form could include the following general information:
Specific information on the count should include:
It may be necessary to look at the voting record book as some jurisdictions authorize registration of voters on voting day, and these may be added using the voting record book. Other jurisdictions use separate forms. Additional detailed information, such as the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box, or of the ballot box itself, is required in some jurisdictions. In several jurisdictions, this form is an important document since it provides the information used by the electoral management body to release both interim and final results. The counting officers responsible for the counting should complete this form with utmost care.
In order to reduce the risk of tampering with the statement of votes form, EMBs can utilize tamper-resistant forms, and require that results be written both numerically and in words. Sometimes, wide, clear adhesive tape is stuck over the filled-in sections of the forms to prevent tampering. Issuing of the Statement of VotesThe statement of the votes for a voting station should be prepared with care since it represents the interim and final (unless subjected to a recount) results of the election for a voting station. This form is usually prepared and signed by the counting officer. The form is often signed by representatives of political parties and candidates as well. Their signatures are very important in order to reflect and demonstrate that they agree and acknowledge the results. They could include their printed names, addresses and telephone numbers, if any, on the form along with their signatures. In case of any problems, the electoral management body will then be able to contact these individuals more easily.
For the sake of transparency, observers, and representatives of political parties and candidates, should be permitted to receive an official copy of the statement of the votes. Communicating ResultsOnce the statement of the votes of the voting station is completed, the presiding officer should communicate the interim results to the local offices of the electoral management body (and in certain cases, to the national electoral management body directly). In the case of voting locations housing multiple voting stations, the person responsible (known in some jurisdictions as the central voting supervisor) should obtain the results from each counting officer and transmit them to the local offices of the electoral management body. In many countries the electoral management body maintains local or regional offices during the electoral period. The interim results are generally communicated to the local office, which, in turn, communicates a cumulative statement of the votes for the electoral district to the national headquarters office.
There is a trend towards a “two-channel” approach whereby the presiding officer will send results both to the local office as well as to the national level. The latter equips the EMB HQ with the source data and allows an internal end-to-end verification of all interim consolidations. Communicating Interim Results The interim results for each voting station, using the statement of the votes, should be transmitted to the office of the local electoral management body by phone (cellular or fixed line), SMS, internet or web application or other means such as radio hand sets, if such exists. It is recommended that a unique password or code be provided to the person who will transmit the results. For security reasons, this unique password or code should be given to the responsible person by the electoral management body as close as possible to the day of the election itself. This code will reduce the possibility of impersonation, and prevent unauthorized persons from transmitting incorrect or biased election results to the local office of the electoral management body. For greater security, and to detect any attempts at fraud, the original form should be sent separately to the local electoral management body in a sealed tamper-evident envelope. This envelope should be sent along with the electoral materials by hand or by courier. By sending the original, the local electoral management body can verify the results against the one previously sent by telephone or electronically, and ensure that they are the same. If there is no available phone (cellular or fixed) at a voting station or the cellular or fixed line phone is not working, alternative methods should be considered. Walkie-talkie or radio emitting devices do not require the installation of a phone line and are flexible and simple in their use. However, their deployment should take into consideration the topography of the area to identify in advance any black-out regions where it is impossible to receive or transmit messages. Satellite phones are increasingly used in small number of highly remote stations, though the cost can be prohibitive. Again, appropriate training and identification codes should be provided to voting station and counting officers before deployment. If it is not possible to use any means of wireless communication, the last resort is hand-to-hand delivery by election official/s of the results to the local electoral management body. If an electoral official is unavailable a suitably designated person should be used as a messenger. As a general rule, electronic transmission should be utilised at the earliest possible point. For example, if a presiding officer is unable to use a cell phone to transmit results from the polling station because of poor coverage, he or she may deliver the results by hand to the local office. If there is cellular coverage at the local office, the presiding officer may now transmit results electronically. This messenger should be a credible person and the choice of such person should be accepted by counting officers, as well as representatives of the political parties and candidates. When using this method, the messenger could also bring the ballot box and its contents, eliminating the need for additional transport arrangements.
A tamper-evident bag is recommended, in order to ensure that results are not changed in transit. This is often a thick plastic bag, signed by the persons at the original location that, once sealed, cannot be opened without damaging the bag. Consequently, the receivers can be confident that the bag is the same upon its arrival at headquarters. A complete chain of custody, comprising trail of signatures of those handing over the materials, and those receiving them, is essential. Constant accompaniment of the materials by election staff, as well as observers is recommended. Role of Media News agencies and media organizations will likely compete to provide their forecast of the election results as quickly as possible after the close of voting. They will dispatch their representatives as to the scene of the electoral action. The offices of the electoral management body are the most likely media targets, mainly for efficiency reasons.
At a centre for collecting results for voting stations, one representative can cover a wide area, and can report for a reasonable number of voting stations. Route of Official Statement of Votes The presiding officer should provide the electoral management body with copies of the voting results, and the right to an official copy the results should be given to representatives of political parties and candidates, and to observers. Such extra copies can be made with a multi-part carbon copy form, or a photocopy machine. Alternatively, multiple copies can be prepared by hand. The original statement of the vote should be attached to the ballot box in a sealed tamper- evident envelope. This is particularly important to processing a recount of the ballots, if required. Once the statement of the vote for a voting station is fully prepared and transmitted to the local electoral management body, a copy can be posted at the outside of the voting station. The same information and results are then made available for everybody, and at the same time.
Because witnesses are permitted to observe and scrutinize the counting process, results are public. The statement of the vote becomes a public document; this is made especially evident once it is posted. However, it is important to mention that these results are not official yet, but are only interim results: official final results will always take legal precedence. Consolidating Voting ResultsAt all levels of the results tabulation process, procedures and logistics should be carefully planned for receiving results from several locations at the same time. The tabulation exercise should ensure transparency, accuracy and minimize risks of tampering with results forms, or genuine mistakes by enforcing clear instructions based on an effective staff training program and close supervision of the results-generating exercise. A form with spaces for pre-printed information needed during vote result collection should be provided to staff answering the phone. In addition, a procedure requiring the recipient of the results to read back the results received to the sender for confirmation would reduce the error rate considerably.
Depending on the level of technology used for results tabulation, various tools could be utilized to enhance transparency. A wall chart, large white board, or computer spreadsheet projected on screen listing each voting station could be completed as the results come in. Once all the information for each election is received, the combined result for the entire electoral district should be updated. Best international practice indicates that both aggregated results and results by voting stations be transmitted to the next level, as this will enable party agents and observer to track individual statements of votes throughout the entire results-generating process, without which the transparency requirement has not been met. National Level At the national level, the same type of logistics should be used, but on a larger scale. Data communications are easier at the national level and therefore more commonly used. Since the information needed is often already in electronic format, it can help to speed up the process for data entry, as well as enabling pre-developed software checks and manual verification on received results data. Also, both aggregated results and by voting stations are pro-actively shared with party representatives, observers and media at the national level. Even when results are received from local levels in electronic format, the EMB cannot accept the results at face value. A first quality control check is done to verify if the results appear to be correct. Data should be checked for mathematical correctness, but the software used often includes triggers requiring closer scrutiny by senior EMB official before cleared for inclusion. Triggers could be set off by unusually high voter turnout or unprecedented results in favor of one party. A more exhaustive quality control checking procedure for each electoral district and its voting stations, will need to be done when the actual statement of votes forms arrive and are compiled prior to release of final results. If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election). The required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when they are needed to compile the national interim results. For interim results, all types of ballots (if possible) should be included to avoid any major discrepancy between interim results and final results. Special ballots, write-in ballots, mail ballots, as well as ballots cast on ordinary voting, advance voting, and mobile voting should be part of the count for interim results. Depending on the amount of delay that is acceptable, special ballots can be counted a few days prior to Election Day, or after the close of voting on Election Day. If the latter is the case, then the counting procedure should be designed carefully, so it will still be possible to include special ballot results in the interim results. For the special ballots (mail and write-in ballots), envelopes received at the head office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. Different coloured envelopes will facilitate the sorting by category. For mail ballots, three envelopes are originally sent to the voter: a return mailing envelope containing an outer envelope (on which may appear the bar code and signature of the voter or other administrative information), and a secrecy envelope containing the ballot. After verification of proper registration and no previous voting having been taken, and the creation of the audit trail, the secrecy envelope is put into a ballot box with its ballot still inside. If the special ballots are counted a few days prior to Election Day, the results should be securely kept and only released at the close of the election. In some jurisdictions special ballots are counted after the Election Day, and in others, on Election Day. If advanced-voting takes place over several days, reconciliation can be done at the end of each day, but the ballot choices are not counted. The number of ballots must match the number of voters of each day. This reconciliation measure is done to create an audit trail of ballot usage. The advance vote ballot boxes are then kept safely until voting day, and counting should take place at an office of the electoral management body at the closing time of the ordinary voting. The counting of advance voting ballots should be done in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates and observers. The counting procedures are nearly identical to those used for ordinary voting. Counting for mobile voting stations may take place at the last place visited, or at an office of the electoral management body. To count the votes of incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance voting may be applied, but, of course, this will only be possible if voting by incarcerated or imprisoned voters takes place prior to Election Day. If ballot boxes and results are delivered simultaneously (i.e. where telephones, fax etc. are not available), the local office of the electoral management body should carefully plan the reception of the ballot boxes and the results. Planning must ensure that provision is made for all the ballot boxes and results arriving at the same time. First, to respect the order of arrival, a receiving official could immediately give a number to the person arriving from a voting station with the ballot box and the results. Then, in chronological order, the identity of each delivery person should be verified, the voting station identified, and the results should immediately be taken and placed in a specified area ready to be compiled. The receiving official should then verify the ballot box, and the authenticity of its seals, and prepare a receipt for the person who delivered the materials, as well as one for the electoral management body. If the receiving officer has concerns regarding the ballot box and/or the statement of votes form, the voting station material should be quarantined for further investigation. An especially dedicated team of EMB officials trained for such a task should before this duty. The ballot box should then be removed from the reception area and be placed in a secure storage room where more detailed verification can be done. Use of Technology Telephones, SMS and fixed or mobile internet technologies are widely used in the transmission of electoral results. To ensure the identity of the person transmitting results, such systems should include authentication of the users and similar security protocols. In some systems, only pre-authorized cell phones can be used to transmit results. This is an efficient way to avoid unauthorized people reporting false results.
As a general rule, all data transmitted should be encrypted and communication should use appropriate protocols. The use of encryption and protocols allows us to enhance the integrity of data in three ways:
For all types of transmission, the systems must be tested prior to voting day to verify their capacity under the heavy use they will encounter on election night. A technical specialist should also be available at any time, in case of system failure. A contingency back-up system should also be created, tested, and fully available. Receiving Result CountsThe local electoral management body will receive the interim results directly from the voting station after counting is completed. They will then compile the results for the electoral district and send it to the national electoral management body as per a pre-determined means of communication. The presiding officer will contact the local level of the electoral management body directly to communicate the results of each vote, but in some countries the very same information is also communicated directly to the national results centre. Adequate phones, computer terminals and bandwidth to cope with peak demands should be installed. Where interim results are called in by telephone, staff answering the phone at the local level should have a pre-printed form for recording results with the names of candidates and parties in the same order as they appear on the ballot paper. A procedure requiring the receiver of results to read back the results for confirmation by the sender could reduce the error rate further. A list of the identification codes or passwords associated with the various voting stations should be provided to the staff as well. This means that the phone operators and those receiving the results need to have signed a confidentiality contract as they are dealing with sensitive information. Only pre-determined EMB officers should communicate to the local/regional/district electoral management body office the results of the voting stations. At the point where the results are received, one team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit the information to the data entry person or the person in charge of combining all the results for the electoral district. In order to avoid mistakes, abuse of misplaced statement of votes forms, this transfer of results forms from intake to data-entry could be regulated requiring affected officials to sign for delivery and receiving statement of votes forms for tabulation. If manual data-entry of the results is performed, extra care needs to be taken to avoid errors. At larger centres, double-blind data entry procedures could be utilized, while smaller operations would require a supervisor verifying the data entered with the statement of results in question before transmitting results. A spread sheet, board or print-outs listing each voting station should be prepared and completed as the results are received; both aggregated and voting station-based results. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and the media should have access to this information points, so that they can observe the results as they come in. Increasingly, EMBs are using their websites to make data available to the widest possible audience, in the shortest possible time for the lowest possible cost. The use of intranets and extranets allows these cost-effective technologies to be harnessed to effectively and securely disseminate data to a limited audience who may have been given usernames/passwords for access. Special measures should be taken so as to make sure that the same results are not given twice. Numbering the voting stations and corresponding ballot boxes is a simple way to avoid such confusion. If such a measure is taken, it should be done before the election process and the EMB staff must be clear on how the numbering works and how to process the data they will receive on Election Day from each voting station. The number of each voting station should be used consistently on all forms used for the election, as well as on the ballot box. The use of this number will also facilitate the creation of an audit trail. The local office of the electoral management body should send its results to the national electoral management body in several stages to accelerate the process of releasing interim results. Then, the national electoral management body will continuously compile, check, and release progressive results for each of the country’s electoral districts. In some countries it is not necessary for the electoral management body to compile preliminary indications of the voting figures. Instead, the media, exit poll organizations and non- governmental organizations compile and publicize the interim results while the electoral management body concentrates on compiling the official results and communicating them formally, once verified. National Level At the national level, the same type of logistics and procedures for receiving the interim results should be used, but on a larger scale if a manual system be utilized. When all the results are coming in at the same time, the staff responsible for the incoming results should first make a quick quality control check in order to verify if the results make sense or not, for example, whether or not the totals are correct, and forms are signed and completed correctly. Most national-level results centre are computerized and therefore efforts are made to pre-load the results system with software containing mathematical formula checks, logical inconsistencies and triggers for extreme or unusual results based on historical electoral data. A more exhaustive quality control procedure, for each electoral district and voting station, will be done when the final official results are compiled. Some electoral districts might need more attention than others, especially those that are the subject of intense political campaign activities, or those with a higher degree of administrative difficulties, such as a very high concentration of registered voters (the core of a large city, for example). On Election Day, these electoral districts might need to be monitored more closely by the national electoral management body. If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election), and the required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when needed. In case of an emergency, the head office of the electoral management body should always be able to reach their local offices, especially when results are coming in. In most cases, both a primary and secondary number (often landline and a mobile phone number) need to be secured and tested prior to Election Day. The phone number should not be the same one used to call in interim results. Votes Cast at Mobile Voting Stations The counting of votes from mobile voting stations may take place at the last station visited by the voting station officers, or at a local office of the electoral management body. These ballots are often not counted until the regular closing time of the voting on Election Day.
The location of the count of mobile voting stations should be known by representatives of political parties, candidates and observers thereby enabling their presence for the counting. Verification of ResultsOnce the count is finished in each voting station, all the electoral materials (the ballot box with all the used, unused, rejected, spoiled ballots, the electoral list, unused seals, and other unused materials), as well as relevant forms needed (especially the statement of the vote, the count sheet, the voting record book) for the verification of results process. The material is transported to a secure local facility, which may be at the local office of the electoral management body. Ability to check the interim count results received against separate documentation is essential to avoid mistakes, and prevent any fraud or manipulation of electoral results. A copy of the original statement of the votes of each voting station should be sent separately to the local office of the electoral management body, in a sealed envelope, and a comparison with first results received should be done, once the original is received. If serious fears of fraud exist, a special paper can be used for the statement of the votes of each voting station. This dark coloured paper (dark blue for example) immediately indicates that the initial inscription is modified. The colour around the modified area will fade. A pencil should be used for this type of paper. If modification marks appear on the paper, then special attention can be given to that specific voting station, and the results of the count. The voting record book should be checked carefully. If the counting officer made a mistake in completing the form at the voting station, then he/she should add his/her initials, or signature, as well as those of party and candidate representatives to denote agreement with the correction. In most instances, a first verification of the electoral materials received, using a check list and an acknowledgement of receipt form, should be done by officials of the electoral management body to make sure that each ballot box and everything associated with the audit trail is delivered, and that forms are properly completed and signed. The sealed envelopes (if applicable) containing the statement of the vote of each voting station are opened, in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates, and the contents verified. In the event of a mistake, the counting officers are still available, so if a form is not signed or properly completed (wrong number of voting station for example), proper modification can be done immediately in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates. If the discrepancies cannot be explained and corrected at this stage, the voting station’s results can be quarantined for further investigation by specially appointed audit teams. A more exhaustive quality control can take place in the following days, but it should be done as soon as possible, so that an audit trail of final results is carefully verified and completed. A table chart, with the number of each ballot box (if any) is frequently created by the electoral management body, and used to verify that every ballot box that was issued to voting stations has been returned. Numbering the ballot boxes is a simple and effective way to keep track of them. Clear problem-solving procedures must be established to track down any ballot boxes that are late in arriving, or are not delivered within a reasonable amount of time.
For each electoral district, the local office of the electoral management body produces a cumulative statement of the votes. This cumulative count usually includes information such as:
Once the statement of votes form and other verifications checks been completed satisfactory, the supervising officer will sign off on the results, which should be properly documented using a standardized form for this very purpose. Based on this verification, a detailed report can be prepared for the official results of each electoral district, recording each voting stations’ results. Consolidating Results: List SystemsConsolidating results in list systems can be very simple and straightforward or highly complicated, depending on the system and the legal framework. In some cases, it is sufficient to count the votes once, either in the voting station or in a counting centre, but in other cases a recount can be necessary. In such cases, the first count is normally in the voting station and the recount in a counting centre. In closed list systems, with no possibility for, for instance preferential or cumulating votes, and just one list per party, one count is normally sufficient. The numbers per list are added up per electoral district, and the seats are allocated to candidates according to list order. In more complex systems, when a party has more than one list per electoral district, or when the voter may cross out, add candidates, or make preferential marks, or cumulate, the counting and consolidating of the results are more complicated. The exact number of votes for each list and candidate, including cross-outs, or additions, must be determined before implementing the electoral formula for allocating seats to parties and candidates. A common procedure in such systems is a preliminary count per party in the voting stations at the close of voting, and a recount later in counting centres at the electoral district or regional level. In some systems a final compilation of the results must be carried out at national level, for example, to allocate national "equalizing" seats. The more complex a system, and the more complicated the electoral formulas to be implemented, the more crucial transparency of the count is. Count sheets, reports from the count, and compilations must be clear, comprehensive, complete, and designed in such a way that the entire process can be followed and supervised by the political parties and the electorate. All relevant information must be published without delay. However, it is essential to make realistic plans for the last phase of the electoral process, and not create exaggerated expectations when it comes to the time of announcement of the final results.
When election authorities publish the final results, instructions on how to appeal and object to the results must be included in the announcement. Publicising Election ResultsVotes are counted and aggregated in many different ways. In most cases, votes are counted for the first time at the voting stations on Election Day, after the close of voting. In other cases, votes are taken to counting centres before they are counted. In some jurisdictions, these first counts are the only counts made, and the ballot papers are looked at again only if the election result is challenged or a recount is requested by a candidate, a party, or a court. In some jurisdictions, votes counted once at the voting station level are taken to a counting centre after Election Day, and rechecked and recounted, recognizing that mistakes are common in the initial count. Votes may be recounted again and again at several stages in the process, depending on the complexity of the electoral system, the need for accuracy, and whether the result is challenged. Publicising election results is therefore not a simple task, as the EMB must consider all these variations and factors when developing its publication of results plan. In addition, as the first results available are usually interim and often only partial results and may therefore change until certified results are published, careful consideration needs to be given to how and when results are published. If not, the release of results could result in violence, undermine the legitimacy of the results, and the credibility of the EMB itself.
The most common terms and steps used when planning the publication of election results are the following: Unofficial v Official: As the transparency requirements have increased on the results- generating process the international praxis often dictates that EMBs release results at the voting station level as soon as counting is completed. The presiding officer is often required to post an official copy of the statement of votes at a public space at the voting station and share official copies with party agents and observers present. In addition, the results released and by EMB officials at centralized counting centres and national results and media centres are also official results, however none of those results are final. Unofficial election results are often stemming from exit polls, or quick-counts conducting by survey companies, observer groups or various media outlets. “Finality” Spectrum: The steps making up the results-generating process are numerous and vary somewhat depending on the legal framework. In many countries the EMB is centrally releasing provisional (sometimes also called interim) results based on information transmitted from voting stations and counting centres using various forms of communications; be it voice, SMS, or internet. Provisional results can be made up of a fraction of the voting stations, or include results from all polling stations. Once the legal document underpinning the results - the statement of votes form – starts arriving at the EMB’s HQ it will begin validating the provisional results reported by the lower tiers of the EMB organization. Once it has verified the interim results and made the necessary corrections, the returning officer will announce the final results. If the EMB is the authority certifying the election results, it is often required to Gazette the result and the winners. In some jurisdiction, the EMB is only authorized to announce the final results and the Supreme Court, Electoral Court, or Constitutional Court charged with certification of the results. Release of Results Considerations It is pivotal the EMB makes a realistic assessment of how long it will actually be before it can start releasing partial results, all preliminary results can be released and when they can make public the final and verified results. When deciding on this time line the EMB better err on the side of caution and give itself a bit of extra time, rather than over promise, as the transmittal solution chosen might not work as efficiently as planned. The first results reported might be inconsistent requiring double-checking before being released to the public. Furthermore, in order to avoid huge swings from one party or candidate to another during the early release of results and thereby cause unnecessary speculations and tension, experiences have shown it’s better the EMB only releases partial interim results once a critical mass of voting stations have reported. Depending on the society's political fault line, the EMB might also have to consider including results from a mix of electoral districts including both strongholds of the ruling party and the main opposition, urban-rural divide, or regional distributions of early results. If Diaspora voting is allowed, special attention need to be paid to the integration of those results. In some jurisdictions, ballots from voting at embassies need to be transported to the country in question before counted and tabulated. This results could be the last to be included in the aggregation of final results and thereby swing the election in favour of a certain party or candidate should the margin of victory be very narrow. The perception among the electorate could therefore become that the winning candidate was elected on a Diaspora ticket, even though it only constituted a small percentage of the overall vote. This could affect the acceptance of the results, or the legitimacy of the elected official. As such, it’s often advisable for the EMB to hold back some of the results from in-country districts and thereby blend the Diaspora results with regular voting station results. Another sub-group of electorate the EMB sometimes need to be mindful of when planning release of election results is the security forces. The police, military and other members of a country's security forces are often engaged to ensure point and area security, as well as being on a generally heighten alert. As a result, they are often stationed away from where they would normally vote, thus, to avoid disenfranchisement, an early voting facility could be offered. Enabling stakeholders to learn the collective political preference of the security forces in a transitional or post-conflict society could not only indirectly politicize the forces, but also cause unnecessary tension. The EMB is therefore advised to integrate these results with the release of other standard voting stations results, but without jeopardizing the transparency of the results process. Irrespective of what the EMB’s planned release of results timeline and schedule is, its pivotal this is clearly articulated in advance and made known to all political stakeholders, observer groups, media and the general public. If not, it would be extremely difficult for the EMB to manage expectations and convince political parties and their supporters to stay calm and await the publication of results. In addition, if parties and candidates are aware of the expected timeline for the results process, understand the results-generating process, and have representatives present at every step of the aggregation process, they are more likely to accept some delays without accusing the EMB of tampering with the results. Some countries still chose to release results for each electoral district only once all of the voting stations have reported their results to the district electoral officer. Therefore, the first published interim results will be close to the final outcome.
With more complex electoral systems, particularly those that involve distribution of preferences, counting may take days, weeks, or in extreme cases, months before the results are certified. Publishing Interim Election ResultsWhen a decision is taken to publish interim results, it is desirable to do so as quickly as possible. A few hours to a day after the close of voting is considered a reasonable amount of time to release the first interim results, depending on the local political, logistical circumstances and the electoral system. However, in some countries, three-five days will often pass before early partial results are released. In more extreme cases a full week can also be deemed acceptable, given the local conditions in the country in question. Irrespective of time required, the EMB must manage stakeholders’ expectations by clearly explain and widely distribute the release of results scheme. Where counting takes place over several days, updates are often published at the end of each day's counting, as a minimum. Often EMBs are updating the results more often, either at press conferences, by issuing press releases, or updating their web-based results site. Where votes are counted progressively, or are recounted several times, and partial and interim results are published before the final result is determined, these results could be misleading. For example, interim results could indicate that a candidate or party was winning a seat, or a particular number of seats, but the final result might be different. Consequently, special precautions are needed to ensure that confusion or civil strife may occur. The release of interim results should include cautionary language. The authority responsible for releasing results should explain that those are not final results, and that changes and corrections may be necessary in the process of determining the final counts. The electoral management body does not necessarily have to release the interim results. In some jurisdictions it is seen as more appropriate for the media, exit poll organisations or non- governmental organizations to release and announce preliminary indications of the vote. However, in the interests of demonstrating transparency and accountability, it is desirable that the electoral management body take responsibility for publishing partial and interim results. If a political situation is unstable, the electoral management body could consider not announcing interim results, but only final results, in order to avoid any confusion and to prevent the exacerbation of conflict. This option has its risks, as any delay in publishing final results may itself cause instability. This option is not very practicable where party or candidate representatives are present at the counts, as these counts are effectively in the public domain. Attempting to suppress information from the counts until the announcement of final results in this case is generally not a realistic option. Depending on the local situation, it may be desirable to include all types of ballots (such as absentee, mail, advance vote, and mobile voting station) used in the election when interim results are released, to avoid discrepancies between interim and final results. Whatever decision is taken on the ways of releasing interim results, the conditions must be clearly explained. For example, are all votes included? Are the votes subject to recounts? In other cases, it may not be possible to wait for these figures to be available without unduly delaying publication of interim figures. In this case it is important to qualify the interim results by pointing out that the results do not yet include these other types of ballots. In some jurisdictions it may be possible to count absentee, mail ballots, advance vote, or mobile voting station results before election day, to enable these results to be included in interim results published on election day. If these special ballots are counted a few days prior to Election Day, these results should be kept very secure, and access to them should be prohibited until the close of voting on lection day. This approach has advantages and disadvantages. While it allows more complete interim figures to be published, it may also seriously compromise the integrity, turnout, or outcome of the vote if any results are publicly released before the close of voting. As it is usual for candidate and party representatives to be present when any votes are counted, this is a real risk. Publication of interim results in countries with multiple time zones before the close of voting in some areas may have an undesirable impact on voting behaviour.
For countries with multiple time zones, staggered voting hours or a blackout on releasing results may be considered, to allow all voters to vote before knowing the election outcome or trends in other parts of the country. In some circumstances, these measures may not be seen as appropriate or necessary. Staggered opening and closing times might be seen as discriminatory in some countries. In addition, it could significantly complicate the public information campaign, as the messaging on opening hours will vary from time-zone to time-zone and thereby risk confusing voters, as well as increase costs. Publicising Official Final ResultsPublication of Official Final Results Discrepancies between interim results and final official results are to be expected. The most problematic scenario is if when the interim result, based on an almost complete count, indicates a narrow victor and then the final results reveals a swing to another party or candidate. However, developing an accurate and transparent results-generating process that is implemented accordingly and supported by a known results release modality will significantly reduce the risk of violence or refusal to accept the final results by the losing competitor. Where discrepancies do occur, the electoral management body should issue statements explaining the reasons for the discrepancies, to ensure that public confidence in the system is maintained. In some cases, special meetings between the EMB and leading politicians and activists are advisable. It is of paramount importance that the EMB explains the difference between partial, interim and final results to the stakeholders. In jurisdictions where the EMB is not certifying the results, this should be made clear too. Equally important, stakeholders must know how they can lodge complaints against the results process even before the results aggregating process begins. The overall principle is that the appropriate authority should make the official final election results available as soon as possible after the counting process has been concluded, the statement of votes checked, and results validated. Some electoral laws stipulate a fixed day for announcing the official results. Depending on the geography of the country, the communication networks in place, and the electoral system used, an average of one to two weeks is generally needed before detailed verifications of interim results are complete for making an official announcement. Often the legislation will provide for the designated period in which the results should be publicized. In many cases the official count can only be concluded once all the ballot papers have been returned to the local electoral management body and all counting steps have been completed, including resolution of any disputes about vote counting (which may result in recounts), and statement of votes validated. Great care must be taken to ensure that the figures are accurate, especially when the margin of victory is narrow. Procedures must be in place to ensure that all appropriate checks and balances have been taken into account before the final results are announced. Formal documents showing the results of the count are normally prepared, certified, and signed by the responsible electoral district officer, or other appropriate official. These documents are usually officially published, such as in a Government Gazette, tabled in Parliament, or presented to an appropriate official. Some EMBs are making the extra effort of scanning all the statement of votes forms and making them available online for public consumption. Often, formal election results are declared at a public ceremony. Candidates, political party representatives, the media, observers, other interested persons, and the general public are often invited to attend these ceremonies. In some cases, candidates and political party representatives are given the opportunity to make speeches. It is desirable to produce detailed publications of election results showing the results of the counting at all levels of voting, from voting stations to regions or electoral districts, and the national level. Most often these are done electronically and the specific result breakdown is provided to parties and candidates. However, in some cases it is desirable to merge some results. As a general principle, EMBs should seek to provide data in a format that allows analysis. Providing results from tens of thousands of polling stations, but only doing so in a human-readable format such as PDF, amounts to a less than complete commitment to transparency.
Make the data available in the most generic format possible – such as CSV (comma separated values) text file or similar. Merging Results to Protect the Secrecy of the Vote It may be desirable to merge or amalgamate results from several voting stations to protect the secrecy of the vote. This is generally done if the publication of results at a detailed level might identify the names and votes of particular individuals. This can happen if the number of votes at a voting station is so small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate or party. This can also be done in cases where there is a real risk that publishing the voting results at a particular voting station could result in retribution against the persons who voted there. This problem can be mitigated by mixing the ballots from two or more voting stations from different areas.
Merging results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other categories of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body, results can easily be merged with other results in order to protect the secrecy of the vote. For internal use only, a special notation can be made in order to keep the verification trail clear. Role of Judicial Courts In some countries, judicial courts are only involved in the electoral process after the election, when offenders against the electoral law are brought to trial, or when an electoral result is challenged. In other jurisdictions, the courts may have a significant role to play in confirming the outcome and official results of the election, where the results are certified only when the court has confirmed them. Such confirmation should be done as soon as possible, in order to avoid political instability and potential delays associated with a transition from one government to another. It is therefore important that not only the EMB, but also the affected courts proactively engages with political stakeholders thereby enabling them to better understand, access and accept their decisions. The courts may also be directly involved in the official count, along with the electoral management body. This will generally be the case if final approval of the count must come from the courts.
When a lot of technology is used in the electoral process, the judicial courts may also benefit from some training in order to better fulfil their role. It is difficult for a court to find neutral technical expertise in the event that the EMB or the technology vendor is the plaintiff. Challenging ResultsMechanisms for Challenging Results A mechanism for challenging results is desirable at every stage of the vote tabulation process. This helps to ensure that the election process is transparent, that election authorities are accountable, and that the election outcome is acceptable to all parties (make a reference to GUARDE publication here). Aggrieved parties and candidates must be able to challenge results based on factual information and are entitled to an independent and fair hearing on the merits of their case. In some jurisdiction more than one institution is charged with adjudicating complaints a clear delineation is important as to avoid complaints filed with the incorrect institution, or at both institutions potentially wasting resources and delaying a verdict. Effective mechanisms for challenging results add to the credibility of an election outcome. If a party to an election is not satisfied that an election has been properly conducted, the ability to effectively challenge the election result will ensure that any genuine errors are corrected, and that any fraudulent activities are identified and dealt with on time. Conversely, if concerns are baseless, the process of challenging an election outcome should provide the public with this information. This will enhance the credibility of the outcome. If an election cannot be challenged to the satisfaction of all parties, then it is possible that the election outcome will not be accepted, leading to civil or political tension and violence. It is also important that election challenges do not unreasonably delay the election process. Delays in the formation of parliaments and governments may lead to civil or political unrest, or exacerbate such if it already exists. Therefore, if the challenge cannot materially affect the outcome of the results, some jurisdiction will not pursue such a complaint. Election results can generally be challenged in several ways, and at several points in the process. A complaint often needs to be filed within a specific period of time and meet certain criteria. The complaint must also be adjudicated within a set number of days, in order not to delay the certification of results indefinitely. Opportunities for challenging results and the ease with which the challenges are adjudicated will depend on whether paper ballots, mechanical, or electronic voting are used. Challenging Results During the Vote Count At the first stage of the counting process for paper ballots, when ballot boxes are opened, and ballot papers counted for the first time, party and candidate representatives are often given the right to challenge whether a ballot paper is genuine, whether a ballot paper is valid or invalid, or whether it has been correctly sorted to a candidate or party. The counting officer in charge of the counting will have the authority to rule on disputed ballot papers, or ballot papers can be set aside so that a more senior electoral official can rule on them at a later time. Similarly, if ballot papers are recounted at a regional or central counting centre, party and candidate representatives may again challenge decisions taken during the count. At this stage, it is usually possible to reverse a decision on a disputed ballot paper that was made at an earlier count. Where mechanical or electronic voting methods are used, political parties and candidates and observers should have the right to inspect audit trails and any source documents used, and have the opportunity to challenge any alleged irregularities. The methods of disputing the count at this stage will vary from place to place. In many cases challenges may be made verbally. In some circumstances, it may be desirable to have a more formal, written process. Where ballot papers are set aside for the decision of a more senior officer at a later time, these ballot papers should be bundled separately, and clearly labelled, so that they can be identified later. Also, these bundles of disputed ballot papers may be kept separate, so that a court or tribunal can rule on them if necessary.
The categories of individuals able to challenge a counting decision will vary. Representatives of candidates and/or parties are often given the right to challenge the counting process. In some cases, registered voters, local or international observers may also be given this right. Recounts by Electoral Bodies Where paper ballots are used it is usual to allow candidates and/or political parties the right to apply for a recount, once counting is completed and a result has been obtained.
This means recounting some or all of the ballot papers to satisfy all parties that the correct outcome has been achieved. Depending on the technology used, it may also be feasible to recount an electronic ballot by, for example, reprocessing the original input documents. However, this is not always the case. Written Requests for Recounts As recounts can be time-consuming and expensive, the responsible electoral official may be given the discretion to decide whether or not to grant a recount. Generally, recounts are only conducted if there is a small difference between the winning and losing party and/or candidate, and if there is some doubt as to the accuracy of the count. In some jurisdictions, recounts are automatic if the result is within a certain margin. In some jurisdictions, recounts may be mandatory whenever a result is challenged, regardless of the margin. If the initial result is a tie, it is wise, as a general rule, to automatically conduct a recount to determine whether any mistakes were made that, if corrected, could break the tie. Otherwise, the definition of a "close" election result will depend on local circumstances, and the estimated margin of victory in the first count. The most important consideration is to ensure that all parties are satisfied with the outcome. If failure to conduct a recount will lead to one or more parties not accepting the election result, a recount could be recommended. A recount can either be a full recount or a partial recount. Depending on the circumstances, it may be possible to select some categories to recount, rather than conduct a complete recount. For example, a representative random sample might be chosen to give an indication of the accuracy of the initial count. A recount may be undertaken simply as a check that all ballot papers have been correctly sorted. Or a recount may involve retracing one or more steps and conducting the recount as if it were the original count. Thorough records of any recounts conducted should be kept. These will be necessary to satisfy all parties that proper procedure has been followed, and may be needed if the election result is challenged at a later stage. There should be a time limit on applying for a recount. In most cases recounts will only be permitted within a short time after the completion of counting. For example, there may be a 24-hour or 48-hour limit. In some cases, recounts may be requested only before the official declaration of the final election result. After that time, recourse may only be permitted to a court or tribunal.
If the responsible officer decides not to do a recount, a candidate or party may have the right to appeal that decision to a higher authority. That authority, such as a more senior electoral official or the board of the electoral management body, may in turn decide whether or not to do a recount. Challenging Election Results before a Court or Tribunal After any administrative recounts are resolved and the electoral authority has officially declared the election result, there may be further opportunity to challenge the election result by appeal to a court or a special election appeal tribunal. Some jurisdictions establish special electoral tribunals or courts specifically during election periods. A challenge to a court or tribunal is generally made in a formal legal petition. Challenges may be made by candidates, parties, and persons eligible to vote in the election, or by the electoral administration. Those mounting a challenge usually have to argue a case for challenging an election result. There will generally be a time limit on challenging election results before a court or tribunal. This limit is usually longer than that applying to an administrative recount, as the legal nature of court or tribunal proceedings require greater preparation. In addition, the court or tribunal may be required to hand down its decision within a specified time.
At this stage, any aspect of the election may be questioned, including:
Some jurisdictions limit the petition to a judicial body to complaints or appeals that affect the result only. Then the complainant or applicant will be required to show that their complaint would have an effect on the result of the election. Courts or tribunals considering disputed elections may have the power, given to them by legislation, to examine ballot papers and other election documents, or order audits and recounts of ballot papers. They are usually given the power to decide to confirm the original election result, or to overturn the election result and declare a different result. They may also have the power to order that another election must be held. Courts and tribunals may be bound by precedents set by previous election challenge rulings. To maintain the integrity of the electoral process, it is important to consistently interpret electoral laws. In particular, each electoral system will have a set of rules defining acceptable marks that may be used on ballot papers and other crucial parts of the electoral process.
In some cases it may be possible to appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal to a higher authority. In other cases, statutes specify that there cannot be appeals against the decision of an election court or tribunal. This helps to prevent election results and the formulation of parliaments and governments being unduly delayed by legal processes. How Long should Election Materials be Kept? As a minimum, relevant electoral materials should be securely stored until the last opportunity for challenging an election result has passed. In some cases, this may mean storing electoral materials for the entire life of a parliament. In other cases, electoral materials may be destroyed, once the time for challenging a result before a court or tribunal has passed, or if a challenge has been lodged, after the challenge has been finally dealt with. Some jurisdictions provide a legislated limit on the period of time that election material should be kept. The minimum period for maintaining election material is normally about six months. Only materials relevant to an election outcome need be kept. This will usually include ballot papers, voters' lists, any declarations completed by voters, election results, and any records related to disputed results. If in doubt, it is better to store materials rather than destroy them. However, any materials that may put the anonymity of the voters at risk should be destroyed. Any stored materials must be kept secure from tampering and the principle of chain of custody upheld. Ballot papers that may be recounted at a later time cannot be relied upon if the responsible body cannot be sure that they have not been tampered with. Note that the archival of electronic records is highly specialised and that, without proper provisions for such storage, electronic data has a very short lifespan.
Once the decision to destroy electoral materials is taken, the responsible electoral management body should ensure that the materials are destroyed appropriately. Any electoral materials that might identify the preferences of an individual voter should be destroyed in such a way as to keep that individual's vote secret. If possible, paper materials should be recycled. Financial and ecological considerations are also important, as some material could be hazardous in large quantities, such as indelible ink containing silver nitrate. Election Challenges and the Political Process Election challenges can be quite disruptive to the electoral and political processes. They can delay the finalization of election results, which in turn can delay the first meeting of the new parliament and the formation of a government. This situation can destabilize a sensitive political environment, and lead to civil unrest. For these reasons, it is important that election challenges are dealt with quickly, efficiently, and with maximum transparency and accountability. This requires proper planning, allocation of significant resources, staff training, a robust public information campaign, and an effective public relations strategy.
The election process is aimed at electing representatives to parliaments or other posts that reflect the wishes of the people who voted for them. The processes for challenging election results should be aimed at ensuring that the wishes of the people are accurately reflected in the outcome, which requires that challenges be professionally adjudicated in a timely manner. Judicial RecountsAfter any administrative recounts are resolved, and the electoral authority has officially declared the election result, there may be further opportunity to challenge the election result by appeal to a court or a special election appeal tribunal. A challenge to a court or tribunal is generally made in a formal legal petition. Challenges may be made by candidates, parties, or individuals eligible to vote in the election, or by the electoral administration. Those challenging usually have to argue a case for challenging an election result. There will generally be a time limit on challenging election results before a court or tribunal. This limit is usually longer than that applying for an administrative recount, as the legal nature of court or tribunal proceedings require greater preparation. In addition, the court or tribunal may be required to hand down its decision within a specified time. Some jurisdictions limit the petition to a judicial body to complaints or appeals that affect the result only. Then the complainant or applicant will be required to show that their complaint would have an effect on the result of the election.
At this stage any aspect of the election may be questioned, including: • the accuracy of the voter's list, • whether voters were intimidated, bribed, or prevented from voting • whether electoral officers acted in a biased, partisan way, • whether candidates or parties acted improperly, • whether candidates were eligible to be elected, • whether votes were fraudulently cast, or • whether there were any errors or irregularities in the vote counting process • whether any technology used in the electoral process or the results management system malfunctioned or was compromised in some way. Courts or tribunals considering disputed elections may have the power, given to them by legislation, to examine ballot papers and other election documents or order recounts of ballot papers. They are usually given the power to decide to confirm the original election result, or to overturn the election result and declare a different result. They may also have the power to order that another election must be held. Courts and tribunals may be bound by precedents set by previous election challenge rulings. To maintain the integrity of the electoral process, it is important to consistently interpret electoral laws. In particular, each electoral system will have a set of rules defining acceptable marks that may be used on ballot papers.
In some cases it may be possible to appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal to a higher authority. In other cases, statutes specify that there cannot be appeals against the decision of an election court or tribunal. This helps to prevent election results and the formulation of parliaments and governments being unduly delayed by legal processes. Procedures for Vote Counting at Counting CentresIn some jurisdictions, for reasons outlined in Different Types and Requirements for Vote Counting, votes are initially counted at voting stations; in some cases they are subsequently recounted at counting centres. There are cases, however, where no counting is done at voting stations, but ballots are transported directly to centralised counting centres after the close of voting. In a counting centre approach, where ballots from two or more voting stations are mixed together, with results published by counting centre instead of by voting station, it is more difficult to link communities with affiliation. This may help to protect the secrecy of the voting pattern, especially in some small communities (normally the ballots are counted by voting station but the centre approach will give the possibility to merge). Even in countries where the count is predominantly done at voting stations, one or more counting centres can ease administration for certain types of ballots. This includes absentee votes, mail votes from armed forces, diplomatic missions, refugees, incarcerated persons or persons residing outside their electoral district which may come from various voting stations, local or abroad, or directly from the voters (by mail). Such ballots can be forwarded to the appropriate counting centre and added to the ballots from applicable elections, making counting easier to organise and easier to protect the secrecy of such absentee votes. There may be many counting centres or there may be only one national counting centre. The limit to the level of centralisation will be the level at which votes are translated into a number of legislators or seats. In a First Past the Post (FPTP) system the counting centre may be at the electoral district level (at a town hall, for example) but not at the national level.
In a proportional representation system based on regional lists, a counting centre may not be more centralised than the region that the list is based on. Vote Counting at the Counting Centre At the close of voting, voting station officers seal the ballot boxes and prepare them to be transported to a counting centre along with related documents such as the ballot account form. Each ballot box is then sorted and tallied. The content of the ballot box can be counted separately or mixed with two or more boxes together, after reconciliation, to protect the identity of voters. The statement of the vote for each counting centre is sent to a regional or national counting centre. Representatives of political parties and observers are allowed to receive an official copy of the results. Releasing interim results is generally much slower when ballots are counted at counting centres. There are several reasons for this, including:
The logistical complexities of moving ballot boxes and related materials to the counting centre can be an obstacle if transportation is difficult, not readily available, or due to adverse weather conditions. Systems are required to receive and store the ballot boxes efficiently while the need to transport the ballot boxes may make it difficult to maintain transparency and retain confidence in the counting and aggregation systems and the election body concerned. Resulting delays in the announcement of the results can lead to accusations of manipulation or fraud during the delivery of boxes or the consolidation of the results of the count. To ensure the success of the counting process, there are administrative considerations and training requirements related to vote counting at counting centres, which need to be addressed early in the electoral process and once decided, they must be respected. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with their respective processes. Procedures for counting at counting centres At the closing of the voting station authorised persons and counting officers stay in the voting station and prepare the ballot box for transportation from the voting station to the counting centre. The slot of the ballot box is closed and sealed and the first reconciliation of ballots is done before completing the ballot account form. The seals on the ballot box are then verified along with all forms in sealed envelopes attached to the ballot box. The waybill or transport form is completed according to the type of transportation used. Important security measures need to be taken to ensure that the ballot boxes will arrive safely at the counting centre. Once at the counting centre, unloading of ballot boxes should be carefully planned and supervised and movement of all ballot boxes should be tightly controlled. All forms related to transportation and movement of the ballot boxes will be completed and verified so that any ballot boxes that are missing can be traced. Upon arrival at the counting centre, the ballot box is checked by an appointed electoral official responsible for the intake of materials from voting stations. Once the officer has reviewed the handover form, documented and verified that seals are intact, the polling station will be flagged as received and cleared for processing. The material is sent to a planned location in the counting centre for ballot boxes ready to be counted. From there, individual ballot boxes are delivered to the appropriate counting table. The ballot box is opened and once the contents of the ballot box are emptied, the validity of each ballot is verified and sorted into different piles before being tallied: valid ballots (by candidate or political party), and rejected ballots. To facilitate the decision making process, clear rules of interpretation or guidelines regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting official, and known in advance. Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the rejected ballots and, if they do not agree with the decision of the counting official, be allowed to make formal objections which can form the basis for challenging the results of the count. Using a count sheet, all valid ballots, spoiled ballots, and rejected ballots are counted - none should be destroyed at this stage of the process. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote for each ballot box. The ballot box can then be re-sealed and appropriate counting documentation can be completed and either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope. The ballot box is then transferred to a pre-planned location in the counting centre where counted ballot boxes are securely stored. Once there, the person in charge will verify, count, and label each ballot box creating the cumulative audit trail for the counting centre. All the ballot boxes are safely kept at the counting centre until further notice from the electoral management body. The results recorded on the statement of the vote for each ballot box will be communicated to the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre. While preparing the cumulative statement of the vote for the entire counting centre, progress reports will also be prepared and sent to the central office of the electoral management body as results for electoral districts are available. Results will be transmitted directly to the national electoral management body so they can be released as they come in. Representatives of political parties and candidates and observers, if present, should be allowed official copies of the progress reports, the statement of the vote for each ballot box, and the cumulative statement of the votes.
The national office of the electoral management body adds the results transmitted as well as results of special ballots, advance votes, mobile voting station votes, etc. All results should be tallied per political party or candidate and publicised as soon as possible. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply. The EMB should maintain citizens informed of challenged results/processes, and educate them so voters understand what the implications are and which is the process to be followed. Effective training for counting officers To be able to implement such procedures regarding vote counting at counting centres, it is essential that appropriate training be conducted. Training requirements, as well as all other administrative considerations (see Context) will need to be forecast in the budget for the election or referendum. During the training and managing a counting centre it is important to emphasise non-partisanship in the conduct of the work. Numerous jurisdictions require that all counting workers sign an oath and a confidentiality clause to make this point clear, documented, and understood by all personnel involved. Counting workers should not make any remarks or mention any personal political affiliation or affinity, nor wear any badge or clothing with political slogans or logos. Since the counting officer at each table will have to handle disputes over any rejected ballots, he will be the first person to deal with representatives of political parties and candidates. This person (if applicable according to the legislation) will also have to make the final decision in validating or rejecting any ballot. Neutrality and non-partisanship are imperative in this decision-making process.
In many jurisdictions, counting officers can be legally prosecuted if their work is proven to be partisan during the counting process. Presence of party and candidate representatives at counting centres To ensure that the level playing field concept is adhered to, it is recommended that all political parties and candidates designate a representative to be present in each counting centre and assign these representatives to scrutinise the counting process. It remains the choice of each party as to whether they send a representative to every counting table or not. Many jurisdictions consider the presence of political party representatives to be essential to ensure integrity, guarantee consistency, and provide witnesses to the transparency of the process. When the time comes to make an important decision during the counting process, such as modifications to previously completed forms, then all party representatives involved should sign the forms to demonstrate that they are informed and agree with the decision. It is recommended that official copies of such documents are shared with party representatives and observers present, as well as be posted at a pre-determined location at the counting centre.
Careful application of such procedures provides tangible evidence that the rules are consistent and the process transparent. Record the History of Each Ballot Box At the counting centre, just as at the voting station, the election management body should be able to retrace the history of each ballot box from the moment it leaves the local office of the electoral management body until it returns with the counted ballots (especially important when the ballot papers of two ballot boxes or more are mixed together). An adequate audit trail will allow the electoral management body to maintain full control and ensure that possibilities of fraud via ballot box tampering are extremely limited and can be detected if attempted. Numbering each ballot box is a simple method of implementing such a control system, which could be traced by barcoding the ballot boxes and use barcode readers to record sending and receipt of boxes. Ballot boxes should also be sealed with uniquely numbered security seals that are noted on the hand-over form, thereby ensuring no tampering while in transit. The handover form is also an important component in the chain of custody for a ballot box. The same number should appear, as well, on each form used at the voting station and at the counting centre. The importance of recording the history of each ballot box may be used as evidence in cases of judicial recount. Summary of counting processes at counting centres
In general, the major process components of vote counting at counting centres are the following:
Preparation for Ballot Box TransportThe preparatory process related to transportation of any ballot box is very important. This is particularly so if counting takes place at a counting centre. When ballot boxes are transported from the voting station to the counting centre, important security control must be provided prior to transportation such as verification of the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box and on the slot match with what’s recorded on the handover form. In addition, ballot boxes must be accompanied from the departure from the voting station to the arrival at the counting centre. Those accompanying the ballot box may include security, party and candidate representatives and observers. However, the ballot box and other sensitive election material should always be under direct control of an EMB official. The ballot boxes should never be left without supervision at any time. Fear of manipulation of the ballot box contents during transportation must be procedurally addressed, and measures to ensure that the contents of the ballot boxes remain intact must be respected, communicated, and enforced. Ideally, counting officers, as well as two or more party or candidate representatives should accompany ballot boxes and supplies. These measures are designed to prevent fraud and ensure that any tampering that occurs will be easily detected. The control measures should be publicised and known in advance by all participants in the process, including the public, as an indication of transparency. Controls on the movement of ballot boxes are essential to maintain the integrity of a democratic electoral process.
The selection of the carrier, private or public sector, (belonging to the Armed Forces or the Police), should be decided before the election is called and should take into consideration several factors:
The choice of transportation methods as well as the organization assigned to perform transport will be a key determinant in the success of the operation. The confidence in the entire election can be affected if the transportation is not entirely secure, credible and properly carried out. At the close of voting, the slot of the ballot box should be sealed so that no additional ballots can be put into the ballot box during transportation. The serial numbers of the official seals used should be written in the respective election books and/or on the transportation forms. Then the counting officer counts the numbers of used ballots by counting the used counterfoils (the ballot box remains sealed), unused ballots, and spoiled ballots. This total should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. If any discrepancies are found, the counting officer should recount until the missing ballots are found or make the appropriate amendments to the forms (ballot account form, transportation forms, and the election book) noting the discrepancy. All the forms are put into sealed tamper-evident envelopes and attached to the ballot box. Representatives of political parties and candidates can append their signatures on the seals used by the counting officer or can use their own seals. The ballot box is then ready to be transported to the counting centre. The transportation form should be completed in multiple copies and given to authorised persons. Representatives of political parties and candidates, the electoral officer in charge of reception of the ballot boxes at the counting centre, the electoral management body and the electoral officer responsible for the ballot boxes during transportation should each have a copy of the transportation form. Creation of Ballot AccountReconciling Ballots Before the start of voting, the number of ballots received from the electoral management body must be counted. In countries where each party has its own ballot and where envelopes are used, it is important to count ballots and envelopes and to verify that all party's ballots are available to the voters. This is an important aspect of the audit trail, as this figure will be needed to reconcile the number of ballots used/unused after the voting has taken place. To ensure completeness, all ballots received should be counted, and serial numbers on the counterfoils (as applicable) should be verified through inspections of the ballot booklets. It is appropriate, especially if ballots are delivered by hand, that the ballot quantities be verified in the presence of the officer who delivered them. A receipt can be signed with a copy then attached to the voting record book. More important, however, is that the actual count be done at the counting station, in the presence of all representatives of political parties and candidates. Once the ballots are counted and proper observations are made on the appropriate forms, then all persons present at the voting station should be shown that the ballot box is empty before placing security seals on the ballot box. Party and candidate parties should be given the opportunity to affix their seal or signature to the seal on the ballot box. The serial number(s) of the seal(s) should be written in the voting record book and on any other appropriate form. These procedures are very important, as they constitute the start of an important audit trail. Many mistakes can be prevented if these procedures are followed. If discrepancies occur, steps can be retraced back to the beginning of ballot marking. Once these preliminary procedures are completed, the person in charge may announce that the voting station is officially open to the first voter. At closing time, the person in charge of the voting station should announce officially the close of voting. The voting station officer should ensure then that only pre-authorised persons are allowed to process or witness the procedures for preparing the ballot box for transportation to the counting centre. Voting station officers, observers, representatives of political parties and candidate should be permitted to stay. If no one except the voting station officers is present, the last voters may be asked to stay to witness the preparation.
The presence of representatives of the political parties and candidates and electoral observers is an important element of the transparency that must be demonstrated in a democratic election. Reconciliation and Procedures in Case of Discrepancies During the close of voting and before starting the reconciliation, the electoral officer in charge of the voting station should seal the slot of the ballot box, using an official security seal with unique serial numbers. The electoral officer in charge of the voting station must count the numbers of used ballots by counting the used counterfoils (the ballot box remains sealed), unused ballots and spoiled ballots. The total of these three categories should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. Verification of the number of voters who voted on Election Day should also be done using the marked-up voter's list and the voting record book entries. It may be necessary to look at the voting record book as some jurisdictions authorize registration of voters on Election Day and these may be added using the voting record book. Other jurisdictions use separate forms. This information can be written on a ballot account form signed by the voting station officer, as well as party and candidate representatives. In case of discrepancies in the reconciliation process, the count should be repeated by verifying the observations made in the voting record book for the spoiled ballots. This can also be accomplished by recounting the unused ballots and the used counterfoils. If discrepancies remain, those in charge should verify the number of ballots sent to the voting station with a higher authority (the district electoral officer and/or the electoral management body) and to inform these authorities of the situation. Keeping higher authorities regularly informed of any problems is an important part of the transparency required in an election. If no satisfactory answer for the discrepancy is found, corrections and amendments to the voting record book, reconciliation form, or any other relevant form should be made to reflect the appropriate number of ballots. To validate these new figures, everybody who should know is informed of the situation and agrees with it. Those who should be informed of the discrepancy are political party and candidate representatives and observers present at the voting station for the vote count. These parties should complete a report and sign the forms and/or the voting record book. This new figure should then become the official one for the voting station. All the documents and forms prepared should be put into a sealed tamper-evident envelope and attached to the outside of the ballot box.
To facilitate the transportation, a bag large enough to contain the ballot box and all the sealed envelopes attached to it can be used and sealed prior to transportation. If the ballot box is too big or heavy, the envelopes should be securely taped onto the ballot box while ensuring that the seals of the ballot boxes are still legible and intact. Providing Security ControlsSecurity controls should be in place prior to transportation; when ballot boxes are transported from the voting station to the counting centre. These measures can prevent fraud and ensure, that if tampering occurs, it will be detected. These controls are essential to the transparency and integrity demonstrated in the democratic electoral process. Voting station officers must ensure adherence to the security procedures, and representatives of political parties, candidates and observers should be encouraged to witness them. The electoral officer in charge of the voting station should verify that the seal on the ballot box closure is still unbroken and that the serial number is the same as the one recorded at the opening of the voting station. The serial number of the seal put on the slot of the ballot box after the close of voting should be verified as well. No ballot box should be transported without being sealed using security seals. Maintaining records of the serial numbers of the seals, and allowing representatives of political parties, candidates and observers to also maintain such records, is important and useful. Representatives of political parties and candidates may wish to put their own seals on the ballot box or simply sign, or attach their initials on, the ones used by the electoral management body. If political party and candidate representatives put their own seals on the ballot box, there has to be early consultation to ensure that the seals they use will fit on the ballot boxes and that the ballot boxes will be able to accommodate all the seals. Some ballot boxes are made of material that facilitates the affixation of seals or signatures, whereas others preclude such affixation. The format and design of the seals should be specified to prevent them from using their seals as advertising stickers. The required strength of the seals should be specified and enforced: if this is not done, the seals may break or fall off while in transit, causing unnecessary complaints and controversies. Controls on the process of manufacturing the official seals used by the electoral management body must provide adequate guarantees that seal substitution will not be possible. In addition, the seals must be strong enough to ensure that they will not break in transit due to the stress of movement of the boxes. It is highly recommended that clear specifications be developed prior to the ordering and production of large quantities. The seals should be serially numbered and tested for adherence to specifications. The control measures should be publicised and known in advance by all participants to the process as well as by the public to provide indications of transparency and security. However, an element of secrecy should be maintained regarding the exact design of materials to avoid illegal reproduction or copying. For example, when publicising the use of the seals, the exact design of the logo (if any) or other specific details about the seals should not be revealed. If reproduction copies are found, it should be easy to distinguish the official seals from counterfeit ones.
If a ballot box seal or tamper-evident bag arrives broken, a special procedure should be executed including dedicated officers trained to investigate such cases. A report should be made and signed by officials and the representatives of political parties and candidates and observers. Creation of Transport LogsWhenever ballot boxes are transported from voting station to counting centre, records should be kept to ensure that security is tight and that an audit trail is in place and the chain of custody remains intact. That way, risk can be minimised, and if anything is missing or tampering is suspected, the problem can be properly investigated.
A handover or transportation form should be used for the specific purpose of controlling the movement of ballot boxes. Information such as the list below could be included:
Moreover, space could be provided on the form to include basic information on the driver, type of vehicle used, and license plate number. If other means of transportation are used, such as aeroplane or boat, detailed information on the schedule, departure time, and flight number could be written on the form. If needed, details on the itinerary can also be written on the form (such as overnight stops, for example, or if any other type of stoppage is needed). Finally, the telephone number of a dispatcher at the electoral management body or the phone number of a contact at the destination could be indicated on the form should the driver need assistance to locate the counting centre destination.
Multiple copies of these forms could be produced for the following:
Representatives of political parties and candidates and observers should be allowed their own official copies. Arrangement for Transport of Ballot Boxes to the Counting CentreDomestic Arrangements Arrangements for transport should be negotiated and planned before the election is called. The electoral management body must ascertain that the chosen carrier has the capacity and capability to make the ballot box deliveries within required time frames while using appropriate security controls. The selection of the transport company (public or private) or organization (national or regional or international organization, police or army or other security service) will be dictated by the political, social and economical context of each country and depend on various risk factors. It is recommended that factors of reputation, dependability, political neutrality, financial strength, coverage of the territory, shipment-tracing capability, speed of delivery, and availability of contingency measures be used as evaluation criteria for selecting the carrier. When the election is called, a contract should be in place and fully negotiated as to the details of obligation and procedure. The contract should include specific performance clauses, with an applicable penalty for partial or non-delivery. For the sake of transparency the contract should be awarded through a tender process. If it is not possible to select a single carrier, or if the political situation requires the presence of security forces or reliable and trusted persons, considerations should be given to allow political party and candidate representatives, as well as observers, to accompany the ballot boxes. However, the right to accompany ballot boxes must be equally open to a cross-section of the parties and candidates concerned. An EMB official should always be present during the transportation and formally be in-charge of the material. To limit the number of people participating in the transportation process, prior agreements between all parties involved are encouraged to assign two persons representing different political sides in the same vehicle along with the election or if this impracticable in a separate vehicle. Observers should be allowed to accompany the ballot boxes, but for practical reasons, they might have to follow in a separate vehicle. Security forces may be required in certain political environments. Agreements with security forces should be made prior to the election by the electoral management body to determine the extent and level of security required. If this is not planned properly, the requirements can impose a burden on the security forces. The security arrangements should also be made known to the political parties and candidates. This is particularly important if there is mistrust or lack of confidence in the security forces by the population or the political parties. International Arrangements Transportation of ballots across national boundaries and throughout the world will require a different approach from domestic arrangements and involve very careful planning. Time zones, customs, carrier's schedules, and other types of delays in transport may impact the starting date and hour of the counting process. (see Special Considerations for Counting Votes Cast Outside the Country) Transport of Ballot BoxesThe ballot boxes should be transported to the counting centre in a vehicle with a closed compartment and a lock that can be sealed. An EMB official should be present and in charge of the material. All the proper information on the vehicle, the driver, the numbers of the seals used on the closed compartment, etc. should be written on a waybill and given to the driver. This same information should be communicated to the counting centre so that it can be checked upon receipt. Such measures promote efficiency of transport and prevent fraud. In the process of transfer from one kind of transport method to another (when using more than one type of transportation such as from a truck to a boat and then back to a truck), the EMB official should verify the following: that all ballot boxes were transferred; that a new seal was placed on the lock of the compartment of the new transport vehicle; and note the number of the new seal on the waybill. The driver of the new vehicle should sign the waybill indicating that the transfer was properly done. Persons who accompany the ballot boxes (representatives of political parties and candidates, observers and electoral officers) should sign as well. In areas where potential violence may compromise the safe delivery of the ballot boxes, a vehicle escorting the carrying vehicle may be appropriate. Armed forces, police, or a national or international organization may be used to provide the needed security. An election official and representatives of political parties should accompany the ballot boxes and observers can follow in another vehicle. The ballot boxes should not be left unattended at any time unless they are locked in secure storage. To demonstrate transparency during transportation, representatives of political parties and candidates and observers should be encouraged to accompany the ballot boxes from the voting station to the counting centre. Prior arrangements must be made regarding who is delegated as a representative of political parties and candidates during transportation, since it will not be possible to have representatives of many political parties and candidates accompanying the ballot box transport. Once at the counting centre, the official responsible for the reception of the ballot boxes should collect the waybill from the driver and verify all information: numbers on the seals, driver identification, etc. The same information should be verified against information previously transmitted. The official then breaks the seal and the ballot boxes are counted and removed from the vehicle to the planned location in the counting centre. All forms attached to the ballot box and the seals are verified before putting a sticker or coloured tape on the ballot box indicating that the ballot box is ready to be counted. The waybill is completed and signed by the official responsible for the reception of the ballot box, the driver, and representatives of political parties and candidates. Official copies should be given to the driver, representatives of political parties and candidates and observers. The electoral official, who is receiving the ballot boxes at the counting centre, should keep the original. Securing Ballot Boxes During TransportationIf one or more ballot boxes from the same voting station are to be transported directly to a counting centre, it is advisable to use just one vehicle. If possible, at least two representatives of political parties and candidates, representing different political parties could be in the same vehicle along with the election official present during the transportation. Observers should be allowed to accompany the ballot boxes. Since some ballot boxes are bulky and heavy, and it is more practical to have one vehicle carry the ballot boxes of multiple voting stations to a distant counting centre, it may be necessary to use a rented vehicle with a closed compartment at the back with a lock that can be sealed. Once the lock is sealed, the serial number of the seal along with a brief description of the content (number of ballot boxes and their respective voting station numbers) and the name of driver and passengers can then be transmitted to the final destination by fax or phone and verified on arrival. This information should also be recorded on the waybill. A new seal should be used, and the numbers of the previous seal recorded, each time more boxes are added to a shipment. Usually, these measures will be sufficient to deter any tampering of the ballot boxes. In areas where potential violence may compromise the safe delivery of the ballot boxes, a vehicle escorting the carrying vehicle may be appropriate. Depending of the safety of the area, military or police forces may provide the escorting vehicle(s). Their presence may be an advantage as their vehicles generally have communication capabilities, which could be used in case of emergencies. Transmission of transport details to the counting centre or electoral management body prior to the departure of vehicles is recommended and representatives of political parties and candidates and observers should be allowed to travel, according to previously settled arrangements, with the escorting vehicles. The transportation of ballot boxes in the most dangerous and violent areas can be done with the assistance of military/police vehicles. Armed vehicles equipped with radios or phones may be necessary to provide the security required. However, agreements with all political parties and candidates should be obtained prior to Election Day, especially in areas where the role of the military in the political process has been questioned. To address any potential criticism, and as far as practically possible, voting station officers, political party and candidate representatives, and observers should be assigned to travel in the same armed vehicles according to arrangements negotiated in advance by the electoral management body. If, at the destination, it is found that any ballot boxes have been tampered with or are missing, the matter should be reported directly to the electoral management body. The electoral authorities must be ready to begin an investigation, as soon as possible, and conduct interviews with the driver to recollect the sequence of events and, if necessary, confirm this with the passengers. To facilitate the recollection of events, a logbook should be provided to the driver to note all departure/arrival times and other events occurring during the transportation (fuel stops, breaks, overnight stays, etc.). At no time should a ballot box transport vehicle be left unattended.
During unavoidable stops the driver and assistant/passengers should take turns to guard the ballot boxes. Unloading of Ballot BoxesOnce the vehicles transporting the ballot boxes arrive at the counting centre, designated officials should unload in the order of arrival. If a queue of vehicles is forming, an attendant could distribute tickets indicating the time of arrival. This will maintain a sequential order of priority in processing the vehicles/teams, and also allow an accurate recording of the time of arrival in the receipt log. The waybill and/or the transportation form should be collected from the driver(see Completion of Transport Logs) and verified: the driver's identification, numbers of the seals, etc. The documentation should also be verified against information previously transmitted to the counting centre from the voting station. The seal on the vehicle should only be broken once proper verification is completed and an exact count of the number of ballot boxes to be received is known. The ballot boxes are then unloaded, one-by-one, from the vehicle and moved to the planned intake destination in the counting centre. This operation should be under constant supervision from officials of the counting centre. The official responsible for reception of the ballot boxes should verify that the seals are unbroken, and that sealed envelopes are attached to the ballot boxes. If all safeguards are in order, a sticker, coloured tape, or other type of symbolic identification could be placed on the ballot boxes as they are removed from the vehicle. This will indicate that these ballot boxes are verified and ready to be counted. This measure can also help to prevent the counting a ballot box twice, or missing a ballot box in the count. The ballot boxes that are ready to be counted should be in a location where they will not be mixed with ballot boxes already counted. Once all the ballot boxes are unloaded from the truck, a last verification count of the number received against the number expected via the transport logs should be done. Once the receiving officer at the counting centre is satisfied all materials have been received, the handover form is completed and signed. A receipt form can be issued to the driver to verify delivery completion. If the seals on ballot boxes are broken or there is any sign of possible tampering, these ballot boxes should be set aside in a separate area quarantined, and not mixed with others. A special procedure should be executed including dedicated officers trained to investigate such cases. A report for each of them should be written and signed by officials, drivers, representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers present during the transportation. These ballot boxes should be clearly identified as “not to be opened”, with a label or other form of sticker, to ensure they will not be confused with “ready-to-be-counted” ballot boxes. Any matter of possible tampering should immediately be addressed to the electoral management body so they can start an investigation. Until further notice from the electoral management body, these ballot boxes should be left untouched and secured. Completion of Transport LogsA document or other type of communication informing the counting centre of the departure of the vehicle from a voting station should be made.
This communication, whether through phone, email or SMS, should provide the counting centre with the following information:
This document/information will be checked against actual information provided at the time of unloading the vehicle. Quantities of ballot boxes and their voting station numbers should be carefully checked. If discrepancies are found, they should be noted on the log and the electoral management body should be informed immediately. If ballot boxes are missing, verification electoral officers should verify with the departure point to ensure that the information provided at the time of departure did not change. It is possible that a ballot box may have been routed through another vehicle. If the vehicle transporting the ballot boxes has a separate sealed compartment, the serial numbers of the seals should be verified against the information provided prior to departure. The driver should not break the seal unless an election official of the counting centre is present and has verified the number. All other steps mentioned above apply. Once all the information is checked and verified, the official responsible for the receipt of the ballot box should sign the waybill and indicate the arrival and completion times and date. The driver and representatives of political parties and candidates who accompanied the ballot boxes should also sign this waybill. Each of them should be allowed to keep a copy. In case the EMB official accompanying the material is not able to produce the waybill or the transportation form for the election official, special measures should be taken. Identification of the EMB official, driver and passenger(s) should be verified against the information transmitted by phone/email or other means. The license plate and the number of the seal on the vehicle compartment should be verified as well.
If all this information is confirmed, the officials may process the ballot boxes as per laid down procedures. However, the official responsible for the receipt of the ballot boxes at the counting centre should make an entry in the logbook regarding the absence of the waybill/transportation form. In all cases, discrepancies should be promptly reported to the electoral management body. Opening and Closing of Ballot BoxesBefore the ballot boxes are opened, a check could be made that there are only authorised persons present in the counting centre. In some instances the list of authorised persons might include members of the armed forces and media. Once the ballot boxes are at the counting centre and ready to be counted, the counting officer will verify the seals on the ballot box and open it. The contents are emptied on a table in the presence of counting officers, representatives of political parties and candidates, observers, etc. Sealed envelopes attached to the ballot boxes are opened and verification of the reconciliation done at the voting station is made. The ballots on the table are counted to establish quantity. The number of ballots in the ballot box should match the number of voters who voted. This figure should be compared to the one written on the ballot account form completed at the voting station. A last reconciliation is done once all ballots are sorted and tallied by candidate and party to verify that all totals are correct before making the official entries and completing the statement of the vote for the ballot box. Everybody (observers and security personnel may be excluded) involved in the counting process should sign the forms to confirm that the accounting of ballots was satisfactory, or to state that they are aware of the source of the discrepancy (if any) and that they agree with the decision taken by the counting official. Once the forms are completed and the ballots bundled, the ballot box will be closed and re-sealed with all the ballots inside. In case of discrepancies, the counting process should be repeated until the missing ballots are found, even if only one ballot is missing. If, after verification, the missing ballots are still not found, the electoral management body should be informed of the problem and verification of their ballot accounts should be done (especially verification of the number of ballots sent to the voting station). Keeping higher authorities informed of any problem is part of the transparency required in an election. If no solution is found, appropriate amendments should be made on the ballot account forms (and on any form on which this information is required) and on the statement of the vote signed by the counting official and representatives of political parties and candidates. This new figure should then become the official one for the ballot box. In some jurisdictions, counting of ballots that cannot be reconciled or that are not within a certain tolerance, (i.e. difference is not more than 2, 3 or 5 ballots, legislation, regulations, or directives may prohibit proceeding with the count. If significant discrepancies are discovered, local rules could apply to the level of action taken.
In some cases, if significant fraud is suspected, it may be necessary to delay opening and counting the contents of a ballot box until the electoral management body investigates the problem and decides what to do with the ballot box. Electoral officers and others involved should be aware of these provisions through their training. Merging Results to Protect Secrecy In some situations, electoral management bodies will combine, merge, or amalgamate results of several ballot boxes. This is generally done if the voting procedure makes it possible to identify every person whose vote has gone into a particular ballot box; or if the number of votes in the ballot box is so small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate or party. In such cases, the secrecy of the vote could be compromised. Results should be combined (mixed or amalgamated) with another ballot box. This can also be done in cases where it appears that the secrecy of individual votes can be secured. There is real risk arising from the fact that a particular voting station, having voted predominantly in a particular way, could result in retribution being visited on the persons who voted at that voting station. Mixing the ballots from two or more boxes from different areas, and then attributing all the votes to one ballot box with proper notation in the results form can mitigate these problems. The counting centre approach is appropriate for making this type of modification effective in counting procedures. For internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers per box can be made to keep the audit trail clear. Combining (merging) results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other category of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body or in a specific counting centre, results can easily be combined (merged) with other results to protect the secrecy of the vote.
Once again, for internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers by category can be made to keep the audit trail clear. Sorting of BallotsGeneral Overview In the case of multiple ballot elections (for example, presidential, national legislature, and municipal elections on the same day) an order of priority for counting these ballots should be given to avoid mistakes and confusion in the counting process. This should be part of the rules given to the counting officers during the training sessions and in the documentation of operational procedures for counting. Instructions should also be given for procedures to be used in cases where ballots are found in the wrong box. Only one person should handle the initial sorting of ballots from a ballot box, usually the counting official in charge of that ballot box. Spoiled ballots should already have been separated and sealed in an envelope attached to the ballot box. A spoiled ballot is simply one that a voter marks incorrectly and hands back to voting station officers in exchange for a new ballot. Spoiled ballots should never be found in the ballot box. Once the ballot box is open, the counting officer or representative of political parties and candidates verifies the validity of each ballot in the process of counting. The counting officer must be able to distinguish between a valid ballot and a counterfeit one by the watermark or any other mark made to identify valid ballot papers. Any counterfeit ballots identified should be set aside, counted and reported to the electoral management body as an attempt at fraud. The counting official will divide all ballots by candidates and political party as they are counted. At the same time, he/she can determine all potentially rejected ballots and sets them aside. After the count of valid ballots is complete, the counting officer must go through the pile, of potential rejected ballots and decide on the validity of each one. The counting officer determines potential rejected ballots to actually be valid, and these are separated by candidate and party. All invalid ballots, as well as any counterfeit ballots, are counted and set aside. The counting officer will then add to the initial number of valid ballots for each candidate and political party the additional valid ballots, and make a total count for each candidate and political party. Rules of interpretation, guidelines, and illustrations regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting officer, and be known in advance to facilitate the decision making process. In all cases, rejected ballots should be put aside and kept. No ballots are to be destroyed at this stage. The separation of rejected ballots is important to create an audit trail of the count and is an essential component if there is to be a recount of the ballots. Rejected ballots must be closely examined and the counting official should announce the reason for rejection of each such ballot. Political party or candidate representatives should be able to examine the rejected ballots although in some jurisdiction non-EMB personnel are not allowed to physically handled ballot papers. If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting official, they should be able to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. Clear rules must exist for recording objections made by representatives of political parties or candidates. Once the spoiled, counterfeit (if any), and rejected ballots have been separated, the valid ballots can be counted. The representatives of political parties/candidates/ options, and other persons allowed in the counting centre for the counting, should be able to make their own count.
The various representatives and observers witnessing the count must also be able to see each ballot that is counted. For more efficiency, other counting officer could assist the counting official. It must, however, be very clear who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of any ballot in question. Checking Validity of the BallotWhen ballots are sorted the counting officer must distinguish valid ballots from counterfeits. Each ballot in the ballot box needs to be verified. In some jurisdictions, security paper is often used for ballots. This paper contains a watermark or other form of unique identification (special colour, lines, symbols, or logos) making the ballot virtually impossible to counterfeit. The texture, thickness, colours, size, and format of the ballot are also indicators that will differentiate a valid ballot from a counterfeit. The counting officer should know where to look on the ballot to be sure of its authenticity. If he/she doesn't recognise the ballot or the ballot was not issued at the voting station, it should not be included in the count and should be put aside. To speed up the process of authenticating the ballots, certain jurisdictions require that the voting station officer append their initials in a provided space at the back of the ballot before handing it to the voter. If the initials at the back of the ballot are not from the voting station officer or are missing, then it should be set aside and not counted as a valid ballot. These initials should appear on the ballot account form, transportation form, the seals, or voting record book. If no initials are on the back of the ballot, the ballot should not be counted as valid. This measure of appending a voting station officer’s initial at the back of the ballot can help to identify valid ballots from counterfeit ones, but the official's initial should always be identical to protect the voter's secrecy of the vote. The voting station officer should always use the same colour of pen or pencil to append his/her initials. In all cases, all ballots are kept, even if they are not valid. No ballots should be destroyed (at this stage of the process, see Challenging Results for more details on how long ballots should be kept) as an audit trail of all ballots considered must be assembled so that the count can be fully reconstructed. If there is any doubt, and before taking the decision to reject a ballot as counterfeit, the counting officer should be able to verify the basis of his decision with the supervisor of the counting centre and/or with the electoral management body. Rejecting a ballot on the basis that it is counterfeit is an important decision and should be done when there is certainty.Separating Spoiled and Rejected BallotsOne way to separate valid ballots is to unfold all ballots, one by one. The counting officer makes sure that the ballot is valid (see Separating Spoiled/Rejected Ballots for a discussion about spoiled and rejected ballots). The counting officer may call out the name of the candidate or political party for whom the ballot has been marked and hold up the ballot for all to see. If several persons are involved with separating and counting the ballots and identifying those that are potentially to be rejected, the practice of calling out names may not be useful. It may be more efficient to separate the ballots according to choice (without counting them), setting aside those potentially to be rejected, and then establish which ballots are actually to be rejected. After the rejections are finalised, the piles of valid ballots for each candidate or party can be quickly counted. In all cases, only counting officers should handle ballots and it must be made very clear that the counting official is the only person entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot. The advantage of showing the ballot and calling out the result of each ballot considered is that it allows the representatives of political party and candidates and observers to make their own count. The disadvantage is that the process is interrupted each time a rejected ballot is discovered; this tends to make the count of valid ballots very inefficient. It can also create a very noisy environment and it could confuse counting officers working at another table. Whichever method is used, the valid ballot papers are put in separate piles on the table; one pile per candidate, political parties, or option (in the latter case for a referendum). The examination of the ballot should allow observers, representatives of political parties and candidates to see the ballot and ensure that it is appropriately separated according to choice. They should have controlled access to contest the validity of sorted ballots. If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting officers, official objections can be made.
While transparency of the process is important, controls on movement of ballots should always be the first concern of the counting officer. Separating Valid BallotsOne way to separate valid ballots is to unfold all ballots, one by one. The counting officer makes sure that the ballot is valid (see Separating Spoiled/Rejected Ballots for a discussion about spoiled and rejected ballots). The counting officer may call out the name of the candidate or political party for whom the ballot has been marked and hold up the ballot for all to see. If several persons are involved with separating and counting the ballots and identifying those that are potentially to be rejected, the practice of calling out names may not be useful. It may be more efficient to separate the ballots according to choice (without counting them), setting aside those potentially to be rejected, and then establish which ballots are actually to be rejected. After the rejections are finalised, the piles of valid ballots for each candidate or party can be quickly counted. In all cases, only counting officers should handle ballots and it must be made very clear that the counting official is the only person entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot. The advantage of showing the ballot and calling out the result of each ballot considered is that it allows the representatives of political party and candidates and observers to make their own count. The disadvantage is that the process is interrupted each time a rejected ballot is discovered; this tends to make the count of valid ballots very inefficient. It can also create a very noisy environment and it could confuse counting officers working at another table. Whichever method is used, the valid ballot papers are put in separate piles on the table; one pile per candidate, political parties, or option (in the latter case for a referendum). The examination of the ballot should allow observers, representatives of political parties and candidates to see the ballot and ensure that it is appropriately separated according to choice. They should have controlled access to contest the validity of sorted ballots. If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting officers, official objections can be made.
While transparency of the process is important, controls on movement of ballots should always be the first concern of the counting officer.
CountingSummary of the Process To facilitate the process of counting, ballots can be bundled by groups of fifty, for example, to facilitate keeping a count of the votes counted. It is desirable for every bundle of ballots to be counted at least twice, with one officer checking the work of the other official. For example, depending on the number of political parties or candidates and also on the number of counting officers, each counting officer can be responsible for receiving and counting all ballots cast for one or more political parties or candidates. Later the counting officers can exchange all ballots cast that they are counting for ballots counted by another counting officer and verify each other's totals. Verification of counting is very important since those results will be added to the final results. All ballots are counted, including spoiled, rejected, and unused ballots. Even if not counted as valid, these ballots are important for the audit trail and will be needed in case of a recount. To eliminate possible objections over the validity of ballots, the counting officer should be provided with clear rules of interpretation of accepted marks on the ballot and all reasons that should lead to rejection of a ballot. Minimising the interpretation that is needed by the counting officer makes it easier for him to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots. If the validity of a ballot is objected to or challenged, the counting officer should be the only person able to make a decision, even if other counting workers are involved in the counting process. To be more consistent in his/her decisions, the counting officer can put all questionable ballots in one separate pile, decide on all rejected ballots following the count of valid ones and then add any additional valid votes to the appropriate candidate or political party. Alternatively, the ballots can be first separated, then, the counting officer decides on questionable ballots, and then each pile can be counted. Each disputed ballot should be numbered on the back. The same number should be written on the statement of the vote (or other form, as prescribed) for each ballot box along with the decision made by the counting officer. To count the ballots, the counting officer often uses a count sheet. The representatives of political parties and candidates and observers may have a count sheet as well. The official count sheet is used by the counting officer in charge of the count for a particular ballot box. The count sheet is a tool used to facilitate the count. For each vote for each candidate or party, a mark is made on the count sheet. Periodically, the marks for each political party or candidate are added together. Although the count sheet used by the counting officer is the only official sheet. Observers and party/candidate representatives should count along the counting officer to prevent errors or to make observations about the counting in case the results they have is different from the results the counting officer has. If a mistake is made during the process, comparison with the count sheets of other counting workers can be made. If the mistake is still not found, the count should be restarted from the last point of agreement. A verification of the count should be done once the ballots are counted. This verification is usually the last one made. It is important to make sure that no votes were changed during the count in favour or against one candidate or party. It should include a comparison to the previous reconciliation (the one done at the voting station and the one done once the ballot box was opened). The total number of ballots cast for each candidate or party plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. This information should be duly noted on the ballot account form completed at the voting station. If it doesn't, any discrepancies should be investigated by the counting officer. Discrepancies may be a reflection of mistakes made at an earlier stage. Once the counting process is over, the ballots are bundled and put back into the ballot box along with all relevant forms. A copy of the statement of the vote should be in a separate envelope, on the outside of the ballot box. Both the envelope and the ballot box should be sealed before being transferred to the planned location in the counting centre for the counted ballot boxes.
In the event of a recount, all these documents are needed. This explains why elaborate precautions about sealing the ballot box contents are important. For more safety, the seal could even be signed by the counting officer and the party and candidate representative. The counting officer should keep one official copy in case of loss. Count of Spoiled and Rejected BallotsSpoiled, rejected, and unused ballots must be counted to create a complete audit trail. Spoiled and unused ballots are supposed to be counted at the voting station, before the ballot box is transported to the counting centre.
These ballots remain official documents even if not counted as valid. Additionally, rejected ballots are essential in case of a recount. Rules of Interpretation for Rejected Ballots This is one of the most challenging aspects of vote counting, as each counting officer brings his/her subjective decision making abilities to the task, irrespective of how effective their training was. In an attempt to eliminate possible objections to the validity of a ballot, the counting officer should be provided with clear rules of interpretation and given illustrations of acceptable and unacceptable marks on the ballot, including the rationale for any rejection of a ballot.
Minimizing the interpretation that is needed by the counting officer makes it easier for him/her to take the necessary decisions and will reduce disputes over the validity of ballots. In the event of a close margin in favour of one candidate or party, a recount is likely to be asked for and rejected ballots will be carefully analysed. Handling Disputes Regarding Rejections In several jurisdictions, the counting officer is the only person qualified to make the final decision on the validity of a ballot. He is also the person handling disputes regarding objections. If a representative of a candidate or political party doesn't agree with the counting official on the validity of a ballot, he may object to the decision. In most cases, the counting officer has to immediately make a decision on whether or not the ballot is valid. To be more consistent in his/her decisions, the counting officer may put all questionable and contested ballots in a separate pile while counting valid ballots. He/she can then decide which of the potential rejected ballots will actually be rejected, and count the total number of rejections. Remaining valid ballots then be added to the count for each political party or candidate. Alternatively, all potential rejected ballots can be pre-identified, decided on, and counted first, and then valid ballots can be counted subsequently. For each objected ballot, the ballot will be numbered on the back. The same number will be written on the statement of the vote (the voting record book or a separate form can also be used) for each ballot box along with the decision made by the counting officer.
All rejected and spoiled ballots are counted and recorded in the statement of the votes for each ballot box as well as on the ballot account form.
Count of Valid BallotsTo count the ballots, the counting officer can use a count sheet. The representatives of political parties and candidates and observers may have a count sheet as well. The official one is the one used by the counting officer. The proper information regarding the ballot box number and the constituency or electoral district should be written in at the top or bottom of the form. In each column, the names of each candidate or party as they appear on the ballot should be written. There are two usual types of count sheet: one where each square represents a vote for a candidate or party and one where square is drawn with a diagonal mark denoting five votes For the first one, each square may be marked for each vote for a candidate or party. At the end, the total for each will be easy to count. For the second, four vertical marks and one diagonal one are made. Each completed square equals five votes for a candidate or party. Establishing correlation between count sheets requires a pause for consensus as to how many votes are recorded per candidate or party at certain set times (every 100 ballots for example).
Restarting the count at the last point of correlation is much more efficient than beginning the entire count. Whichever agreements are reached in the counting process must be clear for all individuals present before the counting starts. Verification of CountReconciling to Ballot Account Totals It is recommended that a verification of the count should be done once the ballots of one ballot box are counted. This verification is usually the last one made before preparing the statement of the vote for the ballot box and transmitting the information to the person in charge of making the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre. This last verification is important to make sure that no ballots have been introduced or removed that would modify the results in favour or against one candidate or party. This last verification includes comparison of the reconciliation done previously, both before opening the ballot box and when the ballot box was opened. The total of ballots for each candidate or party plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. This information was provided on the ballot account form completed at the voting station.
If errors are detected, the count sheet should be verified against count sheets of other counting officers working at the same table on the same ballot box. If the error is still not found, then all the ballots counted per candidate/party/option should be re-examined and recounted.
Sealing of the Ballot BoxTo ensure the safety of its contents, the ballot boxes should be resealed, with all the ballots inside, before returning the boxes to the planned location for ballot boxes already counted. This is very important in case of a recount. In certain jurisdictions, all forms such as count sheets, the voting record book, and the voter's list are also put into the ballot box along with the ballots before sealing. The ballot box's statement of the vote should not be added to the other documents, but put in a separate tamper-evident envelope. However, this envelope should itself be sealed to make sure that no unauthorised person has access to the results and any attempted changes can be detected by higher authorities. A copy of the statement of the vote should already have been transmitted to the person in charge of combining the results for the counting centre. Ballots are placed in bundles, by category (candidates, parties, rejected ballots, spoiled ballots, unused ballots, etc.) in the ballot box. Once all the ballots and relevant forms are in the box, the box may be sealed and transferred to the planned location in the counting centre for ballot boxes already counted. The seal number should be written on the statement of the vote and attached, in a sealed tamper-evident envelope, to the ballot box. Even if all the envelopes are sealed, it is still important to reseal the ballot box. In the event of a recount, all these documents are needed; thus the elaborate precautions for sealing the ballot box contents.
If a paper seal is used, for additional security, some jurisdictions require that the counting officers as well as representatives of political parties and candidates sign the ballot box seal. Transmitting Counting Centre ResultsSummary of Process Once the counting process is over, the counting officer prepares the statement of the vote for each voting station. Progress reports for each counting centre will also be sent to the national office of the electoral management body using a pre-determined communications format, often via internet, preferably using a VPN (virtual private network, whereby the public internet is used as a conduit for securely encrypted data between a counting centre and the EMBs national headquarters).
The electoral management body releases the results as they come in, after various checks have been performed. A cumulative statement of the vote will also be prepared for the counting centre and shared with party agents, observers and accredited journalists. Statement of the Vote for Each Election in Voting Station This form indicates the results of election day and should include standard information such as the name, and if applicable, the number of the electoral district, the number of the voting station, ballot box and date.
Specific information on the count should include:
This information should correspond to the ballot account form completed at the voting station. Then, the number of valid ballots for each candidate and political party and total number of valid ballots should be recorded. The counting officer signs the form, as does the representatives of political parties and candidates. Along with their signatures, the following information could be found: printed names, addresses, and telephone numbers. If there are later investigations, it will be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them. Some jurisdictions require all counting officers present at the counting table to sign the statement of the vote. A transcribed copy, carbon copy, or a photocopy of the statement of the vote for the ballot box is given to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre. Representatives of political parties and candidates are allowed official copies of the statements of the vote.
Any observers should also receive an official copy of the results. The original is attached to the ballot box in a sealed tamper-evident envelope. Progress Reports Once all the ballot boxes for an electoral district are counted, these results should be sent directly to the central office of the electoral management body. In some places the EMB has predetermined intervals where counting centres are supposed to report updated interim results. The purpose of these reports is to allow the electoral management body to release results as they are counted and checked and made ready for release as provisional official results. The same information is needed for the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre in questions.
Where electronic voting systems are used and where these are connected to the EMB’s HQ, such reporting can be automatic. Cumulative Statement of the Vote for Counting Centre Once the vote statement form for all ballot boxes making up a voting station has been completed, a copy should be transmitted to the person in charge of combining results and creating a cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre. If more than one ballot box has been used for the election in question, the vote statement form can only be completed once all ballot boxes have been counted. The person in charge of combining results will transmit the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre to the national office of the electoral management body as soon as it is completed to allow the national office to gather the national results as soon as possible. International practise now requires that the counting centre also reports the results by voting station thereby adhering to the accepted level of transparency for a results management system. The transmission can be done by telephone or cellular phone using a unique security code to ensure the proper identification of the person transmitting the results. However, in order to enhance accuracy and facilitate processing of results data at the national results centre, counting centres are nowadays predominantly sending electronic files via internet. It is recognised that in rural and remote parts of some countries the communications infrastructure does not permit oral or electronic reporting of voting results. In such locations, a pre-determined election officer should hand deliver both the cumulative statement of the vote and statements by voting station to the national office. After the results have been reported orally or electronically, the original of the cumulative statement of the votes for the counting centre should be transmitted to the national office of the electoral management body by hand or by courier in a sealed tamper-evident envelope. Party and candidate representatives, as well as observers, should be aware of this activity and be allowed to be present during the transportation of the original statement of votes forms. This measure is essential to prevent fraud and to provide evidence of any tampering with results. An official copy of the statement of the vote for each voting station; the cumulative statement for the counting centre; as well as periodic progress reports; are given to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre. Another official copy is posted at the counting centre. Any observers and representatives of political parties and candidates are allowed an official copy of the results forms. As the print and electronic media are considered a key element in a free and democratic society, it is recommended that they be given access to the results at both the counting centre and at the national offices of the electoral management body where results are being reported. Some jurisdictions make special provision for the media at the counting centres, facilitating live electronic broadcasts. This is especially important if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question and to ensure transparency of the work of the electoral management body, during the counting process.
To control who is allowed at the counting centre or at the electoral management body offices, proper accreditation must be given by the electoral management body. The media representatives on site should wear accreditation identification, as should party and candidate representatives and observers.
Progress Reports; Cumulative Statement of VotesStatement of the Vote for a Voting Station The statement of the vote is a form on which results are written. The counting official completes this form and includes each ballot box used for the election in question at the voting station. In most cases, only one ballot box is used for each type of election in a voting station, but due to large turnout or large-sized ballot papers, more than one ballot box can be used for the very same election in a voting station.
On the statement of the vote for each election in a voting station the following general information could be found:
Representatives of political parties and candidates present at the counting table can also append their signatures on the form, if part of the regulations. Along with their signatures, the following information should be found: printed names, addresses and telephone numbers. In case of any investigations or complaints it will then be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them.
Specific information on the count should include:
The following information should be added:
Additional detailed information - such as the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box or numbers of the ballot box itself - is required to appear on the statement in some jurisdictions.
This form is an important document since it provides the information used by the electoral management body to release the results. The counting officer responsible for the processing of the ballot box(es) for the voting station in questions should complete this form with utmost care. Progress Report Once all the ballot boxes for an electoral district are counted, the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre should prepare a progress report to be sent to the electoral management body.
The progress report should contain the same information as the statement of the vote for each ballot box, or consist of a summary for the entire electoral district. Cumulative Statement of the Vote for a Counting Centre
Once the statement of the vote for a voting station is completed, a copy is given to the person responsible for combining the results for the counting centre. Each statement of the vote for each voting station counted in the counting centre is included on this cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre. The same general information is needed:
The figure for each voting station is reproduced on the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre. Specific information could include the number of the ballot box and the total number of valid ballots for each candidate/political party/option; total number of rejected ballots; total number of spoiled ballots; total number of valid ballots for each ballot box. The total for each column is added, creating the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre. Issuing the Statement of Votes
The statement of the vote for each voting station, the progress reports and cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre should be prepared with care since it represents the final results of the election for a counting centre, unless subject to a recount. Statement of the Vote for Each Voting Station The statement of the vote for each voting station is usually prepared and signed by the counting officer. In most cases, only one ballot box is used for each type of election in a voting station, but due to large turnout or large-sized ballot papers, more than one ballot box can be used for the very same election in a voting station. If more than one box are used for each voting station, and votes will be counted at the voting station, the boxes should be carefully and clearly identify to belong to the specified voting station. Representatives of political parties and candidates present at the counting table often then sign the form. Their signature is very important as it reflects and demonstrates that they agree and acknowledge the results. The printed name, address, and telephone number, if any, could also be on the form along with the signature of voting station officials and representatives of political parties and candidates. In case of any future complaint or investigation, the electoral management body will then more easily be able to contact these persons.
Concerning principle of transparency, it is strongly recommended that the observers as well as political party and candidate representatives each be able to obtain an official copy of the statement of the votes. Statement of the Vote for the Counting Centre The person responsible for combining the results for the counting centre should complete the progress report and the cumulative statement of the vote. The statement for the counting centre is often signed by representatives of political parties and candidates.
Information contained on this form should also be made available to them, and to any observers present. An official copy of the actual form should be provided. Communicating Results to National LevelOnce the statement of the vote for each voting station is completed, the counting officer should give a copy of the results to the person responsible for combining the results at the counting centre. For greater transparency, periodic progress reports should be sent to the central office of the electoral management body. These progress reports should be sent by the electoral district officer and will enable the electoral management body to release results as they come in, after performing required checks.
Once all ballot boxes in a counting centre have been counted, a cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre needs to be transmitted to the national office of the electoral management body. International practise now requires that the counting centre also reports the results by voting station thereby adhering to the accepted level of transparency for a results management system. This practice allows political party and candidate representatives to check the final results against their copies of the vote counting form, thus, strengthens the transparency of the process. Communication of the Results The progress report and cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre should be transmitted to the office of the national electoral management body by phone (cellular or fixed line), or other electronic means. For security reasons, a unique password or code should be provided to the person who will transmit the results, or other forms of ensuring secure transmission of results electronically could be considered. The electoral management body should issue this password or code on the day of the election itself. This code will reduce the possibility of impersonation, which will screen out unauthorised persons from transmitting incorrect or biased election results to the national office of the electoral management body. For more security, and to detect any attempts at fraud, the original cumulative statement of the vote form should be sent separately to the central office of the electoral management body in a sealed tamper-evident envelope. This envelope should be sent by hand or by courier. Party and candidate representatives and observers should be aware of this mechanism and allowed to be present during transportation.
By sending the original, the electoral management body can verify the results against the one previously sent by telephone or electronically and ensure they are the same. Alternative Methods for Communicating to the Electoral Management Body If internet, cellular or fixed line phones are unavailable at a counting centre, alternative methods should be considered. Walkie-talkie or radio emitting devices do not require the installation of a phone line and are flexible and simple in their use. However, the error rate often increases when using radio communication something the EMB need to make stakeholders aware of when releasing provisional results. Satellite phones can also be used where appropriate, though the costs of the handsets and the service may be prohibitive. However, their deployment should take into consideration the topography of the area to identify in advance any blackout regions where it is impossible to receive or transmit messages. Again, appropriate training and identification codes should be provided to counting centre workers before deployment. If it is not possible to use any means of wireless communication, the last resort is hand-to-hand delivery by election officials of the results to the electoral management body using tamper- evident envelopes. If this is not possible the last alternative is to designate a messenger, who should be a credible, authorised person. As a general rule, electronic transmission should be utilised at the earliest possible point. For example, if a presiding officer is unable to use a cell phone to transmit results from the polling station because of poor coverage, he or she may deliver the results by hand to the local office. If there is cellular coverage at the local office, the presiding officer may now transmit results electronically.
The person chosen to transport the results should be accepted by counting officers as well as representatives of the political parties and candidates in advance. Role of Print/Electronic Media The media will likely compete to provide their forecast of the election results as quickly as possible after the counting process begins. The counting centres are most likely locations for the media to base their reporting activities. Since the print or electronic media is considered a key element in a free and democratic society, it is recommended that they be given controlled access to counting centres, especially if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question. To keep control of who is allowed at the counting centre, proper accreditation should be given in advance by the electoral management body and media representatives should wear corresponding identification. It is important that the disruption of counting activities is minimised. Should the media decide to station their representatives at the national office of the electoral management body offices or at the counting centres, specific physical areas should be set aside to accommodate them. If they require specific installations such as internet, they should make their needs known well before election day. Usually, media should be allowed to have access to the same results provided by the electoral management body to representatives of political parties and candidates and observers. The exponential growth in the use of social media has made it all but impossible for elections management bodies to fully contain the dissemination of results. Even where there are legal prohibitions on the publishing of provisional or interim results by, for example, television or radio stations or newspapers, the use of SMS, email, and such channels as Twitter, Facebook make it all but impossible to prevent the widespread dissemination of election results.
Accordingly, elections management bodies should reconsider the regulations in light of the ground realities. The trend towards early and complete disclosure of polling station results, in response to multi-media dissemination is visible. Route of Statement of the Vote for Each Voting Station Copies of the statement of the vote for each voting station should be provided to the counting officer, to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre, and one should be in a sealed tamper-evident envelope attached to the ballot box. Representatives of political parties and candidates present at the counting table, and observers should be allowed to receive official copies. Such copies can be made from a multi-part carbon copy form, or through the use of photocopy machine. Alternatively, multiple copies can be prepared by hand, but need to be signed by the appropriate EMB official.
The original copy of the statement of the vote for a ballot box should be attached to the ballot box in a sealed tamper-evident envelope. This is particularly important for the processing of a recount of the ballots, should it be required. Route of Statement of Votes for Counting Centre Copies of the voting results should be provided to the electoral management body (often the original sent in a sealed tamper-evident envelope), to the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre, and one posted outside the counting centre. The representatives of political parties and candidates present, and observers, should be permitted to receive their own official copies.
Once the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre is fully prepared and transmitted to the national office of the electoral management body, a copy can be posted at the outside of the counting centre. This way, the same information and results are made available for everybody, and at the same time. Because witnesses are permitted to observe and scrutinise the counting process, results are public. The statement of the vote becomes a public document that is made evident once it is posted. Consolidating Voting ResultsSummary of Process At the national level, logistics should be carefully planned for receiving results from several counting centres at the same time. Some suggestions to improve the efficiency of the process are discussed below. These suggestions might need to be modified depending on the country's infrastructure, or depending on other factors that might affect the implementation of these suggestions. For greatest efficiency, one general phone number or fax number should be given to people transmitting the results to the national office of the electoral management body, another security measure can be communicating through an e-mail provider that encrypts it’s end to end communication. Most telephone and fax systems now allow for calls to a single number to automatically search for the next available phone/fax unit on that line. For example, one team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit the information to the data entry person or person in charge of gathering the results. A wall chart, chalkboard chart or spreadsheet listing for each electoral district should be prepared and then completed as the results come in. Once all the information for each counting centre is received, the combined results for the country should be finalised. If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election). The required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when they are needed to compile the national results. Special ballots, write-in votes, mail votes as well as ballots cast in ordinary elections, advance elections, and mobile voting stations should be part of the count and should be released as soon as possible. Depending on the amount of delay that is acceptable, special ballots can be counted a few days prior to Election Day or after the close of voting on Election Day. If the later is the case, then the counting procedures should be designed carefully so it will not delay releasing the final results. For the special votes (mail and write-in votes), envelopes received at the head office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. If different colours of envelopes are used, it will facilitate the sorting by category. For mail votes three envelopes are originally sent to the voter: a return mailing envelope containing an outer envelope (on which may appear the bar code and signature of the voter) and a secrecy envelope containing the ballot. After verification of proper registration and no previous voting having taken place, and the creation of the audit trail, the secrecy envelope is put into a ballot box with its ballot still contained. If the special ballots are counted a few days prior to Election Day, the results should be kept highly secure and only released at the close of voting on Election Day. These special ballots can be used for absentee voting if no mechanism is in place for voting outside the country, in embassies for example. Maintaining the results in embassies secure is very important, although it may be hard to keep the information from spreading, especially if the diaspora is large and actively participates. Information about the results can be easily spread through the diaspora, and the results can easily reach the in-country population through social media, e-mail, and phone. One solution would be to not start the counting of votes abroad until the counting in the country starts. Nonetheless, this is complicated when there are very different time zones between some embassies and the country. For the counting process, the same rules for vote counting in the country should be followed. If advance elections take place over several days, reconciliation can be done at the end of each day, but the ballot choices are not counted. This reconciliation measure is for creating an audit trail of ballot usage. The advance voting ballot boxes are then kept safely until Election Day and counting should take place at the closing time of the ordinary election. The counting of advance votes should be done in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates and observers. The counting procedures are nearly identical to those used for ordinary elections.
For counting the votes of incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance voting may be applied but, of course, this will only be possible if voting by incarcerated voters takes place prior to Election Day. Use of Technology The use of phones and faxes are common for transmission of electoral results. To ensure the identity of the person transmitting results via phone or fax, an identification number or code should be given to them. For security measures, this code should be given on the Election Day. This method is a simple and efficient way to avoid unauthorised people calling in and providing false results. Transmission of results by modem and computer can also be used. Once again, safeguards and passwords must be built into restricting the transmission of results to authorised persons who are permitted access to the system.
For all types of transmission, systems must be tested prior to Election Day to verify their capacity under the heavy use they will encounter on election night. A specialist should also be available at any time in case of failure of the systems. A contingency back-up system should also be created, tested and fully available. Receiving Results from Counting CentresReceiving Results from Several Counting Centres The national office of the electoral management body receives the interim results directly from the counting centres. The person responsible for combining results from the counting centres will directly transmit the progress reports for each electoral district, broken down by voting station, and the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre directly to the national office of the electoral management body. For greatest efficiency, all counting centres are using a common software for transmitting interim results to the national centre. If a manual system is used, the staff responsible for the incoming results should first make a quick quality control check in order to verify if the results make sense or not, for example, whether or not the totals are correct, and all the data is received. Most national-level results centres are computerized and therefore efforts are made to pre-load the results system with software containing mathematical formula checks, logical inconsistencies and triggers for extreme or unusual results based on historical electoral data. A more exhaustive quality control procedure, for each electoral district and voting station, will be done when the final official results are compiled. Some electoral districts might need more attention than others, especially those that are the subject of intense political campaign activities, or those with a higher degree of administrative difficulties, such as a very high concentration of registered voters (the core of a large city, for example). On election day, these electoral districts might need to be monitored more closely by the national electoral management body. If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election), and the required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when needed. In case of an emergency, the head office of the electoral management body should always be able to reach their local offices, especially when results are coming in. In most cases, both a primary and secondary number (often landline and a mobile phone number) need to be secured and tested prior to Election Day. The phone number should not be the same one used to call in interim results. Special Ballot Counts, Mobile and Advance Voting Counts Special ballots are usually returned to the head office of the electoral management body where a special counting centre is established. These results will then be reported to the central collection point separately, as in all other counting centres. Depending on the rules of the system used and the logistics in place, the ballots returned by mail might be accepted only a set number of days prior to election day or right up until election day itself. If special ballots are accepted right until Election Day, counting procedures should be designed so the publication of results will not be delayed. Depending on the deadline given to return the special ballots, the counting may start before Election Day, at the beginning of Election Day, or at the close of voting on Election Day. However, counting these ballots may take a long time depending on the volume of ballots to process and the procedures used. Counting special ballots before Election Day is common and generally recommended, but special security is necessary to ensure the results are released along with the results of ordinary elections. The ballot boxes for advance voting are safely kept at the counting centre until the closing of ordinary voting on Election Day. The counting process for these ballots starts at the same time as for the ordinary voting and are virtually identical to the ones used for counting the votes of ordinary votes. The counting of votes from mobile voting stations may take place at the counting centre and ballots are counted as any other ballots. These ballots should not be counted until the regular closing time of voting on Election Day. For all cases - advance votes, special votes, mobile voting stations, etc. - if the count takes place a few days prior to Election Day, representatives of political parties and candidates and observers should be present for the counting.
For the purposes of creating separate verification and audit trails and for properly reporting the results of advance voting, mobile voting stations, and special votes, these unique voting procedures should not be confused with ordinary elections. The difference should be made very clear with a distinctive statement of the vote forms used for these types of ballots. Creating an Audit TrailOnce the count for each ballot box is over and the ballot box is sealed, all the ballot boxes will be transferred to the planned storage location for ballot boxes that have been counted. This storage space should be secure. Ballot boxes will be kept at this place until final results are known and accepted by all participants. In the case of a recount, the electoral management body will send instructions to the counting centre about what to do with the ballot boxes that will need to be recounted. Until then, all ballot boxes stay in the counting centre. A spreadsheet, with all the ballot box numbers, should be used to control the storage of all ballot boxes. The supervisor responsible for the ballot boxes (once they are counted) should verify that the seals are properly attached and that the statement of the vote is attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope. The EMB should also be able to show that the chain of custody of the sensitive election material has remained intact throughout the election results process. A sticker or other form of identification should then be put on the ballot box to indicate that the control check was done and the ballot box is ready for storage.
The supervisor should append his initials or signature to both the spreadsheet and identification sticker indicating that the control measure has been taken. Ability to Subsequently Check Results Received Ability to subsequently check the results received against separate documentation is essential to avoid mistakes, and to prevent fraudulent manipulation of electoral results. The chain of custody should show who was responsible for the ballot box at each step of the results process. A copy of the cumulative statement of the vote of each counting centre should be sent separately to the national office of the electoral management body, in a sealed envelope, and a comparison with first results received should be done once the original is received. If serious fears of fraud exist, a special tamper-evident paper can be used for the cumulative statement of the votes for each counting centre. This dark coloured paper (dark blue for example) immediately shows if the initial inscription is modified.
If the person simply made a mistake in completing the form at the counting centre, then the pre-determined dedicated correction officer should fill out a correction form, which will be attached to the original results form. The correction form will be shared with representatives of political parties and candidates and observers and made public at a predetermined location. Tallying Results Per Party or CandidateResults should be counted according to candidate or party for each voting station and each electoral district. The national electoral management body will then count the total national results per political party or candidate and indicate this to be the final result. In all cases, a double counting procedure should be used, even if it is computerised, before the results are publicly posted. After each five to ten ballot boxes for example, a comparison should be done between the two persons responsible for the counts. If results do not match, the previous few addition figures can easily be verified and corrected. If a computerised system is used, it is recommended that two persons should enter the same data on separate computer workstations.
The computer systems can be programmed to immediately indicate when and where entries do not match for a specific electoral district. This makes the process of verification much simpler. Publicising ResultsSpecial security measures should be taken by the electoral management body to avoid fraud and mistakes during the process of releasing results. Only authorised persons should have access to the combined results (prior to public release) and modifications to these results should only be done with proper authorisation. These measures should be in place both at the counting centres and at the national office of the electoral management body. Access to the area where the results are being prepared should be limited, but transparency must still be ensured. The computerised systems used, if any, for combining the results should have safeguards such as passwords, firewall, mirror server, back-ups, etc. No one other than authorised persons should be able to access the computerised systems and change results. These persons should be carefully selected and identified in advance, and they should be required to sign a contract with a confidentiality clause. Police, armed forces personnel, or private security officers should be available on request by the electoral management body and its electoral officials. An electoral management body security contact person should be identified prior to voting day and should have all specific information needed if the assistance of security forces is required. All counting participants, at the national level or at the counting centre, should wear proper identification to avoid any confusion.
Identifying badges or cards should be given to the staff of the electoral management body, the representatives of political parties and candidates, observers, the media, visiting dignitaries, etc. If practical, armed forces personnel may be present in the counting centre and should, as well, be required to wear proper identification. Armed forces could also be outside the counting center to safeguard the votes and be called in by the counting officer if needed. Providing the Official Provisional and Final Results Results management system's operational plans often over-look that it must cater for two distinct yet intertwined tabulation and reporting processes. Given the intense interest in the election results from political stakeholders, media and the electorate, EMBs realize that they no longer have the luxury of waiting until the legal results forms arrives and results verified before announcing final results. An EMB’s results system must include mechanisms whereby both provisional and final results are catered for. Most EMBs are therefore cognizant of the importance of releasing timely provisional results, as this will give the election authority sufficient time to process the final results. Equally important, if the release of provisional results is not forthcoming the EMB could soon find itself being accused of altering the results by some parties and candidates. Having said that, it’s instrumental that EMBs are not pressured into releasing results prematurely. The EMBs must give themselves sufficient time to properly transmit, tabulate and check results before releasing both interim and final results. In order to manage such expectations, EMBs must clearly and repeatedly reinforce the expected timeline for release of results during the lead-up to Election Day, as well as comply with the timeline and inform the public of any possible delays and clearly explain the reason for the delay. Thereafter it’s too late. Given the intense focus on supplying early provisional results, EMBs are sometimes focusing almost exclusively on this process generating interim results at the expense of the final, legally binding, results stream. This could be devastating as in a tight race, the EMB might decide midstream it cannot announce an outright winner, or the need for a second round, before it has verified the provisional results with the actual results forms. Thus, the time lag between provisional and final results shouldn’t be excessive. In some countries, a maximum period of time between Election Day and the publication of certified results is dictated by the legal framework.
The electoral management body should be the only organization announcing and releasing the final official results unless judicial structures have a role in certifying the results. In most cases it should be made clear that the only official source for any results is the electoral management body. The Role of the Courts In some countries, the judiciary is only involved in the electoral process after the election when it comes time to take to court offenders of the electoral law or when a judicial recount is needed. In other jurisdictions, the courts may have a significant role to play in confirming the results of the election; the results only become official once the courts has certified them. Such confirmation should be done as soon as possible in order to avoid political instability and potential delays associated with a transition from a former government to the one elected. As a result, a maximum number of days between the EMB’s announcement of its final results and the certification by the court is often part of the legal framework governing elections.
In some jurisdictions the court may also be directly involved in the count with the electoral management body. This will generally be the case if final approval of the count must come from a judicial structure. Publishing the Detailed Results Publishing the Detailed Results After the final certified results are released many jurisdictions require that detailed voting results be published in the official gazette of the government or another official publication. Best international praxis indicates that EMBs are today publishing results by voting stations online using its own website. Many EMBs scan the actual statement of votes form for each voting station thereby ensures the transparency requirement for an appropriate results management system is adhered to. Legally, the detailed results are often presented to the legislature, agency, department, or the administrative entity that the electoral management body reports to. A courtesy copy of the published report can be sent to the different political leaders who ran for the election and to all elected candidates. A copy of the report could also be made available on the EMB’s website. Publishing this detailed report of the election may take several months of preparation and production. Due to financial constrains, in some countries candidates and all other persons, parties, or organization will buy their own copies of the results from the publisher, or obtain an electronic version from the EMB. As a general principle, EMBs should seek to provide data in a format that allows analysis. Providing results from tens of thousands of polling stations, but only doing so in a human-readable format such as PDF, amounts to a less than complete commitment to transparency. Make the data available in the most generic format possible – such as CSV (comma separated values) text file or similar.
Once the final results are known and publicised, the new government should be sworn in as soon as possible to limit the possible political instability and delays in the transition of one government to another. This can often take a week or more, depending on the type of political system used in the country. Combining Results to Protect the Secrecy of the Vote The electoral management body can merge or amalgamate results of several voting stations. This is generally done if the voting procedure was such that it may be possible to identify every person whose vote has gone into a particular ballot box, or if the number of votes in the ballot box is so small that there is a significant risk that almost all the votes will be for one candidate or party. In such cases, the secrecy of the vote could be compromised. Results should be amalgamated with other voting stations. This can also be done in cases where it appears that the secrecy of individual votes can be secured, but there is real risk arising from the fact that a particular voting station, having voted predominantly in a particular way, could result in retribution to the persons who voted at that voting station. Mixing the ballots from two or more boxes from different areas, and then attributing all the votes to one ballot box with proper notation in the results of this having been done can mitigate this problem. Such procedures must take place in the counting centre prior to the ballots being counted. Merging results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other categories of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body, results can easily be merged with other results to protect the secrecy of the vote.
For internal use only, a special notation can be made to keep the audit trail clear. AnnexGlossaryCategorical Ballot Voters make a straight choice. Collation The transmission of results from a particular polling site to the next level to be collated with other results to give the outcome for a wider area to establish the overall national result. Contestation An administrative objection, or any other, to activities and decisions of an electoral nature, or to the electoral process and results. Counting Centre A central or regional place where the votes for more than one polling station are counted. Counting of the votes and marked in a way that does not allow determining the choice of the elector or that divulges the identity of the voter. Not to be confused with spoiled ballot. Counting of the Votes The activity consisting of counting the votes case for each candidate or political party after the close of the polls. This activity determines the winners. Consists of opening the ballot box, sorting their contents, determining the validity of ballot papers and counting the valid ones. Produces the result. Declined Ballot A ballot which an elector has chosen not to mark for any party of political party, generally with a view to express his dissatisfaction in the choice of candidates or parties. Electoral Dispute (Recourse) A system put in place to resolve complaints, disputes, claims, recalls and contestations relating to the electoral process. Electoral Quota The number of votes or the proportion of the votes required to win a seat in a proportional representation system. Exit Poll An unofficial poll in which voters leaving a polling station are asked how they voted. This is done especially by the media, the parties, and the candidates Mark-Choice Ballot Where alternate candidate/parties appear on the same ballot and the voter places only a single mark to mark his or her preference. Official Results Results published by the appropriate electoral official containing all the information required by law. Ordinal Ballot A ballot where the voter is required to indicate preferences amongst the various candidates or parties by numbering their respective names, in declining order. Panachage A device used in a small number of jurisdictions to add additional flexibility to open-list systems. It is the capacity to vote for more than one candidate across different party lists. It is categorized as a free list system. Plurality of Votes Electoral results in which a candidate or a political party receives more votes than the opponents, but less than 50% of all votes cast. Preferential Distribution A system in which votes counted are used to redistribute the preferences of the electors to establish a winner (in alternative vote and single non transferable vote systems). Quick Count Results Results obtained through a quick count process used where the collation of the overall results can take a lengthy period. Rejected Ballot A ballot paper found in the ballot box during the Counting of the votes and marked in a way that does not allow to determine the choice of the elector or that divulges the identity of the voter. Not to be confused with spoiled ballot. Results Final result establishing the successful candidate or candidates, or party or parties. Seat A position within a legislature or parliament, usually filled by an elected person. Seat Allocation The process of distributing the seats of a legislative assembly to the political parties or candidates on the basis of the number of votes they have obtained. Spoiled Ballot A ballot that cannot be used. A spoiled ballot is one that is returned to the voting officer at the voting station and is not put into the ballot box. The voter may have marked their ballot incorrectly and requires another ballot to give effect to their vote. Statement of the Vote/ Results Slip/ Results Form The statement of the vote is a form on which results are written. The counting official completes this form for each ballot box counted at the counting centre. This form indicates the election results and should include standard information, such as the name of the electoral district, the name and/or number of the voting station, and election date. Tendered Vote Two-Round Electoral System A system in which the election takes place in two rounds, often a week or a fortnight apart. First round is conducted as First Past the Post election. If a candidate receives absolute majority, the election is over. If not, a second round of voting is conducted and the winner is declared elected. Also referred to as run-off or double ballot system. Unmarked Ballot: see Rejected Ballot. Unofficial Results Results published by the media. Unused Ballot Any ballot in excess of the number required which has not been used during the election. Valid Ballot
A ballot that is not spoiled, unmarked or invalid and is completed correctly in terms of legal requirements (if applicable) and that shows the intention of the voter. A valid ballot may be open to interpretation, but the general best practice is to accept a ballot as valid as long as it provides a satisfactory indication of the voter’s choice, and it does not risk the anonymity of the voter. Bibliography and Additional Resources
Published Resources Cassidy, Michael. "Les droits démocratiques et la réforme électorale au Canada" in the Collection d' tudes de la Commission Royale sur la r forme lectorale et le financement des partis, 10. Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1991. Dundas, Carl W. Dimensions of Free and Fair Elections, Frameworks Integrity, Transparency, Attributes, Monitoring. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1994. Dundas, Carl W. Organizing Free and Fair Elections at Cost-Effective Levels. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993. Edgeworth, Linda et al, Election Official Training in Bangladesh: Project Overview and Recommendations, October-November 1995, Country reports, Washington, DC: IFES, 1995. Elections Canada. Compendium of Canadian Electoral Legislation. Ottawa: 1996 Electoral Commission of India. Procedures of Counting of Votes by Mixing of Ballot Papers - Revised Instruction. New Delhi: 1996. Federal Election Commission. The Electronic Transmission of Electoral Materials. Innovation in Election Administration N 12, Washington, DC: 1995. Raynolds, Andrew, and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: International IDEA, 1997. Trudel, Linda. The Pollworker Training Handbook. Washington, DC: IFES, 1997. Electronic Information Resources • Stanford University: http://cs-education.stanford.edu/classes/cs201/current/Projects/electronic-vote-counting/background.htm • Ballot Access News: http://www.ballot-access.org/ • Elections NCP: http://www.craph.org/election/elhome.htm
ContributorsThe Vote Counting Topic area was written by Dominique-Christine Tremblay, and updated by Louise Olivier under the supervision of EISA during 2005-2006. Ms Tremblay is a former Project Officer with Elections Canada. Dominique is a political scientist who began her work in election administration as a research analyst for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. She has experience in voter education, and has also worked in the office of returning officer. She has been involved in elections as a trainer or an observer in South Africa, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin and Mali. Dominique is now working in strategic communications for the Government of Canada Louise Olivier is a lawyer by training who has more than six years experience in the field of election management at the Electoral Commission of South Africa where she worked in recruitment and training, legal services and research. She is based in Johannesburg, South Africa where she works as an elections consultant and provides legal research for the Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa. Other contributors to this topic area are Therese Laanela Pearce, Phil Green, Ron Gould, Harry Neufeld, Louis Massicotte and Jim Hult. As part of the the 2012/2013 review by Staffan Darnolf and Ronan McDermott the 'Vote Counting' topic area was renamed to 'Results Management Systems'. The Sierra Leone case study was contributed by Dr. Aamir Arain.
Country Case StudiesGhana: Vote Counting using Majoritatrian and First-Past-the-Post Indonesia: Counting the Votes for the 1999 Elections Russia: Counting Votes for Local Elections Mozambique: Vote Counting and Tabulation Ghana: Vote Counting using Majoritatrian and First-Past-the-PostGhana practises both the majoritarian and First-Past-the-Post electoral systems. In presidential elections, the winner is the candidate who earns a majority percentage of the valid votes cast. A second round election is conducted for the candidates who obtained the two highest numbers of votes, if no candidate earns a majority in the first round. In Parliamentary elections however, this majoritarian clause does not apply, and a candidate is declared the winner if he/she earns more votes than any other candidate. An issue for determination by referendum is taken to be determined if at least thirty-five per cent of the persons entitled to vote at the referendum voted and, of the valid votes cast, at least seventy per cent voted in favour of the issue.
The constitution of Ghana specifies when and where the counting of votes cast at an election should be carried out. It says: "Immediately after the close of the poll, the presiding officer shall, in the presence of such of the candidates or their representatives and their polling agents as are present, proceed to count, at that polling station, the ballot papers of that station and record the votes cast in favour of each candidate or question." Counting is done manually. Appointment and Training of Election Officials The electoral commission of Ghana employs permanent officers to manage its offices at the national, regional, and district levels. In addition, it appoints temporary staff whenever it embarks on an exercise involving registration of voters, demarcation of electoral boundaries, or elections (including referenda). The highest temporary electoral appointment is the electoral district officer who, assisted by two deputies, is in charge of a district. There is a presiding officer and usually two polling assistants at each polling station. For a national election, therefore, the commission employs as many as 60,320 temporary officials to man the 120 districts and 20,000 polling stations. Most of the temporary staff includes very senior public servants, especially teachers, and senior students. Wherever possible, people with past experience at an election are considered for appointment. One important consideration for appointment is that a person has not shown any active affiliation with, or support for, a particular political party, candidate, or an issue to be determined at a referendum. As much as practicable, the officials are also appointed from the area they are to operate in. Public approval for their neutrality and ability to hold the office is sought by publishing the names of the electoral district officers in the national newspapers, and those of the junior officers in the areas where they will work. The political parties are, in addition, given the names and addresses of all temporary staff. Both the political parties and the general public are allowed to make reasonable objections to a temporary staff appointment. The officials must attend the training exercise, regardless of whether or not they have had election experience. The training of temporary staff is always carried out close to the election. The trainers are usually permanent senior staff of the commission and proven qualified electoral district officers. The trainers themselves undergo a training of trainers (TOT) exercise organized by the Public Education and Training (PET) division at the national level. The trainers for the TOT are professional (university) trainers and some members of the electoral commission (the Board of the Commission). The training session is planned to allow the trainees or trainers to be able to go through the election operations manual, and role-play the election. No training is carried out at the polling stations, but presiding officers are encouraged to hold briefing meetings with their staff at the polling station before the poll starts. (Copies of training and operations manuals are supplied.) Candidates' agents are allowed to attend the training sessions. In Ghana the term "election official" is used to mean the officer in charge of the poll taking and counting exercises. The officer therefore doubles for both on Election Day. The training also involves both aspects of the election. It is normal to train a few more than the number of officials required, and some will serve on a standby basis. The polling station structure is such that the voter population per station is not so big as to require long periods of counting. Most polling stations have less than one thousand voters, and some actually have less than five hundred voters on their lists. Vote Counting Immediately after the polls close, the presiding officer, in the presence of those candidates or their agents, and any other persons permitted to attend the count:
During the count the presiding officer takes a ballot paper, announces for whom or which issue it was cast, and allows any representatives and observers present to check the proof of his announcement. If there is no disagreement, he adds it to the pile of the particular candidate or issue.
If there is any disagreement over the ballot, the presiding officer will pass it around for close examination by the agents, to reach a consensus decision, but the presiding officer has the final word. All rejected and spoiled ballot papers are put together in a separate pile. Any of the following reasons cause rejection of a ballot paper:
When the vote counting is completed, a candidate or his agent may require the presiding officer to have the votes recounted, and the officer must comply. However, a second request for a recount may be carried out only at the electoral district centre by the electoral district officer or his deputy. At the end of the count, the presiding officer and the candidates or their representatives (agents) sign a declaration, stating:
As soon as possible after the announcement of the voting results at the polling station, the presiding officer in the presence of the candidates or their agents puts the ballots of each candidate or issue into separate packets and seals them with his own seal and the seals of the candidates or their agents if they so desire. The packets are then put into the ballot box, along with the following other documents:
The presiding officer then puts his seal (and those of the candidates or their agents) on the ballot box and delivers the box to the electoral district officer. Collation of Votes at Electoral District Centre The electoral district officer makes arrangements for collating the votes in his electoral district in the presence of the candidates and or their agents as soon as possible after the close of the poll. The electoral district officer is required to give the candidates or their agents sufficient notice of the time and place of the collation of votes. During the collation, the electoral district officer shall take the sealed ballot boxes from the various polling stations under his jurisdiction, and open them one at a time, after the candidates (or their agents) have inspected each to make sure the seals are intact.
He takes the recorded results of each polling station and reads it aloud in the hearing of everyone present. He then takes them to find the totals for each candidate or issue. He will also carry out a recount of any ballot box, if there was a request for a second recount at the polling station. At the end of the collation, the electoral district officer:
In a Parliamentary election, on receipt of a writ as prescribed by law, the commission publishes in the Gazette a notice stating the name of the person elected and the total number of votes cast for each candidate, and informs the Clerk of Parliament soon thereafter of the name(s) of the candidate(s) elected.
In the case of a presidential election or a national referendum, the results declared by the various electoral district officers throughout the country are collated to determine the national result. The commission then causes a Gazette notice to be published, stating the name of the candidate elected. No court certification is required. Petition against Election Results
Within twenty-one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of an election result, a candidate, or a person who lawfully voted, or had a right to vote, or other qualified persons may present a petition to a High Court to declare the said result to be void, or grant any other relief sought by the petitioner. Indonesia: Counting the Votes for the 1999 ElectionsThe significance in both the international and domestic public eye of the elections, following as they did 32 years of elections with a high degree of coercion, and low degrees of freedom and transparency make a case study of the count especially relevant. Mechanisms were chosen to highlight the transparency and correctness of these elections that could serve as a model for other transitional elections. On the other hand, the notorious problems of the consolidation of the results, will be brought up as a cautionary reminder of the importance of planning and training as carefully for the count and results process, as for the polling process. The 1999 Indonesian transitional elections do not reflect procedurally the conduct of earlier elections, nor do they reflect necessarily the conduct of subsequent elections. The main differences with previous elections were the increase in political participation (48 parties compared with 3 the 32 previous years), and the transparency built into the procedures. Accredited national and international observers were permitted, in unlimited numbers, to watch both the voting and the count. In addition, party agents (maximum one per party), were not only free to observe, but also to challenge elements of the polling or count. The 7 June 1999 elections were for 3 levels - district, provincial, and regional legislatures. For the national elections, a total of 462 seats were at stake (with 38 reserved for the military and police, making a total of 500). These 462 seats were apportioned to the provinces on the basis of population, but with some favouring of the more sparsely populated outer islands over the densely populated Java. Polling was conducted from 8 am to 2 pm in approximately 300,000 polling stations across the country - no mean logistical feat in a country of 17,000 islands, some mountainous, some densely forested.
Following the closing of the polls, votes were counted at the polling station, by the polling station officials. As 80% of Indonesia ́s polling stations were outdoors, there was ample opportunity for not only the observers and party agents, but also the general public to watch (which they did! - the count across the country was characterised by a carnival like enthusiasm on the part of the onlookers). The Voting Station Count For the sake of this case study, a random sample polling station count is used to exemplify certain stages of the counting process, in this a village polling station in Sorkom Sub-District, North Sumatra. Before opening the ballot boxes, the polling station officials prefilled the Official Reconciliation Forms to the extent possible (see example model C1 form). These forms were in the form of rather unwieldy, large books, a necessity considering that there were not only 48 parties times three elections, but also that all the polling station officials, as well as all the party agents present were to sign, endorsing the correctness of the documents. The C1 book/forms were to be filled out in 3 copies for the station, as well, each party agent had a copy. The first entry on the form Ballots Received should have been filled out already at the opening of the polls. The ballot papers for the polling station were sealed in inside the ballot boxes upon receipt, and were to be opened, counted, and recorded as part of polling station opening procedures, in full view of all present, including the first voters the day. The ballots received total should equal the amount of registered voters at the polling station, plus a 3% contingency (for spoiled ballots, or for persons added to the register with valid registration cards, or for persons registered elsewhere with a special authorisation form). The first ballot box, for national elections, was then opened, and ballots counted. The Indonesian 1999 ballots was small-poster size, and folded in a special way to ensure secrecy of the ballot. An official ballot was one signed by the polling station chairman, the vice-chairman, and a third polling station member as well as affixed with an official hologram sticker. The three levels of ballots had three different colours for differentiation; the ballot boxes were in corresponding colours. When the first ballot box was opened, a number of wrong colour ballots had crept in - a common problem for the count when several elections are held at the same time. With the approval of all the party agents present, the misplaced ballots were placed in the correct boxes. The expectation would be of course that any missing ballots for this count would be found in the boxes to be opened subsequently. For this reason, the official reconciliation form results at each polling station were not to be filled in until the end of the count of all three boxes. Back to the opening of the ballot box - the first task upon opening was to sort out the most obvious invalid ballots, that is the unofficial lines, that were missing the three signatures or the official hologram, fake ballots, photocopies ballots, ballots larger or smaller than the official ballots, or ballots in a different colour, which were to be removed and not counted, should any exist. The official ballots were then counted, the total noted, hopefully matching the amount received, minus unused and minus spoiled, and minus unofficial/invalid. If the numbers did not reconcile, chances are that this was because ballots for this election were still in the other boxes, and yet to be counted. One by one, in front of all party agents, observers, and the general public, the ballots were unfolded, held up in full view, and the party called out by the chairman, and tallied on a large visible boards. The party agents, and observers if they so wished, had forms to do a parallel tally at the same time. Interestingly for the Indonesian elections, ballots were punched with a hole rather than marked. Because of this, the back of the ballots was shown to all present, so that the hole would be clearly visible. As the ballot papers were thin, translucent, and the party symbols bright and easily visible from the back of the paper, this was fine except had there been worse lighting, (mostly the count was done in the daytime, between 2-6 pm, but in some places delayed materials resulted in delayed counts, meaning the count was conducted in poor lighting) this could have been a problem. When voters had not properly punched the cards, but rather just made a dent in the paper, these were considered valid if so approved by all the representatives present. Ballots marked with a pen, punched more than once, unclearly punched (i.e. on the line between two parties), or punched were considered invalid, were set aside along with the unofficial ballots already removed. The chairman made special effort with the invalid ballots to make sure that the invalidity was approved by all. This strengthened the sense of transparency, good will, and participation. Valid votes were both tallied during the count, and the ballots divided into piles, subsequently counted and checked against the large tally board. The parallel count by the party agents and observers present served as a triple check for accuracy. Following the tally, and the determination of votes per party, the ballots were rubber banded together on a party basis, and placed into an official envelope that was then sealed. Invalid ballots, were placed into another envelope, recorded and sealed. These two envelopes, plus the envelope with the spoiled ballots were placed in a plastic bag. This procedure was repeated for the provincial and district level ballots. After the ballots were tallied for each election, the polling station chair asked the vice chair to count the number of votes for each party, for each election, on each tally sheet. The chair announced the total number of votes for each party so that party agents and observers could hear. The vice chair and another polling station member then record the number of votes for each party on the official reconciliation form (3 copies). Another polling station member recorded the numbers at the same time on a large, visible form on the board. The three copies were signed by all polling station officials and all party agents present. One form was to be kept sealed, with the other election material, another to be posted publicly at the polling station, and the third to be given to the village level election committee for the consolidation of the results. The sealed envelopes were locked inside one of the ballot boxes, other materials placed in a second, and all the materials accompanied by the polling officials, party agents, observers, and general public, to the location designated by the village level election committee for safekeeping overnight. The Consolidation of the Results The village election committees, known as the PPS, were each responsible for 2 to 9 polling stations, depending on the population of the area. The Indonesian elections were organised based on a hierarchy of 6 (!) levels: (1) the national election committee and commission (KPU/PPI), (2) Provincial (PPD1), (3) Regency/Municipality (PPD2), (4) District (PPK), (5) Sub-district/Village (PPS) and (6) polling station levels. Official reconciliation forms were consolidated at each level - that is, the PPS (Village) consolidated its polling station results, which were sent to the Sub-district (PPK) level. The District level consolidated and sent official forms to the next level up (Municipality), but also sent the results directly to an electronic parallel counting centre in Jakarta, run largely by internationals (Australia). The official manual results, following consolidation at the provincial and national levels was scheduled to take approximately 2 weeks, followed by a legalization process and official announcement. The computerised count, though unofficial, provided considerably quicker results. Certain observer groups also conducted parallel tallies. Under the current electoral law, candidates are assigned seats on a constituency basis (the constituency, but within a proportional representation system). List of candidates for each party/constituency are posted in advance.
The use of reconciliation of numbers is a very important feature to consider on the election forms, and yet one area that many election officials seemed to have difficulty with during the election. Using the sample polling station as an example, the results were spread over 11 parties, with 2 parties neck in neck, resulting in a marginal victory for Golkar, the party that only a few years before had earned over 90% of the vote. This gives an indication of the changes that a new electoral law, free campaigning, and clear and transparent procedures can bring to a small village. Mozambique: Vote Counting and TabulationElectoral System Mozambique’s electoral system for Parliamentary elections is proportional representation, with a five per cent threshold for representation. The candidate elected as President is the candidate who receives the majority of votes cast. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the votes cast, run-off elections are held where the weakest candidates are eliminated and the candidate that receives the most votes is elected.
Concurrent Presidential and Parliamentary elections are held every five years. The Counting Process Counting takes place at the voting stations after the close of voting. Counting is conducted by the presiding officer in the presence of candidate and party agents, observers and counting officials.
There are three phases to counting votes in Mozambique. Partial Counting and Verification Partial counting and verification takes place at the voting station and begins directly after the voting has been completed. The electoral officer in charge of the voting station closes the voters’ roll, which has to be signed by all the party and candidate representatives. The remaining ballot papers are counted and verified against the number people who voted at that voting station. The ballot boxes are opened and the ballots are counted. Ballots are then returned to the ballot boxes and ballot boxes are closed until they are once again counted in the verification phase. The number of ballots counted is announced publicly and the results displayed in form of a publication. In the event that there are discrepancies between the number of ballots in the ballot boxes and the number of voters that voted, the ballots will be taken as the true figure unless the ballots exceed the number of voters registered. If ballots exceed the number of registered voters, the votes are considered null and voting will take place on the second Sunday after the final decision of nullification of the vote. The voter verification at the voting station takes place in the following manner:
It is only after the counting that party representatives have the right to examine the lots of ballots and if necessary present their complaints to the presiding officer. If a decision is challenged; it should be noted on the back of the ballot and signed by the presiding officer and the agent making the challenge. The challenged decision does not affect the result at this stage but is sent (within 24 hours) to the National Electoral Commission for a final decision. An edict is completed showing the number of registered voters, the number of ballots in the ballot box, the number of ballots each party or candidate received and the number of blank and invalid votes. The polling officials must sign the edicts. The result edicts are then displayed publicly at the voting station.
The ballot boxes, the minutes, the published results, the voters’ roll, the number of contested votes, any problems experienced and any remaining documentation is delivered to the district or city Election Commission, who in turn have to ensure that all this material is received by the Provincial Election Commission within a period of 48 hours. Party representatives have the right to accompany the transportation of the materials. Security is also present when ballots are transported. Provincial Verification Provincial verification is the responsibility of the Provincial Election Commission, which has to centralise the results of each district including all the voting stations within the respective district. This verification is based on the minutes, published results and any other documentation produced at the respective voting stations.
All ballots that have been challenged or considered null have to be submitted to the National Election Commission (CNE) within a period of 24 hours. The final lists of centralised results per district have to include the following:
Verification of the votes is finalised by producing minutes and lists of results. Copies of these documents have to be signed and stamped and given to the party and candidate agents. Observers and journalists can also request copies of these documents.
At the provincial level, results are entered into a results database. All party and candidate agents are given access to the database to compare their tallies recorded at the voting stations to those entered into the database. National Verification It is the responsibility of the CNE to re-evaluate the ballots that have been challenged and those that have been declared invalid. The CNE is responsible for centralizing all the results. This stage of the counting takes place in the capital city, Maputo. The sealed transport bags are organised by province. The bags are opened and two CNE members appointed by different parties review every ballot. The regulations allow for a wide interpretation of what constitutes a valid ballot. A document is filled out for each polling station, specifying the number of invalid votes that have been reclassified as valid and to which party or candidate they have been assigned. The results are then tallied for the whole province on a separate form. Other CNE members review the problematic edicts that had been forwarded by the Provinces. Whenever the problems are resolved, the number of votes is entered into the database. The summarised results of the reclassification of invalid and contested votes are added to the databases with the provincial results. This tabulation is then calculated according to a formula to determine the distribution of parliamentary seats.
To determine the outcome of the presidential race, the figures are added together for nation-wide results. The official results must be publicly announced, within 15 days after the close of the poll, by the CNE. There is no provision for recounting. Challenges to the results may be made through the court system, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Council. Russia: Counting Votes for Local ElectionsThe following is a step-by-step account of vote counting procedures in Russia. Repeated by-election of a Duma deputy in Monchegorsk District - December 3rd 2000. Polling station no 163 in Apatity. This polling station was shared and used as two polling stations in the same big room. The room was divided in the middle. Most polling stations were schools, culture houses or day cares. Voter turnout in this particular polling station was approximately 25% compared to the regional average on 37%. It was common throughout the vote counting process that more than one activity took place at the same time. For example the unused ballot papers were counted at the same time as the number of signatures on the voter register. The vote counting procedures at this election went generally very well and smooth. We did not witness any major violations worth mentioning. This case study represents a typical vote counting procedure from a local election in Russia. The same electoral law is used all over the country with very minor changes. The vote counting procedures at federal elections as well as local are very similar. As far as the domestic observer could tell, as well as ourselves, we could not witness any unusual circumstances during these procedures. The only unusual thing we noticed was that at other polling stations, during other elections, visitors were allowed to come in and out of the voting station during the process. However this was not the case at this polling stations. The polling officials were very experienced and seemed to know the full process by heart. Present at the polling station were: • Seven polling station officials including the chairman. • One police officer (responsible for both polling stations). • One local observer who was representing one of the candidates in the election. • Two international observers The process occurred as follows: 1. The chairman announces that the voting has closed and pulls down the curtains as a symbolic act. 2. Before they started the counting, she asked her staff to remove all pens so that there was no possibility to change numbers on the ballot account form or make marks on the ballot papers. The unused ballot papers and the signatures on the voter register were counted at the same time. Each polling station receives slightly less ballot papers than the number of registered voters for that polling place, but they can easily have more delivered during the day should they run out of ballot papers. 3. When all the unused ballot papers were counted, the number was announced, and the ballots were destroyed. Polling officers cut off a corner of each. During this time the polling boots are taken apart by some of the polling officials to save time since they are not all needed for that one task. 4. The signatures on the electoral roll are now counted. The registers are put on a pile and sown together with thick thread and a needle with the experienced sowing hand of an old woman. The pile is signed by the Chairman on a smaller piece of paper put at the back of the pile. 5. The applications of voters that wished to vote from their homes were counted and the number was announced. 6. The movable ballot box, which was used for these voters, was examined and opened, and the ballot papers in it are taken out and counted. 7. Each ballot paper was held up and was the counting officer announced which candidate received the vote. This was done for every ballot. 8. A big table was set up for the votes from the main ballot box. The votes from the movable ballot box were on another table. According to local regulations, this was actually not allowed because by that moment, all ballots should have been mixed together on the big table. 9. The ballot box from this polling station was examined and opened. The votes were put on the big table by turning the box upside down. 10. After we all had a chance to look in the box, the officer announced that the ballot box was empty. 11. Before they started to count the votes, the polling officials asked the chairman whether they should all stick to the same piles or if they should all have seven piles each. The chairman decided that they should all have their own piles. 12. Every polling official began to sort the ballot papers in piles by candidates. That gave each polling official seven piles. Five for the five different candidates, one for the votes "against all candidates", and one for the invalid votes. 13. Only the polling officials were allowed to touch the votes. Observers were allowed to stand very close, ask questions and take photos but not to touch the votes. 14. While counting was going on, one of the officials was wrapping the unused ballots, then destroyed them and put them in brown, thick paper and sealed it with thick broad tape and stamped the package. 15. Every now and then during counting, the polling officials commented on the votes with surprise. For example "There are not that many invalid votes this time" or "Candidate X seems extremely popular". 16. When all the votes were counted (approximately 1300), all the piles for the same candidate were put on a large pile. 17. Each invalid vote was proclaimed invalid and held up so that everyone present at the polling place could see. 18. The chairman also mentioned the reason for determining that vote invalid. 19. They repeated the process with the pile "against all candidates".
20. After finishing that process, the chairman moved towards the piles of votes with votes for candidates. The chairman started with one pile and held every vote up, and proclaimed that it was a vote for candidate X. The chairman asked the observers to feel free to stand right behind her when she was counting each vote for the candidate so that they could see that it was a vote for that candidate and so that the Chairman would not have to announce each vote loudly. 21. This procedure was repeated for the other four candidates. In some occasions, the counting of the different piles/candidates overlapped. Before any polling official started counting a pile, he/she announced that these were votes for candidate X etc. The number of votes for the candidate that was counted first was announced. 22. The piles with votes were put in alphabetical order on the table, which is the same way they are listed on the balance sheet and on the posters on the wall at the polling station. They can be sorted in any way according to the law, not necessarily in alphabetical order. 23. The Chairman took the pile with the last candidate. It seemed that this candidate received many more votes than any of the other candidates, and therefore, the votes were divided up in piles of 50. Some polling officials were commenting about the high number of votes this candidate had received. However, the Chairman asked the official to stop commenting on such political things, because they had to be neutral. At that point, a former polling officer came in to the polling station to say hello to his old colleagues. The chairman told him that he could not be there as a visitor, because he was not registered before the vote counting process started. An interesting note is that at another local election in Tula, south of Moscow, visitors were allowed to come and go as they wished. 24. One of the ballot papers had a little signature on it made by the voter, but the Chairman declared the ballot valid. As soon as the number of votes for each candidate was declared, the pile of votes for him/her was put in separate envelopes/packages and the number was written on the package with the candidate’s name. The package was signed by the Chairman and stamped like all other packages. 25. One of the polling officials had been sitting down all the time, writing down the numbers that had been announced. Other polling officials were writing the same numbers on the poster sized ballot account form on the wall. This ballot account form also contained information about the polling station (address, name, etc.) At the same time, some other material was being taken down and packed, such as posters, scissors, chairs, etc. 26. The polling official who filled in all the numbers was continuously checking the regulations concerning adding votes, to make sure they were doing it correctly. 27. All the envelopes and packages were put in a larger brown box. 28. They wrapped the registers in thick brown paper and tape. The polling officials were discussing whether the voter registers should be put in the same box. They decided to not put them in the same box. 29. The large box is closed and brown tape wrapped around it. 30. The polling official that filled in all the numbers double-checked them together with another colleague. They agreed that everything seemed correct after reviewing it. 31. The Chairman had a binder where she wrote down how many local and international observers were present. If the observers would had wanted to have a copy, she would have had to to write this down at another place to have copies of the ballot account form. All polling officials have to sign all the balance sheets that are distributed. 32. The poster size ballot form was filled in by the Chairman with the last numbers after adding and subtracting votes. The Chairman read all the numbers out loud. The numbers were read with double numbers. For example, the number 2033 was read twenty, thirty-three. 33. The large box containing the votes was on the table all the time. The voter registers were on top of the box with a binder with information of how many observers there were present during vote counting, and other similar information. The doors had been closed but not locked all the time. Only those that were present at the polling station before closing and registered, were allowed to be there, other people was not allowed in after the voting hours have been proclaimed closed. 34. Every polling official had to sign each of the ballot account forms that the observers wanted and the three official forms that go to the Election Commission. 35. The Chairman then asked one of the polling officials to call the car. 36. Those observers that asked for a copy of the balance sheet had to sign a list to confirm that they received it. 37. The Chairman numbered the three official balance sheets with 1, 2 and 3. 38. The Chairman never officially declared the vote counting process finished but by filling in all the balance sheets and signing them, the Chairman made it clear that it was over. 39. The box containing votes and the voter registers were kept on a pile on the large table. Some polling officials stayed and watched the pile while other polling official went off to fetch jackets and private bags, etc. 40. A police officer arrived. The Chairman, the vice chairman and the secretary of the polling station went with him to the car, which was parked outside the polling station. The policeman carried the box with votes and the Chairman was carrying the voter registers and the balance sheet. Some polling stations were not able to find a free police officer that could assist, so they simply walked to the regional electoral office. 41. The box and registers were placed in the car and all four went in the car to the regional election commission where they were supposed to hand in their box, the registers and the balance sheets. 42. Most transports were done in a police car, but some were done in private or borrowed cars. Public services such as the police and other security forces had to assist in the electoral process. 43. At the regional electoral office the polling officials from each polling station were lined up outside. There was a security guard in the room and local and international observers were allowed to be present. The police officer that accompanied the polling official from this particular polling station left and was on his way to the next polling stations. 44. When it was the turn of the polling officials from our polling station the balance sheets were reviewed. This was the first step. If they were not correctly filled, stamped, and signed, they would be sent back for correction. In our case, all seemed correct and our Chairman was able to hand in the box with votes and voter registers. 45. The box was carried away to a separate archive room to be reviewed later. 46. The balance sheets and other documents were taken to a computer room where all the numbers were registered to the computer. After it had been completed, they printed it out for the Chairman to sign. Sweden: Counting BallotsSummary In Sweden there are three elections (parliamentary, county council, and municipal) on the same day. The votes are counted, by party only, in the polling stations immediately after the closing of the poll. Interim results are reported by telephone from the polling station to the local election committees who report to the regional office of the Regional Tax Board. From the Regional Tax Board, a computer transmits the parliamentary results to the National Tax Board, where a preliminary distribution of seats in parliament is carried out, and the interim results are published. The ballots and reports are delivered to the Regional State Administration where a recount is carried out. Based on the recount, the final distribution of seats for the municipal and county levels is made, and the final results published by the State County Administration. The distribution of seats for parliament is made by the National Tax Board and the final results officially published, based on reports from the State County Administration. Electoral System Sweden has a proportional list system, with a possibility for preferential vote for one candidate on the list. There is a separate list for each alternative (the party can have more than one list in each electoral district). The voter inserts the ballot, with or without preferential mark, in an envelope, using a separate ballot for each election. The ballots have different colours for each election, and separate ballot boxes are used. There are around six thousand polling stations in Sweden, with a separate voters' register for each polling station. Normally, voters choose to vote at the polling station where they are registered. However, absentee voting is permitted at post offices up to eighteen days before Election Day, and during a more limited period at Swedish missions abroad. About thirty-five per cent of the electorate votes using the absentee ballot.
The voter can vote either in person or by proxy. Limited mail-in voting is allowed in special cases. Most of the absentee votes are sent to the polling station where the voters are registered and counted. However, a small proportion of "late" absentee votes, and mail-in votes are counted by the local election committees. Vote Counting in Voting Stations Immediately after the closing of the polls, the votes are counted in the voting stations in this order:
First, the absentee votes are put in the ballot boxes. The number of voters who have cast their votes according to the voter register is determined. The envelopes in the ballot box are counted and compared with the numbers according to the voters' register. If there is a discrepancy, a recount is carried out. If there still is a discrepancy, this is written in the polling station report and the count continues. The envelopes are opened, and the ballots are sorted according to party. Spoiled ballots are set aside and counted.
A ballot is spoiled if:
The ballots are then counted per party and the numbers are written in the polling station report. The ballots are put in special plastic envelopes. A separate envelope is used for each party, and for spoiled ballots, and the envelopes are sealed. The ballots, voters' register, and reports are delivered to the local election committee, and from there, to the state county administration for the recount. Reporting of Interim Results As soon as the parliamentary election is counted in the polling station, the results are reported by telephone to the Regional Tax Authority. The parliamentary results are forwarded to the National Tax Board where a preliminary distribution of seats is carried out and published. The results from the municipal and county council elections are reported in the same way, but the procedures end at the Regional Tax Authority, where preliminary distributions of seats are carried out and published.
Predictions of the parliamentary results are made by the media based on sample results delivered by the National Tax Board. The media bear the responsibility for these predictions. However, the accuracy of the predictions has improved, and normally the predictions are very close to the actual result. Counting of Absentee Votes and Mail-in Votes The local election committees are responsible for "late" absentee votes (that have not been sent to the polling stations), and mail-in votes. This count takes place three days after Election Day, and by and large, the same rules apply as in counting at the polling stations.
The election materials are delivered to the State County Administration for a recount immediately after the count is finished. Final Count at the State County Administration At the final count, all ballots are examined and decided on once again. The ballots are counted, not only by party, but each list within the party, and preferential votes for candidates. The numbers are entered into computers, the results are calculated, and seats distributed among parties and candidates. These operations start the day after the election.
The final parliamentary results are published after a little more than a week later. The final county council and municipal council results are published approximately three weeks after the election. All ballots, reports, and voters' registers are kept in case of complaints. Afghanistan: Results Management SystemIntroduction The uncertainty surrounding the election results is no doubt one of the major challenges effectively undermining the integrity of the election in Afghanistan. The various EMBs in that country have tried to overcome these challenges by adjusting the election results management system during the ten years since multi-party election was introduced in 2004.[1] Given the various results systems used, Afghanistan is an interesting case, as it has proactively tried to adjust and tackle results management challenges. The overriding objective of Afghanistan’s election results system has always been to ensure a timely, correct and transparent system. The variables and challenges shaping the results system are common to a number of other transitional societies, while others are more unique. The more common factors are a rudimentary infrastructure, poor telecommunication system, and low literacy and numeracy levels. The more unusual challenges are the severe security conditions under which elections are organized. Furthermore, the cultural barriers to women participation as election officials, part representatives, domestic observers or even voters further complicates the implementation of a results system across the country covering both male and female polling stations. It is worth noting that a widespread fraud problem has further undermined Afghan stakeholders’ confidence in the IEC as a professional and independent EMB in general, and the results system in particular as over 20% of the ballots were deemed fraudulent in both 2009 and 2010 elections.[2] Description of current results management system Once polling stations are closed and polling is over, the counting of ballot papers will immediately commence in the very same polling station where ballots were cast. These procedures are spelled out in a comprehensive and yet user-friendly manual outlining the individual steps poll workers must perform in order to complete the count.[3] This also holds true when deciding if a ballot paper is valid, or not. Several useful examples are included to facilitate the implementation of the “intention-of-the-voter-is-clear” principle governing this process. The process is following best international practise enabling observers and party agents clear access to the counting process, including when presiding officers decide whether a ballot paper is deemed valid, or not. They are also requested to sign the actual results form and invited to note the numbers of the ballot box’s security seals and serial number on tamper evident bag (TEB) used to transport the sensitive election material, including ballot papers and results form, among other things. Before the results forms are inserted into the tamper evident bag, the Polling Centre Manager is supposed to review the form to ensure these are filled out correctly and completely. The sensitive material is then picked up by the District Field Coordinators who are temporary workers of the IEC and employed during election year to assist with planning and implementing all election-related activities within his/her district of responsibility. In some instances the sensitive material will only be picked up the following day, as counting will only commence the day after election. In a number of districts of Afghanistan, no transportation was deemed secure enough after dark and subsequently ballot boxes and tamper evident bags only moved in a convoy the following day to the provincial centre, often with a significant security presence. Given the poor infrastructure and vast distances the retrieval plan envisaged several days for some material to arrive at the provincial capital. At the provincial centres, the IEC and its UNDP support program have developed and introduced a web-based retrieval management system. This new system enhanced and facilitated IEC HQ’s ability to track the retrieval of ballot boxes and results forms from the polling stations. As soon as convoy arrived with materials from the polling centres within the DFC’s area of responsibility, the provincial intake team logged the identifiers of the polling centre and the number of results forms retrieved from the centre in question.[4]However, IEC officials at the provincial level do not open the tamper evident bag holding the actual results forms. This TEB is transported to National Tally Centre in Kabul, while the ballot box with other sensitive material remains behind at the provincial centre. The IEC had learned important lessons from the 2009 election results process and therefore made drastic changes to the tabulation and aggregation of results process in Kabul leading up to the 2010 election. Once TEBs arrived at the National Tally Centre, they were processed to following way:
Use of ICT The IEC has been especially prone to introduce ICT-solutions in areas often ignored by many EMBs, such as deployment and retrieval of sensitive election-results related material and tracking of polling station results forms. The Commission also implemented a reporting system for Election Day to facilitate data-transfer to its Headquarters to be used by the IEC during its press conferences primarily on Election Day. However, no interim results system was used and with the tabulation and aggregation process highly centralized to the national Tally Centre in Kabul the results management system was subsequently expected to be slow. In the end, it took the IEC more than a month to release most of the results.[5] Tracking of sensitive election results material using technology In 2010, the IEC bar-coded the ballot papers packs, as well as tamper-evident bags, using barcode readers. This information was stored in a database enabling the IEC to track these materials from its headquarters down to polling centre level. As a result, the Commission would be able to identify ballot papers emerging from polling stations other than originally allocated to.
In addition to tracking sensitive material, the IEC also utilized a tracking system for a significant number of the convoys deploying the materials as well using mobile phones and satellite equipment to provincial centres. However, the system had significantly less coverage outside provincial capitals when the material was delivered to District Field Coordinators for onward distribution to polling centres. Results reporting and tracking system The TEBs arriving with the results forms from polling stations to the provincial centres were logged into a web-based system, which was connected to the National Tally Centre in Kabul. The database contained the serial numbers of TEBs, polling centre codes and the number of polling stations. As the TEBs were not opened at this stage no results data was extracted. The main purpose of the database was instead to track the retrieval of results forms from the polling stations and to reduce the risk of manipulation of results during transportation of material by tracking the serial numbers of the TEBs holding results forms. However, in spite of the new system the IEC failed to notice that 511 polling stations had not been accounted for more than five weeks since Election Day.[6] Although the IEC established a system for polling centre reporting on Election Day, the focus was not results, but how many polling stations opened, security incidents and turnout at mid-day and at closing. As no results were communicated from the polling stations to a higher administrative level within the IEC following the end of the count, no interim result system was used in Afghanistan during the 2010 election. Instead, released results were based on legal results forms that were checked and cleared by the IEC’s Board of Commissioners. Reporting opening and closing times of polling stations, as well as turnout numbers at noon and at close of polls, is an effective way for the election authority to control the information flow on Election Day. Several other EMBs are availing themselves of the very same strategy, which is widely regarded as an appropriate approach and thereby often recommended by technical assistance service providers. The newly introduced reporting system from polling stations gave the IEC headquarters a good overview of the number of polling centres and polling stations opened in the morning (and reasons if not open).[7] The system was, as mentioned above, also designed to generate turnout numbers at noon and at the close of polling. Polling Centre Managers phoned in the requested data to DFCs, who conveyed the same information to their respective Provincial Office for data-entry into the web-based software. Unfortunately, the system had some shortcomings. Based on this reporting system, the IEC initially announced a voter turnout of 4,265,354. A month later, when publishing interim results, the turnout had jumped to 5.6 million voters representing a discrepancy of more than 30%.[8] The possible reasons for this discrepancy are numerous, as the reporting system itself had weaknesses that made errors more likely. Existing strengths in the results management system Preparing and holding elections in Afghanistan have proven challenging, given extreme security challenges, socio-economical conditions, as well as cultural barriers effectively preventing women to participate fully as voters, election officials, candidates or observers. The IEC has, cognizant of these extra-ordinary challenges, developed and implemented several improvements to strengthen the integrity of its election results system. An area sometimes overlooked by managers and developers of results management systems is the ability for people to actually implement the results protocols. In other words, sufficient time and resources need to be allocated to ensure an effective training program. The IEC has been fully cognizant of this and therefore dedicated extensive attention to ensure poll worker manuals that are adapted to suit also individuals whose literacy levels are not ideal for the tasks at hand, thereby make extensive use of pictures and samples. The training course is also significantly longer than in most countries, as poll workers are trained during four days (two days focusing on voting and the remaining two days on counting and reporting). The IEC is also aware of the security features used to reduce the risk of fraud are essential to the credibility of the results process. It therefore spends significant resources at procuring ballot papers printed on high-quality security papers with several unique features effectively minimizing the risk of counterfeit ballots entering the electoral process without being detected during the count. According to the public perception, the main threat to the results management system is however not the actual tabulation of the votes cast, but multiple-voting by individuals holding more than one voter registration card. The reason being that Afghanistan has never had a workable voter registration system. In fact, in spite of four elections and several hundred millions spent on various voter registration processes the afghans are yet to find voters lists in their polling stations on Election Day.[9] The sub-standard voter registration methodology stems from the Joint Election Management Body-era (JEMB).[10] Undoubtedly, voter registration cards will constitute a very real and significant threat to the integrity of the Afghan elections by creating the appearance of impropriety. The fact that voter registration lists are not used in polling stations further facilitates fraud by individuals holding more than one voter registration card. Hence, the vulnerability for fraud due to a non-functional voter registration system is very high in Afghanistan. It is important to note, however, that high fraud vulnerability does not automatically translate into actual fraud. The question is, however, the extent to which a significant number of individuals are able to vote multiple times on Election Day and thereby capitalize on the dysfunctional voter registration system to affect the outcome of the election. The main question here is not whether a substantial number of eligible voters own multiple registration cards, but if they are able to vote more than once. The IEC has been using election-specific hole punch tools to mark used cards. Unfortunately, in both 2009 and 2010 the hole punches proved to be of uneven quality and failed after limited usage on Election Day in various polling stations across the country. Regardless, even if the hole punch tools had worked for the duration of the day, voters could still vote in multiple polling stations by simply using a different registration card. Indelible ink has de facto become the only deterrent against multiple voting in Afghanistan, as polling stations lack unique voter lists. Unfortunately, in spite of the procurement of ink of the highest quality and with specifications in line with international best practice, the IEC continues to struggle to instil confidence in stakeholders about the effectiveness of the inking practice. This issue stems from mistakes made by the JEMB Secretariat during the 2004 presidential election, when poll workers sometimes mistook regular marker pens for the marker pen-style indelible ink dispenser and as a result voters were able to remove the ink.[11] It is worth noting that in cases where high-quality ink is properly stored, applied and allowed to dry on the voter’s finger, the indelible ink actually represents a generally sufficient deterrence against multiple voting. It is by no means fool proof, but certainly plays a significant role in reducing fraud on Election Day in many countries. In spite of all the criticism raised against the voter registration system and the significant risk of fraud by voters abusing the system by voting multiple times, the largest domestic observer group found very limited proof of multiple voting during the 2010 elections.[12]The reasons could be numerous. For example, in rural areas, moving from one village to another costs money and given the rudimentary infrastructure also takes a significant amount of time. Queuing and transportation to polling stations also reduce the number of hours available to individuals to conduct multiple voting. Furthermore, due to the social cohesiveness of local communities, it is sometimes difficult for strangers to appear at a polling station to cast a vote without causing suspicion and being questioned. In order to overcome a significant fraud risk during the tabulation of the results, the IEC made two strategically important changes to the election results forms. Instead of requiring poll workers to only write the numerical numbers for votes received by political parties and candidates, the results need to be spelled out in writing thereby closing the loophole whereby a 290 suddenly becomes 1290 votes on the form during results aggregation. The second important improvement made to the results form and procedures was to require Polling Centre Managers to cover the results’ portion of the form with scotch-tape thereby preventing attempts to change the reported results by altering the figures. In addition, attempts to remove the tape would tear the form and thereby render the attempted manipulation unsuccessful, as the form would be set aside for further investigation. The IEC also made extensive use of serial numbered tamper-evident bags and hand-over forms to supervise transportation of results forms from polling stations to the National Tally Centre in Kabul. Existing weaknesses in the results management system In spite of numerous safeguards and an appreciation of the results system’s fraud risks by the IEC leadership, the Commission still threw out some 1.3M ballots during the 2010 elections thereby affecting the outcome in many of the parliamentary seats. The reasons for the large number of invalidated votes are numerous, but certain factors are more salient than others. For instance, even though the IEC made changes to its recruitment policies and even blacklisted a significant number of ad hoc workers from future employment due to improper behaviour and actions, recruitment and training of poll workers and DFCs remain a challenge. The IEC still faces challenges to identify poll workers with sufficient literacy and numerical skills to perform the required duties. This problem is especially significant for women polling stations. Effective supervision of these categories of employees also remains insufficient by IEC’s permanent officers something that directly impacted the training of polling officials as many of the trainings were significantly curtailed and training material not used as planned. On top of that, intimidation, violence, bribery and politically compromised poll workers and DFCs further compromised the results system generating a highly problematic tabulation and aggregation process as a very large number of results forms proved incorrect. Based on experiences from the 2009 election, the IEC had made significant improvements to the intake and investigative part of the results system at the National Tally Centre. The decision-making process had also been streamlined and clarified thereby avoiding inconsistencies and a more formalized system before the IEC Board of Commissioners made decisions to include, or exclude, polling station results. However, the investigative teams - reviewers and auditors of results forms - at the National Tally Centre in Kabul faced a major challenge: they only had access to the results forms and not actual ballot papers as ballot boxes were stored in the provinces. Subsequently IEC’s headquarters and its provincial offices were tasked with auditing or recounting 3,345 polling stations thereby affecting almost 18% of all polling stations in the country.[13] Although additional resources had been allocated in anticipation of some challenges with the results tabulation, the Commission had not foreseen a problem of such a magnitude. In order not to derail the results aggregation process, fraud triggers, which should have initialized investigation and collection of corroborating evidence, were instead improperly treated as sufficient evidence in and of themselves to invalidate ballots. [14] Thus, the categorization of all invalid ballots as fraudulent by the IEC was inaccurate and served to undermine the credibility of the IEC. Improvements to the election results management system are therefore required in Afghanistan without which reliable and timely results cannot be released by the IEC. [1] The 2004 and 2005 elections were organized by the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), which was a joint UN-Afghan composition made up of both national and international election commissioners. Since 2009, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) has had fully responsibility to prepare and organize elections in Afghanistan. [2] And footnotes from TAF’s two surveys referenced in our AFG audit; www.iec.org.af. [3] Add reference to the IEC’s poll worker manual here. [4] National Tally Center Operations and Procedures. Independent Election Commission (IEC) Afghanistan. 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections. Pages 1-2. [5] http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/wolesi-pressr/press_release_on_wj_election_priliminary_result_english_final.pdf [6] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/07/AR2010110701381.html [7] For additional information, please see E Day Reporting Web User Guide. IEC IT Department. August 21, 2010. Kabul. [8] For more details, see The 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections in Afghanistan. National Democratic Institute. Page 38. [9] Reference the report I wrote back in 2009/10 on the VR in AFG under STEP. [10] The JEMB was the joint UN-Afghan institution created to plan and organize the first 2004 and 2005 elections in Afghanistan. [11] International Panel of Experts’ report (2005) . [12] Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), Afghanistan Parliamentary Election Observation Mission 2010. [13] The 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections in Afghanistan. National Democratic Institute. Washington DC. Pages 32; 38. [14] Several different triggers were implemented. For instance, each polling station was allocated 600 ballot papers and if the results form exceeded or was equaled 600 the ballot box was rejected. Other examples were if more than 90 percent of valid and invalid votes were cast for one candidate (against the total of invalid and valid votes); and if there were inconsistencies greater than 4 percentage points between the total number of ballot papers withdrawn from the ballot box and the total number of valid and invalid votes reported. Kenya: Results Management and Transmission SystemThe electoral history of Kenya extends back to the early 1960’s following independence. However, it is the 2007 General Elections and the tragic events that followed that have the most relevance for the current state of elections management in Kenya. A commission of enquiry was established in early 2008 specifically to examine the electoral process in detail and make recommendations. The report (known as the Kreigler Report, named for the South African jurist who chaired the commission) makes specific recommendations, the most relevant of which are reproduced here, in order to give context to this case study. Brief reference to Kriegler report with respect to Vote Counting and Results transmission, focussing on recommendations.
Recommendations of the Kriegler Report (p.138 of that report)
2010 and subsequent by-elections
The Interim Independent Election Commission established following the troubled 2007 general elections was mandated to develop a modern system for collection, collation, transmission, and tallying of electoral data. Accordingly, IIEC implemented a Results Management System that featured:
The new Kenyan constitution, adopted following the 2010 referendum organised by the IIEC, includes the necessary articles establishing Kenya’s current EMB – the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). Article 88, specifically mandates the IEBC to make use of “appropriate technology and approaches in the performance of its functions” Electoral SystemUnder the new 2010 Constitution, Kenyans go to the polls in General Elections to cast six ballots for the following elections:
Each of the ballot papers is a different colour. There are six transparent ballot boxes whose lids match the colour of the ballot papers. Voter education and guidance by polling officials are designed to prevent the accidental placing of ballot papers in the wrong ballot box. This is important, as a ballot found in the wrong box will be rejected. Holding six elections on a single day is an enormous logistical and operational undertaking. Counting ProcessUpon the close of poll, the presiding officer takes the following preparatory steps (with respect to the count):
Then, one election at a time, in the order determined in the regulations, the task proceeds with sorting:
* This is significant for Results Management as it means that there is a legitimate reason for differences between any calculated aggregation of polling station results and the results from Constituency level. Such legitimate differences must be clearly communicated and be subject to accountability mechanisms. Once the sorting is complete, the ballots for each candidate are counted by the presiding officer. Then the invalid (rejected, rejection objected and disputed ballots) are counted. Candidates or their agents can, not more than twice, seek a recount. The presiding officer will then announce and record on the results form:
The results forms will then be distributed as follows:
The original is the official result and commences its journey to the Returning Officer at the Tally Centre. At this point, the provisional results will now be transmitted using the electronic system described below. Provisional Results TransmissionThe Kenyan electoral regulations (which are gazetted and have the force of law) provide for the electronic transmission of provisional results. The regulations explicitly state that the results transmitted electronically are provisional – an important provision that eliminates any ambiguity as to which results matter. The technical solution used has the following characteristics.
Challenges in 2010 and by-elections up to 2012
Official Results TransmissionIt must be emphasised that all electronic transmission and tallying is provisional and, while this meets the demand for rapid communication of results and provides the elections management body with an accountability mechanism, it is the paper forms from each polling station and subsequent paper form consolidating these results that comprises the official results transmission channel. Each presiding officer fills in a form detailing the results at the polling station. This form is copied several times and copies are distributed as follows:
All Polling Station results forms are handed over in a controlled manner to Returning Officers who follow detailed procedures for the further consolidation on Constituency Tally Forms. This tallying is subject to scrutiny by party and candidate agents who are also invited to sign the tally forms, further adding accountability. Each Returning Officer will announce the results in their constituency. These results will be final in the case of the election of members of the National Assembly, but partial in the case of Presidential election. In the case of Presidential elections, each Returning Officer physically travels to the National Tally Centre in Nairobi and submits their constituency level tally forms for scrutiny and final consolidation by the IEBC whose chairman is the National Returning Officer. Results Dissemination
Electoral Disputes (related to results)At the polling station, up to two recounts can be undertaken, at the request of political party or candidate agents. It is worth noting that significant emphasis is placed on the signing by political party or candidate agents of the official results forms at all levels. Where an agent refuses to sign a form, the presiding officer or returning officer is required to record the fact of the refusal to sign on the given form. This is designed to ensure a paper trail that facilitates electoral dispute resolution. Significantly, the regulations explicitly state that the absence of a candidate or their agent at the signing of declaration form or at the announcement of results shall not by itself invalidate the results announced.
Thereafter, citizens, candidates or parties may petition the courts to raise electoral disputes. In the case of most elections, it is the High Court to which electoral petitions must be submitted. In the case of the Presidential elections, it is the Supreme Court of Kenya that has jurisdiction. 2013 Elections in Kenya
At approximately nine pm on March 4th 2013, as the number of polling stations reporting provisional Presidential election results was steadily increasing and Kenyans at home and at the National Elections Centre settled down to watch the emerging political race, something went wrong on the main server and what had been a steady stream of arriving figures slowed to a mere trickle. It took technicians four hours to first identify and then rectify the relatively simple problem that had caused the bottleneck. 24 hours later, this problem combined with operational problems in the field[1] caused the IEBC to essentially step back from its Results Transmission System and focus exclusively on the paper-based official results system whereby Returning Officers converged on the National Election Centre where their results were verified and announced. In any single election, Presiding Officers and IEBC officials might have persevered and overcome the problems, but 2013 was different. First, there was a very high turnout (approximately 86% - a huge success by any measure) with long queues all day and some polling stations still voting four hours after the scheduled close of polls. Secondly, under the new constitution adopted in 2010, the IEBC had to hold no fewer than six elections on a single day. Its results management systems therefore had to cope with six separate elections:
This meant a total of one thousand, eight hundred and eighty two separate races with tens of thousands of candidates. An additional layer of consolidation was introduced at County level. IEBC decided to use the same basic model for results management – i.e. following the counting of ballots at each polling station, Presiding Officers would use a mobile handset to submit provisional results electronically, while official results would be entered on paper forms which would be delivered, along with other electoral materials to Constituency or County Tally Centres. There, the official results would be verified and tallied by Returning Officers. The additional number of elections meant that the software applications would be more complex than in previous years. More stringent security requirements also added to the complexity of the system architecture and the task of deploying the application to over thirty thousand devices and users. The pre-election period (the 12 months leading up to March 4th 2013) in Kenya were characterised by two related problems – procurement of technology and delay. In addition to the significant challenges of delivering a more complex RMS, the IEBC also decided to conduct nationwide, fresh, Biometric Voter Registration (which they had piloted with some success in 18 of 290 constituencies in 2010) and also to introduce an Electronic Voter Identification Device. Other less procurement-intensive information system innovations included new systems for political party registration/membership and candidate nomination. As all these systems would interact by varying degrees (for example, the output of the Candidate Nominations System would be a vital input to RMS), their specification, development and procurement had to be closely coordinated. For reasons that, according to the Kenya Supreme Court judgement[2], merit further investigation, the procurement processes were problematic. First the competitive BVR procurement was cancelled and there was a three month delay in the commencement of voter registration. Later the EVID procurement process was delayed with a contract for EVID not signed until December 2012. The impact on the entire electoral process was direct – the 90 day period between the end of voter registration and any election as envisaged in the 2011 Elections Act had to be compressed to 60 days by the National Assembly. The domino effect hit all relevant preparations, including that for infrastructure and services and the time necessary to conduct all tests on the Results Management System was simply not available. Since IEBC’s overall results management system was designed as a “belt-and-braces” system, the poor performance of the electronic Results Transmission System component, luckily, did not cause the election process as a whole to fail. Many stakeholders were unaware that all the technology was there for provisional results, but that the official results process remained in place and was a paper system. The IEBC was able to complete its official Presidential results tallying process two days ahead of the legal deadline of seven days and announce that Uhuru Kenyatta had been elected on the first round by the narrowest of margins. The second-placed candidate (amongst others) petitioned the Supreme Court of Kenya which, in a landmark ruling, upheld the results. The ruling includes the following analysis (emphasis added): Counsel for the Respondents, by contrast, advance the position that the act of voting is a galaxy, whose central sun is the signifying of one’s choice by the marking of the ballot paper, and its subsequent deposition into the ballot box. Every other process before and after, revolves around this procedure, and involves only the ascertaining of the voter’s choice, and the sustaining of the voter’s right to make that choice. Counsel provides cases from the Philippines, that hold that even if there was a failure of all other support processes (in particular electronic ones), the right to vote and to express one’s self in universal suffrage is not defeated. Manual procedures must come into operation, to fulfil the electors’ expression of choice.[3] While the RTS (electronic transmission of provisional results) was perceived as a failure, it did capture ninety percent of results in some twenty-one constituencies, and, by polling station, over fourteen thousand presidential results overall, and between six and nine thousand results for each of the other five races – well over fifty-two thousand results in all – representing a significant increase on 2010 throughput. While the quantity of provisional results fell significantly short of Kenyan expectations, the quality of what was transmitted, on closer examination, was extremely high – with provisional and official results matching in all but a tiny handful of cases. Notwithstanding the problems experienced on March 4th and the days following, the IEBC held several elections just weeks later and successfully deployed both EVID and RMS. It is reasonable to conclude that, if the lessons of 2012 and 2013 are fully applied, Kenyan elections, going forward, will continue to be characterised by the widespread use of technology for the management of results. [1] The problems in the field ranged from a lack of phones, SIM cards, missing or obsolete authentication credentials, poor training. [2] Available at http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/full-judgment-presidential-election-petition-2013.html Paragraph 234 refers. [3] ibid, paragraph 128 Sierra Leone: Decentralized Election Results Tally 2012IntroductionIn December 2004, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) completed a seven-step electoral reform plan, which was based on a lessons learned process following the May 2004 local elections as well as recommendations pending since the 2002 national elections. The NEC’s 2004 plan provided the foundation for comprehensive electoral reform, which a UNDP project was put in place to support from 2005 to 2007. The lessons learned report following the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections noted that “2007 elections had an extraordinary and historical significance for the consolidation of the peace and democratization process of Sierra Leone.”[1] At the same time, the lessons learned report cautions that the longer-term challenges faced in the consolidation of the democratic process in Sierra Leone have not been fully addressed and notes that “paradoxically, the needs to sustain the positive results achieved with the 2007 elections are even stronger than before.” Subsequently, in 2010 a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM)[2] was fielded and based on the findings of the NAM the current UN Electoral Support programme concentrated on the three areas, which included establishment of operational Regional Results Management centres for the 2012 Elections. Under this NEC was supported in identifying appropriate locations, procurement of required equipment, technical expertise, contract management, monitoring and oversight Regional Results Management centres. With respect to results, a criticism of the 2007 Elections in Sierra Leone was the time taken for the results process. In fact, in some cases it took several weeks for Results Sheets to reach the Central Tally Centre situated in the capital Freetown. This caused delay in the announcement of the results and created apprehension amongst those seeking office and their supporters increasing uncertainty and thereby the risk of electoral violence. The NEC estimated that by decentralizing results tally centres to the regional level the time between the polling and announcement of results could be cut by one-third. The UN programme therefore supported NEC in establishing the four Regional Tally Centers. However, at very late stage of the electoral process, two months before the Elections, NEC decided on the establishment of District Tally Centers. It is worth mentioning that Result Tallying process in 2012 Sierra Leone Election involved tallying of results for 542 elections or 542 different ballot papers. Given the low literacy rate ballots were colour coded representing a specific election. To further alleviate workload of polling staff after a daunting day of managing a complex election a decision was made to preprint all of the Ballot Papers and various Result Forms with the candidate names. This decision added further complexity in the distribution process which was managed through a tracking mechanism ensuring correct ballots reaching the correct polling station. This was instrumental in managing a smooth running of regional/district tally centres.
Concept of Sierra Leone Decentralized Election Results 2012On November 17th 2012 Sierra Leone saw for the first time four rounds of elections held on the same day. There were some 36,000 Results Forms produced in almost 9,000 Polling Stations throughout the country, electing four levels of government. The Commission decided to set up a decentralized result and tally centres at the following levels: District level - The district tally centres were linked to the national and regional centres. Results were tallied at the district centres using the district copies of the polling station result forms for the purpose of producing certified district results as required by Sec. 94 of Public Election Act of 2012. Regional level - The regional tally centre, one in each Regional Capital, used the double blind data entry procedure to tally all district results from the regional copies of polling station result forms and transmit output to the national centre. National level - The national tally centre was linked to the four regional centres via satellite link and performed quality control and consolidation of all regional outputs. The National Tally Centre, the Regional Tally Centres and the District Tally Centres received copies of the Reconciliation and Results Forms from Polling Stations within their respective areas of responsibilities. The responsibilities and activities at each level, National, Regional and District, varied depending on the logistic and ICT infrastructural resources that the NEC had the capacity to put in place at those locations as well as considering the experience of staff who were engaged in the process. At District Tally CentresDistrict tally centres’ objective was to capture the details of a TEE Bag (Tamper Evident Envelope Bag) for reference purposes. Detailed captured included centre code, details of the courier, time of delivery, status of TEE Bag (e.g. Sealed, Suspect/Tampered-with), and number of result sheets. Each result sheet was captured appropriately using a Camera/Scanner and stored on Sierra Leone Voter Collation (SLVC) application. Data Entry Operators captured actual result information from Result Sheet per Polling Station using the scanned copy of the result sheet. Data Entry Operators captured the results of a polling station for each election. A supervisory approval was instituted to vet that the data entered by the data operators is consistent with the details on the results sheet. The supervisor compared the data entered by the data entry operator with the scanned copy of the results sheet. If the entered data is found inconsistent the supervisor was allowed to edit the information entered by the data operator prior to approval, and such approval and changes were confirmed by the District Electoral Officer/ the District Returning Officer. The District Returning Officer received and dispatched TEE bags of station and centre results to regional collation centre, supervised the collation of station results at District level, approved/disapproved changes made by a Supervisor and flagged/un-flagged results from a polling station if found to be inconsistent. The District Returning Officer also generated numerous reports based on entered data or the lack of it, viewed and printed the collated/aggregated results for an election, transmitted by e-mail a complete collated result of an election to the Regional Returning Officer for perusal/comparison and announced provisional results of election types after reconciliation through the Regional Returning Officer and confirmation by the Commission. The District Returning Officer also printed and signed the certified District election results and distributed them to the relevant stakeholders. The establishment of the District Tally Centres was supported by the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) with technical support provided by the Nigerian Election Commission, INEC.
At Regional Tally CentresFour Regional Tally Centers were established at the cities of Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Freetown. The Regional Tally Centres were equipped with desk-top computers, linked by a local area network and via a VSAT link to the National Tally Centre. The Regional Election Officer was responsible for establishing and managing the Regional Tally Centre. The Regional Election Officers received the Tamper Evident Envelopes from the District Office for each of the Polling Stations within its Area of Responsibility. The Regional Election Officers accounted for each Tamper Evident Envelope received as well as for its contents. Each Regional Tally Centre had approximately 24 data entry clerks who were responsible for the data entry of the Polling Station Reconciliation and Results Forms. A clerk entered the data from each of the four Results Forms. The Results Forms for the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections were prioritized ahead of those for Mayoral and Councillors Elections. The data from each Form was subsequently re-entered by a second data entry clerk. The database compared the two sets of data for miss-matches of data, transposition errors and for mathematical or accounting errors. Reconciliation and Results Forms that have been double blind data entered and for which there were no miss-matches of data or mathematical or accounting errors were identified in the database for inclusion in the Final Results. Forms that failed the cross-checking process were taken for Review and Correction and experienced electoral staff were employed to review the forms for miss-matches transposition errors and for mathematical or accounting errors as well as for drafting errors performed by the Polling Station Presiding Officers. Where Reconciliation and Results Forms failed the above process they were held in a Quarantine Area for further action and possible subsequent investigation. When Regional Election Officers were unable to resolve discrepancies in the blind double data entry process or where Results Forms from Polling Stations failed the audit process, they were, upon confirmation from the NEC (Chairperson or delegated Commissioner) task the District Officers with undertaking an investigation and/or re-count of the Polling Station material in order to provide a detailed report of findings and/or a “revised” Result Form for inclusion in the Final Results. At The National Tally Centre:The National Tally Centre was co-located at the NEC Headquarters in Freetown. Staff working at the National Tally Centre provided oversight to the results process, analyzing and assessing the progress of data entry process as well as providing summaries and reports for the NEC, Party Agents and Observers. Results Forms for the National Tally Centre were stored at NEC Wellington warehousing facility which also housed the Central Results database. The establishment of the Regional and National Tally Centres was supported by the UN Electoral Support programme. Procedures for Tally, Consolidation and Announcement of 2012 Elections ResultsAt a Polling Station At the close of polls and at the conclusion of the counting process the Presiding Officer completed the Reconciliation and Results Form (RRF) for each of the four elections conducted in that polling station. These forms were completed in accordance with the Polling and Counting Procedures. One RRF, which contained an original and four carbon copies, was completed for each election. Each Election RRF had 4 copies. One for Region (top and original copy), one for National (second copy), one for District (third copy), one for Polling Centre (fourth copy) and one for the ballot box (fifth copy). The top copy of each election (Presidential, Parliament, Mayor/Chair and Councillors) was sealed into the Tamper Evident Envelope (TEE) 1. The second copies of all elections were put in TEE2, third copies of all elections were put in TEE3, the fourth copies were sent to Polling Centre Manager and the fifth were put in the ballot box. All TEE’s were sent to the Polling Centre Manager. In addition, all Presiding Officers completed a further two versions of the RRF each with four carbon copies which were distributed to Party/candidate agents and /or Observers. Therefore, in principle it was possible that there will be up to fifteen copies of the results in circulation after the count was concluded at the polling station, five copies for NEC purposes and a further ten for agents and observers.
At a Polling Centre The Polling Centre Manager copied the fourth copy of each polling station for each election onto a respective Polling Centre Summary Sheet and pasted the fourth copy along with the summary on the wall. The original summary sheet was placed in a TEE7 and together with all the other TEEs from the Polling Stations, and was sent to Ward.
At a Ward Ward only acted as a concentrator and a transit point. The Ward Coordinators were responsible for collecting the sensitive materials from the Polling Centres and arranging their safe onward delivery to the District Offices.
At a District District located in Regional Capital City District Election Officer received all the TEE’s from the Polling Stations in the district, routed through Polling Centres and Wards, TEE1’s and TEE2’s were passed on to Regional Centers. TEE3s’ were opened and data entered into the District Tally System starting on Election Night and continued 24/7. TEE3s were opened and separated so that Presidential RRFs could be given first priority, then Parliament, the Mayor, then Councillors Results.
District outside Regional Capitol City District Election Officer received all TEEs from the Polling Stations. TEE1s and TEE2s were passed on to Regional Centers but in batches. UN provided extra logistics to help in retrieval of TEEs. TEE3s were opened and data entered into the District Tally System only during daylight. No night entry was performed for the risk of electricity outage and generator failure. TEE3s were opened and separated so that Presidential could be given first priority, then Parliament, the Mayor, then Councillors Results.
At a Regional Tally Centre TEE1s and TEE2s were received and the TEE2s were passed on to Wellington for National Storage and Queries. TEE1s were opened and separated so that Presidential could be given first priority, then Parliament, the Mayor, then Councillors Results. Regional Data Entry started on Election Night and continued for 24/7 until all results were entered and issues were resolved.
Verification Procedures for Regional Tally Centre and District Tally Centres Results were to be electronically and automatically cross referenced at Regional level when District Tally Systems presents entered results. When no discrepancy exists, the Regional were to send back a positive answer and mark the results as such. If a discrepancy was detected, the Regional Tally System was to send back a negative answer highlighting the discrepancies. Both sides would be flagged for investigation. Both sides were to investigate. District were to offer the corrections (or no corrections if Regional was in error) and if solution was found, the discrepancy flags were be cleared by both systems and the results were to be published. Regional Tally Centres were using satellite based independent communication system whereas Districts Tally Centres were relying upon a local telephone operator which was prone to disruption. Therefore, in case of no communication between the Regional Tally Centres and Districts Tally Centres Regional Tally Centre were to proceed with publishing of results.
Election Result Management SoftwareResults were entered at regional level from RRF retrieved directly from Polling Centers using the Result Management Software. The software was developed as a web based interface and the database was designed in such a way that NEC could enter multiple elections held on one day. The system is also capable of retaining all the results for future use allowing cross reference between various elections simultaneously. Every Result and Reconciliation Form (RRF) could be tracked in the system, once entered. The reporting pages could pinpoint exactly how many and what RRF’s were still outstanding in the field. This was done by entering the RRF’s as they arrive in the Material Tracking page at Regional Tally Centers. The receiving staff inspected the TEE in the presence of observers for tampering before opening it. The contents were then recorded to indicate the presence of the four RRF’s expected. Any missing data or obvious tampering was recorded in the system. The software provided a double blind entry mechanism for the actual election result entry and the candidates appeared on the entry screen in the same order as the ballot paper, result form and consolidation forms, courtesy of the integrated design. The RRF was mathematically checked against the prescribed formulae. By initial design the software did not warn the operator of any mistakes, except for asking the operator to put a black sticker on the form if the form did not make mathematically sense, or blue if all was fine. RRF’s could have been quarantined for various reasons such as missing information, wrong polling station code, does not make mathematically sense or duplicate entry. These quarantine cases were displayed in report form and the data centre staff could focus on specific areas to solve them. The software calculated the cut-off point where the outstanding RRF’s including the ones in quarantine, would not make any difference to the outcome. The first milestone was to determine whether to expect a run-off. This was important for the procurement process to be kicked off as soon as possible in order to have the run-off ballot papers in the country. The second milestone was to determine if the outstanding RRF’s would make a difference to the outcome of the presidential contest.
VSAT Based Result transmissionIt was also the first time in Sierra Leone that a satellite based data communication (VSAT) system was introduced into an election result management system. The VSAT system was required for the Regional Result Tally Centers to transmit regional election results to the National Result Tally Centre for consolidated Election Result Management. In total six (6) VSAT sites were established i.e. one at each Regional Result Tally Centres location, one at central datacentre facility and one for the Disaster Recovery Site at NEC HQ. Announcement of 2012 Elections ResultsPresidential Results at Districts and Regions were only posted or published after the official NEC HQ announcements which were the final results. All other elections (Parliament, Mayor/Chair and Councillor) results were announced as preliminary results by District Returning Officers after respective Regional Tally Centre and District Tally Centre were in agreement. The official and final announcement came from the NEC HQ. Strengths of the Sierra Leone Results Management System- The establishment of four regional Result Tally Centers significantly improved the result management for the 2012 elections. NEC significantly benefited from the establishment of a decentralized regional Result Tally Centers and was able to announce the Presidential final results on the 23 November i.e. 6 days after the polling. 80% of provisional results were announced with in 42 - 48 hours after the polling closed. Whereas under the previous centralized result system no provisional results announced which caused great anxiety at the time. - The use of double blind entry at regional level flagged very quickly typing mistakes and the software was “clever” enough to point out possible causes for the errors. The software was able to direct the supervisors in the right direction for fault finding. - The time consuming process of transporting Results Forms from polling stations to the National Tally Centre have been eliminated. - Greater responsibilities are bestowed upon Regional Election Officers and their staff in the consolidation and provision of results. - Improved transparency even at regional level, as Tally Centers had dedicated results computers for observers and party agents to run queries. - The National Election Commission of Sierra Leone has its capacities, staff and resources, built at regional and district levels. - A sustainable election results system is put in place and provides the building blocks for future operations for result management system. - Observers and Party Agents are able to witness and oversee the Results Tally System from polling station to District and Region - The double blind data entry at Regional Tally Centers has given observers and party agents greater confidence in the accuracy of the results process. - Individual polling station results forms entered at the Regions formed the basis of the final results and were therefore offered greater transparency. - Though the number of Reconciliation and Results Forms, in tune of 36,000, was be greater than in any previous election in Sierra Leone the division of labour through four Regional Tally Centers provided more timely results than any past election.
Weaknesses of the Sierra Leone Results Management System and recommendations- While considerable capacity enhancement has been witnessed in NEC overtime, it should be recognized that the technical complexity of the new elements introduced through the heavily IT based decentralized result management system meant NEC still required targeted international technical assistance. - Renewed efforts are needed to improve retrieval of materials from 10% polling stations. This could allow NEC to announce future election results within 72 hours after polls are closed. For 2012 Election, 90% of election results forms were received by regional tally centres and tallied within 24 hours after polls were closed. It was the retrieval of the remaining 10% of results forms which took four additional days. - Majority of the quarantine cases proved to be a mathematically mistake on the form. It would be recommended to have more focused training on the mathematical part and to train the staff on what the consequences would be or the effect would be should they make a calculation error. - Decentralized regional tally centres host large data centres requiring constant supply of electricity which is an issue in Sierra Leone. The maintenance of generators, especially since the running hours accumulate very fast, and the running cost of fuel and lubricants are a big burden on the budget. - The integrated district and regional tally centre operation was adopted but district tally software interface was not implemented in time. This hampered electronically and automatically cross-referencing process between regional and district tally centres. - Two different types of data-entry software were used at district and regional levels negatively affecting timely release of results, in addition to complicating training as different trainings rather than a standardized one, which also had cost implications. Typical Layout for Regional Tally Centre Organizational Chart at a Regional Tally Centre [1] Lessons Learned from the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Sierra Leone, Post Election UNDP Report, November 2007. [2] Recommendations of Electoral Support Needs Assessment Mission to Sierra Leone (NAM), 22 February to 3 March 2010. The NAM included the participation of UNDP’s Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) and Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).
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