Procedures for Vote Counting at Voting Stations

In general, the major process components of vote counting at a voting station are:

• opening the ballot box,

• sorting ballots,

• reconciling the ballots,

• counting the ballots,

• transmitting the results to the local office or the headquarters of the electoral management body.

Following the closing of voting, ballot boxes are kept at the voting station for vote counting. The following procedures are executed:

• recording the number of unused ballots and spoiled ballots. (Spoiled ballots are those that a voter has inadvertently spoiled by marking it incorrectly, and then exchanged for a new blank ballot, or ballots that are improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote secrecy.)

• determining the total of number of voters who voted according to the voter’s list;

• unsealing the ballot box and counting the number of ballots;

• reconciling the number of ballots in the box with the number of voters according to the voters' list or other record of the total number of persons who cast ballots;

• sorting the ballots by candidate or party;

• counting the ballots; and

• setting aside challenged ballots and determining acceptance or rejection of challenged ballots according to established rules.

The statement of the vote, or the results sheet, is compiled, signed, and transmitted to a local office before being transmitted to the regional or national level. Representatives of political parties and national and international electoral observers can copy the results.

There is no interruption in the process until the statement of the vote of the voting station is released and sent to the local office of the electoral management body. Once the counting process is completed, electoral materials are taken to a local office for secure storage.

Interim results are also sent to the national level and publicized. Special measures and procedures need to be followed during the entire counting process in case results are challenged. As with all other aspects of conducting an election, there are administrative considerations which are directly or indirectly related to vote counting at voting stations. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with its respective processes.

At the closing of the voting station, voting station officers and other authorized persons such as party and candidate representatives and observers remain in the voting station and start the counting process.

In some jurisdictions the voting station layout is changed to reflect a layout more conducive to the counting process.

A first reconciliation of ballots may be done before opening the ballot box. Spoiled ballots are counted and put aside. Once the ballot box is emptied of its contents, the validity of each ballot is verified and the ballots are sorted into different piles reflecting the choice of the voter.

The votes are then counted into valid ballots (by candidate/political party) and rejected ballots (a ballot found in the ballot box is rejected because it was improperly marked, or is not marked at all when a mark is required) (see Criteria to Determine when Votes should Count as Valid). Clear rules of interpretation or guidelines regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting staff in advance, to facilitate the decision-making process regarding rejections.

Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the ballots, and if they do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, be allowed to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count.

Using a count sheet, all valid ballots are recorded, as well as spoiled and rejected ballots. All ballots are counted and none are destroyed. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote. The ballot box can then be re-sealed (with the new seal number duly noted by party and candidate representatives and observers), and appropriate counting documentation can either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope. Party and candidate representatives should have the opportunity affix their seals or signatures to the resealed ballot boxes.

The results recorded on the statement of the vote will be communicated by the counting official to the local/national office of the electoral management body by telephone or other means. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers, if present, can make a copy of the statement, where the law provides for such.

The count at the voting station itself is now over, and all the electoral materials may be transported to a secure local storage room. In the event of a recount, all the prepared documents are needed, so elaborate precautions, and sealing the ballot box contents, are important.

The local/national office of the electoral management body totals the results transmitted by all voting stations of the electoral district, as well as results of any special ballots, advance voting, mobile voting stations, etc. Interim results should include all types of ballots so as to avoid discrepancy between interim results and final results. In addition, these results should be for each political party and candidate and posted on a wall, board, or spreadsheet, as they become available.

Unofficial interim results should be publicized as soon as possible. This is often done by the media or political parties, leaving the announcement of final results to the electoral management body. In the following days, the local offices of the electoral management body may perform the final count and prepare the official results. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply.

Training

Appropriate training is essential to be able to implement such vote counting procedures at voting stations. Training requirements, as well as all other administrative considerations, need to be included in the budget for the election or referendum.

Non-partisanship

An important aspect of free and fair elections is the requirement that voting station and counting officers are non-partisan. Once a person agrees to work as a voting station or counting officer on election day, he/she also agrees to be non-partisan throughout the entire process. Most jurisdictions require that all voting station and counting officers sign an oath to ensure that they conduct their responsibilities in a non-partisan and unbiased way.

The importance of non-partisanship remains critical during the counting process. Counting staff should not make any remarks or mention any personal political affiliation or affinity, nor wear or use any partisan materials, during the counting process. Since the counting officers will have to handle disputes over any rejected ballots, he/she will be the first person to deal will representatives of political parties and candidates. This person will also have to take the final decision in validating or rejecting any ballot. Neutrality and non-partisanship are imperative in this decision-making process. The legislation may provide that voting station and counting staff can be legally prosecuted if it can be proved that their work is partisan.

Political parties and candidates should be represented at voting stations during counting and the rules must be the same for all political parties and candidates. Usually, political parties' candidates designate a representative to be present in each voting station to witness the voting and counting processes.

However, it remains the choice of each party as to whether they send a representative. Many jurisdictions consider their presence to be essential to ensure integrity, guarantee consistency, and provide witnesses to the transparency of the process. When the time comes to make an important decision during the voting and counting process, such as modifications to previously completed forms, all party and candidate representatives should sign the forms to demonstrate that they are informed, and agree with the decision. Careful application of such procedures provides tangible evidence that the rules are consistent and the process transparent.

Finally, the electoral management body needs to record the history of each ballot box and seal numbers where applicable, from initial distribution to final collection and storage. The electoral management body should be able to retrace the history of each ballot box, from the moment it leaves the local office of the electoral management body until it returns with the counted ballots.

A proper audit trail will allow the electoral management body to maintain full control, and ensure that possibilities of fraud via ballot box tampering are extremely limited, and can be detected if attempted.

Numbering each voting station, and using the same number for the corresponding ballot box, is one simple method of implementing such a control system. Additionally, the same number should appear on each form used at the voting station. The importance of recording the history of each ballot box (recording ballots book number, serial number of the seals, ballot box number, etc.) becomes clear in cases of judicial recount.

Opening/Closing Ballot Boxes

Several tasks need to be carried out at the opening of the voting to facilitate the vote counting at the closing of voting. The first is to count the total number of ballots originally received (provided by the electoral management body). In countries using one ballot per political party and where envelopes are used, it is important to verify if all parties' ballots are available to voters.

This represents an important aspect of the audit trail, as this figure will be needed to reconcile the number of ballots used/unused after the voting takes place. When the ballots are delivered, prior to the commencement of voting, all ballots (and envelopes where applicable) should be counted, and serial numbers on the counterfoils or ballot book numbers (where applicable) should be verified as well, via inspection of the ballot booklets to ensure completeness. The officer who delivered them should witness the counting of the ballot quantities. He/she should sign a receipt, and a copy should be attached to the voting record book.

In all cases, the information should be written on the ballot accounting form. Depending on the country, and the type of information needed by the electoral management body, in order to reduce duplication of effort, the same information may not need to be recorded in more than one place unless required.

Once the ballots are counted, and proper observations or indications on the appropriate forms are made (if needed), the electoral manager at the voting station should show everyone present that the ballot box is empty, before placing security seals on the ballot box.

The serial number(s) of the seal(s) should be written in the voting record book and in any other appropriate form. The party and candidate representatives present should be given an opportunity to affix their seals or signatures on or next to the security seals of the ballot box. These procedures are very important, as they constitute the start of an important audit trail.

Many mistakes can be prevented by following these procedures. If discrepancies occur, steps can be retraced to the beginning of ballot marking. At no time should any voter remove ballots from the voting station.

Closing the Ballot Boxes

At closing time, the electoral manager in charge of the voting station should announce the official closing of the vote. The electoral manager in charge of the voting station should ensure that only authorized persons allowed to process or witness the count remain inside the voting station. Voting station and/or counting officers, observers, party and candidate representatives should be permitted to stay for the counting process.

If no one except the counting officers are present, the last voters may be asked to stay and witness the counting. All other persons should wait outside the voting station for the interim results.

To facilitate the counting process, the voting station may need to be physically reorganized. Tables are generally placed together for a larger working surface, and chairs, pencils, and a board to post results are put in place.

Summary of Process

At the close of voting, authorized persons and counting officers stay in the voting station and start the counting process. Generally, an average of two hours is needed to complete a count of approximately four hundred to five hundred ballots, if no serious objections are encountered. The time taken to count ballots will depend on the number of staff and the complexity of the voting system and counting procedures.

While the ballot box is still sealed, a reconciliation is done by checking the number of counterfoils (if applicable) indicating ballots given to voters, unused ballots, and spoiled ballots against the total number of ballots issued. The number of voters who voted on election day/s is also counted in order to verify against the number of ballots used (used counterfoils). All discrepancies must be resolved or reported to the electoral management body. The figures are written on a ballot paper account.

Once the first steps are complete, the person in charge of counting can open the ballot box and empty its contents in the centre of the table. The table may have been used during voting, or if no table was used during voting, the electoral management body should ensure that one is present for counting. It is important that the table is large enough so that no ballots will fall on the floor when the ballot box is emptied of its contents.

Seals are verified before ballot boxes are opened in the presence of counting officers, representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers. If only the counting officers are present then the last voters may be asked to stay in order to act as witnesses. Another reconciliation is done once the ballot box is emptied.

A further reconciliation may take place if requested by the representatives of parties and candidates. In all cases, the number of ballots in the box is compared with the number of voters who have voted. No ballots should be missing, nor should the number of ballots in the box exceed the number of voters.

All discrepancies should be reported to the electoral management body and proper modifications or changes made to the forms. As far as possible, everybody involved in the counting process should sign the forms, in order to confirm that the accounting for the ballots was satisfactory, or that they are aware of the source of discrepancy, and that they agree with the decision taken by the counting officer in charge of the count.

The usual forms required for the count are a count sheet, a voting record book, a statement of the vote, and the ballot account form. Envelopes, or bags for ballots, and seals to close the ballot box, or to put on the envelopes are also required. 

Reconciling Ballot Accounts

At the opening of voting, ballots (and envelopes where applicable) received from the electoral management body are counted, and corresponding figures written in the ballot paper account form

At the closing of voting, the first thing to do before sorting and counting the ballots is to count the numbers of used counterfoils (as applicable) and unused envelopes (as applicable), unused ballots, and spoiled ballots. At this stage, the ballot box remains closed.

This total number of ballots should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening. Verification with the number of voters who voted on election day/s should also be done using the marked-up voter's list, and the entries in the voting record book.

It is important that accurate records are kept of the number of ballots used at each voting station. This will enable the electoral management body to demonstrate that all ballots used at each voting station are genuine and that ballots have nor been fraudulently deposited in ballot boxes or removed from the voting station.

Discrepancies

If there are discrepancies in the reconciliation process, the count should be repeated by verifying the observations made in the voting record book for the spoiled ballots, and recounting the unused ballots and the used counterfoils (if applicable).

If discrepancies remain, then verification with a higher authority (with the district electoral officer or the electoral management body) of the number of ballots (and envelopes) sent to the voting station should be done to verify their figures and to inform them of the situation. Keeping higher authorities informed of any problem is part of the transparency required in an election or any electoral event.

If no solution is found, modifications or changes to the voting record book, ballot account forms, count sheets, and statement of the vote forms should be completed in order to reflect the appropriate numbers of ballots. To validate these new figures, and to make sure that everybody who should know is informed of the situation and agrees with it, voting station and counting officers, party and candidate representatives, present at the voting station for the vote count should sign the forms and the voting record book.

Once this first reconciliation is done, the counting officer will verify if the seal is still unbroken and if the serial number is the same as the one recorded at the opening of the voting station. If locks are used, then the person in charge should ask the person with a set of keys to assist in the opening of the ballot box.

This information should be written in the voting record book. The ballot box is then opened and the contents emptied onto a table. These ballots (or envelopes) are counted as well, and compared to figures obtained earlier.

The number of ballots (or envelopes) in the ballot box should match with the number of voters who voted, a number that can be obtained by counting the number of counterfoils as applicable (number of ballots used), unused ballots less the number of spoiled ballots. There should be another reconciliation after the count of the ballots for each candidate/party/option in order to verify that all figures total correctly before making the statement of the vote for the voting station.

In case of discrepancies, the counting process should be repeated ones or twice until the missing ballot or ballots - or an explanation for the discrepancy - are found.

If, after verification, the missing ballots are still not found, then the electoral management body should be informed of the problem, and verification of their ballot accounts should be done (especially verification of the number of ballots sent to the voting station). Once again, if no solution is found, appropriate changes should be made on the forms signed by counting officers and party and candidate representatives. This new figure should become the official one for the voting station.

In some jurisdictions, counting of ballots which cannot be reconciled, or which are not within a certain acceptable variation (i.e. difference is not more than two, three or five ballots), legislation, regulations, or directives may prohibit proceeding with the count. If significant discrepancies are discovered, local rules could apply to the level of action taken.

In some cases, if significant fraud is suspected, it may be necessary to delay opening and counting the contents of a ballot box until the electoral management body investigates the problem and decides what to do with the ballot box. Voting station and counting officers should be made aware of these provisions through their training.

In the case of multiple elections held on the same day, such as presidential elections, municipal elections, and legislative assembly elections, finding ballots in the wrong box is a frequent occurrence. In such cases, the counting officer should transfer the ballot to the appropriate box, reconcile all the ballots, and make a report for each case. This should be followed by a reconciliation count of the ballots and, if no discrepancy is found, the counting officer can proceed with the count.

Sorting

Where there are multiple ballot elections taking place at the same time (presidential, national legislature, and municipal elections on the same day for example), there should be an order of priority for the counting of the ballots, so as to avoid mistakes and confusion in the counting process. This should be part of the rules given to the counting officers during training and in the documentation and training manuals for counting.

Instructions should also be given for procedures to be used when ballots are found in the wrong box. Only one person should handle the initial sorting of ballots; this is often the electoral officer who provided the ballot to each voter on election day. This is particularly important if initials are added on the back of the ballot.

Spoiled ballots should have been separated and counted as part of preparing the ballot paper account. A spoiled ballot is simply one that a voter marks incorrectly, or is somehow unusable, and hands back to voting station officers in exchange for a new ballot. Spoiled ballots should never be placed in the ballot box. In some countries, spoiled ballots are put in a separate envelope and are clearly marked as such. This is to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, as the voter may have indicated how they wanted to vote on the spoiled ballot.

Sorting Procedures

One way of sorting is as follows. Once the ballot box is opened, the counting officer verifies the validity of each ballot in the process of counting. As they proceed with the task, he she needs to be able to distinguish between a valid ballot and a counterfeit (by the watermark or other identifying mark on valid ballot papers). Any identified counterfeit ballots should be set aside, counted, and reported to the electoral management body as an attempt at fraud.

The counting officer will divide up all ballots in terms of the political party or candidate voted for. At the same time, the counting officer can separate all potentially rejectable ballots. After the count of valid ballots is complete, the counting officer must go one-by-one through the pile of potential rejected ballots, and decide on the validity of each one (see Criteria to Determine when Votes should Count as Valid).

Party and candidate representatives will observe the process and have an opportunity to object to the decision made by the counting officer. These objections will form part of the record and will be used if the result is challenged after the announcement of the results.

Potential rejected ballots that are determined to actually be valid are separated by candidate/party/option. All invalid ballots, as well as any counterfeit ballots, are counted and set aside. The counting officer will then add the additional valid ballots decided to the initial number of valid ballots for each candidate/political party/option, and make a total count for each candidate/political party/option.

Rules of interpretation, guidelines, and illustrations regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting officer, and be known in advance by all representatives of parties and candidates and observers, to facilitate the decision making process. In all cases, rejected ballots should be put aside and kept. No ballots may be destroyed.

The separation of rejected ballots is important to create an audit trail of the count, and is an essential component if there is to be a recount of the ballots. Rejected ballots must be closely examined, and the counting officer should announce the reason for rejection of each such ballot.

Political party or candidate representatives should be able to examine the rejected ballots. If party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting officers, they should be able to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. There must be clear rules for recording objections made by representatives of political parties or candidates.

Once the spoiled, counterfeit (if any), and rejected ballots have been separated, the valid ballots can be counted. The counting officer can call out the choice of each voter, and show the ballot, so the political party or candidate representatives, and other persons allowed in the voting station for the counting, are able to see the ballot and make their own count. The various representatives and observers witnessing the count must also be able to see each counted ballot. For greatest efficiency, other counting officers can assist. However, it must be very clear who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot.

Checking Validity of the Ballot

When ballots are sorted, the counting officer needs to distinguish a valid ballot from a counterfeit. Each ballot in the ballot box needs to be verified.

In some jurisdictions, security paper is used for ballots. This paper contains a watermark or other form of unique identification (special colour, lines, symbols, markings or logos) making the ballot virtually impossible to counterfeit. The texture, thickness, colours, size, and format of the ballot are also indicators that separate a valid ballot from counterfeits.

The counting officer should know where to look on the ballot to be sure of its authenticity. If he or she does not recognize the ballot, or the ballot does not have the official identification, then it should not be included in the count. It should not be destroyed but kept in an envelope or file for that purpose.

Authenticating Ballots

To speed up the process of authenticating the ballots, certain jurisdictions require that the counting officer adds his/her initials in a space provided at the back of the ballot before handing it to the voter.

Other jurisdictions provide a validating stamp at the voting station for every ballot to be stamped before handing it to the voter. During counting, a ballot without a stamp is rejected. If the initial system is used and the initials on the ballot are not from the counting officer, then it should be set aside and not counted as a valid ballot. If no initials are on the back of the ballot, but the counting officer recognizes that he or she issued the ballot, he or she can then initial it, and the ballot can be counted as valid.

This measure of adding the counting officer’s initials at the back of the ballot can help to identify valid ballots from counterfeit. The counting officer should always use the same colour of pen or pencil when adding his or her initials. This problem will not exist when a validating stamp is used as described above.

All ballots must be kept, even if they are not valid. No ballots should be destroyed, as an audit trail of all ballots considered must be assembled in such a way that the count can be fully reconstructed.

If there is any doubt, and before taking the decision to reject a ballot as counterfeit, the counting officer should be able to verify the basis of his orher decision with the electoral management body. Rejecting a ballot on the basis that it is counterfeit is an important decision and should be made after careful consideration, as it may have political consequences.

Separating Spoiled and Rejected Ballots

Separating rejected ballots from spoiled ballots is important as the significance of these ballots is very different. Mixing them may seriously impact the audit trail.

Spoiled Ballots

Spoiled ballots should never find their way into the ballot box. A spoiled ballot is generally one that a voter has inadvertently spoiled by marking it incorrectly; it is handed back to the voting station officers in exchange for a new blank ballot that is then marked by the voter and placed in the ballot box.

A spoiled ballot may also be one that is improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote secrecy.

Rejected Ballots

A rejected ballot is one that has made its way into the ballot box, but has been rejected at the count because it was improperly marked, or is not marked at all when a mark is required. The most common criteria to reject a ballot are:

• a ballot with no mark,

• a ballot with a mark for more than one candidate or political party when only one was supposed to be chosen,

• a ballot marked with a type of pen or pencil other than the one provided at the voting station,

• an unofficial mark according to the law or unusual marks,

• a ballot marked so the voter could be identified, or

• a ballot marked in a location prohibited by legislation (outside the circle, etc.)

• a ballot that does not clearly reflect the choice of the voter.

In some jurisdictions, blank ballots (ballots with no marks) are counted separately (and may be considered as protest votes), in others, they are considered to be rejected ballots. In all cases, all ballots are to be kept, and none should be destroyed.

Ballot Envelopes

In countries using envelopes, since marks are not made on the ballot itself, the way to identify a rejected ballot from a valid ballot is different. For example, a rejected ballot will be an envelope with two ballots, an empty envelope, or a ballot in an envelope marked in a way that the secrecy of the voter is compromised, etc.

In many jurisdictions, if the intention of the voter is clear, all types of marks can be accepted. In others, the legislation is very clear on which specific types of marks are to be accepted, even on a write-in ballot.

For these specific cases, those marks should be clearly demonstrated during the training of counting officers and documented in their manual or in the operational guidelines in order to help the counting officer in making his/her decision.

A card summarizing the marks that are to be accepted or rejected, with pictures of sample ballots showing those marks, is a very useful tool that can be inserted in the counting officer’s kit.

Separating Valid Ballots

All ballots are unfolded (if envelopes are used, then all ballots need to be taken out of the envelopes), one by one, and the counting officer makes sure that the ballot is valid.

The counting officer may call out the name of the candidate or political party for whom the ballot has been marked and hold up the ballot for all to see. If several persons are separating and counting the ballots, and identifying those that may be potentially rejected, the practice of calling out names may not be useful. It may, in fact, be more efficient to separate the ballots according to choice (without counting them), setting aside the potentially rejections, and then establish which ballots should be rejected. After the rejections are finalized, the piles of valid ballots for each candidate or party can be counted quickly.

In all cases, only counting officers should handle ballots, and it is the counting officer who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot.

The advantage of showing the ballot and calling out the result of each ballot is that it allows the representatives of political parties and candidates and observers to make their own count. The disadvantage is that the process is interrupted each time a rejected ballot is discovered, which tends to make the count of valid ballots very inefficient and slow.

Whichever method is used, the valid ballot papers are put in separate piles on the table: one pile per candidate or per political party, or per option (in the case of a referendum).

The ballots should be examined in such a way as to permit observers, representatives of political parties or candidates, and other persons allowed in the voting station during the counting process, to see the ballot and ensure that it is appropriately separated according to choice. They should have controlled access to contents of sorted ballots.

If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, they can make official objections. These objections may form the basis of a further challenge to the overall results.

While transparency of the process is important, there should be proper controls on the movement of ballots to ensure that the integrity of the count is not compromised.

Counting

Ballots (and envelopes where applicable) are bundled by groups of ten, for example, in order to facilitate keeping a record of the votes counted. Depending on the number of political parties or candidates, and depending on the number of counting officers, each counting officer can be responsible for receiving and counting all ballots cast for one or more political party or candidate, Later, counting officers can exchange all ballots cast that they were counting and verify each other's totals.

Counting officers count all ballots, including spoiled and rejected ballots. Even if not counted as valid, these ballots are important for the audit trail and will be needed in case of a recount.

To eliminate possible objections over the validity of ballots, the counting officers should be provided with clear rules of interpretation of accepted marks on the ballot, and all reasons that should lead to the rejection of a ballot. Minimizing the interpretation made by the counting officers makes it easier to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots.

If the validity of a ballot is challenged or objected to, then the counting officer should be the only person entitled to make a decision, even if the other counting officers are involved in the counting process. In order to be more consistent in his/her decisions, the counting officer can put all questionable ballots in one separate pile, decide on all rejected ballots following the count of valid ones, and then add any additional valid votes to the appropriate candidate or political party.

Alternatively, the ballots can be separated first, the questionable ones decided, and then each pile can be counted. For each disputed ballot, the ballot should be numbered at the back. The same number should be written in the voting book along with the decision made by the counting officer.

To count the ballots, the counting officers use a count sheet. The representatives of political parties and candidates, and the observers observing the count may have count sheets as well. The official one is the one used by the counting officer in charge of the count.

The count sheet is used to facilitate the count. For each vote for each candidate or party a mark is made on the count sheet. Periodically, the marks for each candidate or party are added together. If a mistake is made during the process, comparison with the count sheets of other counting officers can be made. If the mistake is still not found, the count should be restarted from the last point of agreement.

A verification of the count should be done once the ballots are counted. This verification is usually done before transmission of the interim results to the regional or local district electoral office. Verification is important to make sure that no votes were changed in favour or against one candidate or party. The total number of ballots cast for each candidate or party, plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total of ballots received at the opening of the voting station.

Once the counting process is over, the ballots are bundled and put back into the ballot box along with all relevant forms. The statement of the vote should be in a separate envelope, outside the ballot box. Both the envelope and the ballot box should be sealed before being transported to a secure local storage room. All these documents are needed in case of a recount and the use of precautions for sealing the ballot box contents are important to ensure that al these materials will be available if a recount is required or officially ordered.

For greater security, the counting officers, as well as a representative of the political parties or candidates should sign the seal. The counting officer should keep one official copy in case of loss.

Count of Spoiled and Rejected Ballots

Spoiled, rejected, and unused ballots need to be counted to create a complete audit trail. These ballots remain official documents, even if not counted as valid. Additionally, rejected ballots are essential in case of a recount.

Rules of Interpretation for Rejected Ballots

To eliminate possible objections to the validity of a ballot, the counting officer should be provided with clear rules of interpretation, and illustrations of acceptable and unacceptable marks on the ballot, including the rationale for rejection of a ballot.

Minimizing the interpretation needed by the counting officer makes it easier to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots. In the event of a close margin in favour of one candidate, a recount is likely to be requested, and rejected ballots will be carefully analyzed.

Handling Disputes Regarding Rejections

In some jurisdictions, the counting officer is the only person qualified to make the final decision regarding the validity of a ballot, even if all counting officers are involved in the counting process. He/she is also the person handling disputes regarding objections.

If a representative of a candidate or a political party disagrees with the counting officer on the validity of a ballot, he/she may challenge the decision. In most cases, the counting officer must immediately make a decision on whether or not the ballot is valid. In order to make more consistent decisions, the counting officer may put all contested and questionable ballots in a separate pile while counting valid ballots.

The counting officer can then decide which of the potential rejected ballots will actually be rejected, and count the total number of rejections. The rest of the valid ballots can then be added to the count for each political party or candidate.

Alternatively, all potential rejected ballots can be identified and decided on first, and then the valid ballots can be counted.

One way of accounting for rejected ballots is to number them on the back. The same number will be written in the voting record book or the statement of the vote (or a separate form can also be used), along with the decision made by the counting officer.

All rejected and spoiled ballots are counted and recorded in the statement of the votes as well as on the ballot account form.

Count of Valid Ballots

The counting officers often use a count sheet to count the ballots. The representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers observing the count may have a count sheet as well. The official sheet is the one used by the counting officer in charge of the count.

The proper information regarding the voting station number and the electoral district should be written at the top or bottom of the form. Each column should show the names of the candidates or party or option as they appear on the ballot.

There are two common types of count sheets: one where each square represents a vote for a candidate or party, and the other where you draw a square with a diagonal mark denoting five votes

In the first case, each square may be marked with a tick for each vote for a candidate or party. At the end, the total for each will be easy to count. In the second case, four vertical marks and a diagonal one are made. Each square represents five votes for a candidate or party.

To correct mistakes, if several count sheets are used at once then there is only a need to correct errors when the results of the count are no longer synchronized.

Establishing correlation between count sheets requires a pause for consensus as to how many votes are recorded per candidate at certain set times (every one hundred ballots for example). Restarting the count at the last point of correlation is much more efficient than beginning the entire count all over again.

Verification of Count

Once the ballots are counted, a verification of the count is recommended.

This verification usually takes place before the interim results are transmitted to the local office of the electoral management body. This final verification is important to make sure that no ballots have been introduced or removed that would modify the results in favour of or against one candidate or party.

This last verification should include a comparison with the reconciliation done previously, before opening the ballot box. The total number of ballots for each candidate or party, plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station.

Where envelopes are used, they should be recounted as well in order to match with the number of voters who cast their ballots. If errors are detected, the count sheet should be verified against count sheets of other counting officers. If the error is still not found, then all the ballots counted per candidate or party should be re-examined and recounted.

Sealing the Ballots

To secure their contents, the ballot boxes should be re-sealed, with all the ballots considered during the count inside, before returning the box to a local secure storage room. This measure is very important in case of a recount.

In certain jurisdictions, forms such as count sheets, the voting record book, and the voter's list are also sealed in the ballot box along with the ballots.

The statement of the vote should not be sealed with the other documents, but should be put in a separate envelope and attached to the outside of the ballot box. However, this envelope should itself be sealed to ensure that no unauthorized person has access to the results and that any changes that are attempted can be detected by senior authorities.

A copy of the statement of the vote should already have been transmitted to the electoral management body separately from the ballot box before the ballot box is moved for secure storage. Many jurisdictions require delivery of all materials to the responsible authority.

The question of whether or not the voting record book should be sealed in the ballot box, or placed with the statement of the vote, is an important one. If the voting record book is used to record transactions that fall outside ordinary voting, then it can be useful to have it available for inspection if requested by the electoral management body without having to go before a judge (which is the case in some jurisdictions.

Access to it will help to understand any mistakes that have been made regarding the preparation of the statement of the vote, or other procedures related to vote counting.

Since representatives of political parties and candidates are allowed to witness the official count, they could consult the record book. The voting record book is an important document, and should be safely kept, sealed in the box, or placed on the outside of the ballot box in the envelope with the statement of the vote.

Ballots (and envelopes where applicable) should be placed in bundles, by category (candidates, rejected ballots, spoiled ballots, unused ballots, etc.) in the ballot box.

Once all the ballots and relevant forms are in the box, the box may be sealed and transported to the local storage room. The seal number, if applicable, should be written on the statement of the vote or on the acknowledgement of receipt of the ballot box when delivered to the local storage place. In some jurisdictions the number of the voting station is written on the outside of the ballot box. This is only possible if the material used for the ballot box, e.g. cardboard, can be written on.

Even if all the envelopes or plastic bags are sealed, it is still important to re-seal the ballot box before it is moved. In the event of a recount, all these documents are needed which explains why elaborate precautions for sealing the ballot box are important.

If a paper seal is used, for additional security, some jurisdictions require that the ballot box seal be signed by the counting officer as well as representatives of political parties and candidates.

Transmitting Voting Station Results

Once the vote counting process is over, the counting officer prepares the statement of the vote for a voting station.

This form indicates the election results and should include standard information, such as the name of the electoral district, the name and/or number of the voting station, and election date.

Specific information on the count should include:

• number of ballots received at the opening of voting from the electoral management body,

• number of spoiled ballots,

• number of unused ballots,

• number of valid ballots for each candidate or political party,

• number of rejected ballots,

• total number of valid ballots, and the

• total number of voters who voted on election day.

The counting officer and the representatives of political parties and candidates sign the form. They should provide their printed names, addresses, and telephone numbers, if any, along with their signatures. If there is a problem, it will then be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them.

Some jurisdictions require all counting officers present at the voting station to sign the statement of votes.

Once the form is completed, the results should be given orally, or transmitted electronically, to the local office of the electoral management body to allow them to gather interim results as soon as possible. The counting officer is responsible for communicating the interim results.

The transmission can be done by telephone, cellular phone, modem, or fax, using a unique security code to ensure the proper identification of the person transmitting the results. However, the communications infrastructure in parts of some countries does not permit oral or electronic reporting of interim voting results. In such locations, the use of the counting officer or other officially designated person carrying the statement of the vote may be the only available alternative.

After the results have been reported orally or electronically, the original of the statement of the votes should be transmitted to the same office of the electoral management body by hand in a sealed envelope.

This measure is essential to prevent fraud and provide evidence of any tampering with results.

Representatives of a political party and candidates should be allowed to copy the results.

The counting officer should keep a copy of the statement of the votes and another is posted at the voting station. The original is placed in a sealed envelope and attached to the ballot box for use by the electoral management body. Observers and party and candidate representatives should have the right to transcribe the results from the official statement of the vote for the voting station or the counting centres.

As print or electronic media are considered a key element in a free democratic society, it is recommended that they be given access to the results, either at the voting stations or at the offices of the electoral management body where results are being reported, unless there are valid security considerations related to the release of partial and unofficial results. This is especially important if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question.

The electoral management body is responsible for proper accreditation of personnel allowed at the voting station or results collection office during the counting phase. The media representatives on site should wear identification proving this accreditation.

Issue of Transparency

Transparency is very significant, particularly at the time of the release and transmission of interim results. Representatives of political parties and candidates should sign and have a copy of the statement of the vote and should be allowed to witness the transmission of the corresponding results to the electoral management body.

Such transparency of actions is essential in the acceptance of the general outcome of the election.

Importance of Contingency Plans

Communications technology plays an increasingly important role in the transmission of voting results. If the supporting systems used by the electoral management body fail, postponement of interim results can ensue, creating numerous administrative, technical, and logistical problems. In addition, such failures tend to be politically embarrassing to the electoral management body.

To avoid such failures, a contingency plan should be implemented, and fully tested prior to election day. Identification of a second telephone in close proximity to each voting station can be made prior to election day, and can represent an economical alternative in case of technology failure. Computerized call answering machines can be linked and duplicated in the event that one fails.

Radio hand sets can also be used. Finally, a manual alternative to electronic transmission of results, such as the use of couriers or hand delivery, can be used as a final back-up plan.

The selection of a contingency plan is driven by local context and circumstances in that particular jurisdiction. In some circumstances, prior agreement with security forces to use their communications equipment can be negotiated, or partnership or collaboration with private companies to use their facilities can be made as a backup plan.

Voting Station Statement of Votes

The voting station statement of the votes is the interim results form. The counting officer normally completes this form. One statement of the votes form should be filled out per voting station, even in the case of voting locations housing multiple voting stations.

The statement of the votes form could include the following general information:

• the name of the electoral district,

• the number or name of the voting station,

• the date, and

• the signatures of the counting officer. Representatives of political parties and candidates should also write their signatures on the form.

Specific information on the count should include:

• number of ballots received at the opening of voting from the electoral management body,

• number of spoiled ballots,

• number of unused ballots,

• number of valid ballots for each candidate and political party,

• number of rejected ballots,

• total number of valid ballots, and

• total number of voters who voted on election day according to the voter's list.

It may be necessary to look at the voting record book as some jurisdictions authorize registration of voters on voting day, and these may be added using the voting record book. Other jurisdictions use separate forms.

Additional detailed information, such as the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box, or of the ballot box itself, is required in some jurisdictions.

In several jurisdictions, this form is an important document since it provides the information used by the electoral management body to release both interim and final results. The counting officers responsible for the counting should complete this form with utmost care.

Issuing of the Statement of Votes

The statement of the votes for a voting station should be prepared with care since it represents the interim and final (unless subjected to a recount) results of the election for a voting station.

This form is usually prepared and signed by the counting officer. The form should then be signed by representatives of political parties and candidates. Their signatures are very important in order to reflect and demonstrate that they agree and acknowledge the results. They should include their printed names, addresses and telephone numbers, if any, on the form along with their signatures.

In case of any problems, the electoral management body will then be able to contact these individuals more easily.

For the sake of transparency, observers, and representatives of political parties and candidates, should be permitted to make a copy of the statement of the votes.

Communicating Results

Once the statement of the votes of the voting station is completed, the counting officer should communicate the interim results to the local offices of the electoral management body (and in certain cases, to the national electoral management body directly).

In the case of voting locations housing multiple voting stations, the person responsible (known in some jurisdictions as the central voting supervisor) should obtain the results from each counting officer and transmit them to the local offices of the electoral management body.

In many countries the electoral management body maintains local or regional offices during the electoral period. The interim results are generally communicated to the local office, which, in turn, communicates a cumulative statement of the votes for the electoral district to the national headquarters office.

Communicating Interim Results

The interim results for each voting station, using the statement of the votes, should be transmitted to the office of the local electoral management body by phone (cellular or fixed line), or other means such as radio hand sets, if such exists.

It is recommended that a unique password or code be provided to the person who will transmit the results. For security reasons, this unique password or code should be given to the responsible person by the electoral management body on the day of the election itself.

This code will reduce the possibility of impersonation, and prevent unauthorized persons from transmitting incorrect or biased election results to the local office of the electoral management body.

If a fax machine is available on the counting premises, it can be used to send a copy of the statement of votes to the electoral management body. Specific measures should be taken to control access to the fax machine and number, to reduce the risk of any transmissions of unofficial statements of the votes.

In all cases, the statement of the vote sent by fax should be signed by the counting officer and by representatives of political parties and candidates present at the count. If the party and candidate representatives refuse to sign this does not render the statement of votes invalid or inaccurate.

For greater security, and to detect any attempts at fraud, the original form should be sent separately to the local electoral management body in a sealed envelope. This envelope should be sent along with the electoral materials by hand or by courier. By sending the original, the local electoral management body can verify the results against the one previously sent by telephone or electronically, and ensure that they are the same.

If there is no available phone (cellular or fixed) at a voting station or the cellular or fixed line phone is not working, alternative methods should be considered. Walkie-talkie or radio emitting devices do not require the installation of a phone line and are flexible and simple in their use. However, their deployment should take into consideration the topography of the area to identify in advance any black-out regions where it is impossible to receive or transmit messages.

Again, appropriate training and identification codes should be provided to voting station and counting offciers before deployment.

If it is not possible to use any means of wireless communication, the last resort is hand-to-hand delivery by election official/s of the results to the local electoral management body. If an electoral official is unavailable a suitably designated person should be used as a messenger.

This messenger should be a credible person and the choice of such person should be accepted by counting officers, as well as representatives of the political parties and candidates. When using this method, the messenger could also bring the ballot box and its contents, eliminating the need for additional transport arrangements.

A tamper-evident bag is recommended, in order to ensure that results are not changed in transit. This is often a thick plastic bag, signed by the persons at the original location that, once sealed, cannot be opened without damaging the bag. Consequently, the receivers can be confident that the bag is the same upon its arrival at headquarters. A trail of signatures of those handing over the materials, and those receiving them, is essential, and constant accompaniment of the materials by election staff, as well as observers is recommended.

Role of Media

News agencies and media organizations will likely compete to provide their forecast of the election results as quickly as possible after the close of voting. They will dispatch their representatives as to the scene of the electoral action. The offices of the electoral management body are the most likely media targets, mainly for efficiency reasons.

At a centre for collecting results for voting stations, one representative can cover a wide area, and can report for a reasonable number of voting stations.

Route of "Official" Statement of Votes

Copies of the voting results should be provided to the electoral management body by the counting officer, and the right to copy the results should be given to representatives of political parties and candidates, and to observers. Such extra copies can be made with a multi-part carbon copy form, or a photocopy machine. Alternatively, multiple copies can be prepared by hand.

The original statement of the vote should be attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope. This is particularly important to processing a recount of the ballots, if required.

Once the statement of the vote for a voting station is fully prepared and transmitted to the local electoral management body, a copy can be posted at the outside of the voting station. The same information and results are then made available for everybody, and at the same time.

Because witnesses are permitted to observe and scrutinize the counting process, results are public. The statement of the vote becomes a public document; this is made especially evident once it is posted. However, it is important to mention that these results are not official yet, but are only interim results: official final results will always take legal precedence.

Consolidating Voting Results

At the national level, as well as at the local level, logistics should be carefully planned for receiving results from several locations at the same time. When possible, efficiency is improved if one phone number or fax number is given to people transmitting the interim results to the local office of the electoral management body. Most telephone systems now allow for calls to a single number to automatically search for the next available phone unit on that line.

A form with spaces for pre-printed information needed during vote result collection should be provided to staff answering the phone. For example, one team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit them to the data entry person or person in charge of gathering the results for the electoral district.

A wall chart, chalkboard chart, or spreadsheet listing each voting station should be prepared and then completed as the results come in. Once all the information for each election is received, the combined result for the entire electoral district should be updated. This summary will be sent to the national level.

National Level

At the national level, the same type of logistics should be used, but on a larger scale. Fax communications are easier at the national level. Since the information needed is already written, it can help to speed up the process for data entry or manual tabulation. Also, similar spreadsheets should be used at the national level listing all electoral districts.

A first quality control check should be done to verify if the results appear to be correct.A more exhaustive quality control checking procedure for each electoral district and its voting stations, will need to be done when the final, official results are compiled.

If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election). The required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when they are needed to compile the national interim results.

For interim results, all types of ballots (if possible) should be included to avoid any major discrepancy between interim results and final results.

Special ballots, write-in ballots, mail ballots, as well as ballots cast on ordinary voting, advance voting, and mobile voting should be part of the count for interim results.

Depending on the amount of delay that is acceptable, special ballots can be counted a few days prior to election day, or after the close of voting on election day. If the latter is the case, then the counting procedure should be designed carefully, so it will still be possible to include special ballot results in the interim results.

For the special ballots (mail and write-in ballots), envelopes received at the head office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. Different coloured envelopes will facilitate the sorting by category.

For mail ballots, three envelopes are originally sent to the voter: a return mailing envelope containing an outer envelope (on which may appear the bar code and signature of the voter or other administrative information), and a secrecy envelope containing the ballot.

After verification of proper registration and no previous voting having been taken, and the creation of the audit trail, the secrecy envelope is put into a ballot box with its ballot still inside.

If the special ballots are counted a few days prior to election day, the results should be securely kept and only released at the close of the election. In some jurisdictions special ballots are counted after the election day, and in others, on election day.

If advance voting take place over several days, a reconciliation can be done at the end of each day, but the ballot choices are not counted. This reconciliation measure is done to create an audit trail of ballot usage.

The advance vote ballot boxes are then kept safely until voting day, and counting should take place at an office of the electoral management body at the closing time of the ordinary voting. The counting of advance voting ballots should be done in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates and observers. The counting procedures are nearly identical to those used for ordinary voting.

Counting for mobile voting stations may take place at the last place visited, or at an office of the electoral management body. To count the votes of incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance voting may be applied, but, of course, this will only be possible if voting by incarcerated or imprisoned voters takes place prior to election day.

If ballot boxes and results are delivered simultaneously (i.e. where telephones, fax etc. are not available), the local office of the electoral management body should carefully plan the reception of the ballot boxes and the results.

Planning must ensure that provision is made for all the ballot boxes and results arriving at the same time. First, to respect the order of arrival, a receiving official could immediately give a number to the person arriving from a voting station with the ballot box and the results.

Then, in chronological order, the identity of each delivery person should be verified, the voting station identified, and the results should immediately be taken and placed in a specified area ready to be compiled.

The receiving official should then verify the ballot box, and the authenticity of its seals, and prepare a receipt for the person who delivered the materials, as well as one for the electoral management body. The ballot box should then be removed from the reception area and be placed in a secure storage room where more detailed verification can be done.

Use of Technology

Phones and faxes are widely used in the transmission of electoral results. To ensure the identity of the person transmitting results via phone, they should be required to provide an identification number or code. A password may also be considered for fax transmissions. This is a simple and efficient way to avoid unauthorized people calling in and giving false results.

Transmission of results by modem and computer can also be done. Once again, safeguards and passwords must be built in to restrict the transmission of results to authorized persons who are permitted access to the system.

For all types of transmission, the systems must be tested prior to voting day to verify their capacity under the heavy use they will encounter on election night. A technical specialist should also be available at any time, in case of system failure. A contingency back-up system should also be created, tested, and fully available.

Receiving Result Counts

The local electoral management body will receive the results directly from the voting station after counting is completed. They will then compile the results for the electoral district and send it to the national electoral management body by fax (or other means).

The counting officer will contact the local level of the electoral management body directly to communicate the results of each vote. For greatest efficiency, one general phone number or fax number should be given to counting calling the local electoral management body. It is important, however, that the phone system be installed in such a way that the calls follow-on to the next available device on that line.

Adequate phones or fax machines (as well as other electronic links) to cope with peak demands should be installed.

For more efficiency, the staff answering the phone at the local level should have a pre-printed form for recording results with the names of candidates and parties in the same order as they appear on the ballot paper. This will prevent confusion and mistakes in the data entry.

A list of the identification codes or passwords associated with the various voting stations should be provided to the staff as well. This means that the phone operators and those receiving the results need to have signed a confidentiality contract as they are dealing with sensitive information. Only the counting officers should communicate to the local/regional/district electoral management body office to transmit the results of the voting stations.

At the point where the results are received, one team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit the information to the data entry person or the person in charge of combining all the results for the electoral district. A spreadsheet or a board listing each voting station should be prepared and completed as the results are received. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and the media should have access to this spreadsheet or board, so that they can observe the results as they come in.

Special measures should be taken so as to make sure that the same results are not given twice. Numbering the voting stations and corresponding ballot boxes is a simple way to avoid such confusion. If such a measure is taken, it should be done at the beginning of the election process, and this number should be used consistently on all forms used for the election, as well as on the ballot box. The use of this number will also facilitate the creation of an audit trail.

The local office of the electoral management body should send its compiled results to the national electoral management body in several stages to accelerate the process of releasing interim results. Then, the national electoral management body will compile, for each electoral district, a summary of interim results for the country.

Since interim results are not official results, in some countries it is not necessary for the electoral management body to compile preliminary indications of the voting figures. The media, exit poll organizations and non-governmental organizations compile and publicize the interim results while the electoral management body concentrates on compiling the official results and communicating them formally.

National Level

At the national level, the same type of logistics for receiving the results should be used, but on a larger scale. Also, when all the results are coming in at the same time, the staff responsible for the incoming results should first make a quick quality control check in order to verify if the results make sense or not, for example, whether or not the totals are correct.

A comparison with the number of voters registered on the voter's list to the number of voters who cast their vote is a simple and effective way to identify major mistakes.

A more exhaustive quality control procedure, for each electoral district and voting station, will be done when the final official results are compiled. Some electoral districts might need more attention than others, especially those that are the subject of intense political campaign activities, or those with a higher degree of administrative difficulties, such as a very high concentration of registered voters (the core of a large city, for example). On election day, these electoral districts might need to be monitored more closely by the national electoral management body.

At national level, receiving results from local/regional/district offices by fax is easier and more efficient than by phone. Whatever form is used for transmission of the results it should be standard in order to facilitate the collection of summary interim results.

The need for data entry source documents is critical if a computerized system is used to tabulate results. A global spreadsheet, either manual or electronic, with all the electoral districts listed can be completed as the results come in.

If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election), and the required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when needed.

In case of an emergency, the head office of the electoral management body should always be able to reach their local offices, especially when results are coming in.

Whenever possible, a direct phone line should be set up within each local electoral management body, so that the national electoral management body will be able to reach the person (generally the district electoral officer) in charge at any time. The phone number should not be the same one used by the counting officers calling in their interim results.

Votes Cast at Mobile Voting Stations

The counting of votes from mobile voting stations may take place at the last station visited by the voting station officers, or at a local office of the electoral management body. These ballots should not be counted until the regular closing time of the voting on election day.

The location of the count of mobile voting stations should be known by representatives of political parties and candidates, and they should be present for the counting.

Cumulative Audit Trail

Once the count is finished in each voting station, all the electoral materials (the ballot box with all the used, unused, rejected, spoiled ballots, the electoral list, unused seals, and other unused materials), as well as relevant forms needed (especially the statement of the vote, the count sheet, the voting record book) for the count audit trail will be transported to a secure local storage room which may be at the local office of the electoral management body.

At this point, a first verification of the electoral materials received, using a check list and an acknowledgement of receipt form, should be done by officials of the electoral management body to make sure that each ballot box and everything associated with the audit trail is delivered, and that forms are properly completed and signed.

The sealed envelopes (if applicable) containing the statement of the vote of each voting station are opened, in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates, and the contents verified. In the event of a mistake, the counting officers are still available, so if a form is not signed or properly completed (wrong number of voting station for example), proper modification can be done immediately in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates.

A more exhaustive quality control can take place in the following days, but it should be done as soon as possible, so that an audit trail of final results is carefully verified and completed.

A table chart, with the number of each ballot box (if any) is frequently created by the electoral management body, and used to verify that every ballot box that was issued to voting stations has been returned.

Numbering the ballot boxes is a simple and effective way to keep track of them. If this method of ensuring the return of ballot boxes is used, it is preferable that the same persons remain responsible for receipt of the ballot boxes until all the ballot boxes are received.

Clear problem-solving procedures must be established to track down any ballot boxes that are late in arriving, or are not delivered within a reasonable amount of time.

For each electoral district, a cumulative statement of the votes is produced by the local office of the electoral management body. This cumulative count usually includes information such as:

• the name of the electoral district,

• the number or code (if any),

• the date,

• the names of persons in charge of completing the form,

• the number of votes for each candidate or party,

• the total number of votes cast,

• total numbers of rejected ballots, and

• the total number of voters for each voting station and voting option, ballot-box-by-ballot-box.

A detailed report needs to be prepared for the official results of each electoral district, recording each voting stations’ results and this cumulative statement of votes is the basis for that report.

Using the interim results that are collected (especially if they are captured in computer readable form), and cross-checking the statement of the votes for each ballot box for complete accuracy, results in increased efficiency.

Checking Count Results Received

Ability to subsequently check the interim count results received against separate documentation is essential to avoid mistakes, and prevent any fraudulent manipulation of electoral results. A copy of the original statement of the votes of each voting station should be sent separately to the local office of the electoral management body, in a sealed envelope, and a comparison with first results received should be done, once the original is received.

If serious fears of fraud exist, a special paper can be used for the statement of the votes of each voting station. This dark coloured paper (dark blue for example) immediately indicates that the initial inscription is modified. The colour around the modified area will fade. A pencil should be used for this type of paper.

If modification marks appear on the paper, then special attention can be given to that specific voting station, and the results of the count. The voting record book should be checked carefully. If the counting officer made a mistake in completing the form at the voting station, then he/she should add his/her initials, or signature, as well as those of party and candidate representatives to denote agreement with the correction.

Results per Party/Candidate

For greater transparency, and to allow people to have access to interim results from all voting stations, results counted and available at the end of election day/s can be posted on a wall/chalkboard/spreadsheet at each local office of the electoral management body .

This allows the media and the public to see the interim results as they come in, if no periodic report is available to be provided to them.

On voting night, interim results should be counted for each candidate or party for each voting station. The local office of the electoral management body will compile these results and create a summary report per candidate or political party to send to the national electoral management body. They will then count the total electoral district results per political party or candidate and indicate these to be the final interim results when forwarding the summary to the national office of the electoral management body.

After the final count, the national office will receive the official final results from each voting station and compile them into a national publication.

In all cases, a double counting procedure should be used, even if it is computerized, before the results are publicly posted.

After each five to ten voting stations, a comparison should be made between the two persons responsible for the counts. If results no longer match, the previous few additional figures can easily be verified and corrected.

If a computerized system is used, two people should enter the same data at separate computer workstations. The computer systems can be programmed to immediately point out when and where entries do not match exactly for a specific voting station. This makes the process of verification much simpler.

Consolidating Results: List Systems

Consolidating results in list systems can be very simple and straightforward or highly complicated, depending on the system and the legal framework.

In some cases, it is sufficient to count the votes once, either in the voting station or in a counting centre, but in other cases a recount can be necessary. In such cases, the first count is normally in the voting station and the recount in a counting centre.

In closed list systems, with no possibility for preferential votes, cumulating etc. and just one list per party, one count is normally sufficient. The numbers per list are added up per electoral district, and the seats are allocated to candidates according to list order.

In more complex systems, when a party has more than one list per electoral district, or when the voter may cross out, add candidates, or make preferential marks, cumulate etc., the counting and consolidating of the results are more complicated.

The exact number of votes for each list and candidate, including cross-outs, additions etc. must be determined before implementing the electoral formula for allocating seats to parties and candidates. A common procedure in such systems is a preliminary count per party in the voting stations at the close of voting, and a recount later in counting centres at the electoral district or regional level.

In some systems a final compilation of the results must be carried out at national level, for example, to allocate national "equalizing" seats.

The more complex a system, and the more complicated the electoral formulas to be implemented, the more crucial transparency of the count is. Count sheets, reports from the count, and compilations must be clear, comprehensive, complete, and designed in such a way that the entire process can be followed and controlled by the political parties and the electorate.

All relevant information must be published without delay. However, it is essential to make realistic plans for the last phase of the electoral process, and not create exaggerated expectations when it comes to the time of announcement of the final results.

When the final results are published by the election authorities, instructions on how to appeal and object to the results must be included in the announcement.

Publicising Election Results

Publicising election results is a process that must be handled with great care. As the first results available are usually interim results that may need amending or adding up later in the process, careful consideration needs to be given to how and when results are published.

Votes are counted in many different ways. In most cases, votes are counted for the first time at the voting stations on election day, after the close of voting. In other cases, votes are taken to counting centres before they are counted.

In some jurisdictions, these first counts are the only counts made, and the ballot papers are looked at again only if the election result is challenged or a recount is requested by a candidate, a party, or a court.

In some jurisdictions, votes counted once at the voting station level are taken to a counting centre after election day, and rechecked and recounted, recognizing that mistakes are common in the initial count.

Votes may be recounted again and again at several stages in the process, depending on the complexity of the electoral system, the need for accuracy, and whether the result is challenged.

Election results can be released at various stages in this process. In some cases, results are announced progressively on election night, as each local/regional/district office reports its count. When results are released for each voting station as they come in, close results can change from one likely outcome to another. While this makes for an exciting event, this level of uncertainty might not be desirable in a more volatile country.

In other countries, results for each electoral district are not announced until all of the voting stations have reported their results to the district electoral officer, so that the first published interim results will be close to the final outcome.

While some jurisdictions permit voting at voting stations only on a fixed day, others permit voting by several different methods, to cater for voters who are unable to be at a voting station on election day. These can include absentee, mail ballots, or advance voting ballots, or mobile voting stations, where voters are visited by elections officials in remote locations, hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, or even their own homes.

It is not always possible to count these types of votes on or before election night, so that the tallies of these votes have to be added to any interim results announced on election night.

With more complex electoral systems, particularly those that involve distribution of preferences, counting may take days, weeks, or in extreme cases, months. In these cases, results are usually released progressively at each stage of the process.

Publishing Interim Election Results

When a decision is taken to publish interim results, it is desirable to do so as quickly as possible. A few hours to a day after the close of voting is considered a reasonable amount of time to release the first interim results, depending on the local political, logistical circumstances and the electoral system.

Where counting takes place over several days, updates are often published at the end of each day's counting.

Where votes are counted progressively, or are recounted several times, and interim results are published before the final result is determined, interim results could be misleading. For example, interim results could indicate that a candidate or party was winning a seat, or a particular number of seats, but the final result might be different. Consequently, special precautions are needed to ensure that confusion or civil strife does not occur.

The release of interim results should include cautionary language. The authority responsible for releasing results should explain that they are not official final results, and that changes and corrections may be necessary in the process of determining the official final counts.

The electoral management body does not necessarily have to release the interim results. In some jurisdictions it is seen as more appropriate for the media, exit poll organisations or non-governmental organizations to release and announce preliminary indications of the vote. However, in the interests of demonstrating transparency and accounability, it is desirable that the electoral management body take responsibility for publishing interim results.

Depending on the local situation, it may be desirable to include all types of ballots (such as absentee, mail, advance vote, and mobile voting station) used in the election when interim results are released, to avoid discrepancies between interim and final results. Whatever decision is taken on the ways of releasing interim results, the conditions must be clearly explained. For example, are all votes included? Are the votes subject to recounts?

In other cases, it may not be possible to wait for these figures to be available without unduly delaying publication of interim figures. In this case it is important to qualify the interim results by pointing out that the results do not yet include these other types of ballots.

In some jurisdictions it may be possible to count absentee, mail ballots, advance vote, or mobile voting station results before election day, to enable these results to be included in interim results published on election day.

If these special ballots are counted a few days prior to election day, these results should be kept very secure, and access to them should be prohibited until the close of voting on election day.

This approach has advantages and disadvantages. While it allows more complete interim figures to be published, it may also seriously compromise the integrity, turnout, or outcome of the vote if any results are publicly released before the close of voting. As it is usual for candidate and party representatives to be present when any votes are counted, this is a real risk.

Publication of interim results in countries with multiple time zones before the close of voting in some areas may have an undesirable impact on voting behaviour.

For countries with multiple time zones, staggered voting hours or a black-out on releasing results may be considered, to allow all voters to vote before knowing the election outcome or trends in other parts of the country. In some circumstances, these measures may not be seen as appropriate or necessary. Staggered opening and closing times might be seen as discriminatory in some countries.

Discrepancies between Official and Interim Results

Discrepancies between interim results and final official results are generally small, if procedures are well designed and carefully followed. While discrepancies may affect particularly close races in individual electoral districts, they rarely affect the outcome of a general election.

Where discrepancies do occur, the electoral management body should issue statements explaining the reasons for the discrepancies, to ensure that public confidence in the system is maintained.

Deciding not to Publish Interim Results

If a political situation is unstable, the electoral management body could consider not announcing interim results, but only final results, in order to avoid any confusion and to prevent the exacerbation of conflict. This option has its risks, as any delay in publishing final results may itself cause instability.

This option is not very practicable where party or candidate representatives are present at the counts, as these counts is effectively in the public domain. Attempting to suppress information from the counts until the announcement of final results in this case is generally not a realistic option.

If political or security concerns are acute, consideration could be given to conducting the count in secret, with only counting officers present, or by swearing candidate and party representatives to secrecy until the counting is final.

In general, it is preferable to announce interim results, wherever possible, to enhance the transparency of the election process.

Security Considerations The electoral management body needs to take special security measures in order to avoid fraud during the process of compiling interim and final election results.

Only authorized persons should have access to the processes used to compile election results.

Publicising Official Final Results

Publication of Official Final Results

The appropriate authority should make the official final election results available as soon as possible after the counting process has been concluded.

Generally, the local or national office of the electoral management body will be responsible for announcing and releasing the official results, unless the courts have a role in certifying the results.

Some electoral laws stipulate a fixed day for announcing the official results.

Depending on the country and the electoral system used, an average of one to two weeks is generally needed before detailed preparations are complete for making an official announcement. Often the legislation will provide for the designated period in which the results should be publicized.

In many cases the official count can only be concluded once all the ballot papers have been returned to the local electoral management body and all counting steps have been completed, including resolution of any disputes about vote counting (which may result in recounts).

Depending on the geography of the country, the communication networks in place, and the electoral system, this process can take from a few hours to several days, weeks, or months to complete.

Great care must be taken to ensure that the figures are accurate. Procedures must be in place to ensure that all appropriate checks and balances have been taken into account before the final results are announced.

Formal documents showing the results of the count are normally prepared, certified, and signed by the responsible electoral district officer, or other appropriate official. These documents are usually officially published, such as in a Government Gazette, tabled in Parliament, or presented to an appropriate official.

Also, copies of these documents are usually provided to candidates and party representatives. Often, formal election results are declared at a public ceremony. Candidates, political party representatives, the media, observers, other interested persons, and the general public are often invited to attend these ceremonies. In some cases, candidates and political party representatives, are given the opportunity to make speeches.

It is desirable to produce detailed publications of election results showing the results of the counting at all levels of voting, from voting stations to regions or electoral districts, and the national level. Most often these are done electronically and the specific result breakdown is provided to parties and candidates. However, in some cases it is desirable to merge some results.

Merging Results to Protect the Secrecy of the Vote

It may be desirable to merge or amalgamate results from several voting stations to protect the secrecy of the vote. This is generally done if the publication of results at a detailed level might identify the names and votes of particular individuals. This can happen if the number of votes at a voting station is so small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate or party.

This can also be done in cases where there is a real risk that publishing the voting results at a particular voting station could result in retribution against the persons who voted there. This problem can be mitigated by mixing the ballots from two or more voting stations from different areas.

Merging results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other categories of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body, results can easily be merged with other results in order to protect the secrecy of the vote. For internal use only, a special notation can be made in order to keep the audit trail clear.

Role of Judicial Courts

In some countries, judicial courts are only involved in the electoral process after the election, when offenders against the electoral law are brought to trial, or when an electoral result is challenged.

In other jurisdictions, the courts may have a significant role to play in confirming the outcome and official results of the election, where the results are official only when the court has confirmed them. Such confirmation should be done as soon as possible, in order to avoid political instability and potential delays associated with a transition from one government to another.

The courts may also be directly involved in the official count, along with the electoral management body.

This will generally be the case if final approval of the count must come from the courts.

Challenging Results

Mechanisms for Challenging Results

A mechanism for challenging results is desirable at every stage of the vote counting process. This helps to ensure that the election process is transparent, that election authorities are accountable, and that the election outcome is acceptable to all parties.

Aggrieved parties and candidates must be able to challenge results based on factual information and are entitled to an independent and fair hearing on the merits of their case.

Effective mechanisms for challenging results add to the credibility of an election outcome. If a party to an election is not satisfied that an election has been properly conducted, the ability to effectively challenge the election result will ensure that any genuine errors are corrected, and that any fraudulent activities are identified and dealt with.

Conversely, if concerns are baseless, the process of challenging an election outcome should provide the public with this information. This will enhance the credibility of the outcome.

If an election cannot be challenged to the satisfaction of all parties, then it is possible that the election outcome will not be accepted, leading to civil or political tension and violence.

It is also important that election challenges do not unreasonably delay the election process. Delays in the formation of parliaments and governments may lead to civil or political unrest, or exacerbate such if it already exists.

Election results can be challenged in several ways, and at several points in the process.

Opportunities for challenging results will depend on whether paper ballots, mechanical, or computerized ballots are used.

Challenging Results During the Vote Count

At the first stage of the counting process for paper ballots, when ballot boxes are opened, and ballot papers counted for the first time, party and candidate representatives are often given the right to challenge whether a ballot paper is genuine, whether a ballot paper is formal or informal, or whether it has been correctly sorted to a candidate or party.

The counting officer in charge of the counting will have the authority to rule on disputed ballot papers, or ballot papers can be set aside so that a more senior electoral official can rule on them at a later time.

Similarly, if ballot papers are recounted at a regional or central counting centre, party and candidate representatives may again challenge decisions taken during the count. At this stage, it is usually possible to reverse a decision on a disputed ballot paper that was made at an earlier count.

Where mechanical or computerized voting methods are used, political parties and candidates and observers should have the right to inspect audit trails and any source documents used, and have the opportunity to challenge any alleged irregularities.

The methods of disputing the count at this stage will vary from place to place. In many cases challenges may be made verbally. In some circumstances, it may be desirable to have a more formal, written process.

Where ballot papers are set aside for the decision of a more senior officer at a later time, these ballot papers should be bundled separately, and clearly labelled, so that they can be identified later. Also, these bundles of disputed ballot papers may be kept separate, so that a court or tribunal can rule on them if necessary.

The categories of individuals able to challenge a counting decision will vary. Representatives of candidates and/or parties are often given the right to challenge the counting process. In some cases, local or international observers may also be given this right.

Recounts by Electoral Bodies

Where paper ballots are used it is usual to allow candidates and/or political parties the right to apply for a recount, once counting is completed and a result has been obtained.

This means recounting some or all of the ballot papers to satisfy all parties that the correct outcome has been achieved. Depending on the technology used, it may also be feasible to recount an electronic ballot by, for example, reprocessing the original input documents.

Written Requests for Recounts

As recounts can be time-consuming and expensive, the responsible electoral official may be given the discretion to decide whether or not to grant a recount.

Generally, recounts are only conducted if there is a small difference between the winning and losing party and/or candidate, and there is some doubt as to the accuracy of the count.

In some jurisdictions, recounts are automatic if the result is within a certain margin. In some jurisdictions, recounts may be mandatory whenever a result is challenged, regardless of the margin.

If the initial result is a tie, it is wise, as a general rule, to automatically conduct a recount to determine whether any mistakes were made that, if corrected, could break the tie.

Otherwise, the definition of a "close" election result will depend on local circumstances, and the estimated margin of error in the first count. The most important consideration is to ensure that all parties are satisfied with the outcome. If failure to conduct a recount will lead to one or more parties not accepting the election result, a recount should be conducted.

A recount can either be a full recount or a partial recount. Depending on the circumstances, it may be possible to select some categories to recount, rather than conduct a complete recount. For example, a representative random sample might be chosen to give an indication of the accuracy of the initial count.

A recount may be undertaken simply as a check that all ballot papers have been correctly sorted. Or a recount may involve retracing one or more steps and conducting the recount as if it were the original count.

Thorough records of any recounts conducted should be kept. These will be necessary to satisfy all parties that proper procedure has been followed, and may be needed if the election result is challenged at a later stage.

There should be a time limit on applying for a recount. In most cases recounts will only be permitted within a short time after the completion of counting. For example, there may be a 24 hour or 48 hour limit.

In some cases, recounts may be requested only before the official declaration of the election result. After that time, recourse may only be permitted to a court or tribunal.

If the responsible officer decides not to do a recount, a candidate or party may have the right to appeal that decision to a higher authority. That authority, such as a more senior electoral official or the board of the electoral management body, may in turn decide whether or not to do a recount.

Communicating Election Results

Before an election result can be challenged, the individuals entitled to make a challenge must be equipped with the necessary information. At each stage of the counting process, it is important to communicate the progressive election results to party and candidate representatives and observers.

It may also be appropriate to communicate progressive results to the media and the general public. When the election count is concluded, and the election result is officially declared, it is customary to publish an official set of election results.

Because challenges may lead to changes in final official results, the election management body should stress that the first published results are preliminary and may change at a later time.

This process of communicating the progressive and final election results facilitates the transparency of the electoral process and allows representatives of political parties and candidates, for example, the opportunity to challenge the results, if they wish, on the basis of all available information.

Challenging Election Results before a Court or Tribunal

After any administrative recounts are resolved and the electoral authority has officially declared the election result, there may be further opportunity to challenge the election result by appeal to a court or a special election appeal tribunal.

Some jurisdictions establish special electoral tribunals or courts specifically during election periods.

A challenge to a court or tribunal is generally made in a formal legal petition. Challenges may be made by candidates, parties, persons eligible to vote in the election, or by the electoral administration. Those mounting a challenge usually have to argue a case for challenging an election result.

There will generally be a time limit on challenging election results before a court or tribunal. This limit is usually longer than that applying to an administrative recount, as the legal nature of court or tribunal proceedings require greater preparation. In addition, the court or tribunal may be required to hand down its decision within a specified time.

At this stage, any aspect of the election may be questioned, including:

• the accuracy of the voter's list,

• whether voters were intimidated, bribed, or prevented from voting,

• whether electoral officers acted in a biased, partisan way,

• whether candidates or parties acted improperly,

• whether candidates were eligible to be elected,

• whether votes were fraudulently cast, or

• whether there were any errors or irregularities in the vote counting process.

Some jurisdictions limit the petition to a judicial body to complaints or appeals that affect the result only. Then the complainant or applicant will be required to show that their complaint would have an affect on the result of the election.

Courts or tribunals considering disputed elections may have the power, given to them by legislation, to examine ballot papers and other election documents, or order recounts of ballot papers. They are usually given the power to decide to confirm the original election result, or to overturn the election result and declare a different result. They may also have the power to order that another election must be held.

Courts and tribunals may be bound by precedents set by previous election challenge rulings. To maintain the integrity of the electoral process, it is important to consistently interpret electoral laws. In particular, each electoral system will have a set of rules defining acceptable marks that may be used on ballot papers and other crucial parts of the electoral process.

In some cases it may be possible to appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal to a higher authority. In other cases, statutes specify that there cannot be appeals against the decision of an election court or tribunal. This helps to prevent election results and the formulation of parliaments and governments being unduly delayed by legal processes.

How Long should Election Materials be Kept?

As a minimum, relevant electoral materials should be securely stored until the last opportunity for challenging an election result has passed. In some cases, this may mean storing electoral materials for the entire life of a parliament.

In other cases, electoral materials may be destroyed, once the time for challenging a result before a court or tribunal has passed, or if a challenge has been lodged, after the challenge has been finally dealt with. Some jurisdictions provide a legislated limit on the period of time that election material should be kept. The minimum period for maintaining election material is normally about six months.

Only materials relevant to an election outcome need be kept. This will usually include ballot papers, voters' lists, any declarations completed by voters, election results, and any records related to disputed results. If in doubt, it is better to store materials rather than destroy them.

Any stored materials must be kept secure from tampering. Ballot papers that may be recounted at a later time cannot be relied upon if the responsible body cannot be sure that they have not been tampered with.

Once the decision to destroy electoral materials is taken, the responsible electoral management body should ensure that the materials are destroyed appropriately. Any electoral materials that might identify the preferences of an individual voter should be destroyed in such a way as to keep that individual's vote secret. If possible, paper materials should be recycled.

Election Challenges and the Political Process

Election challenges can be quite disruptive to the electoral and political processes. They can delay the finalization of election results, which in turn can delay the first meeting of the new parliament and the formation of a government.

This situation can destabilize a sensitive political environment, and lead to civil unrest. For these reasons, it is important that election challenges are dealt with quickly, efficiently, and with maximum transparency and accountability.

The election process is aimed at electing representatives to parliaments that reflect the wishes of the people who voted for them. The processes for challenging election results should be aimed at ensuring that the wishes of the people are accurately reflected in the outcome.

Recount at the Voting Station

Paper Ballots

When ballot boxes are opened and ballot papers counted for the first time at the first stage of the counting process for paper ballots, authorized witnesses are often given the right to challenge whether a ballot paper is genuine or whether it has been correctly allocated to a candidate or party.

Usually, the counting officer in charge of the vote counting has the power to rule on disputed ballot papers, or ballot papers can be set aside so that a more senior electoral official can rule on them at a later time.

Similarly, if ballot papers are recounted at a regional or central counting centre, someone may again challenge decisions taken during the count. At this stage it is usually possible to reverse a decision on a disputed ballot paper made at an earlier count.

Mechanical and Computerised Ballots

Where mechanical or computerized voting methods are used, representatives of a political party or candidate should have the right to inspect audit trails and any source documents used, and have the opportunity to challenge any alleged irregularities.

The methods of disputing ballot papers at this stage of the count will vary from place to place. In many cases challenges may be made verbally. In some circumstances, it may be desirable to have a more formal written process.

Where ballot papers are set aside for the decision of a more senior officer at a later time, these ballot papers should be separately bundled and clearly labelled, so that they can be identified later. These bundles of disputed ballot papers may also be kept separate so that a court or tribunal can rule on them if necessary.

The categories of individuals able to challenge a counting decision will also vary. Representatives of candidates and/or parties are often given the right to challenge the counting process.

Recount at District/National Level

Some systems have a recount as a normal part of the counting system. This normally happens for more complex systems such as preferential or parallel systems. Other systems have recount as a way to solve disputes and challenges.

Once counting is completed and a result has been obtained, it is usual where paper ballots are used, to allow candidates and/or political parties the right to apply for a recount. This means recounting some or all of the ballot papers to satisfy all parties that the correct outcome has been achieved.

Depending on the technology used, it may also be feasible to recount an electronic ballot by, for example, reprocessing the original input documents.

Requests for recounts are usually made in writing. As recounts can be time-consuming and expensive, the responsible counting officer usually has the discretion to decide whether or not to grant a recount.

Generally, recounts are conducted only if an election result is close, and there is some doubt as to the accuracy of the count. In some jurisdictions, recounts are automatic if the result is within a certain margin. In other cases, recounts may be mandatory whenever a result is challenged, regardless of the margin.

If the initial result is a tie, it is wise, as a general rule, to automatically conduct a recount to determine whether any mistakes were made that, if corrected, could break the tie. Otherwise, the definition of a "close" election result will depend on local circumstances and the estimated margin of error in the first count.

The most important consideration is to ensure that all parties will be satisfied with the outcome. If failure to conduct a recount will lead to one or more parties not accepting the election result, a recount should be conducted.

A recount can be either a full recount or a partial recount. Depending on the circumstances, it may be possible to select some categories to recount, rather than conduct a complete recount. For example, a representative random sample might be chosen to give an indication of the accuracy of the initial count.

A recount may be undertaken as a check that all ballot papers have been correctly sorted. A recount may involve retracing one or more steps and conducting the recount as if it was the original count.

Thorough records of any recounts conducted should be kept. These will be necessary to satisfy all parties that proper procedure has been followed, and may be needed if the election result is challenged at a later stage. There should be a time limit on applying for a recount.

In most cases recounts will only be permitted within a short time after the completion of counting. For example, there may be a 24 hour or 48 hour limit. In some cases, recounts may only be requested before the official declaration of the election result. After that time, recourse may only be permitted to a court or tribunal.

If the responsible officer decides not to do a recount, a candidate or party may have the right to appeal that decision to a higher authority. That authority, such as a more senior electoral official or the board of the electoral management body, may in turn decide whether or not to do a recount.

Judicial Recounts

After any administrative recounts are resolved, and the electoral authority has officially declared the election result, there may be further opportunity to challenge the election result by appeal to a court or a special election appeal tribunal.

A challenge to a court or tribunal is generally made in a formal legal petition.

Challenges may be made by candidates, parties, individuals eligible to vote in the election, or by the electoral administration. Those challenging usually have to argue a case for challenging an election result.

There will generally be a time limit on challenging election results before a court or tribunal. This limit is usually longer than that applying for an administrative recount, as the legal nature of court or tribunal proceedings require greater preparation. In addition, the court or tribunal may be required to hand down its decision within a specified time.

Some jurisdictions limit the petition to a judicial body to complaints or appeals that affect the result only. Then the complainant or applicant will be required to show that their complaint would have an effect on the result of the election.

At this stage any aspect of the election may be questioned, including:

• the accuracy of the voter's list,

• whether voters were intimidated, bribed, or prevented from voting

• whether electoral officers acted in a biased, partisan way,

• whether candidates or parties acted improperly,

• whether candidates were eligible to be elected,

• whether votes were fraudulently cast, or

• whether there were any errors or irregularities in the vote counting process.

Courts or tribunals considering disputed elections may have the power, given to them by legislation, to examine ballot papers and other election documents or order recounts of ballot papers. They are usually given the power to decide to confirm the original election result, or to overturn the election result and declare a different result. They may also have the power to order that another election must be held.

Courts and tribunals may be bound by precedents set by previous election challenge rulings. To maintain the integrity of the electoral process, it is important to consistently interpret electoral laws. In particular, each electoral system will have a set of rules defining acceptable marks that may be used on ballot papers.

In some cases it may be possible to appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal to a higher authority. In other cases, statutes specify that there cannot be appeals against the decision of an election court or tribunal. This helps to prevent election results and the formulation of parliaments and governments being unduly delayed by legal processes.