Procedures for Vote Counting at Counting Centres

In some jurisdictions, for reasons outlined in Different Different Types and Requirements for Vote Counting, votes are initially counted at voting stations; in some cases they are subsequently recounted at counting centres. There are cases, however, where no counting is done at voting stations, but ballots are transported directly to centralised counting centres after the close of voting.

In a counting centre approach, where ballots from two or more voting stations are mixed together, with results published by counting centre instead of by voting station, it is more difficult to link communities with affiliation. This may help to protect the secrecy of the voting pattern, especially in some small communities (normally the ballots are counted by voting station but the centre approach will give the possibility to merge).

Even in countries where the count is predominantly done at voting stations, one or more counting centres can ease administration for certain types of ballots. This includes absentee votes, mail votes from armed forces, diplomatic missions, refugees, incarcerated persons or persons residing outside their electoral district which may come from various voting stations, local or abroad, or directly from the voters (by mail).

Such ballots can be forwarded to the appropriate counting centre and added to the ballots from applicable elections, making counting easier to organise and easier to protect the secrecy of such absentee votes.

There may be many counting centres or there may be only one national counting centre. The limit to the level of centralisation will be the level at which votes are translated into a number of legislators or seats. In a First Past the Post (FPTP) system the counting centre may be at the electoral district level (at a town hall, for example) but not at the national level.

In a proportional representation system based on regional lists, a counting centre may not be more centralised than the region that the list is based on.

Transportation to the Counting Centre

At the close of voting, voting station officers seal the ballot boxes and prepare them to be transported to a counting centre along with related documents such as the ballot account form.

Each ballot box is then sorted and tallied. The content of the ballot box can be counted separately or mixed with two or more boxes together, after reconciliation, to protect the identity of voters.

The statement of the vote for each counting centre is sent to a regional or national counting centre and the representatives of political parties. Observers are allowed to copy the results.

Releasing interim results is generally much slower when ballots are counted at counting centres. There are several reasons for this:

• the counting process can normally only start once all ballot boxes arrive at the centre;

• more personnel are involved in the process (required for the reception; storage and dispatch of ballot boxes);

• counting may be delayed if several days are required to receive and count all ballots;

• more elaborate procedures need to be followed (due to volumes of materials and personnel);

• more control mechanisms must be introduced (controlling access to location by observers, candidates, party representatives, etc.)

The logistical complexities of moving ballot boxes and related materials to the counting centre can be an obstacle if transportation is difficult or not readily available.

Systems are required to receive and store the ballot boxes efficiently while the need to transport the ballot boxes may make it difficult to maintain transparency and retain confidence in the voting system, the counting system and the election body concerned.

Resulting delays in the announcement of the results can lead to accusations of manipulation or fraud during the delivery of boxes or the consolidation of the results of the count.

To ensure the success of the counting process, there are administrative considerations and training requirements related to vote counting at counting centres which need to be addressed early in the electoral process and once decided, they must be respected.

Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with their respective processes.

Procedures for counting at counting centres

At the closing of the voting station authorised persons and counting officers stay in the voting station and prepare the ballot box for transportation from the voting station to the counting centre.

The slot of the ballot box is closed and sealed and the first reconciliation of ballots is done before completing the ballot account form. The seals on the ballot box are then verified along with all forms in sealed envelopes attached to the ballot box. The waybill or transport form is completed according to the type of transportation used.

Important security measures need to be taken to ensure that the ballot boxes will arrive safely at the counting centre. Once at the counting centre, unloading of ballot boxes should be carefully planned and supervised and movement of all ballot boxes should be tightly controlled.

All forms related to transportation and movement of the ballot boxes will be completed and verified so that any ballot boxes that are missing can be traced.

The ballot box is checked by an electoral official and then sent to a planned location in the counting centre for ballot boxes ready to be counted. From there individual ballot boxes are delivered to the appropriate counting table.

The ballot box is opened and once the contents of the ballot box are emptied, the validity of each ballot is verified and sorted into different piles before being tallied: valid ballots (by candidate or political party), and rejected ballots. To facilitate the decision making process, clear rules of interpretation or guidelines regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting official, and known in advance.

Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the rejected ballots and, if they do not agree with the decision of the counting official, be allowed to make formal objections which can form the basis for contesting the results of the count.

Using a count sheet, all valid ballots, spoiled ballots, and rejected ballots are counted - none should be destroyed at this stage of the process.

A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote for each ballot box. The ballot box can then be re-sealed and appropriate counting documentation can be completed and either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope.

The ballot box is then transferred to a pre-planned location in the counting centre where counted ballot boxes are securely stored. Once there, the person in charge will verify, count, and label each ballot box creating the cumulative audit trail for the counting centre. All the ballot boxes are safely kept at the counting centre until further notice from the electoral management body.

The results recorded on the statement of the vote for each ballot box will be communicated to the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre. While preparing the cumulative statement of the vote for the entire counting centre, progress reports will also be prepared and sent to the central office of the electoral management body as results for electoral districts are available. Results will be transmitted directly to the national electoral management body so they can be released as they come in.

Representatives of political parties and candidates and observers, if present, should be allowed to make copies of the progress reports, the statement of the vote for each ballot box, and the cumulative statement of the votes.

The national office of the electoral management body adds the results transmitted as well as results of special ballots, advance votes, mobile voting station votes, etc. All results should be tallied per political party or candidate and publicised as soon as possible. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply.

Effective training for counting officers

To be able to implement such procedures regarding vote counting at counting centres, it is essential that appropriate training be conducted. Training requirements, as well as all other administrative considerations (see Context) will need to be forecast in the budget for the election or referendum.

During training and managing a counting centre it is important to emphasise non-partisanship in the conduct of the work.

Numerous jurisdictions require that all counting workers sign an oath and a confidentiality clause to make this point clear, documented, and understood by all personnel involved. Counting workers should not make any remarks or mention any personal political affiliation or affinity, nor wear any badge or clothing with political slogans or logos.

Since the counting officer at each table will have to handle disputes over any rejected ballots, he will be the first person to deal with representatives of political parties and candidates.

This person (if applicable according to the legislation) will also have to make the final decision in validating or rejecting any ballot. Neutrality and non-partisanship are imperative in this decision-making process.

In many jurisdictions, counting officers can be legally prosecuted if their work is proven to be partisan during the counting process.

Presence of party and candidate representatives at counting centres.

To ensure that the level playing field concept is adhered to, it is recommended that all political parties and candidates designate a representative to be present in each counting centre and assign these representatives to scrutinise the counting process. It remains the choice of each party as to whether they send a representative to every counting table or not.

Many jurisdictions consider the presence of political party representatives to be essential to ensure integrity, guarantee consistency, and provide witnesses to the transparency of the process.

When the time comes to make an important decision during the counting process, such as modifications to previously completed forms, then all party representatives involved should sign the forms to demonstrate that they are informed and agree with the decision.

Careful application of such procedures provides tangible evidence that the rules are consistent and the process transparent.

Record the History of Each Ballot Box

At the counting centre, just as at the voting station, the election management body should be able to retrace the history of each ballot box from the moment it leaves the local office of the electoral management body until it returns with the counted ballots (especially important when the ballot papers of two ballot boxes or more are mixed together).

An adequate audit trail will allow the electoral management body to maintain full control and ensure that possibilities of fraud via ballot box tampering are extremely limited and can be detected if attempted. Numbering each ballot box is a simple method of implementing such a control system.

The same number should appear, as well, on each form used at the voting station and at the counting centre. The importance of recording the history of each ballot box may be used as evidence in cases of judicial recount.

Summary of counting processes at counting centres

In general, the major process components of vote counting at counting centres are the following:

• preparation of the ballot boxes before transportation from the voting station to the counting centre;

• transportation of the ballot boxes to the counting centre;

• provision of party, candidate, or observer accompaniment of the ballot boxes;

• reception and regulation of the ballot boxes at the counting centre,

• opening the ballot box,

• reconciling ballots in each box with number of voters;

• sorting and counting the ballots so the results can be transmitted to the next level of the electoral management body that compiles them and further transmits until the results are publicised.

Preparation for Ballot Box Transport

The preparatory process related to transportation of any ballot box is very important. This is particularly so if counting takes place at a counting centre.

When ballot boxes are transported from the voting station to the counting centre, important security control must be provided prior to transportation such as verification of the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box and on the slot.

In addition, ballot boxes must be accompanied from the departure from the voting station to the arrival at the counting centre. Those accompanying the ballot box may include security, party and candidate representatives and observers.

The ballot boxes should never be left without supervision at any time. Fear of manipulation of the ballot box contents during transportation must be procedurally addressed, and measures to ensure that the contents of the ballot boxes remain intact must be respected, communicated, and enforced.

Ideally, counting officers, as well as two or more party or candidate representatives should accompany ballot boxes and supplies. These measures are designed to prevent fraud and ensure that any tampering that occurs will be easily detected.

The control measures should be publicised and known in advance by all participants in the process, including the public, as an indication of transparency. Controls on the movement of ballot boxes are essential to maintain the integrity of a democratic electoral process.

The selection of the carrier, private or public sector, (belonging to the Armed Forces or the Police), should be decided before the election is called and should take into consideration several factors:

• reliability,

• speed,

• coverage of the territory,

• availability of contingency measures, etc.

The choice of transportation methods as well as the organization assigned to perform transport will be a key determinant in the success of the operation. The confidence in the entire election can be affected if the transportation is not entirely secure and properly carried out.

At the close of voting, the slot of the ballot box should be sealed so that no additional ballots can be put into the ballot box during transportation.

The serial numbers of the official seals used should be written in the respective election books and/or on the transportation forms. Then the counting officer counts the numbers of used ballots by counting the used counterfoils (the ballot box remains sealed), unused ballots, and spoiled ballots.

This total should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station.

If any discrepancies are found, the counting officer should recount until the missing ballots are found or make the appropriate amendments to the forms (ballot account form, transportation forms, and the election book) noting the discrepancy.

All the forms are put into sealed envelopes and attached to the ballot box. Representatives of political parties and candidates can append their signatures on the seals used by the counting officer or can use their own seals. The ballot box is then ready to be transported to the counting centre.

The transportation form should be completed in multiple copies and given to authorised persons.

Representatives of political parties and candidates, the electoral officer in charge of reception of the ballot boxes at the counting centre, the electoral management body and the electoral officer responsible for the ballot boxes during transportation should each have a copy of the transportation form.

Creation of Ballot Account

Reconciling Ballots

Before the start of voting, the number of ballots received from the electoral management body must be counted.

In countries where each party has its own ballot and where envelopes are used, it is important to count ballots and envelopes and to verify that all party's ballots are available to the voters.

This is an important aspect of the audit trail, as this figure will be needed to reconcile the number of ballots used/unused after the voting has taken place.

To ensure completeness, all ballots received should be counted, and serial numbers on the counterfoils (as applicable) should be verified through inspections of the ballot booklets.

It is appropriate, especially if ballots are delivered by hand, that the ballot quantities be counted in the presence of the officer who delivered them. A receipt can be signed with a copy then attached to the voting record book. More important, however, is that the count be done at the voting station, in the presence of all representatives of political parties and candidates.

n all cases, the information should be written in the ballot accounting form.

Once the ballots are counted and proper observations are made on the appropriate forms, then all persons present at the voting station should be shown that the ballot box is empty before placing security seals on the ballot box. Party and candidate parties should be given the opportunity to affix their seal or signature to the seal on the ballot box.

The serial number(s) of the seal(s) should be written in the voting record book and on any other appropriate form. These procedures are very important, as they constitute the start of an important audit trail. Many mistakes can be prevented if these procedures are followed. If discrepancies occur, steps can be retraced back to the beginning of ballot marking.

Once these preliminary procedures are completed, the person in charge may announce that the voting station is officially open to the first voter.

At closing time, the person in charge of the voting station should announce officially the close of voting. The voting station officer should ensure then that only pre-authorised persons are allowed to process or witness the procedures for preparing the ballot box for transportation to the counting centre.

Voting station officers, , observers, representatives of political parties and candidate should be permitted to stay. If no one except the voting station officers are present, the last voters may be asked to stay to witness the preparation.

The presence of the representatives of the political parties and candidates and electoral observers is an important element of the transparency that must be demonstrated in a democratic election.

Reconciliation and Procedures in Case of Discrepancies

During the close of voting and before starting the reconciliation, the electoral officer in charge of the voting station should seal the slot of the ballot box, using an official seal with serial numbers.

The electoral officer in charge of the voting station must count the numbers of used ballots by counting the used counterfoils (the ballot box remains sealed), unused ballots and spoiled ballots.

The total of these three categories should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station.

Verification of the number of voters who voted on election day should also be done using the marked-up voter's list and the voting record book entries. It may be necessary to look at the voting record book as some jurisdictions authorize registration of voters on electionday and these may be added using the voting record book. Other jurisdictions use separate forms.

This information can be written on a ballot account form signed by the voting station officer, as well as party and candidate representatives.

In case of discrepancies in the reconciliation process, the count should be repeated by verifying the observations made in the voting record book for the spoiled ballots.

This can also be accomplished by recounting the unused ballots and the used counterfoils. If discrepancies remain, then verification with a higher authority (the district electoral officer and/or the electoral management body) of the number of ballots sent to the voting station should be done to verify figures and to inform these authorities of the situation.

Keeping higher authorities regularly informed of any problems is an important part of the transparency required in an election.

If no satisfactory answer for the discrepancy is found, corrections and amendments to the voting record book, reconciliation form, or any other relevant form should be made to reflect the appropriate number of ballots.

To validate these new figures, everybody who should know is informed of the situation and agrees with it. Those who should be informed of the discrepancy are political party and candidate representatives present at the voting station for the vote count.

These parties should complete a report and sign the forms and/or the voting record book. This new figure should then become the official one for the voting station. All the documents and forms prepared should be put into a sealed envelope or plastic bag and attached to the ballot box.

To facilitate the transportation, a bag large enough to contain the ballot box and all the sealed envelopes attached to it can be used and sealed prior to transportation. If the ballot box is too big or heavy, the envelopes should be securely taped onto the ballot box while ensuring that the seals of the ballot boxes are still legible and intact.

For more details on opening procedures and closing procedures.

Providing Security Controls

Security controls should be in place prior to transportation;when ballot boxes are transported from the voting station to the counting centre. These measures can prevent fraud and ensure, that if tampering occurs, it will be detected. These controls are essential to the transparency and integrity demonstrated in the democratic electoral process.

Voting station officers must ensure adherence to the security procedures, and representatives of political parties and candidates should be encouraged to witness them.

The electoral officer in charge of the voting station should verify that the seal on the ballot box closure is still unbroken and that the serial number is the same as the one recorded at the opening of the voting station.

The serial number of the seal put on the slot of the ballot box after the close of voting should be verified as well. No ballot box should be transported without being sealed.

Maintaining records of the serial numbers of the seals, and allowing representatives of political parties and candidates to also maintain such records, is important and useful.

Representatives of political parties and candidates may wish to put their own seals on the ballot box or simply sign, or attach their initials on, the ones used by the electoral management body.

If political party and candidate representatives put their own seals on the ballot box, there has to be early consultation to ensure that the seals they use will fit on the ballot boxes and that the ballot boxes will be able to accommodate all the seals.

Some ballot boxes are made of material that facilitates the affixation of seals or signatures, whereas others preclude such affixation. The format and design of the seals should be specified to prevent them from using their seals as advertising stickers. The required strength of the seals should be specified and enforced: if this is not done, the seals may break or fall off while in transit, causing unnecessary complaints, see .

Controls on the process of manufacturing the official seals used by the electoral management body must provide adequate guarantees that seal substitution will not be possible. In addition, the seals must be strong enough to ensure that they will not break in transit due to the stress of movement of the boxes.

It is highly recommended that proper testing be done prior to the ordering and production of large quantities. The seals should be serially numbered.

The control measures should be publicised and known in advance by all participants to the process as well as by the public to provide indications of transparency and security.

However, an element of secrecy should be maintained regarding the exact design of materials to avoid illegal reproduction or copying. For example, when publicising the use of the seals, the exact design of the logo (if any) or other specific details about the seals should not be revealed. If reproduction copies are found, it should be easy to distinguish the official seals from counterfeit ones.

If the seals arrive broken, a report should be made and signed by officials and the representatives of political parties and candidates.

Creation of Transport Logs

Whenever ballot boxes are transported from voting station to counting center, records should be kept to ensure that security is tight and that an audit trail is in place.

That way, risk can be minimised, and if anything is missing or tampering is suspected, the problem can be properly investigated.

A movement or transportation form  should be used for the specific purpose of controlling the movement of ballot boxes. Information such as the list below could be included:

• the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box and on the sealed envelopes;

• the number of sealed envelopes that should be attached to the ballot box and brief details of their content (voter's list, ballot account form, etc.);

• the name, and if applicable the number, and address of the voting station;

• name, and if applicable the number, and address of the counting centre where it should be delivered including time and date of pick-up;

• name and signature of the person who authorized the transaction;

• name of the person who will receive the ballot box;

• signatures of other voting station officers (if needed) and representatives of political parties and candidates.

Moreover, space could be provided on the form to include basic information on the driver, type of vehicle used, and license plate number. If other means of transportation are used, such as aeroplane or boat, detailed information on the schedule, departure time, and flight number could be written on the form.

If needed, details on the itinerary can also be written on the form (such as overnight stops, for example, or if any other type of stoppage is needed).

Finally, the telephone number of a dispatcher at the electoral management body or the phone number of a contact at the destination could be indicated on the form should the driver need assistance to locate the counting centre destination.

Multiple copies of these forms could be produced for the following:

• the voting station officer;

• the electoral officer in charge of reception of the ballot box at the counting centre;

• the local and national offices of the electoral management body;

• the person responsible for the ballot boxes during their transportation.

Representatives of political parties and candidates and observers should be allowed to make their own copies.

Arrangement for Transport of Ballot Boxes to the Counting Centre

Domestic Arrangements

Arrangements for transport should be negotiated and planned before the election is called. The electoral management body must ascertain that the chosen carrier has the capacity and capability to make the ballot box deliveries within required time frames while using appropriate security controls.

The selection of the transport company (public or private) or organization (national or regional or international organization, police or army or other security service) will be dictated by the political, social and economical context of each country and depend on various risk factors.

It is recommended that factors of reputation, dependability, financial strength, coverage of the territory, shipment-tracing capability, speed of delivery, and availability of contingency measures be used as evaluation criteria for selecting the carrier.

When the election is called, a contract should be in place and fully negotiated as to the details of obligation and procedure. The contract should include specific performance clauses, with an applicable penalty for partial or non-delivery. For the sake of transparency the contract should be awarded through a tender process.

If it is not possible to select a single carrier, or if the political situation requires the presence of security forces or reliable and trusted persons, considerations should be given to allow political party and candidate representatives to accompany the ballot boxes. However, the right to accompany ballot boxes must be equally open to a cross-section of the parties and candidates concerned.

To limit the number of people participating in the transportation process, prior agreements between all parties involved are encouraged to assign two persons representing different political sides in the same vehicle along with the election or if this impracticable in a separate vehicle.

Observers should be allowed to accompany the ballot boxes, but for practical reasons, they might have to follow in a separate vehicle. Security forces may be required in certain political environments.

Agreements with security forces should be made prior to the election by the electoral management body to determine the extent and level of security required.

If this is not planned properly, the requirements can impose a burden on the security forces.

The security arrangements should also be made known to the political parties and candidates. This is particularly important if there is mistrust or lack of confidence in the security forces by the population or the political parties.

International Arrangements

Transportation of ballots across national boundaries and throughout the world will require a different approach from domestic arrangements and involve very careful planning.

Time zones, customs, carrier's schedules, and other types of delays in transport may impact the starting date and hour of the counting process.(see Special Considerations for Counting Votes Cast Outside the Country)

Transport of Ballot Boxes

The ballot boxes should be transported to the counting centre in a vehicle with a closed compartment and a lock that can be sealed. All the proper information on the vehicle, the driver, the numbers of the seals used on the closed compartment, etc. should be written on a waybill and given to the driver.

This same information should be communicated to the counting centre so that it can be checked upon receipt. Such measures promote efficiency of transport and prevent fraud.

In the process of transfer from one kind of transport method to another (when using more than one type of transportation such as from a truck to a boat and then back to a truck), the driver should verify the following: that all ballot boxes were transferred; that a new seal was placed on the lock of the compartment of the new transport vehicle; and note the number of the new seal on the waybill. The driver should sign the waybill indicating that the transfer was properly done.

Persons who accompany the ballot boxes (representatives of political parties and candidates and electoral officers) should sign as well.

In areas where potential violence may compromise the safe delivery of the ballot boxes, a vehicle escorting the carrying vehicle may be appropriate. Armed forces, police, or a national or international organization may be used to provide the needed security. An election official and representatives of political parties should accompany the ballot boxes and observers can follow in another vehicle.

The ballot boxes should not be left unattended at any time unless they are locked in secure storage. To demonstrate transparency during transportation, representatives of political parties and candidates should be encouraged to accompany the ballot boxes from the voting station to the counting centre.

Prior arrangements must be made regarding who is delegated as a representative of political parties and candidates during transportation, since it will not be possible to have representatives of many political parties and candidates accompanying the ballot box transport.

Once at the counting centre, the official responsible for the reception of the ballot boxes should collect the waybill from the driver and verify all information: numbers on the seals, driver identification, etc. The same information should be verified against information previously transmitted.

The official then breaks the seal and the ballot boxes are counted and removed from the vehicle to the planned location in the counting centre. All forms attached to the ballot box and the seals are verified before putting a sticker or colored tape on the ballot box indicating that the ballot box is ready to be counted.

The waybill is completed and signed by the official responsible for the reception of the ballot box, the driver, and representatives of political parties and candidates.

Copies should be given to the driver, representatives of political parties and candidates and the original should be kept by the electoral official who receives the ballot boxes at the counting centre.

Securing Ballot Boxes During Transportation

If one or more ballot boxes from the same voting station are to be transported directly to a counting centre, it is advisable to use just one vehicle.

If possible, at least two representatives of political parties and candidates, representing different political parties could be in the same vehicle along with the election official. Observers should be allowed to accompany the ballot boxes.

Since some ballot boxes are bulky and heavy, and it is more practical to have one vehicle carry the ballot boxes of multiple voting stations to a distant counting centre, it may be necessary to use a rented vehicle with a closed compartment at the back with a lock that can be sealed.

Once the lock is sealed, the serial number of the seal along with a brief description of the content (number of ballot boxes and their respective voting station numbers) and the name of driver and passengers can then be transmitted to the final destination by fax or phone and verified on arrival. This information should also be recorded on the waybill.

A new seal should be used, and the numbers of the previous seal recorded, each time more boxes are added to a shipment. Usually, these measures will be sufficient to deter any tampering of the ballot boxes.

In areas where potential violence may compromise the safe delivery of the ballot boxes, a vehicle escorting the carrying vehicle may be appropriate. Depending of the safety of the area, military or police forces may provide the escorting vehicle(s).

Their presence may be an advantage as their vehicles generally have communication capabilities, which could be used in case of emergencies.

Transmission of transport details to the counting centre or electoral management body prior to the departure of vehicles is recommended and representatives of political parties and candidates and observers should be allowed to travel, according to previously settled arrangements, with the escorting vehicles.

The transportation of ballot boxes in the most dangerous and violent areas can be done with the assistance of military/police vehicles.

Armed vehicles equipped with radios or phones may be necessary to provide the security required. However, agreements with all political parties and candidates should be obtained prior to election day, especially in areas where the role of the military in the political process has been questioned.

To address any potential criticism, and as far as practically possible, voting station officers, political party and candidate representatives, and observers should be assigned to travel in the same armed vehicles according to arrangements negotiated in advance by the electoral management body.

If, at the destination, it is found that any ballot boxes have been tampered with or are missing, the matter should be reported directly to the electoral management body. The electoral authorities must be ready to begin an investigation, as soon as possible, and conduct interviews with the driver to recollect the sequence of events and, if necessary, confirm this with the passengers.

To facilitate the recollection of events, a log book should be provided to the driver to note all departure/arrival times and other events occurring during the transportation (fuel stops, breaks, overnight stays, etc.). At no time should a ballot box transport vehicle be left unattended.

During unavoidable stops the driver and assistant/passengers should take turns to guard the ballot boxes.

Unloading of Ballot Boxes

Once the vehicles transporting the ballot boxes arrive at the counting centre, designated officials should unload in the order of arrival.

If a queue of vehicles is forming, an attendant could distribute tickets indicating the time of arrival. This will maintain a sequential order of priority in processing the vehicles/teams, and also allow an accurate recording of the time of arrival in the receipt log.

The waybill and/or the transportation form should be collected from the driver (see Completion of Transport Logs) and verified: the driver's identification, numbers of the seals, etc.

The documentation should also be verified against information previously transmitted to the counting centre from the voting station. The seal on the vehicle should only be broken once proper verification is completed and an exact count of the number of ballot boxes to be received is known.

The ballot boxes are then unloaded, one-by-one, from the vehicle and moved to the planned destination in the counting centre. This operation should be under constant supervision from officials of the counting centre. The official responsible for reception of the ballot boxes should verify that the seals are unbroken, and that sealed envelopes are attached to the ballot boxes.

If all safeguards are in order, a sticker, coloured tape, or other type of symbolic identification could be placed on the ballot boxes as they are removed from the vehicle. This will indicate that these ballot boxes are verified and ready to be counted. This measure can also help to prevent the counting a ballot box twice, or missing a ballot box in the count.

The ballot boxes that are ready to be counted should be in a location where they will not be mixed with ballot boxes already counted.

Once all the ballot boxes are unloaded from the truck, a last verification count of the number received against the number expected via the transport logs should be done. A receipt form can be issued to the driver to verify delivery completion, and the designated officials in charge of receiving the ballot boxes should keep a copy.

If the seals on ballot boxes are broken or there is any sign of possible fraud, these ballot boxes should be set aside in a separate area, and not mixed with others. A report for each of them should be written and signed by officials, drivers, representatives of political parties and candidates , etc.

These ballot boxes should be clearly identified as not to be opened, with a label or other form of sticker, to ensure they will not be confused with ready-to-be-counted ballot boxes. Any matter of possible fraud should immediately be addressed to the electoral management body so they can start an investigation.

Until further notice from the electoral management body, these ballot boxes should be left untouched and secured.

Completion of Transport Logs

A document or other type of communication informing the counting centre of the departure of the vehicle from a voting station should be made.

This communication, whether it be through phone or fax, should provide the counting centre with the following information:

• name of driver,

• name of passengers,

• number of ballot boxes and respective voting station numbers,

• ballot box seal numbers,

• compartment seal numbers,

• departure time,

• the route that the vehicle is taking,

• type of vehicle, etc.

This document/information will be checked against actual information provided at the time of unloading the vehicle.

Quantities of ballot boxes and their voting station numbers should be carefully checked. If discrepancies are found, they should be noted on the log and the electoral management body should be informed immediately.

If ballot boxes are missing, verification should be made with the departure point to ensure that the information provided at the time of departure did not change. It is possible that a ballot box may have been routed through another vehicle.

If the vehicle transporting the ballot boxes has a separate sealed compartment, the serial numbers of the seals should be verified against the information provided prior to departure.

The driver should not break the seal unless an election official of the counting centre is present and has verified the number. All other steps mentioned above apply.

Once all the information is checked and verified, the official responsible for the receipt of the ballot box should sign the waybill and indicate the arrival and completion times and date.

The driver and representatives of political parties and candidates who accompanied the ballot boxes should also sign this waybill. Each of them should be allowed to keep a copy. If the driver cannot produce the waybill or the transportation form for the election official, special measures should be taken.

Identification of the driver and passenger(s) should be verified against the information transmitted by phone/fax or other means. The license plate and the number of the seal on the vehicle compartment should be verified as well.

If all this information is confirmed, the officials may proceed with the opening and closing of the ballot boxes. However, an entry regarding the absence of the waybill/transportation form should be made in a log book kept by the official responsible for receipt of the ballot boxes at the counting centre. In all cases, discrepancies should be promptly reported to the electoral management body.

Opening and Closing of Ballot Boxes

Before the ballot boxes are opened, a check could be made that there are only authorised persons present in the counting centre. In some instances the list of authorised persons might include members of the armed forces and media.

Once the ballot boxes are at the counting centre and ready to be counted, the counting officer will verify the seals on the ballot box and open it. The contents are emptied on a table in the presence of counting officers, representatives of political parties and candidates, observers, etc.

Sealed envelopes attached to the ballot boxes are opened and verification of the reconciliation done at the voting station is made.

The ballots on the table are counted to establish quantity. The number of ballots in the ballot box should match the number of voters who voted. This figure should be compared to the one written on the ballot account form completed at the voting station.

A last reconciliation is done once all ballots are sorted and tallied by candidate and party to verify that all totals are correct before making the official entries and completing the statement of the vote for the ballot box.

Everybody (observers and security personnel may be excluded) involved in the counting process should sign the forms to confirm that the accounting of ballots was satisfactory, or to state that they are aware of the source of the discrepancy (if any) and that they agree with the decision taken by the counting official. Once the forms are completed and the ballots bundled, the ballot box will be closed and re-sealed with all the ballots inside.

In case of discrepancies, the counting process should be repeated until the missing ballots are found, even if only one ballot is missing.

If, after verification, the missing ballots are still not found ,the electoral management body should be informed of the problem and verification of their ballot accounts should be done (especially verification of the number of ballots sent to the voting station). Keeping higher authorities informed of any problem is part of the transparency required in an election.

If no solution is found, appropriate amendments should be made on the ballot account forms (and on any form on which this information is required) and on the statement of the vote signed by the counting official and representatives of political parties and candidates. This new figure should then become the official one for the ballot box.

In some jurisdictions, counting of ballots that cannot be reconciled or that are not within a certain tolerance, (i.e. difference is not more than 2, 3 or 5 ballots, legislation, regulations, or directives may prohibit proceeding with the count. If significant discrepancies are discovered, local rules could apply to the level of action taken.

In some cases, if significant fraud is suspected, it may be necessary to delay opening and counting the contents of a ballot box until the electoral management body investigates the problem and decides what to do with the ballot box. Electoral officers and others involved should be aware of these provisions through their training.

Merging Results to Protect Secrecy

In some situations, electoral management bodies will combine, merge, or amalgamate results of several ballot boxes. This is generally done if the voting procedure makes it possible to identify every person whose vote has gone into a particular ballot box; or if the number of votes in the ballot box is so small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate or party.

In such cases, the secrecy of the vote could be compromised. Results should be combined (mixed or amalgamated) with another ballot box. This can also be done in cases where it appears that the secrecy of individual votes can be secured. There is real risk arising from the fact that a particular voting station, having voted predominantly in a particular way, could result in retribution being visited on the persons who voted at that voting station.

Mixing the ballots from two or more boxes from different areas, and then attributing all the votes to one ballot box with proper notation in the results form can mitigate these problems. The counting centre approach is appropriate for making this type of modification effective in counting procedures. For internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers per box can be made to keep the audit trail clear.

Combining (merging) results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other category of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body or in a specific counting centre, results can easily be combined (merged) with other results to protect the secrecy of the vote.

Once again, for internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers by category can be made to keep the audit trail clear.

Sorting of Ballots

General Overview

In the case of multiple ballot elections (for example, presidential, national legislature, and municipal elections on the same day) an order of priority for counting these ballots should be given to avoid mistakes and confusion in the counting process.

This should be part of the rules given to the counting officers during the training sessions and in the documentation of operational procedures for counting. Instructions should also be given for procedures to be used in cases where ballots are found in the wrong box.

Only one person should handle the initial sorting of ballots from a ballot box, usually the counting official in charge of that ballot box. Spoiled ballots should already have been separated and sealed in an envelope attached to the ballot box. A spoiled ballot is simply one that a voter marks incorrectly and hands back to voting station officers in exchange for a new ballot.

Spoiled ballots should never be found in the ballot box.

Once the ballot box is open, the counting officer or representative of political parties and candidates verifies the validity of each ballot in the process of counting. The counting officer must be able to distinguish between a valid ballot and a counterfeit one by the watermark or any other mark made to identify valid ballot papers. Any counterfeit ballots identified should be set aside, counted and reported to the electoral management body as an attempt at fraud.

The counting official will divide all ballots by candidates and political party as they are counted. At the same time, he/she can determine all potentially rejected ballots and sets them aside. After the count of valid ballots is complete, the counting officer must go through the pile, of potential rejected ballots and decide on the validity of each one.

Potential rejected ballots, which are determined by the counting officer to actually be valid, are separated by candidate and party. All invalid ballots, as well as any counterfeit ballots, are counted and set aside. The counting officer will then add to the initial number of valid ballots for each candidate and political party the additional valid ballots, and make a total count for each candidate and political party.

Rules of interpretation, guidelines, and illustrations regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting officer, and be known in advance to facilitate the decision making process. In all cases, rejected ballots should be put aside and kept. No ballots are to be destroyed at this stage.

The separation of rejected ballots is important to create an audit trail of the count and is an essential component if there is to be a recount of the ballots.   Rejected ballots must be closely examined and the counting official should announce the reason for rejection of each such ballot.

Political party or candidate representatives should be able to examine the rejected ballots. If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting official, they should be able to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. Clear rules must exist for recording objections made by representatives of political parties or candidates.

Once the spoiled, counterfeit (if any), and rejected ballots have been separated, the valid ballots can be counted. The representatives of political parties/candidates/ options, and other persons allowed in the counting centre for the counting, should be able to make their own count.

The various representatives and observers witnessing the count must also be able to see each ballot that is counted. For more efficiency, other counting officer could assist the counting official. It must, however, be very clear who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of any ballot in question.

Checking Validity of the Ballot

When ballots are sorted the counting officer must distinguish valid ballots from counterfeits. Each ballot in the ballot box needs to be verified. In some jurisdictions, security paper is often used for ballots.

This paper contains a watermark or other form of unique identification (special colour, lines, symbols, or logos) making the ballot virtually impossible to counterfeit. The texture, thickness, colours, size, and format of the ballot are also indicators that will differentiate a valid ballot from a counterfeit.

The counting officer should know where to look on the ballot to be sure of its authenticity. If he/she doesn't recognise the ballot or the ballot was not issued at the voting station, it should not be included in the count and should be put aside.

To speed up the process of authenticating the ballots, certain jurisdictions require that the voting station offcer append their initials in a provided space at the back of the ballot before handing it to the voter.

If the initials at the back of the ballot are not from the voting station officer or are missing, then it should be set aside and not counted as a valid ballot. These initials should appear on the ballot account form, transportation form, the seals, or voting record book. If no initials are on the back of the ballot, the ballot should not be counted as valid.

This measure of appending a voting station officer’s initial at the back of the ballot can help to identify valid ballots from counterfeit ones, but the official's initial should always be identical to protect the voter's secrecy of the vote. The voting station officer should always use the same colour of pen or pencil to append his/her initials.

In all cases, all ballots are kept, even if they are not valid. No ballots should be destroyed (at this stage of the process, see Challenging Results for more details on how long ballots should be kept) as an audit trail of all ballots considered must be assembled so that the count can be fully reconstructed.

If there is any doubt, and before taking the decision to reject a ballot as counterfeit, the counting officer should be able to verify the basis of his decision with the supervisor of the counting centre and/or with the electoral management body. Rejecting a ballot on the basis that it is counterfeit is an important decision and should be done when there is certainty.

Separating Spoiled and Rejected Ballots

Separating rejected ballots from spoiled ballots is important since the significance of these ballots is very different. Mixing them may seriously impact the audit trail.

Spoiled ballots should never end up in the ballot box and should be secured in a sealed envelope attached to the ballot box. A spoiled ballot is generally one that a voter has inadvertently spoiled by marking it incorrectly; it is handed back to the voting station officer in exchange for a new blank ballot that is then marked by the voter and placed in the ballot box.

A spoiled ballot may also be one that is improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote secrecy.

A rejected ballot is one that has made its way into the ballot box but has been rejected because it was improperly marked, or was not marked at all when a mark was required. The most common criteria to reject a ballot are:

• ballot with no mark;

• ballot with mark for more than one candidate or political party when only one was supposed to be chosen;

• ballot marked with a type of pen or pencil other than the one provided at the polling station;

• unofficial mark according to the law;

• unusual marks;

• ballot marked so the voter could be identified; or

• ballot marked in a location prohibited by legislation (outside the circle, etc.).

In some jurisdictions, blank ballots (ballots with no marks) are counted separately (and may be considered as protest votes); in others, they are considered to be rejected ballots. In all cases, all ballots are to be kept and none should be destroyed at this stage of the electoral process.

In countries using envelopes, since no marks are made on the ballot itself, the identification of a rejected ballot from a valid ballot is different. For example, a rejected ballot will be an envelope in which there will be two ballots; an empty envelope; a ballot in an envelope marked in a way that the secrecy of the voter is compromised,etc.

In many jurisdictions, if the intention of the voter is clear, all types of marks can be accepted. In others, the legislation is very clear on which specific types of marks are to be accepted, even on a write-in ballot

For these specific cases, those marks should be clearly demonstrated during the training of counting officials and documented in their manual or in the operational guideline to help the counting official in making his decision.

A card summarising the marks to be accepted or rejected, with pictures of sample ballots showing those marks, is a very useful tool that can be inserted in the counting officials' training kit.

Separating Valid Ballots

One way to separate valid ballots is to unfold all ballots, one by one.

The counting officer makes sure that the ballot is valid (see Separating Spoiled/Rejected Ballots for a discussion about spoiled and rejected ballots).

The counting officer may call out the name of the candidate or political party for whom the ballot has been marked and hold up the ballot for all to see. If several persons are involved with separating and counting the ballots and identifying those that are potentially to be rejected, the practice of calling out names may not be useful.

It may be more efficient to separate the ballots according to choice (without counting them), setting aside those potentially to be rejected, and then establish which ballots are actually to be rejected. After the rejections are finalised, the piles of valid ballots for each candidate or party can be quickly counted.

In all cases, only counting officers should handle ballots and it must be made very clear that the counting official is the only person entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot.

The advantage of showing the ballot and calling out the result of each ballot considered is that it allows the representatives of political party and candidates and observers to make their own count. The disadvantage is that the process is interrupted each time a rejected ballot is discovered; this tends to make the count of valid ballots very inefficient. It can also create a very noisy environment and it could confuse counting officers working at another table.

Whichever method is used, the valid ballot papers are put in separate piles on the table; one pile per candidate, political parties, or option (in the latter case for a referendum).

The examination of the ballot should allow observers, representatives of political parties and candidates to see the ballot and ensure that it is appropriately separated according to choice. They should have controlled access to contest the validity of sorted ballots.

If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting officers, official objections can be made.

While transparency of the process is important, controls on movement of ballots should always be the first concern of the counting officer.

Counting

Summary of the Process

To facilitate the process of counting, ballots can be bundled by groups of ten, for example, to facilitate keeping a count of the votes counted. It is desirable for every bundle of ballots to be counted at least twice, with one officer checking the work of the other official.

For example, depending on the number of political parties or candidates and also on the number of counting officers, each counting officer can be responsible for receiving and counting all ballots cast for one or more political parties or candidates. Later the counting officers can exchange all ballots cast that they are counting for ballots counted by another counting officer and verify each other's totals.

All ballots are counted, including spoiled, rejected, and unused ballots. Even if not counted as valid, these ballots are important for the audit trail and will be needed in case of a recount.

To eliminate possible objections over the validity of ballots, the counting officer should be provided with clear rules of interpretation of accepted marks on the ballot and all reasons that should lead to rejection of a ballot.

Minimising the interpretation that is needed by the counting officer makes it easier for him to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots.

If the validity of a ballot is objected to or challenged, the counting officer should be the only person able to make a decision, even if other counting workers are involved in the counting process. To be more consistent in his decisions, the counting officer can put all questionable ballots in one separate pile, decide on all rejected ballots following the count of valid ones and then add any additional valid votes to the appropriate candidate or political party.

Alternatively, the ballots can be first separated, the questionable ones decided, and then each pile can be counted.

Each disputed ballot should be numbered on the back. The same number should be written on the statement of the vote (or other form, as prescribed) for each ballot box along with the decision made by the counting officer.

To count the ballots, a count sheet is often used by the counting officer. The representatives of political parties and candidates and observers may have a count sheet as well. The official one is the one used by the counting officer in charge of the count for a particular ballot box.

The count sheet is a tool used to facilitate the count. For each vote for each candidate or party, a mark is made on the count sheet. Periodically, the marks for each political party or candidate are added together.

If a mistake is made during the process, comparison with the count sheets of other counting workers can be made. If the mistake is still not found, the count should be restarted from the last point of agreement.

A verification of the count should be done once the ballots are counted. This verification is usually the last one made. It is important to make sure that no votes were changed during the count in favour or against one candidate or party. It should include a comparison to the previous reconciliation (the one done at the voting station and the one done once the ballot box was opened).

The total number of ballots cast for each candidate or party plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. This information should be duly noted on the ballot account form completed at the voting station. If it doesn't, any discrepancies should be investigated by the counting officer. Discrepancies may be a reflection of mistakes made at an earlier stage.

Once the counting process is over, the ballots are bundled and put back into the ballot box along with all relevant forms. A copy of the statement of the vote should be in a separate envelope, on the outside of the ballot box. Both the envelope and the ballot box should be sealed before being transferred to the planned location in the counting centre for the counted ballot boxes.

In the event of a recount, all these documents are needed. This explains why elaborate precautions about sealing the ballot box contents are important. For more safety, the seal could even be signed by the counting officer and the party and candidate representative. The counting officer should keep one official copy in case of loss.

Count of Spoiled and Rejected Ballots

Spoiled ballots, rejected, and unused ballots must be counted to create a complete audit trail. Spoiled and unused ballots were supposed to be counted at the voting station, before the ballot box was transported to the counting centre.

These ballots remain official documents even if not counted as valid. Additionally, rejected ballots are essential in case of a recount.

Rules of Interpretation for Rejected Ballots

This is one of the most challenging aspects of vote counting, as each counting officer brings his/her subjective decision making abilities to the task, irrespective of how effective their training was.

In an attempt to eliminate possible objections to the validity of a ballot, the counting officer should be provided with clear rules of interpretation and given illustrations of acceptable and unacceptable marks on the ballot, including the rationale for any rejection of a ballot.

Minimizing the interpretation that is needed by the counting officer makes it easier for him/her to take the necessary decisions and will reduce disputes over the validity of ballots. In the event of a close margin in favor of one candidate or party, a recount is likely to be asked for and rejected ballots will be carefully analyzed.

Handling Disputes Regarding Rejections

In several jurisdictions, the counting officer is the only person qualified to make the final decision on the validity of a ballot. He is also the person handling disputes regarding objections.

If a representative of a candidate or political party doesn't agree with the counting official on the validity of a ballot, he may object to the decision. In most cases, the counting officer has to immediately make a decision on whether or not the ballot is valid. To be more consistent in his/her decisions, the counting officer may put all questionable and contested ballots in a separate pile while counting valid ballots.

He/she can then decide which of the potential rejected ballots will actually be rejected, and count the total number of rejections. Remaining valid ballots then be added to the count for each political party or candidate.

Alternatively, all potential rejected ballots can be pre-identified, decided on, and counted first, and then valid ballots can be counted subsequently.

For each objected ballot, the ballot will be numbered on the back. The same number will be written on the statement of the vote (the voting record book or a separate form can also be used) for each ballot box along with the decision made by the counting officer.

All rejected and spoiled ballots are counted and recorded in the statement of the votes for each ballot box as well as on the ballot account form.

Count of Valid Ballots

To count the ballots, the counting officer can use a count sheet. The representatives of political parties and candidates and observers may have a count sheet as well. The official one is the one used by the counting officer.

The proper information regarding the ballot box number and the constituency or electoral district should be written in at the top or bottom of the form. In each column, the names of each candidate or party as they appear on the ballot should be written.

There are two usual types of count sheet: one where each square represents a vote for a candidate or party and one where square is drawn with a diagonal mark denoting five votes

For the first one, each square may be marked for each vote for a candidate or party. At the end, the total for each will be easy to count. For the second, four vertical marks and one diagonal one are made. Each completed square equals five votes for a candidate or party.

Establishing correlation between count sheets requires a pause for consensus as to how many votes are recorded per candidate or party at certain set times (every 100 ballots for example).

Restarting the count at the last point of correlation is much more efficient than beginning the entire count.

Verification of Count

Reconciling to Ballot Account Totals

It is recommended that a verification of the count should be done once the ballots of one ballot box are counted.

This verification is usually the last one made before preparing the statement of the vote for the ballot box and transmitting the information to the person in charge of making the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre.

This last verification is important to make sure that no ballots have been introduced or removed that would modify the results in favour or against one candidate or party.

This last verification includes comparison of the reconciliation done previously, both before opening the ballot box and when the ballot box was opened.

The total of ballots for each candidate or party plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. This information was provided on the ballot account form completed at the voting station.

If errors are detected, the count sheet should be verified against count sheets of other counting officers working at the same table on the same ballot box. If the error is still not found, then all the ballots counted per candidate/party/option should be reexamined and recounted.

Sealing of Ballot

To ensure the safety of its contents, the ballot boxes should be resealed, with all the ballots inside, before returning the boxes to the planned location for ballot boxes already counted. This is very important in case of a recount.

In certain jurisdictions, all forms such as count sheets, the voting record book, and the voter's list are also put into the ballot box along with the ballots before sealing. The ballot box's statement of the vote should not be added to the other documents, but put in a separate envelope and attached to the outside of the ballot box.

However, this envelope should itself be sealed to make sure that no unauthorised person has access to the results and any attempted changes can be detected by higher authorities. A copy of the statement of the vote should already have been transmitted to the person in charge of combining the results for the counting centre.

Ballots are placed in bundles, by category (candidates, parties, rejected ballots, spoiled ballots, unused ballots, etc.) in the ballot box.

Once all the ballots and relevant forms are in the box, the box may be sealed and transferred to the planned location in the counting centre for ballot boxes already counted. The seal number should be written on the statement of the vote and attached, in a sealed envelope, to the ballot box.

Even if all the envelopes or plastic bags are sealed, it is still important to reseal the ballot box. In the event of a recount, all these documents are needed; thus the elaborate precautions for sealing the ballot box contents.

If a paper seal is used, for additional security, some jurisdictions require that the counting officers as well as representatives of political parties and candidates sign the ballot box seal.

Transmitting Counting Centre Results

Summary of Process

Once the counting process is over, the counting officer prepares the statement of the vote for each ballot box. Progress reports for each counting centre will also be sent to the national office of the electoral management body.

The electoral management body releases the results as they come in. A cumulative statement of the vote will also be prepared for the counting centre.

Statement of the Vote for Each Ballot Box

This form indicates the results of election day and should include standard information such as the name, and if applicable, the number of the electoral district, the number of the ballot box and date.

Specific information on the count should include:

• number of ballots received at the opening of voting from the electoral management body;

• number of spoiled ballots;

• number of unused ballots; and

• total number of voters who voted on election day.

This information should correspond to the ballot account form completed at the voting station. Then, the number of valid ballots for each candidate and political party, number of rejected ballots and total number of valid ballots should be recorded.

The counting officer signs the form, as does the representatives of political parties and candidates.

Along with their signatures, the following information could be found: printed names, addresses, and telephone numbers. If there are later investigations, it will be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them. Some jurisdictions require all counting officers present at the counting table to sign the statement of the vote.

A transcribed copy, carbon copy, or a photocopy of the statement of the vote for the ballot box is given to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre. Representatives of political parties and candidates are allowed to make their own copies of the statements of the vote by transcribing the contents.

Any observers should also have access to make a copy of the results or transcribe them. The original is attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope.

Progress Reports

Once all the ballot boxes for an electoral district are counted, these results should sent directly to the central office of the electoral management body. The purpose of these reports is to allow the electoral management body to release results as they are ready. The same information is needed for the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre is used.

Cumulative Statement of the Vote for Counting Centre

Once the vote statement form for a ballot box has been completed, a copy should be transmitted to the person in charge of combining results and creating a cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre. The same information is needed from each ballot box that is added into the cumulative statement.

The person in charge of combining results will transmit the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre to the national office of the electoral management body as soon as it is completed to allow the national office to gather the national results as soon as possible. The transmission can be done by telephone, cellular phone, modem or fax, using a unique security code to ensure the proper identification of the person transmitting the results.

It is recognised that in rural and remote parts of some countries the communications infrastructure does not permit oral or electronic reporting of voting results. In such locations, an election officer should hand deliver the cumulative statement of the vote to the national office.

After the results have been reported orally or electronically, the original of the cumulative statement of the votes for the counting centre should be transmitted to the national office of the electoral management body by hand or by courier in a sealed envelope. This measure is essential to prevent fraud and to provide evidence of any tampering with results.

A carbon copy or a photocopy of the statement of the vote for each ballot box; the cumulative statement for the counting centre; as well as periodic progress reports; are given to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre. Another copy is posted at the counting centre.

Any observers and representatives of political parties and candidates, are allowed to make their own copy of the results by transcribing the information.

As the print and electronic media are considered a key element in a free and democratic society, it is recommended that they be given access to the results at either the counting centre or at the national offices of the electoral management body where results are being reported.

Some jurisdictions make special provision for the media at the counting centres, facilitating live electronic broadcasts. This is especially important if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question and to ensure transparency of the work of the electoral management body, during the counting process.

To control who is allowed at the counting centre or at the electoral management body offices, proper accreditation must be given by the electoral management body. The media representatives on site should wear accreditation identification.

Progress Reports; Cumulative Statement of Votes

Statement of the Vote for a Ballot Box

The statement of the vote is a form on which results are written. The counting official completes this form for each ballot box counted at the counting centre.

On the statement of the vote for each ballot box the following general information could be found:

• name, and if applicable the number, of the electoral district;

• number of the ballot box;

• name, and if applicable the number, of the voting station;

• whether the contents of several ballot boxes were added (or merged) to this ballot box;

• date;

• signature of the counting officer.

Representatives of political parties and candidates present at the counting table should also append their signatures on the form.

Along with their signatures, the following information should be found: printed names, addresses and telephone numbers. In case of any investigations or complaints it will then be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them.

Specific information on the count should include:

• information found on the ballot account form completed at the voting;

• number of ballots received at the opening of the election from the electoral management body;

• number of spoiled ballots;

• number of unused ballots;

• the total number of voters who cast their vote on election day according to the voter's list.

The following information should be added:

• number of valid ballots for each candidate;

• political party or candidate;

• number of rejected ballots;

• number of total valid ballots.

Additional detailed information - such as the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box or numbers of the ballot box itself - is required to appear on the statement in some jurisdictions.

This form is an important document since it provides the information used by the electoral management body to release the results. The counting officer responsible for the processing of the ballot box and contents should complete this form with utmost care.

Progress Report

Once all the ballot boxes for an electoral district are counted, the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre should prepare a progress report to be sent to the electoral management body.

The progress report should contain the same information as the statement of the vote for each ballot box, or consist of a summary for the entire electoral district.

Cumulative Statement of the Vote for a Counting Centre

Once the statement of the vote for a ballot box is completed, a copy is given to the person responsible for combining the results for the counting centre. Each statement of the vote for each ballot box counted in the counting centre is included on this cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre. The same general information is needed:

• name, and number, of the electoral district;

• date;

• signature of the person in charge of the cumulative statement of the vote;

• signatures of representatives of political parties and candidates present.

The figure for each ballot box is reproduced on the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre. Specific information could include the number of the ballot box and the total number of valid ballots for each candidate/political party/option; total number of rejected ballots; total number of spoiled ballots; total number of valid ballots for each ballot box. The total for each column is added, creating the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre.

Issuing the Statement of Votes

The statement of the vote for each ballot box, the progress reports and cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre should be prepared with care since it represents the final results of the election for a counting centre, unless subject to a recount.

Statement of the Vote for Each Ballot Box

The statement of the vote for each ballot box is usually prepared and signed by the counting officer.

Representatives of political parties and candidates present at the counting table should then sign the form. Their signature is very important as it reflects and demonstrates that they agree and acknowledge the results.

The printed name, address, and telephone number, if any, could also be on the form along with the signature of voting station officials and representatives of political parties and candidates. In case of any future complaint or investigation, the electoral management body will then more easily be able to contact these persons.

Concerning principle of transparency, it is strongly recommended that the observers as well as political party and candidate representatives each be able to transcribe the contents or obtain a copy of the statement of the votes.

Statement of the Vote for the Counting Centre

The progress report and the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre should be completed by the person responsible for combining the results for the counting centre. The statement for the counting centre should be signed by representatives of political parties and candidates.

Information contained on this form should also be made available to them, and to any observers present, to transcribe, or a copy of the actual form should be provided.

Communicating Results to National Level

Once the statement of the vote for each ballot box is completed, the counting officer should give a copy of the results to the person responsible for combining the results at the counting centre.

For greater transparency, periodic progress reports should be sent to the central office of the electoral management body. These progress reports should be sent by the electoral district officer and will enable the electoral management body to release results as they come in.

Once all ballot boxes in a counting centre have been counted, a cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre needs to be transmitted to the national office of the electoral management body.

Communication of the Results

The progress report and cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre should be transmitted to the office of the national electoral management body by phone (cellular or fixed line), by fax, or other electronic means.

For security reasons, a unique password or code should be provided to the person who will transmit the results. The electoral management body should issue this password or code on the day of the election itself. This code will reduce the possibility of impersonation, which will screen out unauthorised persons from transmitting incorrect or biased election results to the national office of the electoral management body.

If a fax machine is available at the counting centre, it should be used to send progress reports and the cumulative statement of votes to the electoral management body. Specific measures should be taken to control access to the fax machine and number to reduce the risk of any transmissions of unofficial results. These control measures should also be in place at the receiving end to ensure that the reports and cumulative statement of results are not tampered with.

In all cases, progress reports and the cumulative statement of the vote for each counting centre sent by fax should be signed by the person in charge of combining the results for the counting centre and by representatives of political parties and candidates present.

For more security, and to detect any attempts at fraud, the original cumulative statement of the vote form should be sent separately to the central office of the electoral management body in a sealed envelope. This envelope should be sent by hand or by courier.

By sending the original, the electoral management body can verify the results against the one previously sent by telephone or electronically and ensure they are the same.

Alternative Methods for Communicating to the Electoral Management Body

If cellular or fixed line phones are unavailable at a counting centre, alternative methods should be considered. Walkie-talkie or radio emitting devices do not require the installation of a phone line and are flexible and simple in their use.

However, their deployment should take into consideration the topography of the area to identify in advance any blackout regions where it is impossible to receive or transmit messages.

Again, appropriate training and identification codes should be provided to counting centre workers before deployment.

If it is not possible to use any means of wireless communication, the last resort is hand-to-hand delivery by election officials of the results to the electoral management body. If this is not possible the last alternative is to designate a messenger, who should be a credible, authorised person.

The choice of such person should be accepted by counting officers as well as representatives of the political parties and candidates.

Role of Print/Electronic Media

The media will likely compete to provide their forecast of the election results as quickly as possible after the counting process begins.

The counting centres are most likely locations for the media to base their reporting activities. Since the print or electronic media is considered a key element in a free and democratic society, it is recommended that they be given controlled access to counting centres, especially if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question.

To keep control of who is allowed at the counting centre, proper accreditation should be given in advance by the electoral management body and media representatives should wear corresponding identification.

It is important that the disruption of counting activities is minimised.

Should the media decide to station their representatives at the national office of the electoral management body offices or at the counting centres, specific physical areas should be set aside to accommodate them.

If they require specific installations such as telephones or fax lines, they should make their needs known well before election day and appropriate cost sharing arrangements and payments should be made in advance.

Usually, media should be allowed to have access to the same results provided by the electoral management body to representatives of political parties and candidates.

Route of Statement of the Vote for Each Ballot Box

Copies of the statement of the vote for each ballot box should be provided to the counting officer, to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre, and one should be in a sealed envelope attached to the ballot box.

Representatives of political parties and candidates present at the counting table, and observers should be allowed to make copies. Such copies can be made from a multi-part carbon copy form, or through the use of photocopy machine. Alternatively, multiple copies can be prepared by hand.

The original copy of the statement of the vote for a ballot box should be attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope. This is particularly important for the processing of a recount of the ballots, should it be required.

Route of Statement of Votes for Counting Centre

Copies of the voting results should be provided to the electoral management body (often the original sent in a sealed envelope), to the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre, and one posted outside the counting centre.

The representatives of political parties and candidates present, and observers, should be permitted to make their own copies by transcribing the information.

Once the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre is fully prepared and transmitted to the national office of the electoral management body, a copy can be posted at the outside of the counting centre. This way, the same information and results are made available for everybody, and at the same time. Because witnesses are permitted to observe and scrutinise the counting process, results are public. The statement of the vote becomes a public document that is made evident once it is posted.

Consolidating Voting Results

Summary of Process

At the national level, logistics should be carefully planned for receiving results from several counting centres at the same time.

Some suggestions to improve the efficiency of the process are discussed below. These suggestions might need to be modified depending on the country's infrastructure, or depending on other factors that might affect the implementation of these suggestions.

For greatest efficiency, one general phone number or fax number should be given to people transmitting the results to the national office of the electoral management body. Most telephone and fax systems now allow for calls to a single number to automatically search for the next available phone/fax unit on that line. For example, one team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit the information to the data entry person or person in charge of gathering the results.

A wall chart, chalkboard chart or spreadsheet listing for each electoral district should be prepared and then completed as the results come in. Once all the information for each counting centre is received, the combined results for the country should be finalised.

If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election). The required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when they are needed to compile the national results.

Special ballots, write-in votes, mail votes as well as ballots cast in ordinary elections, advance elections, and mobile voting stations should be part of the count and should be released as soon as possible.

Depending on the amount of delay that is acceptable, special ballots can be counted a few days prior to election day or after the close of voting on election day. If the later is the case, then the counting procedures should be designed carefully so it will not delay releasing the final results. 

For the special votes (mail and write-in votes), envelopes received at the head office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. If different colours of envelopes are used, it will facilitate the sorting by category.

For mail votes three envelopes are originally sent to the voter: a return mailing envelope containing an outer envelope (on which may appear the bar code and signature of the voter) and a secrecy envelope containing the ballot.

After verification of proper registration and no previous voting having taken place, and the creation of the audit trail, the secrecy envelope is put into a ballot box with its ballot still contained.

If the special ballots are counted a few days prior to election day, the results should be kept highly secure and only released at the close of voting on election day.

These special ballots can be used for absentee voting if no mechanism is in place for voting outside the country, in embassies for example 

For the counting process, the same rules for vote counting in the country should be followed. 

If advance elections take place over several days, reconciliation can be done at the end of each day, but the ballot choices are not counted. This reconciliation measure is for creating an audit trail of ballot usage.

The advance voting ballot boxes are then kept safely until election day and counting should take place at the closing time of the ordinary election.

The counting of advance votes should be done in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates and observers. The counting procedures are nearly identical to those used for ordinary elections.

For counting the votes of incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance voting may be applied but, of course, this will only be possible if voting by incarcerated voters takes place prior to election day.

Use of Technology

The use of phones and faxes are common for transmission of electoral results. To ensure the identity of the person transmitting results via phone or fax, an identification number or code should be given to them.

This method is a simple and efficient way to avoid unauthorised people calling in and providing false results.

Transmission of results by modem and computer can also be used. Once again, safeguards and passwords must be built into restricting the transmission of results to authorised persons who are permitted access to the system.

For all types of transmission, systems must be tested prior to election day to verify their capacity under the heavy use they will encounter on election night. A specialist should also be available at any time in case of failure of the systems. A contingency back-up system should also be created, tested and fully available.

Receiving Results from Counting Centres

Receiving Results from Several Counting Centres

The national office of the electoral management body receives the results directly from the counting centres.

The person responsible for combining results from the counting centres will directly transmit the progress reports for each electoral district and the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre directly to the national office of the electoral management body. For greatest efficiency, one general phone number or fax number should be used.

It is important, however, that the phone and fax system be installed in such a way that the calls go to the next available device on that line. Adequate numbers of phones or fax machines to cope with peak demands should be installed.

A list of the identification codes or passwords associated with the various counting centres could be provided to the staff receiving the results.

One team could take care of the incoming results and transmit information to the data entry person or the person in charge of combining all the results for the country. A spreadsheet or a board listing each electoral district should be prepared and completed as the results are received.

Representatives of political parties and candidates/ as well as media should have access to this spreadsheet or board so they can observe the results as they come in. Special measures should be taken to ensure that the same results are not given more than once.

Numbering or creating unique codes for the electoral districts is a simple way to avoid such confusion. However, if such a measure is taken, it should be done at the beginning of the election process and this number should be used consistently on all forms used for the counting process. The use of such a number or code will also create an audit trail.

If a country is divided into several time zones the results will come in at different times of the day to the national level (depending on the closing hour of the counting centres). The staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when needed.

In case of an emergency, the head office of the electoral management body should have a consistent line of communication will all their counting centres, especially when results are coming in.

If needed, a direct phone line can be set up within each counting centre so that the national electoral management body will be able to reach the person in charge of combining the results at anytime.

Special Ballot Counts,Mobile and Advance Voting Counts

Special ballots are usually returned to the head office of the electoral management body where a special counting centre is established. These results will then be reported to the central collection point separately, as in all other counting centres.

Depending on the rules of the system used and the logistics in place, the ballots returned by mail might be accepted only five days prior to election day or right up until election day itself. If special ballots are accepted right until election day, counting procedures should be designed so the publication of results will not be delayed.

Depending on the deadline given to return the special ballots, the counting may start before election day, at the beginning of election day, or at the close of voting on election day. However, counting these ballots may take a long time depending on the volume of ballots to process and the procedures used.

Counting special ballots before election day is common and generally recommended, but special security is necessary to ensure the results are released along with the results of ordinary elections.

The ballot boxes for advance voting are safely kept at the counting centre until the closing of ordinary voting on election day. The counting process for these ballots starts at the same time as for the ordinary voting and are virtually identical to the ones used for counting the votes of ordinary votes.

The counting of votes from mobile voting stations may take place at the counting centre and ballots are counted as any other ballots. These ballots should not be counted until the regular closing time of voting on election day.

For all cases - advance votes, special votes, mobile voting stations, etc. - if the count takes place a few days prior to election day, representatives of political parties and candidates should be present for the counting.

For the purposes of creating separate audit trails and for properly reporting the results of advance voting, mobile voting stations, and special votes, these unique voting procedures should not be confused with ordinary elections. The difference should be made very clear with a distinctive statement of the vote forms used for these types of ballots.

Creating an Audit Trail

Once the count for each ballot box is over and the ballot box is sealed, all the ballot boxes will be transferred to the planned storage location for ballot boxes that have been counted.

This storage space should be secure. Ballot boxes will be kept at this place until final results are known and accepted by all participants. In the case of a recount, the electoral management body will send instructions to the counting centre about what to do with the ballot boxes that will need to be recounted. Until then, all ballot boxes stay in the counting centre.

A spreadsheet, with all the ballot box numbers, should be used to control the storage of all ballot boxes. The supervisor responsible for the ballot boxes (once they are counted) should verify that the seals are properly attached and that the statement of the vote is attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope.

A sticker or other form of identification should then be put on the ballot box to indicate that the control check was done and the ballot box is ready for storage.

The supervisor should append his initials or signature to both the spreadsheet and identification sticker indicating that the control measure has been taken.

Ability to Subsequently Check Results Received

Ability to subsequently check the results received against separate documentation is essential to avoid mistakes, and to prevent fraudulent manipulation of electoral results.

A copy of the cumulative statement of the vote of each counting centre should be sent separately to the national office of the electoral management body, in a sealed envelope, and a comparison with first results received should be done once the original is received.

If serious fears of fraud exist, a special paper can be used for the cumulative statement of the votes for each counting centre. This dark coloured paper (dark blue for example) immediately shows if the initial inscription is modified.

The colour around the modified area will fade. A pencil should be used for this type of paper. If alterations appear on the paper, then special attention can be given to that specific counting centre and the results should be checked carefully.

If the person simply made a mistake in completing the form at the counting centre, then he should append his initials or signature, as well as all representatives of political parties and candidates to denote agreement with the correction.

Tallying Results Per Party or Candidate

Results should be counted according to candidate or party for each ballot box and each electoral district. The national electoral management body will then count the total national results per political party or candidate and indicate this to be the final result.

In all cases, a double counting procedure should be used, even if it is computerised, before the results are publicly posted.

After each five to ten ballot boxes for example, a comparison should be done between the two persons responsible for the counts.

If results do not match, the previous few addition figures can easily be verified and corrected.

If a computerised system is used, it is recommended that two persons should enter the same data on separate computer workstations.

The computer systems can be programmed to immediately indicate when and where entries do not match for a specific electoral district. This makes the process of verification much simpler.

Publicising Results

Special security measures should be taken by the electoral management body to avoid fraud during the process of releasing results.

Only authorised persons should have access to the combined results (prior to public release) and modifications to these results should only be done with proper authorisation.

These measures should be in place both at the counting centres and at the national office of the electoral management body.

Access to the area where the results are being prepared should be limited.

The computerised systems used, if any, for combining the results should have safeguards such as passwords, etc. No one other than authorised persons should be able to access the computerised systems and change results. These persons should be carefully selected and identified in advance, and they should be required to sign a contract with a confidentiality clause.

Police, armed forces personnel, or private security officers should be available on request by the electoral management body and its electoral officials.

An electoral management body security contact person should be identified prior to voting day and should have all specific information needed if the assistance of security forces is required.

All counting participants, at the national level or at the counting centre, should wear proper identification to avoid any confusion.

Identifying badges or cards should be given to the staff of the electoral management body, the representatives of political parties and candidates, observers, the media,visiting dignatories etc. If practical, armed forces personnel may be present in the counting centre and should, as well, be required to wear proper identification.

Providing the Official Results

The electoral management body should include all type of ballots; mail votes (absentee votes and other special votes); advance votes; mobile voting stations; etc. before providing official results. If such ballots are received and counted a few days prior to election day, then the figures can easily be included in the results.

However, if such ballots are accepted by the electoral management body until the close of voting on election day, then the counting procedures for these ballots should be carefully designed so they will not hold up the process of releasing results within a few days after election day.

If special votes are counted a few days prior to election day, these results should be kept secure and access to them should be prohibited until the close of voting on election day. Often these ballots will represent a good statistical indicator of the final outcome of the election. If, by mistake, such results are released before the appropriate time, it could seriously influence either the election outcome or the turnout.

The official results should be released as soon as possible.

One to five days is considered a reasonable amount of time to release these results, but emphasis should be placed on preparing the results as quickly as possible. The national electoral management body can make the periodic progress report on the results available to the public as they come in.

In many jurisdictions it is considered to be more appropriate that the preliminary indications of the vote be released and announced by the media or non-governmental organizations. However, in the interests of demonstrating transparency, the electoral management body should make the results publicly available as they come in.

The electoral management body should consider the impact of multiple time zones on releasing results. If results are released in one part of the country while the voting stations are still open in other parts of the country in different time zones, it could create confusion or apathy among voters.

"Staggered" voting hours may be used to prevent this kind of situation. However, given the time required to transport ballot boxes to counting centres, this is not generally a problem. The counting can also be delayed if the hours of voting cannot be changed.

Once all results are received from each counting centre, they should be compiled for publication in the national official results for an election or referendum. Such results can also be compiled by region, by province, by political party, or as global national results.

A summary of the final results should be announced as soon as possible by the electoral management body and published in a report.

The electoral management body should be the only organization announcing and releasing the final, official results unless judicial structures have a role in certifying the results. In most cases it should be made clear that the only official source for any results is the electoral management body.

The Role of the Courts

In some countries, the judiciary is only involved in the electoral process after the election when it comes time to take to court offenders of the electoral law or when a judicial recount is needed.

In other jurisdictions, the courts may have a significant role to play in confirming the results of the election; the results only become official once the courts has confirmed them. Such confirmation should be done as soon as possible in order to avoid political instability and potential delays associated with a transition from a former government to the one elected.

In some jurisdictions the court may also be directly involved in the count with the electoral management body. This will generally be the case if final approval of the count must come from a judicial structure.

Publishing the Detailed Results

After the final results are released many jurisdictions require that detailed voting results be published in the official gazette of the government or another official publication.

Legally, they should be presented to the legislature, agency, department, or the administrative entity that the electoral management body reports to. A courtesy copy of the published report can be sent to the different political leaders who ran for the election and to all elected candidates.

Publishing this detailed report of the election may take several months of preparation and production. Due to financial constrains, in some countries candidates and all other persons, parties, or organization will buy their own copies of the results from the publisher.

Once the final results are known and publicised, the new government should be sworn in as soon as possible to limit the possible political instability and delays in the transition of one government to another. This can often take a week or more, depending on the type of political system used in the country.

Combining Results to Protect the Secrecy of the Vote

The electoral management body can merge or amalgamate results of several voting stations. This is generally done if the voting procedure was such that it may be possible to identify every person whose vote has gone into a particular ballot box, or if the number of votes in the ballot box is so small that there is a significant risk that almost all the votes will be for one candidate or party.

In such cases, the secrecy of the vote could be compromised. Results should be amalgamated with other voting stations. This can also be done in cases where it appears that the secrecy of individual votes can be secured, but there is real risk arising from the fact that a particular voting station, having voted predominantly in a particular way, could result in retribution to the persons who voted at that voting station.

Mixing the ballots from two or more boxes from different areas, and then attributing all the votes to one ballot box with proper notation in the results of this having been done can mitigate this problem. Such procedures must take place in the counting centre prior to the ballots being counted.

Merging results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other categories of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body, results can easily be merged with other results to protect the secrecy of the vote.

For internal use only, a special notation can be made to keep the audit trail clear.