Ballot Paper Design
Electoral management bodies need to take into account a range of issues when designing the ballot paper. A general principle underpinning any design is that the simpler the ballot paper the more effective.
Ballot paper design has an impact on two important aspects of the election process:
- The ability of voters to understand the choices of candidates or parties running in the election and select their choice in a valid manner. Elements on the ballot paper such as party symbols, candidate photographs, a short description of the party's and/or candidate's goals, and clear instruction on the ballot paper as to the method of casting a valid vote will support this.
- The accuracy of counting of votes. Poorly designed ballot papers, with, for example, small and closely aligned preference squares, can lead to voters' marks overlapping more than one square, with consequent dispute at the count over whether the voter is valid, and, if valid, which party or candidate the voter selected. Two other factors that impact on the design of the ballot paper are:
a; The cost of the design is a factor that needs to be considered.
b; The flexibility of design – this is constrained by limitations of the election system and the definition of ballot layouts in legislation.
It will be difficult to design a simple ballot paper, for instance, where the system allows large numbers of candidates and their parties to appear on the ballot, and the voter must choose to either make a single preference mark for the party of choice or number sequential preferences for each of the individual candidates.
Within these constraints election administrators can influence the ballot paper design by:
• the clarity of layout,
• the use of clear typefaces,
• having clear instructions on the ballot paper,
• the size of the font,
• the spacing between candidates/parties names, the quality of the print
• by advising on legislative changes that will simplify ballot completion.
• the space for the box in which the voter places his/her mark
• inclusion of party symbols
• inclusion of candidate/ party leader photographs
• color coding for different ballots
Essential Information
There is some essential information that printed ballot papers should contain.
• the date of the election
• the elected body for which the election is being conducted
• the electoral district for which the ballot is to be issued
Basic Types
The two basic types of ballot require voters to cast their ballots in two distinctly different ways:
• voters faced with a selection of different ballot papers, each representing a different party or candidate. Voters have to choose which ballot they prefer, usually sealing their choice of ballot in a ballot envelope before placing it in the ballot box.
• voters issued with a single ballot containing all the parties or candidates in the election. Voters have to indicate on the ballot paper which of these is preferred before placing the ballot in the ballot box.
Where separate ballot papers are provided for each candidate or party, and voters have to choose and envelope the one appropriate to their choice, ballot paper design considerations are relatively simple and should:
• clearly identify the party or candidate it represents, usually through use of a distinctive colour, or use of party name or symbol, or candidate name, symbol or photograph;
• give clear instructions for correctly selecting the preferred ballot and enveloping or otherwise depositing it in a ballot box.
Components of "Mark Choice" Ballot Paper Design
While there are common factors in "mark choice" ballot paper design, the manner in which they are implemented provides a wide array of different styles and possible permutations. The following examples are by no means an exhaustive review but give an indication of the range of possibilities in current ballot paper designs.
Methods of marking preferred choice:
• writing a number or mark in a box beside a candidate or party;
• writing a number or mark in a ruled off section containing the candidate or party
• circling the number next to a party or candidate
• crossing out all candidates or parties except the preferred one
• drawing a connecting line between two arrows next to a candidate or party
• filling in a small oval or circle next to a candidate or party
• striking through the name of the preferred candidate or party
• writing on a blank ballot a candidate or party number
• writing on a blank ballot the name of a candidate or party
• numbering sequentially all candidates on the ballot
• numbering sequentially a specified number or proportion of the number of candidates on the ballot
• recording a vote for "none of the above"
• setting a punch card machine to punch a hole in the ballot next to the candidate/party
• placing an official stamp on the name of the party
• having the option of placing a mark next to a party, or numbering all candidates sequentially
• keying the number or symbol of a candidate or party on a computer keyboard
• touching a computer screen on the symbol or name of a candidate or party
• pulling levers on a voting machine corresponding to parties or candidates
Party or candidate information:
• code number for party or candidate with no further information
• candidate name or party name
• Party list name and list candidates' names
• candidate name and party name or abbreviation
• party or candidate name, and party symbol
• candidate name and photograph, party name
• party name, party symbol, party abbreviation, party leader photograph
Voter instructions:
• none
• instruction on how to complete ballot
Size and color of ballot:
• one third A4 sheet
• around one metre wide
• consistent size for all electoral districts
• different size according to number of candidates
• colour coded for elections to different representative bodies
• colour coded for different methods of voting (normal, absentee, early, tendered/provisional)
Order of candidates and parties:
• alphabetical
• random draw for position
• rotating, so all candidates appear at the head on an equal number of ballots.
Simultaneous elections
• on the same ballot paper
• each election on a different ballot paper
Clear Specifications
Whatever the format of the ballot paper, clear specifications, approved by the electoral management body, will aid consistency and quality control of printing. These would cover issues such as:
• overall size restrictions
• information to be provided and its positioning
• fonts and point sizes used
• borders and other graphics
• minimum space between candidates or parties
• size of boxes in which voter's mark is to be placed (if used).
Making Voting Easier
The ballot paper form and content needs to be easily understandable. Simplicity aids speed of voter flow, and assists all voters - not only those less literate - to vote with confidence that they have not made a mistake. The following issues can assist voters and aid administrative effectiveness.
Clear instruction for voters on the ballot Paper: For most ballot papers these need only be variations on wording such as: "Write your mark next to the party of your choice." An illustration at the top of the ballot paper may assist in less literate societies.
Reviewing restrictive provisions that specify a single particular type of preference mark to the exclusion of all others such as a number, or "X", or "tick", or circled number, and disallow ballot papers marked in any other fashion, even when the voter's preference is clear.
Ensure that the size of the box or space in which preference marks have to be placed is large enough, especially for the elderly and physically challenged writers, to place their preference, especially where more than one preference has to be numbered. Similarly, the distance between spaces or boxes in which preferences have to be marked should be sufficient to prevent confusion.
Negative vote systems (crossing out all the candidates the voter doesn't want) can be more conducive to error, and take more time to mark a ballot paper than simple single positive preference systems. However, given the history of using negative vote systems in some countries, change can lead to confusion.
Information on candidates and parties assists voters in making their choice. At the very least, the party or candidate name, and for candidates the party affiliation, should appear.
In all environments, inclusion of the party symbols on the ballot paper will help voters. In less literate societies, especially where party affiliations are more fluid, candidate or party leader photographs are useful.
For simultaneous elections, color coding of ballot papers and ballot box signs for each separate election can reduce or minimize confusion.
Review fonts and point sizes used for clarity.
Where ballots for different electoral districts are different sizes, examine the possibilities of standardizing size.
Very large ballots, particularly those that have to be folded to fit into voting compartments, can take longer for the voter to understand the range of choices.
Examples of Ballot Papers can be found in ACE Electoral Materials Section.
Printing of Ballots
In systems where ballots are liable items, strict security and controls must surround ballot paper printing. If ballot authenticity is provided by the use of special papers, paper stocks must also be strictly controlled. As ballot paper printing is a high volume, short turnaround time process that demands total print accuracy, is necessary for the electoral management body to have total confidence in the capacity, quality control procedures, integrity, and security of ballot paper printing contractors. The electoral management body should be also instituting its own strict quality control mechanisms.
Where enveloped ballot voting procedures are used, such as in those following the French system, ballots are freely available to voters. While accuracy of ballot content is still an important issue, there is no need for the same levels of integrity and security controls as where "mark choice" ballot papers are used.
Printing Location
Before determining the design of the ballot papers, there is a need for the electoral management body to consider the time ballot papers take to print and whether potential contractors are capable of meeting the print specifications.
Ballot papers with special features may be restricted in potential production facilities, or not be able to be produced locally, either through lack of technology required or lack of capacity to complete the task within the available time frame. For example:
• using watermarked or other special papers;
• security print methods;
• producing in a booklet with numbered stubs;
• using full colour print and/or colour photographs of candidates.
Production of ballot papers using these more expensive methods can add significantly to election costs.
Additionally, foreign production can make it more difficult to control quality and supply scheduling for the most important item of election material and lead times may be longer, unless very expensive transport methods are adopted. Decisions to print in another country should only be made after very careful consideration of locally produced alternatives.
If there is not sufficient local expertise to print ballot papers contracting ballot paper printing at the regional level can be more appropriate, if suitable contractors are available due to the high volumes and short time period usually available. Contracting to multiple contractors at local levels is generally not sustainable as quality control and standardization of product can too easily be compromised.
Print Scheduling
Print scheduling also depends on how soon various ballots are required for use by voters. If full detail ballots are required for early voting, or sending to voting stations in other countries, there may be some urgency to produce small initial quantities of ballot papers for all electoral districts.
Conversely, where blank votes (which can be produced earlier) are used for early or absentee voting, central or regional production facilities usually start printing with the electoral districts at the furthest distance and with the longest transport lead time, to enable packaging of ballots, with their voting stations' other supplies, to begin first.
Print Quality Control
Before printing ballot papers there is a need to apply intensive quality control measures by both the electoral management body and the print contractor to ensure that ballot papers are correctly printed. Transference of ballot format and content data electronically from the electoral management body to the print contractor can assist in ensuring accurate printing. All ballot printing needs to be undertaken in line with strict control instructions, covering authorizations to print and transfer material, quantities, content, security, and distribution.
For each ballot paper printed (for different electoral districts, different types of voting, or different elections), the quality control measures that need to be implemented would include the following initial checks.
• provision of detailed design specifications to the contractor, and ensuring that these have been fully understood. Mock-up proofs obtained from the contractor and thoroughly checked;
• detailed checking of ballot content material before it is sent to the contractor for print set-up. Checking party/candidate order against the order announced following the close of nominations. Checking the correctness of all party/candidate details required on the ballot against the information provided on accepted nominations forms;
• checking and signing off all contractor-produced film and plate reproduction material, by electoral management ody staff, before production proofs are printed.
During print production, the following checks need to be implemented:
• an experienced electoral management body staff member should be present during the make-ready process for the press and check the format, information, colour, image position, and trim of the ballot. Production printing should only commence when proofs have been approved by the electoral management body as correct.
• there should be a regular extraction of sample ballots for checking as to colour, image position, and trim during printing. If any deficiencies are found, printing should cease until a fresh satisfactory proof has been printed and approved by the electoral management body. Stocks of ballots produced since the last accepted sample should be checked and faulty ballots destroyed.
• repeat these control processes whenever a new plate is used, a different press brought into production or commencement of a different ballot print.
• check samples of the final product to ensure stubs are numbered correctly in sequence and/or packs contain the correct number of ballots, where ballots are being produced in numbered stub booklets or other standard packages.
Although this may seem tedious the consequences of incorrect ballot format, party or candidate order or data, trimming of ballots (so candidate/party names, or ballot completion instructions are deleted), or color (particularly for color print ballots containing candidate photographs or party symbols) can be serious enough to jeopardise the election.
Security
Where ballots are liable materials, the following security measures should be applied during printing.
• an undertaking by the contractor regarding security of ballot materials;
• secure, weatherproof storage by the print contractor of all printed ballots, ballot paper stock, printing plates and other ballot reproduction material;
• physical security in the printing plant, including searches of employees leaving the premises;
• secure return of all printing plates and reproduction material to the electoral management body for secure destruction at the conclusion of prints run.
Where special paper stock is used as an integrity control, security would also be required, including:
• secure storage of ballot paper stock on the print contractor's premises;
• contractor's accounting for and secure destruction of all off-cut and waste paper stock and printing spoils;
• contractor’s accounting for all paper stock supplied but not used.
Printed Ballot Integrity Controls
It is important that the production and distribution of ballots that are the accountable voting material issued to voters are subject to adequate integrity controls.These controls address two issues, namely:
• the number of ballots;
• the authenticity of ballot papers
In systems using enveloped ballots, following the French or similar models, the need for such strict controls on ballots is not necessarily evident.
Assurance that the number of ballots is correct can be attained by various secure packaging, numbering and counting methods. Assuring the authenticity of ballots issued to voters can be an expensive process if through use of special papers and print methods, or relatively simple and inexpensive through validation at the time of issue.
The types of integrity controls instituted depend on how much reassurance the voting public needs regarding voting integrity. Simple validation methods in the voting station can be effective but may not appear as professionally secure as special paper or secure printing.
Security features are necessary to maintain the integrity of the process. The cost of each of these features varies and the electoral management body may decide to use several methods to ensure maximum security.
As the costs vary from one feature to another and this may impact on the choice made by the electoral management body.
Number of Ballots
Printed ballots are normally subject to a series of reconciliations from the time that they are printed to the time of completion of ballot counts.
Counting the ballots at each stage of the distribution process and during reconciliation in voting stations and the count can be assisted if quantity control systems are instituted at the time of manufacture.
Systems banding ballots loose in packs of standard quantities according to specification. This system is the most simple but the least effective as bands can easily be torn, and accuracy of packaging with this method is often suspected. Shrink wrapping of loose ballots in standard packs provides more packaging security but can also be suspect in accuracy.
Printing ballots with a numbered, perforated stub and collating the ballots in standard, stapled booklet,-usually of fifty or a hundred ballots, provides more surety as to numbers.
The ballot paper itself should never be numbered as this indicates to voters that voting secrecy may not be maintained. If this method is adopted, it is important the electoral management body is satisfied that print contractors are experienced and qualified to produce these ballots in booklets accurately otherwise the additional expense will be to no avail. In some environments this facility may not be available locally.
Full Counts
It is essential that a full count of ballots be conducted on delivery of ballots to the voting station and for counts of both used and unused ballots during reconciliations at the close of voting, to identify any manufacturing errors in numbering of these ballots.
This also includes the use of numbered stub ballots.
Authenticity of Ballots
Ballot authenticity can be assured by using:
• special papers, such as watermarked or ultraviolet light sensitive coated paper;
• special security prints methods, such as micro-printed security codes and colour shift print.
Significant lead times for production may be required for these methods, particularly for watermarked or coated paper, which may not be readily available to the required specifications locally in all countries.
Costs of printing using these special papers or print methods are considerably higher than using normal paper stock and print facilities.
Use of Official Marks
In election systems where each ballot is accountable,the ballot paper is validated on issue by the election official placing an official mark or signing or initialing the back of the ballot paper. This is a cost-effective manner for assuring that only valid ballot papers enter the count, and in most environments provides as effective authenticity controls as special and expensive paper stocks or security print methods.
Perforating instruments or stamps can be official marks used by the election officials. A different, distinctive mark would preferably be provided to each voting station to enable full accountability and integrity checks during counts. These are highly accountable items whose design should be kept secret until use and that should be kept under strict security at all times.
Even more cost-effective--but of slightly less integrity and of less use in less literate societies--is the alternative method of requiring the ballot issuing polling official to sign or initial the reverse of each ballot as it is issued.
Place the official mark or election official endorsement in the same position on every ballot, to allow it to be visible when the ballot is folded by the voter.
The top right hand corner of the reverse of the ballot paper is probably the most expeditious position for quick application by most (right-handed) polling officials. The correct position could be marked by a box or other shape on the reverse side of the ballot.
The additional costs of two-sided printing, however, should be carefully weighed against any likely advantages in accuracy.
