Voting Sites

The determination of how many voting sites are needed and their locations is one of the basic requirements for providing an appropriate level of service to voters and organising the resources needed to conduct voting.

Legal Frameworks

Legal frameworks for the election would normally clearly specify:

• the relationship of voting sites to electoral districts and the electoral or geographic areas that voting sites may service;

• the minimum (and any maximum) number of voting sites to be provided in each electoral district;

• a method for officially designating or appointing voting sites, as well as de-commissioning, voting sites;

• responsibilities for determining voting sites, and particularly any role played by governments, elected representatives, and other political participants in the determination of voting site locations;

• methods of identifying voting sites by a unique name or number;

• where special voting facilities may be made available, any specific requirements or restrictions on appointing voting sites for these purposes.

In some systems, maximum and/or minimum voter numbers for a voting site are also determined in the legal framework. There may be some advantages in this, particularly in systems where election administrations may be less experienced, or where, for other reasons, there is a need for a legislative guarantee of service to voters. However, it can lead to inflexibility and restriction of opportunities for efficiency of service to voters.

Such parameters may be better left to electoral management body policy. However determined, any restrictions on the numbers of voters that a voting site may service should not be made without prior research on their practicality and cost-effectiveness.

Given the essential nature of voting site data for election planning, and for voter information purposes, the legal and policy framework for determination of voting sites must be finalised as early as possible, and certainly before the election period commences. Adjusting the parameters, particularly regarding maximum voter numbers, during the election period can throw election planning into chaos.

Formal Approval and Designation of Voting Locations

To ensure accountability in the process of designating voting sites, and to minimise "phantom" or unauthorised voting sites controlled by political participants, all voting sites should be authorised by an official published mandate required by law. This should clearly state the name and preferably the location of the voting site 

If to be used outside the normal hours of voting day (e.g., as a mobile voting or early voting location), the hours of operation and the voting facility provided should also be specified. Where continuous election management systems are in operation, such formal notice need only be given when changes to voting station status occur

Determining the Need for Locations of Voting Sites

Need for voting sites, and the areas in which they must be located, will be determined by:

• any legislative or administrative policy requirements on the number of voters to be serviced by a voting station;

• the number of voters to be serviced and their locations;

• providing accessibility to all voters to the voting process, in a cost-effective manner; Common legislative or policy approaches would include:

• specifying the maximum number of voters that may be serviced by a voting station, and drawing geographic boundaries for voting sub-divisions which encompass no more than this maximum number of voters, and of such size that will enable effective and accessible service to voters;

• alternatively, the electoral district could be split into geographic voting subdivisions of roughly equal size, with boundaries determined by natural features, transportation links,etc

It would be usual to require that a voting site be located in each voting subdivision and that, unless eligible for some special voting facility such as absentee voting, voters are assigned to vote at the specific voting site within their voting subdivision. Effectiveness may be served by allowing some flexibility in such systems, to allow a single voting site to accommodate, in separate areas or voting streams, voters from other specified voting subdivisions.

This can provide efficiencies (particularly for some local government elections or other circumstances where voter populations of voting subdivisions is small). Care must be taken not to adversely affect voter accessibility. Adopting methods based on voting subdivisions of relatively equal voting populations will make election planning easier.

However, in areas of less dense population, more flexible size criteria may be required to preserve voter accessibility. Some legal frameworks, however, allow voters a choice of attending any voting site within a larger geographic area--often the electoral district for which a representative is being chosen at the election.

This may have advantages in flexibility and accessibility for voters, but it provides some difficulties in providing correct resource allocations at each voting site and requires more complex controls for preventing multiple voting and establishing eligibility of voters.

Planning Basis

Within each electoral district and voting subdivision analysis of potential voter numbers, accessible locations with regard to transport links and geography of the area, and characteristics of electors in specific areas forms the basis for effective planning of voting site locations.

(For issues to be considered when determining optimal locations for voting sites, see Demographic Analysis and Locations of Voting Sites.)

Voting Site Arrangements

Once the general area in which a voting site is required has been determined, arrangements must be made for identifying suitable premises or other areas to be used for voting, and, subsequently, the detailed allocation of voting operations resources on the basis of expected voters, feasible logistics, and necessary security.

(For an overview of voting site arrangements, see Voting Site Arrangements, and for security issues, Voting Site Security.)

Premises to be used for voting should be assessed as to their suitability to provide reasonable facilities for the numbers of voters expected.

Effective voter service will be enhanced if voting station managers are provided with an approved layout for their voting stations. These should be based on standard layouts that have been devised to maximise voter service and election integrity, adapted if necessary for the physical shape or floor plan of particular voting locations.

Needs assessments  for voting sites should be undertaken on the basis of the premises or other locations to be used, the facilities required to be provided,the layout criteria and the numbers of voters expected.

A monitoring system will be required to ensure that all voting sites are fully prepared for the opening of voting at the correct time.

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Long Lines on Election Day by Vincent J. Brown is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.0 Generic License.

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Afternoon of a Lesser Election by unprose is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivatives 2.0 Generic License.

Demographic Analysis

To provide both cost-effective and service-oriented voting facilities it is necessary to analyse the demographics of what could be termed each potential voting facility's "catchment area", in both a numeric and qualitative fashion, and use this as the fundamental determinant of voting station locations (see Locations of Voting Sites)

Analysis of potential voter numbers, accessible sites for voting, and the characteristics of voters in different geographic areas is the basis for effective planning of voting operations and the reliability, quality, and efficiency of service provided to voters.

Use of Demographic Analysis

Analysis of demographic data can assist in the solutions of some basic voting operations management needs, such as:

• determining where and how many voting stations are required (and consequently staffing and materials requirements);

• determining the special services that may be required in a voting station;

• determining the needs for any legally sanctioned special voting facilities, e.g., foreign country voting facilities, early voting facilities, or mobile voting stations.

Analysis Required

The nature and extent of the analysis required will depend on both the availability, accuracy, and sophistication of demographic information and the legislative and regulatory frameworks for determining voting facilities. These frameworks could be classified broadly as:

• Restrictive systems, where voters must vote at a specified voting station. Such systems would presuppose the existence of a voters list capable of being accurately broken down into or formed from individual voting station voters lists.

As potential voters at each voting station are relatively predictable from voter registration data and projections from historic voter turnout information, demographic analysis required is of a more qualitative nature;

• Open systems, where voters have some choice in the voting facility they may attend to vote. This may be through allowing a voter on voting day to attend any of a range of voting stations within an electoral district, or by providing special voting facilities (e.g., early voting, voting by mail, or absentee voting) that allow voters a choice of when they vote and a wider choice of where they may vote.

In such systems, careful analysis both of historic figures for voter turnout by location and current or projected demographic data are required for the effective resourcing and location of voting facilities.

Additionally, legal frameworks may impose size restrictions, on  the minimum number of voters required to establish a voting station and, more often, the maximum number of voters that a voting station may service. Where not set in the legal framework, such maximum/minimum limits may be set by the electoral management body to assist effective management, voter service, and resource use.

Data Availability

It would be rare for the full range of accurate, up-to-date demographic data useful for voting facilities planning to be available at the time voting sites and resourcing have to be determined.

It is thus useful for electoral management authorities to maintain a "feel" for the demography of the specific local environments within their area of management, through their own local operatives, agency arrangements with other state authorities, or developing reliable local information sources.

Relevant Data

The data that may be relevant to examine will vary depending on the range of voting services provided to electors, as well as the social environment. However, in all cases, an estimate of the number of voters likely to use particular voting facilities will be required. Thus, both current voter registration data and voter turnout figures from past elections in the area are a basic information tool.

Where final voter registration figures are not available at the time of planning voting facilities, alternative sources will need to be used, derived from census or other population estimates, as either a substitute for voter registration data or to adjust the most recent voter registration.

Particular analytical care needs to be taken with voting history figures when organising voting facilities for an election following any system changes or attempts to adjust any past experience to the current circumstances, whether due to:

• changes in the system of governance (for instance elections affecting a transition to democracy);

• changes in voter eligibility criteria;

• a redrawing of electoral district boundaries;

• recent major population displacements;

• changes in the methods of voting available.

Such analysis can be assisted by powerful computing tools developed to analyse demographic data

However, before embarking on such programs there needs to be a careful cost/output analysis of the incremental advantages in voting site locating and resourcing that maintaining such demographic data management programs may bring. In simpler electoral systems, results of equivalent effectiveness may well be achieved by less costly analytical means.

Useful Demographic Data

In determining voting sites and their resourcing there is a wide variety of demographic data that may be useful in particular situations. The following data has generally useful application.

Overall Voter Population and Mobility: This is the basic tool of determining voting site locations, size, and resourcing. The smaller the geographic units for which this data can be obtained, from voter registration data, census projections, and internal or external migration data sources, the more useful it will be.

Census data should be handled with care according to data reliability. Factors to be considered include the last date of the census, method/coverage of census (full door-to-door, sample, aerial photography, or other estimates), and the methodology of data projections since the last census. In areas where there have been significant movements of refugees or displaced persons, liaison with international humanitarian agencies may be the only practicable way of obtaining population mobility data.

Age Accommodations: Analysis of age distribution will assist in determining where special voting facilities for the aged (e.g., mobile voting stations for aged persons homes or institutions) may be required.

In general, identifying areas with high proportions of aged persons will assist in identifying where greater numbers or lower traffic in voting stations may occur due to reduced voter mobility, and where additional voting stations facilities--such as chairs, rest areas, assistance staff--may be necessary to provide effective voter service. Overall age structure analysis may also be useful, in conjunction with local knowledge of other voting day events, in assessing likely peak periods for voting.

Where computerised voter registration records are maintained, manipulation of these to provide age distribution data is an excellent source. For general analysis, census records may be useful. For more qualitative analysis of what specific facilities need to be provided in local areas for aged voters, liaison with organisations such as medical services, pensioner associations, and nursing home operators is useful.

Occupation and Work Patterns: Analysis of these may assist in identifying such factors as student or military age populations who may require specifically targeted voting sites. Work patterns, in areas with high numbers of seasonal migratory workers can indicate the need for additional voting stations in particular months, or of variations from historical figures of voter turnout (and hence number of voting stations and resourcing needs) according to the time of year of the election.

Transportation Patterns: Analysis of transportation routes used by workers to and from work, and for the general population to and from activities, such as shopping, will assist in determining effective locations for voting sites.

An analysis of peak travel periods, particularly in relation to work patterns where voting day is not a holiday, can also help in determining times of peak voter attendance at voting stations. Where absentee voting is permitted, analysis of records of movements through major transportation service terminals will indicate if there is justification for setting up voting stations in these locations.

Language and Literacy: Useful demographic studies for determining voting stations with a requirement for staff with specific language skills, the distribution of voting material in specific languages, and the need for additional staff and special materials to assist voters of lower literacy could include census data as a basic source. This may be supplemented by data from education authorities and government or non-government social service agencies.

Cultural Demographic Factors: Certain nationality, gender, or religious groups may have difficulties in voting at particular locations or during particular days or hours. The issues to take into consideration could include:

• migratory patterns of nomadic populations;

• specific buildings as voting sites (e.g., state facilities or churches) having negative connotations for sectors of the population;

• provision of special voting facilities where voting day falls on a religious holiday;

• sensitivity towards gender issues when determining voting station location and internal layout.

Census data as well as government and non-government agencies for minorities data plus liaison with social support agencies and community groups is useful for this analysis.

Foreign Relations Authorities: Where voting for an election is permitted at foreign country voting locations, liaison with embassies or other government agencies responsible for tracking international movements will assist in identifying external locations with significant numbers of potential voters and in any required registration of these voters.

Local Resources

In the absence of reliable comprehensive statistics, there is no substitute for maintaining networks of local officials for supply of demographic data.

However, data obtained in such a way may need to be treated with some scepticism as to its complete accuracy, particularly if local funding for election or other projects is dependent on population figures which are not objectively verifiable.

Locations of Voting Sites

Basic criteria for determining how many voting locations will be required to accommodate the expected numbers of voters and where they are best located, will include:

• legal or administrative directions on the placement of voting sites within electoral district or voting subdivision boundaries;

• voting station capacity, i.e., the numbers of voters that a voting station can service;

• accessibility and service standards for voting.

Providing Service to a Defined Geographic Area

There may be legal restrictions as to the placement of voting stations in relation to electoral districts or voting subdivisions of electoral districts. It would be usual that electoral districts be divided into voting subdivisions, each of which must contain a voting site.

Definition of these voting subdivisions' boundaries would normally be better left to the discretion of electoral management bodies, on administrative grounds, rather than become part of any determination of electoral representation boundaries.

Appropriate voter populations of voting subdivisions, their boundaries, and, hence, the numbers of voters that voting stations must service must be determined early in the election timetable for effective planning of staffing, materials supply, and logistics.

There are different approaches to defining appropriately-sized voting subdivisions. One approach is to break each electoral district into geographic areas, or voting subdivisions, containing nearly equal numbers of registered voters.

Such an approach allows for standardisation of staffing levels and materials supply and can thus provide a simple and effective basis for voting operations resource allocation and service. While simple, this approach may present accessibility problems, particularly in areas of lower population density.

A modification of this method would be to set varying maximum voter populations for voting subdivisions according to societal and geographic factors--at different levels for urban and rural environments, or between areas of higher and lower literacy. Maximum flexibility can be gained if voting station areas are determined purely on local criteria.

This will allow maximum effectiveness to be gained for available local facilities, but can lead to widely varying numbers of voters serviced by voting stations and thus increases the complexity of planning and resourcing.

Some legal frameworks allow voters a choice of attending any voting site within a larger geographic area, often an electoral district for which a representative is being chosen at the election.

This may have advantages in flexibility and accessibility for voters, but drawbacks may include:

• the uncertainty of where voters may attend to vote under such systems greatly increases the complexity of planning appropriate locations and resourcing of voting stations and has the potential for resulting in excessive costs;

• such systems will require more complex and perhaps less effective procedures for preventing multiple voting and establishing eligibility of voters.

Voting Station Capacity Criteria

The number of voters that a voting station can reasonably accommodate will depend on a variety of environment-specific factors.

There is no ideal capacity for a voting station that can be applied to all election environments. In some measure, prescribed voting station capacities reflect the philosophy of the voting system, whether it aims to promote a sense of local community participation through provision of smaller-sized neighbourhood voting stations or to gain efficiencies through more impersonal, larger voting stations.

Equally significant for determining voting station processing capacities are the interdependent operational factors that will influence voting station effectiveness, such as:

• the hours during which voting stations will be open;

• the range of services to be provided, both in terms of voting facilities required by the legal framework and additional services provided to assist voters;

• the complexity of the voting procedures;

• whether a single election or multiple simultaneous elections are being held;

• the procedures for checking voter eligibility and issuing voting material to voters;

• the physical area available for voting and whether this is a single room or is broken into multiple smaller spaces;

• the way in which the physical layout of the voting station is arranged, and particularly the number of voting compartments that are provided;

• the availability and abilities of suitable staff for both voting station management and other voting station official positions;

• the service standards for voter traffic that have been set by the electoral management body;

• voter fraud control (in smaller, neighbourhood-based voting, most eligible voters will be known to officials and observers and opportunities for voter fraud more limited);

• how familiar and experienced voters are with the voting procedures;

• the structure of the local voting population, particularly in terms of age and literacy in the official language to be used for voting.

Voting station processing capacities will be more limited where they deal with a single stream of voters.

Conversely, depending on the physical area of the voting station, using multiple voting streams (either based on voters lists for geographic sub-districts, an alphabetical split of voters, or having multiple copies of voters lists available for voting), can greatly increase voting station capacity

General Standards

There are some general standards which can provide useful reference points:

• While there are economies of scale in larger capacity voting stations, voter traffic of 4000-5000 voters is likely to lead to problems in voting station management.

• Conversely, very small voting stations, with voter traffic of under 300-400 voters, are generally an inefficient use of resources and should only be considered where they are required to provide voting accessibility to voters in more isolated areas or where an electoral district's voter population is low.

• Traffic in the range of 1200 to 2500 voters per voting station will generally offer a reasonable level of efficiency, yet not be too unwieldy for staff of average ability to manage. However, the ability to service this number of voters will be dependent on the issues noted below.

Service Criteria

Sites chosen as voting locations need to meet basic criteria to ensure that they are able to effectively service voters and that they are conducive to the conduct of a free and fair election. The basic factors that need to be considered in choosing specific locations include the following:

The ability of the site to cope with the expected number of voters: The physical capacity of the location to cope with both the total number of expected voters, and the likely peak periods of operation, require assessment.

The accessibility of the site to voters, party/candidate representatives and observers: Accessibility must be a paramount consideration. Having to travel long distances or for long periods to their nearest voting station will be a deterrent for voters to attend to vote, particularly where transportation may not be readily available.

Considerations in this regard would include the condition and number of roads servicing the voting station, the availability and frequency of public transport services, and in urban areas, the availability of parking. Locating voting stations in restricted areas, such as military bases, that may prove difficult to observe freely, should generally be avoided.

Special care needs to be taken that voting sites are accessible to voters with disabilities, both in access to and condition of premises  and their location. For example, in environments with few transport facilities where voters will generally walk to a voting station, location of voting sites at the summit of steep hills can inconvenience elderly or frail voters.

The safety and security of voters, election staff, and party/candidate representatives: The ability to ensure that a voting site and its environs are safe assumes great importance in situations where there has been recent or there is current violent political conflict. In such situations, perceptions of how safe the voting site is for those of particular political views or community groups will have a large effect on voter turnout and hence the legitimacy of the election .

Familiarity: Voters will be more easily able to find voting stations if they are in prominent locations.

Wherever possible, sites that have been used previously for voting stations should continue to be used, unless they have negative connotations through connections with former repressive regimes or no longer meet capacity/facilities standards.

This is particularly useful in areas with multiple layers of government which have different voting days; using the same sites for elections at the national, provincial, and local levels will minimise voter confusion and make public information campaigns on voting locations easier.

Where elections are preceded by a locally-based intensive voter registration campaign, early identification and use of voting sites as a local registration office within each voting subdivision will aid voters in their recognition of the correct voting station to attend.

The acceptability of the site to voters: Certain state agency sites such as police premises may not be acceptable as voting locations to the local community.

The ability to supply the voting site with voting materials: Logistics considerations need to include the condition of transportation infrastructure. If there is no suitable road network for delivery of materials, the ability to supply by air or other means must be available.

Availability at all times required for voting purposes: Locations may be ideal for voting, but they need to be available for all voting-related functions required to be undertaken at the site. These could be well before voting day, in systems where voters lists for each voting station are posted for inspection at the relevant voting station.

They may be required after voting day, for finalisation of counts where these are undertaken at the voting station. Where buildings are used they should be available on the day or night before voting day, to allow officials to set up the voting stations, and be able to be left secured from the time of set-up through to commencement of voting.

Telecommunications capabilities: It is very important that voting stations maintain reliable communications with the election administration and, in higher security risk areas, security forces.

Voting stations should not be located in communications shadows, that is, at a location where there is no fixed line telecommunication facilities and mobile phone or radio contact is unreliable due to surrounding natural features or other interference.

Suitability of Location

In determining what are suitable premises or locations for voting stations, there are basic considerations of costs, the floor or ground area available, accessibility, and the condition and availability of facilities in the location  Buildings that would generally be suitable for voting sites would include:

• schools, including pre-schools and kindergartens;

• court houses;

• community operated halls or club premises;

• government buildings.

Use of Private Premises

Where suitable public or community buildings or locations are not available--and this may occur often in rural areas--it may be necessary to lease privately owned premises.

In leasing private property for voting sites, care should be taken in ensuring that the location will be acceptable to all voters, in that the owner is not associated with active political participation. Similarly, it should be ensured that any private property used for voting is not normally used for an activity that may be offensive to minority cultural groups.

In some jurisdictions, additional restrictions on premises that may be used as voting sites are imposed in the legal framework (e.g., that they are not licensed to sell alcoholic beverages).

Integrity Considerations

Consideration also needs to be given to any effect the use of particular premises may have on perceptions of election integrity or on participation by voters.

This may be particularly important in transitional elections where significant sectors of the population may associate buildings owned by the state with repressive action by former regimes.

Costs

Public buildings such as schools and government offices are often available at concessional rates or free of charge from state agencies for voting use. Election legal frameworks could contain provision for forced requisition of state or other premises, either by the electoral management body or by state executive direction.

Such powers to requisition state premises can be very useful in systems where elections may be called at relatively short notice.

Co-Location

Depending on the size of the premises available, dealing with voters from more than one voting subdivision within the same electoral district at the one physical location can be an efficient manner of organising voting sites in urban areas. However, in using this method:

• staff management structures within the voting site must be rigorously defined;

• layouts organised so that material from the different voting subdivisions is kept separate and properly accounted for;

• additional control staff may be required to ensure that voters are directed to the correct voting stream at the voting station;

It would be usual that voting stations are located within the electoral district to which they are attached. This is often required by the election legal framework. Some flexibility in this regard may be useful.

Co-location of voting stations from different electoral districts at the same location near the border of adjoining electoral districts, may, in urban areas, allow the use of facilities that can take advantage of economies of scale.

It can be very useful in reducing the higher unit cost absentee votes in election systems that allow absentee voting on voting day. Control systems for such voting locations need to be particularly rigorous.

Special Voting Facilities

Care is needed if consideration is being given to creating special voting sites to accommodate specific occupational groups, such as government employees or military personnel. There is always the potential at such sites for intimidation of voters by their superiors.

Ballots from such sites would preferably be mixed with those from normal geographic area-based voting stations before being counted.

Voting Site Arrangements

Once the necessity for voting sites in particular areas has been established (see Demographic Analysis and Locations of Voting Sites), the following arrangements must be made:

• the actual buildings or other locations where voting is to take place must be identified;

• contractual arrangements for their use must be put in place;

• action must be taken to ensure that they are properly equipped. furnished, and supplied.

Identifying Suitable Premises

Arrangements for identifying suitable voting sites are better organised at the local level, through the electoral district manager or local election commission for the electoral district or administration area, rather than attempting to do this centrally. Local staff will usually have better ability to find potential facilities in their area.

Where there are permanent electoral management bodies with a local presence in place, periodic assessment of potential available voting locations/premises will assist in minimising workloads during the election period. It is important that contact is initiated with the representatives of state authorities responsible for or owners of potential premises at an early stage in the election period.

Site Inspections

Wherever possible, sites or premises to be used for voting should be inspected by experienced staff before any decision to use the location is made.  If inspection is not possible, information on size, facilities available, and so forth should be gained from inquiry of the site or premises owners.

To aid in determining the suitability of specific premises or locations for use as voting stations, criteria should be developed with regard to the standard facilities that should be present at a voting location.

Standard Layouts

The development of standard layouts for voting stations will assist in maximising the following:

• consistency of service to voters;

• cost-effective resourcing;

• correct implementation of voting procedures.

Needs Assessments

It may not be possible to obtain the use of locations that fully meet the requirements of facilities standards and which have sufficient furniture and other equipment on hand to effect authorised layouts.

For each voting station, a needs assessment should be completed, identifying the additional equipment and other facilities that will be required.

Contractual Arrangements

The specification of actual voting locations should be a recorded process--for both operational and financial accountability reasons.

Buildings or locations to be used for voting should be covered by a formal contractual arrangement (whether there is payment involved or not) to ensure the site and facilities are available as required for voting

Decisions on suitable voting locations will need to consider the associated costs, both any leasing costs and any costs that will need to be incurred in upgrading the facilities present.

Voting Station Readiness

One of the most important tasks in the management of voting operations is to ensure that all voting stations are ready for operations on voting day.

Monitoring systems for tracking the state of readiness of each voting station and rectifying deficiencies are essential for effective management of voting day and for the integrity of voting.

Maps

It is essential for planning of logistics, and for public information campaigns, that maps be produced showing voting site locations. The detail required of these maps will vary according to the purpose for which they are being used

Voting Station Names/Identity Numbers

Each voting station must be given a unique identifying name or number, for use in:

• public information campaigns;

• crucially, for ensuring control of the despatch and return of ballot boxes and election materials;

• control of counts and results.

Where voting stations for different voting subdivisions or electoral districts share the same location, it is critical that they have separate identifying names and/or numbers. It would be usual for the election legal framework to require that the name or number allocated to each voting station be authorised by a designated senior member of the electoral management body, and officially published.

Voting Site Standards

Assessment of the suitability of specific sites for voting should be made against a set of standards defined by the electoral management body.

These standards should cover all facets of the requirements for voting. In many areas it may not be possible to find available buildings that fully meet the required standards, or any suitable buildings at all.

In such circumstances, it will be necessary to determine from needs assessments of the available locations whether one of the following alternatives may be employed:

• bring any existing premises up to the minimum standard required for voting purposes;

• arrange for temporary accommodation, in a tent, caravan, portable cabin, or other temporary shelter, for the voting station;

• hold voting in the open.

The latter possibility is generally only feasible where voting stations are expected to accommodate relatively small numbers of voters and where weather conditions are expected to be favourable (though open-air voting facilities may be the norm in societies where there is a tradition of open air local decision-making as part of the cultural fabric).

Personal Inspection

It is highly desirable that a thorough personal inspection of the location be made. It is more effective if such assessments are undertaken by locally-based election administration staff (the electoral district manager or members of the election commission for the electoral district) in the presence of a representative of the location's owner.

It would be preferable that the voting station manager (if already selected) also attend such inspections in order to get a preliminary feel for the capacities of the location.

Reporting on Inspections

Preparing standard reports on these inspections in check list format will assist in assessing suitability and determining areas where additional equipment or facilities must be provided by the electoral management body 

Where, due to remoteness or other reasons, it is not possible to make a personal inspection of the location, a report in a standard format should be requested from the owners or their representatives

Issues for Assessment

The issues that need to be considered during such assessments include:

• the suitability of the physical area of the location for an effective layout of the voting station and its capacity to cope with the number of voters expected 

• road or other transport access (and in urban areas any parking facilities);

• the facilities that are available--communications, furniture, shelter for waiting voters, secure storage, staff and voter amenities such as toilets and water, reliable power supply and lighting, heating or cooling equipment, ventilation 

• suitability for use by frail, elderly, or disabled voters 

• in higher security-risk environments, the ability to secure the voting station

• the premises is not disqualified from use for voting by any other activity that may normally be undertaken there that may breach legislative requirements for voting stations, offend the cultural sensitivities of the local community, or raise questions about election integrity 

• expected costs of the location and any conditions on its use.

Voting Site Facilities

In determining the necessary standard of facilities required in a voting station, there are some basic issues to consider, including:

• the effective implementation of all required voting procedures;

• the public's ability to vote in safety and comfort;

• provision of an acceptable work environment for voting operations officials.

Standard checklist reports are useful in determining the facilities available at voting locations and providing the basis for needs assessments. ( Needs assessments are further discussed at Voting Site Needs Assessments.)

Minimum Standards

There will be a bare minimum standard that must be provided at voting locations in any environment. These standards will relate to the ability to implement all required procedures in a safe environment.

Elements of comfort in voting locations may be a relative concept that will vary from environment to environment. What is acceptable in a less developed rural area may not be an acceptable standard in advanced urban areas.

However, even in regard to comfort there are some facilities, such as access to toilets and water, that should be regarded as essential at any voting location. Details of facilities that are necessary at voting locations are discussed below.

Condition of Premises

Wherever possible, buildings in sound condition should be used. The condition of external and internal building walls, roof, ceilings windows, and floor should be assessed.

The voting area should have adequate ventilation and a level, non-slip floor surface. Where there is no alternative to a building in poor condition, the electoral management body may need to supply waterproof sheeting for temporary repair purposes.

Accessibility

There are two issues regarding accessibility:

• the accessibility of the voting site location;

• the ease with which voters and officials can use the location for voting.

Accessibility of the voting site location to transport facilities, its relationship to where voters reside, and similar issues are discussed at Locations of Voting Sites.

There are a number of issues that can be assessed in terms of ease of access within the voting site, with special attention being paid to accident prevention and the needs of disabled voters. These issues would include:

• vehicle parking facilities;

• width, gradient, state of repair, and non-slip surfaces of approach paths and entrance and exit of the voting area;

• number of external and internal steps (wherever possible areas with level external and internal access, or with ramps as an alternative to steps, should be used);

• railings provided on landings, stairs, and ramps;

• lighting available for approach paths and its accessibility for use;

• non-slip surfaces on voting station floor area;

• entrance, exit, and internal doorways of sufficient width to allow free access and suitable for speedy evacuation in case of emergencies;

• internal corridors of sufficient width;

• the area available for use is sufficient to cope with the expected number of voters, officials, and observers using an approved voting station layout;

• whether a single room of sufficient size for all voting activities is available or whether multiple rooms must be used;

• availability of a covered area outside the voting station for voters waiting to enter.

Most of these factors cannot be easily ameliorated by actions of the electoral management body. Premises that do not meet all these criteria may be the best available premises. In some jurisdictions, for example:

• portable ramps are supplied to voting stations to assist disabled voter access;

• temporary coverings are supplied to provide voters waiting to vote with some shelter. While useful, these would not be generally regarded as essential needs.

Security and Safety

Security considerations concern the internal security facilities and the ability to secure the external area around the voting station. With regard to internal arrangements:

• it would generally be essential that any area of a building used for voting has lockable external doors and preferably also windows;

• where the building has its own electronic security system, this must be accessible to voting operations officials to activate/deactivate or owner's representatives be available for these tasks;

• fire extinguishing equipment should also be accessible.

If security forces will not be guarding voting sites from the time of delivery of materials through the commencement of voting, it is highly preferable that the location has security alarms installed.

Where legal provisions bar political activity in a defined area around a voting station, consideration needs to be given to the suitability of the location for establishing this area. Locations with external fencing may be preferable.

In high security-risk areas a cleared area around the voting location would be preferable for establishing a security perimeter.

A secure area would also preferably be available so that bulky equipment, particularly voting compartments and any additional furniture required, can be delivered during the week before voting day and stored on the site awaiting use.

Electricity

Each voting station would preferably have a reliable electricity supply. While this is primarily important for lighting, this would also include power outlets in the area to be used for voting, with a load capacity sufficient for any electronic equipment to be used during the vote.

Fuse boxes or other circuit breaking equipment should be accessible to voting operations officials in case of power failure.

Where a permanent reliable electricity supply is not available, arrangement should be made by the electoral management body for supply of generators, either from other state sources such as the military or by lease from private contractors. Where portable electricity supply equipment is used, it should be tested prior to the commencement of voting.

Lighting

In most environments, and particularly where counts are undertaken at voting stations, voting station operations will extend beyond daylight hours. It is essential that the area used for voting and the count should have reliable lighting. Existing facilities may need to be supplemented by the provision of portable electric lamps.

Special attention should be paid to lighting in the area in which voting compartments will be positioned. Where a reliable electricity supply cannot be provided, sufficient portable lighting facilities, such as battery, gas, or other fuel lamps, will need to be included with the voting material provided by the electoral management body.

Where electricity supplies are not reliable, flashlights and batteries or even candles may also be required as back-up emergency lighting.

Communications Facilities

It is essential that voting stations have reliable communications with the electoral management body during their hours of operation. The area used for voting would preferably contain one, and in high security-risk environments preferably two, reliable fixed telephone connections or have these accessible in close proximity.

Where reliable permanent telephone connections are not available, the electoral management body should arrange, where sufficient time and the technical facilities are available, for sufficient fixed telephone lines to be installed or, alternatively, the provision of mobile phones or portable radio communication equipment to the voting station.

Where mobile phone or radio communication is to be used, it is essential that voting locations chosen have reliable reception. It is also essential that strict controls on the issue and return of portable telecommunications equipment are instituted.

Fax Machines

In some jurisdictions fax machines are provided by the electoral management body to all voting stations with fixed telephone lines. These may be useful and convenient for such tasks as:

• ensuring correct, consistent receipt of any further instructions or directions to voting station managers during voting;

• receipt of formal legal advice on issues arising during voting;

• transmission of count results, where counts are undertaken at voting stations.

However, they could not be regarded as essential or even necessarily as cost-effective use of resources.

Photocopiers

Similarly, there may be a use for photocopiers in voting stations for such matters as emergency re-supply of official forms. When assessing voting location facilities, it can be useful to determine if photocopying facilities are available.

However, this would not generally be regarded as an essential facility.

Furniture

The essential basic requirements are for tables and chairs available in good condition to be sufficient for polling staff, party/candidate representative, and observer use, and to provide some seating for elderly or physically handicapped voters. The number needed will depend on the number of staff to be allocated to the voting station and their roles, but generally provision will need to be made for:

• table and chair for voting station manager and deputy;

• table and chair for entrance control officer;

• tables and chairs for voter eligibility checking officers and voting materials issuing officers;

• tables for ballot boxes and chairs for ballot box guards;

• chair for any exit control officers;

• table for information materials;

• tables and chairs for party/candidate representatives and observers.

Sufficient chairs should also be provided so that staff who are mobile through the voting station, such as queue control offices and information staff, also have somewhere to sit, and a small number should also be provided for voter use.

Additional tables and chairs may be needed for use in voting compartments, depending on the design of the voting compartment used.  Where no special barriers are provided for crowd control, the availability of additional tables and chairs can be useful for defining areas for queues and voter flow. However, if this is done, strict control must be exercised to ensure that these are not used instead of secret voting compartments by electors marking their ballots.

Use of schools and similar public premises as voting locations will generally ensure that sufficient tables and chairs are available on site, Where the room(s) to be used for voting are insufficiently supplied, wherever possible arrangements should be made for this shortfall to be made up from elsewhere in the institution. If sufficient tables and chairs are not available from the voting site, the electoral management body should arrange for the lease and delivery to the location of sufficient quantity for the identified needs.

Additional furniture, such as lockable storage cabinets for materials, can be useful but not generally essential. Packaging used for delivery of materials may suffice for materials storage during voting hours.

Polling Staff Amenities

Toilet facilities and drinking water for staff use are necessary requirements. Separate toilets for male and female staff would be preferable. In areas where no available or otherwise suitable locations can provide these facilities, arrangements should be made for their provision from other state agencies. Portable toilets may be leased commercially and delivered and returned with voting equipment. The military may be able to assist with these facilities.

In rural areas where portable toilets may not be able to be obtained, or where temporary shelters are erected for voting, during set-up of the voting station, the digging of pits and erection of screens for toilet facilities may be required.

Small quantities of drinking water could be delivered with voting materials. However, particularly where larger numbers of voters are expected, and there is no nearby public source of drinking water it may be more practicable to negotiate for the use of water tankers from local government, water authority, or military sources. Where elections are to be held in cold conditions, premises used would preferably have some form of heating available.

Additional facilities, such as tea/coffee making facilities, a separate area for staff to eat or take breaks, access to refrigerator, stove, microwave, and/or a meals preparation area, would assist in maintaining staff comfort, but are not necessary and would not generally be supplied by the electoral management body if not already present on the premises.

Voter Amenities

For staff, availability of toilet and drinking water facilities is necessary. In many circumstances, voters and staff may be able to share the same facilities.

However, some leases may contain conditions that preclude voters from using staff toilet facilities, and security reasons may also preclude this. Where such facilities are not available, they should be provided in a similar fashion as described above for staff.

A ratio of one portable toilet for every four to five hundred voters expected should be sufficient, as long as voters are not faced with long voting delays. Drinking water, if not available on the premises, would again be more effectively provided by use of water tankers from state or military sources.

Voting Station Layout Standards

Layouts of voting stations should aim to maximise:

• the efficiency of the flow of voters through the voting station;

• the effective implementation of voting processes as required by the legal framework;

• the security and integrity of voting;

• the transparency of the voting process;

• efficiency of staff allocation;

• protection of the secrecy of voting.

It will not always be possible to fully achieve all these aims simultaneously, as there will often be restrictions imposed by: The voting procedures as defined in the legal framework for the election.

For example, requirements that ballot boxes be stationed next to the officers issuing voting material and that voters return to the table from which their material was issued to deposit their ballots can impede effective voter flow.

In developing voting station layouts, the most effective way of implementing the required procedures must be considered.

The suitability of the building or area used. There may not be much choice available in voting locations, and buildings or other areas used may not be of the optimal size or configuration for the numbers of voters, numbers of staff, party/candidate representatives, and observers present, staff responsibilities, and the processes to be implemented.

Approved Voting Station Layouts

Standard layouts for voting sites are a necessary basis for developing cost-effective staffing profiles, any standard staffing levels assigned to voting stations, materials supply, and staff training. Some flexibility will be needed to allow adaptation of standard layouts to suit the floor area available in each voting station.

Following inspection of voting sites (or where inspection is not possible, provision of a floor plan by the building management), an approved layout should be prepared for each site.

It is useful for voting station managers (if already appointed) to assist in this preparation. In remote areas, it may be left to voting station managers to prepare the layout; these should still be approved for use by the relevant electoral district manager.

Voting station managers must be required to implement the approved layout for their voting stations. Enforcing adherence to approved layouts is a major factor in ensuring effective voter service on voting day and maintaining cost-effectiveness.

Entrances and Exits

To promote an orderly, easily controlled flow of voters through a voting station It is preferable that:

• the voting area has only one available entrance and one available exit;

• the entrance and exit are at opposite ends of the voting area, to allow a one-way progression of voters through the voting area.

This configuration will not be available in all sites used for voting.

Many otherwise suitable (or the only available) locations will have a single entrance and exit doorway or entrances and exits in close proximity to each other. In such cases, barriers should be used to promote the flow of voters around the voting station and especially to separate voters entering from voters leaving the voting station.

Supervisory Staff

Positioning of the voting station manager's (and deputy's, where allocated) table should allow effective oversight of all staff and voter activity.

It would generally be better located near the entrance to the voting station, to allow easy access by voters needing assistance with information or in voting. The area around the voting station manager's table would also be the preferable area for secure storage of voting materials not currently in use.

Materials Issuing Area

Tables for issuing of accountable voting materials should be set up so that officials issuing material have a clear view of both the queued voters and the voting compartments.

Having materials issuing staff directly facing the queued voters may make it difficult for them to have a clear view of both of these. Also, their location should allow a well-defined queue to form.

Voting Compartments

Voting compartments need to be positioned so that voters can complete their votes in secret and that activity around the voting compartments can be monitored by polling officials. The style of voting compartments used, whether free standing, table-top, or needing support from a wall, will affect the flexibility of positioning available.

Wherever possible, they should be located between the voting materials issuing area and the ballot box(es). Care must be taken, when tall freestanding voting compartments are used, that their positioning does not obscure officials' and observers' view of the ballot box(es).

Often the major cause of delays in voting stations is not any lack of efficiency by voting operations officials, but the time taken for voters to complete their ballots.

This is a factor that needs careful study in determining:

• the number of voting compartments required to maintain a steady flow of voters for the expected voter turnout.

• the voting station floor area required to install the requisite number of voting compartments in a layout that allows easy voter access to the voting compartments.

Consideration should also be given to the space requirements for provision of compartments for use by disabled or wheelchair bound voters. These may require a more generous space allocation and special tables or voting compartment design to allow wheelchair access.

Furniture

Many of the officials working in the voting station will require tables, and in designing layouts the space requirements of these need to be carefully calculated to ensure that there is sufficient room for free access. Tables would normally be needed for:

• voting station manager and deputy manager;

• staff checking voter eligibility and issuing accountable voting materials (the more these functions are split between different staff, the more table top space is likely to be required).

Where these tables are placed, and the direction in which they face, will have a large effect on voter processing. They may also be required for:

• display of information or other electoral materials;

• as a stand for ballot boxes;

• as a working or reporting area for party/candidate representatives and observers.

The balance has to be struck between providing officials with an adequately sized work surface and not overcrowding the voting area with furniture. Exit and entry passages should be kept free of furniture. In cases where materials are being issued or voter checks undertaken at the entrance to the voting station, there may be a need to use tables to allow only one voter to pass at a time; however these should not overly obstruct the passageway.

Tables for which there is no apparent, specific purpose should not be left in the voting area. Not only do they impede voter traffic, but it is tempting for voters to use these, instead of the secret voting compartments, as a place for completing their ballots.

Other furniture, such as storage cabinets for materials and secure storage for filled ballot boxes, may also be required. Space requirements and locations of these should be clearly marked on layout plans.

Barriers

The use of even rudimentary barriers can be of great assistance in ensuring that voters move in a controlled manner through the voting station. The placement of barriers should clearly define the voter flow path yet still allow free movement of officials and observers within the voting station. Areas where barriers can be usefully employed include:

• to define the queuing area;

• direct voters to the appropriate sets of voting compartments and ballot boxes where such differentiation is required by the voting procedures;

• maintain separate paths for voters entering and leaving the voting station (particularly important where a single access point is used for both entry and exit);

• ensure that voters, having deposited their ballots, do not move back into the voting area.

Barriers can both define the path of the queue and be used to coil the queue to make maximum use of the available queuing space. Where there is more than one queue, they can be used to ensure that the queues remain separate. Barriers should be arranged so as to maintain access for voters to the voting station manager and information staff.

While electoral administrations wanting to present a highly professional image may have special barriers produced, barriers can also be constructed cost-effectively from ropes or use of existing materials from other government sources, such as barriers used for vehicle or pedestrian traffic control.

Ballot Boxes

Ballot boxes should be set up in a position in full view of polling officials, party/candidate representatives, and observers, and not obstructed by voting compartments or other furniture. The numbers of ballot boxes required as defined in the legal framework (e.g., separate ballot boxes for different ballots in simultaneous elections or separate ballot boxes for different voting streams) and any legal requirements for voters to return to the point of issue of voting material to deposit their ballots will influence where ballot boxes can be located within the voting station.

The most efficient placement, in terms of voter traffic control is between the voting compartments and the exit to the voting station. The area required for ballot boxes will depend on whether they are freestanding units or require tables to bring them up to a reasonable height.

Communications

Fixed line telephone connections should be set up so that, wherever possible, telephones are located on the voting station manager's table. Where a fax machine is required it should also be set up in the area where the voting station manager's and deputy's tables are located.

Multiple Room Voting Stations

It is preferable that voting locations allow all voting activity to occur within a single area. Where the only available premises contain multiple rooms, it would be better to split voting activity so that voters do not have to move from room to room to complete voting processes.

For example, where multiple voting streams are used (using an alphabetic or geographic split of voters attending), the aim would be to fully process a different voter stream, from eligibility checking to depositing of ballots in the ballot box, in each room.

Using multiple rooms for different functions--checking voter eligibility in one room, issuing ballots and/or ballot envelopes in another, positioning voting compartments and ballot boxes in another--can have efficiency disadvantages.

In general, use of multiple rooms voting stations may be less cost-effective in additional control staff required to maintain voter flow, in additional management difficulties, and often in additional equipment required and should be avoided wherever possible.

Potential Voting Station Layouts

 

The following diagrams give a few examples of how voting stations may be set up under different procedures and voting area configurations.

It is not possible to give examples that would cover every potential situation. However, those provided do illustrate some of the key aspects of effective voting station layout given various procedural requirements. While they show a maximum of two voting streams servicing regular voters, depending on the size of the voter population to be serviced and the voting station area, this may need to be increased.

In this model, the voting station has only a single access point which must be used for both entrance and exit. Barriers are used to ensure that the voters entering and leaving the voting station have separate paths. Other features are:

• at positions 1 and 2, positions for staff to maintain control of the entrance and the queues (in low security-risk situations and where voter flow is not intensive, the same official may be able to undertake both tasks);

• clear view of all proceedings to voting station  staff and observers;

• provision for an area for storage of materials (at 4) under the control of the manager (or deputy manager if the voting station is of sufficient size);

• a single table (at 5) for checking voter eligibility and issuing ballot material (whether undertaken by the same or separate officials) positioned to allow monitoring of both the queue waiting to vote (2) and the voting compartment area (6);

• positioning of the ballot box on the route from the voting compartments to the exit (8);

• with a single entrance/exit, one official could maintain both entry control and exit control, depending on voter numbers;

• an area where party/candidate representatives and observers can sit (9), make notes and the like.

Party/candidate representatives and observers should not generally be restricted to any such area but permitted to move around the voting stations, as long as they do not impede voter service.

Where there is a separate entrance and exit, it will be easier to coil the queue, through use of barriers, to make better use of the available space within the voting station. This model uses separate entrance and exit doorways and positioning of staff to promote a one-way flow of voters through the voting station. Barriers are again used to control flow from entrance to eligibility checking/materials issue area and to prevent voters moving back into the voting area from the ballot box.

Care must be taken to ensure that voters needing assistance, for complex queries on voting or assistance with completing a ballot, have free passage to the area where the voting station manager is located.

In other respects, this model is generally similar to the previous model. With a coiled queue, where there are larger numbers of voters, separate entry (1) and queue control (2) officers may be required. Using a separate exit, the ballot box may be placed closer to the exit to allow exit supervision by officials guarding the ballot box (8).

Where voters are marked with ink to indicate that they have voted, an additional polling official and table (5) may be needed next to the voter check/materials issue table (5a) for checking that voters are not already marked with ink, and applying ink to voters established as eligible to vote at that voting station.

In this model, the voter queue is split into queues divided alphabetically on the voters' names--in the example, separate A to M, N to Z queues, each going to a separate eligibility checking/materials issuing table (voters lists will need to split in the same alphabetical fashion). Clear signs and a staff member at or near position 2 are required to direct voters to the correct queue. Other features include:

• at positions 1 and 2, positions for staff to maintain control of the entrance and the queues (in low security-risk situations and where voter flow is not intensive the same official may be able to undertake both tasks);

• use of barriers to ensure that the separate queues do not get mixed;

• placement of the multiple voter eligibility checking/material issuing tables (at 5 and 6) so that officials can monitor both the queue waiting to vote and the voting compartment area.

In systems where regular voting stations may issue voters special types of votes, such as provisional/tendered votes or absentee votes, which require the voter to

• complete a form or declaration and

• after completing the ballot, return to the issuing officials for the ballot and declaration to be enveloped together  it is generally better to provide a separate area for issuing such ballots, rather than holding up normal voters while this more lengthy process is completed.

When there are small numbers of such voters expected, these ballots could be issued by the voting station manager or deputy. Where larger numbers are expected, a separate official or officials may need to be engaged (10 in the above diagram). Where these officials are positioned may be difficult to organise effectively depending on the space available: it would be preferable that they are near the voting station manager's location, as these votes may present greater difficulty to the issuing officials.

However, care should be taken not to interfere with other voter flows if this positioning is adopted. Alternatively, this issuing area could be located near the exit to the voting station, by re-arranging the observer positions at (9) in the above diagram.

A separate ballot box for these voters will generally be required. In such cases, voting compartments specifically for the use of these voters should also be provided, separated from the voting compartments for normal voters, to reduce any voter confusion. This ballot box and voting compartment would be effectively positioned beside the table(s) used for issuing these votes.

While having many similarities with sample layout numbers 4 and 5, this particular layout is set up to utilise bank-style queuing (with use of the queuing area maximised by coiling the queue), so that when voters reach the head of a single queue at position 2, they are directed to the first vacant voter eligibility checking/materials issuing table.

Use of this method will require a legal framework that allows a copy of the complete voters list for the whole geographic area serviced by the voting station to be used at each of the tables checking voter eligibility 

Where there is more than one voting stream in a voting station and each of these streams is for a different voting subdivision, it would be usual for voters from each stream to be required by law to deposit their ballots in a separate ballot box. Setting up a voting station to maintain an uncluttered logical voter flow can be difficult, particularly if the same access has to be used for entry and exit from the voting area.

Even where there are separate entrance and exit doors, configuring the voting station to minimise the risk of voters placing their ballots in the incorrect ballot box, by use of appropriately placed barriers, can be difficult to achieve without disrupting the ability of officials and observers to move around the voting station. In the above model, the two streams for different voting subdivisions are kept apart with voters from voting subdivision 1 moving through the eligibility/materials issuing area (5) through to their voting screens (7a) to their specific ballot box (8a) and thence to the exit. Similarly voters from voting subdivision 2 move through their relevant areas, (6b), (7b), and (8b).

Voting stations operating these procedures may be more difficult to control without a relatively large floor space to voter ratio, or entry and exit points on opposite sides of the voting area, to allow voters to pass in a straight line through the stages of the voting process.

 

Reserving Voting Sites

Arrangements should be made to contract for the use of voting sites as soon as they have been identified, inspected as to suitability (or assessed by other means), and the date or dates on which they are required to be used are known. For elections on fixed, regular dates, this can be planned well in advance.

Where election dates are not at fixed, regular terms, there will usually be speculation about probable voting dates for some time before the election announcement.

Where voting sites are at locations which cannot be demanded for election use, it is generally wise for the electoral management body to make tentative booking arrangements for possible dates, in advance of the formal election announcement.

Issues to Be Covered in Contractual Arrangements

Whether voting sites are on state or privately owned premises, formal contracts for their use need to be arranged, so that there is no doubt in anyone's mind as to the facilities to be provided and dates on which the electoral management body has use of the location. Contracts for use of voting locations should cover the following issues:

The dates and times for which the location is to be available for voting-related activities. Exclusive use during the time between delivery of election materials to the voting stations and dispatch of material following close of the votinh or the count is required. Clear definition of access to the location, for example, for installing additional telephone lines or other infrastructure equipment, prior to voting day is also needed.

The facilities that may be used. If a building has more than one room, the rooms to be made available should be specified. Voting staff and/or public rights of access to communications, water, toilet, power, lighting, and food preparation facilities available at the location should be specified and agreed.

Responsibilities for cleaning of the location at the conclusion of the contract period and any associated costs for which the electoral management body will be liable should be specified.

The fee (if any) to be paid for use, and any circumstances under which this may be varied must clearly stated.

Any requirement by the location provider for their staff to be present in a caretaking capacity during voting use, and any additional payment associated with this should be outlined.

Responsibilities for damages and methods of assessing the value of any damage caused during voting use. Before signing the contract, election administration officials should note any existing damage and a defects report should be prepared and signed by both parties. In some circumstances a deposit for damages may be required; it should be confirmed that this is refundable.

Particularly when leasing private property for a voting location, care must be taken to ensure that:

• there are no restrictions in any other contractual arrangements that would prevent the use of the location as a voting station;

• signatories to the contract are authorised to sign.

Other Matters for Agreement

There are a number of other matters that may not need to be specified in the contract but which will need clear written agreement with the provider of the voting location. These would include:

Any requirements for the electoral management body to take out liability insurance for the period of the contract. This would normally be the electoral management body's responsibility, though in some jurisdictions the state may act as its own insurer.

It is prudent to ensure that there is valid public liability insurance coverage against accident/injury to officials, voters and others on the premises.

Arrangements for picking up keys and any security passwords required to enter the premises, and for return of keys at the conclusion of the contract. Keys to premises should generally be available for delivery of materials and to the voting station manager on the day and/or night before voting day, to allow set up of the voting station.

It is crucial that these arrangements are clearly understood and that the keys or access codes provided allow entry to all the areas and facilities (including toilets, kitchen facilities, storage areas, or cabinets) specified as available in the contract.

Availability of a representative of the location's owner during the period the voting station is being set up and is in operation, in case any problems arise with any of the site's facilities.

Contingency Voting Sites

While it as an additional expense, particularly in areas where security risks are high, it can be useful to identify a small number of contingency voting sites within each electoral district, and arrange for them to be reserved for use for voting, in case of emergencies at other voting stations.

The cost of any wasted leasing fees are insubstantial compared to those for postponing an election.

Voting Site Needs Assessments

Materials and equipment required in each voting location will be dependent on:

• the number of expected voters (see Locations of Voting Sites);

• the range of voting services to be provided;

• the number of voting station officials that will be present, which will itself be dependent on voter numbers and voting procedures to be implemented;

• the standard of facilities that are to be provided .

Allocation of materials and equipment to each voting location, to be cost-effective, needs to be based on strict needs assessments taking into account the circumstances at each location.

For maximum cost-effectiveness, this needs to be a "bottom up" process (overall requirements being a total of identified needs at each location), rather than "top down" (creating an overall "guesstimate" of requirements and dividing this among all locations).

This will be more effectively implemented if voting sites are identified well in advance of the election, sufficiently before deadlines for placing orders for materials and equipment.

Conducting Needs Assessments

In conducting needs assessments there are three phases:

1. Determining, from expected voters and staffing numbers, the materials and equipment that will be required for effective operation of the voting station.
   These needs should be formally recorded for each voting location. Integrating these requirements on the same record may become unwieldy under non-automated systems. Separate records for facilities requirements, voting equipment, staffing and voting materials may be easier to control. Voting materials requirements, in particular, are usually better dealt with in a separate record 
2. Determining which of the required facilities and equipment are already available at the voting location, from inspections of the voting location or other investigations and ensuring in contractual arrangements for use of the location that these will be made available for voting
3. Determining the shortfalls and making arrangements for supply of the necessary equipment/materials. For each voting location an inventory should be prepared listing quantities of all items to be supplied to the location. Depending on the origin of the supply (some times, such as additional telecommunications links, additional water, and toilet facilities, may not be supplied directly by the electoral management body) such inventories may need to be broken down into separate delivery schedules by supplier and a supply date.

Review of Needs Assessments

Where needs assessments are conducted by local electoral managers, some form of supervisory management review of estimated requirements at a regional or central level will assist in standardising resource use and services provided and maintaining controls over cost-effectiveness.

The use of standard schedules, related to voter numbers expected, for estimation of resources needs by field/local managers, for staffing, materials, equipment, and facilities, with any variations from these standards requiring management approval at a regional or central level will minimise the management control workloads.

Arrangements with Other Organisations

Upgrading of facilities at voting sites may require coordination between the electoral management body and other government agencies or service organisations.

Given the often rushed time frames of election preparation, it is essential that close liaison is established between senior electoral management body officers and similarly senior executives of external service providers to ensure that the priority for election-related upgrade work is firmly established.

In some cases, pressure may need to be applied through executive government; this can be necessary when dealing with state-based monopoly service providers, such as telecommunications providers, in many countries.

Voting Station Readiness

Failure to implement control systems to ensure that each voting station is properly prepared to open for voting at the appointed time can lead not only to poor service of voters but potential failure of the election.

It is  vital that electoral management body workplans for the election period include review points where voting site preparedness must be assessed to enable speedy rectification of any deficiencies.

While the exact timing of most of these review points will depend on the time frames in the specific election's calendar, there are standard issues that need to be addressed. In the last week before voting day, especially, daily monitoring of the state of readiness of voting stations is essential.

This encompasses not only assurances regarding the sites themselves, but that all supplies and personnel are in place for transport to the required locations and that all material dispatched has arrived at its intended destination. These checks are generally better distributed down the election chain of command than all undertaken from a central level.

Use Of Checklists

Use of checklists for these reviews is to be encouraged.

At the electoral district level these could be either separate for each voting station or a combined master inventory of voting station readiness. At the central level, the overall state of readiness on each electoral management district should be similarly tracked.

Initial General Review

First level readiness reviews could take place around four weeks before voting day, depending on the election timetable. At this point, electoral district managers should be able to assure the executive of the central electoral management body that:

• all required voting locations have been officially approved and any legal requirements for their appointment for voting satisfied;

• satisfactory agreements for use of all required voting locations and count centres have been signed;

• layouts for each voting location have been approved;

• needs assessments have been conducted for each voting location and the required equipment and materials, logistics/transport arrangements, site facilities improvements have been identified, recorded, and arrangements for supply, either from the electoral management body or outside suppliers, implemented according to prescribed procedures;

• staffing numbers for each voting and count location have been approved and staff recruited for all positions;

• training arrangements for all staff are in place.

Second General Review

While continuous monitoring of voting site preparations will be taking place throughout the ensuing weeks, a further major review point should be scheduled for around seven days before voting day.

At this point, assurances regarding the following voting site preparations should be provided to the central electoral management body:

• all required voting station staff have been contracted and have been trained (replacement staff assigned where necessary);

• any additional telecommunications facilities required for voting stations are in place, and that communication systems to all voting stations have been tested and work satisfactorily;

• arrangements for collection of keys and entry to voting station premises have been confirmed;

• contingency plans for materials, equipment, and staffing are ready to be activated if necessary;

• status reports on receipt of all materials required for supply to voting sites and action taken to redress any shortfalls;

• status report on packaging of materials and equipment for transport to voting sites;

• status report on any locally placed public information programs for publicising voting facilities, voting station locations, and hours of voting.

Distribution of Supplies

To ensure voting site readiness, all materials and equipment required for their operation should be distributed prior to voting day; to leave this until the morning when voting commences is to invite problems.

In low security risk situations, where materials are distributed to or collected by voting station managers, these must be checked by each manager on receipt and any omissions or shortfalls reported immediately.

Similarly, where materials are delivered directly to the voting station, voting station managers should arrange to be present at their voting station to receive and check correct delivery of all equipment and materials on the voting station's inventory. Any delivery discrepancies should be immediately reported to the electoral district's administration office. Checklists for these reports should be maintained by electoral district managers.

Set Up Before Voting Day

Voting readiness will be greatly enhanced if voting stations are set up by voting station managers (assisted if necessary by other voting station officials) on the day/night before voting commences, wherever the location is suitable for this (outdoor voting locations, for example, will generally not be possible to treat in this manner).

It is useful if, following set-up, each voting station manager reports to the electoral district manager that the voting station is set up and secured, ready for the commencement of voting the following day. Such reports can also serve as a final test of the communication systems to be used on voting day.

Following completion of set-up, and reporting of voting readiness, the voting station manager should ensure that lights are extinguished, any security alarms are activated, and that the area is locked before leaving.

Set-Up Checklist

A checklist should be completed by each voting station manager showing that all required actions for setting up the voting station have been completed. Relevant items to include on the checklist would be:

• lighting is satisfactory, and any additional lighting equipment requisitioned has been installed;

• communication systems--telephone, fax, radios, as relevant--are operational;

• all required areas of the voting station are accessible with the keys provided;

• the correct ballot boxes are present, remain unsealed, and are in the required positions;

• tables, chairs, and barriers have been arranged according to the approved layout;

• voting compartments have been installed, correctly positioned, and (where manual voting is used) have writing implements attached;

• all allocated communications equipment is in place;

• information posters and notices required inside the voting station have been displayed in the correct positions;

• material, including any instructional material or checklists for officials, has been sorted for use and allocated to the correct tables/areas of the voting station;

• if continuous security has been arranged, the security forces are in place according to plans;

• ballots, voters lists, and other accountable materials have been properly secured (in environments of low security risk, these could remain with the voting station manager and be brought in on voting day; in less secure environments, the voting station manager should report that these accountable materials are safely secured in whatever location had been previously arranged, for example, police, bank, or other institutional safes);

• any electronic equipment to be used for voting has been tested on site and is functioning correctly.

Morning of Voting Day

On the morning of voting day, before the scheduled time for commencement of voting, each voting station manager should report to the electoral district manager that the voting station is ready for voting. This information is vital to election managers.

The last problem they want on voting day is to be unaware of voting stations that are not going to be open on time or voting station managers who have suddenly discovered that they are missing vital materials.

Where voting stations have been set up and readiness reports have been provided the previous night, this may seem like a redundant requirement.

However, situations may change between set-up time and arrival the next morning. Where large numbers of voting stations are administered from one point, a schedule of reporting times will generally need to be drawn up; what is important is that a report is received before the time for commencement of voting from all voting stations.

Any problems at the voting stations--staff who have not reported for duty, materials or equipment problems not previously noticed, security issues or large crowds of voters already gathered to vote--should be quickly and clearly reported to allow early implementation of contingency plans 

Voting Location Maps

Once the locations of voting sites have been officially approved, maps should be prepared showing the location of voting stations and relevant electoral district and voting subdivisions boundaries.

The timing of production of these maps is important; it is one of the first actions that should be undertaken as soon as voting station locations are determined.

Use of Maps

Maps will be necessary tools in planning functions required to be implemented well before voting day, important amongst which are:

• planning by the electoral management body of effective logistics routes for delivery and return of materials  and for allocation and transport of voting station officials;

• developing security plans, including the need for any security escorted transport of materials, voting station officials, and voters to and from voting stations, and devising optimal locations for voting security forces and emergency response units (see Voting Site Security);

• public information campaign purposes, in advising voters of the voting station or stations at which they should vote.

Maps will also be of significant use at voting stations in redirecting voters who have attended an incorrect voting station.

Map Production

The manner in which the maps are developed, and the quality required, will vary according to the sophistication and reliability of mapping systems available and their cost-effectiveness, as well as the purpose for which they are being used. Potential methods of production could include: Use of sophisticated automated geographic information systems (GIS) to plot voting station locations. Where electoral GIS systems exist for voter registration or boundary delimitation purposes, plotting of voting station locations and production of the relevant maps could be undertaken through that system. In most circumstances, such sophisticated map production would have to be contracted out, often to state land management agencies or even to the military.

Given the critical importance of correct maps, such sophisticated systems should not generally be used unless they have a proven track record of accurate, timely preparation for electoral purposes. In less developed societies particularly, reliance on lower technology mapping methods are generally a more effective and safer alternative.

Hand plotting of voting subdivision boundaries and voting station locations on existing maps. These could be maps prepared for electoral district boundary delimitation purposes or other generally available maps that clearly show roads, other transport, and topographic features.

For logistics, operations centre, and particularly security planning purposes, considerable detail will be required. Developing maps with transparent overlays showing the various components of logistics/security planning, administrative and security areas of responsibility, materials transport routes, and likely voter routes to voting stations can be a useful tool for integrating the large amounts of information required to be shown.

Preparation by the electoral management body staff of hand-drawn maps showing voting station locations and electoral district/voting subdivision boundaries in relation to major topographic features and road/transport infrastructure.

These can be perfectly adequate for public information distribution, such as in pamphlets advising voters of their correct voting station.

Scale of Maps

It is important that the scale of the maps produced suits their purpose. Local administrators will require detailed maps of their administrative area and possibly less detailed maps of surrounding regions. Logistics and security planners will need detailed local area maps of voting locations for the whole area in which elections are being conducted, with larger scale summary maps.

Voting stations can usefully be supplied with a detailed map of the electoral district/voting subdivision(s) which the voting station serves, and a larger scale map showing this in relation to surrounding electoral districts/voting subdivisions.

Quantities of different types of maps produced will need to be carefully related to the needs--in voting stations, by electoral administrators, for public distribution and voter information, and to external bodies such as security forces, observers and political participants.

Voting Site Security

What is involved when looking at the broad area of security in relation to voting operations? Immediate attention is generally attracted to securing voting locations and voter safety on voting day, so that voting may occur without disruption, fraud, intimidation, or threat to life.

However, the facets of election security are much broader than that and affect all aspects of an election. Without sufficient guarantees of security at all stages of the election process (and "sufficient" varies widely according to each country's social and political environment), there can be no guarantee of election freedom, fairness, and integrity.

In broad terms, election security would address three objectives:

• physical security of premises and materials;

• personal security of voters, candidates, party workers or officials, electoral officials, and the general community;

• security of election information, computer systems and software, and communication systems  Powers to enforce election security measures in these regards would normally be legislatively defined.

Specific Security Concerns

Specifically, measures taken may need to address the security needs of:

• electors registering to vote;

• voter registration staff and premises;

• electoral management body staff and premises;

• voter education and information workers;

• production, transport, and use of election materials and equipment, particularly voting material;

• premises used for production and storage of election materials and equipment;

• potential voters;

• training, voting, and ballot counting locations;

• training, polling, and counting officials;

• party workers, candidates, and their supporters 

• premises used for party or candidate activities;

• election-related data, and the manual or electronic systems in which it is stored;

• voice and data communication systems used for the election;

• prevention of election-related fraud, whether concerned with candidate and party registration, voting , vote counting and determination of results, or voter registration and compilation of voters lists;

• premises and staff of other state or non-government authorities who are perceived as having a symbolic or actual relationship with the election processes.

Thus security, in one form or another, is an issue from the time initial preparations for an election commence. Voting operations security measures discussed in this section need to be integrated into the overall security operations for the complete election process.

Voting Site Security

Security for the operation of voting sites can be a complex exercise, particularly in higher security risk environments, due to the dispersed nature of the locations which need to be secured. It is also costly, both in terms of providing secure equipment and materials and a safe environment in which voters may vote.

Thus there is a responsibility on security planners to ensure that cost-effective responses are provided to the level of risk assessed as surrounding the voting process. 

What Are Adequate Security Levels?

Security is a high-cost exercise. In some respects the true cost may not always be apparent to electoral administrators. While the costs of measures to protect election material integrity (such as ballot boxes, special paper stock, voter identification cards) will generally be provided from election-specific funding, the costs of providing personal and property security may often be invisibly subsumed within operating budgets of other state agencies.

To promote efficiency and sustainability of election operations, it is advisable that a total project budgeting approach be taken, and such hidden costs be openly identified in election financial management systems.

Conducting thorough election security risk analyses allows a cost-effective targeting of security measures. While it is not possible to cover in this brief summary the range of alternative security measures that may be appropriate for different specific environments, some examples include:

• Is a police or military presence justified at all or some voting stations, or is the level of threat such that adequate security can be maintained by taking other measures like locating voting stations close to existing security force locations, or by merely maintaining operational liaison with security forces to ensure swift response to any disruption?

• Are expensive special security paper stocks required for ballot papers and other voting material, or can production controls and issuing integrity measures be implemented to provide adequate security through methods such as placing an official authorisation mark on voting material at the time of issue to a voter?

• Do election materials production and storage sites need to be guarded, or can adequate security controls be implemented by measures such as better staff integrity screening, physical site security (e.g., use of existing safes, locking and alarm mechanisms), and rigorous and auditable production and dispatch controls?

• Do security forces need to accompany election materials in transport, or can adequate safeguards be provided by confidential transport scheduling and routing, or using the presence of representatives of political participants to provide counter-balancing checks? Additionally, can transport of election material be minimised to reduce any potential security risk?

• Should ballot boxes be made of durable material, or do cheaper and more easily transportable bags or cardboard boxes provide adequate security?

• What measures are adequate to minimise voter fraud? Are special voter identification cards really necessary? Can existing identification documents be used, or can a combination of other measures (for example challenge procedures and ballot issue procedures) negate the need for any identity document to verify voting rights? Can adequate multiple voting controls be instituted through rigorous identity controls and accurate voters lists, rather than use of expensive additional measures such as marking of voters with security inks?

Low Security Risk Environments

There are countries for which the peaceful determination of continuation or transfer of powers of governance is an established tenet of societal behaviour. In such countries the large scale formal involvement of the state's security apparatus (police or military forces) in a security role for elections is likely to be limited (though their logistics and communications capabilities may be extensively used).

This limited security involvement will still require coordination and planning with the electoral administration.

Even in such societies, with little or no threat of election-related personal or property violation, open and transparent elections demand some level of administrative security measures to be in place to ensure the integrity of election materials production and handling, the protection of data, the safeguarding and secrecy of ballots, and the deterrence of fraud and manipulation.

High Security Risk Environments

At the other end of the spectrum, societies in or emerging from intense or violent conflict or characterised by a high degree of distrust among political participants may require very close integration of election administration and domestic or international security forces' activities to enable an election to be conducted with disruption kept to a minimal level and the integrity of election materials assured.

Security Responsibilities and Planning

To ensure that security at voting sites is delivered cost-effectively, planning of appropriate security precautions and responses should be undertaken on the basis of risk assessments of the general election environment and specific geographic areas (for details of security risk assessments, see Security Risk Assessments).

Coordination with Other Agencies

Unlike most voting operations management issues, which may be fully addressed within the electoral management body, providing security for voting sites may involve intensive cooperation with other agencies of state--police and military forces--with their own method of operations and priorities that may not be fully in line with that of election management. In planning voting site security measures, essential issues include:

• ensuring that sufficient security resources are available in the specific locations and during the hours required;

• fostering very close coordination between security forces management and election managers in developing security responses and voting site plans;

• clearly identifying the chains of command and responsibility for security planning and action between civilian and security forces organisations. These factors in voting operations will be more critical the higher the security risks for the election.

No matter what the security situation, some degree of planning and cooperation between electoral management bodies and security forces will be required. It is important that this is, and is seen to be, under the control of electoral management bodies; security forces control of this planning process can be easily interpreted as evidence of control of the election.

Responsibilities

The boundaries of different organisations' responsibilities must be clear to all participants in security planning. Broadly they can be outlined as:

• electoral management bodies responsibility for decisions on security planning that may affect election processes (but taking appropriate advice from security forces on issues such as the security implications of particular voting site locations or methods of transport);

• security forces responsibility for determining what is the appropriate use of force or power to ensure public safety in response to situations arising during voting. Under any circumstances the following particular aspects have to be dealt with during security planning.

Joint Planning Structure

The structures implemented to develop security plans will also vary according to the level of risks in the election environment. In all cases, continual information exchange between election managers and security forces is beneficial.

Even without formal consultative structures, it is highly useful for officers in both electoral management bodies and security forces to be designated as contact persons on election security matters, and meet regularly to ensure that corporate knowledge of each other's activities is current within these organisations. In low security risk environments, where the focus of security is more on election integrity than personal safety, such liaison may be the only security planning structure required.

In higher security risk environments, and particularly where there are many players in the state security structure or international peacekeeping forces have been introduced, a formal structure that meets regularly on security issues, chaired by an appropriately senior electoral official, is vital for voting security coordination.

Geographic Areas of Responsibility

Electoral district boundaries, especially when drawn by an independent body, are unlikely to be congruent with security forces' normal administrative or operational areas. As far as possible, security forces' operational boundaries for election security should be made up of whole electoral districts (either singly or in clusters), to ensure simplified, effective action and liaison during voting.

Effective liaison points between election and security authorities need to be developed within each of these areas of responsibility.

In higher security risk environments, such liaison is usefully developed into joint operations centres, fully integrating security force planning and action into voting operations management (see Operations and Security Centres).

Resource Planning

In planning security requirements, all involved need to realise that security forces generally do not know a lot about elections operations, and conversely, election managers are not often experts on appropriate security responses.

It is useful if security is dealt with like other technical issues, with needs and specifications drawn up by the electoral management body, draft plans to meet these developed by security forces, and then brought to a joint meeting for approval, using wherever possible security force personnel with an understanding of election needs through prior experience.

Sufficient advance notice of voting operations plans is necessary to enable security force resource planning. The basic information needs are:

• proposed location and period of operation of voting sites, count centres, election administration offices, and storage facilities;

• proposed distribution and return plans for election materials, equipment, and staff.

These should be provided to security forces, even in low security risk environments, as soon as they are determined. In higher security risk environments, information on other aspects of voting, such as planned/approved political campaign rallies and expected voter routes to and from voting stations, will also need to be discussed with security authorities. Advice on security issues relating to these proposals should be considered by the electoral management body before planning is finalised.

Early advice to security is prudent as provision of election security may require adjustment to security forces' existing plans in a number of areas, such as:

• leave rosters;

• unit rotations;

• use of their budget allocation for overtime or fuel;

• servicing schedules for vehicles or air transport.

In high security risk environments, manpower planning for election security is likely to be an extensive task for security forces. Consequently, advice on likely needs is required as early as possible before voting day.

Without mobility, security forces will lose considerable effectiveness in their ability to cover all voting sites. As these may be large in number, and geographically dispersed, it will often not be possible to provide static forces close to each voting site capable of dealing with all emergencies. Thus transport and logistics planning (sufficient availability of light and heavy vehicles and for remote areas possibly helicopters or aircraft) must be carefully considered in security plans.

Emergency Responses

Part of the planning process is to develop clear guidelines for responses to emergencies; be they possibly natural such as fire, or of human intent, such as bomb threats and public riot. For such planning, there may be a need also to involve civil emergency personnel. Plans and guidelines in this regard need to be provided to voting station officials and reinforced during their training.

Chains of Command and Accountability

It is important to determine who is responsible and accountable not only for overall or regional security planning, but for security delivery at the voting site level. As further discussed in Voting Site Security Arrangements, it is highly preferable that at all levels election managers, down to voting site managers, remain responsible for decision-making in the election environment.

The issue of how much discretion local security force commanders have will vary according to the risks in the particular environment, and needs to be covered in security action plans for voting sites. However, for a security force commander to act without a prior request from voting station officials or election management, where there is no clear threat to safety, may compromise the perception of integrity of the election.

Communications

For effective implementation of security plans, a clear communications strategy needs to be developed, both in terms of the physical networks used and communications use policies.

A single communication network linking election managers, voting,sites and security forces through regional or electoral district operations centres will enhance communications effectiveness. (For further discussion of security communications issues, see Use of Communications Networks.)

Higher Security Risk Environments

In all cases it would be preferable to be able to rely on civilian policing authorities for provision of voting site security, to maintain the image of the election process. However, there will be cases where, either through lack of resources, lack of professionalism, or perception of bias in civilian police authorities, that military forces are required to assist with voting security.

In such cases, it is generally preferable that they take a low-visibility role, except when required to take action on actual or potential security breaches.

Security Risk Assessments

Basic Issues

Security is a factor to be considered by electoral administrators in all environments, even those where risks of election-related physical violence are low.

The level of security that is required to assure election freedom, fairness and integrity, can be accurately determined from conducting risk assessments of each voting operations component process within the specific election's environment.

A single blueprint for election security measures cannot be established.

Focus of Security Risk Assessments

Security risk assessments would usually examine for each voting operations component process:

• its vulnerability to disruption, violence, fraud, or manipulation;

• its importance in producing a free and fair election outcome;

• potential security threats to which it may reasonably be subjected;

• the potential impact, if it is not sufficiently secure to withstand potential threats, on the election outcomes, on personal safety, on infrastructure, on other legal or societal obligations (e.g., release of legally protected personal data), or on additional election financial requirements.

Factors to Be Considered in Risk Assessments

In assessing the level of specific threats, it is useful to considerthe following issues, as specific to the particular election, to enable the planning of an appropriate security framework:

The political environment, including analysis of:

• the commitment of each political participant to open and transparent processes;

• the relative competitive strengths of political participants;

• the history and current atmosphere regarding political participants' acceptance and implementation of equitable election frameworks;

• the history of acceptance of potentially adverse election results;

• the stability or transitional nature of current political systems;

• the existence and strengths of any active groups or individuals who may wish to disrupt or subvert election processes;

The conflict environment, including analysis of:

• evident or likely conflict resolution mechanisms (discussion, negotiation, manipulation, fraud, intimidation, violence);

• the level of distrust between political participants;

• the existence of strong geographic, nationality, or issue-based conflicts that will be apparent during the elections;

• the intensity of political conflict;

• the need for or imposition of international intervention to initiate election processes;

The administrative environment, including analysis of:

• the propensity of state institutions to interfere directly or through surrogates in election processes;

• the independence and integrity of election officials;

• the integrity and existing internal security procedures for materials and services suppliers;

The security force environment, including analysis of:

• domestic policing and military forces' integrity, impartiality, professionalism, and operational capabilities;

• the presence and mandate of any international security forces;

• the existence of private militias or official armed forces under the partisan control or influence of political participants;

The information environment, including analysis of:

• the complexity, integrity, and reliability of manual and electronic systems used for storing data on which the proper conduct of the election depends.

Standards and Site Assessments

The best emergency response plans, security management structures, and security personnel resource availability will be tested to the limit if there are not clear security standards implemented within voting stations, and if locations used for voting are not conducive to maintaining security.

Security Standards

Security standards to be applied in voting stations embrace the physical facilities available, crowd control, and materials security measures. Security standards are only one of a number of standards that have to be applied in assessing the suitability of a particular site for voting purposes. Compromises will often need to be made.

(Arrangements for implementation of these standards are further discussed at Voting Site Security Arrangements.)

Physical Facilities at the Voting Station

From a security standpoint, the physical facilities and environment of a voting station should offer:

• a location that is not used for any other purpose during the time the voting station site is in operation;

• communications capabilities, either reliable fixed telephone line(s) or good mobile phone/radio network reception (see Use of Communications Networks);

• clear lines of sight throughout the voting station area--buildings used would preferably be of open plan rather than multi-room design;

• exit and entrance facilities that can be effectively monitored with a minimal staff allocation and are placed to allow a logical flow of votors through the voting area (wherever possible buildings with a common entrance/exit would preferably be avoided);

• proximity to security forces' permanent or temporary election operational bases;

• emergency exit facilities that allow quick clearance of the voting station area.

Crowd Control Measures

In relation to crowd control, a basic essential measure is to be able to identify easily those persons authorised to be in the voting station area. This is most simply done by ensuring that:

• all authorised persons who are not attending to vote (voting station officials, party/candidate representatives, independent observers, official visitors) are issued an official identification badge by the electoral management body, or, failing that, an officially recognised letter of accreditation;

• in environments of potential disruption, only voters eligible to vote at that voting station are allowed to enter, by screening voters' identification documents or checking their details against a copy of the voters list, at the voting station entrance.

Methods of removal of unauthorised visitors, possibly with the aid of security forces, need to be clearly understood by voting station officials and security force personnel.

Within the area used for voting, crowd control measures should aim towards:

• moving voters as quickly as possible through the voting station along defined paths (if possible by the use of portable barriers);

• ensuring that voters do not linger in the voting area after casting their vote.

Delays in voting and consequent slow-moving queues or confused patterns of movement through the voting station may well provoke totally avoidable security problems and disturbances.

Conduct in Voting Stations

Enforcement of some basic personal and political behavioural standards within voting stations will also help in maintaining security. On a personal level, the banning of weapons and alcohol or other drugs within the voting station reduces the potential for disturbance.

Similarly, any intoxicated or obviously biased voting station officials require immediate replacement, and intoxicated voters need to be removed swiftly.

A legally enforceable ban on campaigning within the voting station area helps in preventing exacerbation of existing tensions.

Depending on the environment the extent of this ban may vary; at a minimum it should include a ban on political speeches and distribution of political literature within the voting station.

This may usefully be extended to cover an area surrounding the voting station itself, or to the wearing within such an area of any clothing or badges that may be associated with any political candidate or issue.

With regard to parties, candidates, and voting station officials, clear guidelines on behavioural issues are necessary in their respective codes of conduct.

Such codes of conduct may be voluntary agreements, or included in electoral legislation.

Materials Security Locations for voting stations should also, if possible, offer facilities that help in maintaining voting material security. It would be preferable that secure storage be available for voting material not currently in use.

No matter what safe storage facilities may be available, materials security will be underpinned by implementation of strict standards for materials handling. These standards require thorough reinforcement during voting station officials' training, as the quality of their implementation affects both voting security and integrity. Basic standards include:

• guarding of all official voting material from the moment it reaches the voting station until it leaves--simple issues often overlooked by staff, like leaving material unattended to take a restroom break or leaving unused voting material in the custody of senior officials who may be called from their posts may breach security;

• apart from the voter (or if an assisted voter, their designated assistant), no other person apart form authorised voting station officials should be permitted to handle election material;

• thorough reconciliations of voting material on delivery and at the close of voting.

Site Assessments

In determining voting station locations, potential sites need to be assessed against security standards in conjunction with other suitability criteria 

These assessments should, wherever possible, be done by personal inspection of the site by an employee of the electoral management body. In high security risk areas, it can be useful to gain expert security advice from police or military staff accompanying such inspections.

Where voting station officials have been appointed prior to determining locations for voting stations, the voting station manager could undertake this inspection or accompany the electoral management body staff.

Security and general operations planning will be aided if a checklist style report on this inspection is completed.

Where personal inspection is not possible, a checklist of the security and other suitability criteria should still be completed by the owner (or in the case of state authorities, occupier) of the premises and returned to the electoral management body.

Operations and Security Centres

Particularly in medium to high security risk environments, it is essential to find effective means of integrating security planning and implementation with other aspects of voting operations, while retaining the electoral management body's control over voting processes. Such integration can be achieved by creating joint operations centres (JOCs) for voting processes.

Management Responsibilities

JOCs are an initiative better taken by the election management body than other participants. By integrating the oversight of security and voting operations facets of voting day into one joint body, reporting from voting station site staff and security forces is more efficient and can assist in making response times to queries and operational and security crises more effective.

A major responsibility is the planning, implementation, and response management of security for voting. However, they can be effectively used in a broader role in overseeing voting station performance and dealing with operational emergencies during voting.

The JOC's role could also be extended to cover voter registration campaigns (if held close to voting day) and security for political campaigning. The following could be seen as generic responsibilities:

• developing plans for voting security and ensuring that all required election security resources are in place;

• coordination of responses to security emergencies;

• coordination of response to logistics, staffing, or other operational emergencies;

• information control from and to voting stations, security units, and other voting operatives in the field--in this respect it is important that communication is two way: not just reporting of occurrences from the field, but advice from the JOCs to field staff of action being taken or replies to queries;

• communications base for regular security and voting operations reporting from voting stations and security units;

• providing advice on any permissions required for political activity.

The use of JOCs, as well as aiding voting management coordination, can also provide a focal point for media covering election processes and provide consistent information for public reporting.

It is important that any JOC decisions or actions taken that affect the voting process are documented, in case they are raised in any challenge to the validity of the election.

Management Control

It is highly preferable that management control of the JOCs remains in the hands of representatives of the electoral management body, taking advice from specialist members in such areas as security, civil emergency, traditional society needs, and the like.

While representatives of executive government may be present in JOCs, their role should be that of observer and information conduit only.

Representation in JOCs

The staffing of such centres will depend on the types of organisations that are contributing to the successful conduct of the elections.

Representatives of these bodies in the joint operations centres must be of sufficient standing to make decisions on behalf of their organisations, or the benefit of prompt response and coordination is lost. At the most basic level, representation in the JOCs would, at all times it is in operation, comprise:

• senior elections manager(s);

• staff officers from the police forces and, if involved in election security, national or international military forces;

• representatives of political participants in the election. Depending on the cultural and security environment in the JOC's area of responsibility, representation from the following organisations may also be required:

• civil emergency and rescue services, such as fire and ambulance services;

• skilled negotiation or conflict resolution specialists;

• non-government bodies (NGOs) and other civic organisations;

• women's groups;

• in rural areas, leaders of traditional society or their representatives.

Geographic Areas of Responsibility of JOCs

The level at which JOCs are set up will influence their operational effectiveness. Geographic areas of responsibility should follow election administration areas, for single electoral districts or clusters of districts.

Depending on the potential workloads and response times, it may be useful to set up JOCs at the local as well as regional level, taking care that in any multi-level JOC structure there is clear and prompt communication between the levels and that each level is clear on the boundaries of its responsibilities.

Period of Operation

In planning the integration of security and operational actions, the JOC should be in place at the very latest at the calling of the election. Full-time operation, with at least the basic representation noted above present, is useful from the time any early voting commences, or when materials delivery to voting stations commences.

(It may also need to be considered during the voter registration period.) Depending on assessed security risks, JOCs may also need to be operational after the close of voting through to the announcement of results and return of materials from voting stations or counting centres to secure storage.

JOC Facilities

JOCs would preferably be located in civilian premises, but if police or military communications networks are being used, it may be more cost-effective to set up JOC facilities near communication base stations. Some basic facilities will be required for their operation:

• a room of sufficient size to accommodate all JOC members and support staff during long hours of duty;

• communication base facilities (fixed line telephone, mobile phone, radio, and facsimile) sufficient to allow prompt and reliable communication with all voting stations, electoral administration offices, fixed and mobile security forces, reserve supply depots, executive government representatives, emergency services, and civil society leaders within the area of responsibility, and with links to electoral management bodies and security forces elsewhere;

• maps of the area of responsibility showing locations of voting stations, security forces, election administration offices, election reserve supply depots locations;

• voting management reference material, e.g., copies of the legal texts and manuals forming the basis for voting procedures, staffing, logistics, and security.

Voting Site Security Arrangements

In implementing the security regime for voting stations, operational tactics will depend on:

• the goals that are intended to be achieved;

• the resources that are available;

• the roles played by the various participants in voting operations in maintaining security.

Particularly from a resource perspective, planning of voting station security arrangements needs to be integrated with other election security requirements (see Voting Site Security).

Voting station security arrangements may appear appropriate on paper, but their effective implementation depends upon voting station  officials and security forces at the local level establishing good liaison and acting in a decisive manner. (For discussion of the roles in voting station security of polling officials and security forces, see Role and Powers of Voting Station Staff and Security Forces.) This section looks at physical and personal security within, and in the vicinity of, voting stations.

Aims of Voting Station Security

Effective implementation of security measures at voting stations aids in ensuring the openness, freedom, and integrity of voting. The goals that voting station security arrangements should aim to achieve can be summarised as:

• freedom of movement to and from voting stations;

• prevention of, or at least providing an effective response to, any disturbances in or near a voting station, or attempts to disrupt voting;

• security of all election materials, and particularly ballot material, while it is at the voting station

• preventing intimidation of voters and voting station officials within and around voting stations;

• the safety of voters at the voting station;

• the safety of voting station officials, observers, party or candidate workers, and official visitors at the voting station;

• ensuring that voting is conducted in a lawful manner;

• ensuring that only authorised persons enter the voting station and any surrounding restricted area.

Any public perception of or actual bias shown by voting station officials or security forces towards any of the political participants in the election is likely to exacerbate tensions and make these aims more difficult to achieve.

Voting Station Security Issues

Within these general aims, the specific issues that voting station security arrangements need to cover include the following:

Protection of materials and the voting station between the time of delivery of materials to the voting station and the commencement of voting. Where materials are delivered in an effective way, that is, on the day before voting day, such arrangements will need to cover overnight security and security while the voting station and materials are being set up.

Ensuring a safe passage for voters, officials, and candidates on their way to and from voting stations . In higher security risk areas, this may require security forces patrolling around the voting station perimeter. In areas of extreme risk, secure transport for voters, officials, and candidates may need to be provided (Where such cases are the result of inter-communal violence, it may be more cost-effective to revise voting station locations, or institute facilities for absentee voting).

The maintenance of effective voting station entrance and exit controls during voting. In developing these, a basic principle of prevention rather than reaction is useful. In higher risk environments, screening persons as to eligibility to enter the voting station at as far a distance as is possible from the actual voting area minimises potential disruption. Controls at this point may need to include confiscation of weapons.

Rapid response from security forces in case of threats to the safety of voters or officials . Particularly where security forces are not present in voting stations, reliable communication systems in each voting station and security force transport need to be in place.

Protection of voting materials from theft or misuse . A major factor in this is arrangements to counter attempted voter fraud  This issue also includes proper materials reconciliation processes on delivery and close of voting, physical layout of the voting station ( and providing secure storage during voting hours for materials not currently in use.

Emergency evacuation procedures, in case of threats to safety or natural disaster . In higher security risk areas, it is prudent to draw up formal plans for security force involvement in these circumstances under the control of the joint operations centres (see Operations and Security Centres). In all circumstances, voting station managers and their staff should be aware of procedures for adjourning voting and evacuating voting stations following natural disasters or other emergencies.

Control of access to the ballot count. This would include, if the count is to be conducted elsewhere, strict control and reconciliation of voting materials on dispatch to and arrival at the count, and monitoring of transport to the count centres.

Physical Arrangements

Security considerations are important in both the selection of appropriate voting locations and the layout within voting stations. In establishing voting stations, security-conscious management will consider the following issues:

• Voting stations are, wherever possible, located within reasonable proximity to security forces' operational bases.

• The building or area used for voting has a relatively open area around it which can be physically marked in some way (if not fenced, then marked with rope or tape) to designate the external boundaries of the voting station within which only authorised access is permitted. This area would be monitored by voting station officials (from within) or, if necessary, security forces (preferably from without).

Ejecting unauthorised persons at such a distance, rather than from amongst voting activities, is likely to be much less disruptive. Some jurisdictions define legally such an area in terms of a radius in metres around the voting station itself; where security risks are relatively high, this is an effective security control mechanism.

• There are a limited number of entrances to and exits from the actual voting area, that can be closely watched by voting station officials. Preferably, there would be a single, separate entrance and exit. Any access to the actual voting area that are not in official use are better securely locked.

• Securing materials inside the voting station is easier if there is a clearly defined path for voters to follow through the voting station--in through one door or area with the layout leading voters out through another door or area preferably on the opposite side of the voting station from the entrance  A confused voter path through the voting station can lead to voters milling around and getting in each other's way, and has the potential to create conflict.

• The need for any secure repository, outside the voting station, for confiscated weapons.

• There is a voice communication facility between each voting station and the electoral district manager and operations control centre (see Use of Communications Networks).

• Procedures are in place for commencement and finish of voting that allow public verification of sealing and unsealing of ballot boxes or voting machine/computer records.

• Ballot boxes (whether in current use or full) are always guarded throughout voting hours by a voting station official (as this tends to be a boring task, rotating voting station officials through this position at regular intervals can be useful).

• Care in positioning of materials and ballot boxes within the voting station so that they remain clearly visible and cannot be removed, for example, where security risks are relatively low, placement of the ballot boxes can allow a single official both to guard the ballot box and to ensure that voters do not enter the voting station from the exit for the voting station; however, care needs to be taken that they are not placed so close to the exit to invite their removal.

• Storage of voting materials and staff positioning within the voting station in a manner that ensures that materials are not left unattended, and that materials not currently in use (in particular unused accountable voting materials and filled ballot boxes) are kept securely.

• If the voting station is dealing with voters voting for elections for different electoral districts, appropriate use is made of barriers or rooms to ensure that these voter streams are kept separate.

• Where voting is by machine or computer, that equipment (including cables, modems, and other ancillary equipment) is placed and guarded in such a manner that it cannot be tampered with or deliberately damaged.

• Whether voting stations can also be used effectively for the initial counts of ballots, thus minimising any additional security needs for the count and transport of ballots.

Role and Powers of Voting Station Staff and Security Forces

Within the boundaries of the voting station, however defined, effective control over security can only be achieved if there is clarity about the respective roles and responsibilities of both voting station officials and security forces.

Linking voting station officials and security forces chains of command through local or regional joint operations centres (see Operations and Security Centres) allows better coordination of their respective roles.

Lower Risk Environments

Under normal circumstances, control of the voting station is an election management issue and, therefore, is a matter for the voting station manager. If security forces are to be present within the voting station, it should preferably be at the voting station manager's invitation in response to a specific occurrence, and security forces would normally leave when the occurrence has been resolved.

In low security risk environments, security forces may operate from their normal bases; as risks increase, dispersed operational security bases or rapid reaction forces (see Rapid Reaction and Reserve Forces) may be necessary.

Presence of Security Forces

However, many elections are held under conditions that do not approach normal circumstances, and different models may need to be applied, depending on the risk analysis for the particular voting station or its region. In determining whether there should be a security force presence inside voting stations, the basic factors to be considered include:

• the level of risk;

• the intimidating effect that security forces within voting station may have on voters;

• the cost-effectiveness of internal versus external security presence.

These factors cannot be considered in isolation, though voters' and officials' safety considerations are of paramount concern. Where high risks of violence towards voters or officials--particularly bomb threats, potential ballot box theft, blatant favouritism by election officials--have been established, a security force presence inside voting stations needs to be carefully considered.

Against this, consideration needs to be made of the effect this presence will have on voters, dependent on the established professionalism and integrity of security forces. It is important that voting station security is maintained. It is equally important that the presence of uniformed police or armed forces, or close supervision of voters' actions by administrative authorities, does not in and of itself influence or intimidate voters.

Particularly where local executive authorities or security forces are perceived as being biased towards or against some political participants, their very presence in the voting station may be intimidating.

Lastly, consideration needs to be given to the cost-effectiveness of a security presence inside voting stations as opposed to outside. Generally, having more mobile security forces stationed outside voting stations is more cost-effective. Where risks are such that security forces are needed near all voting stations, it may be more cost-effective, for example, in terms of communications equipment needs, to have some presence inside.

Powers of Voting Station Officials

In all cases, it is essential that administration of election procedures remains the province of voting station officials, and security forces deal only with potential or actual breaches of the peace and disasters. This boundary of responsibility can easily become blurred; for example, in screening people attempting to enter the voting station so that only authorised persons enter.

There may be a need for security forces to assist with this, especially in societies where personal weapons are routinely carried and need to be removed before entry, but the decision on admission or rejection should be that of the polling official. The actual enforcement may be made by security personnel.

Security Force Role

What are the roles at voting stations that are better specifically reserved for security forces? While not exhaustive, the following listing provides a guide:

• providing security for election materials at the voting station between time of delivery and commencement of voting;

• sweeping for explosive devices in and around the voting station before, during, or after voting;

• searches for and control of weapons;

• action against any voting station officials whose breaches of their code of conduct endangers public order or safety;

• closing down any unauthorised or phantom voting stations;

• when present, protection of safety and evacuation following disasters (fire, explosion, etc.);

• if justified by risk analyses, maintaining site perimeter security during voting and the ballot count; For other tasks, security forces are generally better used as the back-up to voting station officials' actions. These would include:

• removal of aggressive, intoxicated, otherwise impaired, or unauthorised persons from the voting station who have refused to move at the request of voting station officials;

• protection of ballot boxes, ballots, and other election material.

Use of Communication Networks

For security to be effective for voting stations, given their dispersed nature, it is vital that reliable communication systems link voting stations to:

• the joint operations centre (see Operations and Security Centres) or separate security command centre and election operations centre;

• security force operational bases;

• any mobile security units (see Rapid Reaction and Reserve Forces).

This requires that each voting station be tied into a reliable communication network. In selecting what sort of network to use, in high security risk environments, reliability considerations for this vital aspect of voting operations outweigh considerations of lowest cost, and additional communications equipment may need to be acquired. In low risk areas, it may be sufficient to use available fixed telephone lines.

Telecommunications Uses

Reliable telecommunications on voting day are not only necessary for security reasons but for normal operations with regard to:

• seeking guidance on operational or legal issues;

• regular reporting of voting station activity;

• advice to election managers of any need for additional supplies or emergency staff;

• reporting of successful commencement and finish of voting;

• reporting dispatch of election material;

• advice of preliminary count figures (if the count is conducted at the voting station).

These multiple use of telecommunications networks is a sound reason for managing both security and operational issues for voting stations from a joint operations centre (JOC), resulting in a simple system using the same links for both purposes.

Planning Considerations

Communications needs may place some restrictions on where voting stations may be located. If mobile phones or radios are to be used, locating voting stations in radio or mobile network shadows (that is in buildings or areas with poor or no signal reception) will render communication strategies useless.

Communications systems should always be fully tested prior to operational use to ensure their functionality in all operating locations, particularly where mobile phones or radios are to be used.

In determining communications strategies, estimated loads on the system need also to be considered; load factors can result in excessively centralised communications systems proving less reliable. If radio or mobile phone equipment is to be used, equipment distribution plans must allow sufficient time for all persons using the equipment to undergo training and become familiar with its use prior to their taking up their duties.

Communication Arrangements

For low security risk environments, the minimum standard required is that each voting station has access to telephone communication systems.

Preferably this would be an on-site telephone, either through fixed line or mobile link. However, in low security risk circumstances, an available telephone in a neighbouring location may suffice, as long as access to this facility can be guaranteed throughout the time the voting station is being used (this would be better detailed in a formal agreement). In remote areas with no telephone facilities, each voting station should have access to radio communications, wherever possible using existing facilities.

For higher security risk environments, a method more reliable than telephone, and that can enable immediate communication with security units in transit, is generally required.

This will mean investigating ways of implementing radio communications to all voting stations cost-effectively. It is obviously going to be less costly to use an existing radio network, though the cost of outfitting each voting station with radio handsets, if these cannot be borrowed for election purposes, will still be substantial.

Use of multiple networks (for example both police and military), unless dictated by geographic coverage reasons, should generally be discouraged. It is less confusing if all those involved use the same communications format.

Use of security forces' telecommunications systems, provided that these can provide a professional service with integrity, may provide the most effective reliable communications with full geographic coverage. It also has the advantage of familiarity for many who will be required to use it.

Communications Procedures

Effective telecommunications require standard procedures. These procedures should cover both methods and manner of communication. Elections administration staff need to maintain an up-to-date communications directory of all voting station, election administration, and security force telephone numbers or radio call signs. Each voting station official and security team should have up-to-date copies of such information relevant to their area.

The designation of regular, fixed check-in and reporting times for voting stations and security teams serves both information and safety objectives. If personal radios are used, call sign allocations should be logically allocated and strictly controlled.

Telephone and radio reporting formats and etiquette should be defined to:

• allow quick identification of the caller;

• allow clear transmission of information;

• give priority to emergencies;

• prevent calling traffic from clogging or jamming networks.

Where communication is by personal radio or phone, election administration or joint operations centre staff rosters need to be developed so that designated radio bases and/or phone contacts are staffed at all times that voting stations are operational. This would include the periods during which material and staff are being transported to and from voting stations.

Use of the telecommunications network equipment should be covered in voting station official, election management staff, and security force training sessions.

Rapid Reaction and Reserve Forces

Where areas of potential risks to voter safety or public order have been established through risk analyses, it can be more cost-effective to deal with voting site physical security (see Voting Site Security Arrangements) through the deployment of small rapid reaction security units, either police, military, or mixed forces, depending on the security situation, capable of responding to emergencies in more than one voting station.

Such units would preferably act under the direction of the relevant joint operations centre (see Operations and Security Centres) to ensure consistency and coordination in the chain of command.

Areas of Responsibility

Each rapid reaction unit would normally operate within a defined area of responsibility embracing particular voting subdivisions or electoral administration areas.

Depending on the level of threat and the location of voting stations, the operational methods used may vary. Where voting stations are in close proximity to each other, and none are regarded as of very high risk, there may be total reliance on highly mobile rapid reaction units.

In areas of higher security risk, a mixed solution may be used, with a small presence at each individual voting station backed by mobile reserve forces.

Similarly, in areas where voting stations are widely dispersed, it would be unwise to rely solely on mobile security units without some presence at or near each voting station. In lower security risk areas, use of usual policing centres as the bases from which teams may be sent if necessary may be sufficient.

Bases for these mobile units need not be established security force bases, though there are obvious advantages in using these from communications and support perspectives. Whether it is more useful for such operational bases to have a discrete or a high-profile presence will also vary in different environments.

Factors to be considered are whether a show of force is deemed necessary to reduce potential disturbance or, rather, will aggravate the situation or intimidate voters.

Necessary Conditions

Rapid reaction forces are likely to be effective only under certain conditions:

• bases situated to provide a fast response time to all voting stations within each force's area of responsibility;

• sufficient staff and vehicles to allow response to more than one emergency simultaneously;

• reliable voice communication systems between the mobile security team's base, all its vehicles, voting stations within the team's area of responsibility and the relevant joint operations centre.

Reserve Forces

Effective security for voting sites requires the ability to call on reserve or back-up facilities for emergencies.

To ensure response time is reasonable, such reserve forces need also to be operating from dispersed bases. In high security risk situations, these may be additional police or, if necessary, military units at the ready during the whole period voting sites are operational.

In lower security risk environments, the ability to call security forces from other tasks may suffice.

Whatever the case, plans for the mobilisation of such forces need to be considered in security planning and their role, the chain of command from election operations centres, and the priority to be given to election emergencies needs to be made clear to the relevant security units.

Information Security

Security of information systems and data is an important issue that may be overlooked in the midst of more visible aspects of electioin security, such as ensuring that election fraud and intimidation are deterred.

Elections are data-driven events. At all stages of the election process, large and complex amounts of data have to be accurately handled and protected from unauthorised manipulation, particularly in:

• compiling voters registers and producing accurate voters lists for voting stations;

• processing nominations and, from these, correctly printing ballot papers;

• determining locations of voting stations and resourcing them;

• recruiting, training, and assigning staff;

• reconciling voting material, conducting ballot counts, and determining results;

• adjudicating grievances.

Loss, unavailability, or unauthorised changes of election data can both cripple election operations themselves (and result in significant cost penalties) and lead to perceptions of lack of integrity or legitimacy of election processes and outcomes.

Security provisions need to address ensuring the availability, accuracy, integrity and, where relevant, the confidentiality of information. The more complex the information systems used, the more complex security measures may need to be.

Manual Information Systems

For information held in non-computerised formats, security is founded in normal office administration systems such as:

• registration of information and documentation received;

• logical filing and secure storage of documents;

• retaining separately stored copies of important documents;

• controlling access to documents.

Computer-Based Information Systems

For information held in computer-based systems, security measures need to be more complex, particularly where these systems are used to produce or process voting material or calculate vote totals or election results, where there is a time-critical need for accuracy and integrity. Risk analyses need to be undertaken to determine the most effective methods of ensuring information security.

Basic security measures that may need to be carefully applied include:

• adequate physical security of the buildings in which computer equipment or critical communications equipment (microwave installations or optical fibre/cable exchanges) are held--including protection against both human intervention and possible natural disaster (flood, fire);

• back-up and recovery capabilities in case of system failure--including recovery of power supply, telecommunications links, hardware, and software, as well as provision for manual or lower-tech methods of achieving the same task in case the computer system cannot be revived, and simple precautions such as daily backups of all systems and data and storage of backup media at a separate location;

• thorough testing of all aspects of systems under production conditions prior to their being placed into production mode;

• access controls on software and data, to prevent unauthorised external access (hacking) or internal attempts at manipulation of system configuration, software code, or data recorded;

• thorough training of staff in the computer systems and software they are required to use, so that data is not lost or systems damaged accidentally;

• ensuring that all staff are aware of the security precautions that need to be applied.