Voting

The focus of all planning, all preparation, all recruitment and training, materials production and equipment acquisition, system testing, and the other preparatory activities is to ensure that operations on voting day or days run effectively.

No matter how good the planning, and the testing, efficient implementation on voting day is the critical aspect of the election's success.

The following factors are important ingredients in ensuring this success.

Preparing for Voting Day

In the days before voting day, and on the morning of voting day itself, the final pieces in the voting preparations jigsaw puzzle are put into place.

Wherever possible, by the night before voting day, voting stations should be in a state of total readiness. To leave essential materials delivery, voting station set-up, and checking that all materials are present and equipment in working order until the morning of voting day can court disaster. A checklist for these final arrangements might include:

• the distribution of voting station material.

• checking by voting station managers that all the material and equipment required for their voting stations has been delivered in the correct quantities and in good condition;

• ensuring that all voting station officials have transport to and from their duty stations;

• reviewing contingency plans for voting day, and implementing backup solutions for problems arising with deficiencies in materials, in voting site availability, or in staffing;

In more developed areas, voting station staff may be able to make their way to the voting station by their own means. In more remote areas, or in developing countries, transport may have to be provided by the electoral management body.

Additional arrangements may need to be made where voting is being held over more than one day

Hours of Voting Operations

While voting stations are in operation, the focus of all voting operations staff is on ensuring that voters are provided with an efficient, courteous, high integrity service. Prior to the time for commencement of voting, final checks of all voting materials and equipment, and that all staff are present, should be followed by notification of readiness from all voting stations to the electoral district office.

Throughout voting station hours of operation, voting station managers are responsible for ensuring that:

• staff are supervised effectively  to provide a high standard of service to voters

• voting integrity is maintained  and security of the voting site, voters, officials, and materials is properly maintained ;

• voting procedures are correctly implemented at all times by all voting station officials;

Procedures in the voting station can be broken down into a number of routines:

• controlling voter entry and ensuring a smooth flow of voters through the voting station

• accurate checking of each voter's identity and eligibility to vote at that voting station, and recording all who have voted;

• efficient issue of ballots to voters, maintaining vigilance over voting secrecy and the security of voting materials;

• providing information in a proactive manner, and, where required, assisted voting services;

• effectively dealing with voters who are apparently not registered to vote at that voting station; 

Monitoring by party or candidate representatives of voting station activity enhances the transparency of voting processes, and can provide a safeguard against errors or partisan practices on the part of other participants in the election.

Actions after Voting

No matter where ballots are to be counted, there are common actions that need to be implemented in voting stations at the close of voting. These include:

Closing the voting station at the correct time so that there can be no later challenges based on voters arriving late being allowed to vote. Equitable treatment of voters already queued to vote at close of voting time, and any decisions made to extend the hours of voting, can have important implications for perceptions of election integrity, and should be addressed in the legislation.

Collection and securing of all liable voting materials--ballots, voters lists and ballot envelopes (if used and accountable). One of the most important aspects of voting station officials' duties is to undertake thorough and accurate reconciliations of liable voting materials following the close of voting. This is often one of the least understood and, coming at the end of an intense working day, most disliked aspects of their tasks. However, for an efficient count, and to guarantee election integrity, it is vital that these reconciliations be accurately completed and any discrepancies investigated. Inaccurate voting materials accounting at this stage can compromise integrity, and create considerable additional expense during counts and in answering election challenges

*The sorting, verifying, and packing of voting station materia. Overly complex systems for this will result in much time wasted later, either in the later sorting of materials by the election management body or in counting. However, it is important that accountable materials, as well as reusable and disposable materials, are clearly separated at this stage.

Many of the actions that are undertaken at the close of voting, particularly involving voting material reconciliations and sealing of ballot boxes or closing down voting machines or computers, are of critical importance to electoral integrity. As such, it is best for election transparency that party or candidate agents that are present witness these actions.

Before leaving the voting station, voting station managers should ensure that all voting records and reports on activities during voting day have been completed. Other actions at close of voting will vary according to whether the count is to take place at the voting station or at a separate counting centre:

• Where ballots are to be counted at the voting station, the voting station layout will need to be modified to facilitate an efficient count 

• Conversely, where ballot papers are to be transported to another location for counting, emphasis following close of voting will needs to be placed on a speedy but accurate sort and verification and packaging of all materials, so that they are ready for transport.

There may be additional organisational or materials accounting requirements at the close of voting where special facilities are provided (for absentee, early, or mail voting, or mobile voting stations). This is particularly so when these facilities operate over several days.

Dealing With Challenges and Complaints

Both during the hours of voting and in the aftermath of voting day, electoral management bodies are likely to have to deal with complaints about the service being provided, about political participants behaviour, decisions of voting operations staff, and about the validity of procedures and practices implemented. Following voting day, election results may be challenged on the basis of perceived irregularities; it is important that there is an open and fair process for handling such complaints, challenges, and disputes.

Follow-Up Actions

The electoral management body will a number of responsibilities after an election. Major activities would include:

• Ensuring that election materials and equipment are recovered, sorted, and maintained in secure storage, or made available for reuse or destroyed in line with legal obligations and electoral management body policy.

• So that future improvements in voting operations can be realised, it is important that a thorough evaluation of voting operations frameworks, procedures, and practices is undertaken, as soon as possible after the election so that valuable impressions and data are fresh in people's minds. This is crucial in improving performance, service, and cost-effectiveness 

• Election voting records will require examination and further investigation where any instances of voter fraud, such as multiple voting and impersonation, are suspected.

In continuous voter registration systems, elections can provide a wealth of information on voter changes of status and addresses, which will require follow-up and processing. In compulsory voting systems, investigations of registered voters who did not vote are also required

Independent Observation Groups

Voting day is also the period of most extensive activity for independent observers. It is when:

• Their resources are likely to be stretched to cover sufficient election locations;

• their data gathering is at its most intense;

• They are likely to be called upon by political participants to intervene on their behalf.

There will generally be an expectation, on the part of the local and/or international community, that they deliver accurate and timely judgments on the freeness and fairness of election processes Proper functioning of observation during this period requires detailed identification of the critical processes for observation, such as election preparatory processes that will indicate the voting day environment, voting hours operations, and the ensuing counting of ballots and declaration of results.

• For this observation to succeed, observers must be provided with reference materials that assist their task

• For the observation to have any influence, observer groups need to produce logical, concise reports on their activities and their assessments of election processes

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Ensuring Readiness

In the period immediately prior to voting day, electoral managers need to carefully review that all planned actions have been undertaken and that voting operations will be ready to operate effectively at the scheduled commencement time on voting day. Important elements of this review include assessing that:

• Voting station equipment and materials have been delivered and acknowledged by voting station managers;

• All voting sites are in a state of readiness;

• arrangements for staff transport to and from their duty stations, whether through private means or provided by the electoral management body, are confirmed (see Transportation of Voting Station Officials);

• ealistic contingency plans for materials, staffing, or voting site problems on voting day are in place (see Contingency Plans).

Where deficiencies in materials deliveries have been found, arrangements for replacement supplies must be promptly made (see Distribution and Receipt of Voting Materials).

Readiness Reporting

Carefully monitoring the results of readiness reviews becomes more important to the central management of the electoral management body in the lead-up to voting day.

In the week before voting day, daily reports on the state of readiness in each electoral district should be obtained from electoral district managers.

Distribution and Receipt of Voting Materials

• strict controls need to be exercised over the implementation of delivery plans for voting station materials and equipment to ensure that materials and equipment arrives at each location

• in time,

• according to planned delivery schedules;

• in the correct quantities;

• security is maintained throughout.

Delivery to voting stations can generally be more effectively undertaken from central or regional packaging centres than from local offices.

Delivery methods will vary according to available resources and the security environment. In low security risk, urban areas, it can be cost-effective for voting station managers to pick up their voting station's materials, apart from bulky equipment, from the electoral district management office.

This could be combined with a refresher briefing session for managers in the days before voting day. Highly accountable materials could be stored in local secure storage until voting day. However, this method is only suitable in environments of low security risk and high public trust.

It would be more usual, and prudent, to arrange for secure delivery of all voting station materials through transport contractors. In some circumstances, assistance from the military or other state agencies with widespread available transport resources can be a cost-effective means of delivery. However, this would only be suitable where such agencies are publicly accepted as non-partisan.

Timing of Delivery

It is preferable that all equipment and materials are present at the voting station or with the voting station manager at the latest on the day before voting day. In rural areas, slightly earlier delivery may be necessary to ensure enough time for the resupply of any deficiencies.

However, delivery too early to voting stations, especially in areas of higher security risk, increases the potential for loss of or tampering with supplies. Public perceptions of election integrity may also suffer if liable voting material is stored for longer periods outside of high security stores.

Voting station delivery arrangements will be made more complex and costly where there are delays in materials supply, or where essential items cannot be produced until immediately before voting day (e.g., in systems where certified voters lists are open until the day before voting day).

The effects on materials delivery reliability and costs should be assessed when determining procedural and legal frameworks and production schedules for voting materials preparation.

Delivery Documentation and Receipt

Deliveries of materials for voting stations should always be accompanied by delivery documentation specifying the types and quantities of materials delivered. This would preferably be a full/partial copy (depending on the delivery method adopted) of the standard "materials pack" contents list or materials/equipment inventory prepared for each voting station.

It is best that voting station managers are on hand to take delivery of their voting station's materials. Receipts should be issued for all materials delivered.

This acknowledgment of delivery should be returned to the electoral district management office. Receipts returned to the electoral management body may need to be completed in two stages:

• An initial acknowledgment of receipt of the delivery.

• A formal notification that all materials have been correctly supplied, after the voting station manager has checked.

This detailed notification is an essential part of maintaining a verifiable audit trail for all liable materials and equipment.

Checking Material on Receipt

It is vital that voting station managers thoroughly check the materials against the inventory of expected supplies for their voting station as soon as the materials are received, and immediately advise their electoral district manager of correct delivery or of any discrepancies. Electoral district managers should monitor that these reports are received.

Deficiencies would require prompt implementation of contingency plans for materials ressupply (see Contingency Plans Even materials delivered in pre-packaged "pack" form can contain errors in quantities or materials missing on delivery. Special attention needs to be paid to:

• Ballot boxes, to ensure the correct number and type have been delivered, and that ballot box serial numbers or other codes are correct for that voting station;

• voters lists, to ensure the correct list, or lists, have been delivered for that voting station and that they are complete, without missing or misprinted pages;

• ballots, to ensure complete supply and that no numbered ballots or ballot booklets are missing;

• ballot box seals or locks, particularly that locks have the correct keys;

• other accountable materials, such as voting station seals or perforating instruments for validating ballots, and ink and associated equipment for marking voters, where used;

• voting compartments, to ensure that they are functioning and present in the correct quantity;

• Essential general supplies, such as pens and pencils, where these are to be used to mark ballots, legally-required instructions to voters, and packaging for used and unused accountable voting material.

Even counter foiled, numbered ballot booklets can have missing ballots. Loosely packed ballots or ballot envelopes, particularly without numbered counterfoils, are even more susceptible to error in post-production packaging in standard bundles. It is essential that ballots, or, where relevant, ballot envelopes received at each voting station are counted on delivery and any discrepancy between delivery notices and actual stocks received formally noted in ballot accounting records.

These figures would then be used as the starting point for all subsequent ballot/ballot envelope accounting calculations. For non-accountable and general purpose materials, an exact check count would not be necessary.

It is also important that equipment necessary for voting station operations, such as voting machines or computers, lamps for detecting invisible ink marks on voters, bar code readers for voter identification cards, or emergency power generators are installed and tested as soon as possible after receipt. To leave this testing on site until the morning of voting day may leave insufficient time for replacement or repair.

Transportation of Voting Station Officials

Basic Issues

Ensuring that officials appointed to voting stations have transportation available to enable them to report for duty is an essential issue in ensuring voting station readiness.

In the week before voting day, electoral district managers, through their voting station managers, need to review that acceptable transport arrangements, both to and from voting stations, are in place for all voting station officials. All hired transport arrangements for voting station staff should also be reconfirmed with contractors at this time.

Provision of Transport

To ensure that voting station officials arrive at their voting station on time, it may be necessary for the electoral management body to arrange transportation through shuttle buses or similar arrangements.

Clear notice as to departure and arrival times should be provided to all staff, preferably with the voting station official's appointment documentation.

Voting station managers should confirm that all their officials know and understand these transportation arrangements.

Provision of special transportation for voting station officials can be necessary particularly in environments where:

• there is low private vehicle ownership and public transportation systems are unreliable;

• security risks are high, necessitating the escort of voting station officials to and from duty by security forces.

Travelling as a group in a single vehicle will make protection of voting station officials' safety easier.

While additional costs may be incurred, in these circumstances it is a small price to pay to ensure that all staff can report for duty.

Rural and Remote Areas

While it is preferable that voting station officials be appointed from within the local community, there will be occasions where officials have to be imported to rural and remote areas. Transport arrangements need to ensure that:

• staff are transported in sufficient time to undertake all their duties effectively;

• reliable transport is provided, so voting station staff are not stranded in a remote area;

• particularly in remote areas, voting station officials are able to report their arrival and departure to the electoral district manager (radio equipment in the transport used may be necessary for this).

Where staff duties involve recruiting and training local assistants or taking delivery of materials and setting up voting stations, staff may need to be transported several days before voting day. Similarly, if long distances are to be travelled, it is unrealistic to expect staff to drive all night and then function effectively in a voting station in the morning.

Where overnight stays are involved, suitable accommodation and food also needs to be arranged. It is important for staff performance in these situations that care is taken; a tired and hungry voting station manager and staff may not perform at their best during long hours of duty on voting day.

Developed Societies

In developed societies, it is not unreasonable to expect that voting station officials make their own way to and from their duties, though a transportation allowance may need to be paid, especially where travel distances are considerable.

Any potential transportation difficulties should be requested from and discussed with staff at the time of their appointment; cost-effective arrangements through use of staff car pooling and the like can often are made.

Mobile Voting Stations/Roving Supervisors

Transportation arrangements for mobile voting stations need also to be planned in advance. In urban areas, mobile voting stations would normally require access to a vehicle. Car rental would be usual, though paying transportation allowances to mobile voting officials for using their private vehicles can be more cost-effective.

In remote areas, mobile voting stations may need access to air or water transport to access all voting locations on their route. Availability of such transport at a reasonable cost must be taken into account when assessing viable mobile voting station routes and itineraries. It is important that any required air or sea charter arrangements are made early; leaving them to the last minute can result in excessive transport costs.

Any roving voting station supervisors  will also require access to a vehicle during voting hours and the count. Suitable vehicles should be provided for the terrain and, if acting as a mobile emergency materials supply source, materials cartage as well.

Readiness Reviews

In the period immediately prior to voting day, electoral managers need to carefully review that all planned actions have been undertaken and that voting operations will be ready to operate effectively at the scheduled commencement time on voting day.

Important elements of this review include assessing that:

• Voting station equipment and materials have been delivered and acknowledged by voting station managers;

• all voting sites are in a state of readiness;

• arrangements for staff transport to and from their duty stations, whether through private means or provided by the electoral management body, are confirmed ;

• realistic contingency plans for materials, staffing, or voting site problems on voting day are in place

Where deficiencies in materials deliveries have been found, arrangements for replacement supplies must be promptly made .

Readiness Reporting

Carefully monitoring the results of readiness reviews becomes more important to the central management of the electoral management body as events move even more swiftly in the lead-up to voting day.

In the week before voting day, daily reports on the state of readiness in each electoral district should be obtained from electoral district managers.

Multi-Day Voting

While it would be more usual for regular voting to occur on a single day, under some election systems or circumstances, voting may take place on several days.

Multiple day voting would generally fall into one of the following broad formats:

• an initial round of voting to establish the leading candidates with a second round at a later date to determine the election winner

• voting being conducted on different days for electoral districts in different geographic areas;

• provisions for the same voting station to remain open for voting for more than one day in a single round election;

• special forms of voting, such as early voting or mobile voting stations, being held for more than one day.

Multiple Rounds of Voting

Systems requiring two rounds of voting will place additional organisational pressures on voting operations managers:

• They will generally lead to significant rises in voting operations costs through higher use of materials production and staffing for voting and counts, logistics, and security.

• Where "mark choice" ballot papers are used, there will be severe pressures on ballot production and distribution for the second round.

Operational planning will need to carefully and separately consider the requirements for each round of the election and address what efficiencies can be found through ensuring that at each round of voting:

• the same premises/locations are used for voting stations;

• the same staff are used as voting and counting officials;

• forms are, as far as possible, designed for common use at each round.

Material production and distribution for the second round, in general, will need to be carefully planned.

Staggered Elections

The progressive conduct of elections for electoral units in different geographical areas can provide efficiencies where election equipment, logistics capacities, security capabilities, and staff expertise are scarce resources, or where the sheer size of the voting population makes single-day elections difficult to manage.

If coordinated by a national electoral management body, multi-day voting can allow resource sharing and better capabilities. Particularly for such important components as training and security, the ability to stagger requirement in different geographic areas can allow for the best use of scarce professional resources.

Disadvantages of this method mainly relate to control of count and results information and the possibility of tensions or security problems being exacerbated by a lengthy period for voting:

• On the one hand delaying counts until all voting is completed may promote accusations of malpractice. It will also require return of material awaiting the commencement of counts to well-secured central locations.

• On the other hand if votes are counted and results are announced immediately, to promote public confidence, they may affect voting behaviour or promote attempts at manipulation in areas voting later.

Multi-Day Voting at Same Location

Holding of voting over more than one day at the same location presents administrative challenges in delivering services in a secure and cost-effective manner. It can, however, afford the opportunity for electoral administrators to make adjustments to services to compensate for any initial problems with logistics, staff allocation, or application of procedures.

In looking at these challenges, it is useful to distinguish between multi-day voting concerned with:

• special voting facilities, such as early voting

• operation of ordinary voting stations. This section is concerned with the latter circumstance.

While it is more usual that voting in an election occurs on a single day, there are circumstances where, because of system constraints (such as insufficient voting stations), cultural factors, or to enhance access to voting opportunities, voting occurs at the same location on multiple days.

Whether it is a cost-effective method of organising voting will depend on the cost structures in the particular environment.

However, the direct costs (such as additional payments to voting station staff) and indirect costs (security availability, and any goodwill costs in maintaining public confidence) are likely to outweigh the costs of providing additional voting locations (additional staff training and recruitment, transport, materials, and security). Its benefits depend on the degree to which it enhances voter access and turnout. This may have particular appeal in countries with very large voter populations or without a history of mass voting.

The following sections deal with issues that need to be considered when planning and operating voting stations that will be open for voting for more than one day for a single round of an election.

Security

Multi-day voting places extra demands on security forces to maintain an adequate presence at voting stations.

Particularly in high security risk situations, their ability to meet these demands needs to be carefully considered in determining the practicality of a voting period of more than one day and the voting locations used. Furthermore, security presence overnight will need to be considered if it is likely that voter unable to vote by close of voting on one day stay overnight near the voting station in order to vote the next day.

It is preferable that voting material is not transported from the voting station until voting is completed. Therefore, voting station locations and the material within them must be secured between the closing of the voting on one day and opening of voting on the next.

Only where there is a high degree of trust in state authorities by all political participants should alternatives such as deposit of the material overnight in police or security forces safekeeping be considered.

Voting Station Premises

As material will need to be secured overnight, temporary structures or open-air facilities may not be suitable.

Materials and Equipment Management

All materials and equipment should still be delivered to the voting station prior to the commencement of voting, unless there are local, specific reasons (such as transport capacity or security) that make staggered delivery cost-effective. For some materials and equipment, the levels supplied will depend on the number of days over which voting occurs.

Particularly where combined with larger voting station traffic, planning for multi-day voting should allow for increased levels of reserve equipment, such as ballot boxes and voting compartments, in case of damage during the voting period.

Ensuring Transparency

It is important that representatives of the political participants are able to verify the integrity of election material throughout the voting period.

In circumstances of extreme distrust, this may require the physical presence of political party or candidate representatives at all times from the commencement to the close of voting, even when the voting station is closed overnight. This should be carefully co-ordinated to avoid conflict.

More practical solutions emphasise the manner in which ballots and other voting material are stored during the voting period. Durable ballot boxes would preferably be used, rather than cheaper cardboard or other non-durable material.

At the close of each day's voting, and the commencement of the next, the condition and sealing of ballot boxes containing completed votes cast should be recorded by senior voting staff and witnessed by party or candidate representatives present.

Other material whose integrity is essential for the successful outcome of the election should also preferably be stored overnight in sealed ballot boxes, and if not, in other secure storage. This would include:

• voters lists,

• unused ballots, and

• completed forms for absentee voting, assisted voting, challenges to voters, and voting eligibility for voters not on the voters list,

• seals, and fraud control equipment such as light sensitive ink.

The sealing of these at close of voting each day and their unsealing at commencement the next day should be recorded by senior voting staff and witnessed by party and candidate representatives present.

Capacity Planning

Multi-day voting makes capacity planning more difficult, particularly if it is occurring for the first time in a country or in a transitional election. It is not simply a matter of dividing expected voters by the number of days of voting and thus establishing expected daily voting station traffic.

Analysis of the potential voter population's daily work patterns, the impact of voter information campaigns on voters' understanding of when they may vote, transportation schedules, and past time patterns of voter turnout are useful in determining likely attendance on each day.

In the absence of any historical patterns, basic voting station location and resourcing capacities should consider meeting a potential turnout of between two-thirds and three-quarters of the total potential voters on a single day.

But voter turnout may not be logical; societal traits or the specific election environment may determine the number of voters from the start of the first day of voting compared to the numbers of final day voters. Ensuring the maintenance of voter service entails planning a reserve capability to increase traffic capacity (by using additional staff) on the final day.

There are administrative means of staggering the turnout over multiple voting days. Potential voters may be administratively split and assigned particular days to vote. This may be effective if done on a geographic basis, but is more likely to cause voter confusion if done on other bases, such as name or employment type. Sensible administrative measures would include electoral administrators' liaison with parties and communities to attempt to schedule any mass transport to voting stations in a staggered fashion over the period of voting.

Hygiene and comfort

Multiple day use of a voting station means that daily cleaning arrangements for the voting station and other facilities, such as portable toilets and replenishment of water supplies, need to be considered.

In less developed countries particularly, voters may have had a long and arduous journey to the voting station, and may wish to stay overnight if unable to vote by the time the station closes on the day of their arrival. If facilities are not available for this, there is the potential for disruption, and possibly violence. Choice of voting station locations and security planning should take this into account.

Staffing Allocations

Working in a voting station involves long hours and is a potentially exhausting experience. The more days of voting, the greater is the need for trained reserve staff to cover illness and absenteeism, and as a precaution for a higher than expected turnout on a single day.

It is sensible to set basic staff to voter ratios higher than for single-day voting and to allow for more frequent rest breaks for staff, particularly when the same voting station staff are conducting the counting. This will offset any apparent staffing efficiency of using fewer, larger capacity voting stations for multiple voting days.

Voter Information

There are some additional voter information messages to be conveyed in a multi-day voting situation (for general voter information issues. In addition to advising of locations and hours of voting, voter information messages in the days before voting day can help in distributing the turnout over the available days.

Apart from use of media, such assistance can be given by staggering the scheduling of any local or street-based "reminders to vote" during the voting period. During the initial voting day, turnout statistics need to be monitored to determine if there is an immediate need for additional voter information placements, either generally or in specific areas. The potential need for these is also a consideration in management of the voter information budget.

Unplanned Multi-Day Voting

There are also significant administrative differences depending on whether the multi-day voting schedule has been planned as part of the election process, or is a response to deficiencies encountered in general or in particular locations on voting day. Limited, defined allowance for such responses is a prudent component of the election legal framework.

Relevant deficiencies could include:

• late or non-delivery of essential material and equipment;

• adjournment of voting due to threat, violence, or natural disaster;

• an inability to process during voting hours the voters who have turned out to vote (an indication of major planning deficiencies);

• a judgment that voter turnout on the specified voting day is insufficient to give credibility to the election.

In these cases the effectiveness of contingency planning  is critical to the success of the extended voting period.

Extension of voting to a further day, or days, is not a decision to be taken lightly, not only for its affect on resourcing, but as it may delay finalisation of vote counts beyond the planned and publicised dates.

Responsibilities for making such decisions are better assigned to the senior executive of the electoral management body and defined in the elections legal framework. In some environments, laws requiring judicial and/or executive government endorsement may be appropriate.

Maintaining public confidence in such circumstances will require additional measures such as:

• ensuring that any partial count results are not publicised before the completion of all relevant voting;

• ensuring that ballot material is handled securely and transparently throughout the extended period;

• mobilising additional resources to allow the publicised count timetable to be followed as closely as possible.

Contingency Plans

Contingency plans are an important part of voting operations management plans in all environments and circumstances. The time critical nature of voting operations requires backup plans to enable quick reaction to operational failures or changes in the social or physical environment.

Developed contingency and backup plans are vitally essential where processes or systems are being operated for the first time or in environments undergoing social dislocation. Ideally, contingency plans should identify flexible options adaptable to specific situations; it is generally not possible to foresee every possible contingency.

Operational Focus

Contingency planning needs to address several broad areas where system or other failures, or events over which voting operations administrators have no control, may affect the ability to deliver voting operations services effectively according to the standard plan. These can include:

Operational or management difficulties in particular voting stations: These may be staff failing to report for duty, communications links being severed, or particular materials or equipment not arriving on schedule. These could well be handled at the voting station or in conjunction with local representatives of the electoral management body.

Breakdowns in general electoral management or supply systems: Such contingencies would include general logistics failures, in transport, mail or communication systems, production failures for essential items such as ballots, voters lists and election forms, and inability of computer systems to perform to expectations.

As these affect overall capacities and effectiveness of voting operations, implementation of contingency plans would generally best be taken at a more central election management level, by senior election administrators in a position to take a broad overview of the effects of responses on all aspects of the election process.

Physical or social environment disasters: These would include fire, flood, earthquake, social upheaval, or other disturbances. These may affect voting operations as a whole or be limited in their effect to a single or small number of voting stations. As decisions may need to be made about postponement or adjournment of voting in these circumstances, involvement of senior election management in determining the appropriate response to such occurrences would be necessary.

Decision-Making Responsibilities

Not only should contingency plans present a clear framework for emergency decision-making and the contingency options available, but they should also firmly establish the responsibilities for determining the implementation of such plans and the trigger points at which such decisions must be made.

They must specifically define for which contingencies determination can be made at a local level, those for which decisions must be made by senior executives of the central electoral management body, and those for which other agencies of state must be consulted or involved in such decisions.

Without such a defined framework, there is a risk of local decisions being made on issues of wider significance; such decisions may be inconsistent or fail to address the root causes of the problems.

Contingency Plan Content

Contingency plans should identify:

• the nature of the contingency;

• the operational impacts of the contingency;

• the feasible responses;

• the financial implications of the responses;

• any effects on other processes.

Feasible responses, financial implications and flow-on effects are likely to vary according to the timing of contingency plan implementation decisions; information on these variations should be included in the contingency plans.

Recognition of Process Interdependence

Given the interdependency of election processes, it is important that contingency planning does not treat each voting operations activity as a discrete task. It should follow through the future effects of contingencies in one area, which may not be within voting operations activities, on subsequent activities. For example:

• unavailability of planned voting sites will affect materials distribution, staff deployment, and voter information activities;

• failure of voters lists printing systems may require preparation of lists in a different format, which voting station staff will need to be trained to use;

• Late redistribution of electoral districts will affect the timing of candidate nominations and the identification of voting sites.

Realistic Planning

Contingency plans must be realistic and effective. There should be a mechanism for determining which alternative contingency plans are implemented, taking into account their cost-effectiveness. Whatever the particular task that may need backup or contingency facilities, the basic aim is to have sufficient voting sites, adequately resourced to enable all attending voters to vote. In crisis situations, performance against other objectives is subsidiary.

Systems failure may often be due to excessive complexity for the environment. Creating contingency plans of similar complexity, or entailing considerable expenditure to effect only small increments in performance or service would generally not be cost-effective.

Materials Contingency Plans

Building Reserves

In preparing contingency plans for voting station materials, issues that are significant to consider include:

• the quantities of reserve materials that it is prudent to hold;

• where reserve quantities of materials are to be held, and in this regard, both available storage locations and the ability to transport from the storage location to voting stations are relevant;

• the provision of emergency transport arrangements--e.g., vehicles and drivers and, for remote areas, possibly air transport--for delivery of contingency materials.

Potential Problems

Problems that may occur with materials supply for voting day would generally fall under two broads categories:

A failure in production processes leading to unavailability of materials. This could be either through a breakdown in production (so that no, or insufficient, material has been produced in time), or errors in production have resulted in unusable materials (e.g., ballots with incorrect candidate or party information).

It would be a grave lapse in production quality control processes if unusable materials were produced.

Failures in materials distribution, so that materials have not reached their intended voting station destination at the required time. This could occur through breakdowns in shipping arrangements or errors in addressing supplies for distribution.

Reserve Quantities of Materials

Appropriate reserve quantities of materials will vary for different types of materials and in different environments. Contingency reserves quantities must address a balance between maintaining cost-effectiveness and being able to meet reasonable contingencies for essential materials. Appropriate reserve quantities would generally fall within the range of 5 percent to 10 percent of expected usage.

However, contingency reserve level would prudently be increased if:

• there is little confidence in overall potential voter figures, through lack of recent updates of voter lists, particularly when combined with provision that allow voters to register on voting day, or otherwise claim a vote;

• there is a large variety of types of voting facilities available, or where there are no strict restrictions on the voting station at which a voter may vote, making "micro" predictions of voter turnout more difficult;

• there is automated mail-out of ballots which can be subject to high wastage rates.

As with normal supply of materials, contingency materials can be more efficiently processed if packed in discrete emergency supply kits.

Location of Reserve Supply

Reserve supplies can only be useful if they can be rapidly delivered to replenish materials shortages.

Centralised contingency supply arrangements generally are not conducive to achieving this. For that reason, it is imperative that contingency materials be held at a regional, or sub-regional level. In general, electoral district managers' offices would be the appropriate contingency supply centres for voting stations, and this need should be considered when office premises are selected.

In electoral districts covering large geographic areas, sub-regional secure depots may need to be leased for the supply period.

Emergency Transport for Materials

Contingency materials are of little use if no method of delivering them to voting stations has been arranged.

Particularly for remote areas, lack of early planning of delivery methods can result in substantial costs if, for example, air transport has to be arranged for immediate delivery. In urban areas potential methods would include:

• providing roving voting station supervisors with suitable vehicles and security so that they can also function as a mobile emergency supply repository;

• maintaining emergency supply vehicles and drivers attached to the electoral district manager's office during the voting period. In a more rural environment, where voting stations may be at considerable distances apart, practical solutions may come at a higher cost.

Attachment of transport facilities to secure emergency supply depots set up for the voting period in significant population centres may need to be considered, depending on transport distances to all voting stations from the electoral district manager's office.

Staffing Contingency Plans

Basic Issues

To meet staffing crises that may emerge during voting election administrators should ensure that reserves of staff are available. Allowance should be made for allocated staff not reporting for duty or voting stations being swamped by higher than expected numbers of voters.

Organisation and deployment of these contingency staff would generally be more effectively implemented at a local or electoral district level. The shorter the chain of command, the swifter the response is likely to be to staffing emergencies. Holding reserves at a central location may result in more complex logistical requirements to get staff into the field.

Location of Emergency Staff

Crucial decisions involve not just how many emergency staff are to be recruited but also where contingency staff should be located during voting hours. A balance between cost-effectiveness, considering both staffing and logistics costs, and the ability to swiftly cover for staffing emergencies and maintain a good level of voter service has to be sought.

Different environments, in terms of transport links, logistics, geographic areas to be covered, and expected needs for contingency staff, will affect the manner in which emergency staff are deployed. Possible solutions include:

Having a small number of contingency staff report for duty to each voting station.  The disadvantages of this method are that it limits flexibility to a certain extent and is relatively costly. The need for additional staff will not generally occur in an equitable manner, but is more likely to be concentrated in a few voting stations. This method may also be wasteful of resources, in catering to a pessimistic scenario at every voting station.

Locating reserve officials at electoral district managers' offices or other local electoral management body offices or depots. While this will give greater flexibility in despatching staff to required voting stations, its effectiveness will depend on transport availability and the geographic area to be covered from each office.

Transport needs to be on hand for such emergencies--not only vehicles but also drivers, to enable the return of vehicles to these offices for further use.

Where roving senior officials are used as field supervisors , assigning trained emergency staff who may be re-assigned to voting stations duties in emergencies as their assistants

This provides:

• some flexibility of response within the roving officials' relevant areas of responsibility,

• uses vehicles already in use for travelling between voting stations, and

• provides the benefit of the roving supervisors' assessment of the situation at voting stations with staffing emergencies.

This method will be limited in use to areas suitable for coverage by roving officials.

Arranging for emergency staff to be on call at home. There could be arguments for this in some areas where officials are appointed from the local communities. There may be some cost advantages if these staff can be paid on-call rates (as opposed to the emergency staff automatically reporting and being paid for duty whether used or not). However, it is only likely to work effectively where:

• public communication systems are reliable, and

• private means of transport is more common (or contingency staff live nearby to the relevant voting locations), and

• election administrators can be sure these staff members will remain on call throughout voting hours.

Emergency Staff Appointments on Voting Day

Plans for staffing emergencies should also consider the fact that contingency reserves of voting station officials may prove to be insufficient. While, hopefully, this will not occur, election administrators and the legal framework for the election should recognise this possibility.

It may be possible to use administrative staff from electoral district managers' or electoral management body offices as voting station officials in emergencies.

These staff members will at least have the advantage of being familiar with some voting processes. However, staff available from this source will generally be very limited in number, and the effect their reassignment to voting stations may have on administrative support during voting must be carefully assessed.

The legal framework for the election could allow voting station managers to appoint additional voting station officials on voting day, in defined circumstances, such as inability to operate the voting station effectively due to failure of officials to report for duty or absence of staff due to fatigue or illness. Where such appointments are made, the voting station manager would need to ensure that these persons sign a contract of employment, as well as the code of conduct and declaration of secrecy or similar documents required of all voting station officials.

It would be preferable if these untrained field-appointed staff were used in less complex tasks, such as exit control or guarding ballot boxes. Election administrators need to ensure that these persons are entered in payment and service records.

Appointments of this nature need to be firmly monitored by the electoral management body to ensure that they are justified in terms of required resources and that the persons being appointed are suitable, in terms of impartiality of actions, to act as officials. The voting station manager should seek advice from the electoral district manager's office before taking this course.

In highly politically charged environments, it may not be possible for all political participants to be satisfied with the impartiality of such field appointments; it may be prudent, therefore, to take the safer, yet more costly, path of a higher level of normal reserve staff recruitment and appointment.

Voter Turnout Contingency Plans

Basic Issues

Contingency planning related to voter turnout issues may need to address situations that include:

• voters turnout overall, or in particular areas, is much less than expected, possibly to the extent that it may threaten the legitimacy of the election result;

• voter turnout overall, or at particular voting sites, is much greater than expected, or is resulting in higher than expected levels of peak period activity.

Methods of addressing these problems will depend on the following considerations:

• the flexibility allowed by the legal framework in revising voting hours and procedures to accommodate the actual circumstances and the ability to adjust staffing or facilities available in voting stations;

• contingency reserves of staff and materials that can be made available

Voter Turnout Less Than Expected

Whether voters decide to vote or not would generally be a decision purely for the voters themselves. Low turnout may well be an indication of the perceptions of voters of the legitimacy of the election process or the quality of the nominated candidates or parties.

However, there are some particular situations where a less than expected voter turnout may need to be addressed by the electoral management body. The following are some examples of potential situations.

Minimum Voter Turnout Requirements in the Law

Some legal frameworks establish minimum voter turnout requirements for the election to be valid. In such situations, it would be generally inappropriate for the electoral management body to take action, other than through increasing the intensity of publicity campaigns during the voting period urging people to vote. Any other actions could be perceived as aligning itself with leading candidates or parties.

Where contingency planning must be implemented immediately--where it appears that turnout may be below any required minimum--is in preparations for a re-run of the election within the time period allowed by legislation.

Transitional Elections

In transitional elections particularly, a low voter turnout may affect public perceptions of the election legitimacy or acceptance of election outcomes. In environments where there is little history of mass voting, this may be as much the result of voter uncertainty or unfamiliarity with voting hours and processes as any dissatisfaction with the election process.

In such circumstances, decisions may need to be made as to whether to extend the hours (or days) of voting, to implement of related contingency information campaigns, or to provide assistance for voters to attend to vote. These are decisions that would be appropriate to make at a central level following legal advice and consultation with the political and any international participants in the election.

Disasters

Natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, earthquake, tornado, hurricane, landslide, avalanche, or anaconda) or intimidation may prevent significant numbers of voters from going to vote. Again, response to these would be more appropriately determined at a central level after consultation with all relevant interests.

Occurrences affecting single voting stations may be handled at the local level.  Use of joint operations centre structures will assist in coordinating responses.

Voter Turnout Greater Than Expected

Competent election planning should accurately assess the numbers of voters likely to turn out at each voting station and allocate effectively the resources required to service expected voter turnouts. However, there are situations in which contingency plans to cope with additional voter turnout should be developed. These circumstances would include:

• at the time of selection of voting sites, there is doubt about the accuracy of voter population figures;

• election systems have no requirements for voter registration before voting day, or are likely to result in significant numbers of voters registering on voting day itself;

• election systems give voters a wide choice of voting stations to vote (initial action would preferably be to redirect excess voters to other nearby voting locations whose resources are being less fully utilised);

• for cost-efficiency reasons, resourcing of voting stations has been calculated on a specific proportion of registered voters turning out to vote;

• Peak periods of voter activity are more intensive than expected, leading to unacceptable delays for voters voting.

Contingency measures for dealing with higher than expected voter turnouts would generally be directed towards:

The ability to increase the resources available to service voters during the voting period:This would require contingency planning for the delivery of additional materials.

Extending the period available for voting: Where voter turnout has overwhelmed available voting station resources, large numbers of voters may still be outside the voting station, waiting to vote, at the close of voting. Flexibility in legal frameworks for extension of voting under specific circumstances can be useful to deal with such circumstances. Particularly in transitional elections, altered processes may result in estimation of turnouts and voting station resourcing of lesser quality.

Decisions on extension of voting hours would be appropriately made at a central election management level according to any processes allowed by the law and consultation with the political and any international participants in the election

Voting Hours Operations

Operations during voting hours and the vote count are the culmination of all election activity. They are the result of the complex interplay of all factors impacting the electoral process, both those under the control of electoral managers and environmental factors.

The range of methods by which voters may participate in the voting process is of wide variety among jurisdictions. It is not possible to cover all potential methods in these brief summaries.

Subsequent sections attempt to draw out from this highly complex interplay some general guidelines for methods of operation during voting hours.

What is most important to remember is that providing voting facilities is a service industry. All aspects of voting hours operations need to be oriented to quality and cost-effective service to voters.

Voting Station Readiness

To ensure that voting stations are ready to open at the required time on voting day, voting station managers and staff must be required to arrive for duty well before the scheduled opening time and conduct commencement of voting checks on all materials and facilities to be used during voting day

Items to check include:

Ensuring that the voting station has been set up correctly: that all signs and/or barriers are in place, entrance and exit are freely negotiable, all furniture and equipment is set up correctly, any security zones have been delimited and security forces are in place.

Ensuring that all staff is present, that any replacement staff required are sought, and that staff are aware of the duties for which they will be responsible during voting hours. 

Rechecking materials available to ensure that these have been allocated correctly to the relevant staff and that any reserve materials are securely stored;

Testing that any equipment to be used during voting hours is correctly installed and is functioning. This would include communications equipment, lighting and heating, ballot boxes and voting compartments. This may also include emergency power supplies, voting machines, and computers. Even if these have been tested the previous day during installation, they should be rechecked just prior to the commencement of voting.

A reporting schedule is necessary to ensure that each voting station manager reports to the electoral district manager on the state of readiness of the voting station prior to the scheduled time for commencement of voting.

Voter Service

When turning out to vote, voters have a right to expect to be processed courteously, professionally, and efficiently. Effective implementation of procedures for voting is a team effort within each voting station, which can be broken down into a number of key areas:

• maintaining control over voter queues and voter flow through the voting station so that voters are processed in an orderly manner-l;

• providing effective means of determining if voters are eligible to vote at that voting station--

• efficiently issuing ballots to voters, ensuring that they are able to make their vote in secret, and are guided as to how to cast their ballot correctly;

• providing information, either in response to voter queries or proactively to enhance voter flow;

• assisting voters whose names cannot be found on voters lists or who require assistance in voting-

Staff Management

To realise the potential effectiveness of their staff, voting station managers and other supervisors have to proactively manage what is happening in their voting stations, rather than sit behind a table watching voters pass by.

Voting station managers need to continuously monitor and supervise their staff's activities, and ensure that staff's working environment is conducive to high-quality performance levels 

Integrity of Voting Processes

Effective implementation of measures designed to protect the integrity of voting is essential if the election results are to withstand any challenges. Voters must have the opportunity to vote freely and confidentially.

Voting station staff must properly implement procedures to ensure that only those eligible to vote are allowed to vote, through efficiently:

• conducting identity checks on voters;

• determining, by reference to voters lists and/or other documents, whether a voter is eligible to vote at that voting station;

• undertaking checks to prevent impersonation of eligible voters and multiple voting.

(For details of procedures in regard to these issues, see Integrity Controls.)

Security

There are a number of aspects to security during voting hours, including:

• maintaining personal security of voters, voting station officials, and political participants;

• ensuring that voting stations are free of threat and intimidation;

• preventing loss of or damage to voting material, or the introduction of spurious voting material.

Cooperation between voting station officials and security forces, and a clear understanding of their respective roles, is vital.

Crisis Management

While effective planning of voting station operations should minimise the chances of crises occurring, there will be issues over which election staff have little or no control, such as natural disasters, civil disturbance, and other unforeseen occurrences. Operational deficiencies may lead to voting stations not being supplied with the necessary materials or equipment.

Contingency planning should address such potential circumstances. Where it is not possible to continue voting station operations, decisions on whether to adjourn or postpone voting will need to be taken (see Crisis Management).

Role of Party/Candidate Representatives

Transparency of voting is enhanced when party and candidate representatives can freely observe voting processes at all voting locations. To publicly assure election integrity party or candidate representatives should formal witness voting station officials actions; critical activities, such as verification that ballot boxes are empty prior to the commencement of voting, and sealing of ballot boxes and packaging of materials at the close of voting require their confidence.

With rights to observe, party and candidate representatives also have responsibilities with regard to their behaviour while in voting stations. 

Stability of Voting Frameworks

Significant advantages can be gained by maintaining some stability in the frameworks used for operations of voting stations. This is not to say that changes should not be introduced; but change needs to be shown to cost-effectively increase performance against the principles of voting operations. Change for its own sake can both lower cost-effectiveness and confuse voters.

Stability has these advantages:

• voting station officials build-up their store of knowledge of voting processes, so that both their performance improves and training may be more cost-effective;

• analysis of past performance can lead to improvement in methods of implementing the voting framework;

• voters can develop a reasonable understanding of what will be expected of them when they go to vote, relieving pressure on voting station staff to guide voters through voting processes and leading to efficiencies in staffing;

• voters are less likely to make errors in casting a valid ballot, thus enhancing effective participation;

• Voter education and information campaigns may be more cost effective.

Preparations for Commencement of Voting

Prior to the start of voting, it is vital that voting station managers ensure that the voting site and its staff are completely prepared and ready to open at the correct time, with all services required available and set up to operate in the correct fashion.

Those voters who turn out early to vote are entitled to the same level of service as those arriving later in the day. If there are still voting site preparation or staffing difficulties being resolved in the first hours of voting, service may suffer, and the effects may last throughout the hours of voting.

Use of Checklists

The extent of the checks to be undertaken is such that the provision of checklists to voting station managers, on which they can note the completion of required tasks, is essential for an efficient start to voting.

Pre-Voting Day

Wherever the security situation and the nature of the voting site allows, delivery and checking of voting station materials and equipment supplies, installing furniture and equipment according to approved layouts, and ensuring that the required facilities are available and working would be undertaken the day before voting day.

This additional access to voting sites will need to be negotiated with site owners. It may incur some additional costs:

• for voting station managers and other staff setting up the voting station,

• for site rentals(if not using premises made available under any official free use policy), and

• for additional security, if required, between voting station set up and commencement of voting.

However, benefits for an efficient commencement of voting would generally more than outweigh any additional costs.

Where the voting station is not in enclosed premises pre-voting day preparation may not be possible. In these cases voting station staff may be required to report for duty sufficiently early to ensure that the voting station is fully ready for operations at the required commencement time. However, the site should still be inspected on the day before voting day to ensure that it is still in a suitable condition to allow preparation as a voting station the following morning.

(For information on actions that may be taken pre-voting day to ensure voting station readiness for the commencement of voting, see  Ensuring Readiness.)

Arrival of Staff

Voting station staff must be required to report for duty before the voting station opening time. For voting station managers and other senior officials, this would be at least one hour before commencement time. Other voting station staff may also need to report for duty at the same time, particularly if the voting station has not been fully set up on the eve of voting day.

Cost considerations must be taken into account--not all staff may need to report for duty an hour beforehand--but staff members must be required to be at the voting station by a deadline that will allow them to be assigned duties and familiarise themselves with the materials to be used, materials locations, and voting station layout and facilities. Time should be allotted for staff to be briefed by the voting station manager, and also to allow the voting station manager sufficient notice of staff who have failed to report for duty in time to seek replacements by the time of commencement of voting.

Pre-Commencement Checks

Pre-commencement of voting checks by the voting station manager on the morning of voting day need to be thorough. In broad terms, they would fall into the following categories:

• site checks to ensure that all necessary furniture and facilities are in place and operational, the voting station is set up correctly, security is in place, all signs and posters are displayed as required, and any crowd control barriers or other such equipment are correctly erected. (see Site Checks);

• staff checks to ensure that all staff are present on time, any required replacement staff are requested, staff are allocated and given a final briefing on their duties (see Staffing Checks);

• materials checks to ensure that the correct quantities of materials are available and have been laid out for use (see Materials Checks);

• equipment checks to ensure that voting and communications equipment is functioning (see Equipment Checks);

• time check to synchronise watches and clocks in the voting station to an accurate source (such as telephone time service or by radio) to ensure that the voting station opening time is punctual.

Any problems found that cannot be resolved on the spot should be immediately reported by the voting station manager to the appropriate election administration office for action.

Readiness Reporting

Local and regional election administration offices should have a readiness-reporting schedule implemented for all voting stations under their control. Contact should be established with all voting stations prior to commencement time for assurance that all readiness checks have been undertaken and of their readiness to open on time.

Time of Opening of Voting Station

The voting station should open for voting exactly at the legally defined and advertised commencement time.

Where essential material has not arrived in time for opening at the designated time (e.g., the ballots, equipment such as ink and lights for multiple voting controls, or voters lists) the voting station should remain closed until enough of these become available to maintain effective voting integrity and service. (This would depend both on the nature of the material missing and any immediate threat to security if the voting station remains closed).

To cover situations where voting starts late at a voting station, provision in the legal framework for authorisation to extend voting hours by a similar period, if necessary to process all voters, would preferably be available. Contingency plans  should be prepared to cover such an eventuality.

Site Checks

Prior to commencement of voting, the voting station area must be completely checked to ensure that it is ready to function effectively at the time voting opens.

Even where the voting station has been set up earlier, a final check of readiness should take place. Issues that the voting station manager needs to ensure are checked include:

• that all voting station furniture and equipment is correctly arranged according to the approved layout for the voting station;

• ballot boxes (unsealed at this stage) are in their correct positions;

• gates or doors leading into the grounds in which the voting station is situated are unlocked (but not the entrance and exit to the voting station itself until the time for voting to commence);

• that any lighting or other power facilities required for voting station operations are working;

• there is free access to all parts of the voting station, e.g., keys supplied will open any locked doors to rooms required for voting or cupboards required for safe storage of material;

• directional signs and other external signs identifying the voting station are in place;

• establishing personal contact with any security forces allocated to the voting station area and ensuring that they are present according to security plans;

• ensuring any barriers around the voting station for security, crowd control, or delineation of a "no-campaigning" area have been erected;

• any required voter information posters, directional signs, and national symbols are in place inside the voting station;

• that any areas that may be hazardous to voters, such as steep steps, slippery floors, and the like, are clearly marked.

In high security risk areas, checking that risk prevention measures as defined in the security plan, such as sweeping the voting station for explosives or arms, have been implemented may also be necessary.

Staffing Checks

At the appointed time for staff to report for duty, the voting station manager should:

• check which staff are present and also check their contract or accreditation documentation;

• contact the local administration office to advise of staff who have not reported for duty and seek replacements;

• allocate the specific duties (or reinforce prior instruction) to each staff member;

• be aware of staff who have never worked in a voting station so that extra supervisory attention can be paid to them during the initial hours of voting;

• ensure that all staff are wearing their identity badges or other means of identification.

Briefing for Staff

It is also preferable that the voting station manager gives a final briefing to staff prior to the commencement of voting. This reinforcement of procedures and any special information regarding the voting station can be of great assistance in minimising errors, particularly early in the day when there may be many conflicting calls on the voting station manager's time. The briefing should cover:

• introduction of supervising staff;

• reinforcement that staff's role is to provide quality service to electors;

• any late instructions or procedural changes received from the electoral management body;

• reinforcement of basic voting procedures—and security; secrecy of voting; voter eligibility checks, such as underage voters ; integrity controls on and methods of issuing ballots; location of spare materials; controlling voter traffic flow; voter, voting staff, party and candidate representative, and observer rights and responsibilities;

• maintaining the cleanliness of the voting station;

• specific characteristics of the voters likely to attend the voting station--age, nationality, language, and the like--and how these may impact staff's performance of their duties;

• facilities in the voting station, such as toilets, washroom facilities, drinks, rest areas;

• rosters for staff breaks;

• emergency procedures;

• reminder of any administrative requirements for staff, for example, signing of attendance record, completion of payroll sheets, or transport arrangements.

In the interests of transparency (and also to use time efficiently by pre-empting potential individual questions), any party or candidate representatives and observers present at the voting station should be invited to listen to the staff briefing.

Materials Checks

No matter what checks may have been instituted on receipt of material at the voting station, a final check should be conducted prior to the commencement of voting to ensure that all material required is present.

If a voting station is set up prior to voting day, it may be possible to lay out some material in its appropriate positions--excluding ballots, certified voters lists, and other highly accountable material--before the morning of voting day. Prior to the opening of the voting station, ballots, ballot envelopes (where used), and voters lists should be distributed to the relevant tables.

Ballot Accounting

Strict accounting controls must be implemented on ballots (or ballot envelopes) received at the voting station. For the accuracy of ballot (or ballot envelope) reconciliations after the close of voting , it is vital that all ballots received at the voting station are individually check counted, to ensure that the number actually supplied is recorded:

• Even where ballots are supplied in booklets, with numbered stubs, errors can occur during production of the booklets.

• Where more than one person is issuing ballots or ballot envelopes, or not all ballots/envelopes are allocated to the ballot issuing area prior to commencement of voting, strict accounting records must be kept by the voting station manager of the quantities and times of allocation of ballots/envelopes to specific issuing staff.

• Whether done as a single allocation prior to voting, or by multiple allocations during voting hours, each allocation for ballots/envelopes should be check counted by the staff member to whom it is allocated. Particularly where a multiple allocation method is used, these staff should also maintain records of ballots/envelopes issued to them for use.

Materials Checks

Pre-voting materials checks required would include that:

• all ballot or ballot envelope issuing officers have received and counted their ballot or ballot envelope allocations and have been issued with all other necessary equipment (such as official marks with which to stamp ballots or envelopes, where these are used);

• figures for ballots (or if applicable ballot envelopes) on hand for the commencement of voting have been entered in ballot reconciliation records;

• all forms and other envelopes required for voting are available and appropriately distributed to staff tables in the voting station;

• voter information materials are in place for distribution to voters;

• voters lists are distributed to the appropriate staff and given a final check to ensure they contain a complete set of pages and are ready for use;

• any ballots, ballot envelopes, or ballot material such as seals kept in reserve are in a secure container in a location that can be constantly supervised;

• if ballots are to be manually marked, a pen or pencil is firmly attached in each voting compartment;

• general stationery supplies (e.g., pens, pencils, note paper) are distributed to all staff.

Equipment Checks

All equipment to be used during voting should be fully tested prior to commencement of voting to ensure that it is functioning. The range of testing to be undertaken will depend on the reliance placed on equipment for voting, but possible likely requirements would include:

• testing communications equipment--telephones, personal radios, fax machines (if supplied)--to ensure that the communication network is operating to all locations the voting station manager may need to communicate with and that the actual devices are working;

• where multiple voting is controlled by marking voters hands with ink, ensuring that any equipment needed for this, such as ink rollers and special lighting equipment, is functioning properly, and any spare equipment supplied is tested and ready for use;

• all voting compartments have been set up correctly;

• emergency power supply generators, if required, are fuelled up and ready for operation;

• Where machines or computers are used for voting, ensuring that these have been correctly installed.

Each voting machine or computer terminal should be tested by processing identifiable, distinctive test ballots/cards through the machines or test transactions through computers to ensure that both the equipment and any necessary software or communications lines are fully operable.

Communications tests to and from voting stations should be to a planned schedule controlled by electoral district managers. Where communications facilities to be used for voting are not in the actual room used for voting, access availability to the premises containing the fixed line phone or other facility must be checked.

Ballot Boxes

Just prior to the commencement of voting, the ballot boxes to be put into use immediately should be displayed empty to the staff and any party or candidate representatives or other accredited observers present. Once they are satisfied that the boxes are empty, the boxes should be sealed with the locks, plastic tie seals, paper seals, or other materials used.

If locks or plastic tie seals are used, the numbers of the seals or locks should be recorded and any party or candidate representatives or other observers present invited to witness the record. In the absence of such observers, staff members should witness.

If locks are used, the keyholes should then be sealed with a paper or other seal. If paper seals are used on ballot boxes, their numbers (if any) should be similarly noted and witnesses invited to sign across the seals. Under no circumstances should seals be then broken or ballot boxes opened until after the close of voting.

Only those ballot boxes to be used at the commencement of voting should be closed and sealed prior to the commencement of voting. If additional ballot boxes are required to be put into use during voting hours, the above routine must be undertaken immediately before they are put into use.

Where voting machines or computers are to be used to record votes, similar procedures to verify that voter count or other recording mechanisms are set to zero (or any start record number data recorded) should be undertaken, documented, and witnessed by party or candidate representatives and observers present, or in their absence, other voting station officials.

Ballot boxes, voting machines, or computers, once sealed or verified for voting, should not be removed from the voting station until after the close of voting, or the count (if held at the voting station), and then only strictly in accordance with procedures for their removal.

Voter Service

Voting stations are the public faces of the electoral management body and voting day the one time when the majority of the public will come face-to-face with formal democratic processes.

The public's experiences in voting stations--how they are treated, the perceived efficiency and integrity of voting station operations--will colour their attitude about the effectiveness of the electoral management body, and often the democratic process itself.

Voting hours operations are a massive exercise in voter service, not just a blind application of rules for the benefit of officials. Under the pressures, within the tight time frames common for elections, of constructing a large network of voting locations, staffing and supplying them, and ensuring that procedures are applied with integrity, administrators can at times lose sight of service issues. The service aspect is of equal importance to, and enhances, integrity.

As with any customer-based activity, poor voter service will drive the customers away. Experiences with long queues, rude or unknowledgeable officials, complex and ill-explained procedures and materials, inflexible facilities, and lack of accuracy in registration records can contribute to decisions not to participate in voting and, hence, in democracy.

Service considerations are an essential component of all stages of planning and preparation for voting, including:

• the voting procedures and methods used and the range of voting facilities provided so as to stimulate voter participation.

• the staffing levels allocated to voting facilities 

• the voter information provided to voters 

• the user-friendliness of design and the availability of election materials and equipment (see Materials and Equipment);

• the training provided to voting station staff

• the measures taken to assure voter safety

Planning Considerations

In the end, no matter what preparations are made, service and integrity rest on the practicality of voting procedures and the quality of their implementation by voting station staff on voting day. Elements that need to be carefully considered in providing voter service during voting hours include:

• voting station locations, size, and facilities—(voting station area, staffing, materials, and equipment allocations) should be of sufficient capacity to cope with the expected number of voters

• voting station layouts should create a one way flow of voters from the entrance, through eligibility checks, issue of ballot materials, to voting compartments, casting of ballots, and thence to the exit

Service Implementation

In implementing plans for voter service, attention needs to be paid to:

• methods of controlling crowds of voters waiting to vote to promote an orderly, efficient, and friendly atmosphere in the voting station, using voting station layouts that encourage a logical flow of voters through the voting station, and ensuring that waiting time to vote is minimised 

• determining eligibility of voters to vote speedily, accurately, and courteously, and in a manner that minimises possible disruption to other voters.

• the manner of issuing ballots and casting votes (see Issue and Casting of Ballots);

• provision of information to voters that will assist their understanding of the voting process (See  Informing and Assisting Voters) and providing assistance to voters with physical disabilities or literacy or language problems;

• systems to identify voters who may need further information or assistance early, before they reach the eligibility check and accountable voting materials issue area and possibly delay other voters' progress;

• helping people who turn out to vote at a voting station at which they are not eligible to vote ;

• motivating and supervising voting station officials in the performance of their duties (see Voting Station Staff Management);

• providing a secure voting station environment (see Security in Voting Stations).

Crowd and Queue Control

Ensuring an orderly flow of voters through the voting station promotes efficiency of voting services and enhances the maintenance of security in the voting station. Time spent waiting to vote is often the major factor that voters remember of their voting experience.

Having to endure a long or disorderly wait to vote can be a significant negative factor in voters' perceptions of the efficiency and integrity of the election:

• Long queues for voting are not necessarily the only problem. Slow moving queues, no matter what length, are also to be avoided.

• A large number of voters inside a voting station is not a problem, if the size of the voting station area is large and the control mechanisms are effective.

• A small number of voters milling around aimlessly in a voting station, with no clear idea of where they should go next, can cause delays and confusion.

• Where voters are accustomed to voting station procedures, speed of voter processing can be increased and voters' waiting time and requirements for crowd and queue control are diminished.

• The fewer voters that need individual attention from voting station officials for procedures to be explained, the more familiar vote styles are, and the greater efficiencies are both in staffing requirements and processing, the more speed can be attained.

Thus creating voting processes and procedures that are sustainable and stable in the longer term will considerably aid effectiveness in voter service.

Crowd Control Focus

There are four distinct areas and functions in the voting station that need to be considered in organising effective crowd control measures:

• queues of voters waiting to be checked for voter eligibility and issued with voting materials, which may extend outside the voting station itself and require assistance from security forces in external crowd control;

• the area between ballot materials issuing tables and the voting compartments;

• voters seeking information or assistance or being redirected within the voting station;

• control of voting station exits.

Factors That Will Aid Crowd and Queue Control

There are some crucial factors that need to be considered in providing an effective framework for crowd and queue control inside a voting station, including:

• the size of the voting station and the appropriateness of its staffing and facilities for the expected number of voters;

• the effectiveness of the voting station layout;

• allocation of staff to crowd control duties;

• control of entry to the voting station, including the use of restricted entry areas around the voting station;

• early identification of and facilities for voters who may be slower to process;

• use of clear signs, voting information posters, and crowd control barriers;

• making voting station officials and other authorised persons in the voting station clearly distinguishable, through use of badges, armbands, caps, or other distinctive apparel;

• use of more than one voter eligibility checking and accountable voting materials issuing table.

Attention to these issues can ensure effective management of large numbers of voters through a voting station in a single day.

Allocation of Staff to Crowd and Queue Control

Crowd and queue control duties should be assigned to specific voting station officials. This may not necessarily mean staff have this as a sole task--for example, in all but very large voting stations or high security risk situations, the staff member guarding ballot boxes may also be able to ensure that voters do not congregate around or attempt to re-enter through exits.

In all but the smallest voting stations, control of queues of voters waiting to vote would generally be assigned to a specific official. However, in enveloped ballot systems, where envelopes are issued on entry to the voting station, this entry control official could also undertake queue control functions.

In other systems, depending on the method of voter identity checking used, and where the issuing tables for accountable voting materials are located, queue control could also be combined with control of the voting station entrance. In very small voting stations, it could be undertaken by the voting station's manager or any voter information officer allocated.

Voting Station Staff Crowd and Queue Control Functions

In instituting effective crowd and queue control measures within the voting station, all voting station staff have a role, not just those assigned to voter queue control duties. This is not just a matter of control; effective handling of voters queued to vote would enhance service to voters.

Staff responsible for entry and/or voter queue control must ensure that:

• Queues are kept in orderly lines, and particularly that voters are not permitted to congregate around the issuing area for accountable voting materials;

• voters have identity or other required documents ready for eligibility checks;

• voters are directed to the voting materials issuing table (or the correct one, if more than one is operating) as soon as it is vacant;

• they have an active engagement with the voters waiting to vote, patrol the queues on a regular basis;

• monitoring the time spent by voters in queueseither on a regular, formal basis, through the use of time stamped cards presented to the voter on arrival at the voting station and also time stamped when the voter is issued with a ballot, or, less formally, through monitoring of a random sample of voters' progress by an official using a watch; service evaluation and improvements can be based on an objective foundation.

These officials can play a large role in enhancing the service to voters and the efficiency of voting materials issue through such activities as:

• escorting "priority" voters to the head of the queue;

• actively providing information on voting process requirements;

• actively attempting to identify any problems with regard to eligibility or voting processes that voters may have and attempting to have these resolved before the voter reaches the ballot issue table;

• identifying voters with language difficulties, or who may require assistance in voting, and arranging for assistance for these voters.

Issuing of Voting Materials

The efficiency of methods used by staff checking voter eligibility and issuing ballots is a major determinant of how fast voter queues are processed. As far as possible, any disputes or difficulties with voters at these points should be directed to senior voting station officials to prevent disruption of service to the bulk of voters. Issuing staff should ensure that:

• Where voters' names cannot be found on the voters list within a reasonable time, assistance is sought from supervisory or voter information officials--arguments over eligibility should not be allowed to hold up the voter queue.

• Voters with language problems or needing assistance in voting are referred quickly to the voting station manager or other senior information staff.

• To prevent congestion in the voting compartment area, a voter is not issued with accountable voting materials (ballots or envelopes) unless a voting compartment is empty.

Congestion may lead to breaches of voting secrecy requirements through voters attempting to complete their ballot outside a voting compartment.

Exit Control

Staff responsible for control of the voting station exit must ensure that voters leave the voting station immediately after depositing their ballot in the ballot box (or after lodging a computer or voting machine vote).

Monitoring by Managers

The voting station manager and any other supervisory staff must constantly monitor the length of time voters are waiting in queues, entry control, and activity at the ballot issuing tables. Issues needing particular attention include:

• checking the overall number of voters in the voting station at any time and advising entry control staff of any need to slow down or speed up entry rates;

• being aware of any difficulties or disputes arising at ballot issuing tables and moving quickly to ensure that these do not affect voter flow;

• in voting stations with multiple voting materials issuing tables, the relative speed of issue at each table.

Where tables deal with separate alphabetical or other divisions of the voters list, inefficient or tired staff at one table can lead to a long queue, and resentment at relatively slow processing, for one segment of voters. Flexibility in systems to allow rotation of staff between the different tables or functions will help maintain overall voter service and goodwill. Such rotation will require a more complex system of maintaining staff accountability for voting materials issue.

Perimeters Around Voting Stations

Legal delineation of an area around the voting station available only to voters, security forces and accredited party or candidate representatives, observers or guests, but not to party campaigners or any other persons not attending to vote, can aid both crowd control and voting station security.

The appropriate radius of this area will vary according to the number of voters assigned to the voting station and the security situation. In various jurisdictions the radius of this exclusion zone may range from a few metres to several hundred metres7. Where buildings used as voting stations (such as schools) are set in fenced grounds, the fence line could also be legally defined as the voting station area. Such perimeters--established with rope, tape, or other barriers--can be of use in distancing any disturbances and crowd problems from the voting area itself.

In some jurisdictions, judicious use of staff and distribution of copies of voters lists to officials stationed at the perimeter are used to assist in advising intending voters if they do not have any required personal documents, have turned out at the wrong voting station, or are not registered, before they join a voting queue, and thus ease crowd control burdens within the voting station.

However, patrolling such perimeters can be very resource-intensive and impractical to enforce if set at a considerable distance from the voting station itself.

Control of Voting Station Entry

Entry to the voting station should be controlled to ensure only those with authorised access to the voting station--voters and other accredited persons--are allowed to enter, and that the number of voters within the voting station area at any time is of manageable proportions. All voting station officials, party or candidate representatives, observers, and security staff authorised to be present in a voting station should:

• be issued an accreditation document or card which must be presented on entry to the voting station;

• prominently wear a badge or other article of apparel that clearly distinguishes them from voters and indicates their function while in the voting station.

Stationing of a voting station official at the voting station entrance to check voters' identity documents can be the most efficient method of controlling voter entry. The nature of the entry check will be in part determined by voter eligibility requirements and the ballot issue system, and in part by efficiency considerations.

Entry control is easy to achieve in systems where voters must produce a document--a general identity card or a voter identity card of some description--to gain entry to the voting station. The issue is how far should the checks on entry extend to achieve a balance between strict entry control, efficiency, and accessibility to voters.

Rigorous control of voting station entry will also be impossible in systems where maximum accessibility to voting processes is the overriding goal--for example, where there is no requirement to show an identity card on entry, where voters lists are not unique for each voting station, or where unregistered persons may register at a voting station or cast a tendered or provisional vote.

Basic Check

The simplest level of entry check is merely to ensure that voters have  the documentation required for voting.

Where such documentation is a general purpose identity card, or a voter identity card that does not identify the voting station at which the voter is eligible to vote, this check may only filter out those ineligible to vote or unable to attempt to vote until they return with their identity documentation.

It may allow persons who are not registered or whose registration does not entitle them to vote at the voting station to enter, and transfers the need to deal with these persons to officials controlling queues inside the voting station or issuing voting materials. It does reduce delays for voters entering the voting station.

Higher Level Checks

Where effectiveness of crowd control inside voting stations or integrity of issue of ballot materials is perceived as a potential problem, more thorough checks on entry to the voting station may be appropriate:

• Rigorous entry checks can be maintained if all voters are issued voter identification cards showing their appropriate electoral district and voting station.

• However, due regard must be paid to voter accessibility and equity issues, so as not to exclude voters who have been the victims of error in production of official materials.

Use of Voters List as Entry Control

In systems where voters are not issued voter identity cards, a copy of the voters list is sometimes used at the entrance of the voting station to determine eligibility for entry. However, there are significant disadvantages to this method:

• It can add to delays in entering the voting station, particularly where the quality of compilation or accuracy of details on voters lists' is poor.

• It is inefficient since it duplicates the effort of other voting station officials, as the vital voters list check should occur when voters are issued accountable ballot material.

However, checking against the voters list at the voting station entrance can have some advantages, though these need to be carefully assessed against the above disadvantages:

• It can provide early notification to voters that they cannot be easily found on the voters list, or are not on the voters list, and allow these voters to be immediately directed to senior officials for assistance and information.

• It moves the area where major disputes are more likely to occur with voters away from the area issuing accountable voting materials.

Use of Maps for Entry Control

Use of voting district maps at the voting station entrance and questioning of voters as to their address of registration can be an effective method of redirecting voters who have turned out at the wrong voting station.

This can be particularly important where voters' lists have only recently been introduced and where there are doubts about the general awareness of voters of the correct voting station to attend, due to new procedures or changes to electoral boundaries.

Numbers within Voting Station

Numbers of voters entering the voting station need to be controlled to the extent that orderly queues are maintained, and so that the number of voters inside the voting station does not prevent voting station officials, party or candidate representatives, and other observers from having a clear view of all voting compartments and ballot boxes.

Some relaxing of strict control of numbers entering the voting station may be required immediately before the time for close of voting if there are still voters outside the voting station waiting to vote.

Weapons

Confiscating weapons carried by voters is a task that should be carried out by security forces outside the voting station rather than by voting station officials.

In environments where this is likely to be an issue, liaison between local security forces and the voting station manager on optimal methods for ensuring weapons are surrendered, and establishment of secure storage and collection points for surrendered weapons, will be required.

Signs

Signs and barriers can be used to assist voters in their flow through the voting station and in keeping queues orderly. Signs should prominently identify the areas and tables for:

• issuing voting material;

• the voting station manager's desk;

• issuing special votes;

• information, language, or other assistance services;

• the ballot box (es).

It is important that signs used are comprehensible to all voters; particularly in areas of lower literacy, symbols should be used, rather than relying totally on words.

Where there is more than one table for issuing voting materials, and these are to deal with different sub-sets of voters on an alphabetical or geographic residence basis, there must be clear, visible signs above or by each table and at the head of the voter queue for each table indicating the correct table and queue for voters to join.

In all cases, placing of signs and markers for heads of voter queues some two to three metres from the relevant issuing table will prevent congestion around the voting materials issuing area.

Barriers

Barriers can be used to maintain a controlled queuing area and keep voters moving in the correct direction through the voting station. Use of a lightweight, flexible, barrier system, such as rope, modular cardboard or lightweight plastic poles/stands, or even road-marking barriers, can allow maximum effective use of available queuing space by compressing queues into a zigzag or similar formation.

Barriers are particularly useful for exit and entry control where voting stations have a combined entrance/exit. They can be similarly used to ensure that voters do not re-enter voting stations after depositing their ballot in the ballot box.

The need for crowd control barriers, and the staff resources that need to be devoted to crowd control, will vary according to the cultural environment. In societies where patience and order are a significant part of the general cultural ethos there may be a minimal requirement for crowd control measures.

Efficiency Measures

Speed of processing of voters and voter capacity of voting stations can be increased by:

• combining voter eligibility checking and voting material issue at the same location;

• having more than one voter eligibility checking/voting material issuing table, allowing simultaneous processing of more than one voter;

• Where voters must complete a ballot for more than one election, issuing ballots or accountable envelopes for all relevant elections simultaneously (either as separate ballots or combined on the one ballot).

Making voters go sequentially to different tables for eligibility checking and voting material issue for each of simultaneous elections being held in a voting station has the potential to cause confusion and slow down voter processing. Some rare exceptions to this may occur where there are major differences in eligibility criteria for different elections being held simultaneously.

Splitting Voter Queues

Where several streams are used for eligibility checking and voting material issue  it would be more usual for the voters list to be split on an alphabetical basis by surname, with voters directed to a queue formed in front of the appropriate table. Where this form of organisation is used, care needs to be taken that:

• the voters lists have been printed so that a fresh sheet is commenced with each alphabetical family name division;

• the split of the list allows approximately equal numbers of voters to be serviced by each issuing table--this will depend on frequency of family names: for example, in many societies, a straight A-M, N-Z split of the list will give widely unequal parts.

Local electoral management officials, while planning voting station operations, should determine appropriate splits for each voting station.

Use of Bank-Style Queuing

Where there is more than one eligibility checking/voting materials issue table in a voting station, voter flow can be most efficiently handled by using a single voter queue.

Officials would then direct voters to the first vacant eligibility checking/materials issue table, rather than splitting voters into separate individual queues based on an alphabetical split of family names or on address of residence.

However, this method's greater efficiency in speed of processing has to be balanced against other cost, management, and integrity considerations that can be adversely affected by its implementation:

• Instead of printing a single voters list for each voting station, that may be split to create different voter streams, additional complete voters lists for the voting station will be required, with consequent additional print and control costs.

• Being marked on a voters list can no longer be a solitary, primary control to prevent multiple voting; though it can be used as a means of identifying voters who vote more than once.

• Additional controls, such as surrendering of voter identification cards or marking voters with ink, are required for prevention, with the additional materials, or equipment and staffing costs involved.

Voting station management needs to be of high quality to take full advantage of the service flexibility possible.

Provided that the voters list format, and measures for materials control and ballot validation are sufficiently flexible, using the voting station manager or another staff member at a temporary eligibility checking/materials issue table can assist in clearing longer voter queues at peak-periods. This is more cost-effective than allocating additional full-time staff that may be under-employed for the whole day.

Other Planning Measures

There are other highly important planning measures that will assist in crowd and queue control. These would include:

• pro-active liaison between local officials of the electoral management body and political, community, and employer groups to determine if and when to expect large influxes of voters, through organised transport or other arrangements, and attempts to negotiate scheduling of these so that they do not arrive at the same time;

• maintenance by the electoral management body of individual voting station statistics of voter turnout by time period, and of queuing time for a sample of voters, so that resource allocations (e.g., the number of voting compartments required or part-time staff) can be effectively matched to peak voting periods.

Determination of Eligibility to Vote

One of the major functions of voting station officials is to determine whether voters turning out to vote at a voting station are in fact eligible to vote at that voting station. Eligibility requirements that need to be satisfied for a voter to be issued a ballot need to be clearly specified in legislation.

The effectiveness of the application of procedures for determining if a person is eligible to vote in an election is one of the crucial determinants of the overall integrity of the election process.

Steps in Determining Eligibility

Three significant questions must be answered in determining an intending voter's eligibility to vote:

• Is the person who he claims to be? Either through presentation of identity documents or by other means, is the voting station official satisfied that the voter is not impersonating someone else?

• Is the voter on the voters list for that voting station, or otherwise qualified to vote at that voting station?

• Does it show that the voter already voted in this election, and if so does this preclude another ballot being issued?

These are best undertaken as an integrated check, immediately before the voter is issued a ballot (or ballot envelope, when these are the controlled materials). In all circumstances, eligibility checking, including any checks of voter identity, should be undertaken by a properly authorised voting station official, not by police or other security personnel stationed at the voting station.

There is no generic system for implementing these controls in all circumstances. The intensity of procedures adopted will depend on a number of factors, including:

• risk analyses of possible manipulations;

• the level of community trust;

• accuracy and availability of relevant documentation.

What is appropriate in transitional elections may be excessive and heavy handed in environments with a history of election integrity.

Importance of Consistency

One important factor is that the eligibility tests are consistently applied by voting station officials, both throughout all voting stations and to all persons attending to vote.

Inconsistency in application will raise valid questions about election integrity. Achievement of consistency can be of particular importance where:

• there is a range of identity documentation, or documents possibly of unverifiable authenticity, that voters may use to prove eligibility;

• there are inaccuracies in voters lists, through errors in compilation, or voters having moved since the compilation of the lists.

Reasonably equitable voter eligibility checking systems take account of such errors (for example that, the elector's name may be misspelled or reversed, address details may have been erroneously transcribed to the certified voters list or may not be current) and would err on the side of the voter, allowing any significant perceived problems to be dealt with by means of challenge to the election.

Where such subjective judgment has to be applied by voting station officials, clear guidelines for their actions, and supervision to ensure that these are implemented consistently, are necessary.

• The overall level of integrity provided by voter eligibility checking will very much depend on the quality of the voters lists.

• It is also likely to be easier to check voter eligibility in smaller voting stations with staff drawn from the local community.

Basic Approaches

In general, there are two ways of approaching voter eligibility checks:

• in an active manner, by requiring voters to prove that they are eligible, that is, by requiring voters to produce some defined identity document, to show in some manner that they have not already voted in the election and possibly to have an exact match with details recorded on the voters list;

• in a passive manner, by relying on an oral or written statement to a voting station official by voters regarding their identity, the match with details on the voters list and that they have not already voted. Appropriate and cost-effective procedures could combine elements of each of these two approaches.

The basic consideration is: are eligibility checking mechanisms to be very high integrity checks that will absolutely prevent anyone not eligible from voting, very possibly at the expense of some eligible voters being turned away, or are they to be more realistically targeted at eliminating significant or systematic manipulation, through maintaining some flexibility in order to maximise participation?

Efficiency of the Eligibility Checking Process

Effectiveness of eligibility checks can be enhanced if:

• the eligibility check is carried out by voting station officials immediately before, and at the same table as, the issue of accountable voting materials (ballots and/or envelopes);

• there is opportunity for officials to challenge the eligibility of any intending voter, and either to have this adjudicated by the voting station manager (or other senior voting station official) following the swearing of a declaration as to eligibility by the voter, or to allow challenged voters to vote only by way of a provisional ballot.

In some systems, party or candidate representatives may also challenge whether a voter is eligible to be issued voting material, though more often this right is restricted to challenging inclusion of these votes in counts.

Voter eligibility checks can efficiently be applied by a single voting station official with the combined functions of eligibility checking, marking the voters list, and issuing voting materials (ballots and/or ballot envelopes). However, it is common that functions of eligibility checking and ballot or ballot envelope issue are assigned to separate officials.

On balance, this may be a more costly method. It may provide some additional integrity through cross-checking between the staff but is often the result of lack of confidence in staff professionalism or additional extraneous tasks, adding little to integrity, being loaded on to these officials.

If multiple voting controls include the marking of voters with special ink, a second voter eligibility control official engaged in checking voters for ink marks and for applying the ink will generally be required.

Voters Eligible for More than One Vote

Under some systems of elections at local government levels, voters may be entitled to vote more than once, in respect of their domicile and also of any other rated property owned or leased by the voter. While the philosophy behind such systems may be open to question, where they are used, the compilation of certified voters lists, preparation of voters lists, and voting station procedures for determining voter eligibility and preventing multiple voting will need to be adapted to allow such voters their legal entitlement to more than one vote.

Similarly, in systems where proxy voting  is allowed, proof of eligibility will need to be established in regard to each vote being claimed by proxy voters.

Multiple voting controls based on marking voters with ink will be more difficult to implement where proxy voting is allowed.

Voter Identity Checks

The first step in checking voter eligibility is to determine if voters are who they claim to be. This should be established before moving to check if the voter's name appears on the voters list at the voting station.

It would be more usual, and generally seen as necessary for voting integrity (for public perceptions, even if not to combat real risks) for voters to show a specified document or documents to prove their identity. The most simple and cost-effective means of checking voter identity is through requiring voters to present a nationally recognised identity card of high integrity.

Determination of Valid Identity Documents

Whatever documents may be used for establishing identity in the voting station, the identification system must maintain equity and, as far as possible, simplicity in defining the relevant document or documents required to prove identity. In implementing proof of identity systems for voting there are some useful principles to use as a guide:

• It is best that a single, unique form of document be used as the basis of establishing voter identity.

• Where a range of documents, or a combination of documents is acceptable, the range should be kept to the minimum required to cover all eligible voters. This issue is more likely to arise in post-conflict situations where administrative identity systems have broken down and there is insufficient time or finances to develop specific voter identity cards for the election. The acceptance of both military and civilian documents as identifiers should generally be avoided.

Where a range of documents may be used to prove identity, additional controls on multiple voting, such as marking the voter with ink, may be required, particularly if voters lists are not of high quality.

• Eligible voters must have had equitable opportunity to obtain the identity document(s) required for voting. (This may be important where elections are rushed as a conflict resolution mechanism in post-conflict or new state situations.)

• The identity document or documents required should not be easily forged.

• Documents bearing a photograph or other high integrity personal characteristics of the voter would preferably be used.

Without these, the documents may be too easily transferable and add nothing to voting integrity.

Using signed documents and requiring some form of signature check (on an application or receipt for voting materials) against an identity document has significant disadvantages; it will slow the voting process, is not reliable (officials are not handwriting experts), and creates problems for illiterate voters.

• The required document(s) must be public knowledge and voting station officials made totally aware of what is acceptable.

• Where a range of identity documents is acceptable, voters must be treated equitably no matter what acceptable identity document they choose to use.

Voter Identification Cards

It is becoming more common that voter identity is established by showing some form of receipt for voter registration or a voter identification card issued for the election. This additional measure may be particularly useful where there is no general national identity card system of sufficient integrity.

Production of a high integrity voter identification card eliminates the need for any other proof of identity to be shown in the voting station (instead these checks are undertaken at the registration stage).

Surrendering or cancelling of the card in the voting station can also provide an effective multiple voting control. High integrity cards would normally bear a non-removable/alterable photograph of the voter. Development of other voter identification systems (using developments in technology for thumb print recognition, voice and retinal imaging) is also current.

However, in determining whether specific voter identification cards are required, all associated costs and the longer-term sustainability of production must be considered.

Their use would be justified in environments where there is likely to be sufficient contention over voting eligibility that lack of a high integrity identity mechanism specifically for voting could affect overall acceptance of election outcomes.

Applications to Vote

High integrity control on voter identity can be achieved, where no national identity card system exists, by requiring each voter to complete an application to vote (or finalise an application pre-printed from registration records) on arrival at the voting station.

The details on this application, including voter's signature, are then compared with original registration records provided in the voting station to determine if the voter should be issued voting material.

While this method can achieve integrity in assessing voter eligibility and preventing multiple voting, it is a comparatively slow, cumbersome method of processing voters, with big disadvantages in societies of lower literacy and requires voting station officials to make quick judgments on handwriting comparisons.

Declaration by Voter

There are systems in which identity checking consists solely of voters orally declaring to the voting station official that they are who they claim to be, and there is little if any evidence that this openness is abused.

While this may be appropriate in societies where there is a tradition of political restraint, transparency, and community trust, it is not a model that is generally applicable.

Location of Identity Checking

Where documents proving identity are to be shown at the voting station by voters, checks can effectively be instituted in two stages:

1. An initial check on entry to the voting station, to ensure that voters have the relevant documents with them and turning away any voters without the required documentation (for discussion of voting station entry controls, see Crowd and Queue Control). Service to voters can be enhanced by questioning voters on entry, or while queuing to vote, to determine if they are at the correct voting station and advise them accordingly (see Crowd and Queue Control).
2. A check of identity as part of a full eligibility check by the official controlling the voters list, prior to being issued a ballot and/or ballot envelope. Voters should be asked to present the required identification documents to the official for inspection.

Eligibility to Vote at a Voting Station

Following confirmation of the voter's identity, the next step in establishing eligibility to vote is to determine whether the voter is eligible to vote at that voting station.

It is preferable that certified voters’ lists be used for this check, rather than relying purely on voter identification cards or on some external source prepared for some other purpose, such as civil lists. Inclusion of a voter on the voters list used in the voting station would generally be regarded as proof of a voter's right to vote at that voting station; if the list includes voters believed to be ineligible, this may be a matter for later challenge.

Checking Against Voters List

In undertaking this check, the voters list should be searched for the voter's name (with reference to the identity document provided by the voter where these are required), and if found, the name and particulars confirmed with the voter. The voters list is then marked to indicate that the voter is issued a ballot. Depending on how the lists are to be later processed, the manner of marking may differ.

Where manual reconciliations of voters marked on voters lists to ballots and/or accountable ballot envelopes issued are to be undertaken, it would be usual and prudent to draw a line through both the voter's name and serial number on the certified voters list. If certified voters lists are later to be processed electronically, special marking means may be required.

Standard Marking of Names on Voters Lists

Care should be taken to ensure that all voters' names are marked accurately and in the same manner. Some issues to consider include:

• Marking of voters on the list should be clear and precise to aid calculation, after the close of voting, of total voters supposedly issued with ballots and/or accountable ballot envelopes (for use in reconciliations),

• The voter's entry on the list should not be totally obliterated; there may be a need to refer to it later in case an incorrect marking has been made.

• Where a voters list entry has been erroneously fully or partially ruled through, this should be clearly indicated by the voting station official through use of an initialled standard mark.

• Use of a ruler can assist the voting station official to mark cleanly through the voter's name and serial number, as long as writing implements with non-smudging ink are used.

• Accountability for marking of voters lists is important.

Particularly where there is more than one official with the duty of marking names off voters lists, the names of the officials responsible should be clearly indicated on the cover of each voters list or section of the list.

Common Problems Encountered

There are a number of common problems that may arise with checking of voters' names against the voters list.

Hopefully, as many as possible of these potential problems will have been ascertained before the voter reaches the table for eligibility checking and for receiving ballots (or ballot envelopes), and either solved or the voter directed to the voting station manager or voter information officials. Where the voter's name cannot be found on the voters list, this could indicate that:

• the voter is not registered at all;

• the voter is registered at another voting station;

• there is some difference in the name/details provided by the voter, and the details as they appear on the certified voters list;

• there has been an error in preparation of the voters list, resulting in omission of the voter's details.

Where the voter's name and details cannot immediately be matched to an entry on the voters list, the voting station official should not make an immediate assumption that the voter is not eligible to vote.

This is a poor service standard to provide; the principle of maximising valid participation in the election should be kept in mind.

However, lengthy checking of the voters list by eligibility checking officials can considerably delay other voters. If, after a reasonable check, the voter cannot be found on the voters list, the voter should be directed to the voting station manager for assistance.

If the voting station manager finds that the voter is listed on the voters list, the voter would then be returned to the voting materials issuing area. If the voter's name is not found, the voting station manager would most likely undertake the appropriate action for voters not on the voting station's list (for further discussion of this issue, see Voters Not Found on Voters Lists).

Matching Voter to Voters List Entry

Where no immediate exact match to a voters list entry can be made, eligibility checking officials should carefully check the voter’s list and question the voter to ensure that:

• The voter's name has not been misspelled, or given/family names jumbled in order on the list. Care needs to be taken regarding voters from minority cultures, who may be known under different names peculiar to their culture, or whose given/family names may appear on the list in an order different from that used in their culture. Further investigation of the voter's identity documents may help clarify such an issue.

• The person has changed name since registration, for example, by taking another name after marriage. Equity would require that these voters be accepted as eligible to vote; integrity would require evidence, by means of a statement provided by the voter, or other evidence, of a link between the two names.

• The voter's current address (as shown either on an application for a ballot, the required identity card, or in questioning by voting station officials) is different from what is on the voters list.

Procedures for handling such occurrences can vary widely according to how restrictive the proof of eligibility and integrity controls required by electoral legislation are.

Where the address on the voters list can be shown to be incorrect as a result of an error in voters list processing, equity would demand the voter be allowed to vote. Where the address on the voters list and any other address provided by the voter are within the same electoral district, both integrity and equity can be served by a legal framework that still allows the voter to vote; the vote, however, may need to be supported by a formal declaration of eligibility by the voter.

Where these addresses are in different electoral districts, and it can be established that the address on the certified voters list is a recent former address of the voter, in systems which place the emphasis on maximising participation, it could still be argued that it is preferable to allow the voter to vote in some fashion, provided that there are sufficient controls on multiple voting.

Circumstances where voters whose details cannot be matched exactly on the voters list may be deemed eligible to vote need strict definition in election legislation or rules, and consistent application of procedures by voting station officials. The extent of such problems will be influenced by the comprehensiveness of voter registration measures, the quality control in voters' list preparation, and the quality of the identity documents required.

Voters Already Marked as Having Voted

Conversely, on looking up the name in the voters list, the official may find that the voter's name has already been marked as having received voting materials. This could be due to either the voter having already voted or the voter's name having previously been marked in error for another voter.

The problem is, how to separate the voting station official errors (which may well occur, particularly with families with similar or the same names at the same address) from attempts to vote more than once.

Where multiple voting controls (such as marking voters with ink, surrendering or cancelling of voter identification cards, requiring voters to sign a record when issued a ballot) have been effectively implemented, a voter who has passed these checks but who is found to be already marked as having voted on the voters list could be presumed to have been marked on the list in error.

Equitable systems would contain procedures to allow these voters to be issued with a ballot.

Where the voter’ list is the sole control on multiple voting, it is more difficult to determine correctly. These are not matters for the voting station official to determine. Assistance and decision should be sought from the voting station manager, with, no doubt, opinions from party or candidate representatives present.

Systems that would allow voters in such cases to vote in the normal fashion after swearing a declaration that they have not previously voted, or to cast a sealed tendered or provisional ballot, with later determination of validity by a court or tribunal (or where it is of trusted integrity, the electoral management body), can assist resolution in the voting station. Any such occurrences should be noted by the voting station manager in reports on voting station operations.

Announcement of Voters' Names

In some systems an additional function of the official checking the voters list is, having found the voter's name on the certified voter’s list, to call out the serial number or name of the voter for the benefit of all present including observers and party and candidate representatives.

The serial number and/or name may also be recorded on a ballot stub or list of voters. The supposed benefits are in enhanced transparency and in better control of materials issue. This practice can give rise to misperceptions about voting secrecy and is better avoided.

Prevention of Multiple Voting

As part of the voter eligibility checks, the voting station official must check that the voter has not previously voted. The intensity of this control will very much vary with the environment. Use of accurate, unique lists is the most cost-effective control to prevent multiple voting.

Provided that lists are unique and are carefully and accurately marked by voting station officials, they will immediately show when a voter is attempting to vote more than once. Where apparent multiple voters make claims that errors have been made in marking of lists, these will need to be dealt with as described under "Voters Already Marked as Having Voted" above.

In systems where each voters list is not unique, or there are doubts about their accuracy, or if national identity documentation systems are weak, additional multiple voting controls will be needed. Depending on the security risk environment and the need to allay public fears of multiple voting, this could be accomplished by methods of varying intensity, including:

• before issuing accountable voting materials, requiring all voters to make a verbal or written declaration that they have not voted before in this election;

• the surrendering or defacing of unique special voter identification cards or stamping of other identity cards;

• marking voters with special inks when they vote.

Use of Special Ink

Marking voters with special indelible ink when issuing ballots has become more common, particularly in transitional elections, but it is an expensive mechanism.

For security, safety, and aesthetic reasons, indelible inks of secret composition, a determinate lifespan, and visible only under special (usually ultra violet) light are better used. The additional costs incurred, in ink production, supply of special light equipment, and the need to engage at least one additional staff member per voting station to implement this control, can be considerable.

While this is an effective method, alternative measures such as ensuring accuracy of unique voters lists are less costly, more sustainable, and make marking of voters redundant. However, where other controls are weak, or where there is a need to present a strong image of integrity control to the public for acceptance of election validity, the additional costs of using special ink as a multiple voting control can be justified.

Where special inks are used, the voter should be checked to determine if the specified body part has been marked with ink prior to checking identity or voters list entry. In some situations this could be done on entry to the voting station, usually this would occur just prior to other eligibility checks. If the mark is revealed, the voter should be removed from the voting station. If not, identity and other eligibility checks proceed.

After the voter has been found on the voters list, or otherwise deemed eligible to vote, the voter is marked with the special ink. If done before this point, voters who have turned out at the wrong voting station may then find themselves unable to vote at the correct one.

The ink must be applied in a consistent fashion, to specified fingers or hands either by dipping in a container or application by a device. If inks invisible to the naked eye are used, the voter should be immediately tested under the appropriate light to ensure that the ink has been applied correctly.

Fraud Control through Use of Voter Identification Cards

Voter identification cards, issued by the electoral management body, could alternatively be used as a control on multiple voting, as long as these are high integrity photographic or similarly personalised cards that must be surrendered or cancelled when the voter is issued voting materials.

Without a photograph, or other easily distinguishing personal mark of the voter, such cards can be easily bought, traded, or stolen, and their effectiveness as both an identity and multiple voting control is very low.

Issue and Casting of Ballots

Following determination that a voter is eligible to vote at the voting station (see Determination of Eligibility to Vote), the accountable voting materials should be immediately issued to the voter.

The materials subject to strict accountability of issue will vary according to the basis of the ballot issuing system:

• Where ballots are accountable, and their use restricted, issuing controls will apply to ballots.

• On the other hand, if ballots are freely available, but instead there is strict accountability for the ballot envelope issued to voters in which the voter's ballot must be included (as in the system operating for manual ballots in France), issuing controls will relate to the ballot envelopes.

• For some types of voting, both ballots and envelopes may be accountable and subject to issuing controls.

Such systems relying on accountability of envelopes can be more costly, in additional printed materials required and in additional time taken in preparing materials for ballot counts.

Ballot Issuing Controls

Where the ballots themselves are the accountable voting material, the basic process of issuing the ballot entails:

• taking the ballot from its pile, folder, or tearing it from it's stub;

• where required, validation of the ballot by the voting station official placing an official mark or stamp, or endorsing, the reverse side of the ballot;

• showing the face of the ballot to voters and explaining the correct method of recording a vote (including advice to read any instructions on the ballot);

• showing voters the correct method of folding the ballot so that the vote remains secret and any validation mark required on the reverse of the ballot is visible;

• if the ballot has to be placed in an envelope before being placed in the ballot box, instructing voters on how and where this will be done;

• instructing voters on how and where to place the ballot in the ballot box (and, where more than one ballot is being issued, or there is more than one ballot box in use, the correct ballot box in which to place each ballot);

• directing voters to a vacant voting compartment, and instructing them that they must be alone in the voting compartment while marking the ballot (for discussion of systems where the voting station manager may authorise assisted voters to be accompanied in the voting compartment, see Assistance to Voters).

For reasons of efficiency in staffing and crowd control,  (see Crowd and Queue Control), where more than one election is being held simultaneously, ballots for all elections would preferably be issued at the same time to a voter.

Issuing of ballots to voters using special voting facilities, such as early, absentee, or provisional voting, may require a more complex process. Where voting machines, which mechanically or electronically record votes, or computers are used, controls on voters recording a vote require a different methodology.

Validating Ballots

In many election systems where each ballot is accountable, the ballot is validated on issue by the voting station official placing an official mark on or signing or initialling the back of the ballot.

This is a cost-effective manner of controlling that only valid ballots enter the count, and will generally do away with the need for special and expensive paper stocks, bearing watermarks or security print, for ballots.

Official marks used by voting station officials could be made by perforating instruments or stamps. A different, distinctive mark would preferably be provided to each voting station to enable full accountability and integrity checks during counts. These are highly accountable items for which design should be kept secret and that should be held under strict security until the voting station opens for voting, and then be secured immediately following close of voting.

Even more cost-effective, but of slightly less integrity and of less use in less literate societies, is the alternative method of requiring the ballot issuing official to sign or initial the reverse of the ballot.

The official mark or voting station official endorsement should be placed in the same position on every ballot, to allow it to be visible when the ballot is folded by the voter.

The top right hand corner of the reverse of the ballot is probably the most comfortable position for quick application by most (right-handed) officials. The correct position could be marked by a box or other shape on the reverse of the ballot; the additional costs of two-sided printing should be carefully weighed against any likely advantages in doing this.

Overly complex systems for thus validating the ballot should be avoided; a single mark or voting station official's endorsement should be sufficient.

Requiring multiple official marks, more than one voting station official to endorse, or party or candidate representatives to counter-endorse increases the chances of error, slows down the voting process, and implies poor selection of and lack of trust in staff.

Voting station officials validating ballots must validate each ballot only when it is about to be issued to a voter:

• To validate a stack or book of ballots in advance defeats the purpose.

• However, in their haste to issue a voter with a ballot, voting station officials can forget to place any official mark or endorsement required on the ballot and thus jeopardise acceptance of the voter's ballot for counting. In systems where such validation is required, training must reinforce the importance of validating each ballot issued.

Other Controls on Issuing Ballots

In systems where ballots are accountable voting materials, various additional controls may be applied in issuing a ballot. These could include the ballot issuing official:

• copying the voter's serial number from the voters list onto the issued ballot's counterfoil or stub;

• maintaining a list of voters who have been issued ballots, or making voters sign a register or list on receipt of their ballot paper.

These additional controls slow down the ballot issuing process and add little to its integrity, while raising doubts in voters' minds about voting secrecy.

Where voting station officials accurately mark voters names on voters’ lists when ballots are issued, they are a duplication of effort. Whether they are of more use in disputes over whether particular voters were issued ballots than good quality control on marking of voters lists is open to question.

It would seem more appropriate to concentrate voting station officials' efforts and management supervision on ensuring the voter’s list was marked correctly, and using this as the basis both for determining how many and who voted, rather than adding additional recording tasks that are equally prone to error or challenge.

Enveloped Ballot Systems

As an alternative to being issued an accountable ballot, some systems issue electors instead an accountable envelope. In these systems what happens to the stock of ballots is not relevant; the envelope quantities must be accountable. Such systems may operate under either very high integrity controls or lesser controls.

Simple Enveloped Ballot Systems

Under simple enveloped ballot systems, the voter, after being assessed as eligible to vote at that voting station, being marked as voting on the voters list, and having obtained a ballot, is issued or obtains a ballot envelope.

In these simple variants, ballot envelopes are not separately identifiable by any detachable counterfoil or serial number. Controls can be instituted by:

• having on hand only as many ballot envelopes as voters registered to vote at that voting station;

• officials carefully watching or issuing the ballot envelopes during voting to ensure each voter obtains only one envelope;

• officials guarding the ballot box to ensure that voters insert only one envelope in the ballot box;

• reconciling numbers of voters marked on the voters list as having voted with numbers of envelopes issued;

• validating each ballot envelope on issue with an official voting station stamp.

With a simple system:

• if integrity controls are instituted through matching the number of envelopes available to the number of voters registered, it can be inflexible in treatment of persons who may have valid claims to be on the voters list but have been omitted in error;

• there may be difficulties in ensuring adequate levels of control, and is more suited to environments of high community trust.

Higher Integrity Enveloped Ballot Systems

Higher integrity enveloped ballot methods involve envelopes that are fully accountable through numbered tear-off stubs or counterfoils that are retained by the envelope issuing official or another voting station official. Alternative methods for such systems would require:

• the voter to return to the ballot/ballot envelope issuing table with the completed ballot(s), where it is sealed in the envelope by the official who issued the envelope and then deposited by that official in the ballot box, located on the table or nearby;

• the voter being issued the envelope and ballot, and having recorded the vote, places the ballot in the envelope and deposits it in a ballot box.

To use such a system for all ballots can be a cumbersome, inefficient procedure to protect integrity; that would be more effectively served by high quality identification checks and voters lists. Where ballots need protection from damage, such as where punch card or optical scan ballots are used, it may be a useful system.

Special Voting Facilities

Where voters may vote in absentia, use early voting facilities, or vote by mail, where systems allow a provisional or tendered vote, and any voting method that requires later verification of the voter's eligibility to vote, a similar system of enveloped ballots may be used. It would be usual to have an attachment to or enclosure with the ballot envelope containing sufficient voter information for assessment of voter eligibility.

In such systems, it would be more usual to ensure voting secrecy by using a double enveloped ballot, with the ballot sealed inside a plain envelope and with this envelope again sealed in an outer envelope containing the voter's information. Using this form of enveloped ballots is a reasonable solution for extending voter accessibility to participation in voting.

Voters Recording a Vote

After being issued a ballot, or obtaining the ballot envelope, depending on the system being used, voters should be directed to a vacant voting compartment to record their vote.

There should be no pressure placed on voters to hasten completion of recording their votes; it is a choice of great significance that voters are making. Additional time may need to be taken by elderly voters, first-time voters, or those having difficulty with ballot instructions, and where more than one ballot or complex preferential ballots have to be completed. This should be taken into account when planning voting station capacities, staff, and numbers of voting compartments required.

After recording the vote, by marking the ballot or choosing which ballot he or she wishes to use, each voter will cast their ballots according to the system being used:

• if ballots are to be deposited directly into the ballot box or returned to a voting station official for enveloping, the ballot should be folded by the voter before leaving the voting compartment, so that the voting preferences are not visible and any official validating mark stamped or written by the ballot issuing official is clearly visible.

• if the ballot has to be enveloped by the voter, the voter should insert the ballot in the envelope and seal it before leaving the voting compartment.

Marking of Ballots

In systems where preferences have to be marked on ballots, the method used to mark a paper ballot has cost implications. Pens are more expensive than pencils, and more likely to be taken as a souvenir by voters.

Pens offer no greater integrity; a voter's mark with a pen can be as easily overwritten as a pencil mark can be erased. However, where there is wide public concern about election integrity, use of pens may enhance the image, if not the reality.

Use of special stamps with which voters mark their ballots and which have to be returned to the ballot issuing table by the voter can cause problems for voter flow.

Voter inconvenience and the additional costs of providing such equipment and of directing staff required are generally not commensurate with any additional integrity achieved.

Monitoring Voting Compartment Area

The area around the voting compartments needs to be constantly monitored by officials to ensure the secrecy and efficiency of voting. Issues to be carefully monitored include:

• Voters are not marking their ballots outside the voting compartments.

• Voters are alone in a voting compartment, except in cases where authorised assistance to the voter is being provided.

• The voting compartment area is kept clean and tidy. Particular care must be taken to remove and deal with any ballots left in the area by voters (see "Ballots Discarded by Voters" below);

• No political campaign material--pamphlets, posters, stickers, or graffiti on surfaces--that may influence voters has been left in any voting compartment by earlier voters.

• Where "mark choice" paper ballots are used, each voting compartment has a functioning pen, pencil, or other required marking implement attached to it;

• Where instructions to voters on how to vote are in the voting compartment, are not removed or defaced.

In some environments there may be a need for allocation of at least one voting station official whose single role is constant monitoring of the voting compartments area to ensure that voting is conducted in secret.

In all voting stations, officials should regularly inspect the area to ensure that voting is conducted in secret, that voter flow is orderly, and that the area is kept clean and free of extraneous material. Officials should not enter voting compartments when occupied by voters, of course, unless the voter is authorised to receive their assistance in voting.

Special attention needs to be paid to hierarchical groups--such as military, state officials, particular families--arriving together to vote, to ensure that there is no intimidation within the group with regard to voting preferences and that all ballots are marked in secret by the correct voter.

A common cause of congestion in the voting compartment area, and of voters attempting to record their vote outside voting compartments, is that ballots or ballot envelopes are being issued to voters when there are no voting compartments free for use.

Staff monitoring the voting compartment area should check continually with officials issuing ballots (or ballot envelopes) to regulate appropriately the rate of issuing ballot papers.

Depositing of Ballots in the Ballot Box

When voters have completed recording their votes, they should be directed to the ballot box. Where the voter goes will depend on whether:

• The ballot is to be deposited directly into a ballot box;

• the ballot is required to be returned to the issuing voting station official for enveloping, either by itself or with details of the voter attached before being deposited in the ballot box.

Where the ballot is to be deposited by the voter directly into the ballot box, ballot boxes should be located, as far as possible, in a direct line between the voting compartments and the voting station exit, and as near the exit as is prudent for security. Ballot boxes should at all times be closely supervised by a voting station official.

When the voter approaches the ballot box, the official should ensure that:

• if the ballot is not required to be enveloped, the ballot is deposited in a manner that the voter's preferences cannot be seen;

• if the ballot has been enveloped by the voter, the voter has only one ballot envelope, and the envelope has any required official mark;

• where separate ballot boxes are being used for different elections being held simultaneously, the voter deposits each ballot or envelope in the correct ballot box;

• no voter leaves the voting station without depositing their ballot or ballot envelope in a ballot box;

• nothing other than ballots or ballot envelopes is deposited in ballot boxes. Clear instructions and signs, and especially colour-coding of ballot boxes to match ballots or envelopes, will assist in the voting process.

However, there will still be voters who deposit their vote in the incorrect box, and once in, they cannot be removed until the count. For this reason, equitable ballot or envelope validation and vote counting systems would allow ballots or envelopes deposited in the incorrect ballot box, if otherwise valid, to be counted.

When voters have deposited their ballot(s), officials should direct them to the exit. Voters should not be permitted to congregate around ballot boxes.

Inspection of Validation Marks

Where official validating marks are required to be placed on ballots by ballot issuing officials, it is appropriate that the ballot box supervisor be required to check, before the voter deposits the ballot in the ballot box, that the required official mark or voting station official's endorsement is on the ballot.

If the mark is not present, the voter should not be allowed to deposit the ballot in the ballot box; assistance should then be sought from the voting station manager.

If the voting station manager determines that the ballot was validly issued, it could either be validated with the correct mark by the voting station manager or cancelled as "spoilt" and a fresh ballot issued to the voter (at no stage of these actions should the way the voter voted be made visible).

The former course is the more efficient; the latter preserves full accountability measures. Where the voting station manager determines that the ballot was not validly issued, details of the incident should be noted for voting fraud investigation and police may need to be called.

Where an error has been made by the official issuing ballots, these actions can protect the voter's voting rights. Where a voter is attempting to deposit an illegal ballot, it will be stopped. In either case, later ballot disqualifications and disputes during the count will be avoided.

Checking Need for Fresh Ballot Box

Officials should regularly check how full each ballot box being used is (a ruler or similar implement can be used if needed) and warn the voting station manager in good time when any additional ballot boxes need to be sealed for use.

Early warning is needed, as this procedure may take some time (for procedures for sealing of ballot boxes, see Preparations for Commencement of Voting). Also extra ballot boxes may need to be sourced from another voting station that has surplus or local electoral management body office.

Use of Multiple Ballot Boxes

Whether separate ballot boxes or the same ballot box are used for simultaneous elections held in a voting station is a matter of practicality for the particular environment rather than of principle. There is a cost factor to be considered: the costs of acquiring, maintaining, transporting, and securing separate ballot boxes as against the costs of accurately sorting different elections' ballots taken from the same ballot box at the count.

There is also a perception of integrity factor: when different ballots are deposited in the one box, it may be harder for ballot box supervisors to ensure that only validated ballots are deposited.

Spoilt Ballots

In systems that depend on ballot accountability, spoilt ballots, that is, ballots that are returned to the ballot issuing table because a voter has made an error in marking the ballot or cannot be used due to print defects, need to be carefully controlled so that they do not find their way into the ballot box. Prudent control mechanisms would ensure that:

• no replacement for a spoilt ballot is issued until the original ballot has been surrendered to the voting station official who issued it;

• voting station officials do not look at the manner in which the ballot has been marked;

• where more than one ballot issuing table is in use, the voter returns the spoilt ballot to the table from which it was issued;

• spoilt ballots are fully accounted for in ballot reconciliations following close of voting .

When spoilt ballots are surrendered by voters, they should immediately, in the presence of the voter, be:

• cancelled by the official, by writing "spoilt" on the reverse of the ballot or using any stamp provided for this purpose;

• sealed individually in special envelopes--one ballot per envelope--and maintained under the security of either the ballot issuing official or the voting station manager until the close of voting.

Misprinted or damaged ballots found amongst those to be issued should be similarly enveloped and sealed immediately on discovery, to prevent their issue.

Leaving enveloping or sealing of spoilt ballots until some fixed time, or leaving a single envelope to contain spoilt ballots open throughout voting hours, runs too great a risk that these ballots may find their way into a ballot box, or may be inadvertently lost creating problems in the verification process later.

The voting station official should record on the outside of the spoilt ballot envelope some basic information to aid accountability and reconciliation, such as:

• the signature of the voting station official issuing the replacement ballot;

• identification of the voting station;

• if multiple elections are being held simultaneously within the voting station, the election for which the ballot was issued;

• if multiple voting material issuing tables are in operations, identification of the table from which the replacement for the spoilt ballot was issued. It is useful to have specially printed envelopes available for this purpose.

Damaged Optical Scan or Punch Card Ballots

In some systems where ballots are later counted automatically, such as ballots designed for optical scanning or punch card machines, methods of dealing with damaged ballots will need to be implemented either at the voting station or at the counting centre.

Spoilt ballots that have been torn or otherwise damaged after completion by the voter will not be read accurately by machines.

For integrity purposes, these ballots be set aside from machine counting and counted manually. Attempting to remake these ballots so they can be machine counted, even under intense observer supervision, political or otherwise, can raise doubts as to the motives.

Ballots or Sealed Envelopes Discarded by Voters

While it is the duty of officials supervising ballot boxes to ensure that all voters, before leaving the voting station, deposit their ballots or envelopes in the ballot box, this supervision may not always be fully effective, and voters may leave ballots or sealed envelopes containing ballots in voting compartments, drop them on the floor, or otherwise misplace them.

It is prudent to have procedures in place to cover such control failures. Ballots or sealed ballot envelopes left in this fashion in the voting station by voters should never be placed in the ballot box by any other person, especially voting station officials.

In maintaining supervision over the voting compartment and ballot box area of the voting station, voting station officials should always be watching for ballots (or where relevant, sealed ballot envelopes) left by voters. These should be marked as "cancelled" and each placed into a separate special "cancelled" or "discarded" ballot envelope as soon as found, and kept under security by the voting station manager for inclusion in ballot or envelope reconciliations following the close of voting.

These envelopes containing cancelled or discarded ballots or ballot envelopes should have recorded on them similar information as for spoilt ballots, except that where e multiple voting materials are issued the table of issue will not be known. Special envelopes used for this purpose could be designed to function for both spoilt and discarded or cancelled ballots

Declined Ballots

Under some election systems, voters, after being issued a ballot, may indicate their refusal to vote in the election by declining the ballot, and handing it back unmarked to the voting official who issued it.

To ensure that reconciliations of ballots in ballot boxes to voters marked as having voted can be accurately conducted, these ballots should:

• Immediately, in the presence of the voter, be cancelled by the official by writing "declined" on the ballot or using any stamp provided for this purpose;

• be sealed individually in special envelopes, one ballot per envelope, and maintained under the security of either the ballot issuing official or the voting station manager until the close of voting.

Declined and discarded ballots (or ballot envelopes) must be fully accounted for in ballot reconciliations following close of the voting 

Informing and Assisting Voters

Information Issues

The role of voting station officials in providing information to aid voters in their participation in the election is an important part of providing voter service; all eligible voters should be provided with the most informed opportunity to cast their voter correctly.

Information should be restricted to implementation of election procedures; voting station officials should politely refrain from engaging in any discussion with voters about the merits of political participants, candidates, or the appropriateness of election policies and procedures.

(For further discussion of voter information services that may effectively be provided in voting stations, see Voter Service)

Designated Information Officers

Consideration should be given to assigning a specific official, or officials, to voter information duties. This will generally be effective in voting stations where:

• of larger size, other officials may be fully pressed in undertaking other voter service duties;

• significant proportions of the voters expected are from minority cultural or language groups, are elderly, or are first-time voters;

• there have been significant changes in voting procedures;

• computer or machine voting has been introduced which may require taking each voter through a trial run using the computer or voting machine to ensure that they understand the operations required for voting.

Particularly in transitional environments, voting station officials with specific voter information duties may well need to undertake a broader voter education role.

Guidelines for Providing Information

General guidelines for providing information to voters in voting stations include:

• Information for voters must be provided in an open and transparent manner and must allow monitoring by party or candidate representatives and other observers in the voting station.

• All voting station officials should be ready to answer courteously and promptly any inquiries by voters about voting procedures; where the official does not know the answer, assistance from the voting station manager or other senior voting station officials should be sought.

• Except where the voters are authorised to receive assistance in marking their ballots, any information for voters should be provided before voters enter the voting compartment.

If voters require further information after having commenced to mark the ballot, they should be requested to step outside the compartment.

• All voting station officials should pay particular attention to the needs of voters from minority language and cultural groups; employment of multi-lingual voting station officials will assist in this regard.

• Voters requiring assistance to vote should be identified as soon as possible after entering the voting station and directed to the appropriate officials for assistance

Proactive Methods

Information is more effectively provided, and voter service enhanced, if a proactive stance is taken by voting station officials. The use of a static voter information officer, seated behind a table, both disrupts voter flow and may well not encourage contact with those who need further information the most.

Voting station layouts may provide for a separate information table or area for storage of information pamphlets and other materials (if the voting station is of sufficient size) or store such materials on the voting station manager's table. Such a static facility is generally required for voters with complex inquiries or difficulties.

However, maximum effectiveness is obtained if voters' information needs can be ascertained and satisfied while they are queued waiting to vote, through pro-active inquiry by entry control or queue control officials (see Crowd and Queue Control) and use of roving information officials.

Voting station managers and any other supervisory officials assigned to the voting station should also take an active interest in providing information to voters. The better voters are informed before they reach the eligibility checking and voting materials issuing tables, the more efficient the issuing of ballots is likely to be.

Assistance to Voters

Where voters with certain disabilities are allowed assistance in marking their ballots, voting station officials should do everything possible to assist such voters to participate in voting with the same high level of service provided to other voters.

Categories of voters who would normally be eligible for assistance in marking the ballot would include:

• voters who have a temporary or permanent physical disability that prevents then from marking the ballot;

• voters who are blind or severely vision impaired;

• voters who are not sufficiently literate in the language used on the ballots for the election.

Time Allowed to Vote

Voting station officials should not assume that because a voter is taking a long time to complete marking the ballot they require assistance.

However, officials issuing ballots and monitoring the voting compartments should be aware of voters obviously having difficulty in understanding the ballot and advise them of assistance that may be available.

In all cases, both for voters requesting assistance and for those whom voting station officials believe may need assistance, it is appropriate that the voting station manager be the person legally delegated to make the decision as to whether the voter is eligible for an assisted vote.

Assisted Voting

Wherever possible, voters seeking or requiring assistance should be identified and directed to the voting station manager as soon as they enter the voting station.

This may not always be possible, particularly with non-literate voters in more advanced societies where admission of non-literacy may be embarrassing. In some systems such voters must make special application to be allowed assistance, but this would seem generally excessive for maintenance of a reasonable standard of integrity.

Under equitable systems, a voter eligible for assistance would be able to designate a friend or other person to complete their ballot, or, if no such person is available, could be assisted by a voting station official.

While this is generally a task specifically given to the voting station manager, it would be useful if the voting station manager possessed the power to delegate the actual assistance in marking the ballot for such voters to other senior voting station officials, to prevent delays during peak periods or in large voting stations.

Assisted by Friend

Steps in implementing assisted voting will vary according to who assists the voter. If the voter brings with them or nominates another person to complete the ballot for them, the voting station manager should ensure that:

• the person qualifies for an assisted vote under the rules for the election;

• the person chosen by the voter to mark the ballot is not excluded from providing assistance by the legislation or rules governing the election--qualifications defined in electoral legislation of minimum age, or being registered to vote at that voting station, or restricting persons to assist only one voter, can enhance the integrity of the process;

• the voter's eligibility is checked as for any voter, and if eligible for a ballot, is issued a ballot and goes with the person designated to complete the ballot in a vacant voting compartment to mark the ballot, and from there deposits the ballot in the ballot box in accordance with the normal prescribed procedures.

In such cases here should be no requirement, nor is there any real need, for anyone else to witness the marking of the ballot.

Assistance by Voting Station Official

Where the voter does not designate anyone to assist, assistance (where allowable under the legal framework) could be provided by a duly authorised voting station official. The method used is essentially the same, except that the integrity is better served if the legal framework requires that there is one or more witnesses.

This would often be specified in the legal framework as either one (and preferably more) party or candidate representatives, or alternatively, another official or even a person chosen by the voter. The voter must be informed of and understand this condition, and reasonably then be again given the opportunity to designate a person of their choice to assist in their vote, rather than having their vote witnessed by party or candidate representatives.

The witness (es) must be able to hear any oral instructions or see any written instructions given by the assisted voter, and observe the ballot being completed by the official.

Where an assisted voter provides written instructions for marking the ballot, the voting station official should check to be certain the voter understands and agrees with the content of these instructions. If voters are not literate in the language used on the ballot and in the voting station, but literate in some other community language, wherever possible the help of any official literate in the voter's language should be sought.

In those jurisdictions where voting station officials are political appointments rather than independent, a balance of interests from amongst the officials should together assist the voter to vote, rather than a single official.

It is very important that assisted votes are still completed in a voting compartment and the ballot remains secret from any person not authorised to assist or observe the assisted vote.

Those assisting the voter and any authorised witnesses must not disclose to any other person the instructions which the voter gave for marking the ballot. To ensure this, it can be useful to require that persons assisting voters complete a formal declaration binding them to keep the vote secret (where they have not already done so for the election).

Visually Impaired Voters

As an alternative to being assisted to vote, templates could be provided for blind or vision impaired voters that can allow them to complete their vote themselves. This will allow these voters the option of keeping their vote totally secret. Where paper ballots are used:

• the voter's eligibility is checked as for any voter;

• when issued a ballot, the voter is also issued a template that fits over the ballot, with holes cut out that line up with the parts of the ballot paper where the voter may mark a preference, and is instructed on its use--the template may also include braille script indicating the party or candidate relevant to each of the holes in the template;

• a voting station official accompanies the voter to the voting compartment but does not enter it, but would then read to the voter the party or candidate names in the order they appear on the ballot, to assist the voter in marking preferences correctly through the holes in the template;

• the voter removes the template from the ballot before leaving the voting compartment, folds the ballot, hands the template back to the voting station official, and from there deposits the ballot in the ballot box in accordance with the normal proscribed procedures.

Where computers are used for voting, such arrangements are more difficult; however, templates fitting over the keyboard (for keyed voting) or monitor (for touch screen voting) could be used.

Other Assistance to Voters

Other categories of voters that may often require assistance from voting station officials, but who may not need another person to complete their ballot for them, would include those who:

• have limited understanding of the language used on voting material and in the voting station;

• have physical disabilities or are elderly or frail sufficient to make entering the voting station difficult.

Voters with Language Difficulties

Where significant numbers of voters from minority language groups are expected to attend a voting station, all effort should be made to employ at least some staff fluent in these minority languages. In some cases, staff appointed specifically as interpreters may be justifiable; more cost-effectively, some officials engaged for tasks involving information provision, entry and queue control, eligibility checking, and ballot issuing would have skills in the relevant minority language(s).

If officials with these minority language skills are not available, every effort should be made to assist the voter in explaining required actions, through slow, clear speech, simplifying language, and using diagrams, illustrations, or gestures to demonstrate what is required. This would apply equally to all voters with literacy difficulties.

Elderly and Frail Voters

Voting station staff should in general be aware of the needs of elderly, frail, and disabled voters, as well as other classes of voters such as pregnant women and nursing mothers, to ensure that they do not have to endure long waits in queues to vote.

Bringing such voters to the head of queues to vote and providing them with a high level of information and/or physical assistance to ensure that they are not disadvantaged in voting is an integral part of voting station service.

For the elderly, frail, and physically disabled, election rules may allow the voter to vote outside the voting station, from the area outside the voting station or from a vehicle parked outside (so-called "kerbside voting"). Systems for allowing such votes would normally provide for:

• a maximum distance from the voting station entrance within which such voting is allowed;

• voting station officials, on application by the voter, to check the voters eligibility and mark the voters list inside the voting station and then bring to the voter the ballot(s), ballot envelope (if required), and a portable voting compartment or screen within which the voter can mark the ballot in secrecy;

• the folded (or enveloped), completed ballot, and voting equipment, to be brought back into the voting station by the voting station official who, without attempting to look at the manner in which the voter has marked the ballot, deposits the ballot in the ballot box.

It would be best if this process only be undertaken in the presence of party or candidate representatives, but other voters should not be allowed to observe the marking of the ballot.

Whether voters need to make prior application for this assistance is more a matter of practicality than integrity. Large numbers of such voters needing such assistance may require additional staffing in the voting station or advice to political participants of additional monitoring requirements.

The utility of adding this service to the range of voting station services will depend on factors such as:

• the potential disruptions of service to other voters;

• the ability to provide transparency;

• the availability of other methods of voting of equal integrity for disabled and frail voters.

Special Provisions with Regard to Voting Locations

As an alternative to or extension of the "kerbside voting", legislative provision may be made for disabled or frail voters to vote on voting day at a voting station other than that to which they have been assigned to attend to vote.

In systems where a general system of in-person absentee voting is in operation on voting day, these voters would be serviced according to procedures for absentee voting.

In systems more restricted as to voting methods and locations, special provisions for disabled or frail voters to vote at a voting station other than the one(s) to which they have been assigned, if this (or these) do not offer easy access to the disabled and frail, could be provided. These would normally entail:

• an application prior to voting day by the voter, or someone authorised by the voter, for the voter to vote at a specified voting station other than the one(s) to which the voter has been assigned;

• examination of the request by the electoral management body and, on approval, issue of a certificate to the voter enabling the voter to vote at the voting station requested;

• the voter producing this certificate when attending to vote during eligibility checking, and the voter's attendance being specifically noted in voting station records.

Depending on the sophistication and complexity of any general systems for absentee voting, this facility may have to be limited to allow the voter to choose an appropriately accessible voting station within the voter's electoral district of registration.

Consideration could also be given to providing special facilities for disabled, infirm, and frail voters, rather than insisting they attend a normal voting station. These could take the form of:

• locating voting stations in care institutions that are restricted to residents or patients (and possibly staff) at the institution and/or the elderly and infirm within a specified geographic area;

• where the legal framework allows, providing mobile voting stations within care institutions or for home visits to elderly and infirm voters.

These facilities could be provided in advance of voting day (where allowed by legislation) or on voting day itself. Where these facilities are provided in advance of voting day, these voters should also be allowed the opportunity to vote at their normal assigned voting station on voting day, if they did not participate in the early voting. Reliable mechanisms to prevent multiple voting would be required.

Voters not Found on Voters' Lists

Basic Issues Varying methods of treatment of voters who are not found on the voters list at a voting station can have a marked affect on:

• the equity of the election process;

• Potential disruption in the voting station;

• Voting operations costs.

In general, people do not turn out to vote unless they genuinely believe that they are entitled to be part of the process. Methods for including in the election process, in some manner, all who turn out to vote, facilitate building democratic processes.

Apart from this ideal, there is always the possibility that voters are not on the voters list at the voting station because of an administrative error, or because they have come to vote at the wrong voting station. At the very least the opportunity to overcome such errors should be provided.

Facilities available and procedures used for persons not on the voters list attempting to vote will generally be dependent on the voter registration legal framework and the manner of maintaining the certified voters list, particularly on the methods adopted for it’s revision.

Reasons for Omission from Voters Lists

Voters may not be found on the voters list in a voting station for a number of reasons, including:

• the voter has correctly registered and is entitled to be on the voters list for that voting station, but due to administrative error the voter's information has been recorded incorrectly on the certified voters list, or has been omitted in preparing the voters list for the voting station;

• the voter is correctly registered, but on another area’s list;

• the voter has not registered;

• the voter has been officially and accurately removed from the certified voters list by due process;

• the voter has had an application for registration rejected.

Service to Omitted Voters

So as not to unduly delay the voter queue, voters with such problems would be better directed to the voting station manager or officials with specific voter information duties, rather than being fully investigated by staff conducting eligibility checks and issuing voting materials.

Wherever possible, proactive questioning by officials controlling voter queues and voting station entry should attempt to identify voters with more easily recognisable problems, such as attending the wrong voting station, before the voter has waited for too long in the queue (see Crowd and Queue Control). A map of the voting station area and its adjacent voting station areas placed at the voting station entrance will also help voters in determining immediately if they have come to the incorrect voting station.

Voters who cannot be found on the voters list are as deserving of service in the voting station as other voters. In providing this service, voting officials should make every effort to assist voters in determining if they are in fact eligible to vote, whether at that voting station or elsewhere.

It may not be possible to fully investigate all such voters at the voting station itself; however, the basic steps listed in the next section should be followed by voting station officials to attempt to determine the voter's status.

Investigative Measures

In dealing with apparently unregistered voters who cannot be found on the voters list by voter eligibility checking voting station officials (see Determination of Eligibility to Vote), voting station managers and information staff should pursue a thorough line of investigation by questioning voters to establish if there is any basis for their belief that they are eligible to vote. Questioning may be effectively pursued in this order:

Determine whether the voter is qualified for and did apply to register on the voters register for the election.

Establish the voter's address for the purposes of registration and assess whether this is within the area that would allow the voter to vote at that voting station, or in another area.

If it is within the voting station's area, further investigation may be required; if not, the voter should be directed to the correct voting station (or if allowable under the voting system, directed on how to cast an absentee ballot at that voting station or at any special voting stations set up for voting day absentee voting). Voting station managers should be provided with maps of surrounding electoral units, voting station areas and lists of voting station locations for this purpose.

If the voter claims to be living in and having registered for the relevant voting station area, further investigation of the voters list entries to determine if the voter's details have been incorrectly entered in the list should be undertaken.

Potential misspellings and reversals of or omissions from name or address information should be investigated. If the voter is found on the list with incorrect details, equitable systems would allow the voter still to vote, having provided an oral, or, to give greater integrity, a written declaration that they are in fact the person represented by the incorrect list entry.

If a voter claiming to be living in the voting station area still cannot be found on the list, procedures for unregistered voters will need to be implemented. There are wide variations in the basis and content of such procedures. Possible alternatives are discussed below.

The alternatives available will very much depend on the legal framework for the certified voters list, whether it is a closed document which must remain unchanged following its certification for use in the election to the close of the election period, or whether it is open to further revision under certain defined circumstances during the voting period.

Where permanent, continuous voter registration systems are maintained by electoral authorities, it is preferable that facilities should be made available in the voting station for persons not found on the voters list to complete a voter registration form.

This will enable their participation in future elections, even if there are no voting day registration provisions to allow them to vote at the current election. In any situation, information on how to register should be provided to these persons.

Denial of Vote

The simplest administrative solution, yet one that does not encourage participation or accessibility, is to deny the person a vote. Where certified voters lists are closed documents, this can often be the option taken. However, while administratively simple, it has a number of negative features on both equity and operational grounds:

• it provides no safety net to deal with administrative errors in compilation of voters lists.

The onus is on the voters to have ensured that their registration has been correctly processed. This is not a fully effective method, even where provisions for compilation of voters’ lists allow for public inspection, close to voting day, of the certified voter lists by voters, and amendment of defects found.

• It does not admit any possibility of error in production/printing of voters lists used in voting stations.

• Particularly where registration systems are not of high quality, or not well understood by the public in general, use of this method may lead to problems at the voting station in controlling voters denied a vote.

Where voters not found on the list are denied a vote, at the very least the voter should be referred to an electoral management body information officer for further investigation. This will help in dealing with electors who may be registered elsewhere.

Implementation of telephone systems by which voting station managers can access a central voters list information bureau to check on a voter's registration status should only be undertaken with extreme caution.

Experience with such systems has often been that they become easily overloaded, thus tying up voting station phone lines and voting station officials' time in attempting to make contact.

Issuing of Voting Certificates

More equitable solutions would at least allow voters an opportunity to determine if they had been omitted from the voters list because of administrative error and an opportunity to redress this.

Where voter registration is a function under the control of electoral authorities, such solutions would allow a person omitted from the voters list in error to obtain on voting day a certificate from the electoral management or voter registration body attesting to the error and, on presentation of this at the appropriate voting station, to be allowed to vote.

Where voters lists are extracts of civil register data, civil registries would preferably remain open throughout all hours of voting to enable voters who believe that they have been incorrectly omitted from the voters list to check records held at the civil registry, and be allowed to vote at their correct voting station on presentation of a similar certificate issued by the civil registry.

It would enhance transparency to allow representatives of parties or candidates running in the election to observe the issue of such certificates, whether by electoral authorities or by a civil registry.

Such certificates should be:

• authenticated, when presented by the voter, by the voting station manager or another senior voting station official;

• Surrendered by the voter to the voters list checking officials;

• Maintained securely by the voters list checking officials for use in close of voting reconciliations

It may also be useful for officials checking voters list to maintain a supplementary list of those voters not on the original list but who prove their eligibility to vote on voting day.

Under such systems, these voters, after establishing their entitlement to vote through presentation of the required certificate, would be issued voting material and vote in the normal fashion.

Use of Provisional or Tendered Ballots

An effective means of handling possible administrative errors in compilation of voters lists, for both voters and voting station officials is to allow a provisional or tendered ballot to any voter who cannot be found on the voters list and who claims to be living in the area covered by the voters list for the voting station.

Under such systems, the voter's ballot will be enveloped with a declaration of relevant details by the voter, kept separate from other ballots, and after the close of voting the eligibility of the voter will be checked against voter registration records.

If the voter is then found to have been eligible to vote in the election, even though not found on the voters list for that voting station on voting day, the voter's ballot will be included in the count.

There are both advantages and disadvantages in using this method. Major advantages include:

• accessibility to all voters wishing to vote;

• reduced risk of disruption in the voting station;

• greater accuracy in checking voter eligibility in such doubtful cases than that available in the pressured atmosphere of the voting station;

• maintenance of voting integrity. The ballots of these voters are only included in the count if it is established following checking of the registration records that the voter was eligible to vote.

Thus, the risks of election challenges on the basis of ineligibility of ballots completed by voters not found on the list are avoided.

Disadvantages of this method are mainly related to the increased complexity inherent in using such a system, and the additional resources required for implementation. These would include:

• provision of special materials, e.g., envelopes and other documents for recording voter information;

• additional training of staff in issuing provisional ballots;

• additional controls required for voting material;

• additional staff expenses in checking the eligibility of these voters prior to determining if their ballots should be admitted to counts;

• possible delays in finalisation of counts due to the time taken for such checks.

It is important that where systems of provisional or tendered ballots are implemented, these ballots are later assessed for eligibility and, if eligible, counted.

It has been the practice in some environments that the tendered ballot is a useful method of eliminating a source of stress on voting day, but it is too difficult to undertake later full investigations to determine if the voter was eligible to vote, and thus these voters' ballots are ignored during counts. Such an attitude is dangerous, both to the integrity and reputation of the electoral management body, and also in terms of voter reaction if it were learned that tendered or provisional ballots had not been properly examined.

In determining eligibility of provisional ballots to be included in the count, strict guidelines are required as to what administrative errors, or other conditions, must be satisfied.

These methods still will only allow the admission to counts of ballots from voters who have registered but have been affected by administrative error in the compiling or production of voters lists.

Voting Day Registration

Voter accessibility can be greatly enhanced if there are facilities for voters to register to vote on voting day itself. Provision of such facilities will depend on the legal frameworks for allowing voters lists to remain open during voting.

This method can make planning and resourcing of voting station activities difficult, particularly if relatively low proportions of the estimated voting age population have registered to vote prior to the election. It, therefore, needs careful examination of its effects on the administration of the voting process before being considered.

It can also be a process of less transparency and integrity as it does not allow for the checks, through objection or revision proceedings, which would be normal in high integrity registration systems.

 Where implemented, systems allowing voting day registration will require some specific procedures in voting stations themselves.

The exact nature of the procedures will depend on whether the registration is done in the voting station or at an office of the electoral management body.

Registration by Declaration in Voting Station

A simple means of allowing voters not found on the voters list to vote is by means of a declaration by the voter allowing on-the-spot registration in the voting station. This would require the voter to:

• produce documents proving identity and address of residence;

• make a sworn declaration, administered by the voting station manager, that they are eligible to vote at that voting station.

An additional measure of integrity can be applied to such declarations if:

• the declaration is required to be witnessed by a voter or voters on the voters list at that voting station;

• party or candidate representatives may object to the eligibility of such voters and have these objections officially recorded, with such challenges being required to be taken into account in any recount or judicial application to have the election overturned.

The voter is then issued a certificate of entitlement to vote by the voting station manager ; on surrendering of the certificate to the appropriate voting station official, a ballot is issued in the normal manner and the ballot is deposited in the ballot box and counted with all other ballots.

A supplementary list of such voters should be maintained, and the certificates retained for use in voting material reconciliations following close of voting.

There are a number of advantages to this method in its simplicity of operation; however, it may raise questions about election integrity, particularly in environments where there is some history of election manipulation or where voters do not have a high level of knowledge of the requirements of voter registration. Its advantages would include:

• Better access for all voters wishing to vote. (This may be limited by the strictness of any requirements for witnessing of declarations required for voting day registration.)

• Reduced risk of disruption in the voting station, since voters not found on the voters list may still have an opportunity to vote.

• Simplicity of administration, both in the issuing and counting of ballots, requiring little in the way of additional materials or processes. However, the disadvantages in terms of perceptions of election integrity can also be substantial:

• The onus is put on party or candidate representatives in the voting station to issue objections to the voter's entitlement to vote, rather than the eligibility of all such voters being checked officially by electoral authorities and subject to public scrutiny.

• Ballots of such voters may be admitted to counts without any prior official check or opportunity for public challenge of the voter's eligibility to vote.

This is a weaker system of control than that which applies to other voters and may raise questions about election integrity if there are substantial numbers of such voters.

• The only redress available is through official challenges to the count or judicial review of whether the election should be overturned. This can be a less effective method than determining voter eligibility before admission of ballots to any count.

Whether such a method would be appropriate would depend on careful analysis of the level of risk of manipulation of voting that it may engender. If societal mores are such that the risk is very low, it can be a service-oriented and cost-effective manner of dealing with unregistered voters.

It will also work with higher integrity if voting stations cater to small numbers of voters from distinct local communities, where party or candidate representatives and voting station managers are more likely to be aware of who is eligible to register to vote in that area.

Higher integrity could be satisfied by having these ballots enveloped with the registration certificate and further confirmation of eligibility obtained before accepting the voter's ballot for counting.

Voting Day Registration at Electoral Authority Office

Alternatively, voters not found on the list could be directed to electoral management body offices to apply for voting day registration. As for registration in a voting station, the voter would produce identity and other documentation normally required for voter registration. It would enhance transparency by allowing representatives of parties or candidates running in the election to observe these proceedings.

If registration requirements are satisfied, the voter would be issued with a certificate which must be presented at the relevant voting station to evidence eligibility to vote.

These certificates should be surrendered to the voting station manager, the voter's name would normally be entered on a supplementary list of voters, and arrangements made to issue voting material to the voter.

Similar advantages and disadvantages as those for voting day registration in a voting station apply.

Reconciliation of Material

Where voting day registration or provisional voting may occur, care must be taken when the quantity of liable voting material issued to voters is reconciled to voters marked on the voters list as having voted to include those voters registering on voting day or issued provisional ballots.

Voting Station Staff Management

Basic foundations of voting station staff management on voting day include:

• Supervision, to ensure accuracy and service in staff performance;

• A commitment to staff welfare, to motivate staff through this long day.

Professionalism in Management

Voting day is a long and generally arduous day for voting station staff, often under pressure, in which they perform tasks for which they have received some training but may never have had to undertake in a real environment before. Without a commitment to professionalism in management of voting station staff, voter service and procedural accuracy are likely to slip below acceptable levels.

Establishment of a good rapport with voting station staff, supporting their efforts in taxing conditions, and offering encouragement are important aspects for voting station managers to remember if they wish to get the most out of their staff.

Electoral District Management

Management responsibilities for voting station activity are not confined to the voting station itself.

Electoral district managers must also play their part in supervising voting hours operations. Working through an operations centre structure  is an effective means of integrating management responses.

There will be specific requirements to ensure effective management of voting stations by electoral district managers' offices, including:

• establishment of a voice communication reporting schedule with voting stations at set intervals on voting day--staggered so as not to overload administration communication capacities (critical points, such as the commencement and closing of voting, should be covered in this schedule);

• ensuring open and swift communication with voting station managers, particularly in answer to any queries;

• providing reliable support to remedy materials or staff shortages or security problems;

• inspection of voting stations during voting hours to ensure that voting station managers are correctly applying required procedures and management practices.

Visits to Voting Stations

It is important when scheduling supervisory visits to attempt to cover all voting stations within the first two hours of voting:

• even a brief visit can identify and remedy voting station set-up shortcomings, misinterpretation of procedures, or materials delivery problems.

• a visit early in the day will also allow early identification of the weaker voting station managers, who may require more frequent visits and management support.

• to wait until later in the day to inspect any voting station would run risks of a considerable number of voters whose processing has been flawed, or the formation of long, slow voters queues through inefficient application of procedures

Scheduling of such visits should also attempt to maximise support for less experienced or lower performing voting station managers throughout voting day.

The use of roving senior voting station officials for voting station inspections and emergency materials supply will enhance the management supervision capabilities within electoral districts. This will be easier to implement in more densely populated areas. In rural areas, the distances between voting stations may make this useful field supervisory capacity impracticable.

Staff Supervision within Voting Stations

One of the major tasks of voting station managers is managing the performance of voting station staff to ensure that service, integrity, and procedural accuracy are maintained at a high standard throughout the voting day.

In voting stations with larger numbers of staff, this may require additional supervisory staff, with assistant manager or second-in-command status, for effective monitoring of staff performance

Appointing as voting station managers staff without supervisory skills, no matter how good their technical knowledge, will create problems on voting day. In managing and supervising staff effectively, voting station managers need to take a proactive role rather than waiting for problems to arise. Essential elements of supervising staff within voting stations include:

• staff performance is continuously monitored throughout the hours of voting (see Monitoring Voting Station Staff Performance);

• attention is paid to staff welfare issues (see Staff Welfare on Voting Day).

Understanding of Duties

All voting station staff must have a clear understanding of their assigned duties. This requires that the voting station manager clearly assigns specific duties to all staff before the commencement of voting, and at any times when staff are rotated through different functions in the voting station.

Before the commencement of voting, the voting station manager should also brief staff as a group and, where necessary, individually, to refresh staff of voting station procedures and advise them of any service or procedural matters specific to that voting station and available amenities (see Preparations for Commencement of Voting). A similar briefing should be provided to ballot counting staff before commencement of the count.

Settlement of Disputes

Voting station managers should be on the alert for any indications that disputes are arising between voters or observers and voting station officials, and intervene swiftly, calmly, and courteously to resolve such differences.

Management Support for Voting Station Officials

An objective and detached attitude must be taken by voting station managers and electoral administrators towards any complaints about the actions, service, and attitudes of voting station staff.

In the sometimes heated emotions of voting, honest errors can be perceived by political participants as bias and the necessary strict application of the integrity requirements of voting procedures appear to voters as bureaucratic lethargy.

Voting station officials often work long hours under taxing conditions that would try any person's patience.

Where voting station officials are following their procedures and endeavouring to serve voters to the best the conditions will allow, they deserve their managers' support in the face of complaints. When their departures from standard procedures may threaten voting integrity, clear powers of discipline must be available to and used by the voting station manager.

Monitoring Voting Station Staff Performance

Monitoring of Performance

Voting station officials' performance of their duties needs to be actively monitored throughout voting day by the voting station manager, assisted by any other supervisory staff available.

This will mean undertaking regular checks and close observation of staff in all areas of the voting station, to ensure that high standards are being maintained at all times, and to provide early warning of any impending difficulties.

Voting station managers cannot effectively manage by sitting at a desk and waiting for problems to be brought to them.

Activities that are important to monitor include:

• free passage through entrances and exits;

• voter queues controlled in an orderly and effective manner;

• fraud and multiple voting prevention controls are correctly applied to all voters --such as (where required by procedures) identity checks, collection or stamping of identity or other documents, marking of voters with ink, taking statements or declarations from voters-- (see  and Integrity Controls);

• voters lists correctly and accurately marked;

• ballots issued correctly, with clear, impartial instructions provided to voters on how to vote in a valid manner ;

• security measures on ballot and other election materials consistently implemented;

• ballot boxes or equipment for recording votes constantly kept under alert supervision;

• voting station officials treatment of and communications with voters not perceived as showing bias toward any political participant, or discrimination against any individual or classes of voters on gender, nationality, religious, or other grounds;

• voting compartments occupied by one person at a time (unless allowable assistance is being provided) and there is no marking of ballots (or choosing of the preferred ballot) occurring outside the voting compartments.

• correct information provided in response to voter inquiries 

• procedures for unregistered voters attempting to vote being correctly applied 

• the voting compartment area kept free of rubbish, writing equipment remaining available in all voting compartments (if card or paper ballots are used), and any spoilt, discarded, or declined ballots collected and treated correctly 

• voting station officials and accredited observers wearing identification badges at all times, and unauthorised persons are not allowed inside the voting station.

Where voting station officials are not certain as to how to complete their tasks, voting station managers or other supervisory staff must be able to provide them with clear, consistent, and accurate advice.

Task Re-allocation

If monitoring shows that particular staff are making errors or are too slow in performing more demanding tasks, the voting station manager should attempt to raise overall effectiveness by re-allocating these staff to less demanding duties.

The ability to do this will depend on how broad voting station official training has been. There are a number of duties, such as guarding ballot boxes that may be suitable for less able or slower working voting station officials.

Performance Evaluation

Voting station officials are entitled to expect that, at the completion of their duties, the voting station manager will provide them with an objective evaluation of their performance. This should be included with the voting station manager's report on voting.

Undertaking a brief assessment of each staff member's performance will aid future election recruitment assessments and, hopefully, contribute to staff motivation.

Staff Welfare on Voting Day

Apart from poor training, staff fatigue is the most common cause of errors in voting stations. Voting station managers need to be aware of the fatigue factor in managing their staff.

The most effective way of limiting staff fatigue would be to reduce voting hours to a reasonable work day rather than the all too often 12-15 hours of voting, followed by a count; but this is often not within the powers or discretion of voting station managers.

Management of fatigue may be assisted at the staff allocation level by allocating part-day staff available to assist with peak periods, or, where voting stations are also used for the count, using different shifts of voting station officials or employing unskilled staff to set up the count centre layout and clean up the voting station while voting station officials have a break between voting and the count. Within the voting station, voting station managers can assist in combating staff fatigue by:

• if any allocated staff do not report for duty, attempting to obtain replacement reserve staff, rather than attempting to show superior management skill by making do with less resources;

• formulating meal break and rest break rosters for voting station officials, and ensuring that staff takes at least one break during the day.

Even though a 15 minute break for each staff member might at times slow voter service, staffs without a break are likely to provide slower and progressively less accurate service throughout the second half of the day. (It is, of course, sensible to schedule staff breaks to avoid expected peak voting periods.)

• ensuring that there are water/drink supplies available to staff during the day;

• where voting station staff are trained for and capable of doing multiple tasks, rotating staff through these tasks during the day (the different competencies to be applied in different tasks can be revitalised);

• ensuring that where the same staffs conducting voting are used for the count, they have a break before counting commences.

Staff Welfare

Other staff welfare measures to be taken by electoral administrators and/or voting station managers that will promote staff motivation during voting day include:

• no gender or other discrimination in the allocation of staff tasks, nor harassment of any staff member due to gender, nationality, religious, or other considerations;

• reliable transport arrangements made for staff to get to and from the voting station;

• adequate security protection within the voting station environment;

• staff payments and other entitlements provided on time and according to agreed schedules. This last consideration is a highly important factor in the retention of good staff.

Effective organisation of payroll for voting station officials is a massive exercise and requires intensive application of management resources for it to proceed accurately and on schedule, but it should be a priority.

Integrity Controls

The integrity of voting rests on assurances that:

• votes are completed only by those persons eligible and entitled to vote at a particular voting location and in a particular election;
• each voter votes only once and in his or her own name only (unless specific provision is made otherwise in election legal frameworks for forms of proxy voting);
• voters make a free and secret choice when voting;
• accountable voting materials are issued only to those authorised to use them;
• the use of all liable voting materials can be accounted for.

It must be made very clear to voting station managers and staff during their training that they are responsible for ensuring that voting integrity is not breached within the voting station.

While the basic integrity controls necessary within voting stations have been dealt with in some detail in sections such as Preparations for Commencement of Voting, it is useful to summarise these in brief.

Particular care may need to be taken in systems requiring a minimum voter turnout for election validity to watch for ineligible persons attempting to vote and attempts at introducing unauthorised material into ballot boxes.

 
Voting Site Controls

Effective management of the voting area will limit the potential for breaches of other integrity controls.

Major issues for the voting station manager to consider in controlling the voting site are that:

• entry to the voting station is restricted to authorised persons--voters attending to vote, officials, and other properly-accredited persons;
• there is no politically partisan activity (to the extent that this is defined in election legal framework--see (Role of Party/Candidate Representatives) within the voting station;
• any required restricted access or activity perimeters around the outside of the voting station are set up and enforced;
• signs, barriers, and staff resources are used effectively for crowd and queue control;
• voting station officials and observers have a clear view of all activity within the voting station, particularly of areas used for accountable voting materials issue, voting compartments, and ballot boxes.
  

Voter Identity Controls

Before being issued liable voting material, voters should prove that they are entitled to be issued the material. To prevent impersonation of another voter, this would normally require the voter to produce, for examination by voting station officials, an identity document.

Identity cards acceptable for this purpose should be of high integrity, bearing a photograph or other easily recognisable personal characteristics of the voter. Where national identity card systems of high integrity exist, these may be cost-effectively used.

Alternatively, where high integrity identification controls are applied during voter registration, a voter identification card issued as a receipt for registration (or at a later date) could be used.

 

Voter Eligibility Controls

The major control on the eligibility of a voter to vote at a particular voting station, at a particular election, is the accuracy of preparation and of use by voting station officials, of voters’ lists in the voting station. Accurate matching of voters with entries on the voter’s list and marking of the entries of voters who have voted is essential.

Additional controls in the form of voter identification cards denoting each voter's correct voting station may also apply.

These controls may be supplemented by similarly well-controlled systems to allow those eligible to vote, but through administrative error not on the voters list to vote, and/or, where allowable under the legal framework, voting day registration of voters.

 

Voting Secrecy

Controls on voting secrecy go to the heart of principles of free choice in voting. Within the voting station, voting station officials must ensure that:

• voters are alone in voting compartments (except when assisted voting is authorised);
• ballots are appropriately folded or enveloped to conceal the voter's vote before they leave the voting compartment;
• no one attempts to ascertain from a voter within the voting station how they intend to vote or have voted.

The question of exit polls conducted by media or political participants may also cause concern and such activity needs to be carefully monitored to ensure that voters are not harassed.
 

Materials Controls

Strict control of liable voting materials should be enforced at all times before, during, and after voting. Particular attention needs to be paid to:

• keeping accountable materials under strict security at all times (tables or storage containers in which there are accountable voting materials should never be left unattended; and any accountable material not currently in use should be kept in secure containers);
• witnessed sealing of empty ballot boxes before use;
• supervising ballot boxes (or voting machines and computers) to ensure that each voter casts only a single vote, that only valid materials enter the ballot box, and that seals remain intact and materials are not removed from the ballot box during voting;
• careful accounting for and reconciliation of all accountable voting materials received, issued and unused, and of voting materials issued to voters recorded as having voted.
   

Intimidation Controls

Voting station officials must be aware of the atmosphere within the voting station and alert to prevent any intimidation of voters.

Strict control of entry to only authorised persons and of removal of weapons from persons entering the voting station will assist this. Voting station managers must be alert to:

• state or security officials remaining in the voting station having an intimidatory affect on voters;
• attempts to influence voting of subordinates by supervisory staff (in military or other hierarchical establishments) attending to vote with their subordinates;
• party or candidate representatives, observers, or voting station officials attempting to communicate with or influence voters on a partisan basis;
• intimidation of officials by party or candidate representatives, for example, through loud challenges, threats, influence of earlier public criticism (e.g., at an earlier round of the elections), or by officials of the state present in the voting station;
• establishment of close liaison with security forces allocated to the voting station (see Security in Voting Stations).

 

Multiple Voting Controls

Strict application of controls to prevent multiple voting is much more effective than attempting to investigate and remedy its effects after its occurrence:

• the basic and most effective control is to use unique, accurate voters lists at each voting location and have tight procedures to confirm voter identity.
• tight integrity controls on voter registration, particularly if coupled with production for all voters of a voter identification card that must be presented for voting, will support the integrity checking of voter identity and prevention of multiple voting.

Where there are doubts about the quality of voter identity procedures, the accuracy of voters lists, or the accuracy of marking of voters lists by voting station officials, or voters lists used in each voting station do not contain a unique set of voters, other multiple voting controls will be required to maintain high voting integrity standards.

Common additional controls would include:

• cancelling or stamping voter identification cards specifically issued for the election to indicate the voter has voted--this control depends on the integrity, and potential transferability, of the voter identification card;
• marking any general identity card to be used as proof of identity to denote the voter has voted--the effectiveness of this again depends on the integrity, and potential transferability, of the voter identification card;
• marking voters with special ink when they vote. 

 

Party/Candidate Representatives

Monitoring by party/candidate representatives in the voting station not only aids transparency, but can also assist in maintaining the integrity of voting by bringing matters to the attention of voting station officials. Voting station layouts should enable a clear view of all voting activity--including entrances, eligibility checking, voting materials issue areas, and voting compartments, ballot boxes--to voting station officials, party and candidate representatives, and observers present.

Party/candidate representatives must have the right to observe all activity in the voting station, from the pre-voting checks of apt voting materials and sealing of ballot boxes to the post-voting materials reconciliations and packaging of materials.

Party/candidate representatives would preferably have the right to challenge both the eligibility of voters and actions of voting station officials where these are not in accordance with procedures.

Challenges to voters and voting procedures may assist voting integrity where party/candidate representatives suspect that:

• voters believed ineligible to vote are being allowed to vote, or believed eligible to vote are being denied a vote;
• voters believed to have already voted are being allowed to vote;
• unauthorised additional ballots are being introduced into the ballot box;
• ballots are being removed from the voting station for marking outside, then brought back into the voting station by other voters to deposit in the ballot box;
• the ballots or ballot envelopes being used by voters are not those officially printed;
• there is any intimidation of voters;
• ballots or ballot envelopes are being handled by other party/candidate representatives during voting;
• unauthorised assistance is being provided to voters marking their ballots.
  

Security in Voting Stations

Effective maintenance of security in voting stations during voting is a cooperative effort between voting station managers and their voting station officials, security forces, and electoral management body administrators.

In higher security risk environments, coordination centres at the regional and electoral district level or local level will assist integrated decision making on security-related issues and will ensure the integration of election administration and security forces operations during voting.

Involvement of Security Forces

The required level of involvement of security forces in maintaining security during voting will depend on results of risk assessments of the security situation. Where elections have a peaceful history, voting station officials may be able to handle all security requirements themselves, with no need for anything but formal liaison arrangements to engage security forces support for any emergency.

In relatively secure environments, and where the law allows, it may be useful to arrange for one or more voting station officials at each voting station to be sworn in as special constables for voting day, with their authority limited to the voting station and its immediate vicinity--extending as far as any area around the voting station within which legislation prohibits political activity.

Where security risk assessments show a higher level of risk of political or physical transgressions, or where elections have the potential to result in radical changes in the control or structures of government, engagement of security forces for protection of voting station operations will often be required.

Security Prior to Commencement of Voting

Prior to the commencement of voting, security may need to be provided at voting stations during the period between delivery of election materials and equipment to the voting station and the commencement of voting. Wherever possible, voting stations would preferably be set up on the day before voting commences.

• In areas of minor security risk, normal security precautions for the premises--locking, setting of security alarms, dependence on checks by security personnel who would normally visit the premises--can be sufficient.

• In higher security risk areas, a permanent security force presence from the time materials arrive would be advisable.

Accountable voting materials- ballots and/or ballot envelopes, voters lists, voting machines or computers-or any valuable or vital equipment, such as radios or other communications equipment, should under no circumstances be left unsecured on voting station premises following delivery. How and where security is required for these will depend on the methods and timing of delivery and the security risk assessments for the area.

If they are to be delivered to the voting sites prior to voting day, a security presence must be arranged through to the commencement of voting. This presence should be continuous. How many security personnel will be required on-site and whether security duties will be undertaken by police or armed forces will depend on assessed security risks.

If apt materials are not delivered to the voting station until voting day, as is common in many lower security risk environments where voting station managers collect or have custody of liable materials before voting day, consideration can be given to alternatives such as:

• safekeeping in local police, bank, or other secure storage facilities, where there is community trust in such institutions;

• secure safekeeping by voting station managers at their own premises--a cost-effective method, but one that should only be contemplated in very low risk situations;

• in urban areas, requiring collection of such accountable materials by the voting station manager from secure storage at the electoral management body's local offices only on the morning of voting day.

Voting materials and equipment should not be left unattended anywhere. In situations where voting station managers are responsible for the collection and delivery of voting material, this may need to be particularly reinforced with voting station managers in regard to leaving voting materials in their vehicles.

Voting Day Security Deployment

Where security plans call for security forces to be present at voting stations or at mobile/fixed bases covering voting locations, all required security personnel should be in place no later than the required time of arrival of the voting station managers.

As part of the pre-voting checks at the voting station, the communication links established between voting stations and security forces, mobile security forces and joint operations centres should be thoroughly checked.

Voting station managers must ensure before the commencement of voting that any security forces assigned to the voting station have a full understanding of the division between security force and voting station official responsibilities with respect to the voting station, and how high a profile they are required to take in their activities in and around the voting station. Where there have been any threats to voting locations, security forces should thoroughly check the voting station for explosive devices before staff enter.

Security during Voting Hours

During voting hours, security forces may be required either to provide continuous security for voting locations or be on alert to respond to any emergencies, depending on the assessed security risks of the environment.

What is important to emphasise is that, apart from situations that endanger the life of those present in or around the voting station, security forces should act only on the request of the voting station manager or other electoral management body officials.

For them to have a role in directing any aspect of the voting would raise grave questions about election integrity.

Specific actions to be taken by security forces during voting hours need to be carefully matched to the security risk environment; too intensive an approach in relatively peaceful environments may discourage attendance by voters or raise doubts about who is controlling the voting process.

On the other hand, in higher security risk environments, lack of a security presence risks endangering voting materials or allowing intimidation of voters and voting station officials.

Where security forces are not present at voting stations, rapid response by security forces to any voting station emergencies must be a reality, backed by operational readiness and sufficient resource allocation.

Voting station managers should, as a component of a regular scheduled operational verbal report to electoral district managers, report on the security situation.

Potential Roles for Security Forces

In all situations, security forces should be available to assist voting station managers by removing from voting stations persons who refuse to obey lawful directions from voting station officials 

Specific additional roles that may need to be undertaken, depending on risk assessment of the environment, include:

• ensuring that voters are not harassed or intimidated on their journey to or from the voting station;

• maintaining checkpoints outside the voting station to search for weapons and store confiscated weapons from voters while they are in the voting station;

• providing evacuation and safety management in the event of disasters;

• control of disturbances within or near the voting station;

• enforcement of any security perimeter established around the voting station.

High Risk Environments

In some environments of high security risk, there may also be a need for security forces to maintain general monitoring throughout their areas of responsibility to ensure that no illegal voting stations, not authorised by the electoral management body and intended to siphon off voters from legitimate voting stations, have been set up.

In some specific circumstances of high security risk, security forces may have to take a more active role in assisting voters to attend and return from voting and the protection of voting station officials.

Where threats to participants in voting processes in general are high, secure transport may need to be provided for both voters and officials. In respect to voters, any secure transport arrangements are more effectively organised as convoys, rather than protection of individual voters or small groups.

Attention is required to appropriate scheduling of such services and ensuring that these services are provided equally to all communities at risk, so as not to raise questions of potential political bias in these arrangements.

Security after Close of Voting

In situations where security forces are assigned to voting stations, they will generally have a continuing role after the close of voting:

• They may be useful outside the voting station in assisting to turn away voters arriving after the close of voting.

• They may also be required to provide security during the count or for transportation of ballots to counting centres.

Crisis Management

Voting station managers and staff may need to react quickly in the face of a crisis during voting day to safeguard their own personal safety and/or the integrity of voting:

• Contingency planning must consider potential crises.

• Training exercises for voting station managers should also test their reaction and judgment in the face of potential crises.

Possible Crisis Environments

Major problems could occur during the hours of voting as a result of:

• non-delivery of critical materials or equipment;

• inability of the voting station location to cope with voter crowds;

• natural disaster, such as fire, flood, lightning strikes in or around the voting station;

• public violence or disturbance in or around the voting station;

• threats to the safety of voting station officials or voters whilst in the voting station, such as bomb threats.

Effective Communications

Effective crisis management requires reliable communication systems between voting stations and election operations centres or other supervisory administrative offices. While initiative on the part of voting station managers may defuse a local crisis, the relevant operations centre or elections administration office should always be informed immediately.

Communications strategies that include:

• a regular reporting schedule for each voting station,

• the use of roving voting station supervisors, and

• effective availability of contingency reserves of materials and staff can assist in averting management crises.

Duty of Care

Voting station managers would in many situations have a legal duty of care towards their staff and any voter in the voting station area. They should be provided with emergency evacuation plans by the electoral management body; their training should ensure that they are familiar with these; and their staff should be briefed on these procedures prior to the commencement of voting.

Adjourned Voting

There are some situations in which it would be impossible for a voting station to remain open for voting, or in which it would be impossible to continue with voting at a particular voting station, while still giving potential voters a reasonable opportunity to vote.

Responsible action, and possibly saving the election from challenge, can be assisted if the legal framework allows the voting station manager or other specified officers of the electoral management body to adjourn voting, for a short time, or to another date, and to another location if necessary, in such situations.

Reasons for Adjourning Voting

The circumstances under which voting may be adjourned and responsibility for such decisions need to be clearly specified in legislation, and the chain of command necessary to make and ratify decisions to adjourn voting laid down in electoral management procedures:

• It would be reasonable that, wherever possible, there be consultation between the voting station manager and senior electoral management body staff (and with regard to disturbance or natural disaster, security force management) in the region, before any decision to adjourn voting.

• Where there is no time for such consultation, senior electoral management body staff must be informed as soon as possible by the voting station manager, and a decision made as to where and whether voting which has been adjourned can be quickly commenced again.

The circumstances could include:

• natural disasters--fire, flood, storm--that would prevent voters on the voters list for a voting station from attending to vote;

• riot or public disturbance of sufficient severity to prevent voters from attending the voting station

• unavailability of vital voting materials;

• serious threats, such as those of bombs, leading to the necessity to evacuate locations used for voting.

Length of Adjournment

If at all possible, voting should be adjourned only for as long as it takes for the crisis to abate. The identification of alternative nearby contingency sites that could be used for voting in such emergencies will assist this.

In some situations--such as where a low intensity fire occurs in the voting station during voting hours--it may be possible to use areas outside or around the voting station to continue voting, depending on security requirements and the ability to quickly replace any materials and equipment lost.

Adjourning voting to another day should be a step of last resort, but may be necessary to preserve personal safety or in situations such as major flooding in the voting station area.

Where voting has to be adjourned to another day, the legal framework should specify a reasonably brief period of days within which voting should be scheduled anew.

Postponement of Voting

In some circumstances, voting at a voting station may be delayed before it commences, for example where:

• it  is obvious that voters will not be able to attend a voting station throughout the specified hours of voting and no alternative locations provide satisfactory accessibility to voters;

• vital materials are unavailable.

This information needs to be transmitted to voters in as effective a way as possible; radio and television media or other public broadcasting methods are often the only immediate option.

Adjournment during Voting Hours

Where voting has commenced, and later needs to be adjourned, voting station managers should act under the direction of security and emergency forces in implementing emergency evacuation or other safety plans.

The voting station manager should announce the adjournment of voting, and consistent with preserving the safety of voters and voting station officials, secure and move voting material and ballot boxes, voters’ lists and other election material out of the voting station.

As far as possible, the voting station should be closed down and materials packaged normally--procedures similar to those for multi-day voting or for mobile voting stations could apply.

As far as possible, the same materials should be used when voting begins again; that is voters' lists, ballots, ballot boxes, and the like not destroyed or lost during the adjournment--. Alternatively, the re-start of voting could be treated as a fresh election with fresh ballot boxes and materials. This may make the procedure of final reconciliation of material more complex.

Where ballot boxes, ballots, or voters’ lists were lost during the crisis that caused the adjournment a complete re-run of the election in that voting station could be appropriate Where voting resumes it would be more usual that only those voters who had not voted before voting was adjourned should be entitled to vote.

This will require additional care in publicity for the additional voting day or period of time and may require great tact and vigilance in the processing of voters turning out to vote when voting begins again.

Secure storage for the affected materials, ballot boxes and equipment, separate from other used voting materials, will need to be arranged until the restart of the voting, and arrangements made for reserving, staffing, and securing a voting location on the new date.

Ballot Counts

The legal framework also needs to consider the position of the count for other voting stations in the same electoral district as any voting station where voting has been adjourned.

The need, for integrity and transparency reasons, for these figures to be announced has to be set against any influence public knowledge of these count totals may have on the voting behaviour of voters in those voting stations where voting will occur at a later date.

Role of Party/Candidate Representatives

Freedom to observe all voting processes by representatives nominated by parties and candidates in the election is a necessary safeguard of the integrity and transparency of the election.

The rights and conduct responsibilities of candidate and party representatives in voting stations would normally be defined in the legal or regulatory framework for the election 

(For further discussion of these, see Rights and Conduct Within Voting Stations.

For further discussion of the roles of party/candidate representatives during and after voting, see Preparations for Commencement of Voting, Voter Service)

Observation/Monitoring Role

What must be clear to such representatives is that they are attending the voting station to observe proceedings, not to campaign or otherwise participate in voting. All legal restrictions on campaigning within the voting station area must be strictly and equitably enforced for representatives of all parties and candidates. These may be restrictions on:

• communication with voters,

• distribution of partisan material,

• wearing of badges or apparel,

• public broadcasts that can be heard within the voting station.

Voting station officials must also ensure that party/candidate representatives do not handle any liable voting materials.

Whilst within the voting station party and candidate representatives should be subject to the authority of the voting station manager and staff, and may be removed from the voting station on direction of the voting station manager if their conduct breaches any of the standards laid down in the regulatory framework, including any code of conduct.

While candidate and party representatives should have the right to immediately question decisions made by voting station officials or the implementation of voting procedures, by requesting review by the voting station manager or if still unsatisfied by electoral management body officials, they should not be permitted to influence voters, to disregard voting station officials' directions, or to otherwise disrupt voting.

Assistance from Voting Station Officials

Voting station officials should, within reasonable bounds, assist candidate and party representatives in the conduct of their observations. This would include undertaking all actions in a manner that is visible and senior voting station staff providing explanations to representatives of why particular actions or decisions have been taken.

Requests by candidate and party representatives to slow down voter processing or the compilation of documentation are more problematic as they can impinge on the efficiency of voter service.

Where staffs are following standard procedures correctly, such requests should generally be refused; voting station officials cannot allow the effectiveness of their service to be limited by the effectiveness levels of the representatives provided by parties or candidates.

Party/Candidate Representatives Authorisation

Transparent voting systems would allow representatives of all parties or candidates running in an election to nominate representatives to represent their interests in all voting stations in which voting will take place for that election.

This need not extend to political groups not contesting the particular election. All representatives of parties and candidates present in voting stations should hold formal accreditation from the electoral management body and be accredited by their party or candidate.

Application forms for accreditation should be made available through electoral management body offices during the election campaign period

Party/candidate representatives should present evidence of accreditation before being allowed to enter the voting station area. This evidence could be in the form of a badge or a formal letter of accreditation issued by the electoral management body.

In some systems the candidate or party may issue accreditation without requiring the approval of the electoral management body. While this may provide greater flexibility, it would place a greater burden of control on voting station managers.

Voting station staff controlling voter entry to the voting station or voter queues must undertake accreditation check as part of their duties.

Particular care needs to be taken where representatives are accredited to a particular location or locations only, or where there are different categories of party/candidate representatives, that their accreditation is valid for the specific location.

On Entry to Voting Station

On entry to the voting station, representatives should immediately present their accreditation and introduce themselves to the voting station manager. Representatives should also advise the voting station manager whenever they leave or re-enter the voting station. The voting station manager should keep note of the representatives present and the political interests that they represent.

This is useful in general, and particularly important in systems where there are regulatory restrictions on the number of representatives representing any one party or candidate who may be present in a voting station at the same time. Claimed excess numbers of representatives may be seen as a ground for challenging the conduct of voting.

Identifying Badge or Sticker

While within the boundaries of the voting station, representatives should prominently wear a badge or sticker identifying their role.

Where letters of accreditation, rather than badges identifying party/candidate representatives, are issued by the electoral management body, each voting station should be supplied with a stock of identifying badges for this purpose.

Eligibility of Candidates

There is also the question of whether candidates themselves should be restricted from acting as voting station representatives.

As the continued presence of a candidate within a voting station could be considered "campaigning" it is often seen as prudent that this restriction, as with other restrictions on political campaigning within voting stations, be applied in the election rules.

Numbers of Representatives Present

Legal frameworks for the election may restrict the numbers of representatives that any one candidate/party may have present in a voting station at any time. The balance has to be struck between transparency of the process and the capacity of voting stations to take large numbers of representatives.

Where there are large numbers of candidates/parties, and hence large numbers of representatives present, voting station managers may need to have powers to restrict movement of representatives within the voting station so as not to interfere with voting processes. This should be done by a process of negotiation, rather than by edict, and in such a way that preserves transparency of voting official actions.

Where different voting stations share the same site, additional controls on party/candidate representative numbers and movement may be required. Special arrangements may need to be made for mobile voting stations (see Representatives at Mobile Voting Stations).

Recording of Complaints and Challenges

Any challenges to voters by party or candidate representatives, and any complaints from them regarding the operations of the voting station, must be recorded in writing by the voting station manager (and preferably countersigned by the relevant observing representative) and included with the voting station manager's reports on voting submitted to the electoral management body (see Close of Voting).

Removal from Voting Station

In briefings to representatives, the need to follow the spirit as well as the letter of the law should be stressed. A cooperative attitude between representatives and officials will make activity more comfortable within the voting station. Where breaches of conduct requirements are detected, the voting station manager should act immediately.

Depending on the seriousness of the breach, a warning or removal of the offending party/candidate representative(s) from the voting station could be justified. If party/candidate representatives ordered to leave the voting station refuse to leave, the voting station manager should request security officials' assistance in removing them.

All breaches by representatives of their code of conduct or other election rules should be recorded in writing by the voting station manager and included with the reports on voting submitted to the electoral management body (see Close of Voting). It will decide whether further action to seek penalties under electoral law should be instituted.

Removing a party/candidate representative from a voting station for misconduct has the potential to disadvantage a party and its voters through the behaviour of one individual.

Equity is maintained if there is provision in the election framework that a party or candidate can replace any representative who has been removed from a voting station with another appropriately accredited person.

Voter Information

The practice that is common in some jurisdictions of party workers outside the voting station assisting voters by providing them with information on their serial number on the voters list, or information as to whether they are in fact on the list can be a dangerous practice for the following reasons:

• Material supplied to party/candidate workers may not be an exact replica of the voters list being used in the voting station.

• Party workers may attempt to discourage or misinform voters who they believe will be supporting contestants from other parties.

• Errors in identifying voters from the lists of voters used may occur.

While this practice could assist voting station officials in redirecting voters, unless party workers are well trained, impartial in their advice towards supporters of all election contestants, and provided with accurate data, it can cause confusion among voters.

Rights and Conduct Within Voting Stations

While the specific manner in which their observation duties are undertaken may vary according to the voting systems used, open and transparent voting processes would generally provide the following rights to party/candidate representatives in voting stations:

• to observe all activity, with the exception of the marking of ballots by voters, within the voting station, from the check counting of ballots and sealing of ballot boxes prior to the commencement of voting to the final packaging of material after close of voting;

• to challenge the right of any person to vote;

• to question any decisions made by voting station officials with the voting station manager and election management officials;

• to witness the marking of ballots for physically impaired or non-literate voters by a voting station official, where such assistance to voters is allowed;

• to make notes of any occurrences, make copies of any official documents, and record any statements freely offered by voters.

These rights are exercised subject to:

• being validly accredited to the voting station;

• remaining within the voting station while lawfully carrying out their functions;

• any restrictions on the number of representatives representing one party or candidate that may be present.

Campaigning within Voting Station

Different jurisdictions have widely differing definitions in law of what constitutes "campaigning." Preventing party or candidate representatives from campaigning within a voting station is a restriction that attempts to allow voters some distance from any political pressures at the time when they actually cast their vote.

Open attempts within the voting station to influence voters in their vote by displaying or distributing political literature or otherwise communicating with voters, including public broadcasts that can be heard from within the voting station, are barred.

There is often also an exclusion zone around the voting entrance within which the distribution of political material by anyone is banned. The area of this zone varies widely among different jurisdictions, dependent on factors such as:

• the security environment;

• cultural attitudes towards voters being left in peace on voting day to determine their vote;

• past harassment of voters outside voting stations.

This exclusion area may be as little as five metres from the voting station entrance or up to a kilometre. Where wider security areas are established around voting stations , it may also be appropriate for the legal framework to ban any political campaigning within this area on voting day.

Some jurisdictions additionally ban party or candidate representatives within the voting station from wearing any apparel or badges that could be identified with any candidate or party running in the election. (This may be particularly sensible where there is a potential for conflict during voting.) Others ban the distribution of any materials attempting to influence voters' choices on voting day.

Conduct of Party and Candidate Representatives

As a condition of accreditation to voting locations, party and candidate representatives must have formally accepted the code of conduct applicable for their behaviour.

If a full code of conduct has not been developed, then at the very minimum a formal declaration that their actions will maintain voting secrecy, follow the directions of voting station officials, not interfere with election processes, and be bound by the legal framework for the election should be sought from each party/candidate representative as a condition of accreditation.

While within voting stations, party or candidate representatives are expected to adhere to the conditions of the code of conduct, and of any requirements imposed on them by the legal or regulatory framework for the election. Specific requirements may again vary according to the details of the voting system; however, in principle, conduct required of party or candidate representatives while within the voting station area would include:

• not attempting to influence or intimidate any voter;

• not attempting to intimidate, harass, otherwise threaten or interfere with the work of any voting station official;

• communicating with voting station officials and voters only as necessary for the conduct of their duties;

• not marking or handling any official election material (except to witness records of the vote), or attempt to have it removed from the voting station or destroyed, or attempt to introduce any purported official election material into the voting station;

• obeying all lawful directions by the voting station manager and voting station officials delegated to issue directions to representatives;

• not campaigning for votes within the voting station area;

• not providing any person turning out to vote with false information regarding their eligibility to vote at that voting station or in the election;

• not entering the voting compartments, except (if allowable under the law) when nominated by a voter to assist in voting or to witness the vote of a voter who is assisted by a voting station official.

Some jurisdictions would also bar party and candidate representatives from using any communication device--mobile phones, telephones, radios--from within the voting station while voting is in progress.

Representatives at Mobile Voting Stations

Party or candidate representatives should be given the opportunity to observe the conduct of any mobile voting facilities that are used for home visits to voters, voting in hospitals or other institutions, such as prisons, or in remote areas. Dates, locations, and hours of mobile voting must be announced by the electoral management body to parties and candidates in advance to allow them this opportunity.

For mobile voting in remote areas, reachable only by air charter transport, it may be useful for promotion of the integrity of the election for the electoral management body to allow party or candidate representatives to travel with the mobile voting station, where practicable. In such situations the issue of some contribution by representatives towards the costs of their transport may need to be addressed.

Whatever arrangements are made in terms of assisting representatives must be equitable towards all parties or candidates contesting the relevant election.

Rights and responsibilities of party and candidate representatives in observing mobile voting stations are those applicable to static voting facilities (see Rights and Conduct within Voting Stations and Role of Party/Candidate Representatives).

Mobile voting officials must ensure, particularly where mobile voting stations are servicing elderly or frail voters, that the behaviour of party and candidate representatives is not such that may, even unintentionally, intimidate voters.

Party or candidate representatives observing mobile voting stations operating in voters' homes or in hospitals or other care institutions must act with common sense and courtesy; where it is obvious that their presence may discomfort a voter, they should withdraw.

Particularly where mobile voting stations are visiting voters' homes, sensitivity is required; large numbers of representatives entering a voter's home could be regarded as invading the voter's privacy.

Relaxation of Campaigning Restrictions

In more complex voting systems, particularly those that require the electors to mark multiple preferences on the ballot, there may be some advantages in the legal framework allowing distribution, either by party/candidate representatives present or the mobile voting station officials, of party voting guides on request by voters.

In some situations, such as where voters are bedridden in medical institutions or homes, in prisons, or in remote areas, the voters may otherwise not have access to such information. It would be the responsibility of the party or candidate, not the electoral management body, to ensure such information was available for use.

Close of Voting

Basic Issues

The close of the voting station can be an intensely pressurized period for voting station officials, especially if:

• there are considerable numbers of voters still waiting to vote at the appointed time for closure;

• there is pressure to commence counts quickly.

Clear systems and instructions, backed by checklists of actions to be taken, will aid correct decision-making during this period.

Use of Roving Supervisors

Where roving voting station supervisors are used, they should ensure that they are at a voting station, rather than in transit, at the time of close of voting and preparation for and commencement of the count.

It will be most effective if they adjust their schedule to ensure that they are present at voting stations where management has been less effective during voting hours.

Preparation for Close of Voting

Under normal circumstances, the voting station should close exactly at the time specified in legislation. It is essential that voting station managers synchronise their watches and clocks with an official time source, so that there can be no later argument as to whether the voting station closed at the correct time.

During the last hour the voting station is open, there may be actions that can be taken in preparation for the close of voting:

• If there are few voters turning out during this period, it may be possible to commence dismantling or packaging some excess equipment and material.

• If the count is to take place at the voting station, some furniture can be reorganise to the layout required for the count.

However, this should only be done if it will not adversely affect voter service during the remainder of voting hours, and no preparation of accountable voting material for the count should occur until voting has closed. Where staffs are eligible to vote at their voting station, voting station managers should ensure that they have had the opportunity to do so before voting closes.

Voters Still Queued to Vote at Time of Closing

Equitable voting procedures will contain provisions that allow all voters inside the voting station area at the time of close of voting to vote. If large crowds of voters are still waiting to vote at the time of close of voting; this would be the result of inadequate voting station resourcing or efficiency, rather than any fault of the voters.

As a service to voters, voting station managers should ensure, wherever possible, that voting station officials move any voters still waiting outside the voting station inside the designated voting station area before the time for close of voting.

If those waiting cannot fit inside the voting station premises (so the doors may be closed), it may be possible to designate the end of the line of voters who arrived before close of voting with rope, tape, or a similar barrier, or the stationing of a voting station official or security officer at the appropriate point.

In compulsory voting systems, an additional service can be provided to voters if voting station officials guarding entrances to the voting station at the close of voting note the details of those voters who arrive after close of voting, for reference during any action regarding failure to vote.

Extension of Voting Hours

Election rules and regulations should define the circumstances under which the hours of voting may be extended and who is accountable for making such a decision. Extension of voting hours can be a very contentious decision.

Voting station managers should not take it upon themselves to decide to extend the hours of voting. To do so will be to invite almost certain challenge to the result of the election.

If considerable numbers of voters are still outside the voting station area waiting to vote or are arriving to vote after the time of close of voting, guidance must be sought from senior electoral management body officials regarding any possible extension to voting hours.

Reasonably effective monitoring of and reporting from voting stations would identify the probabilities of this well before the time for close of voting.

It may be prudent that the electoral management body extends voting hours, or extend voting to a further day. This should be done in accordance with any provisions within the election rules, which would require consultation with all political participants and government executive authorities, and possibly with judicial authorities.

There may be situations threaten the personal safety of voting station staff, or the security of voting materials, and security forces are insufficient to offer protection or unable to provide rapid response. Common sense and self-preservation must prevail in such situations.

If the only way to preserve safety is to allow those who were not at the voting station at the time of close of voting to vote, efforts should be made to keep their ballots and voting records separate, pending a decision on extension of voting or for later adjudication as to their validity.

 

Actions at Close of Voting

At the exact time of close of voting, the voting station manager should officially announce that voting is closed, and the entrances and exits to the voting station should be closed and secured (if the voting station is not within a building, the perimeter of the voting station area will need to be secured).

In environments of low security risk, this could be done by voting station officials; in situations of higher security risk it would be more prudent for security forces to guard entrances/exits.

At the same time, external signs identifying the voting station should be taken down, and voters still in the voting station should be moved outside courteously as soon as they have finished voting. From this time on (unless any extension to voting hours is approved) the only persons who should be in the voting station are those holding official authorisation to be there under the election rules. This would normally include:

• Voting station officials assigned to that voting station;

• Accredited representatives of political parties/candidates

• Accredited independent observers;

• Authorized law enforcement/security force officers;

• Authorized electoral management body staff or other official observers.

This restriction must be rigorously enforced to provide integrity of the materials collecting and packaging processes.

Whether ballots are to be counted at the voting station itself, or at another location, at the close of voting, the following procedures should be followed:

• Ballot box slots should be closed and sealed immediately upon the close of voting.

Where machines or computers are used for voting, check numbers for the last vote or transaction recorded at close of voting should be recorded and witnessed, the machines locked and sealed, or computer vote entry screens securely closed to prevent further use.

• All voting materials should be collected and ballot issue records reconciled in preparation for the start of counting (see Collection of Ballots).

• Any special votes (absentee, provisional/tendered or similar) accepted in the voting station should be collected and reconciled with their ballot issue records (see Closing Arrangements for Special Voting).

• Reports on voting activity should be completed by the voting station manager.

• All other voting material not required for the count should be collected to be packaged and prepared for return to the electoral management body (see Verification and Packing of Materials).

Where counts are to be conducted at the voting station itself:

• Staff involved in the count will need to be organised and briefed.

• Count equipment and the voting station physical layout will need to be prepared for the count (see Preparation for Ballot Count).

Where counts are to be conducted at another location:

• Provisions for the secure transport of all voting station material and records to the count centre need to be implemented.

• All staff attendance and payment records should be correctly completed. If payments are made on conclusion of duty, the voting station manager should make correct payments to staff.

• All voting equipment and additional furniture should be prepared for collection or disposal.

• Any arrangements for retrieval of voting station staff should be executed

• Following collection of all election material, the premises should be tidied, locked and secured, and premises keys should be returned according to agreements made.

Additional special procedures may be required for voting locations dealing solely with special votes (see Closing Arrangements for Special Voting) and for mobile voting stations (see Close of Voting for Mobile Voting Stations).

Variable Closing Times

Some election systems allow discretion to voting station managers to close the voting station earlier than the advertised hours of voting if they believe that all voters on the voters list for that voting station have already voted.

This can be a dangerous practice, however, and where implemented has led in some instances to allegations of abuse. Even if allowed by electoral law, it is not to be encouraged by electoral management bodies. "All registered voters having voted," can too easily turn into "all registered voters that we think will vote have voted." It also does not allow for errors in voters lists, or any further service in redirecting voters turning out at the wrong voting station.

Voting Station Managers' Reports and Voting Records

It is important that following the close of voting, the voting station manager compiles a report on activities at the voting station. This report would be returned to the electoral management body with other apt voting station materials.

If ballot counts are to be conducted at another location, it should accompany the ballot material to the count.

Contents of the report would include:

• records related to voting in the voting station;

• voter service records;

• staffing and payment information;

• Reports on premises and occurrences during voting hours. If ballot counts are undertaken at the voting station, records of the counts could also be included in the same report.

(For discussion of the detail useful to include in voting station managers' reports, see Voting Station Managers' Reports.)

Collection of Ballots

Liable Materials

The immediate concern after the close of voting is to ensure that all apt voting materials in the voting station are collected, accounted for, and secured in preparation for conduct of the count. The focus of this will be on the following areas:

• securing of ballot boxes (or, if used, voting machines or computers);

• collection of other accountable voting materials--unused ballots or ballot envelopes, spoilt, or otherwise cancelled ballots or envelopes, certified voters lists, and any supplementary records of persons voting;

• Reconciliation of ballots (or envelopes) and their issuing records. Where the prime integrity control mechanism is the ballot itself, reconciliations of ballot stocks are necessary. Where the prime integrity control mechanism is a ballot envelope issued to eligible voters, reconciliations will instead involve these ballot envelopes.

Collection and accounting for ballots (or ballot envelopes where relevant) should not begin until all voters and any other unauthorized people have been moved outside the voting station.

Where there are no observers or party/candidate representatives present, it may be useful to request that a small number of voters remain to witness this accounting. If this is done, it is preferable that these voters first signed the same oath or conduct declaration required of accredited observers.

The voting station manager should collect official seals or stamps used to authenticate ballots or ballot envelopes (at the same time as the ballots are being collected). They should be formally accounted for and held under security until packaged.

Initial Reconciliations

No matter whether the count is undertaken an initial reconciliation of ballots (or ballot envelopes) received at to ballots (or ballot envelopes) that should be on hand after voting must be undertaken at the voting station. This is to establish the number of ballots or envelopes that should be in the ballot boxes.

This reconciliation should occur before any material is packaged for transportation to the counting centre, or before any ballot boxes are opened if the count is to occur at the voting station.

It is a useful control process for the integrity of voting and the count. It is also a process that is often recorded incorrectly, and can thus cause later disputes. Accuracy of reconciliations requires emphasis in voting station manager training and care in execution.

Where voting machines or computers are used, accurate internal integrity check mechanisms or software to prevent illegal exclusion or addition of votes must be installed.

For further details of this reconciliation, see Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Received.

Reconciliation of Ballots Issued to Voters

The other major integrity check on ballots that needs to be implemented is a reconciliation of records of the number of voters who voted to records of the number of ballots issued or ballot envelopes issued (see Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Issued).

Later reconciliations at the count should reconcile the number of voters recorded as having voted against the number of ballots extracted from the ballot box.

Discrepancies in Ballot or Ballot Envelope Accounting

Discrepancies in close of voting ballot (or ballot envelope) and voter numbers accounting can occur for a number of reasons apart from fraud. However, any discrepancy, for whatever reason, will arouse suspicion about the integrity of voting station operations.

Strict controls, care, and perhaps a little additional time spent at each stage of the ballot (or ballot envelope) handling process can prevent embarrassing and inexplicable ballot (or ballot envelope) accounting and reconciliation discrepancies.

Common non-fraudulent reasons for discrepancies in ballot/ballot envelope and voter number accounting include:

Ballots or ballot envelopes received at the voting station were not correctly and accurately counted before use. Even counter foiled, numbered, ballot booklets can have missing ballots. Loosely packed ballots or ballot envelopes, particularly without numbered counterfoils, are even more susceptible to error in post-production packaging.

It is essential that ballots, or ballot envelopes received at each voting station are counted and any discrepancy between delivery advices and actual stocks received is noted in ballot accounting records. The voting station manager should endorse the results of the check and these figures be used in all subsequent ballot/ballot envelope accounting calculations.

Failure to record properly any official movements of unused ballots or ballot envelopes to and from the voting station during voting day.

Voting station official errors in maintaining records of voters who voted. This is a task that requires continual monitoring during voting to ensure that each voter issued a ballot (or ballot envelope where this is the control mechanism) is recorded as having received a ballot or ballot envelope, and that this is done in the correct, consistent manner to aid counting of total figures. Where ballots are the integrity control mechanism, spoilt or discarded/rejected ballots not being immediately sealed/secured in an envelope or container and kept under security so that they cannot be later placed in the ballot box.

Counting and calculation errors. Each count and calculation required for accounting should be rechecked by another voting station official before being entered into the ballot account and voter reconciliation records.

Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Received

In voting systems whose prime control on the integrity of ballots is control of issue of the ballots to voters, all ballot stocks received at the voting station will need to be accounted for. Accounting for ballots at the close of voting is most effectively undertaken if it follows a series of simple steps.

All steps in this process should be recorded on official ballot account forms that are endorsed by the voting station manager and by any party/candidate representatives present.

While this reconciliation is being done, the voting station should be thoroughly searched, particularly the areas around the voting compartments; checking at floor level under furniture, in any cracks between tables, and in any areas that could be used for storage, would ensure that all ballots at the voting station are included in the accounting.

This important reconciliation of ballots can be undertaken using the following steps:

• establish Number of Ballots Received;

• establish Number of Ballots Issued to Voters;

• count Spoilt/Discarded/Rejected Ballots;

• calculate Number of Ballots Apparently in Ballot Box;

• count Unused Ballots;

• preliminary Reconciliation.

Where voting machines or computers are used the reconciliation will be entirely different (see Automated Voting below).

Where the liable item is the ballot envelope (and not the ballot itself) the procedures will also differ (see Ballot Envelope Reconciliation below).

Establishing Number of Ballots Received

The first step is to establish the total number of ballots that should be on hand in the voting station This is done by counting the number of ballots received before or during voting (adjusted for any discrepancies found during delivery checking and subtracting any ballots officially removed from the voting station (in some systems this may occur if emergency re-supply for other neighbouring voting stations is necessary).

It is important that this figure is correctly calculated. At the conclusion of the count this figure for total ballots on hand should be equal to the number of votes counted during the count (including any spoilt or otherwise cancelled ballots) and the unused ballots.

Any discrepancy between the initial calculation of total ballots at the voting station and the figure calculated at the end of vote counting would suggest tampering or error in the election, and will require thorough recount of all ballots and investigation at the count.

Establishing Number of Ballots Issued to Voters

The second step is to establish the number of ballots issued to voters. If there is more than one table issuing ballots to voters in the voting station (e.g., if there are different issuing tables according to an alphabetical split of voters' names), this figure should be first established separately for every issuing table, and only when these figures are endorsed by the voting station manager, added up to a total for the voting station.

Depending on the style of the ballot, and the control systems for ballot material in the voting station, the methods of doing this will vary:

• Where ballots have numbered stubs or counterfoils, and there is only one ballot issuing table, or a separate counterfoil number range has been given to each issuing table, ballot issues may be established by subtracting the number on the stub of the first ballot issued from that on the stub of the next remaining unused ballot at close of voting. This simple method should only be used if there is strict control over ballot issuing during voting to ensure ballots are issued in strict numerical order of the stubs.

• Where counter foiled ballots have been issued out of strict numerical order, which may particularly occur if there is more than one table for issuing ballots or if there has been a re-supply of ballots to the voting station during voting, the number of stubs/counterfoils from which ballots have been torn off should be counted at each issuing table.

• Where ballots without counterfoils/stubs are used, staff at each issuing table should count the number of unused ballots left at the end of voting, and subtract that from the number of ballots provided to that issuing table during voting day.

It is thus important that all supply of ballots to issuing tables (including any from voting station reserves during voting hours) is carefully recorded during the course of voting day.

Counting Spoilt/Discarded/Rejected Ballots

The third step is to count the number of ballots that have been retained by voting station officials as:

• spoilt-that is, the voter surrendered the ballot before placing it in the ballot box and requested a fresh ballot to complete, or the ballot was damaged and could not be issued;

• discarded or rejected-that is, the ballot was issued to a voter but was then left by the voter somewhere in the voting station other than the ballot box, or rejected when issued.

Many systems may treat such ballots as a single category of cancelled ballots.

Calculating Number of Ballots Apparently in Ballot Box

The fourth step is to calculate the number of ballots that should be in the ballot box. This is calculated by subtracting the number of spoilt, discarded, and rejected ballots from the total number of ballots issued to voters.

Where absentee ballots from voters registered to vote at that voting station are merged on voting day with normal ballots cast at the voting station, these will also need to be included.

It is vital that this figure is correctly calculated, as it is the figure to which the initial count of ballots in the ballot box, on opening of the ballot box at the count, must reconcile. Any discrepancy would suggest tampering or error in the election, and will require thorough recount and investigation at the count.

Counting Unused Ballots

The fifth step is to count the unused ballots. Again, the method of doing this, whether by simple subtraction of counterfoil numbers, counting of unused ballot counterfoils, or of the ballots themselves, will depend on the ballot style and control methods within the voting station.

It is important that all unused ballots are accounted for, not just those remaining at the voting materials issuing tables, but any reserves held by the voting station manager.

Preliminary Reconciliation

The sixth step is a preliminary reconciliation: The figure for total ballots at the voting station should equal the sum of ballots issued to voters, plus spoilt/discarded/rejected ballots, plus unused ballots. Any discrepancies between these two figures should be noted and investigated.

Automated Voting Reconciliation

Where voting machines are used, reading the start and finish numbers on an automatic counter of voters using the machine is an integral part of reconciling the numbers of votes completed.

Similarly, for computer voting, a log totalling the number of relevant voter transactions entered into the computer must be maintained.

Ballot Envelope Reconciliation

In systems where the primary control on the issue of ballots to voters is an envelope in which voter must place their ballot, the focus of reconciliation is rather on envelopes received at the voting station and those remaining at the close of voting. Procedures for ensuring accuracy of accounting for use of these ballot envelopes must be implemented.

Similar to procedures based on accountability of the ballot itself, these procedures would involve:

• accurate recording of the numbers of ballot envelopes received at the voting station, including adjustments for any authorised further stocks received or despatches to other voting locations during the hours of voting;

• establishing how many ballot envelopes have been issued to voters during the course of voting;

• establishing the number of ballot envelopes remaining unused at the close of voting.

If envelopes are stubbed or counter foiled, this may be calculated by counting the torn off stubs or counterfoils. If not, it should be calculated by subtracting the ballot envelopes remaining unused at the close of voting from figures for ballot envelopes received at the voting station.

All steps in this process should be recorded on official ballot envelope account forms which are endorsed by the voting station manager and which party/candidate representatives present are invited to endorse.

Where there are multiple tables issuing ballot envelopes to voters, these calculations should be done individually at each issuing table and verified before adding them up.

The figure derived for ballot envelopes issued should be the same as the number of ballot envelopes found in the ballot box. It is vital that this figure is correctly calculated, as it is the figure to which initial counts of ballot box contents must be reconciled. Any discrepancy would suggest tampering or error in the election, and will require thorough recount and investigation at the count.

Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Issued

In systems where control of ballots issued is the primary integrity mechanism, the number of ballots issued, accounting for any spoilt ballots (those surrendered by the voter and a new ballot issued in its place), should equal the number of voters recorded as having voted.

In those systems using control of issue of ballot envelopes as the prime integrity mechanism, envelopes issued to voters should equal the number of voters recorded as having voted.

This reconciliation would preferably take place at the voting station and be formally recorded by the voting station manager and be countersigned by any party/candidate representatives present.

Often, due to time pressures, this is done on a national basis following return of materials from the count.

This method often leads to disputes about eligible and actual voter numbers, which are more difficult to resolve without those responsible for the issuing of ballot material being present.

Where automated methods for calculating voter numbers can be used, such as where voting is by computer, or optical scannable voters lists are used, it may more effectively be undertaken at a central location.

Data Sources

Figures for the number of ballots issued, or of ballot envelopes issued, should already be obtainable from the ballot or envelope accounting records.

Records of the number of voters apparently issued ballot material could be obtainable from a number of sources, depending on the recording methods used, for example:

• by counting the number of voters marked as having voted on the voters list(s) plus records for the number of voters not on the voters lists(s) who established an entitlement to vote and were issued ballots at the voting station;

• by counting the entries on any separate lists of voters issued ballots, or check sheets/score cards of numbers of voters issued with ballots, where these are maintained by ballot issuing officers during voting;

• by counting applications from voters for ballots, where these are used;

• by counting the number of voter identification cards surrendered, where this control is used.

Generally, the most effective source of numbers of ballots (or envelopes) issued is from counting those voters marked on the certified voter’s list as having voted, adjusted for any voters voting from a supplementary list compiled from:

• voting day registrations, or

• by provisional/tendered ballots, or

• using certificates issued where it has been established voters have been wrongly omitted from the voters list.

Where voters must provide applications for votes, counting the applications may be a preferable primary reconciliation figure source.

Where neither voters lists are used, nor applications required, some other method, such as maintaining a list of voters issued ballots, will need to be implemented.

Multiple Data Sources

Maintaining multiple sources of such information creates a greater possibility of error and thus perceptions/allegations of malpractice. Voting station officials are not perfect. If required to maintain the same information in two or more different ways, it is highly likely that there will be discrepancies at the end of a long working day.

For example, where voters lists are used and marked, the practice of also manually maintaining a separate list of voters issued ballot papers is an inefficient use of resources and can create problems during voting station reconciliations or later checks where the two records differ.

Even where check sheets or score cards marked to indicate voter flows and service levels at varying times of voting day are maintained, they should be clearly unofficial records of the number of voters who have voted.

Discrepancies

Any discrepancy between figures for ballots issued (or, where relevant, ballot envelopes issued) and voters recorded as having voted requires immediate investigation and report on the resolution by the voting station manager (or electoral management body officials, if this check is done after voting day).

• Where discrepancies are found to be the result of error, such a finding would preferably be countersigned by party/candidate representatives.

• Where discrepancies are significant and inexplicable, further investigation is required before any count can be finalised.

Later reconciliations during the count of number of ballots actually in the ballot box plus the number of any discarded/rejected ballots compared to the total number of voters recorded as having voted will refine this integrity check.

Verification and Packing of Materials

Following the completion of accounting for voting materials or simultaneously, if sufficient staff are on hand, all materials in the voting station need to be sorted and organised for packaging.

A thorough search of the voting station should be undertaken to ensure that no material has been placed or left during the day in obscure or unusual places.

Accountable materials, those required for voting, electoral or financial integrity purposes, should be verified wherever possible against supply or other records to ensure that none are missing. Such materials would include:

• receipts for ballots or ballot envelopes;

• other ballot accounting records;

• official seals or marks for ballots;

• ballot or ballot envelope issue records maintained by voting station officials;

• information on voters including any voting day registrations;

• records of challenges and disputes;

• financial and staff attendance records.

Time of Packaging

Where counts are to be conducted at a different location, all voting station material should be packaged immediately following accounting for and reconciliations of ballot material and their verification, and despatched with the ballot boxes to the counting centre 

As a precaution against any apt material being misplaced, it is preferable that all packages of material from the voting station go to the counting centre.

Where counting is to take place at the voting station, all materials should be sorted following the close of voting. Accountable materials not needed during the count--unused ballots or prone envelopes, voters lists, and the like--should be packaged and sealed immediately following the completion of any reconciliations for which they are required.

If access to these packages is required during the count (e.g., in searches for any missing or wrongly packaged material) breaking of the seals of these packages, and resealing, should be formally recorded (including a note of the reasons) and witnessed by party/candidate representatives.

If there is confidence in the professionalism and integrity of count officials, and the security situation is favourable, it may be preferable not to fully package and seal other materials until the count at the voting station has been completed, to make searching for any missing items needed during the count considerably easier.

Rather, after sorting, material not required for the count could be maintained under appropriate security in an area separate from the counting area.

Packaging

Packaging of voting station materials is an activity that is often regarded as an unimportant adjunct to voting. It occurs at the end of the day when major tasks appear to have been completed and staffs are likely to be fatigued. However, incorrect packaging can cause considerable dysfunction and suspicions of improper practices, especially at counting locations or at later challenges where much time can be wasted and emotions aroused looking for missing material that has been mispackaged.

It is important that the packaging of voting station materials be governed by clear guidelines and is undertaken in a professional and efficient manner under strict supervision by senior voting station officials. Care must be taken during packaging that all material is retrieved from within the voting station and packaged.

One common reason why packaging of voting station material is incorrectly implemented is that the packaging systems used are too complex.

Systems requiring a series of envelopes within larger envelopes within other envelopes within boxes within other boxes within bags, all too often distinguished only by strikingly similar identifying labels or numbers, can become bewildering to staff at the end of a very long day, no matter how intensive their training. Simple packaging systems that separate and identify essential accountable material, and, where affordable, are based on a colour-coded system, will assist correct packaging of material after voting or the count.

Packaging System

The packaging system for voting station materials has a number of basic objectives:

• to separate materials relevant to the count and integrity of voting from other materials;

• to separate materials relevant to different elections held at the same voting station, be they elections for different representative structures in the same electoral district, or where a voting station issues ballots for more than one electoral district;

• to logically group materials so that packages contain related material;

• to protect materials during transport to counting centres (if required), for transport to any later check counts, and for storage of ballot material until the period for challenge to the election has elapsed.

Depending on local costs, the amount of material to be packaged, and the security environment, the packaging system may use envelopes, cartons, high density plastic bags, locked containers or a combination of these.

Non-Accountable Materials

The easiest materials to deal with are those with no relevance to the count or integrity of the election. Given that the major priority at the time is the count, these materials could be all packed in the one, clearly labelled container, for later sorting.

Such materials would include:

• manuals and procedural guides used by voting station officials;

• posters, signs, and other voting station official and voter information and reference materials;

• unused non-accountable forms, such as those for voter challenges, voter service monitoring and complaints, voter registration (possibly including ballot envelopes, but only where these are not accountable materials used as a control for ballot issue);

• other minor voting equipment, such as badges, pens, pencils, note paper, unused ballot box and package seals, tape, string, torches, lamps for checking if a voter has been marked with ink and so forth.

Apt Materials

It is very important that appropriate materials are sorted in a consistent, disciplined fashion for packaging. It is possible to logically group such materials to aid retrieval.

Each separate material classification requires a clear distinguishing and easily recognisable label to be attached to or on the package. Each label should bear the contents of the package (type(s) of material and number of articles of each type). Where more than one package is used for a single classification of material, the labels should bear standard part-consignment notations. The voting station manager must ensure that these package content notations are accurately completed by voting station officials and formally endorse their accuracy.

Each package must be sealed in such a fashion that any tampering with the package will be noticeable, using a method and packaging materials robust enough to prevent accidental breakage of the package during normal transport and handling. Depending on the packaging container used, this may be by using plastic or metal seals (with appropriate recording of their numbers) paper seals or packaging tape.

Where seals or tape are used, the voting station manager should sign over the top of the seals. Political party/candidate representatives and independent observers present should be invited to sign endorsement of the contents and sign over the seals of the packages.

The details of the types of liable material to be packaged will depend on the voting system and procedures used. The following classifications provide a sound basis for categorising particular types of materials within a logical framework

1. Ballots deposited by electors in the appropriate ballot boxes. If ballots are to be counted by hand, these will remain in the ballot boxes until they are required for counting.

If machine counted at another location, they may need to be partially processed at the voting station  and replaced in the ballot box or another container. These must be sealed, and political party/candidate representatives and observers present invited to formally witness the sealing. Following counts, these ballots should remain bundled or packaged as sorted by candidate preference, for repackaging in either a ballot box (if the security situation warrants) or other sealed containers.

This post-count packaging of ballots should also be formally recorded and witnessed by political party/candidate representatives and observers.

1. Other ballot material. For voting systems in which the ballot itself is the prime integrity control, and thus all ballots must be accountable, this could include:

• unused ballot papers or cards;

• stubs of ballots issued (if detached on issue);

• spoilt ballots (those for which a voter has requested and been issued a fresh ballot);

• discarded or rejected ballots (those that voters have been issued but which were not placed by the voter in the ballot box);

• official marks or seals used to authenticate ballots when issued;

• voting machine keys. In systems where issue of a ballot envelope to a voter is the prime integrity control, rather than the ballot itself, this category would include unused ballot envelopes, discarded ballot envelopes, stubs or counterfoils of ballot envelopes issued (if detached on issue). It may be useful to package each of these sub-categories in separate packages within the one container.

1. Records of voters turning out at the voting station. This would include:

• all copies of voters lists issued to the voting station;

• applications for ballots completed by electors (except where these are attached to the ballot itself in the ballot box);

• any records compiled in the voting station of ballots issuedto voters ;

• details of and forms for voting day registrations where electors were issued a ballot or certificates from civil authorities certifying that voters were incorrectly omitted from the voters list;

• voting machine or computer readings and reports on numbers of voters voting;

• completed forms relating to challenged voters.

1. Voting station managers reports and voting records. By whatever name, poll books, voting reports, voting records, or in whatever format, as an integrated booklet or series of forms, this category contains all data relevant to management of the voting station's operations. This will include:

• receipts for material;

• ballot accounting records and reconciliations;

• records of issue of any special ballots;

• ballot box sealing records;

• reports on any challenges, incidents, and disputes over voting;

• staffing and attendance, payment, expense, and evaluation records;

• voter service and premises suitability reports.

1. Records of any special votes issued.
2. Voter and political party/candidate representative and observer information. Depending on the electoral system, relevant contents (if any at all) will vary widely. It could include data such as accreditation documents that political party/candidate representatives or observers are required to hand over or information on or from voters relevant to their registration.

In packaging these materials, voting material relevant to elections for different representative bodies or different electoral districts held in the same voting station should be kept clearly separate, by colour coding package labels or envelopes, for example, according to different colours of ballots used. When packaged, all material should be securely prepared for transport, and any transport control documentation completed.

If at all possible, all materials packages from a voting station should be secured in a single container (ballot boxes may need to be handled separately). Such containers should enclose material from one voting station only. Each package and outer container from a voting station must be clearly marked with the voting station identity (name and/or number) and the electoral district to which it belongs. Care needs to be taken in this regard when there is more than one voting station occupying a voting location.

Storage of Voting Station Materials

Following finalisation of counts of ballots, arrangements for sorting of election materials and equipment into those to be stored, and those to be destroyed, need to be implemented.

The periods, for which election materials must be in storage, the manner of their storage, and the accountabilities for their maintenance or destruction would usually be specified in the electoral legal framework. 

Preparation for Ballot Count

Reorganising for the Count

Where voting stations are used for the count, in addition to dealing with materials (see Collection of Ballots and Verification and Packing of Materials) and party/candidate representative issues (see Role of Party/Candidate Representatives), there are some preparatory actions that need to be undertaken to turn the area into an efficient facility for counting.

The exact preparatory actions taken and the nature of the reorganisation will depend on the manner of voting--manually, by machine or computer--whether a single or multiple elections have occurred, and the method of the count.

Preparatory Actions

Where paper or card ballots are used, there are some general guidelines within which these actions should be undertaken:

• collection and reconciliations of voting materials (see Collection of Ballots and Verification and Packing of Materials);

• following a thorough check for any ballot materials left in the area, the voting compartments should be dismantled and moved to an area out of the way of counting staff;

• any crowd control barriers within the voting station should be dismantled to provide an uncluttered count space;

• if all ballot boxes are not opened simultaneously, set up an area for secure holding of ballot boxes not yet being counted;

• reorganise available furniture in the configuration required for the count;

• distribute and set up any equipment required for the count--ballot counting machines, calculators, tally boards--according to the requirements of the count;

• where special ballots are also being counted, set up the facilities required for counting these.

If large numbers of party/candidate representatives and/or observers are present, there may be a need to place some barriers to allow free movement of count officials around the count tables and prevent party/candidate representatives and observers from handling ballots or intimidating voting station officials. If this is necessary, barriers should not be erected at such a distance to prevent party/candidate representatives from fully observing count processes.

Reorganisation of Furniture

Furniture will need to be reorganised to provide a counting area, a table from which the voting station manager can supervise the count, an area for party/candidate representatives, and a rest area for staff. The count area configuration will vary according to the count method.

When using efficient production line-style count methods, with the ballot papers progressing through areas for emptying of ballot boxes and unfolding of ballots, sorting to candidate/party, counting, counting and recording, and parcelling, an elongated double "T" formation for count tables is effective. An example of this style of layout is shown below.

The layout of the count area will also depend on:

• whether there are ballots for more than one election to be counted (e.g., president and legislative body, or multiple legislative bodies);

• whether the elections use a single ballot or multiple ballots;

• whether counts for different elections are to be held simultaneously (in which case extreme care needs to taken that ballots from different elections are not mixed) or consecutively.

Where different ballots from the same voters are counted simultaneously, and particularly where ballots for different parts of a representative body or representative bodies have been placed in the same ballot box, a U-shaped table layout can be effective. An example of this type of layout is shown below.

Where voting machines or computers are used, radical reorganisation of the voting station furniture will generally not be necessary if the count is to take place in the voting station. Count totals taken from the machines can be added and processed at a single table.A small area set up for reconciliations of voter records to ballots counted, with any required count area for special votes, should also be set up.

Voting Station Staff

No matter what the pressure for an immediate start to the count, the voting station manager should ensure that all staff who have been working all day on voting station duties have an opportunity for a break between close of voting and commencement of the count.

This may be achieved by the employment of unskilled or junior staff for a short period to reorganise furniture and clean up the voting station.

Prior to the count commencing, all staff should also be briefed by the voting station/count manager. A quick review of essential features of the procedures and any specific instructions for the particular count location should be given. Observers and party/candidate representatives present for the count should also be invited to attend this briefing.

Role of Party/Candidate Representatives

Transparency of Action

At the close of voting it is important that candidate and party representatives present are clear as to the proceedings and their rights.

Actions to be taken at the close of voting need to be clearly explained to party/candidate representatives present, so that these representatives are aware of the basis of activities like:

• the rights of voters in the voting station to vote,

• the barring of voters who arrive after the closing time,.

• any preparations for counting occurring before the voting closing time.

It can be of assistance to have an information sheet:

• explaining briefly the actions at close of voting, rules and procedures to be applied during the count, and

• defining the roles of party/candidate representatives at the count, prepared for distribution to all candidate/party representatives attending the count.

Accreditation of Party/Candidate Representatives

Where the count is to be conducted at the voting station, there may be different or additional party/candidate representatives accredited to the count.

Their accreditation needs to be checked by voting station officials, and it must be ensured that no unaccredited persons enter the voting station count area. Whether candidates for a particular election can themselves act as a party/candidate representative during its count is a matter generally addressed in election law.

It would be a reasonable legal requirement that only parties or candidates running in an election should have their representatives present at the count. The number of representatives that each party/candidate may have present at a count location at any one time varies under different election frameworks:

• Ideally, each party/candidate would be allowed an equal number of representatives to the number of counting staff. Any more restrictive provisions than these would, prima facie, appear to be a restriction on the ability to observe all that is occurring during the count.

• Space restrictions in counting locations may lead to legal restrictions on the number of party/candidate representatives allowed to be present. Any such restrictions should still ensure that each party or candidate in the election may have at least one representative present.

One criterion for the identification of suitable count locations would be that there is sufficient room for party/candidate representatives and observers. The issue of available space should not be used to manipulate the observation of the count.

Invitation to Staff Briefings

It is useful to invite party/candidate representatives present to listen to any briefing provided by the voting station manager to voting station officials prior to the commencement of the count (see Preparation for Ballot Count):

• Informed party/candidate representatives are a necessary part of the transparency and integrity measures for the count.

• With a refreshed knowledge of the procedures to be used, they are less likely to delay proceedings with challenges to approved procedures.

The alternative would be to brief them separately.

Behaviour of Representatives

The rights and responsibilities of party/candidate representatives at ballot counts would normally be defined in the legal framework for the election. In any case:

• It is important that party/candidate representatives understand, before the count begins, that they have a duty to maintain election integrity in their handling of all election material, particularly ballot material, but also any other election materials being packaged for return or undergoing counts.

• It is also important to reinforce to these representatives that they must not communicate with counting officials about progressive count totals or results.

• Party/candidate representatives should be made aware that breaches of their responsibilities will lead to sanctions on their activities, which may include their removal from the voting station.

Party/candidate representatives present should be invited to witness, formally, the completion of ballot issue reconciliation records and the unsealing of ballot boxes, and provide comment where they believe correct procedures have not been followed.

They should be reminded that, at this stage of proceedings, and during the count, the decision of the voting station or count centre manager will prevail. Not all disputes will be capable of resolution on the spot.

Where party/candidate representatives do not agree with a decision of the voting station or count centre manager, they can be reminded of their right to lodge a formal complaint in writing to the electoral management body or other authorities that are legally charged with resolving electoral disputes.

Count at Counting Centres

Where the count is to be conducted at a location other than the voting station, it should also be made very clear to party/candidate representatives present that:

• they are not permitted to handle any election materials, and particularly ballot materials, while they are being, or after they have been, packaged for transport,

• or during transport, and

• that breaches of this requirement will be dealt with according to sanctions under the election law.

As with counts held in voting stations, party/candidate representatives present should be invited to witness, formally, any preliminary ballot reconciliation documents of total ballots received at the voting station and of ballots issued to voters shown as having voted.

Additionally, when ballot material has been packaged for transport to the counting centre, party/candidate representatives should be invited to witness the sealing of all packages and endorse their disclosed contents; a similar invitation should be extended to formally witness seals and contents of packages of other election materials.

Where party/candidate representatives refuse to endorse or witness the contents, they should be provided with the opportunity to state their reasons in writing and have these included with the voting station manager's report on voting.

Arrangements should also be made for party/candidate representatives to be invited to accompany ballot materials during their transport to the counting centre.

Closing Arrangements for Special Voting

The specific additional measures that need to be taken at the closing of voting for special voting facilities will depend on:

• how restrictive these facilities are in terms of pre-qualifications and applications required;

• the method of issue of ballots;

• whether special voting facilities are located with normal voting stations or occupy separate locations;

• for which electoral districts they issue ballots;

• whether these facilities are open for a single day or multiple days;

• whether the ballots they issue are to be counted at a voting station or taken to special counting locations for special ballots.

The type of special voting facilities offered will also affect the procedures at close of voting. For details of procedures see the following:

• Provisional or tendered votes: Close of Voting for Provisional Votes.

• Early voting: Close of Voting for Early Voting.

• Absentee voting: Close of Voting for Absentee Voting.

• Mail voting: Close of Voting for Mail Voting.

• Voting in a foreign country: Close of Voting for Votes Cast Outside the Country.

• Mobile voting stations: Close of Voting for Mobile Voting Stations.

Special Voting Location Managers' Reports

The general content of voting station reports is discussed at Voting Station Managers' Reports.

Where special voting facilities are provided in normal voting stations, reports on special voting activities, such as ballots and materials reconciliations, record of different types of special votes issued and for which electoral districts, can be included in the overall report of the voting station manager to avoid unnecessary additional documentation.

Where special voting facilities are provided at separate locations, their reports can still be based on those for a normal voting station, with modified forms, where necessary, for:

• ballot accounting--for reconciling ballots for different electoral districts received and issued;

• records of votes issued for each electoral district;

• where operating for more than one day, progressive daily ballot issue and reconciliation forms and modified forms on which to record sealing and unsealing of ballot boxes at the commencement and completion of voting for each day.

Close of Voting for Provisional Votes

Where provisional or tendered votes have been issued to voters not on the voters list at a voting station, at the close of voting these ballots will need to be totalled and reconciled separately against any application forms required and records of issue.

If voter details are attached to or within provisional ballot envelopes they may require checking against voter registration data prior to the ballot being accepted for counting . They are more effectively counted at a central administration location for the whole electoral district.

Thus, after reconciling with issue records they would be parcelled separately from normal ballots. During voting, use of a ballot box for provisional ballots separate from that used for normal ballots will assist this.

Where the same ballot stocks are used for provisional ballots as for normal ballots, ballot accounting records may need to be adjusted for the number of provisional ballots issued, if these will not be found in the ballot box for the voting night count.

If separate ballot stocks are used, a full accounting must be completed for provisional ballot stocks and included with other ballot accounts with the voting station manager's report. The accounting should be done in a style similar to that for normal ballots.

Ballot Envelopes

Where envelopes used for containing provisional or tendered ballots are also strictly accountable, reconciliations will need to be undertaken for:

• stocks of these on hand at the close of voting to stocks received, less envelopes recorded as issued;

• Envelopes issued to voters listed as having been issued provisional or tendered ballots.

Close of Voting for Early Voting

Procedure Factors

Actions at close of voting will depend on whether early voting locations:

• Can issue ballots only for the electoral district within which the early voting station is located, or whether ballots for other locations can be issued.

Are open for a single day, or several days; this will affect the format of the records to be completed during voting and at close of early voting.

The following discussion deals with early voting in person. (For close of voting procedures for mail voting, see Close of Voting for Mail Voting.)

Ballots Issued for Same Electoral District Only

Procedures at close of the early voting, whenever that is legally determined, can follow those for a normal voting station:

• where an early voting station can only issue ballots for the electoral district within which it is located, and

• Issues these votes by reference to a voters list for the electoral district.

If applications for an early vote are required, these should also be reconciled to ballot issues. Material can be returned to the voting operations administration office following closure of early voting, and ballots may be stored in the ballot box until counted after the close of voting on voting day. They should not be counted earlier than this.

With this method of issue, it would be more efficient to count these ballots at a single location in the electoral district, rather than distribute to relevant normal voting stations for the count.

If early ballots are issued for the home electoral district only, but as special enveloped ballots with accompanying elector details, rather than by reference to voters lists, the same ballot and/or envelope accounting methods can be used at close of voting, and voter eligibility and counting undertaken at a single counting location. While eligibility checking of the voters' identity information can usefully occur before voting day, the ballots should not be counted before close of voting.

Ballots Issued for Multiple Electoral Districts

Ballot accounting at close of voting becomes more complex when early voting stations can issue ballots for multiple electoral districts.

Separate ballot accounting records will need to be completed for each electoral district for which ballots may be issued.—District reconciliations should be done for:

• ballots issued;

• unused ballots;

• applications for early ballots received (if required);

• ballot issue records;

• envelopes (where used);

• voters marked on lists as having voted.

Where early voting stations issue ballots for multiple electoral districts from lists of early voters for each electoral district, it can be effective to count all early ballots issued at the early voting stations or at a location in that electoral district (particularly if these counts can be combined with counts of similarly-issued absentee ballots on voting day).

In such cases, early ballots can be stored under security in their ballot boxes until the count. Advice of counts should be transmitted to relevant electoral districts as soon as counts are completed, with supporting ballots and documentation despatched by secure transport to the relevant electoral districts following the packaging of all count material.

However, it can also be efficient to package and return these ballots immediately following the close of voting to a central location for sorting to electoral district and counting.

Where early voting stations issue ballots for multiple electoral districts as special enveloped ballots with accompanying voter identification information, rather than by reference to voters lists, it can be more cost-effective, and easier to maintain integrity controls, to despatch all early ballots, in their ballot boxes, and accompanied by ballot issue records, for voter eligibility checking and counting at a single central location for all electoral districts.

This will require high quality, centralised voter registration data, a fairly complex count centre set-up, and, if electoral districts are dealt with consecutively, may cause delays in some count results.

If early voting is conducted using special enveloped ballots, but they are not all to be counted at one central location, at the close of early voting:

• Envelopes containing all early ballots issued in an electoral district will need to be removed from the ballot box(es), sorted according to electoral districts, counted by electoral districts, and reconciled with ballot issue records. This should be done in the presence of and witnessed by party/candidate representatives.

• Secure packages of ballots for each electoral district (sealed lightweight ballot boxes could be used for this) should be prepared for secure transport to the relevant electoral districts for voter eligibility checking and counting. If a long period is allowed for early voting, more than one such despatch may be required.

• Notices of the early ballots to be sent to each electoral district should be prepared and sent under separate immediate cover to the relevant electoral districts.

• On arrival, reconciliations of ballot envelopes received to despatch notices should be instituted by the receiving electoral districts, and when reconciled, officials could proceed to check the ballot envelopes for voter eligibility and counting of ballots.

 Unless relatively costly, very well-controlled, and accurate recording and despatch systems are implemented, it is all too easy for this cross swapping of ballots to break down. Manual systems are generally not up to the task. Centralised counting and transmission of results to the relevant electoral district requires considerably less complex logistical controls and can concentrate resources.

Multiple Day Early Voting

If early voting locations are open for more than one day,

• a count of ballots issued and remaining unused, reconciled to total ballots received at the voting station, and

• a count of applications processed during the day (where applications are required) and records of ballot issues, reconciled to actual ballot stocks remaining, Should be progressively undertaken at the end of each day to retain control over ballot accounting and make reconciliations at close of voting easier.

Where early voting stations can issue ballots for multiple electoral districts, this progressive ballot accounting will need to be a more complex document containing separate ballot accounting records for each electoral district.

Close of Voting for Absentee Voting

Where absentee voting in person is allowed on voting day, close of voting procedures will depend on:

• the method adopted for voting (from pre-prepared absentee voters lists or enveloped ballots, in designated absentee voting stations or at any normal voting station) and

• the number of electoral districts for which ballots may be issued at any voting station.

The following discussion relates to absentee voting in person on voting day. (For close of voting issues relating to absentee voting by mail, see Close of Voting for Mail Voting and absentee early voting at Close of Voting for Early Voting.)

Special Absentee Voters Lists Used

Where absentee votes are issued from a list of absentee voters at special absentee voting stations, close of voting procedures can be similar to those for a normal voting station.

However, separate ballot accounting records must be completed for each electoral district for which voters were registered to cast absentee votes. Reconciliations should be done for:

• ballots issued;

• unused ballots;

• ballot issue records;

• voters marked on lists as having voted.

As for early voting, there can be speed and control advantages in counting these ballots where they were issued, if management at absentee voting stations is sufficiently robust and skilled.

Particularly where ballots for large numbers of electoral districts have been issued, it can be safer, and more effective, to securely package all absentee voting material immediately following the close of voting and despatch it securely to a central facility for sorting to electoral district and counting.

Enveloped Ballot Systems

Where absentee voting procedures allow anyone to claim an in-person absentee vote on voting day, through a system of special enveloped ballots, close of voting ballot accounting should reconcile:

• ballots issued;

• unused ballots;

• ballot issue records;

• any applications required for absentee voting in relation to each electoral district.

If all absentee ballots are to be sent to a central location for voter eligibility checking and ballot counts, following close of voting, absentee ballots can be despatched in their sealed ballot boxes, and accompanied by ballot issue records, to the central count centre.

However, if these absentee ballots are to be returned to the voter’s home electoral district for eligibility checking and counting, a system parallel with that described at Close of Voting for Early Voting for dealing with early votes under similar circumstances will need to be implemented at close of voting.

Again the logistical complexity of such an exercise makes this method generally inadvisable.

Close of Voting for Mail Voting

Basic Issues

Close of voting procedures for absentee voting by mail will vary according to:

• When the cut-off date for return receipt of mail ballots is defined, prior to voting day, as at close of voting on voting day or at some later date;

• Whether mail voting facilities in electoral districts can issue mail ballots for their own electoral district only, or for all electoral districts;

• The return addresses to which mail ballots are sent.

Regardless, there are some general guidelines that should be followed, both for the close of issuing of mail ballots and for the deadline for receipt of returned mail ballots.

Progressive Reconciliations of Material Issued

Ballot accounting records should be maintained on a daily basis and final reconciliations of ballot stocks conducted following the closing time for issuing mail ballots. Records that should be kept daily include:

• A count of ballots and any special return envelopes issued and remaining unused, reconciled to total ballots (and envelopes if applicable) received at the voting location;

• Mail ballot applications processed during the day and/or mail ballot issues from permanent mail voter lists reconciled to records of ballot issues and to actual ballot stocks remaining.

Where mail ballots can be issued from the one location for multiple electoral districts, ballot accounting records would need to be maintained for each electoral district for which ballots are issued.

Returned Mail Ballots

From progressive daily records of returned mail ballots received, the total mail ballots that should be in the ballot box must be calculated for reconciliation at the count.

Where mail ballots may be issued within an electoral district for that electoral district only, and the return address is to that electoral district, this is a simple process of marking returned ballots against issue records.

Where voting locations in an electoral district may also issue mail ballots for other electoral districts, and particularly if mail ballots are returned to a location other than the issuing location, this may be a process of considerable complexity requiring very strict control systems.

If the return address for mail ballots from all electoral districts is to a central location, a system for matching issue records to returned ballots will be needed. The structure of this system will depend on whether mail ballots are retained at the central location, or returned to the electoral district of registration for the count.

If mail ballots can be issued from locations in an electoral district on application by voters from any electoral district, with the ballots returned to the voters electoral district of registration, a complex system of monitoring advice between electoral district administration offices, and for forwarding mail ballot applications to the voters' own electoral district office, and then reconciling these to ballots returned will need to be implemented.

It is also essential that at the deadline for receipt of returned mail ballots, mail-clearing procedures be implemented:

• In particular, any mail boxes used as return addresses for mail ballots should be cleared at the time specified as the closing time for receipt of ballots by mail.

• Additionally, all mail ballots returned need to be time and date stamped immediately on receipt; time stamps need to clearly distinguish between returned mail ballots received before and after the legal deadline for return.

Packaging and Transport

Procedures for packaging and transport of mail ballots and issue records following the deadline for mail ballot return will depend on where these ballots are to be counted.

If the deadline is before voting day, and particularly if each electoral district can only issue mail ballots to voters registered in that electoral district, it may be possible for returned ballots to be security delivered on voting day to the voting station relevant to each voter's registration for inclusion with the normal count. This, however, will add further complexity to sorting and transport requirements.

If mail ballots are to be counted in the electoral district in which each mail voter is registered, and return deadlines are on or after voting day, where the return mail address for mail ballots is to a single central location, security distribution arrangements must be implemented to deliver mail ballots to the appropriate electoral district office. More than one such shipment may be required, depending on the length of time allowed for return of mail ballots.

Where the return mail address is to the voter's electoral district administration office, ballot envelopes may remain in ballot boxes until the close of voting.

If mail ballots are to be checked and counted at a single central location, the return mail address for all mail ballots would preferably be that location, with returned ballots sorted on arrival to a ballot box for their relevant electoral district in preparation for the count.

Timing of Count

Checking of voter details accompanying the ballot to determine eligibility of the vote can usefully occur before voting day to determine which ballots will be accepted for counting. Counts of mail ballots, however, should not begin until after the close of voting.

Close of Voting for Votes Cast Outside the Country

Basic Issues

Following close of voting in voting stations in a foreign country, the measures to be taken will depend on the manner of the controls placed on issuing ballots.

Special Foreign Voters Lists Used

If voting is from lists of voters located in other countries, the counts of foreign votes for each relevant electoral district could be undertaken at the foreign location, with results electronically communicated to the electoral management body.

Material can be packaged for secure courier return to the electoral management body in a similar fashion as a normal voting station after the count, except that ballots and any supporting documentation for each electoral district should be separately bundled within packages.

Counts at foreign locations would be better regarded as preliminary only, with a thorough recheck of all ballot and other liable materials, in the presence of party/candidate representatives, being undertaken following return of the material to the home country.

However, as it is unlikely that there will be opportunity for party/candidate representatives to be present at these counts, for integrity reasons it may be more prudent that following close of voting all election material is packaged and sealed at the foreign location and returned to the home country for counting, either at a central location or for distribution to the relevant electoral districts for counting.

Other Ballot Controls Used

For all other methods of issue, if the foreign location acts as a mail ballot issue and return point, or a location for early or absentee voting in person without the use of a special foreign voters lists, at the close of voting, reconciliations of ballots (and special ballot envelopes if used), ballot issue records, voter applications, and completed mail or other ballots received should be carried out in the same way as for a local absentee, mail, or in-person early voting location issuing ballots for multiple electoral districts (see Close of Voting for Early Voting and Close of Voting for Mail Voting).

Advice to Electoral Management Body

Ballot issue and reconciliation records should be transmitted electronically to the electoral management body immediately after close of voting. Arrangements should also be made for fast and secure courier transport of ballots and supporting material back to the electoral management body for eligibility checking and counting.

Voting Equipment

It would generally be cost-effective for voting equipment--ballot boxes, voting compartments and the like--not to be returned to the home country but maintained at the nearest diplomatic mission office.

Close of Voting for Mobile Voting Stations

Basic Issues

Mobile voting stations undertake a series of closing of voting at each location that they visit. Procedures for closing voting at each of the locations visited will generally require the same actions as at other types of voting stations (see Close of Voting), but some variations may be required.

Schedules

Mobile voting would preferably be carried out according to a pre-determined and advertised schedule, rather than in response to ad hoc voting day requests . It may also be allowed to operate during a specified period prior to the normal voting day.

If voters are still waiting to vote at a mobile location at the time scheduled for the close of voting at that location, scheduling arrangements should be flexible enough to allow those present to vote.

In terms of flexibility, the following are useful guidelines:

• Mobile voting stations should remain longer at locations than scheduled, if necessary, to allow all those wanting to vote to vote (except, of course, allowing voting at any location after the time for the general close of voting on voting day itself; mobile voting stations should be bound by normal closure procedures at that time).

• Mobile voting stations should not leave any location before the scheduled and advertised time of cessation of voting.

• Where a mobile voting station, through transport or other delays, arrives late at a voting location, it should remain there at least for the full number of hours scheduled and advertised, and not cut this time short by closing voting at the scheduled time; any potential late arrival at a location should be announced, wherever possible, to the community or institution concerned.

Care of Ballot Boxes

To use a separate ballot box for each mobile voting location would be wasteful.

Ballot slots in ballot boxes used will need to be sealed at the conclusion of voting at each location, and the sealing witnessed (by party/candidate representatives, if present, by voters), opened at the next location with the opening witnessed, and so on.

Numbered

seals--polypropylene ties or similar--on a slot closure mechanism, rather than plain paper seals over the slots will provide more effective control. It is important that sealing and unsealing of ballot box slots is rigorously implemented, recorded, and witnessed by party/candidate representatives, observers, or some other witness.

Ballot Accounting

In maintaining ballot accounting, it will be more effective to account for ballots issued at the conclusion of voting at each location, in a progressive table, rather than leaving ballot accounting until the conclusion of the mobile voting station's activities.

This will allow earlier detection and resolution of any problems and is most important when a mobile station's activities extend over several days.

Mobile voting stations visiting hospitals and other institutions may also be dealing with voters registered for a wide variety of electoral units. Where mobile stations may issue absentee ballots, careful accounting for these by electoral district will be required.

Counts of Ballots

It is more practicable for ballot and other material from mobile voting stations to be returned to another location for counting. This could be a voting station or a more central counting centre. For accountability purposes, it is useful that ballots from each mobile voting station should be counted and parcelled separately.

However, where only small numbers of votes are taken by a mobile voting station, it is highly preferable that these be amalgamated, either with a normal voting station's or other mobile voting stations' ballots, before actual counting of ballots commences, to ensure voting secrecy is preserved.

Return of Material

Mobile voting station schedules should be arranged to allow return of material for counting as soon as possible after the time for closing of voting on the general voting day.

As for normal voting stations (see Verification and Packing of Materials), care should be taken in packaging material to ensure that electoral material is securely and separately packaged.

Mobile voting stations (particularly those operating in remote areas) may have considerable amounts of non-election material to be returned, such as camping gear, provisions, and other equipment. This material also needs to be carefully checked on return; however, this should not occur at a location or time that would interfere with ballot material checks and counts.

Mobile Voting Station Managers' Reports

At the completion of a mobile voting station's itinerary, and before returning all material to the district electoral officer or other authorised person at the voting operations administration centre, managers of mobile voting stations should complete a report.

The content of the report will vary, depending on what type of area the mobile voting station was covering. The report may be a series of separate forms, or, more effectively, be combined in a single stapled or bound booklet.

In addition to the items common to other voting station reports (see Voting Station Managers' Reports), further information should be recorded regarding:

• mobile voting station itinerary and whether there were any variations from planned schedules;

• record of ballots issued at each mobile voting location;

• progressive ballot accounting (see Collection of Ballots) recorded following conclusion of voting at each place visited and at the end of each day's voting, if the mobile voting station is in operation for more than one day;

• particularly if operating in remote areas, a communications schedule or checklist and time of communications with base;

• diary commenting on facilities and conditions at mobile voting locations, noting disputes, and incidents, travelling time, other useful data for future mobile voting station planning;

• records of reimbursable expenses. 

Voting Station Managers' Reports

Content of Reports

While supervising close of voting activities, the voting station manager may be able to commence the completion of the voting records and a report on voting activities.

The contents of these reports will vary, particularly between voting stations where counts are to be conducted, where the count details may be included in an overall report, and those where ballots are counted at a different location.

The voting records and reports may be a series of separate forms, or, more effectively, be combined in a single stapled or bound booklet for each voting station. The reports should be fully completed before the voting station manager leaves the voting station, and information required should be clearly identified in the voting station manager's activity checklist.

The content of  these reports falls into two broad categories: accountable information and service information.

Apt Information

The liable information to be provided in voting station managers' reports would normally cover:

• witnessed records of the sealing and, if the count takes place at the voting station, unsealing of ballot boxes, with the numbers of the seals or locks placed on each ballot box recorded;

• where paper or card ballots are used, an accounting record for ballot stocks received at the voting station against those on hand at the close of voting (see Collection of Ballots) (where issue of ballots to voters is controlled through envelopes, this accounting would relate to envelope, rather than ballot stocks);

• a reconciliation of total numbers of ballots issued (or registered on a machine/computer) with total numbers of voters marked on voters lists as having voted at the voting station (see Collection of Ballots) (in some partially or semi-automated ballot information systems, reconciliation may be more efficiently and accurately done centrally by computer rather than at each voting station);

• if the voting station is used for any form of special voting, a summary of the special votes received, by category (if any of these are votes for another electoral district, this summary should be categorised by electoral district);

• where applications are required to be completed for the issue of any vote, a reconciliation of numbers of completed applications received with numbers of ballots issued;

• reports and statements on any challenges, disputes, accidents, involvement of security forces, and interruptions to voting.

Where the count is conducted at a different location, the accountable information should accompany the voting material, under security, to that location (or if a centralised count of computer or machine votes is undertaken, to the computer processing centre). Where the count is undertaken at the voting station itself, these completed reports should be returned at the conclusion of the count, under security with voting materials, to the electoral district manager at the voting operations administration centre.

Service Information

The service information to be provided in voting station managers' reports would include:

• correctly completed attendance records (and if paid at the voting station, payment records) for voting station staff to provide an audit trail;

• performance evaluations of all staff employed at the voting station, indicating their suitability for future voting station employment, including suitability for higher responsibilities;

• voter service, length of voting queues and time voters had to wait to vote, effectiveness of voter information provided in the voting station, any need to provide assistance in future to voters with lower literacy, different languages, or physical disabilities;

• the premises used, its facilities, and suitability for continued use as a voting station;

• any petty expenditures for reimbursement;

• any appointments of substitute officers, in the event of illness or other absences, to voting station staff.

Where the count is conducted at a different location, it may be preferable to send this material to the counting centre with the liable materials. While it may seem that this would result in irrelevant information being sent to the counting centre, a split of information destinations runs the risk of material not being at the counting centre when required.

Where the count is undertaken at the voting station itself, these completed reports should be returned, at the completion of the count and under security, with other voting materials to the electoral district manager at the voting operations administration centre.

Records of Multi-Day Voting

If voting is conducted over more than one day, some issues covered in voting station manager's reports and voting records will require separate recording at the end of each day. This will include essential areas such as:

• reconciliations of ballots, voters marked as having voted and any applications for votes, to allow early identification of any errors or suspicious figures;

• reports on challenges, interruptions, disputes.

The design of form or report formats provided to managers of multi-day voting locations must cater to this need.

Management of Challenges and Complaints

Treatment of Complaints

Effective and transparent mechanisms for dealing with complaints about and challenges to voting operations promote the accountability of the electoral management body and can assist in enhancing the acceptability of election outcomes by political participants and the public in general.

It is important for maintaining standards of accountability and transparency that all complaints about and challenges to operations of voting stations are investigated, not just those sufficiently serious to raise doubts about the validity of election outcomes. Even apparently vexatious complaints, if not openly and publicly answered, can be manipulated to raise doubts about voting operations integrity.

Effective and transparent complaint resolution and challenge mechanisms can identify and combat not only any fraudulent activities or wrongdoing, but can ensure that any errors made by voting station officials in the course of their duties can be identified and corrected.

For further discussion of dispute management frameworks, see Complaint Procedure.

Types of Complaints

Complaints on the operation of voting stations would generally fall into the following broad categories:

• challenges to the rights of specific voters to cast a vote, and complaints by intending voters that they have been omitted from voters lists or otherwise denied a vote (see Challenges to Voters and Challenges to Voting Operations Management);

• challenges to validity of ballot papers

• complaints about or challenges to the actions of parties, candidates, and their representatives (see Challenges to Party/Candidate Representatives' Actions);

• complaints about or challenges to the administration of voting stations, either regarding the materials available and logistics issues, or the decisions/actions of voting station officials, election administrators, or security forces.

Correct Implementation of Procedures

It is important that it is reinforced both during training and whilst on duty, to all election administration officials and all officials working in voting stations and in counting ballots that:

• All actions they take may be subject to challenge or may need to be justified in the course of investigating election-related complaints or legal actions.

• It is vital that all officials implement the actions required by the procedures, manuals, and checklists provided by the electoral management body.

• It is also necessary that any significant occurrences or decisions taken that may affect the election outcomes (such as disturbances, unavailability of necessary materials, voters turned away or denied votes) be recorded at the time in writing.

• Records of voting and the count are official records that may be required by judicial authorities in relation to challenges to election outcomes or other legal action regarding voter fraud or other alleged election irregularities.

• It is essential that all documentation of voting operations be maintained in the manner prescribed by the electoral management body.

Principles of Complaint Resolution

Transparency and public confidence in the election process are considerably aided if:

• voting station managers have the powers, ability, and training to enable resolution of minor complaints and disputes at the voting station level;

• there is no undue limitation on the classes of persons who may make officially recognised and formally investigated complaints regarding voting operations, including voters, political participants, independent observers, and officials of the electoral management body itself;

• there is no undue limitation on voting issues about which formal complaints and challenges may be made;

• complainants are protected from any intimidation or harm that may be perceived as resulting from their complaints or challenges;

• procedures for lodging complaints are simple, equitable, affordable to complainants, and publicised;

• complaints and challenges are handled in a courteous, open, and professional manner;

• complaints and challenges are handled at as local a level as possible;

• resolution of complaints and challenges is swift (time frames for resolution would preferably be defined in the election framework), and decisions and their basis are openly available to the public.

These principles hold as true for minor, local complaints about voting station operations as they do for later challenges to election outcomes. 

Systems for Handling Complaints and Challenges

Given the usually tight time frames during election periods, complaint and challenge handling systems for voting activity work better in a simple, quick-response system, following a single hierarchical line. Without this, resolvable minor complaints may grow into major challenges to election outcomes.

Multiple avenues of initial complaint or appeal, to voting operations administration and judicial bodies, may not only confuse but delay resolution of complaints or challenges, as aggrieved parties "shop" for a favourable forum of decision.

In general, administrative review mechanisms should be used before recourse to judicial intervention is available; though in systems where there is little confidence in the professionalism or independence of electoral management, handling all complaints through a judicial system may be the only reasonable option.

A practicable complaint resolution and review chain would see complaints and challenges handled in the following ways:

• On the operations of a single voting station, wherever possible, by the voting station manager, in consultation with the electoral district management, where necessary.

Complaints of this nature could be related to issues such as the behaviour of voting station officials or party/candidate representatives or observers in the voting station, lack of necessary supplies, or incorrect opening and closing times.

• On general issues surrounding voting station operations, to the appropriate electoral management body administrative level--local, regional, or national. Complaints of this nature could be related to such issues as the overall accuracy of voters’ lists or consistent patterns of procedural implementation across voting stations that appear not to be in accord with the law.

• Where a satisfactory outcome to the complaint is not achieved, immediate review is available at the next level in the administrative hierarchy, either within electoral management body administrations, or specially-appointed administrative tribunals. This could include review by electoral district management of complaint decisions made by voting station managers; by regional electoral authorities of electoral district managers' decisions; by national electoral authorities of regional decisions.

• Judicial review, through normal courts or specially appointed tribunals, of decisions endorsed at the national electoral management body authority level. To ensure that election outcomes are not unduly delayed by successions of appeals, electoral legislation may sensibly provide for a single, non-appellant judicial authority to hear such reviews.

Challenges to election results, based on perceived voting operations deficiencies, would be better determined by judicial authorities. Where internal investigations by the electoral management body show that these deficiencies are significant enough to have had a possible affect on an election's outcome, it is prudent for the electoral management body itself to challenge the election's result.

In publicly recognising these deficiencies it can help the future promotion of its image as a professional, impartial body.

Voting Day Complaints

On and around voting day, there will be intense pressure on complaint resolution mechanisms.

To prepare for this, voting operations administrators at local and other levels must ensure that they have:

• access to legal and specialist technical, conflict resolution, and operational advice;

• consulted with judicial and administrative review bodies to ensure that their officers will be available, and facilities are in place, to allow swift complaint resolution.

Documentation of Complaints and Challenges

It is best that all complaints and challenges concerning voting operations be accurately documented by the official to whom the complaint is made. Without such documentation, defences against any later challenge will be based on what may be imperfect recollections of occurrences in a pressured atmosphere.

At the voting station level, standard forms for generic or specific complaint purposes could be provided to voting station managers, particularly where widespread challenges or complaints may be expected on issues such as eligibility of voters. Alternatively, documentation could be included in the voting station manager's report on voting.

Documentation should:

• state the time and location of the complaint/challenge;

• give the substance of the complaint;

• note the action taken by voting station officials or other election staff;

• be signed off by the voting station manager or other supervisory staff;

• be witnessed, wherever possible, by the complainant.

Complaint records should be treated as apt documents to be securely maintained, as they may be later required in any challenges to election outcomes.

Court Challenges to Election Results

While some challenges and complaints regarding voting operations may be resolved satisfactorily by administrative means prior to the declaration of election results by the electoral management body, where aggrieved parties are not satisfied by such measures, they may be able to challenge an election's result before a court or a legally designated special election tribunal. It is important that such courts are not unduly limited in the directions and determinations they may make. Possible outcomes would preferably include:

• confirming the election result;

• determining a different result;

• directing that the election be voided and a new election held;

• making orders binding on election participants, including administrators, candidates, and parties.

In relation to ballot paper counts, they should also include powers to direct that certain ballot papers formerly included in counts be excluded, or certain ballot papers formerly excluded be included, and a new result calculated by the electoral management body.

Legal Specifications

Issues that could come before the courts fall into two distinct categories:

• those that allege breaches of criminal or electoral law by individuals or groups, but do not challenge election outcomes;

• those that challenge the outcome of the election through alleged breaches of electoral law. With regard to challenges to the election results, electoral legislation needs to be specific as to:

• judicial authorities with jurisdiction over challenges and any appeal rights;

• grounds available for challenge;

• procedures for challenge;

• required actions by complainants in terms of nature of evidence and necessity for affidavits;

•who may initiate court challenges--whether this may be done by individual complainants, the electoral management body, or whether it requires judicial order;

• the role of the electoral management body and other state agencies in investigations, preparation, and presentation of evidence. The legal framework should also give clearly stated deadlines for lodging and resolving challenges to election outcomes.

Unless determined quickly, challenges to election results can disrupt systems of governance since they can leave in doubt the validity of any decisions taken by the challenged representative body. However, the time period for lodging such challenges should be sufficient to allow the complainant to gather evidence to support the challenge.

 For such challenges, it would be usual for legislation to require the complainant to prepare and present formal legal documentation of the challenge (or a judicial order to be prepared) within a specified time period after the results of the election have been announced, and argue the case before the court or tribunal. It is preferable that the electoral management body also has the power to make application to the relevant judicial authorities that an election be set aside.

The electoral management body is likely to have access to a wider range of data on the election than individual complainants.

It is best that judicial bodies have the power to examine all relevant election material, including ballots, ballot boxes and seals, voters lists and supporting documents, election forms, voting station reports and records. In the interests of justice and transparency complainants should have access, under security conditions if necessary, to original or certified copies of such material held by the electoral management body.

Storage of Material

All information that may be relevant to challenges to election results must be kept securely until any time limit for such challenges has passed.

Care must be taken that during counts or post-voting day administrative actions, no marks are placed on ballots or voters lists, and other material is not amended or defaced in a manner that obliterates the original record. It is vital that this material is kept under secure conditions sufficient for the electoral management body to be certain that it cannot be tampered with or destroyed.

In determining which material may be relevant to challenges, and should be maintained under security, it is better to err on the side of safety:

• all ballots, ballot boxes and seals/locks, voters lists and supporting documents, ballot paper reconciliations and count records, voting station and incident reports would fall into this category.

• it is better to maintain secure storage of all possibly relevant material than be embarrassed by the inability to produce material required for a court challenge or later recount.

A formal materials destruction schedule should be developed by the electoral management body that ensures that election material is not destroyed before the lapse of any period during which it may be required for legal or further administrative action. In some systems, where recounts are used to replace resigned or deceased representatives, ballot material may need to be kept under secure conditions for the term of the elected representative body.

Challenges to Voters

 

Basis of Challenges

Challenges to or complaints regarding voters in voting stations could be made about the following:

• the behaviour of the voter within the voting station;

• the issuing voting material to a voter believed to be ineligible to vote at that voting station;

• the denial of a vote to a voter believed to be qualified to vote at that voting station.

Voter Behaviour

Regarding voter behaviour, the voting station manager must be given and be prepared to use powers to remove or arrange for the removal from the voting station of persons who:

• are intimidating or otherwise threatening other voters, officials, or observers;

• are intoxicated;

• refuse to surrender weapons when entering the voting station (excepting security forces undertaking their voting operations security duties);

• are not authorised to enter the voting station;

• are in any way threatening the security of election materials or the secrecy of voting;

• remain unauthorised in the voting station following completion of their vote;

• are distributing political material or in any way advertising political allegiance or attempting to influence other voters' ballot choices.

Voting station officials should take a proactive role in monitoring behaviour within the voting station. They also must be prepared to react swiftly to investigate any complaints about the behaviour of other persons in the voting station made by other voters, party/candidate representatives, or observers.

In societies emerging from conflict, or in the midst of bitter political dispute, voters, and particularly party/candidate representatives, may have very sensitive perceptions about the behaviour of others in voting stations. In such environments, some training on conflict management and resolution techniques would be appropriate for voting station managers, if not all voting station staff, during their operational training sessions. 

The voting station manager's report on voting activity should include details of complaints about voters' behaviour and instances where persons were removed from the voting station.

Voters threatened with removal from the voting station must first be given the opportunity to behave in an acceptable manner.

If a voter refuses to leave the voting station or any designated area around it on request by the voting station manager, assistance should be sought from security forces.  Voting station officials should not generally attempt to remove voters by force themselves.

Official Verification of Voter Eligibility

All voters should be questioned, by voting station officials prior to being issued a ballot, as to their identity and eligibility to vote in the election and at that voting station.

Where, as a result of such questioning, the voter is denied a vote, details should also be recorded, as this issue may be relevant in any later challenge to election results (and in evaluations of voter information programs, particularly regarding voters who have turned out to vote at the wrong voting station).

Challenges to Voters

It would be usual that the legal framework gives voting station officials the power to challenge or formally object, in the voting station, to a voter being issued a ballot. This may be on the grounds of eligibility to vote, multiple voting, or impersonation of another voter. In some systems, party/candidate representatives may also have this right.

This may have some practical additional effect where voting stations are servicing relatively small numbers of voters in a distinct community.

However, allowing challenges in the voting station by party/candidate representatives may lead to retributive, rather than fact-based, challenging by all party/candidate representatives. This would disrupt voting without enhancing voting integrity.

Resolution at Voting Station

Where challenges to voters are resolved at the voting station level, there needs to be provisions for a formal statement giving reasons for a challenge, formal response by voters, and determination of eligibility by voting station managers.

Where this method is used, arrangements should be made for voters who can satisfy the voting station manager of their right to vote to resume their original place in the voting queue.

Resolution Following Close of Voting

It would generally be regarded as less disruptive to the voting process that such objections are recorded and resolved following the close of voting. Methods by which this could be implemented include:

• allowing the voter to vote in the normal fashion after providing a formal declaration of eligibility to vote, officially recording the objection or challenge, and requiring such objections to be considered in any ballot recount or result challenge proceedings;

• issuing the voter with a provisional or tendered ballot, which is enveloped with the voter's identity information, to be checked after the close of voting to determine if the voter was eligible to vote.

Records of challenges to voters must be treated as highly accountable material, as they may be relevant to any post-voting day challenges to election outcomes.

Area for Dealing with Challenges

To minimise disruption to the service being provided to other voters, challenges to voters within the voting station should, if at all possible, be dealt with away from the tables or areas used for issuing and marking ballots.

Dealing with these at the voting station manager's table and (if allowable under election frameworks) a special area for taking declarations from voters or issuing provisional or tendered ballots is preferable.

Validity of and Omissions in Voters Lists

The validity of the entries on the voter’s lists used in voting locations is an aspect of voting operations that can be highly contentious. The issue is whether validity should be subject to complaint and challenge. In some jurisdictions challenges to validity are barred.

There are two issues here. The first is the accuracy of the compilation of the voter’s lists, that is, whether the processing of voter information to produce the voters’ lists has either:

• omitted or incorrectly recorded details of valid registered voters;

• included details of persons not entitled to be registered.

In systems where voters’ registers are open, that is, there is a method available to voters who have been omitted from the register to vote through means of a declaration as to their eligibility or by provisional ballot, or where voting day registration is available, this can be dealt with in the context of the voting procedures.

In systems where the voters’ registers are regarded as closed, that is, unless the voters' information can be found on the voters list they are denied a vote, it would seem that this would be a valid basis for challenging the election results, to determine if errors in compilation of the voters list were sufficient to affect election outcomes.

The second issue relates to the validity of claims to registration by those voters who have been accepted for registration and who consequently appear on the voters list:

• Where there has been reasonable public opportunity for challenge and equitable resolution of challenges to the acceptance of a person's claim for voter registration, through objection, revision court, or other facilities, at the voter registration stage, this would seem to be an issue no longer capable of challenge.

• Where such reasonable opportunity has not been provided, it would seem that it should be legally allowed as an issue capable of challenge during and after voting.

Complaints about voters’ registers inaccuracies are not something to be resolved on the spot by individual voting station managers. Where significant problems in this regard are encountered, they should be immediately relayed to voting operations administrators. Once voting has commenced amendment of the actual voters lists being used is generally not practicable, and may be a questionable exercise at best. However, omissions or incorrect information on voters’ lists can be dealt with by allowing, within the legal framework means of provisional voting, voting following a formal declaration of eligibility or additional registrations being accepted on voting day.

Where voters’ lists are based on civil registry records, provision can also be made for voters omitted from their correct voters list to receive, on voting day, certificates from the civil registry attesting to their eligibility to vote in a particular area and use these to establish their eligibility at the voting station. The success and equity of this method will depend on the accessible locations of civil registry offices and the costs and capacities of civil registries to handle this workload.

Post-Voting Day Challenges

Challenges to election outcomes may be based on complaints about the accuracy of voters’ registers (see above), significant levels of impersonation of voters, voting by ineligible persons, and multiple voting (see Management of Challenges and Complaints).

It is vital that all records relevant to voter eligibility, persons voting, and challenges to persons voting remain under strict security at least until any time limitations for election challenges has elapsed.

 

Challenges to Validity of Ballots

Basis of Challenges

Challenges to validity of ballots are more likely to occur during the counting phase rather than during voting itself.

However challenges may occur during voting where it is suspected that:

• unauthorised additional ballots are being introduced into the ballot box;

• ballots are being removed from the voting station for marking outside, then brought back into the voting station by other voters to deposit in the ballot box;

• the ballots being issued by voting station officials are not those officially printed or authorised;

• ballots are being handled by unauthorised persons (e.g., party/candidate representatives) during voting;

• unauthorised assistance is being provided to voters in marking their ballots.

Complaints about ballot validity issues in voting stations should, in the first instance, are directed to the voting station manager. Details of these should form part of the voting station manager's report on voting day proceedings.

Introduction of unauthorised ballots into the voting station will generally require the intervention of security forces.

Suspected unauthorised ballot handling and assistance to voters will require intensified control by voting station officials and the removal from the voting station of offenders.

Where complainants are not satisfied with the action taken at a voting station level, there should be right of complaint to and immediate response from voting operations administrators.

Post-Voting Day Challenges

Challenges to election outcomes may be based on complaints about the validity of ballots issued or found in ballot boxes (see Management of Challenges and Complaints)

It is vital that all records remain under strict security until any time limitation for election challenges has elapsed. These would include:

• receipts of ballots at voting stations, both prior to and during voting;

• reconciliations of ballots at close of voting;

• statements from staff, party/candidate representatives, other observers, or voters regarding any suspicious occurrences in relation to ballots during voting.

Challenges to Party/Candidate Representatives' Actions

Basis of Challenges

Complaints and challenges based on the behaviour of political participants may result from the following:

• perceived intimidation of voters, voting station officials, or other political participants by party officials, candidates, or their representatives;

• campaigning at prohibited times and places;

• publicising false or misleading statements about voting procedures or other political participants;

• campaigning within voting stations;

• party or candidate representatives in voting stations attempting to influence voters or assist them to complete their ballots;

• party or candidate representatives in voting stations handling ballots or marking election material in an unauthorised fashion. In carrying out their duties, voting station officials should be preventing such actions from occurring.

However, where they have not, or there is collusion between political participants and officials, political participants and voters must have the opportunity to lodge and have resolved challenges to such actions.

Immediate resolution may be available by lodging complaints at the voting station level and voting station managers removing such persons from voting stations, with the aid of security forces if necessary.

Direction may be required from voting operations administrators for application of sanctions under the legal framework, including any legally sanctioned codes of conduct.

Post-Voting Day Challenges

Challenges to election outcomes by voters, political participants, independent observers, and voting operations administrators may be based on complaints about intimidation or illegal influencing of voters and voting station officials by political participants (see Management of Challenges and Complaints).

It is vital that all records relevant to complaints about political participant behaviour in and around voting stations, including voting station managers' records, party/candidate representative statements, security force records, statements from voters and independent observers, remain under strict security until any time limitations for election challenges has elapsed.

Challenges to Voting Operations Management

Voting Operations Materials and Logistics

Logistics, production, or planning failures, if not sufficiently remedied by contingency planning may result in inequitable opportunities for voters to record their votes and, therefore, significant complaints.

There could be many causes, including:

• late or non-arrival of ballot boxes, ballots (or voting machines), or other necessary material at particular voting locations;

• errors in quantities of or candidate/party details on ballots;

• errors in voters lists (see Challenges to Voters);

• early or mail voting materials not arriving in time for the voter to vote;

• inadequacy of voting station facilities to cope with the voter turnout;

• advertised voting stations not opening on time or at all;

• claimed inaccuracy or failures in the operation of computers or other voting machines.

These are avoidable complaints which adequate planning and quality controls during the lead up to voting day should prevent.

Recourse in such situations requires immediate notification of deficiencies to voting operations administrators from voting station managers and well developed contingency plans. Depending on the framework for the election these could include:

• possible extension of voting hours;

• delivery of emergency stocks of reserve materials and equipment;

• transport of voters to other voting stations.

Even where such remedial action is taken, such deficiencies could be an allowed basis for requesting judicial invalidation of any election, if it can be shown that the number of voters denied the opportunity to vote could have affected the election's outcome.

Legal Limitations

It can be prudent that election legislation specifies what actions taken by voting station officials to counter emergencies that arise on voting day are subject to challenge. In general, restrictions on such challenges should be limited to breaches that, while they may not be allowable normally, could not be considered to have a material affect on the fairness and integrity of the election.

An example of such circumstances could be where a voting station exceeds a legally defined limit on the numbers of voters allowed at a voting station. Similarly, adjournment of voting to another location or time due to natural disaster or civil disturbance should be covered by legislative provisions.

In general, however, it would be better to leave open to challenge and determination by the relevant judicial authority whether actions taken by voting station officials and administrators in the face of emergencies, while taken in good faith, sufficiently affected the voting processes to warrant the result of the election being set aside.

Voting Operations Staff

Complaints about the attitudes, service, and perceived bias of voting station officials may be received from political participants and voters. Causes for complaint could include:

• partisan actions by voting station officials;

• selection of voting station officials with known partisan affiliations in systems where independence is a requisite for selection;

• a preponderance of voting station officials of one particular political bias in systems where voting station officials are supposed to represent a balance of partisan interests;

• poor service, long voting queues, and lack of procedural knowledge shown by voting station officials;

• late opening or early closing of voting stations;

• intimidation of voters by voting station officials or allowing others in the voting station to intimidate voters or deny voting secrecy;

• errors in assessing voters' eligibility to vote and in issuing of correct ballots.

Wherever possible, such matters should be handled at the voting station level, through discipline, and, if necessary, termination of staff by the voting station manager.

Party/candidate representatives and independent observers should, however, be encouraged to report voting station irregularities to voting operations administrators.

Service complaints, in particular, may be resolved by the attendance of a roving senior voting station official.  However, where any pattern of systemic bias, or violation of correct procedures is detected by party or other observers in voting stations, there should be the opportunity for relief measures to be sought from an independent judicial body.

There will also be many decisions made by electoral management bodies during the voting period that could be the subject of complaints, such as in the preparation of voters lists , decisions on registration of parties and acceptability of candidate nominations

Where electoral management bodies have a history of independence, such complaints could initially be investigated and dealt with internally. Equity would demand that opportunities for external administrative or judicial review of such decisions should be available.

Post-Voting Day Challenges

Challenges to election outcomes may be based on complaints about unavailability of ballot materials, required services, and lack of impartiality and professionalism of staff (see Management of Challenges)

It is vital that all records relevant to voting station operations remain under strict security until any time limitation for election challenges has elapsed.

Relevant records would include:

• inventories, materials supply, and distribution records, including delivery receipts;

• records of opening and closing of voting stations, including sealing of ballot boxes;

• recruitment and staff selection records;

• code of conduct violations;

• voter service records.

Voter Follow-Up

Investigation

Following the completion of voting, there may be a need for further investigation of and action on records of those who voted:

• In all systems, investigations of apparent fraudulent attempts to vote will be necessary 

• In compulsory voting systems, action will be required to determine and investigate instances where registered voters apparently did not vote.

Continuous Voter Registration Systems

Where voter registration systems are not dependent for their data on a civil registry and are based on a permanent, continuously updated voters register, voting operations can provide a wealth of data for purging, adding or amending entries on the voters register.

Particularly in systems that allow provisional ballots or forms of voting day registration , there can be considerable data gathered on voters who have changed their name through marriage or otherwise, changed address, had their information transcribed incorrectly onto the voters register, or who were not previously registered to vote.

Efficient continuous register updating systems would allow the collection of updated registration data while such persons are voting, for later processing.

Information on registered voters may also be received from other voters while they are voting, with regard to recent deaths, changes of address, and the like. Such information should be recorded by voting station officials and later followed up by the voter registration authorities to determine accuracy and any action required.

Compulsory Voting System

Investigation

Following the completion of voting, there may be a need for further investigation of and action on records of those who voted:

• in all systems, investigations of apparent fraudulent attempts to vote will be necessary.

• in compulsory voting systems, action will be required to determine and investigate instances where registered voters apparently did not vote.

Continuous Voter Registration Systems

Where voter registration systems are not dependent for their data on a civil registry  and are based on a permanent, continuously updated voters register, voting operations can provide a wealth of data for purging, adding or amending entries on the voters register.

Particularly in systems that allow provisional ballots or forms of voting day registration  there can be considerable data gathered on voters who have changed their name through marriage or otherwise, changed address, had their information transcribed incorrectly onto the voters register, or who were not previously registered to vote.

Efficient continuous register updating systems would allow the collection of updated registration data while such persons are voting, for later processing.

Information on registered voters may also be received from other voters while they are voting, with regard to recent deaths, changes of address, and the like. Such information should be recorded by voting station officials and later followed up by the voter registration authorities to determine accuracy and any action required.

Voter Fraud

Investigations

Where voter fraud is suspected, intensive investigations would generally be undertaken after the close of voting. The framework within which these investigations take place would be determined by the legal provisions relating to challenges to election outcomes and investigation and prosecution of voter fraud. The methods by which the electoral management body responds to any responsibilities given to it under the legal framework will be governed by its management framework for dispute and challenge resolution.

 

Electoral Management Body Responsibilities

While decisions on and conduct of prosecutions of voter fraud would generally, and more appropriately, is the responsibility of civil law enforcement authorities, the electoral management body requires systems in place to fulfil two specific responsibilities:

• Detect and document all attempted cases of voter fraud, so that suspected perpetrators may be identified and subject to the appropriate processes under electoral or other legislation and regulations;
• Determine, if at all possible before the finalisation of counts and the announcement of election results, if the extent of any detected fraud regarding voting is sufficient to have a possible effect on the results of any election.

 

Election Challenges

All results of electoral management body investigations into suspected cases of voter fraud must be made public as swiftly and in as open and transparent a manner as possible.

This will maintain confidence in the integrity of the election management system and allow challenges to the election results by political participants or by the electoral management authority itself.

(For further discussion of challenges to election results, see Management of Challenges and Complaints.)

If the extent of fraud detected is sufficient to have possibly affected an election's results, the electoral management body itself making application to the relevant judicial authorities that an election be set aside will aid in projecting the image of the electoral management authority's vigilance, professionalism, and integrity in the face of attempts to manipulate election outcomes.

 

Security of Materials

Where investigations of suspected voter fraud are undertaken prior to the expiration of any period for challenging an election's results, care must be taken in handling any relevant ballot materials.

They should be maintained in a secure area, and the unsealing and resealing (when not in use) of relevant materials into their packages should be scrupulously undertaken and witnessed.

Strict care must be taken during investigations that no markings are placed on any election materials used during voting.

 

Multiple Voting

Detection and investigations of multiple voting will depend on:

• The integrity, accuracy, and sophistication of methods used to compile voters lists;
• Whether, to enhance accessibility, voters have a choice of voting locations or methods which they use, and whether each voting location and method uses a unique voters list to establish voter eligibility;
• The strictness of voter identity controls at voting locations;
• The quality and accuracy of voting records maintained, and the professionalism of voting station officials in strictly applying voter identification requirements, marking of voters lists, and enforcing ballot issue controls;
• The integrity and comprehensiveness of system and access controls on computer systems or other machines used for vote recording or result calculation.

Where there are no strict controls against duplicate entries on voters’ lists (for example a lack of thorough identity checks prior to being registered, and/or of systems for automatically deleting the previous entry in the voter’s register when registration is updated under continuous voter registration systems), the potential for multiple voting is high.

If election frameworks do not compel unique voters’ lists for every voting location and method, detection of multiple voting will require the implementation of systems to enable consolidations of the records of all voters who cast votes, and examination of this consolidation to determine if more than one ballot has been cast in any voter's name.

Where different types of identity cards may be produced to verify voter identity, additional controls, such as marking the voter with non-removable ink, will be required.

If voters’ lists are not used for an election, it will be difficult to investigate, or even detect, multiple voting.

 

Suspected Multiple Voting

Multiple voting could be suspected where voting show:

• during ballot paper reconciliations, greater numbers of ballots cast at a voting location than names marked off the voters lists for that location;
• during any consolidation of voting records (e.g., of votes cast in a foreign country, or absentee votes with voting station attendance records, where separate voter registers for each method of voting are not maintained) the same voter is detected as having voted by different methods in different locations.

 

Documentation and Investigation of Apparent Multiple Voting

Documentation of suspected multiple voting cases for assessment and further investigation by civil law authorities should show:

• the location of places where multiple voting is suspected to have occurred and relevant statements from voting station staff at these locations;
• complete and accurate records of ballot or system reconciliations to voter numbers. if it is suspected that ballots have been illegally introduced into ballot boxes, or computer/machine voting systems;
• certified copies of voters lists and other documents (e.g., voter eligibility declarations for mail, absentee, or other special ballots) indicating that a voter may have cast more than one ballot.

Preliminary investigation before referral to civil law authorities should be thorough and tactful. There may well be instances where errors by voting station officials, or confusion, particularly on the part of elderly or less-literate voters faced with multiple methods of voting, rather than any fraud, were the cause of apparent instances of multiple voting.

 

Impersonation

A voter casting one or more ballots in the name of other voters, when not authorised by any proxy voting provisions to do so, is difficult to detect after the event. The best defence against it is accurate voters’ lists combined with rigorous voter identity integrity controls within each voting location  and insistence on voters marking their ballots individually and in secrecy.

Impersonation, however, may be suspected and should be investigated in cases where:

• inaccuracies in voters registers have allowed deceased persons' names to have remained on the registers, and people have voted in their names;
• voter registration systems allow persons known to be in distant locations or out of the country to remain registered at their former address, and their names have been marked on voters lists as having voted in their former locality of residence;
• mail ballots have been apparently completed by a person other than the voter to whom they were officially provided;
• voters have been challenged as to their identity in a voting station, and election systems allow them to cast a sealed ballot pending further investigation.

Impersonation in voting by mail may be detected on checking voter eligibility/identity statements accompanying the returned mail ballots and discovering difference in details or handwriting from mail ballot application or vote registration applications.

Similarly, irregularities may be detected where a number of mail ballots originate from the same location (e.g., aged persons' nursing institutions, armed forces bases, hospitals) bearing similar handwriting.

All such occurrences should be carefully and tactfully investigated by voting operations administrators prior to any referral to civil law authorities. As with multiple voting, voting station official error could be the cause of seemingly irregular voting patterns.

Documentation provided to civil law authorities for further investigation would normally include:

• certified copies of any relevant voters’ lists;
• certified copies of challenged voters' statements and relevant death certificates, ballots, statements accompanying mail or other special ballots;
• statements by voting station officials and other witnesses.