The
devastating war that tore Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) apart in the early 1990s
and divided the country’s three constituent peoples ended with the signing of
the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton
Agreement) in Paris on 14 December 1995. Prior to the war, Bosniac, Croat and
Serb ethnic groups were interspersed with no specific concentrations of any
group in any particular part of the country. (The term Bosniac has been
generally used since the war to describe the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.)
The pattern of multi-ethnic integration was irretrievably altered as a result
of the war. Ultimately, the Dayton Agreement was intended to ensure that BiH
remained a single state, but under the terms for peace it was divided into two
‘entities’: the Muslim–Croat, known as the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and the Serb, known as the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska, RS). The agreement
also outlined a national constitution that specified a basis for power sharing among
the three ethnic groups for defined federal institutions, including a
tripartite presidency, a shared central legislature, and separate governmental
structures for the two entities. For the restructuring to begin, one of the key
conditions of the Dayton Agreement was that elections be held throughout the
country not later than nine months after its signing. The first post-war
elections were held in September 1996. They were to include elections of
officials at all levels of government, including municipal elections, taking
into consideration the changes of municipal boundaries affected by the drawing of
the Inter-entity Boundary Line dividing the Federation from the RS.
Although verify
able statistics have never been readily available, it has been estimated that
approximately 2 million people, nearly half of the entire population, was
displaced by the war, with about a quarter of the population taking refuge
outside the country. The mass emigration caused by the war itself was
exacerbated by the severe economic conditions that faced the country
afterwards. The sheer numbers of refugees and the international interest in
seeing them repatriated as quickly as reasonably possible made it imperative
that they be fully enfranchised as participants in the elections that would greatly
affect their futures, the stability of their country under the new governmental
institutions and structures, and the possibilities for their safe and secure
return.
Three
factors, which have evolved concurrently, have shaped the process of external
voting for BiH since the war and had significant impact on the procedures as
they exist today. The first is the transition from a passive voter registration
system to an affirmative registration system whereby every citizen must
personally apply to register as an elector. The second is the progressive shift
of responsibility out of the hands of the international supervisors and back
into the hands of the BiH electoral authorities. Finally, the procedures set in
place at the end of 2005 have been significantly affected by the dramatic
decline in participation by voters living abroad which has been experienced in
each successive election since 1997.
Prior to the
war, inclusion on the electoral registers required no action on the part of an
elector. Local officials compiled the registers on the basis of residency
records maintained by the municipality. Because so many municipal records were
lost or destroyed during the war, the Dayton Agreement declared that inclusion
in the 1991 pre-war census, which identified each person’s municipality of
residence, would be the basis for establishing eligibility to participate in
the elections. Furthermore, it provided that persons who were no longer living
in the municipality in which they had resided at the time of the census would,
as a general rule, be expected to vote in their pre-war municipalities. The
exception to the rule covered people who had moved in the period between the
1991 census and the beginning of the war in April 1992 and who could
substantiate that move with appropriate documentation. These general rules
applied to all citizens abroad, including refugees (General Framework
Agreement, annex 3, article IV).
A small
loophole was provided in that a person could apply to the Provisional Election
Commission to ‘vote elsewhere’. Eventually, under rules and regulations adopted
by the Provisional Election Commission working under the direction of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), this was
interpreted to mean that a displaced person could apply to vote in the
municipality in which he or she currently resided, or in the case of an
out-of-country elector in a ‘future municipality’ to which he or she declared
an intention to return. In the latter case a stringent set of rules was adopted
defining what documentation would be necessary to substantiate that declaration
of intent. Documentation could include, for example, confirmation of a promise
of employment, or residence with family members already resident in the
intended municipality of future residence.
A
significant number of refugees might reasonably have been expected to take
advantage of the ‘future municipality’ option, given that in the post-war
environment the three ethnic groups are more clearly concentrated in separate
regions. It is estimated, for example, that as many as 300,000 people who
formerly lived in the territory of today’s Federation now live on the RS side
of the Inter-entity Boundary Line; similarly 200,000 people who used to live in
the RS now reside on the Federation side of the boundary line (Association of
Election Officials of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003). However, the stringent
nature of the documentation, investigation and verification requirements put
the future municipality option out of reach for the vast majority of refugees
who might have been interested in exercising this option.
The use of
the 1991 census as a basis for the electoral register for the 1996 elections,
while expedient, failed to provide a sound basis for establishing a verifiable
number registered electors against which an auditable election result could be
definitively and accurately compared. In addition, incidents of electoral fraud
were suspected as ethnic groups sought to mobilize voters improperly to use the
ballot box to regain territory lost in the war or to consolidate political
influence over territory gained in the war. Due to concerns about how such
instances could adversely affect the local elections, the municipal elections
were postponed altogether and were not held until 1997.
It was in
preparation for these municipal elections that a complete shift was made to establish
an affirmative registration system whereby every citizen has had to apply to be
registered as an elector and has had to provide supporting documentation to
establish identity and voting residence. This shift had a particularly
burdensome effect on refugee voters because of the time constraints involved in
the two-way postal process, and the fact that access to the required
documentation was often limited.
External
voting procedures were also significantly affected by the step-by-step transition
from an election process that was totally supervised by the international community,
under the auspices of the Office of the High Representative and administered by
the OSCE, to one totally managed by national authorities, specifically the
Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its secretariat. This
transition was completed in August 2001.
Another
factor that is seriously affecting the current approach to out-of-country voting
in BiH is the continuing decline in both the number of potential voters
remaining out of the country and their interest in participating in BiH
elections. Both these circumstances have had a major impact on the facilitation
of registration and voting by electors who have lived outside BiH since the
1996 external voting efforts began.
In 1996,
reaching out effectively to the upwards of 800,000 citizens estimated to be living
abroad taxed the logistics and manpower capacities of the OSCE’s Sarajevo-based
operations. The task of operating the programme within BiH was also hampered by
the lack of a reliable postal service within the country. In preparation for
the first post-war elections in 1996, the OSCE established an emergency Refugee
Elections Steering Group (RESG) to oversee the registration and voting of
eligible electors outside the country. The OSCE also entered into a memorandum
of understanding with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to
serve as the operational arm of the RESG from its base in Vienna. Outreach to potential voters was
accomplished through communications and coordination with refugee
organizations, immigration offices, diplomatic missions and consular offices,
as well as Bosnian social clubs that had emerged in countries hosting larger
numbers of refugees, and through advertising in publications that targeted
these refugees. Ultimately, 630,257 electors outside BiH were registered, of
whom nearly 400,000 actually voted in the 1996 elections (International
Organization for Migration, undated). External voters posted their ballot
papers to the IOM’s operations office in Vienna.
Once verified, they were shipped to the counting centre in Sarajevo where they were counted and
integrated into the countrywide results.
The RESG
was disbanded for the 1997 elections, but a similar arrangement between the
OSCE and the IOM was maintained. In addition to the postal voting services
provided to voters scattered in 80 countries around the world, in-person
registration centres and polling stations were established in the former
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and in Croatia to serve the 156,000
refugees residing in those countries in nearly equal proportions. Regardless of
whether he or she had participated in the 1996 elections, each external elector
was required to register anew and submit a copy of an authorized identification
document. Acceptable identification included identity documents issued by BiH
authorities in either of the entities or by former Yugoslav authorities in the
state, or a refugee document issued by a host government or international
refugee agency. An applicant could also submit a copy of a passport granted by
a host government which permitted dual citizenship. Upon proper registration
each elector was sent a confirmation form that was posted to him or her well in
advance of his or her ballot packet. This form was to be returned with the
completed ballot papers, which were to be sealed in a special envelope to
preserve the secrecy of the vote. In the event of a person returning to BiH
before voting as an external voter, he or she had the opportunity to present
the confirmation form in order to be assigned to a polling place within BiH.
In 1997 the
number of out-of-country applications dropped to just under half a million, but
turnout among them was over 80 per cent.
Through the
1998 elections the application rules remained the same for new registrants.
However, those who had registered successfully in 1997 did not have to reregister.
Rather, they were sent a confirmation form to confirm their continued interest in
voting, to record any changes in personal status or address, or to change their
voting option from their 1991 municipality to a future municipality of intended
residence. The major change in the process in 1998 was the development of an
external voting department within the OSCE Mission in Sarajevo. The transfer of operations to Sarajevo was deemed a critical step in preparing for the
eventual takeover of responsibility for the conduct of elections by the
Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the inevitable
pulling out of international supervisors. The department was supervised by international
personnel but was fully staffed by local staff from both the Federation and the
RS. The IOM was also retained, but in a much more limited capacity. It
continued to arrange for the in-person registration and voting sites in the FRY
and Croatia, and to serve as
the repository for applications and votes cast by post before they were
transported to Sarajevo
for processing and counting.
Once again
the number of voters abroad declined. Approximately 350,000 external electors
received ballot papers. The postal turnout rate remained over 80 per cent, although
participation in the FRY and Croatia
fell significantly. The decline in these two countries was attributed to a
great degree to voters’ disappointment at the choices on the ballot paper, as
parties continued to be ethnically based. A Croat voter residing in Croatia who
had formerly lived in what was now the territory of the RS was likely to find
only Serb parties on the ballot paper for his or her 1991 municipality, and
Serb voters who had formerly resided in Federation territory would have found
predominantly Croat and Bosniac parties to choose from on their ballot papers.
Two major
changes in external voting procedures were implemented for the elections in
2000. Operations were managed solely out of Sarajevo, without the assistance of the IOM.
In addition the establishment of in-person polling stations in the FRY or Croatia was
abandoned, and BiH voters who chose to participate from those countries had to do
so by post.
By the 2000
elections it became obvious that the number of registered external electors was
decreasing with each election. In 2000 this number fell to 222,000.
In August
2001, the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was enacted and responsibility for organizing elections was finally transferred
from the OSCE Mission to the Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The procedure for registration and voting by external electors that had been
established by the OSCE was generally maintained. However, under the new law,
the eligibility of BiH citizens seeking to register could no longer be
confirmed on the basis of their inclusion on the 1991 census. They had to
substantiate their claim to citizenship with a copy of a citizenship
certificate or a copy of a newly issued national ID card.
By 2002,
the total number of successfully registered external electors had dropped to
58,000. The significant decline in external voting is attributed to two
important factors. The first is reduced interest in participating in BiH
elections as more and more refugees still living abroad have sought and
received citizenship in their host countries. In addition, more stringent
application and documentation requirements continue to hinder potential voters
for whom accessing the proper documents is still burdensome. For the latest
elections, in 2004, the total number of successful external registrants was
27,000, while an additional 30,000 applications were rejected due to the lack
of acceptable supporting documentation.
The turnout
among registered external electors remains high, however, at about 80 per
cent—well above the turnout for in-country voters in 2004, which was about 52
per cent. However, some 20 per cent of ballot papers returned from voters
abroad could not be counted because registrants had failed to follow the
instructions that were sent with them. Those instructions indicated that a copy
of an ID document and the confirmation of registration form had to be enclosed
in the outer mailing envelope along with the secrecy envelope containing their marked
ballot papers.
Given the
significant decline in participation by Bosnians living abroad, it is anticipated
that the Election Commission of BiH will soon approach the Parliamentary Assembly
with proposed amendments to the election law to limit external voting to voting
in person in BiH diplomatic offices abroad.
