Background
The Law of
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL) specified
that elections were to occur no later than 31 January 2005. The date was set as
30 January 2005 for elections to the National Assembly, the Governorate
councils and the Kurdistan National Assembly. Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) Order no. 92 established an electoral commission—the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI)—to be the exclusive electoral authority for
Iraq. The commission is structured in such a way as to ensure its independence.
The IECI
requested an assessment of external voting (out-of-country voting, or OCV), and
this was undertaken in October 2004 by the International Organization for
Migration (IOM). The objective was to provide a general overview of the options
available and to ascertain the numbers of Iraqis in the diaspora. Demographic
data were almost non-existent. The assessment report was presented to the IECI
in late October 2004. It identified two options—one that could be implemented
for the January 2005 election to take account of the tight time lines, and a
more evolved system to be implemented for future electoral events. If an OCV
programme were to be implemented for the January 2005 election, it was
recommended that an experienced organization such as the IOM manage it.
IECI
decisions and legal provisions
The IECI
recognized the problems and risks of the short time line but decided that it was
important to give the diaspora the opportunity to participate. It decided that
OCV would apply to the National Assembly elections only, since the voters did
not live in a local jurisdiction. The electoral system for the National
Assembly elections, under which Iraq
is a single electoral district (with proportional representation), made it
possible to use a single ballot paper for the out-of-country voters. The
suggested threshold for the numbers of potential voters in the diaspora of one
country was 10,000. However, of the 14 countries the IECI named to host the OCV
programme, most had over 15,000 potential voters. The IECI included France (with only an estimated 6,000 Iraqi
electors) and excluded Norway
(which had 23,000). Since the numbers were rough estimates, it was difficult to
set a firm threshold. OCV was to take place in Australia,
Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Syria,
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The estimated total number of eligible Iraqis in these countries was 1.2
million. Estimates of the total diaspora ranged up to 2 million or more but
there was no way to confirm this number or even to establish a reasonable
estimate of the worldwide total. (The estimated total number of electors in Iraq was 14.2
million.)
A
memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed by the IECI and the IOM on 11
November 2004, authorizing the IOM to conduct the OCV programme in the 14
countries. This gave them just over two months to complete the task. The IOM
immediately started to negotiate MOUs for the programme with the various governments.
It established cooperation with host countries, deployed staff, identified offices,
developed materials and established polling and registration centres in an extremely
short time. By 26 December 2004, 11 countries had signed agreements, with the
other three signing shortly after. The concern over security issues had to be considered
in each of the 14 agreements.
Two IECI
regulations provided the legal basis for the OCV programme—10/2004 (Out-of-Country
Registration and Voting) and 16/2005 (Polling and Counting Outside Iraq). The
regulations outlined the procedures and clarified the counting process.
Eligibility
to vote
Iraq has had a series of wars, which has
meant that displacement and migration have occurred over a long period,
starting as early as 1968. It was therefore difficult to limit eligibility by
time period or status for expatriate Iraqis. However, most Iraqis did retain their
documents.
The
Electoral Law and the TAL specify provisions for eligibility and citizenship
that are broad enough to include OCV voters. In order to vote, a person must be
deemed an Iraqi citizen, be entitled to reclaim citizenship or be eligible for
Iraqi citizenship (which is established only through the paternal, and not
through the maternal link); must be born on or before 31 December 1986; and
must be registered to vote. According to the TAL, anyone who has Iraqi
nationality is deemed an Iraqi citizen; an Iraqi can have more than one
citizenship; and no Iraqi can have his/her citizenship withdrawn. This definition
was very broad so that estimates of numbers of eligible expatriates included almost
anyone who had left the country at any time for any reason.
Registration
procedures
There were
no databases of Iraqis who would qualify for OCV, so each external elector had
to provide proof of eligibility. This was not required in-country as the Public
Distribution System (PDS) database was used as the basis for the electoral
lists and only names to be added required proof.
Iraqi
embassies were inadequate for the numbers of persons expected to register; moreover,
not all the countries selected had an Iraqi embassy, so IOM staff in each country
identified suitable premises. Security was an issue and security procedures
were developed for each country.
The
registration period was very close to the voting dates (17–25 January 2005). To
accommodate the registrants, opening hours were extended and two days were
added to the original registration period. A total of 279,785 Iraqis registered
to vote at 74 registration centres in 36 cities (in the 14 countries). This
represented some 25 per cent of the number for which the IOM had established
registration capacity.
Registration
procedures required applicants to present two documents to prove eligibility:
this was in an attempt to prevent fraud, irrespective of whether one document,
such as a passport, for instance, could prove all criteria. However, after the
start of registration it became obvious that in some cases many Iraqis were in
possession of only one document. The IOM then approached the IECI for
permission to accept one legal document instead of two, and this was granted.
There were a very small number of instances of malfeasance by registration
staff, including accepting registration by proxy, registration without proper
documents and intimidation. These were identified and dealt with by
supervisors.
As the
registration period was extended by two days, the last day coincided with a
display period, during which challenges to the electoral list could be made.
Because many Iraqis had to travel long distances to the registration and
polling centres, especially at a time when many were attending the hajj, the
Iraqi diaspora had requested that same-day registration and voting be allowed.
However, the IECI decided, upon the recommendation of the IOM, that, in order
to allow for a display period between registration and polling and to reduce
the potential for fraud, no registration would be conducted during the polling
period.
There was
an intensive public information campaign using the media (radio, television and
the printed press), distribution of posters and flyers, community meetings, a
global information centre, a website, emails and text messaging. Thanks to the
support provided by the host governments, there were no serious security
incidents.
Polling
procedures
The
three-day voting period, 28–30 January 2004, ended with a total of 265,148
Iraqis voting from out of country. This was 94.8 per cent of registered
external electors or 22 per cent of the estimated expatriate population in the
14 countries. The voting had taken place in 358 polling stations located in 75
polling centres in 36 cities (in the 14 countries).
The
personal voting option was chosen as it was deemed to be more credible than
other approaches (such as postal voting). Procedures were similar to those for
in-country voting, including the use of voter-marking ink to prevent double
voting. There were no serious problems but there were reports of minor
incidents such as campaigning near polling centres. There were two incidents
related to demonstrations against the election. In Auburn, Australia,
there was a brief interruption in the polling (for one hour) while the police
dispersed disruptive demonstrators. One notable success was that at the polling
station in Manchester, UK, there was no disruption in the
polling.
Initially,
it had been anticipated that all OCV ballot papers would be returned to Iraq and
counted in a central location there, but a more practical approach was adopted
and counting centres were established in each city where there was external
voting. An exception was the case of the Netherlands where, for security
reasons, the government had requested that counting take place in only one of
the three cities where OCV voting took place.
Observers
(and IECI monitors) were present throughout the programme, from registration to
polling and counting, in all locations.
Financing
It had been
estimated that the OCV programme for Iraq would be the most expensive operation
of its kind ever undertaken due to the security risks and the costs of
addressing them. The figures suggested by the assessment report (including
security costs) were in the range of 67–92 million US dollars (USD) in total. The
actual expenditure was close to the upper limit of the range. The IECI paid the
IOM in instalments according to the arrangements set out in the MOU.
Conclusion
Given the
time constraints and the complexity of the arrangements, it was generally agreed
that the IOM had run a successful programme. It reported that it had identified
the committed expatriates—those who wanted to participate and were interested
in the democratic process in Iraq.
The reasons suggested for large numbers of expatriates not registering included
security fears, concern about the confidentiality of voter information, lack of
interest due to the length of time out of Iraq, lack of documentation, and
inconvenience for those living far from the voting centres. Since registering
and voting required two visits to the location, it was a costly decision for
those living a long distance from the designated cities (the IOM estimated that
the selected cities were close to 60–70 per cent of the diaspora in each
country). The Danish Government was unique in assisting with these transport
costs.
The costs
of the OCV programme were very high and questions were raised about the value
in relation to the number of registrants. However, it was necessary to prepare
for the possibility of over 1 million persons registering and the possible
security threats.
As a result
of the relatively low registration figures, the IECI is to review the
parameters of future OCV programmes for Iraqi elections. Future electoral
events will need to be assessed in the light of the security situation and the
need for a comprehensive OCV programme. They will take into account expanding
the operation to other countries and potentially changing the in-person
registration and voting system to a postal system, at least in those countries
where the postal infrastructure would allow this.
