It is good practice for a democratic political system to try to encourage the citizens to put themselves forward as candidates for election to public office. To make sure that only citizens with serious intentions try to gain a seat in parliament in the elections some democracies place financial deposits on the access to the ballot.
This is not only done to keep away irresponsible candidates from the ballot but also to alleviate the number of candidates who want to stand for election. Voters need some kind of a limitation of the number of candidates to select between.
One can distinguish between payment of a fee and a monetary deposit that is returned to the candidate after the elections if she/he has gained a certain amount of votes.
The monetary deposit system is applied in different ways in different electoral systems (Katz 1997: 255).
The deposits are usually higher in candidate-oriented Majority/Plurality systems than in more party-oriented Proportional Representation Systems. The Majority/Plurality electoral system tends to encourage the two major parties and hence discourage third parties and independent candidates. It is therefore said to be easier for frivolous candidates to gain votes and a seat in parliament in Plurality/Majority systems.
It is still unclear if there is a correlation between financial deposits for candidates and the number of candidates that are actually included in the ballot. One would assume in the first instance that the higher the deposit, the lower would the number of candidates be. Not all parties are as much affected by financial deposits as others. Minor parties who nominate candidates only in a few constituencies where the candidate has good hope to win the run are said to be less affected by those financial restrictions.
The example of the UK, where the financial deposit was raised by law in 1985 and the threshold of necessary vote shares to return the deposit likewise lowered, indicates that the effect of raising the deposits and lowering the threshold is rather marginal for major parties but can be significant for independent candidates (Katz 1997: 260). Although it seems very difficult to separate the effect of the lower threshold from the higher deposit. Richard Katz interprets the data as follows: the higher the deposit the lower the number of candidates of subminor parties and independents, the higher the threshold the more costs of competition for smaller and middle size parties that are placing their candidates on the ballot no matter how high the deposit will be (ibid.).
Other effects of deposits, like societal implications – ie. who has wealth in society has more possibilities to stand as a candidate – or gender implications have not been explored in detail yet. But one can assume that the richer a candidate is the less deterred will he or she be by higher deposits. Serious but poor candidates may not want to contest an election because they cannot afford to potentially loose the fees (Maley 2000).
Higher deposits may also lead to a lower representation of women in parliament because they are usually faced by more financial drawbacks than man in political systems all over the world. But again, there is no clear evidence for that correlation/connection.
To avoid the deterring effects on those candidates and to discourage frivolous but rich candidates, alternative ways of requirements can be introduced, as for instance the stipulation of a specific number of nominators for one candidate.(ibid). This may however lead to discrimination as well if the required number of nominators is excessively high and only achievable for well equipped parties and candidates.
In the table (see the dynamic sidebar at the right hand side) "Table of Financial Requirements for Parliamentary Ballot Access" adapted from Katz (1997) and supplemented with other data you find a compilation of ballot access deposits in a number of countries.The inflation rate in a country is influencing the significance of the amount of the deposit.
