In implementing the security regime for voting stations, operational tactics will depend on:
• the goals that are intended to be achieved;
• the resources that are available;
• the roles played by the various participants in voting operations in maintaining security.
Particularly from a resource perspective, planning of voting station security arrangements needs to be integrated with other election security requirements (see Voting Site Security).
Voting station security arrangements may appear appropriate on paper, but their effective implementation depends upon voting station officials and security forces at the local level establishing good liaison and acting in a decisive manner. (For discussion of the roles in voting station security of polling officials and security forces, see Role and Powers of Voting Station Staff and Security Forces.)
This section looks at physical and personal security within, and in the vicinity of, voting stations.
Aims of Voting Station Security
Effective implementation of security measures at voting stations aids in ensuring the openness, freedom, and integrity of voting. The goals that voting station security arrangements should aim to achieve can be summarised as:
• freedom of movement to and from voting stations;
• prevention of, or at least providing an effective response to, any disturbances in or near a voting station, or attempts to disrupt voting;
• security of all election materials, and particularly ballot material, while it is at the voting station
• preventing intimidation of voters and voting station officials within and around voting stations;
• the safety of voters at the voting station;
• the safety of voting station officials, observers, party or candidate workers, and official visitors at the voting station;
• ensuring that voting is conducted in a lawful manner;
• ensuring that only authorised persons enter the voting station and any surrounding restricted area.
Any public perception of or actual bias shown by voting station officials or security forces towards any of the political participants in the election is likely to exacerbate tensions and make these aims more difficult to achieve.
Voting Station Security Issues
Within these general aims, the specific issues that voting station security arrangements need to cover include the following:
Protection of materials and the voting station between the time of delivery of materials to the voting station and the commencement of voting. Where materials are delivered in an effective way, that is, on the day before voting day, such arrangements will need to cover overnight security and security while the voting station and materials are being set up.
Ensuring a safe passage for voters, officials, and candidates on their way to and from voting stations . In higher security risk areas, this may require security forces patrolling around the voting station perimeter. In areas of extreme risk, secure transport for voters, officials, and candidates may need to be provided (Where such cases are the result of inter-communal violence, it may be more cost-effective to revise voting station locations, or institute facilities for absentee voting).
The maintenance of effective voting station entrance and exit controls during voting. In developing these, a basic principle of prevention rather than reaction is useful. In higher risk environments, screening persons as to eligibility to enter the voting station at as far a distance as is possible from the actual voting area minimises potential disruption. Controls at this point may need to include confiscation of weapons.
Rapid response from security forces in case of threats to the safety of voters or officials . Particularly where security forces are not present in voting stations, reliable communication systems in each voting station and security force transport need to be in place.
Protection of voting materials from theft or misuse . A major factor in this is arrangements to counter attempted voter fraud This issue also includes proper materials reconciliation processes on delivery and close of voting, physical layout of the voting station ( and providing secure storage during voting hours for materials not currently in use.
Emergency evacuation procedures, in case of threats to safety or natural disaster . In higher security risk areas, it is prudent to draw up formal plans for security force involvement in these circumstances under the control of the joint operations centres (see Operations and Security Centres). In all circumstances, voting station managers and their staff should be aware of procedures for adjourning voting and evacuating voting stations following natural disasters or other emergencies.
Control of access to the ballot count. This would include, if the count is to be conducted elsewhere, strict control and reconciliation of voting materials on dispatch to and arrival at the count, and monitoring of transport to the count centres.
Physical Arrangements
Security considerations are important in both the selection of appropriate voting locations and the layout within voting stations. In establishing voting stations, security-conscious management will consider the following issues:
• Voting stations are, wherever possible, located within reasonable proximity to security forces' operational bases.
• The building or area used for voting has a relatively open area around it which can be physically marked in some way (if not fenced, then marked with rope or tape) to designate the external boundaries of the voting station within which only authorised access is permitted. This area would be monitored by voting station officials (from within) or, if necessary, security forces (preferably from without).
Ejecting unauthorised persons at such a distance, rather than from amongst voting activities, is likely to be much less disruptive. Some jurisdictions define legally such an area in terms of a radius in metres around the voting station itself; where security risks are relatively high, this is an effective security control mechanism.
• There are a limited number of entrances to and exits from the actual voting area, that can be closely watched by voting station officials. Preferably, there would be a single, separate entrance and exit. Any access to the actual voting area that are not in official use are better securely locked.
• Securing materials inside the voting station is easier if there is a clearly defined path for voters to follow through the voting station--in through one door or area with the layout leading voters out through another door or area preferably on the opposite side of the voting station from the entrance A confused voter path through the voting station can lead to voters milling around and getting in each other's way, and has the potential to create conflict.
• The need for any secure repository, outside the voting station, for confiscated weapons.
• There is a voice communication facility between each voting station and the electoral district manager and operations control centre (see Use of Communications Networks).
• Procedures are in place for commencement and finish of voting that allow public verification of sealing and unsealing of ballot boxes or voting machine/computer records.
• Ballot boxes (whether in current use or full) are always guarded throughout voting hours by a voting station official (as this tends to be a boring task, rotating voting station officials through this position at regular intervals can be useful).
• Care in positioning of materials and ballot boxes within the voting station so that they remain clearly visible and cannot be removed, for example, where security risks are relatively low, placement of the ballot boxes can allow a single official both to guard the ballot box and to ensure that voters do not enter the voting station from the exit for the voting station; however, care needs to be taken that they are not placed so close to the exit to invite their removal.
• Storage of voting materials and staff positioning within the voting station in a manner that ensures that materials are not left unattended, and that materials not currently in use (in particular unused accountable voting materials and filled ballot boxes) are kept securely.
• If the voting station is dealing with voters voting for elections for different electoral districts, appropriate use is made of barriers or rooms to ensure that these voter streams are kept separate.
• Where voting is by machine or computer, that equipment (including cables, modems, and other ancillary equipment) is placed and guarded in such a manner that it cannot be tampered with or deliberately damaged.
• Whether voting stations can also be used effectively for the initial counts of ballots, thus minimising any additional security needs for the count and transport of ballots.
