The Question

This question is posted by ACE on behalf of Jeff Fischer.

What are the best practices associated with conducting audits of election results?

By audit, I am not referring solely to a recount of ballots, but an inspection of ballots, tally sheets, poll journals and other polling station documents.

Summary of Responses

Practitioners’ Network Members suggested a range of best practices for election audits.  

As this question was asked during the 2014 Afghan presidential election audit, a member suggested looking at the IEC (Afghanistan) Audit Checklist. It suggests auditing officials ask the following questions:  

• Is the box of the same type as distributed by the IEC for the election? Is it intact?
• Does it have a sticker, indicated the code of the polling station and centre?
• How many seals does the box lid have and how many are intact?
• Can the seals be opened by the force of a hand?
• Are the serial numbers of the seals similar (sic) to those of the recording form inside the box?
• Is the results form copy inside the box?
• Are there unused, spoiled or invalid ballot papers? If yes, how many?
• Are there marked ballot papers not detached from the stub. If yes, how many and in favour of which candidate?
• Do the back of the ballot papers related to a candidate bear a verification stamp. How many ballots lacked the stamp and which candidate did they favour?
• Have the ballot papers been marked according to the procedure? How many and in favour of whom?

Additionally, the same member shared the following UN guidelines :

• Are there “identical or significant patterns of the same markings on ballots”? If yes, how many?
• Is there evidence of “tampering with the results sheet and coherence with the number of ballots in the box”? If yes, provide details.
• Does the results sheet copy match that processed in the national tally centre
• What is the relevant information from the polling station journal and list of voters?
• “Do ballot boxes register results that, according to best international practices, require special scrutiny (eg when there are significant differences between first and second round tallies)? If yes, then such boxes will receive particular attention from international and domestic observers and agents.”

Similarly, another member suggested asking the following questions:

•  Are ballot stubs numbered (e.g. Afghanistan in 2005) ?
•  How many ballots have 2 candidates marked?
•  Are you checking TEBs?

The member also suggested that counting centers should ensure the following measures are in place: 

• Counting staff have IDs allocated to table and rotating every 3-4 shifts
• Each counting staff member has an attendance sheet
• Separate counting tables, and each one numbered
• Counting supervisors for each group of tables
• Counting staff report counts on a daily basis / statistics are run for each group of tables daily
• Counting staff members are paid frequently against their reported hours (to be recorded in worksheets)
• Boxes/ materials/ areas are color-coded
• Webcams should be everywhere, even if some are not connected
• Irregularities are reported in a discrete manner
• Observers have shifts at counting centers
• There is adequate security at the entrance of the counting center (and no liquids, pens, pencils, and things that can punch ballots in the center)
• Double team A/B verification for highly suspicious areas/quarantined boxes
• There is good lighting at the counting center

Furthermore, the member suggested the following must occur when auditing voter registers:

• Analysis of the voter register update numbers to spot outliers and irregularities (i.e. number of registrants/ days vs. average operating time) 
• Frequency of reporting from the VRS
• Proper Final Voters Register analysis

Another member mentioned the importance of quality control for the audit, and the importance of establishing a clear sampling methodology. 

Additionally, a member from South Africa shared that when Results Forms or Slips are received at the lowest management level of the institution (e.g. local or municipal government offices), results are captured on a computerized system and an auditing process occurs. However, these are preliminary checks meant to be performed by the presiding officer. This check looks for :

• Tampering: The tamper-proof bag (sealed at the voting station) must show no evidence of tampering. The tracking number of the bag label must be the same as the one pasted in the Election Diary (completed by the presiding officer) for that voting district.
• Quantity: Open the tamper-proof bag and check that the bag contains the correct number of results slips (2 or more as per the number of elections conducted)
• Validity: Check that the results slips are for the valid for that voting district and Ward.
• Completeness: Checks that each results slip is completed and that all fields have been filled in, including a zero (0) or hyphen/dash (--) in blank fields. Also check that the deputy presiding officer, presiding officer and Party Agents have signed the Results Slip. It is not compulsory for Party Agents to sign Results Slips.
• MEC 7s (a sworn statement in an instance where a voter is not on the voters' roll but can provide valid proof of registering): Check that the MEC 7 fields on all the results slips for a particular voting district are all the same.
• Accuracy: Use a calculator to check that the totals on each ballot paper are accurate.
• These preliminary checks provide an entry point before the result forms continue into the capturing process.
• The same member also suggested the following checks can also be performed, and they must ask:
• Are there any alterations on the result forms, such as deletions?
• Is there a significant variance between two different result forms for different elections (such as for two different legislatures) from the same voting district? in this case it might be both the total valid votes, spoilt votes and votes cast per party or candidate?
• Do the number of MEC 7s exceed an acceptable margin? This margin must be determined beforehand.
• Do the number of votes cast exceed the registered population?
• The auditing function at the municipal office is meant to be a critical check that the results that are captured are the same as those on the result forms. The preliminary checks, though not fool-proof, allow for a measure of safeguarding of the initial process prior to capturing.

Another member suggested the following guidelines:

• Officials conducting audits should have experience running elections from an operational or training role
• Audits must follow the rule of law/ legal framework in the country where the audit is being conducted
• Under no circumstances must ballot boxes not subject to quarantine containing VALID ballots papers be discounted.  Avoid removing valid ballots from the count at all times.

Additionally, the member added that the visual audit process must look at the following:

• Missing seals, or replaced seals;
• Broken ballot boxes;
• If the box is translucent – tampered ballot papers (stacked or still attached to the stub – if used);
• Missing paperwork; amended paperwork both may indicate that the presiding official is complicit in error or possibly counting or data managers
• In some cases the VR card number is written down. Examine the list to see similar number sequences, as simple fraud sometimes follows internal process such as recording numbers in order to “issue” ballot papers;
• If it is a dual election such national and sub national a difference ballot papers issued should be examined;

Best practise associated with conducting audits in my view should start from the planning stage where the number of registered voters at each polling station is established. Then when the ballot paper is being printed. during quality control to check the accuracy of the printed ballot , on polling day, tallying them and then after poll comparing with the numbers who would have voted as well as the residue .

Of topical interest, the guidelines currently being used for the audit in Afghanistan are reproduced below, courtesy of the Afghanistan Analysts Network (link here):

Afghan Presidential Election Technical Framework 12 July 2014 

IEC Audit Checklist

1 Is the box of the same type as distributed by the IEC for the election?

2 Is it intact?

3 Does it have a sticker, indicated the code of the polling station and centre?

4 How many seals does the box lid have and how many are intact?

5 Can the seals be opened by the force of a hand?

6 Are the serial numbers of the seals similar (sic) to those of the recording form inside the box?

7 Is the results form copy inside the box?

8 Are there unused, spoiled or invalid ballot papers? If yes, how many?

9 Are there marked ballot papers not detached from the stub. If yes, how many and in favour of which candidate?

10 Do the back of the ballot papers related to a candidate bear a verification stamp. How many ballots lacked the stamp and which candidate did they favour?

11 Have the ballot papers been marked according to the procedure? How many and in favour of whom?

Additional UN recommendations

12 Are there “identical or significant patterns of the same markings on ballots”? If yes, how many?

13 Is there evidence of “tampering with the results sheet and coherence with the number of ballots in the box”? If yes, provide details.

14 Does the results sheet copy match that processed in the national tally centre?

15 What is the relevant information from the polling station journal and list of voters?

16 “Do ballot boxes register results that, according to best international practices, require special scrutiny (eg when there are significant differences between first and second round tallies)? If yes, then such boxes will receive particular attention from international and domestic observers and agents.”

Hi,

I assume that "6 - similar" due to high number of wrongly recorded numbers in the past.

Questions?

Are ballot stubs numbered somehow, like in 2005?

Number of ballots with 2 candidates marked? 

Checking TEBs?

Counting centre:

Prepare very good worksheets with 1. counting staff with numbered IDs allocated to table and rotating every 3-4 shifts 2. attendance sheet for each counting staff member 3. separate counting tables properly from each other and number them 4. introduce count supervisors for each group of tables 5. report counting on a daily basis/run stats for each group of tables 6. make sure counting staff is paid frequently against their worksheets 7. Introduce color coding for boxes/material/areas 8. Webcams everywhere, even not connected 9. Allow reporting irregularities in a discreet manner 10. Introduce observers shifts, if there is too many of them 11. security at the gates (no pens, pencils, things that allow punching, liquids) 12. Double team A/B verification for a highly suspicious areas/quarantined boxes 13. Good lightning will help

VR:

Analysis of the VR update numbers to spot outliers and irregularities (i.e. number of regs/day vs average operating time).

Frequency of reporting from the VRS - daily as in 2004/05 or as of 2009 - every 2-3 weeks that will not allow spotting of any trend or irregularity. Spot areas reporting once only at the end.

Proper Final Voters Register analysis - although in Afghanistan this will not help too much at this stage.

As I understand it, in the current Afghanistan audit, all ballot boxes are being examined for the above verifiers mentioned by Ronan. 

In the 2009 elections, a sampling technique was used to look at what percentage of votes had been fraudulent and then this percentage was applied to the whole.

With any audit, if a ballot box is found to have been the subject of fraud, all ballots in it are then discounted from the final tally. Thus, if a sampling technique is used the same rule must apply. A copy of the IEC fact sheet on the process is attached.

The system worked well but it took a while to develop the sampling technique described in this fact sheet. This caused some confusion with the media at the time. 

I also witnessed the election commission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia opening ballot boxes where there were credible complaints against them from political parties, in 2008 (I think).  Here they looked for indicators of fraud such as identical signatures on the voters list, no signatures on the voters list, changes to the protocol or the protocol's not matching. If any of these indicators were found, they either discounted the ballots, or recounted them depending on the problem.

I would like to draw your attention to one important issue: which body is authorized/obliged by the law to establish the result in the polling station? because, if it is the polling station commitee, any audit could be done as part of a legal remedy, i.e.

1. upon appeal against the result in the PS AND

2. after decision of the appellate body AND

3. within the scope of the decision on revision/audit.

Of course, if the result of a polling station is established by a higher level body (e.g. counting centre, CEC), it means that result of counting done in the PS is just for information  purposes, and the result in legal terms can be established after the audit is done by the said higher level bodies. However, in this case it is important to ensure that participants can exercise their right to seek legal remedy, i.e. they must be informed of the place and time of audit and the outcome othe audit.

EN ANALYSANT LA QUESTION, JE ME SUIS POSE LA QUESTION DE SAVOIR QUAND ET POURQUOI FAIRE L'AUDIT? CHAQUE FOIS QU'IL Y A LES ELECTIONS OU UN CAS DE BESOIN, LORS DES RECLAMATIONS DES CANDIDATS. AU RWANDA DEPUIS 2000, ON A JAMAIS EU DE RECLAMATIONS. MAIS NOTRE CODE ELECTORAL STIPULE LA FACON DONT LA COUR SUPREME INTERVIENNE EN CAS DE RECLAMATION OU CONTESTATION DES RESULTATS. MAIS POUR MOI JE PROPOSERAI QUE MEME SI IL N Y A PAS EU DE RECLAMATION, IL SERAIT IDEAL QUE LES EMBs ORGANISENT DES FOIS UNE AUDIT EXTERNE DE LEUR PROCESS ELECTORAL POUR UNE AMELORATION DANS LE FUTUR.

In the South African context a series of preliminary checks are performed when the Result Forms or Slips are received at the lowest management level of the institution, often the municipal or local government offices where the IEC has a permanent presence. These offices are also where results are captured on the computerised system and an auditing function is performed at this point. These preliminary checks are meant to be performed before the presiding officers are dismissed. They  are as follows:

When results slips come from a voting district, the following is checked:

• Tampering: The tamper-proof bag (sealed at the voting station) must show no evidence of tampering. The tracking number of the bag label must be the same as the one pasted in the Election Diary (completed by the presiding officer) for that voting district.
• Quantity: Open the tamper-proof bag and check that the bag contains the correct number of results slips (2 or more as per the number of elections conducted)
• Validity: Check that the results slips are for the valid for that voting district and Ward.
• Completeness: Checks that each results slip is completed and that all fields have been filled in, including a zero (0) or hyphen/dash (--) in blank fields. Also check that the deputy presiding officer, presiding officer and Party Agents have signed the Results Slip. It is not compulsory for Party Agents to sign Results Slips.
• MEC 7s (a sworn statement in an instance where a voter is not on the voters' roll but can provide valid proof of registering): Check that the MEC 7 fields on all the results slips for a particular voting district are all the same.
• Accuracy: Use a calculator to check that the totals on each ballot paper are accurate.

Horacio Boneo, in response to another question on this forum,  also points to the IREC process where an audit of election results was conducted following the 2007 elections in Kenya. Please see http://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/ace-workspace/questions/open-questions/111840644/689967680/Annex-6-A.pdf for more details.

Estimado Fisher

En Venezuela, la auditoría a los procesos electorales es un mandato constitucional, legal y sublegal. He aquí el marco normativo

Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela (1999)

Artículo 293… “Los órganos del Poder Electoral garantizarán la igualdad, confiabilidad, imparcialidad, transparencia y eficiencia de los procesos electorales, así como la aplicación de la personalización del sufragio y la representación proporcional”.

Artículo 294. Los órganos del Poder Electoral se rigen por los principios de independencia orgánica, autonomía funcional y presupuestaria, despartidización de los organismos electorales, imparcialidad y participación ciudadana; descentralización de la administración electoral, transparencia y celeridad del acto de votación y escrutinios.

Ley Orgánica del Poder Electoral (2002)

Artículo 33

…“42°. Determinar los mecanismos para garantizar progresivamente la automatización en todas las áreas de su competencia, con base en los principios de confiabilidad, transparencia, auditabilidad, transferencia tecnológica, seguridad e integridad informática.

Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales (2009)

Artículo 156. La auditoría es la verificación de todos aquellos recursos materiales, tecnológicos y datos utilizados en la ejecución de las distintas fases del proceso electoral, para que éstos garanticen la transparencia y confiabilidad de dicho proceso. Las auditorías podrán aplicarse al conjunto o algunas de las fases del proceso electoral.

Artículo 160. La auditoría electoral garantizará la auditabilidad del sistema electoral automatizado y comprenderá la certificación de los procesos del sistema electoral automatizado en cada una de sus fases.

Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales (2013)

Artículo 442.- La auditoría electoral garantiza la auditabilidad del sistema electoral automatizado y comprenderá La certificación de los procesos del mismo en cada una de sus fases.

Artículo 443.- La auditoría del sistema electoral automatizado persigue las siguientes finalidades:

1.Verificar la precisión de la solución automatizada a través de la realización de las auditorías a la misma.

2. Suscitar la confianza necesaria en la solución automatizada.

3. Refrendar la transparencia, celeridad, confiabilidad y autenticidad del sistema automatizado de votación.

Artículo 444.- La realización de la auditoría del sistema electoral automatizado se efectuará, tanto al software como al hardware que conforman el sistema automatizado de votación a ser utilizado en un proceso electoral.

Artículo 445.- Para cada proceso electoral, el Consejo Nacional Electoral establecerá el procedimiento para la certificación de los procesos del sistema electoral automatizado en cada una de sus fases, garantizando la observación de las o los representantes de las organizaciones postulantes

Dado que existe un sistema automatizado en la gran mayoría de las fases (en las cuales se incluyen: la inscripción de candidaturas, financiamiento, votación, escrutinio, totalización y adjudicación), contamos con diversos tipos de auditorías. He aquí las principales:

Vale decir que pese al número y participación activa de los partidos políticos en los procesos de auditoría, aún existen solicitudes del sector opositor venezolano en aras de cumplir con la debida garantía de transparencia de los procesos electorales. Una de ellas por ejemplo fue la exigencia para las elecciones del 14 de abril de 2013 de la Auditoría de duplicidad de huellas, con la cual se pretendía verificar el cumplimiento del principio: un elector, un voto. (fortalecido, según el Consejo Nacional Electoral, órgano supremo de la administración electoral en Venezuela,  al incorporar a partir de dicha  elección un sistema integrado de identificación biométrica y votación).

Igualmente se solicitó el reporte de incidencia del Sistema de Autenticación Integrado (SAI) que permitiría conocer a nivel nacional  algunos casos de anomalía en la ejecución del proceso de votación y, la revisión de los cuadernos de votación utilizados para cruzarlos con la data de fallecidos, a objeto de verificar la no suplantación de identidad. Ésta última revisión pretendía hacerse integralmente en la medida que se cotejarían simultáneamente Cuadernos de Votación, actas de escrutinio y comprobantes de voto (la traza de papel del sistema automatizado de votación que se conserva en unas cajas especificas el día de las votaciones). (El CNE no aceptó a estas solicitudes y decidió efectuar la Auditoría de cierra, también llamada Verificación Ciudadana para el resto de las Mesas de Votación)

Para finalizar adjunto un afiche de unas de las auditorías más importante del proceso electoral venezolano, a saber, la auditoría de cierre o Verificación Ciudadana (estipulada en el Artículo 437 del Reglamento General de la Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales (2013), en la cual en un porcentaje de las Mesas de Votación se comparan los resultados del Acta de Escrutinio con los valores reflejados en los comprobantes de votación en presencia de los electores además de los testigos y demás actores involucrados en la elección.

Dear Liberata Irambona,

it depends what "audit" means.

Option #1: audit is revision of results (results forms) as established in Polling Sation

in this case, as described above, any audit can be conducted as part of legal remedy (either ex officio legal remedy or legal remedy upon request). In case of ex officio revision, this must be emphasised in the legislation and the law must ensure that political parties, candidates, etc. can exercise their right to legal remedy vis-a-vis the results established as a result of audit.

if the audit is to be conducted only upon request, it is to be done in accordance with the order of the EMB adjudicating the appeal against the establishment of the results in the Polling Station. it assumes, obviously, that the legislation stipulates that a) it is the Polling Station Committee that is solely authorised to establish the results in the Polling Station, b) the political parties, candidates, the public itself are informed of the decision of the Polling Station Committee.

Option #2: audit is just an in-take procedure at regional/central level, a review (en française: recensement) whether all sensitive and mon-sensitive material are in place and in custody of the EMBs.

In conducting an audit, and in this case I use the word fraud, it needs to be ascertained if it is simple or complex fraud. Simple fraud is stuffing ballot boxes etc, complex fraud is doing it in such a way as to not immediately arose suspicion ie outcomes under existing trigger. It is assumed that the rights, roles and obligations of observers, party and candidate agents has been clearly communicated. Not discounting the positive comments made thus far especially Tomasz'from 2005 I believe the key to this approach is best practices;

1. The first being and I know this will upset some – but unless you have managed as in conducted and run elections from an operational or training role then you should not be involved in conducting an audit because you do not know what you are looking at or indeed looking for.
2. Second it must follow the existing rule of law, bringing in external parties regardless of intentions can be seen as interference – granted there are a number of election laws that do not follow international norms however elections come from the basic premise of rule of law so careful consideration is needed.
3. Thirdly under no circumstances are ballot boxes that are not subject to quarantine containing VALID ballot papers are to be discounted – it is very erroneous to consider that the 2009 Afghan audit was a correct process - it is nothing short of a travesty to wilfully and knowingly to remove valid ballots from the count in order to appease a construct that has no valid electoral basis; the sacrosanct nature of a voter’s intention must be upheld at all times.

• ·         Missing seals, or replaced seals;

• ·         Broken ballot boxes;

• ·         If the box is translucent – tampered ballot papers (stacked or still attached to the stub – if used);

• ·         Missing paperwork; amended paperwork both may indicate that the presiding official is complicit in error or possibly counting or data managers

• ·         In some cases the VR card number is written down I would examine the list to see similar number sequences as in my experience simple fraud sometimes follows internal process such as recording numbers in order to “issue” ballot papers;

• ·         If it is a dual election such national and sub national a difference ballot papers issued should be examined;

• ·         I would add in this section the knowledge of broken chain of transmission being grounds for examination.

The investigative audit process should look at the actual ballot papers and other factors. The main factor in this element is agreeing on the percentage of error margins – this combined with data analysis of voter turnout identifying anomalous voting patterns requires both careful examination and acceptance. Usually the Host EMB would have inbuilt triggers however as has been seen before an EMB under pressure may water these down so acceptance of these should be considered carefully as well.

Prior turnout is a good indicator if the election data is available and in a usable format such as CSV etc and does not involve mixing of ballot boxes from different stations and centres. Mixing is problematic if historically good locations are mixed with potentially dubious locations. The use of Open Data is especially useful in situations where there are male and female locations if the female turnout is above the norm then considerations could be given to include these for audit. Granted some locations do have a higher female to male turnout however this should be considered particularly in gender fragmented societies.

Similar marks – indicating possible malfeasance from one or several ‘markers’ – simple fraud invariably needs to look at the similarity of ballot paper marking – if there is an error margin and agreement amongst auditors then the box needs to be set aside.

The most important factor however when considering the actual investigative audit process is ensuring the acceptance and the outcome from those present is agreed.

Hi Paul, Ghana

No voting system is perfect. In elections today vote are counted using manual voting systems. Such voting systems have produced result changing errors through problems with hardware, software, and procedures. Errors can also occur in hand counting of ballots or in the compiling of results. Even serious error can go undetected if results are not audited effectively.

Well-designed and properly performed post-election audits can significantly mitigate the threat of error, and should be considered integral to any vote counting system. A post-election audit in this document refers to hand-counting votes on paper records and comparing those counts to the corresponding vote counts originally reported, as a check on the accuracy of election results, and resolving discrepancies using accurate hand counts of the paper records as the benchmark. Such audits are arguably the most economical component of a quality voting system, adding a very small cost for a large set of benefits.

The benefits of such audits include:

• Revealing when recounts are necessary to verify election outcomes

• Finding error whether accidental or intentional

• Deterring fraud

• Providing for continuous improvement in the conduct of elections

• Promoting public confidence in elections

Risk-limiting audits have a large, predetermined minimum chance of leading to a full recount whenever a full recount would show a different outcome. (Correct preliminary outcomes are never overturned). After any audit, this chance should be calculated and published as part of the audit results to promote continuous improvement. However, in this case it is important to ensure that participants can exercise their right to seek legal remedy, i.e. they must be informed of the place and time of audit and the outcome of the audit.

THANK YOU

PAUL GODDEY GABALH

Greetings dear colleagues ;  Jeff, I believe we have met twice in Haiti.

To quote somebody on another forum, this is an excellent topic to stretch our brains on! A topic that deserves a working group all by itself.

Here are my own reflections on a topic that I have been acquainted with for decades in various fields of interest, both in critical industry activities and in elections management for the last 20 years :   audits, inspections and verifications.  I would not dare pretend to lecture or be definitive on such a topic, but I hope what follows could perhaps provide some context if not provide direct answers to Jeff’s question.

I have read previous comments made until this Sunday July 27. I will start with proposing a baseline :  what is an audit and its confusion with inspection and quality controls.  Likely, to many this will appear as an exercise in semantics, but why not draw on a whole world of practical process experience and on the body of knowledge created in critical domains of industry and services accumulated over the past 6 decades, rather than reinvent the wheel for electoral purposes alone ?

Reliability and trust :  These are the cornerstones of audits.  If reliability and trust were perfect, there would be no need for audits.  Unfortunately, humans, machines and related processes and procedures that result in outcomes that often come short, sometimes unacceptably very short of agreed norms as defined by their intended users and/or surrounding populations.

Does this sound like it could include electoral management bodies and electoral processes and results ?  To me, it certainly does, and elections and their results and outcomes (often not the same thing) certainly rank among activities that affect human peace, order, safety and life to a high degree.

1.    Audits and inspections or controls

The ISO 9001 from the International Standards Organisation does provide an in extenso description of the requirements of an audit, but not a simple formal definition.  Various attempts at such a definition can be found on the Internet.  For our purpose I would quote the following ones which seem to me reasonably close :

An audit is an evidence gathering process. Audit evidence is used to evaluate how well audit criteria are being met. Audits must be objective, impartial, and independent, and the audit process must be both systematic and documented.

Better yet :

The general definition of an audit is a planned and documented activity performed by qualified personnel to determine by investigation, examination, or evaluation of objective evidence, the adequacy and compliance with established procedures, or applicable documents, and the effectiveness of implementation.         
"Audit defined in Six Sigma and Beyond: The Implementation Process Volume VII, D.H. Stamatis (CRC Press, 2002) cited in".

We could discuss this topic ad nauseam, but that’s not the purpose here, but let’s retain some key requirements :       
Audit scope, criteria, documented, objectivity and impartiality, qualified auditors, clearly defined, acceptable/compatible and agreed purpose(s), a documented and agreed procedure, including purpose and expected results definitions (further details would be found in ISO Standard 9001, 14000, and 19011).     
No audit could be considered complete without a thorough review and understanding of applicable standards, internal procedures and processes against applicable norms, standards and requirements. In no way can it be limited to a simple inspection of outcomes and products, although this inspection activity should definitely be part of the audit.

A thorough audit should also include the control of non-conforming product(s), data analysis and a follow-up on improvement and corrective actions.

Thus, inspections and controls should not be confused with an audit although their results are a significant component of audits.  Nevertheless, in the case of debatable vote outcomes, intensive number crunching may become an essential component of an audit.

2.    Comments on previous colleagues’ contributions

a)      On the question :       
By audit, I am not referring solely to a recount of ballots, but an inspection of ballots, tally sheets, poll journals and other polling station documents.   
To me what this is is a simple inspection and does not meet the intent of even a specialized audit unless its scope is broadened to include an assessment of applicable (and perhaps tolerable) requirements, procedures and process(es).

b)      On the Afghan Presidential Election Technical Framework 12 July 2014 :  
The so-called audit checklist, even with its additional UN recommendations, comes very short of an audit. This is a simple inspection or control if you will.

c)      Counting Centre :      
Good practical points from an operational point of view, although, obviously, the list of requirements could stretch a lot.

d)      Current Afghanistan audit :               
With any audit, if a ballot box is found to have been the subject of fraud, all ballots in it are then discounted from the final tally.     
I am not knowledgeable of the Afghan election process, but I do hope that this “audit” was not in any way related to a determination of the vote outcome.

e)      On audit timing :       
Je me suis posé la question de savoir quand et pourquoi faire l’audit…     
This raises a very important aspect of audits and/or inspections. An important principle applies to any form of observation :  it, or its dedicated observers, shall in no way interfere with an ongoing process or with its intended outcome or become a direct source of unrest.  This is obviously subject to the circumstances of each country.  Nor should the audit become part of the process of determining election’s winners in case of indecisive vote results.   
I will add comments on this below.

f)       Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela :     
The quoted articles of the constitution appear to form a sound basis for the definition of the purposes of an audit.          
Audit definition, Article 156 :            
Artículo 156. La auditoría es la verificación de todos aquellos recursos materiales, tecnológicos y datos utilizados en la ejecución de las distintas fases del proceso electoral, para que éstos garanticen la transparencia y confiabilidad de dicho proceso. Las auditorías podrán aplicarse al conjunto o algunas de las fases del proceso electoral.          
To me this comes close to a good definition of an audit, albeit for the need to add :           
“independent” and “documented” to the word verification ;  fields of verification should also cover procedures and the application of their requirements.  Failure to follow proper procedures may not result in vote tainting, but do affect perception of reliability and even of exactness in particular.
For the certification of processes, in particular computerized ones, the performance by a politically and government independent body is essential.

g)      it depends what "audit" means…          
Based on my previous remarks, both  options suggested would come nowhere close to a complete definition of an audit, even with a scope limited according to the originator’s question.         
We should, however, reach a proper definition of what constitutes an audit, and I would dare suggest that we use what I propose above as a starting point for the discussion.  Once we agree on what we are talking about, we could then progress to provide Jeff with answers.

h)      Audit and Fraud :      
I agree with Andy’s view on simple — one could say elementary or obvious fraud — versus more sophisticated forms of fraud requiring more elaborate schemes much less conspicuous that require close scrutiny. This concerns more what I would call inspection or control practices than audit.  There should be a clear distinction between observation and auditing.  Observation being a fundamental right of the electorate members who seek to witness an ongoing electoral process, the other having potentially disruptive or damaging effects if reports, results or interactions were to be released in an untimely manner.  I will come to this below.

i)       The first being and I know this will upset some but unless you have managed as in conducted …   
I regretfully have to concur.  I have personally seen this in a tabulation centre. Operational procedures at that level are complex and rarely will an outsider/observer have the opportunity to devote enough time to study them thoroughly enough to recognize what is going on with the process.  Witness someone (employee, observer, party rep.? who knows) who confused complementary data acquisition with including in the official results polling station counting reports already set aside.  This was so gross and so remote from the reality, and yet, the president of the EMB was distraught, and the loosing presidential candidate went public with this silly accusation.  This could have caused serious trouble for an altogether acceptable and not contestable outcome.

3.    Two Cases

Audits and inspections need to be treated very carefully to avoid interference with due process.  Such is naturally the case also for the simple observation, but to a large degree this latter operation carries a lesser potential for disruption.  They need to have a specific and acceptable purpose, be approved by EMB or government authorities and performed with the full knowledge of all parties concerned. In addition, such verifications cannot be performed by non-independent persons, nor can they be conducted in an untimely manner that could, for example provide an unfair advantage to some contesting parties.

3.1   Attempt to verify/inspect Polling Station Vote Count Reports

One day, at the end of a tabulation, the representative of an organisation insistently requested to conduct a comparison of the copies of polling station counting reports they had collected against the originals used for the tabulation.  The representative was offended by the centre’s request denial.  This request was tantamount to conducting an investigation on sensitive documents ahead of possible due verifications by the contestations courts to be held shortly thereafter, disrupting due process and potentially providing unfair pre-trial advantage to some candidates.

The request was denied.

3.2   A mission to verify vote counts as tabulated

In December 2010, the Organisation of American States – OAS – conducted an assessment of the vote counting process and in particular of the tabulation process and results.  This mission was requested by the Haitian government and had many of the characteristics of an audit.

n  Originated from government authorities ;

n  A generally trusted independent Organisation ;

n  Had clear and specific purposes ;

n  Verified procedures, processes and actual results versus existing generally agreed requirements, procedures, and processes ;

n  Verified tabulation raw materials and results (output) ;

n  Etc.

The mission, however, wisely did not label its activities as an audit although it had many of the required fundamental operational characteristics. Moreover, it produced over 40 recommendations that proved pertinent to the improvement of the vote tabulation centre.  In spite of the above, its true purpose, however, was rooted in the need to determine the assignment of the second and the third candidates, and this was clearly a political requirement that had a likely impact on the outcome of the process being scrutinized.  The mission thus titled its report an Expert Verification Mission, and not an audit, in spite of the scope of all the tasks completed, many of them compatible with audit requirements.

I am very late to answer this question but I think the best practices with conducts of elections must focus on the following questions:

1) Was the legal framework of elections enacted in time?

2) How was the plannification of these elections?Hasn't been overestimation of prices and materials of elections?

3) Management of candidates, did they respect the deadline?Were the documents required complete for each candidate?

4) What about civic and voter education, has it reached all the  groups?

5) Election campaign, did the candidates have equal access to public media?

6) Electoral Observation; local and international observers were present at all polling stations?

En ce qui me concerne, pour mieux réaliser l'audit, il faille que  tout le monde impliquer dans le processus électoral joue une part active dans le processus. l'éducation civique et électorale semble pertinente pour une prise de conscience des électeurs, des candidats et des agents commis au processus électorale.

Tout commence par les lois qui, déjà dans leurs conceptions, tenir compte d'une possibilité d'audit électoral et en définir les mécanismes

En outre, l'audit doit partir de la planification électorale car si déjà les données sont  mal planifiées, les résultats seront aussi faux et parfois provoquent des troubles violents dans la population et commence le cycle infernal des violence et guerres.

La connaissance du nombre d'électeurs par circonscription, par sites ou bureau de vote doit être connu;

Le nombre de bulletins de vote imprimé à l'usine par site et bureaux de vote doit être connu, et le nombre de bulletins réceptionnés dans les sites de vote et bureaux de vote doit aussi être connu, cela vous permettra de vérifier déjà à ce niveau s'il n' y a pas d'écart entre les bulletins imprimés et bulletins réceptionnés à la destination pour voir si certains mécanisme de soustraction de bulletin ou encore s'il n'y a eu une production en surnombre des bulletins de vote. 

Dans le dépouillement, le nombre des bulletins utilisés doit correspondre au nombre des électeurs ayant émargé dans les listes d'émargement, au nombre de la liste de présence tenu par l'assesseur 1, ainsi en additionnant les nombre de bulletins utilisés et celui des bulletins restants, on doit normalement revenir au nombre des bulletins réceptionnés parles bureaux de vote. Que toutes ces vérifications se fassent en présence des témoins des candidats, des observateurs nationaux et internationaux s'ils seront présents.

La somme du  nombre obtenu dans la fiche de comptage et celui des bulletins nuls doit aussi correspondre au nombre de bulletins trouvés dans l'urne, au nombre des électeurs ayant émargé.

Vérifier aussi si le même résultat est transmis et compilés dans le centre de compilation mis en place pour centraliser tout les résultats. 

Enfin, vérifier aussi si le chiffre compilé est celui publié ou proclamé en public comme résultat final. 

Voila en bref mon raisonnement sur cette question 

Estimado Alain Gauthier

Le escribo principalmente para una precisión. La definición de Auditoría que usted cita del marco jurídico de Venezuela es el Artículo 156 de la Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales (2009), no de la Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela.  

Por otra parte, suscribo completamente su observación acerca de la importancia de contar con un cuerpo independiente a los fines de organizar transparentemente las elecciones.

EMBs need to exhibit readiness in case a situation warrants conducting audits of election results. Best practices in conducting audits of election results should permit demonstration that election officials (and observers alike) are free, confident and well equipped with the knowledge pertaining procedures laid down to exercise or witness transparency in the process. 

From the operational perspective, it would make a good case for specific benchmarks to be determined for each  item that will be considered under the audit in order to readily identify deviations from the general rules or norms. I advocate for a computer aided approach.

Finally, results of the audits should be communicated in a transparent manner. Those individuals or institutions that will have taken part in the audit should accept to stand up to be counted on the ultimate declarations.