The Role of Technology in the Outcome of the Kenyan General Election

Ayesha Chugh and Katherine Krueger

Introduction

Kenyan citizens voted in a historic general election on March 4, 2013. It was a significant contest, in light of the mass violence following the 2007 presidential election, claiming over 1,000 lives and displacing over 600,000 people.   This year, Election Day was largely peaceful and Kenya demonstrated its ability to move beyond 2007’s ethnic turmoil.

According to official results released by Kenya’s Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Uhuru Kenyatta, leader of the Jubilee Coalition, defeated his opponent, Raila Odinga of the Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy (CORD).  Odinga subsequently challenged these results by petitioning the Supreme Court, which ultimately upheld the IEBC’s ruling.   

Despite the peaceful outcome of this election, the international community and news media continue to focus on its failures, and specifically, technological ones.  Some tend to assume that malfunctions of Kenyan voter technology caused Kenya’s polling crisis. On the contrary, we must understand the relationship of technology to Kenya’s vote counting process as a managerial failure before a technological one.

Background: Kenya’s Election Management Overhaul

Kenya’s 2007 humanitarian crisis sparked a multi-year overhaul of Kenya’s political and electoral system to stabilize the country.[i] By 2013, the reform process was underway by the IEBC, and the body had largely implemented a plan to improve polling stations using three pieces of technology: Biometric Voter Registration (BVR), Electronic Voter Identification (EVID, or pollbooks), and an electronic Results Transmission System (RTS). Yet these technological enhancements were a large challenge for the IEBC to implement. 

 

Election Day Challenges

As voters took to the polls on March 4, several technological problems arose.  Laptops and cell phones used for the RTS ran out of battery power; additionally, some polling stations (particularly in the rural areas) had no outlets.[ii]  Many poll workers were also poorly trained on how to use the new election software, lacking access to (or, in some cases, forgetting) basic PIN numbers and passwords needed to operate. 

Additionally, the electronic voter identification system (EVID) had not been set up, distributed, and supplied with enough battery power to last a whole day. This affected more remotely located polling stations. Furthermore, secure servers intended for results transmission were unable to handle the volume of data being uploaded, leading to the breakdown of the RTS.iii  An error with the RTS source code also led many to believe there were 300,000 invalid ballots, when in reality the source code error had just multiplied the actual number of invalid ballots by 8 (an ‘8x error’).iv  

 

The Failure of Project Management

We must view the problems faced by the IEBC above as managerial, rather than technological. This is exemplified by the delays in key processes that adversely impacted the management of election technology. The short timeframe between the development of the RTS and the election limited the amount of testing for the system before the election.  Delays in several key processes, which include—the competitive procurement process for a BVR system, a three month delay in the commencement of voter registration, and the procurement process for EVID — directly impacted the ability of the IEBC to test all three of these technologies. Although the 2011 Elections Act mandated a 90-day period between the end of voter registration and the election, Kenya’s National Assembly compressed it to 60 days, giving the IEBC a tight timeline in which to train their staff and prepare for any contingencies.

 

The Role of Technology in the Outcome of the Election

Planning more thoroughly for technological failures may have prevented the abandonment of the RTS. However, the relationship of technology to the overall outcome of the election, and the ensuing political conflict over votes, is less apparent.

Although the Supreme Court in March ruled the election was indeed free, fair, and credible, some continue to associate technological failures with the outcome of this election.  For example, some Odinga supporters use the failure of technology to bolster claims that election results were manipulated, citing the fact that the election commission was unwilling to publish election results by polling stations, and repeatedly changed the official number of registered voters.v  

As controversial as this question has become, these technological failures ultimately did not compromise the sanctity of the election.  Regardless of whether technical difficulties had occurred or not, all electronically transmitted results were provisional, and while this provided the IEBC with an accountability mechanism, the official results were solely based on paper.  Each presiding officer of a polling station would have had to fill out a paper form with results details, and official results would have had to be determined by manually tallying all votes. Therefore, the official results declaring Uhuru Kenyatta as the winner were tabulated by hand.vi  As the Carter Center notes in their final observation report of the election, “[d]espite serious shortcomings of the IEBC's management of technology and release of information, [we find] that the paper-based procedure for counting and tallying presented enough guarantees to preserve the expression of the will of Kenyan voters.” [iii]

 

Conclusion

Kenya’s many challenges on Election Day, therefore, must be understood as problems of project management, rather than a consequence of voter technology.

Kenya’s Supreme Court finally ordered a recount of 22 polling stations in late March, after Raila Odinga alleged voter fraud and petitioned for the nullification of the official results. Considering multiple non-technological problems faced on Election Day, Odinga may have still demanded a recount regardless of the technological setbacks. For instance, Kenya experienced an unprecedentedly high voter turnout of 86 percent, contributing to  long lines and voting stations voting four hours after polls had officially closed. Additionally, Kenya’s RTS had to deal with six different elections as stipulated by the 2010 Constitution.vii Notwithstanding, Odinga may have also alleged fraud without any of these challenges arising, noting the incentives for losers to declare fraud in a high stakes winner-takes-all system like Kenya’s.  The tightness of an electoral race, guaranteed by Kenya’s majoritarian electoral system, which stipulates that the winner must receive 50 percent of the national vote +1 (+ 25 percent of the vote in at least half its counties) may encourage candidates to reject election results on grounds of manipulation.

Finally, compared to the multitude of problems faced in 2007, the March 4^th 2013 election (and its use of technology) can be seen as a success. For example, The Kriegler Report’s evaluation of the management of the 2007 polls revealed mass incidents of ballot stuffing and 1.2 million dead people on the voter roll. Thus the technologies in question during this election (EVID, BVR, and RTS) were introduced to address these larger problems, and must be understood in this context.

 

Elections Canada workshop on Canadian Aboriginal Electoral Participation

By Paul Laronde

The 2009 APRC was jointly sponsored by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, the University of Western Ontario and the National Association of Friendship Centres. This was the third APRC featuring 130 workshops with over 250 presenters. The event brought together researchers, students, policy makers, Aboriginal leaders and other national and international interested parties to present and debate new research on Canadian Aboriginal issues. Aboriginal people in Canada are recognized as belonging to three groups: First Nations, Métis and Inuit.

Elections Canada participated in the conference by organizing a workshop on Aboriginal electoral participation in Canada. The objective of the workshop was to deepen the knowledge base on Aboriginal turnout in Canada and examine factors that engage Aboriginal electors in voting.

Elections Canada’s workshop featured three presentations by Canadian academics on factors leading to participation or non-participation of Aboriginal electors in Canada and potential ways to encourage and facilitate voting.

Lesley A. Jacobs (Professor, York University) presented his paper, Mapping the Legal Consciousness of Aboriginal Voters: Understanding Voting Rights Mobilization. In his paper, Professor Jacobs applies the framework of legal consciousness to conceptualize voting rights mobilization among First Nations people in Canada. According to the author, voting rights mobilization for First Nations electors can be understood as an expression of what those rights mean to them. His paper distinguishes between three forms of legal consciousness – enfranchisement, citizen plus and disenfranchisement – to define different modes by which First Nations electors construct their legal voter status.

In the second presentation, Allison Harell (Professor, Queen’s University), Dimitrios Panagos (Professor, Royal Military College) and Scott Matthews (Professor, Queen’s University) shared important findings from their paper, Explaining Aboriginal Turnout in Federal Elections: Evidence from Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. In this paper, the authors examined a unique dataset produced by the Institute for Social Research at York University, the Equality, Security and Community Survey, which includes a sample of Aboriginals living in the Prairie provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba). This paper examines factors specific to Aboriginal communities that may promote turnout, including differences across First Nations communities, involvement in Aboriginal politics and relevance of Aboriginal issues. The authors found little evidence of differences between on-reserve and off-reserve electors in their willingness to vote, but significant differences across bands and language groups.

Lastly, Paul Howe (Professor, University of New Brunswick) and David Bedford (Professor, University of New Brunswick) presented their paper, The Electoral Participation of Aboriginals in Canada. The authors analyzed patterns of electoral participation among Aboriginal Canadians, drawing on a large-scale Statistics Canada survey (The General Social Survey Cycle 17) designed to support broad-based analysis of social, civic and political engagement among Canadians at large. The paper examines socio-demographic factors, such as age, education, income and place of residence (urban vs. rural), that are found to greatly effect whether an elector participates or not. Confidence in political institutions, sentiments of community attachment and other attitudinal factors are also linked to voting. Practical hindrances to participation, such as residential mobility were also discussed. The authors added there is much more to learn about Aboriginal electoral participation and additional research is needed.

The session concluded with comments from Tonio Sadik, Senior Director, Policy Coordination and Operations at the Assembly of First Nations (AFN). Mr. Sadik spoke about the relevance of the research, noting activities the AFN carried out in partnership with Elections Canada during the 2008 Federal General Election to facilitate voter turnout among First Nations electors. He described recent amendments to the Canada Elections Act requiring proof of identity and residence when voting as making a challenging situation even more difficult. He remarked the scope of research on Aboriginal electoral participation needs to be expanded and enriched while quantifying the effects of legislative changes on turnout rates.

For more information on the conference and workshop, please visit the Aboriginal Voters section on Elections Canada’s website at www.elections.ca. Full papers and presentations will be available in English and French in late spring 2009.

Paul Laronde is an Analyst in the Elections Canada Research and Parliamentary Affairs Directorate

US 2008 ELECTIONS: a Pre-Election Briefing for the Global Observer

 
 

The world is watching the U.S. 2008 general elections. The race between presidential candidates John McCain and Barak Obama has garnered unprecedented interest both inside the U.S. and in the international community. The OSCE has deployed long-term election observers to 40 U.S. States. The candidates and issues at stake in this election have inspired unprecedented participation; indicators including voter registration, campaign spending, and expected voter turnout are breaking previous U.S. records. Despite surging participation, public confidence in the electoral process is alarmingly low.

Observers remember the last two presidential elections were especially close, revealing significant cracks in the way the U.S. actually runs its elections. In 2000, the election outcome came down to several hundred votes, and was eventually decided in court. Four years later, despite national and local efforts at reform, the 2004 presidential contest was characterized by problems with electronic voting equipment and allegations of fraud. In the last eight years, the way citizens register and vote has changed dramatically, largely driven by federal laws and citizen activism.  How will the U.S. electoral management system, already suffering from a dearth of public confidence, hold up to this exceptional pressure?

In the sections below, we outline the key aspects of the U.S. electoral process from a global perspective, giving you, the ACE community, tools to analyze this important race.  

• Electoral Systems
• Legal Framework
• Electoral Management Structure
• Boundary Delimitation
• Voter Registration
• Voting Operations
• Electoral Justice
• Further Reading
  

 

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U.S. Electoral Systems

National Legislature

The U.S. legislature is bicameral, consisting of a lower house (the House of Representatives) and an upper house (the Senate). Members of both houses are elected using a plurality system with single member districts (First Past the Post or FPTP). 

The House of Representatives (the House, Congress, or HoR) has 435 voting members elected to two-year terms. Following a census every ten years, these seats are apportioned according to population among the 50 states. There are additional delegates with limited rights from the U.S. territories and District of Columbia.

The Senate has two members elected from each U.S. state. Terms are staggered such that one-third of the Senate is elected every two years. No more than one Senator is elected from any state in a given year.

President and Vice President

To understand the system used for U.S. Presidential Elections, it is best to consider elections for President and Vice President as an amalgamation of 51 separate yet simultaneous elections. The president is not directly elected by popular vote, being instead indirectly elected by a special body called the Electoral College. This system is truly unique; indeed the U.S. is the only presidential democracy in the world that uses an electoral college to elect an executive head of state.

Voters in each state as well as the District of Columbia (Washington, DC) elect electors to the college. Ballot design varies, some votes select presidential candidates, in others, they select parties. In 48 of 50 states, electors are sent as a block: the winning candidate’s party chooses all of the electors. In two other states, Maine and Nebraska, the electors are partially chosen on a district basis and partially on a state-wide basis. A state’s number of electors (relative voting power) is equal to its number of federal legislators (House members plus Senators).  Washington DC, which is not a state, has representation in the Electoral College as if it were a state. 

[+] Click here for further details on U.S. state and local election systems

Electors subsequently elect the president by absolute majority; that election will occur on December 15th.In the unlikely event of a tie, the legislature decides the winner.

 

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U.S. Legal Framework for Elections

The federal constitution mandates much of the key aspects including direct elections for legislature, the Electoral College, and the voting age (18 years.) Likewise, courts have interpreted a constitutional “equal protection” clause as affecting some aspects of electoral management.

Federal laws mandate the number of members in the U.S. House and the formula by which they are apportioned to each state. They also mandate single-member districts, compel jurisdictions to protect the voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities, and to print ballots in multiple languages where necessary. Finally, since 2002, federal law provides states with financial incentives to meet certain equipment and administration standards.

Other provisions flow from federal court decisions. These include equal apportionment, matters related to voter registration and ID, whether state legislatures must respect decisions by voters about Electoral College members, and specific ways in which boundary delimitation must affect the voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities.

There is a great deal of further variation at the state and local levels. Usually this affects registration, early and absentee voting, and ballot access provisions. Some municipalities, however, allow non-citizen residents to vote in local elections. Finally some states forbid convicted felons from voting.

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U.S. Electoral Management Structures

Primary authority is with local governments, but the legal framework imposes some obligations on these officials. While state governments are a common focal point for electoral management, their effective control is often weak. American University’s Robert Pastor called the system “decentralized to the point of being dysfunctional.”

Responsibility for electoral management and core funding, from registration to results, is shared between 50 state and 13,000 local governments. The EMB model is governmental or mixed, meaning either appointed or elected officials or multi-partisan commissions manage the process. 

At the state level, responsibility for oversight and confirmation of results is with an elected or appointed, partisan Secretary of State, who is a member of the state executive. Less frequently these duties are with boards of elections. Because most states’ chief electoral officers are often elected officials, it is not uncommon for him or her to publically campaign while overseeing an election.

Nationally, the Federal Electoral Commission regulates political finance disclosure and, when candidates accept it, public funding. Following controversies over voting equipment in the 2000 federal election, an Electoral Assistance Commission now establishes equipment standards and best management practices, but it cannot formally enforce them.

While EMBs are not structurally independent, they generally work impartially with relatively infrequent exceptions in the modern era. Nonetheless, mistakes and malfeasance, whether actual or perceived, have called elections’ legitimacy into question. Indeed, 27 percent of Americans polled in the 2004 post-election period believed the presidential voting process was unfair.

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U.S. Boundary Delimitation

State legislatures are responsible for delimitation, though some legislatures delegate the authority to a multi-party or judicial commission. In all cases, new boundaries take the form of a bill, which governors must sign into law. Federal boundary delimitation conventionally follows the census every 10 years, but some states in recent years have redrawn boundaries at other times, for partisan advantage, known as gerrymandering, or to correct for changes in population.

Federal law dictates some of the criteria authorities use when delimiting legislative boundaries. These include population equity, boundary contiguousness, and racial and ethnic minority representation. The latter is the most controversial, requiring that districts be drawn specifically to ensure descriptive minority representation.  

Jurisdictions may apply other criteria. Usually they specify a hierarchy of criteria since some may be in conflict. These criteria include compactness (minimizing the distance between the farthest apart points in a district), respect for political subdivisions like municipalities and counties, and respect for communities of interest.

States using independent, multi-party or judicial commissions have had mixed results. On one hand, “independent redistricting” has enhanced public confidence. On the other, it has not relieved tensions among conflicting boundary delimitation criteria, and has not made elections more competitive overall.

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U.S. Voter Registration

The federal constitution forbids age or gender restrictions on voting rights for any citizen of at least 18 years, though some states restrict specific groups including those convicted of serious crimes. Registration is self-initiated and not compulsory. Most states require citizens to register by some deadline well in advance of an election, though a few permit same-day or Election Day registration, and one does not conduct registration at all

There are various governmental efforts to encourage registration. The federal National Voter Registration Act offers citizens opportunities to register at public service centres, like driver’s license centres.

Recent controversies have concerned the fairness and partisan effects of registration regulations. For example, states require different forms of identification. Proponents argue this controls fraud, and detractors argue it depresses turnout among poor and elderly voters who are less likely to obtain these forms. Another recent controversy stems from the requirement in some states that a voter’s name on his or her identification match, character for character, his or her name in the voter file. Partisan differences have cropped up as well; Democrats generally promote increased access to the polls (believed to favour Democratic candidates) while Republicans are generally concerned about potential for fraud (stricter standards are believed to favour Republican candidates).

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U.S. Voting Operations

The greatest controversies surround the rise and fall of electronic touch-screen voting machines. Following mechanical failures in punch-card machines during the 2000 election, many EMBs used federal support to purchase “direct recording equipment,” or touch-screen computer systems. When concerns surrounding the use of these machines arose in 2004, some counties transitioned again, this time to optically scanned paper ballots. As a result of this expensive process, many poll workers in 2008 will be managing new and potentially unfamiliar equipment.

In addition, the expected high turnout will tax the capacities of polling centres and poll workers. In the run-up to the 2008 polls, many EMBs are experiencing difficulty recruiting enough staff to manage projected turnout. 

Some experts say we should see November 4^th not as the days the polls open, but the days that the polls close, because nearly 1 out of 3 voters are expected to vote early through early walk-in, mail voting, or absentee voting. Indeed two states (Oregon and Washington) will vote almost entirely by mail. 

 

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U.S. Electoral Justice

The Electoral College impacts the resolution of disputes on the presidential level. By dividing a national election into 51 localized contests, the national outcome can hinge on the result in a few small places. The 2000 presidential election is a good example where the national election depended on the outcome in the state of Florida; likewise the 2004 race depended on the winner in the state of Ohio. In close races, the margin of victory may approach or exceed the margin of administrative error. These conditions contribute to an environment ripe for litigation.

Since 2000, electoral dispute resolution has taken on a high public profile. Legal challenges to registration drives, ballot access and polling practices have become accepted campaign strategies. In fact, the number of court cases regarding elections nearly tripled from 1996 to 2004. In the run-up to November 2008, both major parties have nationally deployed robust legal teams ready to dispute processes, especially in contested “swing states.”

 

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Further Reading

• Election Preview 2008.  This preview of the 2008 election provides a comprehensive look at the rules, technology, registration figures and issues to watch in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Pew / Electionline.org
  
• The US Administration of Elections: Decentralized to the Point of Being Dysfunctional.  Robert A. Pastor / International IDEA.
• Focus on US Elections.  ElectionGuide.org
• OSCE/ODIHR: Limited observation of general elections in the United States of America

 

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On the lighter side:

• RECOUNT: The Story of the 2000 Presidential Election.  Two-time Oscar®-winner Kevin Spacey leads an outstanding cast in this illuminating, highly entertaining film that pulls back the veil on the headlines to explore the human drama surrounding the most controversial presidential election in U.S. history.

Voter Registration in Afghanistan

Background

Subsequent to the Bonn agreement, the United Nations Development Program was given a pivotal role in helping to establish viable governance structures in Afghanistan.  Among these efforts was support to the 2004 Presidential and 2005 Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections.  Both elections were a success with large voter turnout and nationally accepted results.  The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was tasked with political oversight of the elections process, with UNDP holding responsibility for the execution of the 2004 Presidential elections and managing all resource mobilization and donor relations for the 2005 Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections.  UNOPS was the implementing agent for all electoral activities in 2005.

In June 2008, 65 donors met in Paris in order to reiterate the commitments under the Afghan Compact and “underlined the importance of holding of elections in 2009 and 2010 as a crucial step to consolidate democracy for all Afghans.  The international community pledged its strong support to help make the elections free, fair and secure.”

With less than a year to go before the second cycle of elections to be held in Afghanistan in almost three decades, UNDP continues to build capacity of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); established in 2005 according to Presidential Decree 21 and replacing the former Joint Election Management Body (JEMB) [1]  which managed the electoral process in 2004 and 2005.  The current task of UNDP is to provide advisors to the IEC in order to strengthen capacity to design and implement a sustainable national voter registration programme. This programme will inform and engage the Afghan public and deliver a credible voter register in time for national elections in 2009 and 2010.  UNDP will further support the IEC in the delivery of credible, sustainable electoral processes in 2009 and 2010.  Furthermore it will support the broader electoral framework through capacity building, engagement with and support to civic and voter education, media development, political parties, domestic observation and other emerging issues.

Voter Registration

Due to time constraints and delays in political decisions on when to hold the elections, it was decided in late June the IEC would only be able to conduct an update of the current voter register of 12.5million voters.  Unfortunately a new registration exercise was not feasible and UNDP was tasked with assisting the IEC to develop an update which would allow the current information of registrants to be built upon and eventually establish a register which would be sustainable and meet international standards

The voter registration exercise which commenced on October 6, 2008, in 14 provinces is split into four one month phases.  The exercise will close on February 2, 2009, in order to allow enough time to produce a register and allow for commencement of candidate nomination; to begin in March 2009.  The rationale behind the four phases was principally to ensure the Afghan National Police (ANP) were able to secure all voting registration centres around the country.  Currently the ANP has only 30,000 people which would have diverted essential police manpower from the day to day police work if the voter registration exercise had taken place simultaneously across the country.

Another contributing factor towards the decision to use a phased approach is the climate.  In the central and northern regions, winter tends to arrive by late October, therefore if registration had commenced any later in these regions it would have the potential to disenfranchise many potential registrants in accessing the registration centres.   Finally, due to the decision of having a phased approach, the IEC is able to take note of lessons learned from each phase in order to improve their public outreach campaign and logistical arrangements according to the region.

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All Afghans are eligible to register who:

• Have turned 18 since the last registration or will turn 18 before September 2009
• Not registered before
• Returned to Afghanistan since the last registration
• Moved to a new province
• Lost their old registration card

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Afghanistan has a potential of approximately 15 million voters.  The voter registration exercise aims to register over 2 million new registrants and perhaps 3 million voters who have either lost their card or have changed provinces since the last election.  Although voters were not attached to any particular polling station in the last cycle of elections, all new registrants and those eligible to register according to the above criteria (in box above) will be assigned to a polling station.  To this end, a proportion of the population will know exactly where they will vote on Election Day, allowing the IEC to prepare more adequately for the supply and transportation of ballot papers.  Those who have previously registered will still be free to choose the polling station where they would like to vote within the province they have registered; however, in the future, the IEC will strive for all registrants to be assigned a polling station so polling station lists will be available and logistics for allocation of ballot papers will be easily facilitated.  The current and future use of biometrical data, such as fingerprinting and facial scanning will further facilitate the IEC to flush out any multiple entrants in the system.

Challenges

The start of the voter registration process exceeded all expectations, and to date no major incidents have been reported.  The process, though, has not been without its challenges and further challenges lie ahead.  One of the major challenges was opening voter registration centres (VRC) on time.  Of the 261 sites included in the first phase, only 204 centres were able to open on the first day.  Within six days of the process, a further 40 were active, signifying that a total of nearly 94% of the centres  are registering potential voters.  The various centres still not open face logistical and security issues.

 Within six days nearly 94% of voter registration centres were operational.

The challenges of security in a country like Afghanistan are always difficult.  Nevertheless, thus far, security incidents during voter registration (VR) have been minimal. The combination of a phased approach and the selection of “green” security permissible provinces in the first phase limited the number of potential incidents.  In later phases security incidents are expected to  increase; especially in the Eastern (Phase 3) and Sothern (Phase 4) regions. At this time, the main challenge facing VR is the coordination of VR activities with supporting security agencies, primarily the Ministry of Interior (MoI).

The Independent Election Commission’s (IEC) voter operations centre (VROC) was set up on the day VR commenced (6 Oct 08). Had it been set up at least a month earlier, many coordination issues could have been solved (e.g. coordination of police escorts and air movements). The lack of an IEC VROC or a field operations representative at the MoI’s table-top exercise (TTX) on September 25, 2008, was a missed opportunity to tighten coordination between the IEC and supporting security actors (MoI, MoD, NDS and ISAF). MoI plans to conduct a TTX prior to each VR Phase (the next is scheduled for October 16, 2008). The TTXs are important in order to capture and implement lessons learned from previous phases after a thorough action review process.  Failure to improve coordination between the IEC and the MoI will have serious consequences as VR progresses into more unstable provinces in the remaining phases.

In addition, communication is proving quite difficult in the Afghan context.  Communication between HQ and Provincial Electoral Officers (PEO) and between PEOs and District Field Coordinators (DFCs) has proved difficult.  As a result, the figures of the registration process are not yet perceived to be a true reflection of the figures on the ground.  Nevertheless on October 16, 2008, the IEC reported 215,610 people had registered to vote in the 14 provinces covered under Phase I.  The provinces of Kunar, Takhar, Badakshan and Kapisa reported the highest turnout rates due to a combination of support from local government and effective public outreach campaign.  According to the IEC, the majority were reportedly first-time registrants and an estimated 27% were women.

  

A woman poses for her photograph during voter registration

Gender

Of the approximately 250,000 registrants less than a third were women.  The figures to date are also much lower than they were for both men and women in the 2004 and 2005 registration efforts.  There are a few provinces with a higher than average turnout, and research is being conducted as to the possible reasons why to see if lessons can be learned to apply to the next ten provinces to enter the second phase of voter registration in November.  The low turnout for women is a disappointment, as many efforts to increase female participation were put into effect.  As a direct result of the low turnout figures for women so far, the campaign to attract women to the voter registration centres is being stepped up.  It is hoped that at the beginning of November a religious decree will be issued by the Ministry of Haj which will encourage all women to register and, more importantly, for male relatives to allow their women to register.  Other initiatives will be to increase the number of radio spots on women’s participation and to work in close coordination with religious and community leaders to encourage and increase awareness of the importance of women’s participation in the process.

Improving participation of women and men in the voter registration process is key to the success of the overall process.  Apart from the pertinent security challenges which face Afghans, apathy towards the election process is increasingly evident.  This concern is echoed by all stakeholders involved in the process.  As a consequence, the interest in the voter registration exercise by Afghans will set the first benchmark as to possible participation in the election process due to enter its first cycle in September 2009.  The holding of second elections are always expected to draw less attention than the first, however the success of a second election will definitively illustrate that the Afghan people have progressed from a transitional government to a society capable of embracing the ideals of democracy.  Nevertheless, true indicators of a fully fledged democracy will require more than successful elections and will necessitate a commitment by both the future government of Afghanistan and the continued support of the international community  to work together far beyond the upcoming electoral process. 

Mexico's New Electoral Reform and the Contribution of the Federal Electoral Institute

by Manuel Carrillo and Carlos Navarro 

Mexico faced several difficulties after the July 2006 presidential elections which intensified clamors and exigencies for review and adaptation of an adequate legal framework for a highly competitive multi-party system.  In light of such demand, all political forces represented in Congress passed, by majority vote, an important package of constitutional reforms ensuring greater equity and better control mechanisms for elections, this past September.

 

With approved constitutional reforms, to be followed shortly by important adjustments to the electoral law, Congress honored the commitment it made last December to integrally review and adapt the legal framework for elections in Mexico. In order to support the reform process and encourage productive deliberations within Congress, the IFE conducted a national survey on electoral modernization and reform.

 

The survey was based on the fundamental idea that all interested citizens, including representatives of political parties, legislators, experts and general public, could express their opinions and suggestions in improving and strengthening the electoral system.  In order to fulfill these objectives, the IFE formed a working group of electoral councilors and representatives from national political parties and the IFE General Council Legislative Branch.  This group was responsible for defining the agenda, format and requirements for the “National Forum for Reflection and Analysis on Electoral Modernization and Reform.”

 

In order to encourage broad participation, the working group publicly promoted a national invitation on March 14, 2007, in each of the 32 federal states. The invitation listed all aspects related to participation in the Forum. In order to focus presentation and analysis of the proposals, six areas were delineated:

 

1. Electoral procedures: registration, organization and logistics of elections, voting abroad and the structure of the IFE
2. Generation and dissemination of electoral results: publishing of preliminary results, surveys, vote counting and official tallying of results
3. Campaigns: conditions of equity and access to media for electoral advertisement and duration and regulation of campaigns
4. Regulation: of political parties and national political associations in areas of prerogatives and obligations, funding and oversight of campaigns, monitoring media and guarantees of transparency and accountability
5. Citizen participation: electoral participation, civic education and the different aspects of civic participation in the electoral process
6. Resolution of controversies: electoral justice, sanctions, declaration of validity, causes of election annulment and other electoral offenses

 

The forum consisted of three sessions: April 25-27, 2007, for areas 1 and 2; May 30 to June 1 for areas 3 and 4; and June 20-22 for areas 5 and 6. All proposals had to be received and registered at IFE offices countrywide, prior to the forums. IFE offices were tasked with logistics management in order to hold simultaneous public sessions in all 32 states. In order to facilitate preparation of the proposals, IFE offered a series of technical diagnostics on each of the six topics, as well as support materials on its website (www.ife.org.mx).

 

It is important to note that given the interest Mexicans living abroad showed in participating in this survey, the workgroup decided to issue a special notice.  The special notice allowed Mexican ex-patriots to present their diagnostics and suggestions for reform and modernization of the Mexican electoral system. Mexicans living abroad had July 27, 2007, as their deadline to e-mail proposals to IFE.

 

The final result of the survey was the receipt of 3,420 proposals reflecting on modernization and reform of the country’s electoral system.  Proposals came from a complete cross-section of Mexican society, ranging from legislators, to representatives of political parties, to academics, experts, students, the general public and Mexicans living abroad.

 

The distribution of proposals per topic is shown in the chart below:

Electoral procedures	1,336	39.0%
Generation and dissemination of electoral results	195	5.7%
Campaigns, conditions of equity and the media	673	19.7%
Regulation of political parties and national political associations: prerogatives and obligations	332	9.7%
Civic Participation	673	19.7%
Resolution of controversies, electoral justice and penalties	199	6.1%
No specific topic	12	0.1%

 

As a follow-up to this initiative, the workgroup agreed to carry out an International Seminar to analyze aspects related to the six topics from an international comparative perspective and from the perspective of Mexican opinion leaders. The International Seminar on Electoral Reform was carried out in IFE facilities in Mexico City from August 21-23, 2007, in collaboration with UNDP-Mexico, the EU, IIDH-CAPEL, as well as representatives of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Mexico and the Special Prosecutor for Electoral Offenses of the General Attorney’s Office (FEPADE).

 

As expected, all the proposals presented in the National Forum and in the International Seminar formed the basis for a final report which included technical studies prepared by IFE and reports prepared by domestic and international observers of Mexico’s 2006 federal elections. The final report was delivered to parliamentary leaders August 31, 2007, a day before the ordinary session of Congress started.

 

On September 12, 2007, after intense debate and negotiation, the Senate approved constitutional reforms with significant adjustments and modifications on various electoral matters.  The new reform cut the length of presidential campaigns almost by half, gave the IFE power to regulate party primaries, cut public funding to political parties and banned all political advertising outside of officially arranged time slots. 

 

It is expected that all necessary procedures for approval and promulgation of constitutional reforms will be finished in the following weeks. On this basis, the reforms will be immediately discussed, agreed, and added to the electoral legislation, so that can be in place for the 2009 midterm election. As a result, Mexico will have a more comprehensive and strict legal framework to face the challenges of a growing and intense electoral contest.  The new legal framework will offer better electoral service that contributes to strengthening and enhancing the quality of democracy.

United Nations holds Electoral Dispute Resolution Workshop in Vienna

The 7^th Global Forum on Reinventing Government: Building Trust in Government, held in Vienna, Austria, from 25-29 June 2007, facilitated a workshop on electoral dispute resolution mechanisms. The workshop was attended by distinguished participants such as chairpersons and members of Electoral Commissions from countries and regions around the world as well as well as representatives of international organizations such as OSCE/ODIHR, UN, UNDP, International IDEA, NDI, IFES, EISA, IDASA, ACEEEO, ENEMO and ERIS.

 

The workshop provided an opportunity to exchange ideas and experiences on various aspects of electoral dispute resolution such as: international standards, best practices, formal and informal mechanisms to solve electoral disputes concerning electoral results. Four sessions were held consisting of a short presentation made by the panelists, a Q&A session and open group discussion.

 

Workshop Findings

• A comprehensive approach to electoral dispute resolution (EDR) must consider the entire electoral cycle
• EDR systems should be designed in a way to enable relevant bodies to exercise their duties throughout the electoral period
• EDR mechanisms must include both political EDR systems and legal EDR systems

 

Political EDR systems are those where a political assembly is ultimately responsible for judging electoral related disputes, often through certification of elections results.

 

Legal EDR systems may consist of various models, such as:

• Constitutional Courts or Constitutional Councils
• Specialized electoral courts: courts with a specific mandate to resolve electoral disputes.
• Judicial EDR systems: where complaints and appeals are handled by ordinary courts of justice
• Administrative EDR systems: disputes are handled by administrative bodies (usually EMBs) with final election decisions powers.  
• Ad hoc provisional bodies: established domestically or by the international community to resolve a specific electoral conflict or deal with transitional elections

 

Each country chooses the system best suited to its circumstances.  In doing so, there are five criteria to consider while setting up mechanisms to increase confidence and trust in the electoral process, those called to administer it, and those elected from it. These principles include:

• Independence and impartiality in the establishment of EDR bodies
• Accountability and transparency
• Integrity and professionalism
• Clear and enforceable sanctions
• Procedural principles and actions in regards to swift consideration of complaints, possibility of appeal, public hearings, and decisions based on legal frameworks

 

In addition, political will and engaged political parties are ultimately necessary for any EDR mechanism to function effectively. Political parties participate in elections on the basis of accepting the rules of the game. Therefore they must address complaints through EDR mechanisms and accept the final decision. 

 

Discussions

Workshop discussions underlined the recent attention given to the use of conflict prevention and alternative dispute resolution techniques in the field of EDR. These techniques often fall outside core electoral legal mechanisms and are founded on political rather than legally binding methods, such as codes of conduct for political parties or for domestic observers. Additionally, such mechanisms can include the summoning of political party committees by electoral authorities for consultation purposes or mediation techniques to tackle serious differences among stakeholders on issues related to the electoral process. The use of these strategies and methodologies in the context of electoral processes is new and deserves attention. However, it is also important to emphasize that these strategies should operate in line with the electoral legal framework and in recognition of the role and authority of the institutional mechanisms set up to redress electoral disputes.

 

The workshop also highlighted the importance of civic and voter education programs which ultimately enhance the credibility of candidates as well. In the future, these programs should contain information regarding EDR mechanisms and provide details about institutions responsible for addressing electoral complaints, appeals and the steps necessary to file them. EDR bodies should enhance transparency of the process by publishing their deliberations and decisions to complement the programs.  And finally, the role for civil society in civic and voter education campaigns should remain central to ensure the increase of overall credibility of the electoral process.

 

Identified Next Steps:

• A follow-up discussion among partners of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network project to single out EDR as an in-depth topic area for analysis and reference.
• Further discussion and work are necessary to examine the introduction of conflict prevention techniques and alternative dispute resolution methodologies to electoral managers.
• Discussions should focus on the broader topic of how electoral managers can be oriented and better prepared to help manage conflict and limit violence. 

 

For further information on the event, including copies of the presentations and background materials and the integral version of the final report on the event, please visit http://sdnhq.undp.org/governance/elecs/edr/index.html.

 

 

 

 

Sierra Leone's 2007 Elections

August 11, 2007, was a historical day for Sierra Leone as it successfully held its first post-war presidential and parliamentary elections, fully organized, supported and conducted by the country’s National Electoral Commission (NEC).  Shortly thereafter, on September 8, 2007, the NEC held a presidential run-off election in which Mr. Ernest Bai Koroma, the candidate of the All People’s Congress (APC), the lead opposition party, won with 55 percent of the votes. Merely hours after the announcement of Mr. Koroma’s victory, the outgoing President, Mr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah acknowledged defeat of his ruling party, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), and congratulated his successor. This peaceful transfer of power, through the ballot box, from one government to the next, constitutes a clear indicator of democratic development and sustainable peace in the West African nation.

 

Parliamentary elections saw additional victory for the APC, which obtained 59 of the 112 “ordinary” seats, while the SLPP and the People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) received 43 and 10 seats, respectively. The 12 remaining seats were allocated to representatives of the Paramount Chiefs, elected in a separate election.

 

The elections were largely considered “peaceful, transparent and credible” by national and international observers,[1] notwithstanding isolated clashes between political party supporters, irregularities in some areas, logistical difficulties due to weather conditions and poor infrastructure. The 75 percent turnout rate on Election Day demonstrated the determination of the citizens of Sierra Leone to participate in free and fair elections as well as their confidence in the institution in charge of the electoral process. Earlier this year, 91 percent of the 2.8 million eligible voters (of which 49 per cent were women) turned out to register during the voter registration exercise.

 

Under the leadership of NEC Chairperson Ms. Christiana Thorpe, the professionalism and dedication of NEC staff, including 37,243 polling staff, were the determining factors of success in this election.  Other entities, such as the Political Parties Registration Committee (PPRC), the national and district Political Parties Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees (DCMC) and the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) played a crucial role in mitigating intra- and inter-political party disputes and diffusing election-related tensions. These actions greatly contributed to the level of peace during elections.

 

The single biggest setback, however, was the failure of political parties to nominate an equitable number of female candidates. As a result, out of 556 candidates for the parliamentary election, only 64 were women and no female candidate participated in the presidential race. This situation directly contributed to a 12 percent decrease in the number of elected women, with only 16 deputies in the current Parliament.

 

International Assistance: UN’s Role

Following a request from the Government of Sierra Leone, the United Nations (UN) provided assistance in preparation and execution of the elections.  This was provided through the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Electoral Assistance Division (EAD).

 

A team of 51 UN electoral advisers provided technical assistance to the NEC and to the PPRC throughout the electoral process. This assistance included:

• Advisory services for the electoral budget
• Operational plans and procedures for different phases of the process
• Design and procurement of voter education, training and polling materials.
• Delivery of voting materials to polling centers located in remote areas, via UN helicopters
• Training for NEC staff, PPRC Commissioners, polling centers managers, presiding officers and polling agents 

In addition, UNDP-Sierra Leone managed a basket fund aimed at supporting the electoral process. This mechanism was used by several of Sierra Leone’s development partners to channel their financial contributions to the electoral process.

 

Throughout the electoral process, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Victor Angelo, and the NEC Chairperson jointly chaired meetings bringing together domestic and international stakeholders. During the electoral campaign, the UN radio produced election-related programmes and provided equal access and airtime to all political contestants.

 

The Way Forward

Although Sierra Leonean electoral institutions demonstrated their ability to successfully run major electoral events, the NEC recently expressed the need for a certain degree of technical assistance from the international community for its 2008 local elections.  The local elections will be instrumental in strengthening local democracy and governance in the country. To ensure sustained peace, the new government, in collaboration with international partners, should devise a programme for long-term, sustainable national electoral capacity building in Sierra Leone for the NEC and other institutions.

Iraq’s Election Commission Battled Fraud in 2005 Election Cycle

One of the most important elements of a post-conflict election is public trust in the process. If citizens and rival groups have confidence that an election has been free and fair, they are less likely to reject the election and turn to violence to secure outcomes they view as just. Unlike some of Iraq’s other public institutions, the country’s Independent Electoral Commission (IECI) successfully delivered its services—three elections in 2005—whose outcomes Iraqis appeared to trust, as evidenced by their growing participation rates over the course of the year. Its ability to generate that public confidence has several causes, but its battle against electoral fraud was one important, and often overlooked, factor.

 

Mechanisms to Build Voter Trust in the Process

 

Electoral fraud not only can impact the number of votes a party/candidate receives but also (if widespread enough) can de-legitimize a post-conflict election and lead to renewed violence. The IECI recognized the importance of establishing mechanisms to protect against fraud. Just as importantly, it understood the importance of informing the public about these mechanisms and implementing a complaint adjudication process to respond directly to citizens’ concerns.

 

The IECI used a range of mechanisms to reduce the opportunity for fraud and identify it should it occur. These include:

 

1. Tally Monitoring: Any polling stations whose vote tallies were particularly low or higher than its number of registered voters were quarantined for further examination.
2. Audit Teams: Iraqi staff, accompanied by international advisors, conducted audits of selected ballot boxes and the forms completed at polling stations after election day and visited staff before polling day. Polling stations that had encountered trouble in the past were especially targeted for audits.
3. Complaint Procedures: The IECI set up a system to collect, process, and investigate citizen complaints about irregularities in the electoral process.
4. Election Observers: The IECI certified both domestic and international monitors to observe the voting process. In December 2005, there were 300,000 domestic and 700 international observers.
5. Random Pollworker Selection: People were selected to work in the polling centers by lottery in order to minimize the possibility of regional or sectarian bias.

 

Most of these mechanisms function out of the public eye, with the significant exception of the process of receiving and adjudicating complaints. In practice, complaints rarely lead to discoveries of fraud that actually impact the outcome of an election. This is generally the case because, if complaints uncover fraud, it affects fewer votes than are needed to change the allocation of seats. In Iraq, this was the case. The monitoring of polling station tallies identified problems that complaints did not, and more ballot boxes were voided as a result of that mechanism than as a result of complaints.

 

	January 2005 presidential election	October 2005 constitutional referendum	December 2005 legislative elections
Voter turnout	8,286,156	9,852,291	11,888,911
Complaints filed	430	158	1,985

 

However, the complaint often confirmed suspicions that arose from the tally room audits, and tally sheets often definitively confirmed or negated the allegations in a complaint.  The complaint process allows citizens and parties the opportunity to be part of the battle against electoral fraud and therefore can play an important role in building public trust in the electoral system. The process of collecting and adjudicating complaints—if conducted properly—accomplishes three goals that are important in the transition from conflict to peaceful governance: (1) it helps establish trust between citizens and their government, which is a prerequisite to stability,[1] (2) it demonstrates that the election administration does respond to citizen concerns, and (3) it is an opportunity for a government, by allowing an independent election process that includes complaints, to demonstrate its institutional integrity and transparency.

 

This is certainly not to say that an electoral complaints process can solve the ills that are endemic to failed states, but rather the process offers the public a window into the performance of a transitional institution as it seeks to build confidence in government in the midst of what is hoped will be a transition to peace.

 

The Election Complaints Process

 

The IECI faced many challenges that limited its ability to establish the mechanisms responsible for adjudicating election complaints. For example, the small number of experienced election workers available limited the IECI’s ability to process complains as rapidly as it wished. In addition, the security situation limited the number of people willing to work in the Green Zone (the heavily fortified area where the Commission is located).

 

However, the IECI did establish workable procedures that its available staff could carry out and achieved some notable successes. According to the International Mission for Iraqi Elections, making clear which organizations have jurisdiction over the different components of the complaints procedures is key to the success of the process. They found that the IECI had established a solid legal framework that generally defined clear jurisdictions. In addition, the legal framework gave the IECI the authority it needed to act effectively to investigate and resolve complaints.

 

Submitting complaints

 

The complaints process improved incrementally with each new electoral event in 2005. For the October referendum and December legislative elections, Iraqis were offered several methods to submit a complaint: (1) they could complete a complaints form at the polling station, which was placed with the counting forms, (2) they could submit a handwritten complaint at the governorate or national electoral offices, or (3) they could submit a complaint by email. To ensure the complaint was credible, it had to meet several conditions. First, it had to be filed by a direct witness whose name was stated (though not made public) and second, it had to be submitted within three days of the incident.

 

In the December elections, complaints received at the polling stations were put in a tamper-evident bag (rather than an envelope as previously) for more secure transportation to the complaints offices.

 

Processing complaints

 

Both the ratio of complaints to staff and the desire to process complaints expeditiously required that the IECI develop a method to prioritize complaints and quickly identify and investigate those that could affect a result. A team made up of an Iraqi lawyer, an international legal expert, and a translator divided the complaints into two categories: “red” and “non-red.” The team’s goal was to ensure that every complaint was seen within two hours of receipt.

 

“Red” complaints were issues such as interference with a ballot box before or after polling hours, which affected a significant number of ballots and therefore could impact an election’s outcome. “Non-red” complaints might be incidents that, although serious breaches of election law, impacted only a few votes and therefore were unlikely to change any results.

 

Corroborating complaints

 

Every time a red complaint was identified, complaints staff would check with the audit process, tally center staff, and observers to see if other reports from the same area could corroborate the submitted complaint. Despite these efforts, it was not easy to substantiate claims in a country where the rule of law was barely functioning.

 

In the December elections, 58 complaints were classified as “red” and investigated. Many of them resulted in the cancellation of polling station results and/or the punishment of election officials.

 

Types of complaints

 

The IECI received complaints covering a wide range of offenses, including ballot box stuffing/theft, tally sheet tampering, intimidation, violence, voter list deficiencies, shortage of ballots, multiple voting, improper conduct of the police and Iraqi National Guard, voting by security forces who had previously voted (on the special voting day), campaigning within polling centers, and campaigning on the two days of prescribed silence before election day.

 

In December, many complaints came from a few geographic areas, where local actors had learned to stuff ballot boxes with fraudulent ballots more effectively from the experience of their fellow citizens in January. By October, ballot stuffing had become more sophisticated. In several locations, people stuffed the boxes before the polling center opened. In doing so, some of them created a vote distribution that was not credible, revealing their fraud. However, in one instance, aware of this potential problem, a group ensured a ballot box had about 400 ballots “cast” for one party and about 100 for other parties (polling stations usually had about 500 registered voters). However, their activity was detected through complaints and the box in question was voided.  Other less experienced con artists completed forms showing 600-nil results, an optimism that was revealing.

 

The benefits of good planning and experience

 

The IECI’s experience over the course of the three 2005 elections and its establishment of solid procedures paid off. Even in December 2005, when the IECI received 1,985 complaints, the complaints office was able to classify, investigate and act on the “red” complaints within 15 days of election day. (The marked increase in complaints, from 158 in October, does not necessarily indicate more problems with the electoral process; almost certainly, it indicated a greater public awareness of the complaints process.)  

Lessons for Transitional Environments

 

Iraq’s experience shows that a healthy complaints process that functions efficiently and quickly can result in a public feeling that the process was generally fair and that fraud was often or usually detected. Despite initial objections about the handling of complaints by losing parties, these groups eventually accepted that it had been the voters, not the handling of complaints, that had reduced their share of the vote. The degree of public trust created may be debated, but we argue that the complaints process contributed to the successful administration of Iraq’s 2005 elections.

 

One key to that success seems to be the speed of the process. In Iraq, the prioritization of complaints that might impact election results proved effective in moving the process forward. However, the volume of complaints and short timeline means that the IECI will need a substantial staff (clerical and legal) to register, organize, and process complaints in the future.

 

The complaints process cannot always offer a remedy in post-conflict settings—and the public should understand this—but it can be effective in neutralizing fraud and bias, which can be a first step towards encouraging rival parties to accept election results and move towards resolution of their difference through legal, rather than violent, means.

 

The International Mission for Iraqi Elections evaluated all three elections of the 2005 cycle (including their complaints procedures) and issued several reports about their conclusions.

 

Michael Clegg is a lawyer and election expert with IFES. Langdon Miller is a Program Coordinator in IFES’ Europe & Asia division.

UN Offers Support to Timor-Leste for 2007 Elections

Timor-Leste has been a sovereign nation for five years and the United Nations has been working to enable the country’s electoral institutions to mount free and fair elections. In this way, the UN is working to build public confidence in the electoral process and thereby promote the peaceful continuation of the country’s political development.

Timor-Leste Develops Its Electoral Infrastructure

 

Since the 1999 referendum in which 78 percent of voters rejected greater autonomy within Indonesia—thus beginning the transition to independence—three elections have been held in Timor-Leste. In 2001, the United Nations (UNTAET) organized elections for a constituent assembly (which later became a legislative assembly), and in 2002, it organized presidential elections. Between December 2004 and September 2005, Timor-Leste held local elections. All three elections enjoyed high voter turnout (91 percent, 86 percent, and 84 percent, respectively).

 

The local elections were the first conducted in accordance with election law adopted by Timor-Leste’s legislature. In addition, by that time, the Timorese government had established the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE), which was given the responsibility to organise and carry out electoral processes as well as to consult and provide support in electoral matters for all elections and referenda. Because the constitution called for an independent organ to supervise voter registration and voting, the National Electoral Commission (CNE) was temporarily created specifically to supervise the electoral registration and regulations governing the 2004–2005 local elections. (On 15 January 2007, the CNE was re-created as a permanent body.)

 

Since 2005, and in line with its mandate as the country-level provider of democratic governance assistance to developing countries on behalf of the UN system, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office in Dili has been working with the government and electoral authorities to provide longer-term support in voter registration, voter education, electoral administration and other processes. This work was in anticipation of the 2007 elections but also aimed to help national institutions acquire the skills needed to prepare and administer elections into the future. 

 

Violence Alters Electoral Assistance Plans

 

However, the UN’s assistance strategy shifted when, in April and May 2006, violence broke out in Dili. Rooted in citizens’ frustration with poverty and unemployment as well as in tensions dating back to the struggle for independence, the violence led to killings, looting and burning of private homes and public institutions. On 11 June 2006, the Timorese government requested that a “robust United Nations police, military and civilian mission” be established in their country.[1] In response, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

 

The United Nations also stated that it “further encourages Timor-Leste to enact a set of electoral legislation which provides for the 2007 elections to be supervised, organized, administered and conducted in a free, fair and transparent manner, with due respect to the need to establish an independent mechanism, and reflects general consensus within Timor-Leste regarding the appropriate modalities for the 2007 electoral process.”[2] Given the presence of both UNMIT and UNDP in Timor-Leste, the responsibility for various aspects of electoral support needed to be properly divided between the two. 

 

UNMIT Support for the 2007 Elections

 

The 2006 political crisis served to damage even further public confidence in the impartiality and capacity of state institutions, including the STAE and CNE. During the 2004–2005 local elections, the STAE, which is part of the Ministry of State Administration, had been regarded by minority parties and others as close to the ruling party and therefore not impartial. During the same elections, the newly created CNE did not have sufficient funding to ensure its effectiveness. In addition, it was only an ad hoc, temporary creation, which was not reborn as a permanent one until early 2007. Given these circumstances, most Timorese stakeholders agreed that international assistance would be required for the 2007 nationwide elections.

 

UNMIT was charged with providing technical/logistical support to the electoral process, but it also concentrated its efforts on promoting public confidence in Timor-Leste’s electoral institutions. It considered four different methods of achieving its goals: (1) providing technical electoral assistance; (2) observing the electoral process; (3) “certifying” the electoral process; and (4) administering the elections itself. The fourth option, a UN-administered electoral process, had the disadvantage of building little or no local capacity to hold fair and transparent elections in the future. The best way to promote capacity-building as well as the integrity of the electoral process was a mix of options one and three: technical electoral assistance combined with “certification” of the electoral process.

 

Certification Process

 

Thus, the UN deploys a team of three experts to Timor-Leste at the end of each phase of the electoral process to determine whether matters are proceeding in a satisfactory manner. The following elements were considered for certification: (1) legal framework; (2) electoral authorities; (3) voter registration; (4) political party and candidate registrations; (5) campaign period; (6) polling-day activities; (7) ballot-tabulation procedures; and (8) adjudication of election challenges.

 

Technical Assistance

 

Alongside the certification process, technical assistance has been provided in the areas of general election administration and policy advice; legal framework (including regulations and procedures); voter registration and information technology; gender issues, including promoting the equal participation of women; operational planning and logistics; training; and field operations. UNMIT is also providing STAE and CNE with a total of 285 international experts in those aforementioned areas, 250 of whom are UN volunteers.

 

UNDP Support for the 2007 Elections

 

To respond appropriately to the Timorese government’s request for electoral assistance and at the same time complement UNMIT’s activities, UNDP has focused on (1) developing the institutional capacity of Timor-Leste’s electoral management bodies and (2) meeting the long-term needs of Timorese civil society groups involved in the electoral process. Its goals are to improve Timor-Leste’s ability to meet international standards with respect to legal and institutional components of the election process, strengthen the capacities of its electoral management bodies, and promote more effective donor coordination.

 

The 2007 electoral cycle began with the first round of the presidential election on April 9, 2007. Should none of the eight candidates earn more than 50 percent of the vote, a second round will be held within 30 days of the first. The more significant parliamentary elections—more significant because they will determine the identity of the more powerful prime minister—are scheduled for mid-year. The UNDP has been working in close coordination with national authorities to guarantee timely support to all phases of the electoral process.

 

Assistance to STAE and CNE

 

In activities that complement those of UNMIT, UNDP has provided the STAE and CNE with international advisors knowledgeable about voter education, graphic design, political parties, international/domestic observers, and media and has supplied funding for local staff in Dili and the districts. In addition, UNDP has and will continue to (1) help procure equipment and print voter registration forms, (2) enable effective communications for CNE and STAE headquarters by supplying landlines and mobile phone cards, and (3) print voter lists.

 

Voter Education

 

UNDP’s voter education advisor has counselled STAE on strategies to increase citizens’ awareness of voter registration. For example, the advisor discussed the most effective types of voter education messages and mechanisms for disseminating them. With this assistance, STAE designed and produced posters and TV/radio advertisements that educate voters about the registration process. Arrangements were also made with the national TV/radio agency (RTTL) and community radio stations to broadcast STAE’s information about voter registration.  In addition to these national channels, the UNDP advisor worked with UNMIT to ensure that voter education materials were distributed through the network of UNMIT volunteers in the districts. To develop local capacity to mount future voter education programs, 13 district voter education officers were recruited to work with STAE during these voter education activities.

 

Media

 

UNDP staff have worked closely with STAE and CNE to increase public awareness of the electoral process through widely publicized events. They have also endeavoured to increase journalists’ capacity to communicate this information effectively and impartially to the public, even working with the electoral authorities to establish a media code of conduct. To further assist the media, UNDP staff have helped establish sustainable mechanisms to distribute information about STAE and the CNE to local media in Dili and the districts, including creating a Web site that provides content to both journalists and voters.

 

Coordination of International and National Election Observers

 

UNDP’s program has also supported and coordinated the activities of both international and national election observers. Past experience in Timor-Leste suggests that between 150 and 200 international observers may come to observe parts of the 2007 election cycle. The International Observer Coordination Centre will provide them with briefings, access to logistical and demographic information about Timor-Leste’s 13 districts (geography, climate, population centres, accommodation, transport, communications, etc.), and information about the electoral process (laws, regulations, procedures, timetable, candidates, etc.). The Centre will be a place where observers can seek accreditation from STAE and security updates from the UN Police. In addition, it will provide a location where observers can coordinate their deployments to enable maximum coverage on election day.

 

As for national observers, contacts have been made with the principal coalition of national observers in order to plan and coordinate with reference to registration, training, accreditation, and the socialization of these processes.

 

Candidate and Political Party Resource Centres

 

As part of the UNDP effort to support candidates, parties and party coalitions competing in the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, resource centres will be established in Dili and three additional districts (Baucau, Oecusse, and Maliana).  These centres are designed to enable candidates and parties to participate more effectively in the political process. In them, candidates/parties can find material support and training in message development, preparing campaign staff, voter outreach, and other skills and campaign issues. The resource centres provide equal access to office supplies, computers, printers, photocopy machines, land/fax/Internet lines (where possible), and professional support in the design and reproduction of campaign materials (through the Dili centre). Training is also being given to parties in each of the country’s 13 districts.

 

Relevant Legislation

 

                                           

Created the STAE:	Ministerial Order No. 3/2004, 5 May 2004
Made the STAE part of the MSA:	Decree Law 2/2003, 23 July 2003
Created a temporary CNE:	Law 2/2004 on the Local Authorities
Created UNMIT:	UN Resolution 1704 (2006)
Created a permanent CNE:	Law 5/2006 on the Organs of Electoral Administration

                     

                               

                                                                               

Carlos Dinis works with UNDP’s Office in Timor Leste as a Programme Officer in Democratic Governance Unit. Linda Maguire works with the UNDP’s Democratic Governance Group (part of the Bureau for Development Policy) as an Electoral Advisor.

Strengthening Political Parties for Sustainable Democracy in Botswana

The southern African region has made significant democratic achievements since the 1990s following a wave of ferocious internal conflicts in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In order for this progress to be sustained, the region requires viable political parties, which play a key role in a democracy. The majority of parties currently in power in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region—such as the African National Congress in South Africa, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), the Lesotho Congress for Democracy, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Zambia’s Movement for Multiparty Democracy, and Namibia’s SWAPO Party—are powerful while their opposition parties are generally fragmented and weak. There is a clear need to provide technical assistance to opposition parties so that they can pose a significant challenge to the ruling parties in elections, but even ruling parties need help to improve their ability to carry out their mandates.  

 

It is against this background that the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) developed a programme aimed at strengthening political parties in the SADC region. This project is currently being implemented in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa. It focuses on five key components: gender representation, intra- and inter-party democracy, outreach activities, conflict management, and party leadership. This paper presents a brief case study of the project activities in Botswana.

 

Intra- and Inter-party Democracy

 

Despite Botswana’s much acclaimed political stability, its parties have always faced the problem of establishing democratic practices that support cooperation both inside and between their organizations, i.e., intra- and inter-party democracy. Instead, its parties have suffered the impact of rampant factionalism. At independence in 1965, the two major parties were the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) and the Bechuanaland People’s Party (BPP). (These parties are now called the Botswana Democratic Party and the Botswana People’s Party.) Prior to the 1965 elections, the BPP divided into two factions, which diminished its electoral strength and thereby gave the BDP an edge (Somolekae 2002; Selolwane and Shale 2007). In 1966, dissatisfied with the BPP’s factionalism, some of its members formed the Botswana National Front (BNF), hoping it would unite the splinter groups. However, the BNF did not succeed and instead fragmented into at least seven different parties itself.

 

Even after these many splits, clearly Botswana’s politicians had learned no lessons about how to remedy intra-party conflicts. Over the years, they have not created any mechanisms that would allow them to circumvent party infighting. Such factionalism continues to be widely acknowledged as one of the major challenges of Botswana’s party politics.

 

The Mirage of Party Unity

 

Four decades after independence, the BDP remains comfortably in charge of the government, while the opposition has continued to fragment into smaller parties with trivial electoral impact (judging by the number of votes they received in the 2004 elections). Although part of the BDP’s dominance is attributable to Botswana’s use of the first-past–the post electoral model, this electoral system is not the only factor that makes it difficult for opposition parties to make any headway in the polls. In addition, a lack of party funding and the external regulatory framework equally affect the performance of parties.

 

Despite these realities, the Achilles heel of the opposition parties is their failure to cooperate and form coalitions. Had opposition parties done this in the past, they would have won some constituencies from the ruling party (judging by their combined 2004 election results). Instead, opposition parties have a history of reneging on alliance agreements on the eve of or immediately after elections. Examples include the 2004 pact between the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM), BNF, and BPP and the 2005 memorandum of understanding signed by BAM, the Botswana Congress Party (BCP), BNF, and BPP. In both instances, the party leaders were not able to transcend their narrow self interests for the sake of broader party unity. (For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Selolwane and Shale 2007).

 

Given this background of party and coalition disunity, EISA conducted a workshop for political parties in Botswana in December 2006 with the objective of providing a platform for parties to discuss issues of common interest. In addition, participants were encouraged to identify and prioritise their capacity-building needs related to the program’s five primary components: gender representation, intra-/inter-party democracy, outreach activities, conflict management, and party leadership. The following sections describe the main issues that arose during the political parties’ workshop discussions.

                                                                               

Diagnosing Challenges

 

The workshop identified a number of challenges facing Botswana’s political parties, the most important of which were (1) the complex historical role of political parties and (2) inadequate governance mechanisms. In Africa’s colonial history, parties often played one of two roles, either they were created as an instrument to transfer power from colonial regimes to the locals or they were organisations formed by locals to fight colonialism. However, once colonialism—the original reason for the parties’ creation—had ended, they came to be seen as impediments to “nation building and development” because they were seen to perpetuate ethnic differences by serving the interests of a single ethnic group rather than the interests of the country as a whole.

 

With respect to party governance, workshop participants agreed that political parties needed greater internal democracy in the election/selection of party leaders. Much intra-party conflict is the result of power struggles between leaders, which leads to party splits. They also suggested that parties need more clearly defined governance structures, with clear horizontal and vertical linkages. (These governance structures impact much of the party’s function, including how women and young people are represented within the party.) Participants also recognised a need for a membership database, which would let party members know how many rank-and-file members they have and help them conduct better outreach. In general, workshop attendees agreed unanimously that it was a lack of intra-party democracy that in turn created a lack of inter-party democracy.

 

Suggested Solutions

 

Political party representatives agreed that party members need to develop technical skills. These skills will be primarily developed through support and training in areas such as leadership, conflict management, fundraising, organisation/mobilisation, and negotiation (particularly with respect to forming alliances). Workshop participants also recommended solutions to the challenges described above. These proposed solutions are briefly discussed below:

 

Gender

 

Participants noted that gender inequality still exists within all party structures in Botswana. They therefore recommended that a training programme be developed on gender equality for both men and women.

 

Intra-party Democracy and Inter-party Relations

 

Participants recognised how intra- and inter-party conflict has impacted the country’s opposition parties. They therefore recommended that EISA assist parties in institutionalising party activities, developing a political education programme, and developing a code of conduct for parties.

 

Public Outreach

 

Participants indicated that outreach remains a challenge for parties. Therefore, they recommended that a training programme be developed that addressed (among other things) the design of effective mechanisms for recruitment and mobilisation. In addition, because electoral success often depends on the amount of preparatory work done between elections, participants asked EISA to help develop simple, user-friendly voter/civic education programmes for rank-and-file members across all parties.

 

Leadership

 

Participants acknowledged the lack of visionary leadership in political parties. While they indicated that in most cases leaders are born not made, they agreed that much could be done to improve a person’s inherent leadership skills. A person could learn through programmes on leadership skills, organisational management skills, project management skills, fundraising strategies, and capacity-building skills.

 

Conflict Management

 

Participants believed urgent attention should be paid to the conflict that has not only crippled parties but is threatening the country as a whole. They recommended that EISA develop a conflict management programme to help parties develop negotiation and mediation skills.

 

Conclusion

 

Overall, in uncovering Botswana’s political parties’ understanding of the challenges they face and the possible solutions available to them, the workshop was a success. It is quite likely that Botswana’s experience fairly closely resembles the experience of political parties throughout the region. In addition, these parties also face additional challenges, such as party funding and external legal frameworks, which were not a focus of this project but equally impact their political performance.

 

Victor Shale is a researcher at EISA.

References

 

Selolwane, O. and V. Shale. 2007. “Inter-party relations and sustainable democracy in Botswana.” Journal of African Elections. 5(2) “Special Issue on Botswana” (forthcoming).

Somolekae, G. 2002. “Botswana.” In T. Lodge, D. Kadima and D. Pottie. Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.

Post-Transitional Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Last year, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) completed its transition from war to peaceful democratic rule. Because the DRC is the third largest country in Africa and is populated by as many as 250 ethno-linguistic groups, it was no easy feat to overcome the challenges of voter registration and mounting elections there. However, despite some initial disputes over election results, the DRC successfully conducted its first democratic poll in almost four decades.

 

Historical Background

 

The DRC is emerging from decades of dictatorship and misrule, which has been worsened by years of civil war. It gained independence from Belgian rule in 1960, but its early days as a sovereign state were marred by political and social instability, which saw Colonel Joseph Mobutu seize power in a 1965 military coup. For 32 years, the Mobutu regime ruled a single-party state characterised by violent repression of any form of political opposition. In 1996, Laurent Kabila began a rebellion (backed by Rwanda and Uganda) that toppled Mobutu from power the following year.

 

Despite the popular acclaim that greeted their accession to power, Kabila and his government did not meet the democratic aspirations voiced by the Congolese people. In 1998, the regime was challenged by an insurrection again backed by Rwanda and Uganda (whose governments had fallen out with Kabila). Other neighbouring states, including Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Chad, entered the conflict militarily in support of the Kabila administration. In 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated, and his son Joseph Kabila replaced him as head of state.   

 

The new president successfully negotiated the withdrawal of foreign forces occupying the eastern DRC and adopted a more conciliatory approach to the conflict, one based on dialogue. In 2002, the Pretoria Accord (which resulted from the negotiations of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue) was signed by all belligerent parties, the political opposition, and civil society to end the fighting and establish a government of national unity. Known as the “Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition,” the accord was a roadmap for the DRC’s transition to a stable, peaceful, and democratic state. It provided that political, military, and economic power be shared by the former belligerents, civil society, and the political opposition during a two-year transition period, with two possible six-month extensions. Within this time, a referendum on the post-transition constitution and general elections were to be held.

 

The Transitional Political Dispensation

 

The DRC transition process formally started on 30 June 2003 with the installation of a transitional government, which was a political compromise between the five main armed groups. With regard to the executive branch of government, the transitional agreement established a political system known as “1+4.” In this system, President Kabila was supported by four vice presidents, each responsible for a particular commission. Legislative powers were vested in the transitional parliament, which was inaugurated in Kinshasa on 22 August 2002 and consisted of the 500-seat National Assembly and the 120-seat Senate. Seats in these chambers were allocated according to a quota agreed upon by all signatories to the Pretoria Accord. The primary mandate of the transitional institutions was to bring the country to a democratic dispensation through competitive multiparty elections

 

The transition was initially scheduled to be completed by 30 June 2005. But at the request of the electoral commission (the Commission Electorale Indépendante or CEI), the Parliament extended the transition period to 30 June 2006. The resulting electoral schedule allowed the CEI to call for a constitutional referendum on 18 December 2005, to be followed by legislative and presidential elections before the end of June 2006.

 

Voter Registration

 

With the electoral schedule set, the next challenge was to establish a voter registry. The last population census had been conducted in 1981, making existing demographic records unreliable and outdated. This situation was made more complicated by the fact that there was no system in place to control the flow of refugees, caused by the region’s recurring wars, across the DRC’s borders.

 

As a result, during the transition, it was debated whether or not voter registration should be preceded by a national census. Although it was recognised that conducting a general census before voter registration would be ideal, technical and financial challenges (as well as the relatively short duration of the transition period) forced the CEI to opt instead for voter registration using strict criteria to identify and register prospective voters. To register, a person had to be a Congolese citizen and reside in the DRC during the registration process. As dual citizenship is prohibited in the DRC, only people holding Congolese citizenship (and no other) were allowed to register. The minimum voting age is 18.

 

Out of an initial estimate of 28 million potential voters, a total of 25,021,703 citizens registered to participate in the referendum and the general elections.

 

The Constitutional Referendum

 

The first electoral exercise was the constitutional referendum, which was held over two days, on 18 and 19 December 2005. The vote passed with relatively few security incidents, despite fears that the opposition’s call for a boycott and the volatile security situation in the eastern DRC would lead to disturbances. It is worth mentioning that opposition parties, particularly the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS), had called for a boycott not only of the referendum and elections but also of the voter registration exercise, claiming fraud and irregularities in the electoral process.  

 

The polling was generally free of major problems, although some technical flaws and voter intimidation were observed in the process. The size of the country posed great challenges given the lack of effective logistical, communication, and transport facilities. The final results indicated that the people of the DRC endorsed the new constitution, thus laying the foundation for the country’s first democratic elections since independence. The CEI released results that showed that 12,461,001 (84 percent) of the 15,505,810 Congolese who took part in the poll voted in favour of the post-transition constitution, while 2,319,074 (16 percent) voted against it. The post-transition constitution was subsequently promulgated on 18 February 2006.

 

The referendum was a momentous step towards the organisation of general elections in the country. Its success marked a significant turning point in the history of the DRC by giving the Congolese the opportunity to democratically choose their system of governance. It also gave the CEI and other electoral stakeholders the chance to test their capacity and improve their ability to deliver success in the forthcoming elections.

 

Post-transition Electoral System

 

The DRC’s post-transition constitution establishes a system in which the president is directly elected by an absolute majority for a five-year term. That is, for a candidate to be elected president of the DRC, he/she must secure at least 50 percent plus one of the total valid votes cast by registered Congolese citizens. If no candidate receives a simple majority in the first round, a run-off is scheduled between the top two candidates.

 

The members of the DRC’s bicameral parliament are elected through a proportional electoral system for five-year terms. They are elected from open lists, i.e., a party’s list of candidates or a list of independent candidates from which voters can select their favourite. (The DRC considered but decided against using closed lists, where votes are cast for parties rather than individuals.)

 

According to the electoral law, the 500 members of the National Assembly are directly elected from 169 districts by proportional representation. However, over a third of the electoral districts have only one seat. As a result, these districts elect Assembly members on a winner-take-all basis. With regard to the Senate, the electoral law stipulates that the 108 senators are elected by provincial assemblies from 25 newly designed provinces (four senators from each) and from Kinshasa (eight senators). Given that the 25 new provinces will take three years to establish, it was agreed that provincial and senatorial elections would be held on the basis of the current provincial configuration.

 

The General Elections

 

The first round of presidential elections was held concomitantly with parliamentary elections on 30 July 2006. Of the 269 political parties formally registered in the country, only 197 were able to put candidates forward. A list of 33 presidential candidates and 9,584 parliamentary candidates for the National Assembly was approved by the CEI and confirmed by the Supreme Court of Justice. Given the country’s huge size and its virtually non-existent infrastructure, this was obviously a major operation by all standards. Only President Kabila’s party, the Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD), managed to field candidates all 169 constituencies, while the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) had candidates in 160 constituencies and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma) in 156. As for gender representation, only four of the 33 presidential candidates and 13.5 percent of legislative candidates were women.

 

The results of the July 2006 presidential elections indicate that of the 33 candidates, 26 received less than 1 percent of the total valid votes, while seven received votes ranging between 1 percent and 44 percent of the total. Therefore, the poll was inconclusive, with no outright winner with 50 percent +1 votes. Consequently, a second round pitting President Kabila against his main challenger, Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba, was scheduled.

 

With respect to the parliamentary elections, President Kabila and his party failed to win a majority in the National Assembly; final results indicated his PPRD secured only 111 of the 500 seats. However, the broader political coalition backing him held a total of 224 seats. In contrast, Jean-Pierre Bemba’s alliance won approximately 100 seats. The Unified Lumumbist Party (PALU) garnered 34 seats, the former rebel movement RCD-Goma earned 15, and 63 seats went to independent candidates. Given that no political party or coalition won an absolute majority, small coalitions and independent candidates would join one of the two main coalitions. In the new Assembly, only 42 women held seats, making it an institution dominated by men, who held 92 percent of the seats.

 

The second round of the presidential election was held on 29 October 2006 at the same time as the provincial assembly elections. Incumbent President Kabila finally won the presidential race, and his arch-rival Jean-Pierre Bemba conceded defeat after several legal challenges to the validity of the results. Kabila’s election and the establishment of democratically elected assemblies at both the national and provincial levels have brought a formal end to the transition phase initiated after the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

 

It is hoped that these historic elections will lead to a genuine democratic dispensation in the DRC and that they will contribute to restoring sustainable peace and achieving democracy in the Great Lakes region.

 

Dieudonné N. Tshiyoyo is the Senior Programme Officer of Elections and Political Processes at EISA.

2006 Yemen Elections Highlight Continued Progress

Since 1990, Yemen’s electoral commission—the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCER)—has gained experience through the conduct of three parliamentary, two presidential and two local council elections. Following the 2003 parliamentary elections, international NGOs reported that—despite inevitable violations and irregularities—the SCER had shown major technical improvements in its conduct of the elections as compared with earlier polls. In 2006, the major challenge facing the SCER was to maintain these gains, despite the fact that the country’s September elections were to be the most complex it had ever mounted.

 

The 2006 elections were particularly complicated for three reasons. First, it was the first time that simultaneous elections were held for the presidency, the governorate councils and the councils of the administrative districts, which created significant logistical and voter education challenges for the SCER. Second, it was also the first time that the incumbent candidate of the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC), President Ali Abdullah Saleh, faced a credible opponent, Faisal bin Shamlan. Shamlan was endorsed by a coalition of opposition parties called the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). Third, the elections were held in a political climate characterized by strong distrust of the SCER by the JMP. Although the SCER did make some sporadic efforts to promote a dialogue with the JMP, these attempts were not productive. Despite these challenges, the SCER succeeded in maintaining the technical progress it had made in the 2003 elections.

 

Preparing for the Elections

 

Yemen’s constitution requires the nine-member SCER to be independent and impartial. Operationally, the SCER conducts voter registration, elections and referendums through a series of  three-member committees. Although not legally required, Yemen’s practice is for members of all these committees to be party representatives, according to proportions agreed by the parties. In 2006, the SCER appointed a supervisory committee for each of Yemen’s 21 governorates, a main committee for each of the 333 administrative districts, and a total of 27,010 male and female sub-committees for 5,620 voting centers.

 

The SCER’s efforts to administer the fairest elections possible were hampered by two realities in place before they began preparations. First, in 2005 the government—apparently without consulting the SCER—ruled that the 2001 election law would not be amended before the 2006 elections. This decision was very unfortunate, because it meant that issues raised after the 2003 elections (in IFES reports and elsewhere) would not be addressed in time for the new polls. In addition, the 2001 election law is not well suited to simultaneous elections and does not specifically recognize the multi-member districts used for some local council elections.

 

Second, the boundaries of the local electoral constituencies were not revised according to the newest census data. According to statute, the SCER sets these boundaries so that the population in each constituency varies no more than 5 percent. A population census was held in December 2004, but the final results were not issued until January 2006—too late for the SCER to revise the boundaries of all 5,620 local constituencies before the voter registration update. It is certain that the constituencies within many administrative districts do not currently comply with the statutory population requirements.  

 

In its preparations for the elections, the SCER successfully distributed supplies, printed ballots, trained staff and registered voters, though it did encounter some unforeseen difficulties in voter registration. First, the SCER successfully managed the major logistical exercise of providing election supplies (e.g., ballot boxes, screens, forms, stationery, manuals, indelible ink, etc.) to the male and female sub-committees in each of the 5,620 voting centers. The UNDP was a major contributor of election supplies and also conducted voter education on behalf of the SCER.

 

Second, the task of printing the ballot papers was a major undertaking, and one tied to very tight timeframes. All ballots were printed centrally and distributed to the 27,010 sub-committees at the voting centers according to the number of voters registered with each sub-committee. The SCER contracted a private printer for the presidential ballot papers, but it printed the 333 different governorate council ballots and the 5,620 different district council ballots. Different colored security paper was used to distinguish each type of ballot paper. Despite the significant logistical challenges, the SCER was able to distribute the ballots as planned.

 

Third, the SCER and its staff needed to be well trained, which is a crucial ingredient in the efficient, effective and professional administration of elections. In cooperation with the UNDP Election Support Program, IFES developed, translated and implemented a SCER Professional Development Course that combined modules from IFES’ BEAT (Basic Election Administration Training) program and the BRIDGE (Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections) program, which was jointly developed by UNEAD, International IDEA and the Australian Electoral Commission. International trainers conducted two workshops, each for 35 mid-level SCER staff, using Arabic training resources that can easily be adapted for use in other countries in the region. The effects of these courses were readily apparent in the much improved training program and materials the SCER implemented for the 2006 election committees.

 

Fourth, the SCER had to delay the pre-election voter registration update following the failure of the GPC and the JMP to agree on their proportions of relevant committee memberships. Eventually the SCER could wait no longer and appointed the committees from applicants for civil service employment. The total number of registered voters increased from 8.1 million in 2003 to 9.3 million in 2006. Following the update, 42% of registered voters were women, the same proportion as in 2003. Because there were large numbers of duplicate and under-age registrations, the SCER referred about 300,000 names to the public prosecutor, resulting in the removal of 250,000 names before the voter lists became final on July 26.

 

Candidates and the Campaign

 

While the voters had many candidates to choose from—five presidential candidates, 1,612 candidates for 431 governorate council seats, and 18,901 candidates for 6,896 administrative district council seats—a disappointingly small number of these candidates were women. Despite many pre-election statements by the GPC that at least 15% of its governorate council candidates and at least 20% of its district council candidates would be women, in fact it nominated very few female candidates. Islah (the largest party in the JMP) nominated no female candidates at all. Overall, 0.7 percent of candidates in 2006 were women, slightly more than at the previous local council elections in 2001 (though 35 women were elected in both years). This year, seven women won governorate council seats, and 28 women were elected to the district councils. There is certain to be renewed debate about legal changes to improve the participation of women as candidates before the 2009 parliamentary and local council elections.

 

During the campaign, the SCER is charged with ensuring candidates have equal opportunity to communicate their campaign messages through the official media. Unlike 2003, this year the SCER did ensure that opposition party presidential candidates received equitable coverage during the four-week campaign period. However, the fact that, by law, reporting of the president’s “daily activities” was not counted as part of his campaign meant that the incumbent received the most coverage by far. In addition, as in previous elections, government resources were used illegally to support the incumbent president and his party.  

 

The governorate council and administrative district council elections were largely ignored by the media during the two-week campaign period. Candidates’ campaigns seemed to consist largely of display of campaign posters.

 

Voting, Vote Counting and Results

 

Despite some fears of violence, election day passed without major incident. On the whole, it appears that the SCER’s sub-committees did a good job, although there were reports that some members of female sub-committees were not well trained. Voters appeared able to cope with the three different ballot papers, and voter turnout was 65 percent (for the presidential election), compared to 77 percent for the 2003 parliamentary elections. However, as expected, there were anecdotal reports of irregularities and violations, e.g., non-secret voting, campaigning on election day in or near voting centers, and vote buying.  

 

Vote counting started late and proceeded very slowly. First, all presidential ballots were counted and the results reported, then the governorate council ballots were tallied and then the district council ballots. The EU observer teams reported significant problems with counting in some areas where the counting was conducted in an extremely tense environment. There were also anecdotal reports of irregularities, such as the exclusion of party/candidate observers, the involvement of security forces in the counting process, and “creative” interpretations of the legal criteria for identifying a valid vote.

 

In the presidential race, incumbent President Saleh won 77 percent of the valid votes (compared to 96 percent in 1999). The JMP candidate, Faisal bin Shamlan, won 22 percent, and actually won a majority in 18 of the 333 administrative districts. The percentage of invalid votes was 3 percent (approximately the same as in 2003). In the governorate council election, the ruling GPC party won 85 percent of the seats, compared to 10 percent for JMP candidates and just over 5 percent for independent candidates (6 percent of votes were invalid). In the local council election, the GPC won 76 percent of seats, JMP candidates secured nearly 15 percent, and independent candidates got 8 percent (5 percent of votes were invalid). 

 

Conclusion

 

Overall, the SCER’s conduct of the 2006 presidential and local council elections consolidates the progress it made in 2003. However, because the 2006 elections were much more technically complex, they can be seen as a significant advance over the 2003 polls. Nevertheless, some problematic issues must be dealt with before the 2009 elections. First, the election law must be amended, the boundaries of parliamentary and local constituencies must be revised (using a transparent process), and action must be taken to ensure the integrity of the voter registers. Second, ways need to be found to improve women’s representation as political candidates. Third, the SCER needs to deal with technical issues such as the counting/reporting processes and improving disabled people’s access to the electoral process. Finally, the SCER needs to be more determined to enforce the election law, to be seen as more independent, and to be more open and transparent, particularly in its relations with political parties.

 

Paul Harris was IFES’ Country Director in Yemen from June 2004 to December 2006.

Mexico Adopts Innovations for the 2006 Federal Elections

by Carlos Navarro 

On July 2, Mexico will hold its next federal elections. More than 71.5 million Mexican citizens are registered to vote, and they will elect a new president, 128 senators and 500 deputies (the latter two make up the National Congress). This election will be the sixth organized at the national level by Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) since its creation as an independent, public organization in 1990. However, it is the first federal elections to follow the historic 2000 elections, which saw the PRI party cede the presidency to another party for the first time in 70 years. In addition, it will be the first election since nine new members took the reigns of the IFE’s governing body, the General Council, after being appointed by Congress in October 2003.

The three federally elected offices—president, senator and deputy—are governed by different electoral rules. Mexico’s president is elected by simple majority for a period of six years. Presidents serve only one term as re-election is not allowed by the constitution.

The 128 members of Mexico’s Senate are elected for six years using a mixed electoral system. Each of the 32 federal states elects three senators: two seats are assigned to the party or coalition with the most votes and the third seat is assigned to the party or coalition with the second largest number of votes. The remaining 32 seats are assigned according to the principle of proportional representation using a national list of candidates from each party or coalition.

Congress’ 500 deputies are also elected using a mixed electoral system, though their terms of office are only three years. Three hundred deputies are elected in 300 single-member districts (each state is assigned a certain number of districts according to its population) using the principle of plurality (the candidate who receives the most votes wins). The other 200 deputies are elected using proportional representation: candidates on party lists compete for 40 seats in five multimember districts.

Mexico’s July elections are expected to be highly competitive. Only registered national political parties are allowed to present candidates, and currently, there are eight registered political parties. Six of them already have parliamentary representation: PAN, PRI, PRD, PVEM, PT, and PC (see box for party descriptions). The other two parties—PASDC and PANAL—obtained their registry for the next elections only last year.

PAN (National Action Party): center-right party of current Presi­dent Vicente Fox and historically the leading opposition force to the PRI. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 151

PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party): left-of-center party, which won all presidential elections between 1929 and 2000. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 224

PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution): left-of-center party, founded in 1988 by a wide array of leftist parties and organizations, and former members of the PRI. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 97

PT (Labor Party): formed in 1990, its roots are in a network of community organizations. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 6

PVEM (Green Ecological Party of Mexico): first registered as a party in 1991, this party has allied alternately with PRI and PAN over the past 15 years. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 17

PC (Convergence Party): describes itself as a “social democratic party”; first registered for party status in 1999. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 5

PANAL (New Alliance Party): registered in 2005.

PASDC (Social Democratic and Peasants Alternative Party): regis­tered in 2005.

While PAN is fielding its own presidential candidate, the PRI and the PVEM have chosen to form an alliance—the “Coalition for Mexico.” Likewise, the PRD, the PT and the PC have formed the “Coalition for Common Wellbeing,” and each of these coalitions is offering voters a single candidate or list. Newly registered parties are not allowed to form coalitions to present common candidates. As a result, the PASDC and the PANAL are running their own candidates. To maintain their party registry and the right to participate in the allocation of seats by proportional representation, a party must receive at least 2 percent of the votes in any federal election.

The 2006 elections include significant innovations and present some important challenges for election administrators. First, between 2004 and 2005, the IFE conducted a redistricting process, redrawing the country’s 300 electoral districts. The review and adjustment of electoral boundaries was designed to ensure that each district had equal populations and therefore granted Mexican voters equal political representation and equal power at the ballot box. This new electoral geography corrected disparities created by significant social and demographic mobility; now, all districts vary no more than 10 percent from a pre-established average. In addition, 29 districts have been created—for the first time—with a predominantly indigenous profile. This redistricting will impact all races, but particularly those of the 300 deputies.

Second, voting by Mexicans living abroad will be allowed for the first time. As approved by Congress in June 2005, expatriate Mexicans will have the opportunity to exercise their right to vote in the 2006 presidential elections. In addition, they will do so by mail, and the postal vote has never been used before in Mexico. To prepare for these new voters, registration was conducted abroad between October 2005 and February 2006. During this time, more than 40,000 Mexicans registered to vote abroad in the next elections.

Third, because there had been concern about going further in establishing a level playing field among candidates, creating eq­uitable campaign finance rules and disclosing political accounts, the IFE’s General Council recently approved a group of political finance regulations that represent an important step forward in this matter. These new regulations set more detailed guidelines for the oversight of national political parties’ financial resources and, for the first time, made clear political parties’ obligation to report on their campaign expenses before the election. For the 2006 elections, presidential candidates are required to report three times (March 30, May 30 and July 31), while candidates for deputy and senator must report twice (June 15 and July 31). The IFE will make all reports available to the public. These new political finance regulations were approved in November 2005 and were met by unanimous approval and supported by the political parties.

In addition, the political parties are required to authorize the National Bank and Securities Commission to deliver information about their bank balances to the IFE—should it be necessary—in order to ease the exercise of its oversight responsibilities.

In another step to increase political finance transparency in the upcoming elections, the IFE signed an agreement with the National Chamber of the Radio and Television Industry (CIRT) and the Special Prosecutor for Electoral Offenses (FEPADE) in January 2006. This agreement stipulates that all stations af­filiated with the CIRT will provide the IFE with a copy of all service contracts signed with political parties between January and July 2006 as part of a campaign for federal office. This information—as well as the account information and party reports mentioned above—will give the IFE more tools for conducting oversight of campaign expenses, and consequently, will guarantee greater integrity and certainty in the electoral process.

Carlos Navarro is the director of electoral studies of the International Affairs Unit (Director de Estudios Electorales de la Coordinación de Asuntos Internacionales) of Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE).

Parliamentary Elections in Moldova: Assessing the Results and their Implications for Democratization

Interviews with John Todd Stewart, Igor Botan and Angela Sirbu

Given the proliferation of civic revolutions in regions of the former Soviet Union in the last two years, elections there command more attention than they once did. However, in Moldova’s March parliamentary elections, the Communist Party won in a poll that international observers considered to fairly represent the voters’ choices. In April, Elections Today spoke with John Todd Stewart—former U.S. Ambassador to Moldova and election observer during the recent elections—and Igor Botan and Angela Sirbu—both of whom are members of Coalition 2005, an association of 150-200 Moldovan NGOs set up to ensure free and fair elections—to find out more.

Was the Communist victory a surprise?

STEWART: Hardly. The Communists had a great deal going for them that the electorate could not ignore. First, they ran on an impressive economic record, at least by Moldovan standards. Moldova’s gross domestic product has grown by at least 6% a year since the Communists took over in 2001, the only period of significant growth since independence. Consumer prices had risen more than 30% in both 1999 and 2000, and after the Communists took over, the price increases fell to the low teens or lower. Moldova’s 662,000 pensioners now benefit from regular cost-of-living increases and receive their payments in a much more timely fashion. Critics correctly point out that the country’s improved economic circumstances are due in large measure to (1) the economic reforms pushed through by previous governments, (2) the large volume of remittances from Moldovans working abroad and (3) the energy-fed economic boom in Russia, which takes almost 40% of Moldova’s exports. However, analogous arguments are often heard in U.S. politics, where they fall equally flat. 

Second, the Communists remain the best-organized political party in Moldova. There were an impressive number of political party observers at the polling places I visited, but I cannot recall one in which there was not at least one Communist representative. Where personal contact is the most important means of political persuasion, a well-oiled machine is crucial. It appeared, moreover, that there was good, disciplined communication in one Russian-speaking village we visited between the Communist Party organization and the leadership in Chisinau. When the Communist mayor, a garrulous sort in his late 50s, heard that I was from the United States, he was quick to note that he stood with President Voronin and America against Russia!  

Third, the Communists benefited from the inertia, mixed with nostalgia in many cases, of older Moldovans who are accustomed to voting for the hammer and sickle—the Moldovan equivalent, if you will, of “yellow dog Democrats” in the American South. Both are dying breeds with diminishing political importance, but they still have a lingering effect on electoral outcomes. For example, our fellow observers commented that the returns from mobile ballot boxes, taken to shut-ins unable to come to the polls, had an exceptionally high share of votes cast for the Communists.

Finally, the Communists had the benefit of incumbency, which they used wisely. Good examples were the meetings President Voronin held in the run-up to the election with Presidents Yushchenko of Ukraine, Saakashvili of Georgia, and Basescu of Romania, which were extensively—and properly—reported by the Moldovan media to the benefit of the Communists. However, the gold nugget was the signature of the EU/Moldova Action Plan shortly before the parliamentary elections. This agreement clearly indicates a path to membership in the European Union—provided Moldova complies with its provisions. To any voter interested in the country’s future in Europe, it was evidence that President Voronin could lead them into the promised land.

During the election campaign, did the Communists take unfair advantage of their control of the government to win votes?

STEWART: This is a more complicated matter, and here I must rely on the reports of the ODIHR long-term observers who arrived in time for the campaign, rather than just for the election itself. These observers reported instances in which local government authorities (presumably Communists or allies of the party) prevented the posting of campaign material, interfered with opposition party activists conducting legitimate campaign activities, prevented the lawful assembly of opposition meetings, forced civil servants to attend Communist campaign rallies and provided preferential access to public space for Communist activities. I believe these reports are accurate and represent a regrettable erosion of the standards upheld in the 1998 parliamentary election campaign, which I witnessed while ambassador. Still, I doubt that they materially affected the election results.

However, the main charge leveled by ODIHR in this area concerns preferential access for Communist candidates to the electronic media. The facts provided in the preliminary findings of the International Election Observation Mission, which included several European groups in addition to ODIHR, are too complicated for me to present in detail, but the gist is that restrictive and sometimes ambiguous regulations on campaign coverage limited voters’ access to information and that coverage by Moldova 1, the public television channel, was “clearly biased in favor of the ruling party.” These findings are accurate, I’m sure, but I would argue that the real problem was not so much the election regulations or political influence at Moldova 1 but the generally poor quality of the country’s electronic media.

Moldovan TV viewers watch “First Channel in Moldova,” which rebroadcasts Moscow’s ORT channel plus some local programming, 71% of the time as compared to a mere 8% for Moldova 1. This huge difference is not rooted in Russophilia but rather in the considerably superior production standards of ORT. Unfortunately, “First Channel” elected not to cover the campaign from a journalistic standpoint and did not even accept paid advertisements. Hence, unless voters sought out election programming on Moldova 1, they only received whatever ORT coverage was rebroadcast by “First Channel.” That coverage was an inadequate basis for voters to reach informed judgments.

The final count against the Communists in this area concerns the spurious charge made by their executive secretary, Victor Stepaniuc (endorsed by President Voronin), that the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections—”Coalition 2005” —was supporting an opposition party. The Coalition was, in fact, a grouping of almost 200 civil society organizations that monitored the campaign, especially media reportage, and published findings that were not to the Communists’ liking. Following the Communist broadside, the foreign embassies and missions in Chisinau rallied to the Coalition’s defense and the Communists had the wisdom to back off. Coalition 2005 went on to conduct an extensive observation effort at polling stations, appearing at well over half of those my partner and I visited, a percentage consistent with the country-wide figure reported by the International Election Observation Mission. They made a significant  contribution to proper conduct of the voting.

What do the results mean for the future of Moldova?

STEWART: When we talked after the election, former President Lucinschi commented that the remarkable development in Moldovan politics was the reorientation of the Party of Communists toward Europe. I agree. Moldova now has a parliament where all three parties avowedly support the country’s Europeanization and have an excellent road map to guide them westward in the form of the Action Plan signed with the European Commission. It should now be possible to reduce the inter-party bickering that frustrated progress in past parliaments and approve the decisive measures necessary to transform Moldova into a truly European state. Two such measures come immediately to mind.

The first is the creation, with adequate financing, of an independent, sophisticated and unbiased public national television service that Moldovans would want to watch. Assuming that the necessary expertise and ethos could be developed, Moldovan television could provide the broad but unbiased political coverage so lacking in the past campaign. Second, there must be a parliamentary consensus on a strategy to end the secession of Transnistria, another issue in which all three parties supposedly agree. The single biggest reason for the continued existence of the secession has been the lack of political will on the part of Moldova’s political elites to deal determinedly with the problem. A firm, united stand could also have a positive effect on Russian policy toward Transnistria. 

To sum up then, I am encouraged by the Moldovan election results—but only if the winning parties can now pull together in the national interest. If they can, Moldova could become a remarkable example of revolutionary progress without a revolution— and a model for other states in the region.

From the perspective of Moldovan civil society, were the March 6th elections in Moldova free and fair?

BOTAN: The elections were not fair. However, I could say that the elections were partially free, because there were no impediments for Moldovans residing in Moldova to participate in the elections. However, the government did little to ensure Moldovans abroad were able to vote. According to the electoral code, the government is obliged to ensure the right to vote. Their explanation was that they had no money and legislation does not provide very clear directions. We in civil society proposed absentee voting, but their answer was no. The result was that the most educated and active Moldovans (who are working abroad) could not vote. They only opened polling stations in embassies and consulates abroad. This means they had a polling site in the Washington, DC, embassy, which served the United States, Canada and Mexico. The same situation occurred with some European countries, and it’s obvious that this impacted the results. For example, in Moldova, Communists have 46% support while Christian Democrats have 9% and the Democratic Moldova Bloc has 30%. Abroad, the Communists generally earn 12% and the Christian Democrats and Democratic Moldova each receive 44%. So obviously it was not in the Communists’ interest to allow significant participation of Moldovans living abroad.

SIRBU: When we talk about elections, we have to make clear that there are different stages. Election Day was fairly smooth, though there were many unanswered questions. But if we talk about the election campaign, there were serious problems. The mistakes observed in the 2003 elections were not corrected, and there was little education for Moldovans about the electoral process. The rules kept changing—in most cases at the last moment—so this created a lot of confusion and people did not understand what their rights were and what they should do to vote legitimately. For example, the Central Election Commission adopted a new rule stating that, after voting, each voter must receive a stamp in his or her passport in order to avoid double voting. But people reacted aggressively to this request because they didn’t understand it, and the officials offered very little explanation of how important this is and why it was necessary.

How might the results of these elections change the political landscape in Moldova, particularly the relationship between the Communists and the opposition?

BOTAN: Certainly the results of this election will have an important impact on politics in Moldova. The Communist Party lost 15 seats in this election; they have now 56 versus the 71 they had before. This time, they are unable to pass constitutional change without the support of the other parties. The news is that the Communist faction in parliament is no longer a monolithic bloc; they will have to negotiate with their new partner [the Democratic Moldova bloc], and this has inspired some confidence that the democratic process could get better. It is important, though, to note that all major parties had similar messages during the election campaign: European integration, a sound market economy, establishing social protections in Moldova, increasing salaries and so on. I think that civil society should remain vigilant but there are some good signs.

SIRBU: We can talk about improvements only if we believe that the Communist Party’s new orientation is not just an electoral slogan but is actually politically real.

Do you think President Voronin’s pro-Western stance is genuinely held?

BOTAN: I think this is the most interesting question. In Moldova, the so-called political elite were educated in Soviet times. The majority of them are former Communists, many of whom, after the transition, just changed their label: Communist to Social Democrat, Liberal, etc. I believe that the great majority of them were relatively sincere. Their main concern was to remain in power so they could participate in the privatization process, the transformation of state property into private property. They formed clans around political parties and competed over said property. In between their struggles, there was some room for democratic development because they needed the support of the mass media, civil society, and so on. This is the essence of transitional progress in Moldova.

The Communists came to power four years ago, and they promised to re-build socialism and communism but half a year later they realized they could not do it because Moldova is a small country that would be destroyed by “international imperialism” (as they used to call it), which could not stand a communist regime. So they decided to integrate into the European community. But Voronin emphasized that social protection mechanisms were very important to maintaining the electorate. The number of pensioners in Moldova four years ago was some 700,000. The number of voters for the Communist Party was 800,000. When Voronin realized that Russia was not interested in helping him [to solve the Transnistrian conflict, facilitate Russian access to Moldovan goods, etc.], this pragmatic politician switched allegiances.

Why do I mention all this? Voronin changed pro-Russian slogans into pro-Western ones only on a rhetorical level. No laws were adopted that changed anything real. To the Communists, principles are not that valuable. For them, the main principle is to remain in power because remaining in power means their businesses will flourish. However, they understand perfectly

that Moldova is a small country that needs international support. When the Communists realized that they wouldn’t get that support from Russia but they could get it from the European Union and the United States, they made a strategic choice and launched this idea of European integration.

I will not trust their campaign promise until I see the law adopted by Parliament that obliges the government to undertake measures that orient Moldova towards European integration. Circumstances lead me to encourage the opposition and civil society to maintain a kind of intelligent pressure on the Communists to do what is needed. If the Communists want Moldova to be integrated into the European Union and steer Moldova in this direction, I would welcome it, though I would have to say to them “Okay, you’re doing a good thing for the country, but you are destroying yourselves because you cannot remain Communist and promote liberal values.”

SIRBU: This [Voronin’s genuineness] is the crucial point here because in the last three years what we have seen is a double standard. There are two separate messages: one for the West and one for the people in Moldova. Even before the election, politicians made statements about the importance of becoming a member of the European Union, and at the same time, the government put political and economic pressure on the media. It even attempted to close down the alternative media. In Moldova, there is an imitation of a democracy. The government continues to use state media to discredit representatives of civil society who criticized them. This is reality. The members of the Communist Party in the parliament now are the same as before. Therefore, until we see things changing in reality, I’m skeptical that democratic standards will improve in Moldova.

The most important thing now is to insist that democratic norms be respected in Moldova. This is the main challenge, I think: for civil society and for all people in Moldova to really ask for their rights and their lives to improve.

John Todd Stewart served as U.S. Ambassador to Moldova between 1995 and 1998 and served as an election observer during the recent elections. He is now retired from the Foreign Service and does not, as a result, speak on behalf of the U.S. Government. Igor Botan is the executive director of the Association for Participatory Democracy “ADEPT” in Moldova and Angela Sirbu is the executive director of the Independent Journalism Center in Moldova. See http://e-democracy.md for an update on recent political events following the March election.

First Female Legislator Takes Office in Ebonyi State, Nigeria

Dorathy Obasi, the first woman legislator to be elected to the State House of Assembly in Ebonyi State, Nigeria, was sworn in to office on April 25.

Although the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions underscored the equality of all Nigerian citizens, women’s participation in Nigerian politics is limited and political parties do not tend to put forward female candidates. Several domestic and international NGOs have been working to promote women’s political empowerment in Nigeria. One domestic NGO, DOVENET, hosted seminars on enhancing women’s participation in politics in Ebonyi State, which spurred participants to put what they had learned into action. Women rallied behind Obasi, helping her win by an overwhelming margin. In a post-election interview, Obasi said, “I honestly believe that DOVENET provided the motivation for women in Ebonyi State to campaign on my behalf and get me elected.”

While the government has yet to put into force several international treaties protecting women’s rights (including the Beijing Declaration), President Olusegun Obasanjo has kept his promise to give 15% of federal appointments to women (though this falls far short of Beijing’s recommended 30%). However, women still lack representation in elected offices, and NGOs in Nigeria continue to work to replicate Ms. Obasi’s success in other states.  

For more information on women’s participation efforts in Nigeria, visit www.ifes.org/reg-activities/africa.

Anatomy of a Civic Uprising

Akayev had always seemed the most liberal of Central Asian leaders, but when his government’s carefully constructed façade of citizen involvement unraveled and uncovered his strongman tactics, it meant his  political end.

by David Mikosz

The events of March 24, 2005, pushed Kyrgyzstan onto the world stage for a few brief days. Comparisons with the recent “civic revolutions” in former Soviet Republics like Ukraine and Georgia were inevitable but facile. Like all real political change, the Kyrgyz revolution was very much rooted in the details of Kyrgyz political life in the period since independence. It was not, as many observers have suggested, simply rooted in the discontent caused by poverty. While Kyrgyzstan is, indeed, a very poor country, the World Bank reports that its level of poverty is decreasing (it fell 10.9 percentage points between 1999 and 2002) and that, generally speaking, the poorest of the poor (i.e., those living in rural areas) have benefited. Instead, a key factor in the so-called “Tulip Revolution” was the cynical attempts by the former government to exploit civil society for its own benefit. 

Hoisted on his own petard

Elected as Kyrgyzstan’s first president in 1991, Askar Akayev initially appeared to be the most liberal of CIS leaders, and he allowed multiparty elections to continue. However, in the late 1990s, he began to limit—though not end—political and economic liberties. An accomplished politician (a fact too rarely noted), he thought that he could manage civil society without destroying it. But he was wrong.

Akayev’s techniques were most often used to dilute or limit the messages of civil society (and thereby flummox the opposition) through GONGOs (government-organized nongovernmental organizations) and control of the media. Using these tools, the Akayev regime confused the public by creating an artificial dichotomy: when the opposition criticized the government, “others” were ready to stand up and support it.

One Akayev GONGO was the Association of Non-commercial and Nongovernmental Organizations (or “the Association”). While authentic NGOs (like the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, or “the Coalition”) criticized the government, the Association condemned Kyrgyz NGOs’ use of foreign funds, even as it accepted money from the World Bank. In the 2003 referendum in which Akayev successfully increased his presidential powers, the Association played a vocal role and even “monitored” the election. Not surprisingly, the Coalition was critical of the conduct of the election, while the Association defended it. The Association provided Akayev a useful front though which to legitimize his political actions (for example, it sponsored a petition drive asking him to run again).

Akayev also silenced opposition media through purchase, regulation or outright harassment. Some media outlets were bought by Akayev supporters, while Kyrgyzstan’s only independent publisher suffered mysterious power outages. Radio Free Europe lost frequencies from its Kyrgyz language version, and independent radio and television stations leasing government equipment fi rst abruptly lost and then regained their licenses.

The government also used its position as an employer to compel state employees to demonstrate their support for the administration. For example, state employees (like teachers) had to attend pro-government demonstrations in order to receive their salaries. In 2003, my wife saw one of her primary school teachers in tears in the main Bishkek square “voluntarily” handing out leaflets in support of the President’s referendum. This compulsion was also present during the pro-government demonstration on March 22: teachers were told they would receive a salary only if they showed up. This sort of coercion was almost habitual, and the regime little realized that such public support was built only on a foundation of sand.

So what went wrong? How could this accomplished politician— who had managed to confuse and outmaneuver the opposition for several elections—fail so completely in March 2005? 

The house Akayev built

First, the public was deeply shocked at the disclosure by an opposition journal of pictures of a large house said to be for the president along with a clever poem listing all businesses supposedly owned by his family. A necessary fiction for many in Kyrgyzstan was that Akayev was a modest scientist (perhaps maneuvered by his smart family) who wanted nothing more than to guide the country in the right direction. The publication of photos of his palace exposed Akayev’s personal wealth, and Akayev himself seemed truly thrown by the intensity of the public’s disgust and anger.

A run-off election

Second, the government did all it could to promote the success of Akayev’s daughter in her campaign for a parliamentary seat in Bishkek’s University district, even eliminating strong competitors using administrative means and deploying university rectors to campaign for her. An exit poll conducted during the election (Kyrgyzstan’s fi rst) predicted that Akayev’s daughter would win the election with more than 55% of the vote. However, the actual count put her votes in the low 40^th percentile and set the stage for a run-off. This news spread quickly and students in the district realized that they could vote for whomever they wished as long as they told the pollster they voted for the government candidate. Thus, they did not have to be part of Akayev’s civil society myth. This reality became clearer in one university, where rather than demanding or threatening them, the rector apparently beseeched and cajoled the students to vote the “right” way. More and more students began to see that they really could vote as they wished. In the end, students played a key role in the March demonstrations. The second round of elections in the University district was riddled with imperfections.  Many people complained about fraud, such as people filming the casting of ballots and people cheating outright. In short, anti-opposition forces were obliged to turn to brute force to win rather than relying on their façade of civil society promotion.  

March 24th

The detailed history of the events of March 24th remains for future writers. Too many questions are still unresolved. But a rough chronology of the events that day can demonstrate how the kinds of missteps described above prepared the way for Akayev’s departure. The demonstrators began their rally on the outskirts of Bishkek. They included people who had seen the candidates of their choice disqualified from the election, people who had purchased the opposition’s newspapers or people who were tired of government pressure. The group peacefully marched down the main street, Chui Avenue, past the Kyrgyz White House to the main square.

The Kyrgyz White House was ringed by hundreds of riot police, but they peacefully let the demonstrators march by. Once inside the square, the demonstrators were confronted by government thugs who attempted to provoke a fight. (These strongmen were a revealing mutation of the GONGO idea mentioned above: rather than pretending to be civil society advocates, for the first time, the regime was using thugs—a sign they felt they were losing control.) Initially successful, the pro-government thugs were driven off by the numerically superior crowd. But this confrontation changed the mood of the crowd. They were angry, and they wanted to show their displeasure at the seat of power. Turning back, they walked the short distance to the Kyrgyz White House and began to demonstrate.

In front of the Kyrgyz White House, the demonstrators and the security forces engaged in a dialogue and seemed to reach a compromise. However, a sudden cavalry charge of some 50 horsemen dispersed the crowd. It appears that Akayev chose this moment to flee the presidential residence in an armored truck. Surprised and afraid, the crowd poured back into the square, but moments later, realizing their strength, turned around and began to stone the horses and riders. 

The transition begins

Despite Akayev’s initial democratic promise and many political gifts, this then was his political end. Unlike President Karimov in Uzbekistan, he had not relied on a powerful army or security services; unlike his President Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, he did not have the support of numerous oligarchs who benefited from a growing economy; and unlike President Rakhmonov in Tajikistan, he couldn’t vilify his opposition as Islamic extremists. In the weeks following March 24, 2005, it was clear that whatever would come next, this was the end of the Akayev era for Kyrgyzstan.

 David Mikosz is IFES’ Country Director in Kyrgyzstan. For more information, visit www.ifes.org.

Election Observation in West Africa: The ECOWAS Experience

by Tim Bittiger

Election observation is a key element of building a stable democracy. In states that are undergoing democratic transition, election observers can build citizens’ confidence in the electoral process; while in states holding elections following a conflict, observers can help conflicting parties trust the election will be conducted fairly even if they do not yet trust each other. Since democratization began in Africa in the 1970s, international actors have observed elections (and provided electoral assistance) throughout the continent.1 However, recently African players have started to become more involved in the observation of African elections. They began as early as 1980, with the independence elections in Zimbabwe, but their work did not gain momentum until 2002, with Zimbabwe’s heavily observed presidential elections. Regional groups—like the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—have moved election observation (and election assistance) to the core of their mandates in order to better enhance democracy, good governance and conflict prevention in their member states.2

This movement is important because, in the future, international observers and donors will hand over responsibility for election observation to Africans, who will choose their own approach in light of their thorough understanding of the African context. However, before this time, they will have to overcome a number of challenges in order to bring their practice of election observation in line with international  standards. Some recent African observation missions have generated controversy over their effectiveness and credibility. For example, Western and African groups developed widely divergent assessments of Zimbabwe’s 2002 elections.3

More recently, ECOWAS’ report following observation (by 150 observers) of Togo’s 2005 presidential elections provoked international criticism for sanctioning a flawed election process.4 In fact, ECOWAS’ experience with election observation illustrates the challenges African organizations must overcome in pursuit of free and fair elections. The main issues facing ECOWAS are gaps in their observation methodology, conflicts of interest, inexperience and the absence of coordination with other electoral players.5

Methodology

ECOWAS has not yet decided on a single approach to election observation that would be valid for each of its missions.6 Selecting a single methodology would give ECOWAS the means to consistently identify (1) minimum circumstances under which they would agree to observe an election; and (2) the scope of their mission, in terms of length of time in country and focus of observation efforts. The  ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance does set out general principles for ECOWAS election observation.7 However, the document does not provide clear enough criteria and operational guidelines to serve as a checklist for observers. ECOWAS also lacks standard operating procedures that could facilitate the planning for observation missions in difficult terrain or challenging security environments. Finally, ECOWAS does not have a code of conduct that binds its observers to common rules and standards and ensures consistency in their work. In this respect, ECOWAS lags behind other African organizations, such as SADC, which have developed methodologies that are viable, albeit not always fully implemented.8

What hurts ECOWAS’ credibility the most is its lack of a long-term approach to observation. It is now generally recognized that observers must observe the electoral process—which can take up to two months—not just Election Day. ECOWAS currently sends missions for about 10 days, which is insufficient to make a credible assessment. While most western organizations now take a long-term approach, African organizations are generally still struggling to send observers for more than the two weeks surrounding Election Day.9 Consequently, the findings and assessments of African observers are often neither sufficiently detailed nor credible.

Conflicts of Interest

ECOWAS must address a conflict of interest between its dual roles as mediator and election observer in its 15 West African member states—as both roles are important aspects of its mandate to build democracy and ensure stability in the region. For example, in Togo earlier this year, following the death of long-time President Eyadema Gnassingbe, ECOWAS diplomats successfully negotiated a nine-step plan to hold presidential elections and then oversaw its implementation. However, an ECOWAS observation mission was also charged with making an independent assessment of the election process and all its players. Critics have accused ECOWAS of whitewashing the election outcome for the sake of maintaining stability in Togo and have questioned the credibility of its observer declarations. Similar scenarios could emerge in ECOWAS’ current mediation efforts in Liberia and Ivory Coast, where elections are imminent. Other organizations have faced similar problems—for instance, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Bosnia and Herzegovina— but have since been systematically addressing conflicts of interest.

Experience and Capacity

Another reason why ECOWAS is still struggling to field an observation mission that meets international standards is its lack of experience and capacity. At the moment, the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja does not have an elections unit and therefore lacks the capacity to plan, mobilize and manage election observation missions. In addition, the organization does not have an adequate pool of trained, experienced observers from member states. Finally, ECOWAS has not taken full advantage of the recognized African expertise in the election administrations and civil societies of its member states. In view of the fact that ECOWAS has only recently undertaken observation missions, a lack of experience is not surprising. However, the organization might not have the time to let its ability grow gradually. West Africa has a busy election calendar and many countries in the unstable region will require outside observation of likely difficult polls.

Regional Cooperation

African observation of elections would be much improved if ECOWAS and other African organizations took a common approach to election observation.10 All too often, various observer groups have different standards for what they consider democratic elections. When—as a result—several groups issue diverging statements about the same election (as was the case in Togo in 2005), doubts are raised both about the competence of these groups and the fairness of the election. Such a situation also allows political parties in the host country to play one observer group off another for their own benefit.

The good news is that ECOWAS and other organizations have committed themselves to cooperating with each other.11 In fact, in 2004, the United Nations initiated discussions on a global Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation. Most African organizations, foremost the OAU, are committed to signing the final document. However, as long as different groups have differing methodologies, capacities and expectations—as well as diverging political agendas—it will be difficult to reach agreement on a common line without compromising the position of individual partners. Moreover, ECOWAS and other international bodies should cooperate to a greater extent with local observer groups who represent civil society and know the local political scene and traditions intimately.  

Although much needs to be improved, the recent increase in election observation by African organizations is generally a positive development. ECOWAS and other African organizations have a clear mandate in this respect and  should continue to take a comprehensive approach, integrating elections into wider conflict prevention strategies, albeit it with due care to avoid a conflict of interest for themselves. Assuming a role in elections gives African institutions the chance to take democracy building on the continent into their own hands and, with time, prove that they can do this in a responsible and coordinated manner. Clearly, African organizations understand the continent’s traditions, cultures and politics in a way that outsiders never will. Therefore, African observer organizations must receive all the support and encouragement they need to assume an increasingly central role in the observation of African elections.

Tim Bittiger is a consultant for election assistance and organizational development. He has recently worked with ECOWAS to improve their conduct of election observation.

Notes:

1 A standard publication on the topic is Jon Abbink and Gerti Hesseling (eds.), Election Observation and Democratization in Africa (London and New York, 2000).

2 See African Union - African Charter on Human and People’s Rights; Organisation of African Union/African Union - Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa – AHG/DECL.1 (XXXVIII); Norms and Standards for Elections in the SASDC Region – Adopted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum Plenary Assembly on 25 March 2001, Windhoek, Namibia; ECOWAS Protocol A/SP1/12/01 of December 2001 on Democracy and Good Governance, Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999; Harare Commonwealth Declaration, 1991.

3 Denis Kadima, African Election Observer and Monitoring Missions: Towards Best Practices and Common Standards (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Pretoria: 2000).

4 Serena Parker, “International Monitors Say Election Observer Guidelines Needed,” Voice of America News (30 April 2005).

5 These shortcomings characterize African observation efforts generally. See for example: Musa Abutudu, Monitoring and Observation of Elections in Africa (Pretoria, 2002).

6 Similarly, the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights started observing elections in 1991 with only limited capacity and took until 1997 to develop the consistent methodology that has cemented its high reputation. Hrair Balian, Ten years of international election assistance and observation (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw: 2001).

7 Abutudu, Monitoring and Observation of Elections in Africa.

8 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, Mauritius, 2004; African Union - Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions – EX/CL/35 (III) Annex II.

9 O. Van Cranenburgh, “Democratization in Africa: The Role of Election Observation,” in Election Observation and Democratization in Africa, p. 29.

10 This, too, is a familiar challenge. Coordinating observation efforts among European organizations has not always been a common practice.

11 See for example, ECOWAS Protocol A/SP1/12/01, Section II, Article 16.

Out-of-Country Voting in Post-Conflict Elections

by Ben Goldsmith

Increasingly, elections are viewed as a crucial peace-building tool in post-conflict states. While the transition from non-democratic to democratic political traditions is rarely smooth, it is particularly challenging when the transition follows a war. However, post-conflict elections can jump-start the democratization process by offering all citizens the opportunity to be involved, and their involvement is critical to giving elected institutions the legitimacy they need to govern in often difficult circumstances. For this reason, post-conflict elections are often held earlier than some think they should be, sometimes even when widespread insecurity means that they cannot be genuinely free and fair.  

One key decision officials make when organizing a post-conflict election—like those held recently in Iraq and Afghanistan1— is how to deal with a country’s external populations. These populations may include refugees who fled a conflict for neighboring countries and members of national diasporas (who may have left the country for political or economic reasons, have since settled elsewhere, but retain ties to their homelands). Will they be eligible to vote? In the post-conflict elections held in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, refugees were allowed to vote.  However, setting up out-of-country voting (OCV) for external populations is a lot more complex than organizing in-country polling, and taking on this logistical and financial burden in the  challenging environment of a post-conflict election is rarely without risks. In the end, it could even endanger the credibility of the wider electoral process.

Beyond financial and logistical concerns, the decision to organize external voting can also be politically difficult, especially when the external population is substantial in number. A large external population could change the outcome of the election, which may not be politically acceptable in-country. While it is rarely possible to enable all of the external population to vote, politically it may be easier to exclude all rather than include only some.

Despite these challenges, there are often strong pressures to include external communities in post-conflict elections. Given the ongoing instability in the period immediately following the end of the conflict, those who wish to return home are often unable to do so even though they may have a great desire to be involved in post-conflict developments. Diaspora and refugee communities have often suffered greatly; in addition, they may maintain significant influence in their country of origin.

Including external populations in post-conflict elections can also serve to re-establish ties between them and citizens in-country, which can be very beneficial for the reconstruction process. Diaspora populations have often developed financial resources and professional qualifications in exile that can be useful during rebuilding. Engaging them in the political process makes more likely their return and active participation in reconstruction.

(The complexity and financial burden of external voting also affects the sustainability of such programs. While many post-conflict elections are heavily supported by the international community, once the initial elections have been conducted, this support diminishes. This can leave post-conflict countries financially and institutionally challenged to continue delivering external voting programs. However, it can easily be argued that external voting is more important in the immediate post-conflict elections and that subsequently, when a real opportunity for return exists, there is less reason for such external voting options. This reality mitigates the arguments on sustainability, although once a decision has been taken to enfranchise the external  populations, it may be politically difficult to retract later on.)

The OCV operations conducted in the recent Afghan and Iraqi elections were, in many ways, very different, but the experiences of these voting programs serve to identify many of the issues surrounding the conduct of OCV programs in post-conflict elections.

Timeline

Both the Afghan and Iraqi electoral administration bodies made the decision to enfranchise their external voting populations very late in the process. In each case, these complex programs had to be set up in approximately 80 days—an extremely tight timeline. With the Afghan Joint Electoral Management Body and the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq already challenged to run their respective in-country elections—and there being no other domestic organization with the capacity to conduct an OCV program—the decision was made to contract a strategic partnership between the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and IFES to conduct both OCV programs. Due to the time constraints, both programs were led by large numbers of international electoral experts, which unfortunately gave Afghans and Iraqis little opportunity to build their capacity to manage the process themselves in future elections.

The budgets for both OCV operations were large (US$92 million was budgeted in the case of Iraq), and in many ways money was used to mitigate the time constraints on the operations. Security was a concern in both in-country elections, and the threat of violence extended to the OCV operations. A considerable part of the budgets for both operations went to efforts to ensure security at the polls.

Scope of Operations

The short timeline impacted the scope of OCV operations as well. Due to the dispersed nature of the Afghan and Iraqi external populations, it was not possible to provide polling services for everyone. Instead, OCV operations focused on the largest concentrations of expatriates. This meant that a significant part of the diaspora community (in both elections) was not provided for, but it was determined that to enfranchise some was better than none at all.

While it was very difficult to estimate the exact number of expatriates living outside of either Afghanistan or Iraq, both countries have sizeable populations of eligible external voters. Large Afghan refugee communities exist, primarily in Pakistan and Iran. Best estimates indicated that there were 500,000 eligible refugees in Iran and 1.2 million in Pakistan (all Afghan nationals over the age of 18 were eligible), although government and UNHCR estimates varied. Similarly, many Iraqis had fled the regime of Saddam Hussein and sought refuge in countries around the world. Iraq’s election commission asked the IOM to operate in 14 countries with significant Iraqi diaspora populations. 2 Again, population data was difficult to come by as the Iraqi diaspora was in many cases well integrated into the host countries; often its members had been there for many years and had been granted citizenship. Best estimates indicated that there could be as many as 1.2 million eligible Iraqis living in the chosen 14 countries. However, from an operational perspective, it was important that the higher estimates were used for planning purposes in order to be prepared to deal with all potential voters.

The tight timeline had a particular impact on which Iraqi expatriates were able to vote. The Iraqi diaspora was particularly spread out, and a number of countries outside of the designated 14 claimed larger populations of Iraqis than those living in the 14—including Switzerland, Norway and Lebanon. In addition, the distribution of Iraqi expatriates within the 14 countries made locating the registration and polling centers there a controversial issue. For example, in the United States, a large community of Iraqi Kurds lives in Nashville, Tennessee— which did have a voting center—while a large community of Iraqi ChaldoAssyrians (who are Christian) lives in San Diego—which did not have a voting center (though there was one in Los Angeles). Many groups demanded that centers be established in many additional cities in the 14 countries, but operationally it was not possible to meet all of these demands.

After establishing the territory in which OCV operations would be held, the next hurdle involved negotiating with governments of the host countries to conduct external voting programs in their territories. In the Afghan case, memoranda of understanding (MoUs) already existed for both the Iranian and Pakistani governments that covered the activities of the OCV program. Despite this, a number of issues arose. Visa approvals in Iran were problematic, and as a result, many staff arrived very late in the process, leaving them little time to implement the program. The Pakistani government had a number of interests in the OCV operation. Among other things, it wanted access to the voter registration data so that it could identify subversive elements who might attempt to disrupt the electoral process. However, the OCV program was unable to support this request as it would have been in violation of data protection principles and contrary to international external voting standards.

In the Iraqi case, no MoUs were in place with any of the 14 countries. In some instances, this MoU negotiation process was smooth; in other cases negotiations were difficult, with considerable demands being made on the OCV operation. Some countries were reluctant to allow in-person registration and voting because of security concerns but were persuaded when it became clear that there was not sufficient time for the alternative: postal registration and voting. Ironically, it was most difficult to conduct the OCV program in some of the more established democracies as agreements between central governments did not necessarily translate into support from local government institutions. In more authoritarian countries, once the central approval for the operation was obtained, all levels of government actively supported the OCV program.

During Afghanistan’s 2004 presidential election, refugee voting services were provided through eight field offices in Pakistan and seven in Iran. In total, 180 international staff were recruited and deployed; 16 separate offices established (15 field offices and a headquarters); 260 core Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian staff employed for the duration of the program; and over 20,000 registration and polling staff employed and trained over a short period before Election Day. For Iraq’s 2005 parliamentary elections, more than 400 international elections staff and more than 7,000 local staff were employed during the registration and polling periods. Registration and voting operations took place in 74 centers in 36 cities across 14 countries.

Determining Eligibility

In both operations everyone involved accepted that the pre-registration of voters was essential to the integrity of the process. In any election, it is very important that only eligible voters be allowed to participate. In the context of external voting, identifying eligible voters is a particular concern—given that you are operating outside of the country holding the election— as you cannot assume that residence indicates eligibility. At pre-registration, potential voters demonstrate their status using approved documents. However, to combine determining eligibility with the act of voting would make the transaction time in the polling station too long, slowing the processing of voters on Election Day and limiting the number of people who could vote as a result. In addition, the list of registered voters generated by the pre-registration process can be reviewed by members of the voting community and examined for possible errors or the registration of ineligible people. The opportunity for community review is an important element of the electoral process and one possible only with the pre-registration of voters at a time prior to Election Day.

The short timeline of both Afghan and Iraqi elections meant that registration had to be conducted quickly. It was not possible to conduct this process of registration and voting by mail, even in the countries in which a secure postal system existed. Instead, a short period of intensive registration was conducted in the same locations where polling would take place. Afterwards, hard-copy voter lists were assembled, made available for review and challenges, and remained onsite for polling on Election Day.

This was the procedure in all OCV locations for the Afghan and Iraqi elections with the exception of Iran in 2004. In Iran, many Afghan refugees had already been registered and issued an Amayesh card (indicating their refugee status), and initially OCV officials decided to accept this card as proof of eligibility to participate in the Afghan election. However, the Amayesh database proved to be out of date as many refugees had returned home since registering and some still in Iran had never collected their cards after registration. In the end, it proved necessary to allow Afghans living in Iran to use other forms of documentation to prove their voting eligibility. In Pakistan, as no register already existed, eligible Afghans went through pre-registration.

As no register of eligible Iraqis existed in any of the 14 designated countries, a registration process was required that took place over nine days.  Initially, Iraq’s electoral commission required that eligible Iraqis provide two documents to prove their identity, their nationality (eligible voters must be Iraqi citizens, entitled to reclaim citizenship or eligible for Iraqi citizenship), and their age (eligible voters must have been born before 31 December 1986). As the registration period began, it became apparent that many Iraqis were struggling to provide the required documents and, in the end, certain single documents that proved all aspects of eligibility (such as an Iraqi passport) were accepted.

Assessment of OCV Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

Overall, the OCV programs in Afghanistan and Iraq should be considered a success. Given the incredibly challenging timelines and significant operational complexities, the fact that they happened at all is evidence of considerable success. That functioning institutions—institutions that were able to plan and implement complex electoral processes in challenging environments—were created from nothing in approximately 80 days represents incredible achievements.

Approximately 850,000 Afghan refugees participated in the election of their president through the OCV program in Iran and Pakistan, which represented about 10% of those voting in the election and about 50% of the estimated eligible population. Much of this success can be attributed to a comprehensive voter education campaign conducted through local community structures to inform Afghan refugees about the election.

Participation rates in Iraq’s OCV program were much lower, with only 265,000 of the estimated 1.2 million eligible Iraqis living in the 14 designated countries taking the opportunity to vote—about 22% of the estimated eligible population. Turnout was particularly low in countries like Jordan, Syria, the UAE and Turkey.

In analyzing this outcome, a number of reasons for this lower-than-expected rate of participation were discovered. In the listed countries, the Iraqi diaspora is subject to fears of repatriation, and many felt that participation in the election might be used to return them to Iraq. In addition, many saw the election as a U.S.-sponsored event and, as a result, did not want to participate.

Others complained that they did not know many of the more than 100 political party or candidate entities on the ballot and therefore could not be expected to make a choice among them. Voter disinterest was also a major factor; many Iraqis had left Iraq decades ago and were well integrated in their new homes. This fact limited their interest in returning to Iraq and hence in the electoral process there. Given this context, the lower-than-expected turnout is more understandable.

Conclusion

Irrespective of the advantages and disadvantages of enfranchising external populations in post-conflict elections, the decision to do so should not be left as late as was the case in these two recent OCV programs. While ultimately both OCV programs were implemented successfully, the compressed timeframe made the possibility of failure too great, and such failure could have had negative consequences for the perceived success of the wider electoral processes. Nevertheless, the symbolic value of including such populations cannot be underestimated. The joyful celebrations that were seen amongst the Iraqi diaspora and Afghan refugees when given the opportunity to be part of the post-conflict electoral process cannot be denied, and this human dimension to external enfranchisement is a powerful and abiding memory for many of these electoral events.

Ben Goldsmith is an international election expert who has been engaged in elections in the UK, Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia, Iraq and Afghanistan. He is currently the Deputy Chief Electoral Officer of Afghanistan.

Notes:

1 In October 2004, Afghans elected their president and, in January 2005, Iraqis elected a National Assembly, Governorate Councils and a Kurdish National Assembly.

2 The 14 countries selected were Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Iran, Jordan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Transition Ends and the Work Begins

by Homeyra Mokhtarzada

On September 18, Afghan men and women headed to the polls, marking an important milestone in their country’s transition to democracy. It was the second time Afghans had the opportunity to vote in less than a year (though these were the first local elections held since 1969). In 2004, Afghans had elected President Hamid Karzai and this time, they were electing members of a new lower house of the National Assembly (the Wolesi Jirga) and of 34 provincial councils. Despite predictions of election-day violence, 6.4 million of Afghanistan’s 12.5 million registered voters cast ballots and, on November 12, the certification of results completed the process laid out in the Bonn Agreement in 2001 following the fall of the Taliban. Months of planning and preparation culminated in an election day that, by official accounts, was credible and its results accepted. But the challenges the new elected bodies will face are far greater and more complex.

Organizing the Elections

With just six months of lead time, Afghans—working in concert with international donors and consultants—took on the task of organizing one of the most complex post-conflict elections in history.  The price tag: US$159 million.

To make the elections a success, at least two intangible elements had to result from the tangible preparations.  First, there had to be buy-in and understanding on the part of the Afghan populace.

With this in mind, a civic education and outreach campaign was launched. Through face- to- face sessions, about 8 million Afghans heard and discussed information about the election process and the new representative bodies. Both traditional and innovative techniques were used to communicate voter and civic education messages. These included mobile cinema and theater as well as a Voter Information Center that fielded over 110,000 election-related calls from the Afghan electorate on a toll-free number.

Second, Afghans needed to perceive the election process as credible. Just a few of the measures taken to promote fair treatment of all electoral participants included reviewing candidate nominations, designing a  complicated series of ballots for the 69 separate elections and establishing an Election Complaints Commission to adjudicate complaints in Afghanistan’s volatile environment.

On Election Day, Afghans voted for the 249 members of the Wolesi Jirga as well as members of 34 provincial councils. The number of representatives to come from each province depended on provincial population estimates. However, even if their region was to send several representatives, Afghans could only vote for one candidate for parliament or council, rather than (for example) a slate of candidates from the same party who shared the same political platform. Afghanistan’s president and cabinet decided on a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system. One reason for the choice was President Karzai’s known distrust of political parties, due to their disruptive role in Afghan political history (in fact, Karzai himself has refused to establish a political party). A second reason was the desire to maintain a strong executive branch.

The SNTV system proved problematic. Because individuals ran as independents, the list of candidates (each with name, number, symbol and photograph) was typically long and the final ballots unwieldy. In Kabul for example, 400 candidates vied for 33 Wolesi Jirga seats. Rough estimates put the time required at seven minutes for a voter to identify his/her candidate and cast a ballot. In most districts, because of the sheer number of candidates, the total vote was so fragmented that many candidates were declared winners with percentages of the total vote in single digits. In the long-run, the lack of blocks or parties in the new National Assembly will make it very difficult for the institution to organize and counterbalance the power of the executive.

The Winners

Among the multitude of candidates, there were some notable winners. Nearly 600 women ran as candidates, and in a country where—until just a few years ago—women were virtually forbidden from appearing in public, this in itself was a great marker of political change. Despite intimidation and harassment, Afghan women candidates also beat the odds. The constitution calls for just over 25 percent reservation for women in the National Assembly, and women captured 27 percent of the seats, several winning their contests outright.

In Herat province, the top vote winner was a woman: Fauzia Gailani. A candidate for the Wolesi Jirga, she won 16,885 votes, or 3.6 percent of the provincial total. A mother of six who started a chain of fitness clubs in Herat after the fall of the Taliban, she has become well known for her rhetoric on equal rights and against child marriage.  Gailani will be joined in the National Assembly by conservative religious leaders, former Mujahedeen (including top vote-getters Younus Qanooni, a Tajik, and Mohammad Mohaqeq, an ethnic Hazara), and a 100-person strong Pashtun contingent (among whom tribal factions are strong). Even four former Taliban will join the ranks of new parliamentarians.  

But while there were no major disruptions on Election Day, there were clearly some areas of concern. Ballot boxes from approximately 4 percent of 26,000 polling places were set aside for investigation into charges of fraud, including ballot boxes with broken seals and evidence of ballot box stuffing. The Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) took a strong stand on attempted fraud. In the end, 3 percent of ballot boxes were excluded from the count. In addition, the JEMB dismissed 50 election workers who were implicated in attempted fraudulent activities. Among voters, cases of proxy voting were noted as well as possible intimidation of voters to influence their choices. Nevertheless, international organizers and monitors insisted that the integrity of the election was not affected by these problems.

Analysis

At 51 percent, turnout was lower than in last year’s presidential election but still higher than that in many so-called “developed democracies,” like the United States. This lower-than-expected turnout can possibly be attributed to three main factors: (1) Afghan disenchantment with the slow pace of development and accompanying widespread corruption; (2) the security concerns of Election Day; and (3) the overwhelming multitude of choices on the ballot.  

The problems encountered and the challenges overcome in mounting these elections are important steps in the process of Afghanistan’s democratization, but the real test will be in how the National Assembly and provincial councils will function and the role they will play in this country’s nascent democracy. 

National Assembly

The effectiveness of the newly elected Wolesi Jirga will be determined by the answers to the following questions:

1. Will it become mired in internal politics—unable to coalesce into working coalitions—and come to be seen as an ineffective institution?
2. Can it strike the necessary balance of power with President Karzai?
3. Will it be able to deliver tangible results to voters?

Once the Wolesi Jirga convenes, which is expected in mid-December, the answers to these questions will begin to emerge. Many of them depend on how the new body’s power structure evolves.

If leaders emerge who are able to forge working alliances then perhaps the Wolesi Jirga will be able to influence the national agenda and provide the democratic check on Karzai’s power envisioned by Afghanistan’s constitution. Any coalitions are likely to form around three principal groups: (1) the opposition National Understanding Front—a coalition of Islamic and former Mujahedeen parties—headed by Younos Qanooni, a former Minister of Education and Northern Alliance commander who also ran against Karzai last year; (2) the National Democratic Front, which includes about a dozen groups that support

Karzai and come in large part from the Pashtun ethnic group; and (3) the Kabul Agreement, seen as the swing vote camp, made up of liberals and leftists. With women making up 27 percent of the new body, it would be shortsighted not to mention that they, too, could play a key role if they are able to organize themselves into a caucus.

However, this coalition-building faces real challenges. First, because each elected member ran as an individual (rather than as part of a party), they don’t have the loyalties one would see in a traditional parliament. Second, most of the legislators are unfamiliar with the functioning of a National Assembly. They will need training on their individual functions as well as the procedures of the Wolesi Jirga. In addition, a civil service staff must be trained from scratch. These are just two reasons why there is real danger that the Wolesi Jirga may not be able to take on the executive in any meaningful way.

With respect to whether candidates will be able to deliver results to their constituents, there is likely to be a great deal of disappointment on this front. Some candidates promised to build roads or schools or to bring electricity to local communities. Others campaigned on platforms that promoted disarming armed groups and fighting corruption. However, these priorities will require time, money and a member who can deliver funds to his/her local communities. As the government remains severely cash-strapped, these challenges are not small. Given this circumstance, and the fact that a number of candidates financed their campaigns through opium revenues, the possibility that new National Assembly members will turn to corruption or the illicit narcotics trade is real. Revenue from narcotics in Afghanistan is about six times the government’s budget, and—in this decentralized country—it is not a stretch to say that narcotics is a primary source of local revenue and will continue to be so.

Provincial Councils

The signatories of the Bonn Agreement had envisioned that district elections would be held when provincial and national elections took place. Correspondingly, they had expected that the upper house of the National Assembly (the Meshrano Jirga) would be composed of representatives chosen by the provincial councils, district councils and the president (1/3 each). However, logistical problems prevented these elections from being held. After some debate, it was decided by the cabinet, after consultation with the Supreme Court, that rather than convening an incomplete Meshrano Jirga, 2/3 of its seats would be filled by representatives from the provincial councils until district council elections are held.

The role of the provincial councils is defined only vaguely in the Afghan constitution, which states that they should “take part in securing the developmental targets of the state and improving its affairs in a way stated by the law” and give “advice on important issues falling within the domain” of each province. In the immediate term, though, they have little on their agenda besides selecting representatives to sit in the Meshrano Jirga, and the danger exists that these councils will be toothless bodies with little relevance—particularly since they will not receive the attention, funding or training that the National Assembly will to promote their empowerment. In conclusion, the new Meshrano Jirga, Wolesi Jirga and provincial councils have a difficult path ahead. Expectations of these bodies should be tempered because, following post-conflict elections, newly formed legislatures take time to develop into fully functional institutions. The success story is that Afghans once again succeeded in surprising the international community. But the last year’s sprint toward the elections, and the victory they represent, should not be a signal to those who have helped this shattered country come this far to now turn their attention to the next “hot zone.” Afghanistan will continue to need international assistance and expertise if it is to complete its marathon toward democracy, prosperity and stability.

Homeyra Mokhtarzada is an IFES Program Officer.

New Tools for Today's Election Practitioners

by Thérèse Pearce Laanela and Jeff Brady

In the 1990s, a whirlwind of democratization swept the world, producing a flurry of elections in long-time authoritarian countries in Eastern Europe, Africa and elsewhere. In these nascent democracies, newly minted electoral policymakers and administrators had to start from scratch as they wrote legislation, procedures and manuals to get their countries’ first elections off the ground. Faced with short time frames and incredibly high political stakes, international electoral advisors and indigenous election officials had to rely on manuals from other democracies, usually sent through slow postal services or faxed through unreliable telephone services. 

As frustrations grew, a team of election practitioners came up with an idea to support these election pioneers with a tool that could categorize the existing knowledge from around the globe about democratic elections—and make it readily available on the Internet. In 1998, a partnership composed of International IDEA, UN-DESA and IFES (with funding from USAID)—released the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project. ACE became one of the most valued and best-known international depositories of knowledge on managing elections, focused on the administrative and cost implications of the choices available.

With more than 2.4 million annual visitors and wide acclaim, the ACE project has provided election professionals with critical information in over 700 elections worldwide. However, the original partners realized that ACE could be strengthened by drawing on the expertise of the thousands of election professionals that now existed. To that end, new partners joined on and a new idea emerged: the ACE project is now the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, a series of new informational products brought together in one portal that aims to provide a ready environment for professionals to generate, share and apply knowledge on managing elections and, ultimately, offer capacity development services.

 

A Unique Partnership Approach

In 2004, the founding partners—along with Elections Canada, the Electoral Institute of South Africa’s EISA, Mexico’s IFE and the UNDP—reviewed the ACE Project’s overall vision and sought out the collaboration of associate members, such as universities and regional/national electoral organizations. In February 2005, the University of Calgary became an associate member, helping to grow an ACE network that now includes vibrant relationships among more than a dozen international organizations (i.e., the ACE partners, the University of Calgary and 10 regional associations and local civil society organizations).

 

Commitment to Community: Election Administration as a Profession

The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network is driven by a fundamental belief that election administration should be seen as a profession in its own right, requiring specialized knowledge and practical experience. Given this aim, the intended outcomes of the 2006 ACE Electoral Knowledge Network are: 

• Enhanced knowledge services that promote a ready environment for election professionals to exchange information, solve problems and build a common language, methods and models around specific competencies; and
• Improved professionalism of those engaged in electoral activities, stressing the tools needed to ensure credible, sustainable, peaceful and cost-effective elections.

 

Enhancing Knowledge Services

To create an environment for information exchange, the partners expanded, updated and improved the core content of the ACE Project. The result is a comprehensive and authoritative collection of highly readable, informative and practical documents covering management approaches, alternative methods, cost considerations and policy issues in electoral administration.

Second, ACE added new features to improve the user’s experience, including: 

• Direct and system-wide links with the Election Process Information Collection (EPIC) Project, providing updated comparative data on election systems, laws and management worldwide.
• Access to Election Resources Online, a comprehensive

and continuously updated collection of materials such as sample ballots, election posters and administrative manuals.

• A Focus On online article series that explores cross-cutting issues relevant to elections and democratic governance (produced three or four times yearly).
• Electoral Advice Online, a portal divided into three main sections: a help desk function, an archive of questions from users (with answers from experts) and a virtual meeting place where electoral experts can debate pressing issues.
• Coverage of timely electoral topics as well as analysis of electoral events, produced in Elections Today (this magazine).
• Case Studies that feature practitioners’ experiences of electoral reform and innovation.
• An interactive ACE Electoral Quiz, allowing ACE users to  test and expand their knowledge of elections.

 

Towards a Practitioners’ Network

Unlike other fields, election administration has very little codified knowledge for best practices. ACE provides this service by (1) creating a rich information resource, (2) providing a workspace for election practitioners to generate new knowledge and (3) coordinating the provision of specialized technical advisory services.

For election practitioners, two kinds of peer support are of primary value. The first is information from people around the world who are grappling with similar issues—dealing with boundary disputes, developing voter registration software or finding creative and constructive ways of liaising with political parties. The first kind of practitioners’ network is therefore topic-based and information-rich and, in time, should become a mechanism of mutual support and professional development, a source of expertise in the field and a quality-control mechanism for the knowledge services section of the ACE Project.

The second type of support is for those who seek to network with colleagues who share a common (or similar) cultural, geographical or historical background. Building on a model that has worked successfully for the EPIC Project (which collects comparative data on elections), entities as diverse as regional organizations, professional associations of electoral administrators, electoral management bodies and nongovernmental organizations that promote democracy will serve as hubs to offer high quality regionally specific information to election practitioners. These organizations are also the most effective sources of data and research, country case studies, sample materials, up-to-date news and other resources relating to how elections are run.

 

Building Capacity

The ACE partners view the growing global demand for capacity development services for electoral management bodies, as well as a need to offer opportunities for training and professional development of officials involved in election administration in developing countries and transition economies. ACE places a particular emphasis on the power of training, professional advisory services and peer partnerships—especially among electoral management bodies—to increase their capacity to administer free and fair elections and to deepen their professional standards.

Overall, the objective of this third component is to capitalize on the wealth of materials and networks generated by the ACE network, so that member organizations have a menu of capacity development services. As this is a more exploratory (as well as potentially resource-intensive) initiative, the intention is to begin with a pilot. With ACE partner EISA as the host and manager, capacity development services will be threefold: technical advisory services, training and the promotion of peer partnerships.

The methodology and structure that prove successful in the pilot will form the basis for a model. The basic concept is to support the capacity of regional organizations to strengthen delivery of quality electoral services to their respective constituencies.

The ACE partners believe that the value of this information resource and professional network is determined by its users and grows through conversation—especially between those who manage, study and shape the legal, policy and regulatory frameworks for free and fair elections. As professionals engaged in elections administration, we continually examine our own work and hope that as we move forward you help ensure that we meet your needs.

Thérèse Pearce Laanela is the ACE Project Coordinator with International IDEA in Stockholm. Jeff Brady is a senoir program specialist with the F. Clifton White Applied Research Center at IFES. This article is adapted from an article in Electoral Insight, published by Elections Canada in 2006.

The Genesis of the ACE Project

by Antonio Spinelli

As the month-long voter registration campaign drew to a close, I asked my friend Sabah if he had registered. “I don’t believe in the value of my vote,” he replied. “Nothing will change, whether I vote or not,” he added, with a sense of resignation that nearly overwhelmed me.

An upper class citizen educated abroad, Sabah passionately believed that his vote would not make a meaningful difference. He simply couldn’t trust the system and institutions of governance in his country, despite the legislative and structural reforms that were underway at that time. He believed his only choice was to abstain from exercising his political voice.

Even though Sabah felt his remarks were justifiable, I was struck by his attitude. Perhaps I felt so uncomfortable because of the years I had worked to support and promote the values of democratic elections in various regions of the world—and because I believe in those values. Or perhaps because I had worked in many countries where the right to vote was not taken for granted but, rather, it was the result of long-term struggle and sacrifice by people who had been arbitrarily stripped of fundamental rights.

Whatever his reasons, Sabah’s perception of voting as an exercise in futility left a deep mark on me, so deep that, today, I still think of him and of his words.

Since then, I have been confronted many times by the question of how to reverse the spreading of the resigned attitude of people choosing not to choose. Why is voter confidence — and consequently voter turnout — relentlessly declining both in emerging and established democracies? How could Sabah’s confidence in the value of his vote be regained?

In looking for answers, and possibly for a solution, we have to step back a few years.

New Democracies and the "electoral knowledge gap"

While the aftermath of the Cold War was characterized by a sharp increase worldwide in the number of pluralistic elections, their meaning, value and legitimacy varied significantly from case to case. In addition, many electoral processes failed to provide citizens with a real opportunity to choose their representatives freely. A number of adverse factors worked to limit their voting opportunities, such as inadequate electoral frameworks, the inadequate or untimely funding of elections, a politically biased or unprofessional election administration, electoral fraud, unequal access to media, political restrictions, intimidation and violence, to name just a few.  

The widely varying electoral practices and standards of emerging democracies attracted unprecedented levels of attention from the world community, which began to address the conditions necessary to hold legitimate elections. As a result, emerging democracies saw a sharp increase in the demand for both technical electoral assistance and the required “stamp of approval” delivered by electoral observation missions.  

With the field of electoral administration growing dramatically and changing in its scope, in the 1990s, electoral practitioners found themselves confronted with new and complex challenges. In most cases, governments, political parties and governance bodies found themselves unprepared to go through democratic transitions that relied heavily on the holding of credible and competitive elections. Not possessing the necessary experience and knowledge to guarantee the fundamental conditions necessary for legitimate elections, many countries failed to respond appropriately to the emergence of these new challenges.  

The Erosion of Public Trust

At the turn of the millennium, a shift in the nature of these new electoral challenges turned the knowledge gap into a deficit of public trust in the election process. Elections in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan demonstrated—as never before— the importance of stakeholders’ confidence in the electoral process and the consequences when it is lacking. Public trust in the electoral process is crucial to its success because such confidence legitimizes the process and connects citizens to the institutions that represent them. 

Today, election practitioners and institutions face the significant challenge of rebuilding the confidence of key stakeholders in the electoral process—stakeholders such as the electorate, political parties, civil society, the media and observer groups. So how do we address the credibility problems emerging on almost all continents and the mistrust of  citizens like Sabah, who are resigned to the choice of not choosing? These problems can be solved by creating a more professional and sustainable electoral administration that, in turn, can promote enhanced credibility and strengthened public trust in the democratic process at large.  

The ACE Project: Meeting the Credibility Challenges

The Administration and Cost of Elections Project (www.aceproject.org) was first made publicly available in 1998 as a collaborative effort to help developing democracies address the gap in electoral knowledge. An electronic encyclopedia covering all aspects of election administration, the ACE Project initially encouraged the use of best practices worldwide; promoted transparency, accountability, professionalism and efficiency in electoral processes; and provided alternative frameworks and guidance to election officials and policymakers seeking to strengthen national electoral systems.   

Over the years, it became apparent that the ACE Project and its many resources represented an invaluable tool that could be employed to enhance the professional capacities of electoral practitioners to administer more efficient and credible elections. It also became apparent that, to effectively address the new credibility challenges, ACE had to be transformed into a more active and dynamic tool.  

The new ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, to be officially launched on May 4, 2006, is the result of a transformation that has taken the original ACE Project to an entirely new dimension, through a networking process that generates value from its intellectual and knowledge-based assets, maximizing the use, dissemination and application of such assets.  

This process is founded on the establishment of an electoral “community of practice,” a community of election professionals and practitioners from different regions of the world. Members of this group share common interests, professional responsibilities and goals, and have an instrumental role in implementing the three fundamental elements of the ACE  Electoral Knowledge Network, namely:  

• Knowledge generation: community members engage on thematic discussions, exchange knowledge and good practices, share technical and policy advice, develop new ideas, learn from each other’s experiences (about what worked, and what didn’t, in similar situations) and help one another;
• Knowledge sharing: the knowledge generated by the community is systematically acquired, organized and shared among community members and ACE users at large; and
• Knowledge application: the collected knowledge is adapted to be re-used in professional development initiatives targeting election practitioners and institutions in need, contributing to the increased professionalism of election administrators worldwide.

The concept of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network is innovative and powerful, something that has never been attempted before in the field of election administration. The electoral knowledge generated by and disseminated through the ACE Project—as well as the application of its resulting principles—is likely to have a significant impact in decreasing the widespread public mistrust and disillusion affecting many of the world’s regions.

I hope this innovative project will serve to motivate my friend Sabah, along with others who think like him, to reclaim the indisputable value of their votes.

 

Antonio Spinelli is a senior program officer at the Electoral Processes Programme of International IDEA in Sweden and a member of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network Project Team.

A Step Towards Peace

by Boaz Paldi

Voters in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) go to the polls on July 30, 2006, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Mission to Congo (MONUC) are contributing to the international effort to ensure those elections will be fair and transparent. For the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, UNDP and MONUC are ramping up civic education, security and media-development efforts in what should be the climactic stage of the largest and most complex electoral-assistance mission ever.

An Important Step Towards Peace

The US$422.9 million initiative is of historic importance, according to William Swing, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Special Representative in the DRC. “This is the closest that the Congolese people have been to a credible election since independence in 1960,” he said. “They have the largest and most sustained international support since independence, including the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the history of UN peacekeeping. We are encouraged simply because of the sheer enthusiasm of the people, who are determined to get back to conditions of stability and legitimacy of institutions.”

The elections are a crucial step in a peace process aimed at ending the DRC’s five-year civil war, which has affected six adjacent countries and killed four million people. To this day, fierce fighting continues in some of the country’s 11 provinces, but a peacekeeping force 17,000 strong stands ready to help maintain order and stability in a nation whose location and size make it a bellwether for Africa as a whole.

The DRC has been riven by conflict throughout its history. The country’s first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated just four months after the country achieved independence from Belgium in 1959. A series of coups in its first years of existence led to the three-decade reign of Mobutu Sese Seko, which was notorious for pervasive corruption.

In 1997, rebels took the capital and installed Laurent Kabila as president. Shortly afterward, the nation plunged again into civil war, with factions supported by neighboring countries facing off against Kabila’s forces. Joseph Kabila, the current president, took the reins of power when his father was assassinated in 2001.

UNDP/MONUC’s Technical Assistance to the Elections

In the past year, UNDP and MONUC have been a major force in registering 25.7 million Congolese to vote in a country the size of Western Europe with few passable roads and minimal infrastructure. The task required ingenuity, technology and hard work. Eighty-kilogram (176-pound) registration kits—each containing a laptop computer, fingerprinting materials and a digital camera—were distributed throughout the DRC by means ranging from light aircraft and trucks to dugout canoes and litters hand-carried through dense rainforest. The mobile kits made possible the immediate issuing of photo identity cards, an important tool for safeguarding citizens’ rights and access to public services.

However, most Congolese have never participated in a democratic process before. So UNDP, in collaboration with local partners, is ramping up its efforts in civic education, a crucial component

in preparing citizens for the nation’s first free election. For example, the Bam Bam group, supported by UNDP and a local NGO, Francophone D’appui au Développement, performs civic-education plays for local communities in Kinshasa.

One play tells the story of a candidate—nicknamed Drunkard—who says he will legalize drugs and send everyone to Europe and America if they simply give him money. The performers then talk with the audience about democratic choice and politicians’ responsibilities to their constituencies. Other performances take on issues like women’s roles in the election, the importance of youth participation and how one goes about voting on polling day.

UNDP Civic-Education Officer Renzo Hettinger said UNDP has programs like this in all 11 provinces of the DRC. “It is very important for UNDP and for the electoral process to reach the population at the grassroots level, with activities that are simple, short and have a sure hook for the population.”

Setting the elections in motion has brought its share of challenges, particularly in logistics. Shortly before the December referendum on the DRC’s new constitution, the company bidding to provide salaries to the country’s electoral workers pulled out of the process, putting the referendum at risk. In a matter of days, UNDP arranged to pay 240,000 election workers and police in 10,000 locations.

“It was not easy, but we succeeded in doing it on time,” said Simone-Pierre Nanitelamio, head of operations for UNDP in the DRC. “It’s a payment mechanism that we’re going to improve for the next phases of the electoral process, namely for future voting, but that’s the greatest challenge, to try to dispatch the material across a territory that is as vast as the European Union.”

Another aspect of UNDP electoral assistance is fostering independent media. UNDP and the UN Department of Public Information jointly fund and run a radio station based in the capital. In addition to music and pop-culture broadcasts, the station invites representatives from all political persuasions to hold public debates on the airwaves. UNDP also holds seminars on the media’s place in the elections, and the role and contributions of women in journalism.

Malu Malu, president of the Independent Electoral Committee, says he is optimistic about the future of Congo after the elections but says much work remains in building public confidence in the institutions of government and law. “It is essential to consolidate democracy on the basis of respect for the wording of the constitution and the laws, and to ensure that the latter are applied totally impartially. The system of oversight has to be a system binding on everybody, not just a certain category of people, because very often we have experienced a system that covered the lower ranks while the higher ones, the ones that ought to have been subject to oversight, escaped,” he said.

Building Legitimate Institutions for a Better Future

UNDP support for democratic elections has grown rapidly in recent years. The organization supports, on average, one election every two weeks, in 46 countries around the world. By far the largest demand comes from Africa, where in 2005 UNDP worked with 20 different countries on elections, including the critical post-conflict election processes of Liberia, DRC and Sierra Leone.

However, UNDP’s work goes far beyond election day in building the foundations of sustainable democracy. Indeed, what happens before—and long after—the event is just as important as the vote itself. Increasingly, UNDP works to help countries build capacity and stable institutions over a longer term. This includes establishing independent electoral-management bodies, strengthening or revising electoral laws and supporting long-term election planning, monitoring and budgeting.

As UNDP Administrator Kemal Derviş stated recently, human development cannot take place without an electoral process. Building legitimate institutions, he maintains, is the basis for any country’s development—and that is the crux of any democracy-building mission. “There is increasing agreement among economic historians and analysts that institutions that …are supportive of development, [and that] are legitimate vis-à-vis the people of the country, are … factor[s]. Without these institutions, without governance, nothing works…. Electoral legitimacy is a very important part of governance and that is why supporting that kind of legitimacy is so important…for development,” Derviş said.

To be sure, challenges remain before the DRC goes to the polls in July. And it is far from certain that these elections will succeed in bringing change to this troubled land. Still, the hope of the international community and the UN is that the democratic process will gain a foothold. And although this may not cure all of the troubles facing the nation, it will be a first step on the path to recovery.

Boaz Paldi is a broadcast specialist with UNDP.

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The MMP Electoral System Faces Political Challenges in Lesotho

Selecting the electoral system that best suits a given country is a delicate balancing act (as is explored in depth in the ACE Encyclopaedia). Countries must balance many competing values, including accurate representation of their populations and government effectiveness (should a multitude of very small groups elect representatives, the legislative branch might find itself unable to form a coalition large enough to actually enact proposed laws).

 

Over the past 10 years, Lesotho has been struggling with exactly these challenges. Its government hopes it has found the solution in a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system, which combines elements of first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) systems. In comparison with other systems, MMP electoral systems are said to keep legislators more accountable to the electorate and to maximise the representativeness of the legislature. However, doubt was cast on Lesotho’s 2007 elections as the result of political infighting, and its MMP system may need further reform before it can fulfil its promise of better political accountability and representation.

 

The Prompt for Change

 

Following its independence from Britain in the 1960s, Lesotho inherited the British electoral system, which is the majority wins, first-past-the-post system. However, in 1998, this system came under intense scrutiny when the governing Lesotho Congress of Democracy (LCD) won 78 of the 79 contested seats but only 60% of the valid votes cast. In contrast, opposition parties—who earned 40% of the vote—won only one seat (1.25%). The resultant public outcry was followed by violent protests which left 75 people dead. As a result, Lesotho’s constitution and electoral law were amended (following discussions among national stakeholders) to introduce a mixed-member proportional system with 120 legislative seats (adding 40 seats). Eighty of those seats are filled using FPTP (and are tied to specific constituencies), and 40 are filled using PR in order to ensure each party’s number of legislative seats more or less reflects its proportion of the national vote (as indicated by the PR ballot). That is, they compensate for the FPTP system’s tendency to over- or underrepresent political groups.

 

How the System Works

 

On election day, voters receive two ballots. They use one to elect the Member of Parliament for their constituency using the FPTP system, and they use the other to vote for their preferred party. The second (or party) ballot is used to determine the number of seats each party would receive if the system was fully proportional and thereby determines the proportion of the 40 compensatory seats each party receives.

 

The total number of valid votes cast on the party ballot is divided by the total number of seats at stake in the national assembly in a given election (open constituency seats as well as the 40 compensatory seats). The resulting number is the quota or “price” of each assembly seat. The number of votes each party received on the party ballot is divided by the quota to determine how many seats it deserves to receive. This process is known as the provisional allocation.

 

For example, if party A won 35 seats in the FPTP election, but the provisional allocation shows that it deserves 45 seats then it receives 10 of the compensatory seats to give it its full complement of 45 seats. This process is repeated for each party. If, at the end of the first round, all seats have been allocated, the process stops. However, the law anticipates certain complications, such as a situation in which a party wins more constituency seats than it is entitled to according to the provisional allocation or where the first round of the provisional allocation gives parties more compensatory seats than are available. Instead of automatically adding these extra seats and potentially changing the size of the national assembly each time there is an election (as in Germany), Lesotho electoral law handles this challenge by excluding the seats for those parties which had won more than their fair share in the FPTP. In 2002 one such constituency seat was won by a party that was due compensation: the Lesotho People’s Congress. As a result, the number of seats used to determine the quota was 41.

 

Lesotho’s 2002 Elections Show Improvement

 

Following the 2002 elections, the seat allocation in the National Assembly was as shown in Table 1.

As can be seen from this table, the use of the MMP system greatly improved proportionality and broadened representation of political parties in Lesotho’s legislature when compared with the 1998 results. 

 

The 2007 Elections Yield New Controversy

 

Unfortunately, the country’s next election (in 2007) did not go as smoothly. In late 2006, floor crossing in the national assembly reduced the LCD majority from 79 to 61 (of 120) seats. This slim majority proved difficult to manage and led to the calling of elections in February 2007.

 

In an attempt to gain political advantage, the LCD allied with the National Independence Party (NIP) while the LCD’s newest and strongest rival, the All Basotho Convention (ABC), entered into a coalition with the Lesotho Workers Party (LWP). In an MMP system, the more constituency seats a party wins, the fewer compensatory seats it earns (which is why the LCD won no compensatory seats in 2002). The NIP and LWP are both smaller parties, and the coalitions between them and larger parties were clearly designed to take advantage of this aspect of MMP systems.

 

According to their agreements, the LWP and NIP did not contest the constituency elections rather ran only on the party ballot (though one NIP faction did run in some constituencies). In turn, the larger LCD and ABC did not run on the party ballot. However, members of the LCD and ABC who ran for constituency seats were also included in the party lists for the NIP and LWP respectively. As a result, some people represented two different parties in different aspects of the election. Nevertheless, the four parties used different symbols and registered separately for the elections. Clearly, the larger parties aimed to earn compensatory seats through the “back door” provided by the smaller parties, and the smaller parties were attempting to “piggyback” on the strength of the larger parties to gain access to the legislature for at least some of their candidates.

 

Following the election the total number of party votes was 442,963. The first round allocated 119 seats (an election in one constituency did not take place) on the basis of a quota of 3,723 votes per seat (442,963 divided by 119), as shown in Table 2. In this round, the ABC and LCD were not included in the provisional allocation (because they had not participated in the PR ballot). As Table 2 shows, this resulted in the provisional allocation of more compensatory seats than the 40 seats available. Therefore, the allocation had to go to a second round (shown in Table 3), which excluded the 78 seats already won by parties not listed on the party ballot and the one constituency seat which was not contested. One of the parties which had run on the party ballot had also won one constituency seat, therefore this seat was added to the 40 compensatory seats to make a total of 41 seats to be considered. In the second round, the quota was 10,804 votes per seat (442,963 divided by 41), and it was applied only to those parties that had participated in the party election. This round determined how the 40 compensatory seats were allocated. The final allocation, including the constituency seats, is shown in Table 4.

 

The Parties Challenge the Seat Allocation

 

After the allocation process, several political parties contested the manner in which seats had been distributed, alleging that the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) should have taken into consideration that LCD and NIP were in fact acting as one party (as were ABC and LWP) and should be treated as one party. They argued that treating these coalitions as a single entity would have significantly changed the seat allocation (as shown in Table 5). The smaller parties would have more seats and the LCD would control fewer seats.

 

This allocation issue has created a new political impasse in Lesotho and has prompted a mass job stayaway in March 2007, violent attacks against top political leaders, and the continued recalcitrance of the opposition parties. Taken together, it has created political instability and has in fact negated the consensus the MMP system was designed to promote. Some people in Lesotho do not see the election results as legitimate, and the system itself has been compromised in the eyes of observers both inside and outside the borders of Lesotho. Some argue that the current allocation of seats looks more like a parallel electoral system, in which the calculations for the FPTP and PR seats are made separately and do not have any effect on each other.

 

Implications for the MMP System and Future Electoral Reform in Lesotho

 

Despite its current political turmoil, Lesotho’s experience should not be taken to signify fundamental flaws in the MMP system. After all, this system has been used successfully by countries such as Germany, New Zealand, and Mexico. Those who designed Lesotho’s system acted with the understanding that political actors would respect the system and not abuse it, and it is possible that they did not even consider the ways in which the system could be manipulated. If they had, the system could have included safeguards to prevent the situation in which Lesotho finds itself. Lesotho’s experiences stands more as a cautionary tale than a condemnation of MMP systems.

 

Any reforms of MMP systems should consider making explicit the legal status of alliances and coalitions, particularly when it comes to the calculation of quotas. The law should guide election administrators as to how to allocate compensatory seats in cases in which coalitions are not officially registered or when the parties listed on the constituency ballots are not the same as those on the party ballots. Some have argued that parties that do not participate in the constituency ballot (as the LWP and NIP did not) should not be eligible for compensatory seats, and the law should resolve this issue. Some argue that the law should compel parties to participate in both ballots. (Such a law raises questions about whether parties that do not have the same level of support across the country should be forced to field candidates in constituencies in which they would be at a disadvantage from the beginning.) Because Lesotho’s law is silent on these issues, it is difficult to legally fault the election administrators for allocating these seats as they did.

 

The fact that some well-known members of the LCD and ABC have entered the legislature (and indeed the executive branch) on the ticket of the NIP and LWP respectively raises another problem. It defies common political sense that a person can stand for two parties in one election. The law should specify that a person can only appear on constituency or party ballots representing a single party. Reformers could also consider introducing a threshold requirement (according to which parties must have some minimum percentage of the national vote in order to qualify to run), though this has the potential to decrease the diversity of representation in Parliament (where, in Lesotho’s case, some parties only have one seat).  

 

There is no doubt that Lesotho’s electoral law should be reformed not only to safeguard the compensatory mechanisms but also to address as much as is legally possible other loopholes in its MMP system, such as issues related to seat allocation and the nature of coalition politics. Such reform will be closely watched not only by those contemplating introducing an MMP system of their own but also by those who currently operate an MMP system, with the goal of avoiding the instability that has arisen from the manipulation and misunderstanding of the system in Lesotho.

At the End of the Day: Diary of an International Election Observer in Tokelau

October 16, 2007:

Getting to Samoa

 

 

 

 

I once had an Aussie boss who wasn’t one for a lot of words, and summed up most issues with the phrase, “At the end of the day…”  I somehow never thought that I would actually end up there.

 

The trip to Tokelau involved a stop in Samoa, which sits on the edge of the International Date Line.  Fiji, its neighbor to the west, lies on the other side of the Date Line and the one hour flight connecting the two, can depart Fiji on Tuesday evening and arrive in Apia, Samoa’s capital on early on Tuesday morning, a bit reminiscent of Groundhog Day.  It was a bit less confusing for me, as I had left Los Angeles around 11:00pm on Tuesday 16 October and traveling in an easterly direction, arrived, some 9 hours later, at the end of the day at 5:00am on 17 October.

 

The Referendum briefing was scheduled to start at 11:00am on 19 October.  Team Tokelau, as the General Manager of the Tokelau referred to us, was a diverse group consisting of folks from the Tokelau authorities, the New Zealand Government, the Tokelau office in Apia, the New Zealand Electoral Office, the UNDP office in Apia, Florentine from UNDSS in Apia, the foreign press, the visiting UN delegation which also included my colleague Walter a seasoned election expert. 

 

We were briefed on the training and voter education activities, and given an overview of preparations for the referendum, including actions taken on the recommendations of the February 2006 referendum UN monitoring report.  These included portable, waterproof ballot boxes that had been designed specifically for the Tokelau referendum process.  It consisted of a lightweight collapsible shell with a zipper for the slot, and another zipper to seal the lid. Attached to the shell was also a handle for to facilitate portability.  A collapsible wall made of four sections of stiffer material which is held against the inside of the shell by Velcro supports. We were also given copies of the draft constitution, drafty treaty with New Zealand, and the referendum rules, in preparation for the first day of voting on 20 October.

 

October 20, 2007:

The first day

 

 

 

 

The next day, armed with the checklists that we would use for the process, Walter and I went to the polling station which was located at the Tokelau Apia Liaison Office (TALO).  Our first task was to observe the sealing of the empty ballot boxes.  The polling station was then officially open for business, and some of the polling staff were the first voters.  The total voters list for Apia was only 59, and the voters thus trickled in through the course of the day….certainly no need for crowd control!

 

Toward the end of the day, I accompanied part of the polling team as they made visits to one voter at the hospital and another at his residence, as they were unable to come to the polling station to cast their ballot.  The patient at the hospital had just had a baby boy 15 hours before, but was happy to vote in what she viewed as an important process for the Tokelauans.

 

By the close of the polls, 57 of the 59 voters on the roll had voted, as well as 6 Tokelauans from the atolls who would be able to vote at their place of residence on the appointed polling day.  It all went quite smoothly, and I was happy to have completed my first day as a monitor!

 

Later that night we got the wharf at about 9:00pm and found the cabin with the bunks where we would spend the night of the passenger ship, the Lady Naomi.  These were some claustrophobic double-decker spaces separated by narrow passages with absolutely no room to change one’s mind.  I followed Walter’s lead and went upstairs to the dining room and found a comfortable space below one of the dining tables.  Fortunately, the Tokelau office provided us with mattresses, thin but quite wide, as well as a couple of pillows, and after standing outside catching the fresh air, chatting and watching the Apia skyline disappear into the night.

 

 

 

 

 

I awoke at about 5:00am and wandered outside to greet the morning sun, happy that I did not have need for my “sea legs” or motion sickness pills.  I had heard so much about this 26-hour voyage, which according to my colleagues, was much rougher the previous year.  During the day, as I looked out onto the rolling sea with the painted sky and the silhouetted clouds, I understood where some of the inspiration for the wonderful Pacific tattoos might have come from.

 

October 22, 2007:

Welcome to Tokelau

 

 

 

 

We awoke to see Fakaofo (pronounced “Hahaoho”), the first of the atolls that we would visit in the coming days.  Even though I had been reading about atolls in the months prior to the mission, I still had no clear idea of what one would actually look like in terms of size and layout.  But here it was: a ring of coral islands, enclosing a lagoon, formed by the protruding perimeter of a submerged volcano.

 

A small aluminum boat was sent out to bring us ashore and we clambered in, trying to keep our balance on the swaying boat as we stepped across the wooden palettes on the floor of the small craft.  The ballot boxes and polling material were loaded into the boat, and it was then that I first caught sight of the Tokelauan policemen, dressed in the whitest of uniforms: white British colonial police hat; white policeman’s shirt; and white lavalava (traditional skirt).

 

We came ashore at about 8:00am and made our way with the crunch of coral under our feet to the polling station.  This was a beautifully decorated “fale” as large as a volleyball court.  I decided to take a walk around the atoll before settling down to begin our first day’s work. 

 

Later in the afternoon, I left Walter at the polling station and set out with the mobile polling team to the larger island of Fanuafala.  We used the “school bus” that takes the children from Fakaofo to the school there.  We visited about four elderly voters at their homes; they cast their ballots and wished us well in our work and travels.  As we walked along the coral paths, past solar-powered street lamps in the 40-degree sun, the Tokelauans greeted us with big smiles and their customary salutation “malo”.

 

Following the close of the polls, there was the usual round of speeches by the Tokelauan and international dignitaries, followed by some traditional dancing and singing by the men of Fakaofo.  Back on board the Lady Naomi, everyone was happy that the day’s events had gone well. 

 

October 23, 2007:

Nukununo…Paradise Found

 

 

 

 

 

The next day we made our way downstairs to board the aluminum boats that came to whisk us away over the shallow coral beds to the wharf at Nukununo.  Following the now customary welcome ceremony and opening of the polls, the spacious polling station came alive with the steady flow of voters, many of whom bore features much different from those of the Atafu residents.  It was no surprise that many families carried surnames like Perez and Perera.  It seems that, in the 18th century, some Portuguese landed in Tokelau and never left. 

 

One of the first things that a visitor to Nukununo notices is that the turquoise blue sea is the ubiquitous backdrop for every scene on the island.  Even the poorest house is framed by the amazing gradations of blue that surround this paradise of smiling and friendly people.  Later, I again accompanied the mobile polling team carrying the special ballot box to the infirm and the elderly, and took the opportunity to take some of the best photos of the trip up to that point, including of some lads playing cricket with a hard rubber ball in the burning sun.

 

By the time four o’clock rolled around, the number of voters coming into the polling station had slowed to a trickle, but 181 of the expected 182 voters had managed to show up.  After the polls closed, we caught the small boat that would take us back to the Naomi.

 

October 24, 2007:

The Big Day

 

 

 

 

The following morning, we got ashore at Atafu, and immediately set about our respective tasks: the Tokelau authorities holding their meetings; the electoral folks preparing the polling station; the media getting set up with their internet connections.  Here we were on this possibly historic day…the place was abuzz with excitement and activity.

 

After the time the polling station opened at 9:00am sharp, more than 30 persons voted in the first half an hour, and we were thinking that the polling would be over by lunchtime.  This was not to be the case, as the pace eventually slowed to about 15 persons each hour.  In any case, 195 persons had voted on Atafu by the close of polls, and preparations immediately began for the count.  At this point the Tokelauan authorities, the foreign dignitaries, and the press, began assembling around the counting area.

 

Walter and I observed the breaking of the seals and the opening and emptying of the ballot boxes, which was followed by the count.  The whole affair was exceptionally smooth which was the result of the hard work of the Tokealauan polling team, trained and supported by the Alofa from the New Zealand Electoral Office.  As the respective “Approve” and “Reject” piles of ballots grew, it was apparent that the affirmative votes were not an overwhelming majority.  The question was, would they be enough to get the two-thirds majority of the total 692 valid votes?

 

After the counting team rechecked their initial tabulation, the count manager came over to the observer table and we verified their arithmetic.  The result was then passed to the Referendum Commission.  The Ulu then slowly rose and announced that the 446 votes in favour of the free association proposal had not met the required majority.  There was a stunned silence across the room.  For some, all the hard work over the past year and a half had not paid off.  Tokelau would remain under New Zealand’s administration.

 

 

 

In the months following the referendum, there have been discussions among the Tokelauans and the New Zealand government on the future of Tokelau.  It appears; however, it will be quite some time before the question of self-government is again put to a referendum.

 

 

 

Tokelau Referendum on Self-Government (2007)

When the United Nations was established in 1945, 750 million people - almost a third of the world's population - lived in non-self-governing territories dependent on colonial powers.  Today, fewer than 2 million people live in such territories and more than 80 former colonies have gained independence. Chapter XI (Articles 73 and 74) in the Charter of the United Nations established the principles that have guided United Nations decolonization efforts, including respect for self-determination, since the Organization’s establishment. 

In 1961, the General Assembly created the Special Committee on Decolonization, the focal point for implementation of the 1960 Declaration on decolonization. The Committee monitors the political, economic and social situation in each of the remaining Non-Self-Governing Territories identified by the United Nations. During its annual sessions, the Committee hears petitioners from the Territories, who speak of the concerns and aspirations of their people. Taking into account all the available information; the Special Committee recommends and the General Assembly adopts resolutions aimed at protecting the interests of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Today, there are sixteen Non-Self-Governing Territories remaining. One of these is Tokelau which, from 1926, has been a Non-Self-Governing Territory administered by New Zealand. Over the past 31 years, there have been a series of discussions, consultations and ongoing experimentation with variousgovernance and public service systems, as the people of Tokelau grapple with the question of its future political status.  Tokelau consists of three atolls, islands of coral that encircle a lagoon partially or completely, located about 483 km north of Western Samoa. Atafu is the northernmost atoll, 92 km north of Nukunonu, which in turn lies 64 km north of Fakaofo.  Fakaofo has the largest population of 597, followed closely by Atafu with 543 and then Nukunonu with 437.

In November 2003, Tokelau’s parliament, the General Fono, took a formal decision by consensus and with support of all three Village Councils (representing each of the atolls), to endorse self-government in free association with New Zealand as the choice to be actively explored with the New Zealand Government. That decision was based on a recommendation of the Special Constitutional Committee of the General Fono, which in turn was based on extensive consultations held on each atoll earlier in that year. Agreement on the steps to be taken to give effect to this decision was reached at the General Fono held in January 2004. At its meeting in August 2005, the General Fono approved a draft treaty of free association between Tokelau and New Zealand as the basis for an act of self-determination. An overall majority of two thirds of the valid votes cast in a national poll would be required for a change in Tokelau’s status and the voting should take place sequentially in Apia and on the three atolls.

The question of self-government was first put to a referendum in Tokelau in February 2006. At that time, 60 per cent of the Tokelauan voters supported the option of self-government in free association with New Zealand.  However, this percentage was insufficient to meet the two-thirds majority and thus Tokelau’s status remained unchanged. The 2006 vote was conducted in the presence of a United Nations electoral monitoring mission, which deemed the election process credible and reflective of the will of the people of Tokelau.

The Tokelauan authorities took a decision to hold a second referendum in late 2007.  The referendum was conducted from 20-24 October, under the observation of the Electoral Assistance Division and the Decolonization Unit of the United Nations.  Polling was overseen by a Referendum Commission with representation from each of the three atolls. Technical assistance for the referendum was provided by the New Zealand Chief Electoral Office.

Referendum Preparations

 

During the August 2005 General Fono assembly, a set of rules for the first referendum in February 2006 was enacted. According to the Rules, the referendum was to be conducted by a referendum commission. As the second referendum was held only 20 months after the first, a great deal of information on the referendum process had already been distributed to all households as well as placed on the Tokelau Government website. These initial documents included a number of fact sheets covering the following topics: “Tokelau’s self-determination referendum”; “Have your say on the future of Tokelau”; “Tokelau’s self-determination”; and “What will self-determination mean for Tokelau”.

 

In order to increase the sense of ownership of the referendum process and garner buy-in of Tokelauan villagers, village referendum committees were established  with responsibilities for the design and implementation of civic education/public awareness campaigns at the village level. In January 2007, a training workshop was held in Apia for the members of the village referendum committees, as well as for the issuing officers of the referendum. The village referendum committees then returned to their respective communities to develop and implement atoll-specific civic education action plans. These plans were approved by village elders and then used to encourage full participation. The committees organized meetings, workshops and radio programmes and reported fortnightly to the referendum project manager in Apia.

 

In July 2007, a civic education assessment was conducted on each atoll to determine the level of understanding of the population on the issues related to the overall referendum process. This assessment identified priority target groups (the 18-30 age group and mothers) and issues that needed more focus (the draft constitution and the draft treaty). Civic education activities were then conducted on a weekly basis to address any deficiencies in the overall understanding of the process.

 

In September 2007, a three-day voter education campaign covering the mechanics and logistics of the referendum was conducted on each atoll, through power point presentations. It was during this period that colourful T-shirts with the words “Referendum 2007” printed on the back in Tokelauan, together with the booklet entitled “TOKELAU — self determination package”, were distributed to members of the Tokelauan community who came to the meetings. A series of consultations were also held by the Council of Ongoing Government with the villages to further reinforce the civic education campaign.

 

Following a meeting of the Referendum Commission in Atafu in June 2007, and a subsequent report to the General Fono, the Commission decided that the referendum planning would proceed on the same basis of voting as in 2006: four locations, on 20 October in Apia and on 22, 23 and 24 October on the atolls of Fakaofo, Nukunonu and Atafu, respectively. As in 2006, a two-thirds majority of valid votes cast would be required to change Tokelau’s status.

 

According to the agreed rules, Tokelauans who resided overseas were not entitled to vote unless certain criteria were met. Criteria were established to ensure the referendum be logistically viable and the decision be made by those directly affected. The estimated number of Tokelauans living overseas is 12,000, while the total population of Tokelau is around 1,500.

 

The United Nations team was present for voting on each of the four days of polling, on 20 October 2007 in Apia (for eligible Tokelauans based in Samoa), and on the 22^nd, 23^rd and 24^th of October on the atolls of Fakaofo, Nukunonu and Atafu, respectively. Voters were informed of polling station locations in leaflets distributed directly to registered voters, as well as through the Tokelau Government website. The leaflets described how to vote and provided an illustration of what the voter would expect to see on the ballot paper.  These were made available to voters at the entrance of each polling station. The polling stations were open from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. at each location. At each of the four different polling locations, a ballot box for special votes (including postal votes) was taken around by issuing officers and United Nations staff to hospitals and homes of people who could not travel to the polling stations. This was done to ensure all voters who would otherwise have been unable to do so were given access to vote.

 

The counting of votes for all four polling locations and postal ballots was conducted immediately after the scheduled close of the poll on Atafu on 24 October 2007. It was generally considered to have been conducted in an open and transparent manner and in accordance with the procedures prescribed in the rules. In terms of numbers, 64.4 per cent of those registered voted in favour of self-government in free association with New Zealand. However, that percentage fell just short of the two-thirds majority required to effect a change in Tokelau’s status. A total of 697 voters turned out, with 446 voting in favour and 246 against (there were five invalid ballots). Overall voter turnout was 88 per cent. The United Nations monitoring team deemed the referendum process credible and reflective of the will of the people.

 

Tokelau will now remain on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Given the extensive dialogue and consultations that took place on Tokelau’s future status over the years, there has been some degree of surprise expressed at the outcome of the referendum. The referendum result had been expected to come out overwhelmingly in favour of self-government. Tokelau, like all places, clearly has its own internal political dynamics. The challenge for Tokelau’s leadership now is to consider and address, in a spirit of lessons learned, the concerns of the 35 per cent of Tokelauans who voted “no” in the referendum, so as to unite the small Tokelauan population in its future course of action.

Nepal: Constituent Assembly Elections (2008)

On 10 April 2008 the people of Nepal went to the polls, undoubtedly hoping their country continues toward peace and reconciliation.  Recent steps began in November 2006 when six major political parties[1], and leaders of the Maoist movement, brought an end to 10 years of armed conflict and committing themselves to a democratic process by signing a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  The CPA includes a commitment to June 2007 elections for a constituent assembly (CA) following the formation of an interim legislature and government including the Maoists. The constituent assembly should be elected through a mixed first-past-the-post and proportional system and be charged with deciding the future structure of the country and the fate of the monarchy.

Following failure to meet the original June 2007 target for the Constituent Assembly elections, the rescheduled 22 November date was abandoned on 5 October 2007. The much anticipated elections finally took place on 10 April 2008. The elections were held in a generally peaceful atmosphere, although election day violence claimed at least four lives. 

 

The election had the highest number of observers in Nepal’s history with more than 60,000 national and over 800 international observers spread across the country. Public statements by major international observer groups, including the European Union, the Carter Centre, the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) and the Japanese observer mission all concurred that the election was conducted in a relatively peaceful manner and the administration of polls was well executed. All observers, and the UN, praised the efforts of the Nepali Election Commission (NEC).  

 

The NEC estimated that about 60 percent of Nepal’s 17.6 million eligible voters cast their ballot, with a high number of women participating. Re-polling was conducted in 106 of nearly 21,000 polling stations. These figures are not considered high under the circumstances.  Final election results are expected in the coming days. 

 

The UN Role

 

Nepal has considerable election experience. General elections in 1991, 1994 and 1999 were regarded as well managed considering logistical challenges and had high turnout.[2] This occasion, however, was the first time Nepalis were to elect a constitution-drafting body; hence a request for UN assistance to respond to a perceived need for a widespread UN electoral presence to build confidence in the process.

The UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was established by the UN Security Council under Resolution 1740 (2007) at the request of the Nepali authorities. It was mandated to support the peace process in Nepal, including by assisting in the conduct of the Constituent Assembly election and in creating a free and fair atmosphere for the election. UNMIN was also requested to work closely with the well established and respected programs of the UN agencies and the UNHCHR Mission. 

 

The UN played five specific roles in assisting the NEC and Nepalese authorities:

1. The UNMIN Electoral Assistance Office worked together with the NEC for more than a year in Kathmandu and all regions. It provided advice and assistance in areas such as the legal framework, voter education, media monitoring and logistics. For the last stage of the election, experts from the UN Volunteer programme were deployed as district electoral advisers in all 75 districts to support the work of the district electoral officers of the NEC.
2. Although the United Nations did not observe elections, the Secretary-General appointed a small team of renowned international electoral experts (the Electoral Expert Monitoring Team, or EEMT) to monitor the entire process, provide advice to the NEC and UNMIN and report its overall assessment directly to the Secretary-General.
3. UNDP supported the NEC in providing coordinated information and assistance to election observers.
4. Fourth, the UN system, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, deployed teams on election day to as many districts as possible – around 45 – to try to contribute to an atmosphere of confidence.  
5. UNMIN officials monitored Nepali Army and Maoist commitments to remain in their cantonments or barracks and only go out to cast their votes. On election day, arms monitors were posted in all 28 cantonment sites and visits were made to some Nepal Army locations.

Others, including particularly IFES, provided much appreciated material and technical assistance to the NEC, while many other partners and donors supported directly the efforts to conduct democratic elections in Nepal.

Results and the New Constituent Assembly

The election was held under a mixed system of first-past-the-post and proportional representation for the 601-seat Constituent Assembly.  Of the total seats, 240 were elected in the first-past-the-post race and 335 through the proportional system, with the remaining 26 appointed by the future Council of Ministers. The first results have shown substantial support for the Maoists, who with 220 seats will become the largest single party in the Constituent Assembly.  The Maoists are, therefore, expected to lead the new national unity government during this transitional period. However, under an interim constitution, the leading parties are supposed to remain together until the new constitution is written. In addition, no single party will secure a majority in the Assembly, which will not only draft a new constitution but also serve as the legislature-parliament until the next election.

 

When Nepal's 601-member constituent assembly sits for the first time, three weeks after the announcement of final results, it will look very different from any previous parliament. Twenty five political parties will be represented in the Constituent Assembly. There will be more representatives from Madhesis, Janjatis, indigenous groups and Dalits, and about 30 percent of representatives will be women. It is hoped the increased representation of previously marginalized groups will create a new and positive environment for a more inclusive political culture and a broader coalition in government.

 

The Constituent Assembly Members have two years to craft a new constitution. There are some difficult issues to settle: the status of the monarchy, integration of Maoist combatants with the former Royal Nepal Army and deciding on constitutional models.  Prior agreements among the leading parties determined a republic would be declared in the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly. 

The Constituent Assembly election has been a key moment in the peace process, although it certainly will not be the end of it. UNMIN’s current mandate will expire on 22 July 2008, after being extended following the second postponement of the Constituent Assembly election.  UN support to the electoral cycle will continue, however, primarily through ongoing UNDP programming.

IFES and Pakistan Election Commission host national electoral reform workshop

On June 21, 2008, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and IFES successfully hosted the National Stakeholder Workshop on Electoral Reform in Pakistan.  The event elicited direct feedback and recommendations from political parties and civil society organizations involved in electoral reform. This was the first time the ECP directly and collectively engaged stakeholders; a significant step forward for the ECP.

  

 

The morning session focused on political parties and the afternoon focused on civil society organizations (CSOs). Nine political parties, including all major parties, were represented by senior officials. Eight CSOs were also represented.  The ECP Secretary, two Joint Secretaries and all four Provincial Election Commissions (PECs) were present. Each political party and CSO had 15 minutes to present recommendations to the ECP. The ECP listened intently, while offering few comments.

 

ECP Secretary Kanwar Muhammad Dilshad noted, “We have gathered here to achieve our common goal of making our national institutions stronger, thus paving the way for a true democratic culture in the country.” Briefly referring to the newly-established Electoral Reforms Committee, constituted to study and recommend amendments to electoral laws and related policies, he stated the Committee welcomes input from political parties and CSOs. He also stated, “by working together for the cause of democracy, I am confident that we will be able to achieve the desired goal in the near future.” 

 

Key reform recommendations centered on:

·         Appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner

·         Independence of the Election Commission of Pakistan

·         Independence of the Judiciary

·         Voter registration (process, ID card requirements, improving the register, NADRA-ECP collaboration)

·         Election Tribunals (exceeding statutory period for resolving petitions)

·         Campaign financing

·         Interference of security agencies in the electoral process

·         Code of conduct for political parties

·         Voter education

·         Vote rigging

·         Polling schemes

·         Vote counting procedures / transparency

·         Management & publication of election results

·         Media bias

·         Candidates’ running in multiple constituencies

 

Michael Hryshchyshyn, Director of the USAID-Pakistan Office of Democracy and Governance and Sanja Vukotic-Hodzic, USAID Project Specialist/ Deputy Contracting-Agreement Officer also attended the event. Mr.  Hryshchyshyn encouraged the ECP to maintain the good momentum borne from the one-day workshop.  The ECP agreed to hold a similar event in the near future.

 

The ECP has the constitutional mandate to plan, prepare and administer elections in Pakistan. Accordingly, it is essential the ECP drive the reform agenda. To embark upon a successful reform process the ECP must actively seek input, advice and consultations with other key stakeholders, such as responsible sub-committees in the National Assembly and Senate, political parties, civil society and the electorate at large.

Assisting elections in Georgia – UNDP project for fair electoral processes and active civil participation

TBILISI. 27 June 2008 – The recent political situation in Georgia has been characterized by tension and unrest. The run-up to Georgia’s parliamentary elections in May 2008 saw a rise in tension between the government and political opposition as well as mass unrest in November 2007 followed by early presidential polls in January 2008. Political opposition strongly questioned the fairness of the electoral process predicting mass ballot rigging, while media fanned the situation with aggressive language and unbalanced coverage.

The electoral administration faces the challenging task to conduct elections in an environment of high political polarization, lack of trust and allegations of multiple violations.

    

UNDP’s approach

 

UNDP has been supporting electoral processes in Georgia since 2003. In July 2007, UNDP’s Georgia Country Office launched another project to help the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Georgia prepare for the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Speaking in Tbilisi at the official launch of the project in July 2007, Robert Watkins, UNDP Resident Representative in Georgia, said, “We closely worked with the Central Election Commission to identify the needs and draw up a project that would help the Commission undertake its mission of holding free and fair elections.”   

With more than $3 million (USD) in funding from the European Commission, Government of Georgia and UNDP’s own resources, the project addressed immediate electoral needs, such as professional training for the electoral administration throughout the country, as well as works to develop long-term capacities for fair electoral processes.

Four major components of the project serve as the basis for ensuring free and fair elections: qualified electoral administrations, well-informed voters, a stable Unified Electoral Code and increased civil participation.

 

Training/Capacity Building

 

Before the extraordinary presidential elections of January 2008 and parliamentary elections of May 2008, the project provided assistance to the CEC in planning procedural training strategies and schedules, developing manuals and instructions and training for permanent and temporary members and support staff of the Electoral Administration.

 

With presidential elections forthcoming, training was provided to approximately 50,000 members of the Electoral Administration, including 76 District and 3,447 Precinct Electoral Commissions. The training plan was revised and adjusted for parliamentary elections. Training format and modules reflected changes to the Unified Electoral Code and the increased number of the District Electoral Commissions members. The updated plan concentrated on improving training content in counting, tabulation, complaints and results transmission processes, as well as instituting proper monitoring to ensure credible results. Overall, 1,964 training sessions were conducted for Precinct Electoral Commissions and 75 for District Electoral Commissions.

 

Special long-term training modules based on the internationally recognized methodology “Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections” (BRIDGE) will be developed after parliamentary elections to benefit the permanent electoral administration.  

 

Voter Education/Information

 

To promote informed citizens’ choices and encourage adequate and balanced reporting on the parliamentary elections, UNDP supported the CEC in improving its pre-election communication campaign. The information and education campaign covered the country, including rural areas and regions populated with ethnic minorities. The programme also included professional training for media in reporting on elections by the Reuters Foundation.

 

In the future, UNDP plans to expand voter education activities to form a broader civic education campaign to include public debates and information campaigns on values of democracy and active citizenship.

 

Sustainability of the Unified Electoral Code

 

After parliamentary elections, UNDP focused on advocating for a stable Unified Electoral Code to avoid constant changes that, based on political expediency, usually happen close to the election date.

 

UNDP will support political debate on basic concepts of the law. This includes round-table discussions attended by members of the Electoral Administration, local experts, NGOs, representatives of the Government, Parliament and all relevant stakeholders. The process will be in close cooperation with local and international partners, including the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission and the OSCE. For that purpose, UNDP will provide the Central Electoral Commission with legal expertise. This work will start by fall 2008 after planned elections in an autonomous region of Georgia – Ajara.

 

Public Awareness Campaign and Promotion of Civic Participation

 

The Georgian Young Lawyers Association, a local non-governmental organization, implemented a public awareness campaign before the parliamentary elections in 2008 which increased citizen understanding of electoral standards and procedures. Media campaigns and bus tours were arranged throughout the country. TV/radio ads in national and regional broadcast media informed voters on procedures and promoted participation in the elections. The bus tours involved distribution of promotion materials, such as information leaflets, T-shirts and caps, and role plays on election simulation. This served as another tool for informing the public about procedures and increasing motivation to vote. A hotline was also arranged where young lawyers provided legal advice to the population at large.

 

Similar activities will continue for the upcoming Ajara Elections. In addition, the advocacy campaign will address citizens to ensure civic engagement and participation in decision-making. Issues of concern identified at the community level will be discussed with representatives of central and local government, newly elected majoritarian MPs, media, NGOs and international organizations.

 

 

 

U.S. Electoral Systems - State and Local Government

State Legislatures

Almost all states have bicameral legislatures modelled after the federal legislature. In general, members to both bodies are directly elected in single-member plurality districts, but there is variation across states. Several states use the block vote for at least one chamber with district magnitudes ranging from two to six. Some states use variants on the two-round system.

State Governor

The chief executive of each of 40 states is directly elected state-wide in a single-member plurality district. In 10 other states, governors are directly elected under two-round systems with thresholds ranging from 35 to 50 percent.

Local Offices

Electoral rules for local government vary significantly across states. Local government includes cities, towns and counties. While there is a variety of local elected bodies with different functions, in general, each locality elects some executive official (a mayor, for example) and a lawmaking body of several members (a city council, for example). Executives and councils may be directly elected, or a directly elected council may indirectly elect an executive.

Electoral systems currently used at this level are generally from the plurality/majority system though some examples of proportional representation exist. Specific systems used include: single-member plurality, block vote, two-round, alternative vote, single non-transferable vote, cumulative vote, and single transferable vote.

There is further variation in nomination rules. For example, candidates in Louisiana’s two-round system do not need their parties’ nominations to appear on the ballot. In Connecticut towns using the block vote, on the other hand, no party may nominate to more than two-thirds of the seats.

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Presidential Elections in Iran 2009

An ACE & BRIDGE Hub for West Africa: the Gorée Institute

By Ibrahima Amadou Niang

When the ferry arrives on Gorée Island, a stunning atmosphere of confusion and excitement confronts visitors in the remaining ghosts of the slave trade. There is no need to turn back, but rather face this history and its dark pages upon which new hopes of peace are written. As most visitors rush to the Slave House, others serenely move towards an old ochre building which the indigenous people take pride in calling the Gorée Institute.

With a mission to build open and self-reliant societies on the African continent, the Gorée Institute is the major link between the Pan-African intelligentsia and the rest of the world. From March 23 – 27, 2009, the Gorée Institute hosted the very first Building Resources in Democracy Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) training course in Senegal specifically for west African civil society Organisations (CSOs) working in electoral processes. This five-day training facilitated by both Theophilus Dowetin of IDEA and Ibrahima Amadou Niang of Gorée completed the following set of BRIDGE objectives:

• Train CSOs in various aspects of electoral management
• Introduce the BRIDGE curriculum and its pedagogy to West African CSOs 
• Position the Gorée Institute as a hub of excellence for both Administrations and Cost of Elections (ACE) and BRIDGE in West Africa

• Allow potential donors to familiarize themselves with BRIDGE

At the end of the BRIDGE training hosted by the Gorée Institute, all participants expressed a willingness to see this curriculum introduced to more west African civil society organisations. They believe BRIDGE is the most comprehensive and participant oriented course on elections they have attended and expressed a wish to see more Train the Facilitator courses organised for West African Civil Society Organisations. 

Since July 2007, Gorée Institute has been the ACE Regional Electoral Centre for West Africa and has been working closely with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) to implement the ACE project in the region. Thanks to this dynamic partnership, the Institute accomplished many necessary goals over the course of 20 months: 

• Take part in three election observation missions 
  - Zambia General Elections 2008 with EISA
  - Ghana General Elections 2008 1 & 2 with the African Union
• Participate in top regional meetings on elections
  - Convention of Democracies 2007 in Mali
  - Two 2008 Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) conferences 
  - Centre Africain de Formation et de Recherche Administratives pour le Développement (CAFRAD) meeting on Electoral Dispute Resolution 2008 in Tangier
• Have a staff member accredited as a bilingual full BRIDGE facilitator
• Get funds from the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDF) to implement a new project called Gorée Centre for Electoral Processes in which three (3) BRIDGE trainings are to be organised for West African Civil Society Organisations
• Disseminate electoral information and electoral materials in West Africa
• Promote ACE and BRIDGE in the region

Under the Gorée Centre for Electoral Processes project, the Gorée Institute launched the first network of West African Civil Society organisations working in electoral processes on January 30, 2009. About 15 west African civil society organisations agreed to establish a network to share best practices, develop capacities of their staff and increase the quality of civil society work in elections. This new network is called the West African Centre for Elections.

Along with complete synchronization between all electoral process projects currently managed by the Gorée Institute, ACE is the knowledge sharing channel through which best practices and information are disseminated. BRIDGE is the capacity development course used by the Gorée Centre for Electoral Processes project to build the capacities of west African civil society organisations working in electoral processes.

The steering committee is composed of seven member organisations out of which six have been already designated: West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), the Gorée Institute, the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) in Ghana, ADG in Burkina Faso, La Rencontre africaine pour la défense des droits de l'Homme (RADDHO) and REDEMEC Cape Verde. This centre will soon be fully operational, basing the coordinating secretariat at the Gorée Institute.

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Ibrahima Amadou Niang is a Project Manager for the Gorée Institute

A Primer on Iran’s Presidential Election System

By Homeyra Mokhtarzada

Iran has had an election of some type almost every year since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The administration of these elections is decentralized and a grass-roots operation.

Iran’s various elections are governed by both the constitution and specific electoral laws. According to the Presidential Election Law, Iran has two main bodies involved in the electoral process – the Guardian Council and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The MoI is responsible for administration of elections while the Guardian Council is mandated with a broad supervisory role.

 

Election Administration

Approximately three months prior to the presidential election, the MoI’s Election Centre becomes operational. Iran is made up of 669 districts forming 330 counties that make up the 30 provinces of the country. Each district is headed by a District Administrator, each county is headed by a Governor. At each level, appointees of the MoI are responsible for the grass-roots organization that implements elections. In addition, prior to the election, Election Executive Committees are formed at each level. By law, these Committees are constituted of a Governor/District Administrator (who chairs the Committee), the county/district prosecutor, the head of the civil registration office and eight members of the public.

Election Executive Committees are responsible for:

• Deciding the number and location of polling stations
• Informing the public about elections including the election date, voting hours, voting qualifications and voting station locations
• Selecting eight public representatives for the Election Executive Committees
• Evaluating election complaints

The full Election Executive Committee at the district level assigns poll workers for each polling station. The polling station team is composed of a chief, a deputy and 3 secretaries. In addition to this five-member team, the Governor of each county assigns a sixth person to each polling station.

Election Supervision

For each presidential election, the Guardian Council establishes a Central Supervisory Committee made up of two members of the Guardian Council and five individuals chosen by consensus by the Council. 

The Central Supervisory Committee selects a supervisor for each county and together they:

• Assign representatives to every polling station
• Supervise the overall quality of the elections, including monitoring for fraud

Meantime, the Guardian Council reserves the right to nullify or suspend the election throughout all of Iran or just in a specific region or polling station if the election or components of the election are deemed to have been fraudulent.

Becoming a candidate

Iran’s president serves a 4-year term. There are general requirements for candidacy which include: the candidate be of Iranian origin, they be a citizen of Iran, they be reputable and qualified to be care-takers of the Republic, they be thoughtful and possess management abilities, they believe in Islam and the principles of the Islamic Republic and lastly, they be persons with a record of religious and political affiliation. 

Because additional requirements such as age or education are not specifically mandated, there are typically hundreds, if not thousands, of people who register to be a candidate in the presidential elections. However, registration does not guarantee the ability to run for the office.

Once candidates register with the MoI, the Ministry sends the list of names to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council then vets the list according to the requirements laid out in the law. In this way, many people can be disqualified for lacking the requisite qualifications. While the Guardian Council is vetting the candidate list, candidates also have the opportunity to submit information or testimonials that confirm their eligibility and qualifications. Once the Guardian Council completes its vetting, a final list of candidates is sent to the MoI, which publishes the list. 

Campaigning

The publication of the names of the candidates marks the start of the official campaign period. Campaigning ends 24 hours before Election Day.
To ensure all candidates benefit equally from the State’s resources, the MoI establishes an Election Campaign Monitoring Commission. The members of this commission include the Attorney General or his/her representative, the Interior Minister or his/her representative, the managing director of the state media or his/her representative and a representative of the Guardian Council. According to the law, every candidate has equal access to State media for purposes of campaigning. 

Some provisions governing campaigns include:

• Government employees cannot campaign for or against candidates
• It is illegal to destroy the posters or ads of any candidates during the campaign period
• Candidates and their supporters are prohibited from insulting or defaming other candidates
• Election officials are barred from campaigning for candidates

Voting in Iran

In Iran, there is no voter registration or roll. Iranians can vote anywhere as long as they present their national identification book, or Shenasnameh. The system is set up to prevent fraud at a number of levels, starting with voting procedures.

Iran has a two-part ballot – the ballot itself and a stub portion. When a voter enters the polling station, there is a check of their shenasnameh for authenticity to ensure the voter is eligible to vote (the voting age in Iran is 16) and that the voter has not already voted in the election. For every election in Iran, there is a unique ink stamp which is stamped into a voter’s shenasnameh. This latter check is based on an examination of the shenasnameh to ensure there is not already a stamp from the current election in the booklet.

The voter’s information, consisting of basic biographical data, is then entered onto the stub portion of the ballot. It is important to note that the stub, once detached from the ballot, cannot be matched to the ballot. There are no serial numbers or any other markings that tie the two parts together. Thus, it is realistically impossible to know for whom a voter cast a ballot.

Once the stub portion of the ballot is completed and the shenasnameh stamped, the stub is separated from the ballot and deposited into a box where all the stubs are collected. The voter then proceeds to the voting station, fills in the name of their desired candidate, folds the ballot in half and casts their ballot in a ballot box.

The Count

Polling stations in Iran are typically open from 8am to 8pm. These hours can be extended by the MoI if the turnout warrants it.

Once the polling station is closed, the counting process begins. Polling station officials first count the ballot stubs, followed by the ballots. If the number of stubs and ballots are equal, then the actual vote count begins. If there are more votes than ballots, then the difference is randomly selected from the ballot box and the votes cancelled, then the ballots are counted. In cases where there are more stubs than ballots, the discrepancy is reported and the votes are counted.

Once the votes are counted and results tallied, the official results are certified, all ballots are returned to the ballot box, which is then sealed and officially transferred to the Executive Committee. 

It is important to note that neither the general public nor outside entities are permitted to officially monitor the elections. However, candidate agents may be present at every polling station during the voting hours and during the vote count. Additionally, they may attend every Election Executive Committee meeting during the election period.

Determining the Winner

The Iranian President is determined through an absolute majority. In other words, the person with 50%+1 of the votes is the winner. However, in cases where there is no absolute majority, the law calls for a runoff election between the top two vote getters. The runoff election is mandated to take place within one week of the first round of elections. 

Once a winner is determined, the Guardian Council approves the election process and the Supreme Leader signs off on the Letter of Presidency. The new president takes the oath of office before the Iranian Majles (Parliament).

Homeyra Mokhtarzada is a Programme Manager with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. She specializes in the Middle East.

Guinea Struggles to Register Voters

By Elizabeth Côté

This new biometric system was chosen following years of negotiations between political parties and the Government of Guinea, as well as the repetitive postponement of the June 2007 legislative elections.  Despite the obstacles, a two-phased project to support the electoral process in Guinea was finally formalized in July 2007. The first phase consisted of the organization of the voter registration process. The second phase consisted of assisting all aspects of the electoral process.

The Voter Registration process is funded chiefly by the European Union (EU) and managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through a trust fund. 11 companies competed to be the providers of the biometric registration kits. Of these, three finalists (ZETEC, SMARTMACT and SAGEM) were selected to participate in a pilot test. SAGEM emerged as the winner of the contract to provide the necessary equipment, training and technical assistance to the first ever biometric voter registration in Guinea. 

After months of delays and arduous negotiations between the EU, UNDP, the GoG and SAGEM, 1000 kits were delivered, 1,800 operators trained and deployed, over 900 administrative commissions set up to receive an estimated 5 million potential electors. Voter registration, officially launched on August 28 2008, is now scheduled to end April 16.

The voter registry process faced many obstacles. Slow downs and delays have been costly. Initially planned to last 1 month, we are now entering the 5th month of registration on the ground. The cost in salaries alone is valued at approximately 350,000$ a week, a situation that has affected the timely payment of salaries. This caused many kit operators and local staff to abandon their posts and affected the distribution of materials and the ability to coordinate and supervise operations adequately on the ground. In many instances materials such as ink, gas coupons, CDs and paper were diverted and sold on the market. By the end of October, the registration process had come to a halt in most localities due to lack of material and/or human resources.

The government was ready to remedy some of these problems by releasing promised funds when President Lansana Conté died on December 22. The military coup that followed a few hours later did not help to speed the process, even though the junta and new self-proclaimed President asked that the registration process continue as planned.  

Government funds to this day are still blocked and over 3,000 local election officials and 10,000 members of the administrative commissions have yet to be paid for their extra time.  An assessment carried out in February indicated that almost 50% of eligible voters had registered making it clear that much more work remains to be done.  A rescue mission of over 100 people  (CENI, Ministry, IFES, UNDP, civil society and political parties), sponsored by USAID and the French Embassy is currently being deployed throughout the country to boost the process on these last days of registration and help Guinea meet its objective. This includes delivering funds and materials to on site operators and an extensive media campaign to inform Guineans of the proceedings.

There is a great deal of speculation as to how long the military transition will last and exactly when the next election will take place.  Political parties and civil society have agreed on a timeline for the transition that was accepted by the President Dadis Camara. However growing support for the new president’s actions against corruption, drug trafficking and overall bad governance could push elections back to 2010. Hopefully, this new registration process will help build trust and confidence amongst stakeholders and contribute to peaceful and credible elections.

Elizabeth Coté is Chief of Party in Guinea for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. She has been based in Conakry, Guinea since 2001. 

Open Source Software and the Electoral Assistance Community

by Ajay Patel

Software is the hidden building block of election administration. At nearly every stage of the process there is a program in a datacenter taking raw information and turning it into something useful. Be it voter rolls, ballots, or results, man gathers the information while machines do the real work.

The trust we apportion these machines is awesome; we rely on programs to tell us who won an election, who has the right to vote, and who is entitled to right to run as a candidate. They build ballots. They help identify suspicious behaviour. They handle masses of data with ease. Ideally, they help create elections that are fast, flexible and accurate. Because we trust these programs to handle so many fundamental analytic functions, their development and deployment should be as integral a part of mission planning as Logistics or Security.

Election missions build their critical software with little rigour or methodology, surprising given its importance. Open source software development is a proven approach with a focus on sharing, innovation, and strengthening programming community capacity. It is a way to bring better designed, more professional, sustainable products to both the missions and, more significantly, national election institutions.

 International assistance missions spend hundreds of thousands of dollars and thousands of man-hours on software development to build and manage these mission-critical systems. Data integrity, critical functions, and significant investment; all are good reasons to expect that there are modern, effective products underpinning this work.

In fact, oftentimes this is not the case. Chances are an assistance missions’ election software was built a long time ago; by a programmer who has reused the same code, mission after mission, stretching it to try and fit new needs. New name, new logo, same old code

It is tempting to think this is a good thing, that a program that has worked election after election has become richer with time, proved its sturdiness. This is not so.

These programs are built with old, rigid technologies that were never designed to be dynamic or reusable. This means that the recycling of old code is neither quick nor easy, and rather than code being strengthened by each iteration, it becomes increasingly fragile. Deeply hidden remnants of elections gone by can create unexpected results, wreaking havoc and taking days to find and purge. Programmers hired on a project-to-project basis have little time and motivation to develop a stronger overall product, only enough to get the job done and go home.

This points to an even greater issue within the electoral assistance IT community. Software and systems development has traditionally been conducted in an ad-hoc and non-collaborative manner, leading to systems with no standards and oversight, a lack of institutional development, and generally unremarkable products.

The election software development process is opaque. Inside missions, programmers do as they please, as few mission staff know enough to challenge or guide the software development process. Observers may try monitoring datacenter processes, but are often limited to lingering in tally centres watching data entry while the real work is done behind the scenes, beyond their reach and technical understanding.

A lack of collaboration has hampered the international election communities’ efforts to build capacity in the national institutions they are assisting. Because international advisors falsely believe their value lies in the code, rather than their specialised knowledge, they resist sharing in a bid to protect future employment. IT advisors will often leave without handing over editable software to their national counterparts, and will rarely share these assets with their organizations or the international community. Although the ACE website offers nearly every other electoral resource you could think of, from budgets to stickers to manuals, election software in noticeably missing.

The isolationist approach to building software does not lend itself to innovation. Collaboration is key to creating better products, and the open source movement has shown us that software lends itself to being build collaboratively.

Open source software is developed using methodologies and standards that put collaboration, flexibility and reuse at the heart of the software. The resulting product is distributed freely, usually under a free software license, so it can be taken by others; used, improved and re-distributed, creating an effective development cycle with a community of programmers invested in the project.

This design approach has had extraordinary success. The Firefox web browser is an open source product that is used on nearly a quarter of computers worldwide. Linux is an open source operating system that powers 13% of the servers in the world, with support from sources as diverse as the Brazilian government and Nokia. Even the CIA uses open source software, to organise and search its data. Election software is simple by comparison.

Notably, many of these projects been developed by world-class programmers working as part-time volunteers. Development can take place remotely, or in concentrated ‘geek meets’ and code sprints. These programmers have various motivations: exercising technical talent, building prestige, or simply having an impact in the world. A number of open source projects are already involved in monitoring and crisis mapping elections. There would be tremendous interest within the open source community if given the opportunity to contribute to actually making elections happen.

 

 If the election assistance community were to migrate to an open-source approach, the resulting software products and community would serve not only international assistance organisations, but also the institutions they strive to build. Open source software could be customised in-house by local developers or tailored by a network of global contributors. Communities have worked on similar projects for decades, they can be trusted to provide the skills for free support and development to national bodies long after international consultants move on and the attention spans of donors expire.

Would this mean the end of international IT election experts in the field? Almost certainly not, but it would encourage a shift in responsibilities towards coordination and oversight of projects, managing installations, testing, training and troubleshooting. Capacity building of national staff might finally get the attention it requires. There would an opportunity to modernise electoral assistance missions operations, using IT to update logistics, field coordination and public outreach; areas of standard practice outside the field of election assistance.

Introducing open source products and philosophies to the electoral assistance community is an opportunity to inject some much needed innovation to its IT solutions. If open source software has provided better products, transparent solutions, and cheap community support to the other industries, perhaps it’s time to see what it can do for international elections.                

Ajay Patel is an election technology and observation consultant with the United Nations and the National Democratic Institute. He is currently observing the Afghanistan elections.

Roadblocks to the 2010 Palestinian Elections

By Vladimir Pran

Statements by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah and Hamas leaders indicate that Palestinian factions have agreed to hold elections in January 2010. There are, however, various contextual challenges that make the implementation of these elections far from certain.

The challenges faced take on a special urgency as the 2010 elections would be an important step for the continuation of the Palestinian government that was formed as result of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords. In Oslo, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel negotiated the formation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which was led by Yasser Arafat until his death in 2004. Presidential elections were then held in 2005, and legislative elections were held in 2006. These elections resulted in the presidency of Mahmoud Abbas and a majority-win in parliament for Hamas. The 2010 polls would be the third set of elections for the Palestinian government.

Of even greater importance, the Palestinian population feels that a government must be democratically elected in order to be valid. Recent opinion polls suggest that Palestinians believe the government must go through elections in January 2010 to retain legitimacy.

This article presents a brief overview of the roadblocks to the 2010 elections:

Political or "Constitutional" Framework

Once the various Palestinian factions and the President agree to hold the elections, they have to agree on a political/constitutional framework under which to conduct them. The 1996 elections were conducted as a result of the Oslo Accords. When President Arafat died in 2004, Palestinians carried out a ballot to elect a president and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). They did this without a political agreement with Israel, following the Basic Law and the 2005 intra‐Palestinian Cairo Agreement. It is, however, very difficult to conceive that in light of the current intra-Palestinian conflict both Hamas and the PNA can agree on Hamas’ participation without a new intra-Palestinian political agreement. This agreement will likely require some concessions on Hamas’ side regarding its stance toward PLO commitments.

International Community

In 2006, the international community supported an electoral process in which Hamas took part. The financial and technical support of the international community was essential for the Palestinian Central Elections Commission (CEC). It supported the CEC’s outreach and voter education activities; aided political factions in campaign organizing; and funded international observation missions. The large number of international observers contributed greatly to the credibility of the electoral process. However, similar support for the new elections under the same 2006 framework is uncertain. In the three years since 2006, the rules of engagement (especially for the EU and the US) have changed to become stricter to ensure that no assistance is provided to Hamas.

Israel

Israel's support is crucial for the elections to take place. Even a passive Israeli rejection of the Palestinian elections would render the implementation of the electoral process impossible.

Israeli authorities must facilitate implementation in several ways, including:

• The movement of Elections Commission goods (election materials) and personnel in the West Bank, between the West Bank and Gaza and to Jerusalem, during all of the phases of the electoral process
• The importation of election materials from overseas
• The movement of candidates and voters across the Palestinian territories during the campaign period
• Enabling the registration of candidates and campaigning in East Jerusalem and easing restrictions on voting of the Jerusalemite Palestinians
• The coordination of the deployment of Palestinian security forces

Fatah

Fatah’s situation has not improved much since its 2006 election defeat. Fatah’s political program is unclear and the transition from a national movement into a political party is not going smoothly. The leadership remains divided and cannot agree on a formula for the (s)election of delegates of the long overdue 6th Fatah General Conference. Demands of the party base that the delegates be selected through internal elections processes have been largely ignored and lead to friction between the leadership and the party base. As it stands, Fatah’s position in any electoral process is far from desired. President Abbas must call for elections for them to take place. He might be unwilling to do so while his party is in disarray.

Legal Framework

In September 2007, President Abbas issued an election law under the pretext of an emergency government. Any piece of legislation issued by decree must be ratified at the end of the rule of the emergency government by the Palestinian Legislative Council for it to be legally binding. For this reason, Hamas disputes the validity of the 2007 Elections Law. There are two main areas of contention in the 2007 Elections Law: the system of representation and the “PLO requirements.” If Hamas and the PNA agree on these two topics, it is safe to assume that legality of the law will not be an issue. The CEC is refraining from taking sides, choosing not to interpret either law. Instead, the CEC designed operational plans for either scenario. From the operational perspective, a Proportional List system of representation (as proposed in the 2007 election law) would be much easier to implement than the system used in the 2006 PLC elections.

Election Operations

In 2005 and 2006, the Palestinian CEC successfully defied domestic political pressures and Israeli occupation and organized several large‐scale operations. This helped prove the CEC’s independence and capacity to conduct sound elections. After the legislative elections and voters’ list were updated in 2007, the CEC reduced its staff but preserved its core infrastructure. Since the last elections the CEC has been actively working on building the capacity of its staff, reforming some aspects of the electoral process and fine‐tuning operational plans.

However, despite the fact that the CEC has begun to prepare, it will face a challenging situation if the elections are called without sufficient time for expansion of infrastructure and staff. These are needed to carry out the most demanding immediate task: the registration of voters. While the CEC was developing a plan to introduce continuous voter registration, the plan has not been rolled out because of the intra‐Palestinian conflict. The CEC needs at least three months notice before polling begins to implement voter registration, as registration centers must open directly following the call for elections in order to update the list

Another challenge for the CEC is uncertainty over the system of representation. The registration of candidates, ballot printing, polling procedures and election materials all depend on the system chosen: the current system or a pure List Proportional Representation system. The CEC will also have little time to make arrangements for matters pertaining to Jerusalem, which have to be negotiated between the PNA and Israeli authorities. The Commission will have to invest substantial efforts to provide the best possible voting conditions to Jerusalemite Palestinians.

For more information, or to see the briefing paper on which this article is based, please click here.

Vladimir Pran is Chief of Party for IFES - West Bank/Gaza where he advises and provides training to the Palestinian Central Election Commission

Political Finance Regulation: The Global Experience

“Political finance is a vital issue for democracy, governance, and development. No matter how flawless are the country’s elections, how active its civil society, how competitive its political parties, and how responsible its local authorities, the role of money in politics undeniably influences the quality of democracy and governance. Only through greater transparency will one fully understand the extent and nature of this influence”[1]

It was in recognition of this influence that the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) came to include an appeal that all countries should strive to “enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties” (article 7(3)).

As the question of what role money plays in the affairs of political parties and the conduct of election campaigns has received increasing attention worldwide, much experience has been gathered through practical involvement, regulation or monitoring of political finance, and by scholarly attention and international assistance to such activities.

In their efforts to learn from experience, several organizations have developed lists of key lessons learned and understandings relating the issue of political finance. While each such list reflects different experiences and approaches to the issue of political finance, there are recurring themes. In the below table, the various key understandings have been categorized under common headings, and we have subsequently reached the following synthesised common understandings that have influenced the project and this publication;

1.      Money is necessary for democratic politics, and political parties must have access to funds to play their part in the political process. Regulation must not curb healthy competition

2.      Money is never an unproblematic part of the political system, and regulation is desirable

3.      The context and political culture must be taken into account when devising strategies for controlling money in politics

4.      Effective regulation and disclosure can help to control adverse effects of the role of money in politics, but only if well conceived and implemented

5.      Effective oversight depends on activities in interaction by several stakeholders (such as regulators, civil society and the media) and based on transparency 

In spite of these good intentions, much work remains to be done. Of the 136 countries that were parties to UNCAC by 1 September 2009, sufficient information is available to judge their compliance regarding candidate disclosure in 107 countries. Of these, 61 countries or 57% do not have formal disclosure requirements for the income and expenditure of candidates.[2] We also need to acknowledge the often significant gap between formal rules and practical application and note that the number of countries that de facto lack effective oversight mechanisms is much higher. Indeed, no country can be said to have finally overcome all difficulties related to political party and campaign finance disclosure.

With regard to enhancing transparency through disclosure, the first step that countries should take is to decide what their normative goals are: more informed voters, more equal footings on which parties and candidates compete, or more equitable access to politics across socioeconomic groups, for example. From this decision, reformers can envision an ideal disclosure system in terms of key regulatory dimensions: what is disclosed, who discloses, how often, and to what type of regulatory body. Finally, one must consider what requirements make sense in the country context and what will be feasible for regulators, political parties and campaign actors to live by, given the resources available to them. The process of developing these procedures should as much as possible be conducted in dialogue both with those who will be required to submit reports and with those who will be the intended users of the disclosed information (regulators, media, civil society, and ultimately the electorate).

Given that different regulatory frameworks foster different normative outcomes, there is no model political finance disclosure system. Formal political institutions have further implications for each of the key system variables, such as variation in constitutional designs and the characteristics of electoral systems. Beyond that, levels of technology, literacy, social peace, and civil society development will vary. Every context has its own set of best practices.

One aim of IFES’ study of political finance regulation has been to start thinking about practical solutions, the place of political finance reform in a hierarchy of needs, and its implications for reform priorities. Some countries may need electronic disclosure while others need more far-reaching reforms of accounting conventions. On examining the variables in disclosure systems and how they might operate in different countries, we learn that the list of best practices is fairly short. To ratify a generic disclosure law is simple. Meaningfully implementing the UN Convention against Corruption, however, requires identifying country specific goals and problems. Once those are agreed upon, reformers can design disclosure systems that maximize their goals and minimize the pitfalls.

 

The article above is an extract from Political Finance Regulation: The Global Experience, edited by Magnus Öhman and Hani Zainulbhai. The book draws together experiences from over 2 years of IFES work on a project funded by the United Nations Democracy Fund aimed at working towards global standards for political finance. This book is available for download on IFES.org. Print copies available upon request.

 

 

 

Experts Gather in Ghana to Develop Improved Standards for African Elections

Leaders of civil society, the media, election management bodies, security services and political parties from 25 sub-Saharan African countries gathered in Accra, Ghana from November 12 to 14, 2009 to assess recent elections across the continent and develop recommendations for raising standards of professionalism among election administration officials, political parties, civic groups, security services and media in order to mitigate conflict and improve electoral processes.

The Colloquium on African Elections: Best Practices and Cross-Sectoral Collaboration focused on Ghana’s 2008 elections, which were universally viewed as credible despite heated political tensions and a razor-thin margin between the candidates. Participants drew on lessons from the experience in Ghana, where for the second time in less than a decade, political power has changed hands from the ruling to an opposition party through the ballot box. Effective collaboration among all sectors of the electoral process helped ease tensions, enhanced transparency and built voter confidence in the election results. Drawing on this example, the participants identified the following as key prerequisites for peaceful, participative and credible elections: inclusiveness, transparency and accountability.

Participants also explored the differences between the Ghanaian experience and elections in other countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, which experienced gross irregularities, fraud and conflict. They identified the factors that contributed to different outcomes in each of these cases and discussed how to foster credible elections on the continent based on these case studies. 

“This is an opportunity for Africans to reflect on our own experiences and build upon our successes. As a regional initiative, this conference will bolster electoral reformers, and civic and political stakeholders on the continent,” said Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, chair of the Electoral Commission in Ghana, ahead of the event.

Participants deliberated on best practices of elections in Africa and recognized the importance of cross-sectoral collaboration, trust and effective communication between all election stakeholders as essential ingredients for peaceful and credible elections. Participants shared concrete experiences and mechanisms, including inter-party dialogue platforms/multi-party liaison committees and cross-sectoral codes of conduct and their enforcement mechanisms.

During the Colloquium, participants recognized the need for a holistic approach to elections that includes all sectors of society in their conduct, including civil society, the media, election management bodies, security services and political parties. Participants acknowledged the yearning and demand for democracy from the populations of countries across Africa, and believe that the political will exists to advocate for credible elections, even if the electoral process in many countries continues to fall short of citizens’ expectations.

Participants also assessed the successes and the challenges of competitive elections in Africa over the past two decades. In many countries, successful elections strengthened democratic institutions and enhanced opportunities for economic growth and political development. In other countries, credible elections paved the way for national reconciliation and return to civilian rule after decades of armed conflict and civil war. But flawed elections in other countries resulted in violence, further polarized divided societies and eroded public confidence in the political process. 

Finally, participants discussed the importance of the African Union’s Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted in 2007. Article 17 of the Charter “reaffirms the commitment to holding transparent, free and fair elections in accordance with the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa,” and calls on states to take concrete actions to fulfill their responsibilities. Article 22 of the Charter commits governments to “create a conducive environment for independent and impartial election monitoring or observation mechanisms.”

At the conclusion of the colloquium, participants released a communiqué summarizing these discussions. The communiqué shared recommendations for election standards in Africa including recommendations to African governments, election management bodies, political parties, domestic and international election monitoring and observer groups, the media and security and military services. 

Co-organizers of the colloquium include the National Democratic Institute, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Open Society Initiative for West Africa and United Nations Development Programme.

Two Decades Later: Democratic Progress and the Fall of the Berlin Wall

by Michael Svetlik

The 20^th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall is receiving the attention it deserves:  ceremonies, books, and scholarly conferences acknowledging the historical import of the event which marked the end of communism’s grip on the countries of Central Europe and the beginning of the end of communism in the Soviet Union.  Yet, as the fall of the wall was only part of a decades long struggle to expand democratic processes in Eastern Europe and beyond, this anniversary also compels  us to assess the legacy of the revolutions of 1989 and rededicate our efforts in  support democratic freedom. 

Two decades have now passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The event remains a powerful symbol for those of us dedicated to supporting the expansion of democratic processes to ensure respect for fundamental human rights and enable human development.   The people power which resulted in the destruction of the wall that literally and figuratively divided a nation continues to stand out as a poignant demonstration of the human urge for self-determination and freedom. We recall the exhilarating images of the cheering crowds of Berliners that celebrated as the wall came down around them.  We shared their euphoria then and we are buoyed by the recollections of their triumph.

 For an organization like IFES that is involved in supporting the institutionalization of democracy and political freedom, the fall of the wall provided an impetus for change and reform across the Soviet bloc and beyond. The inevitability of democratization in the absence of a competing system, propelled the expansion of public space, the development of free media, the blossoming of civil society, and the institutional development required for open, democratic societies in country after country.

The fall of the Berlin Wall was clearly just the beginning of a process of social and political change across the former Eastern bloc that continues to this day. The fall of the wall unleashed forces of change that continue, in starts and fits, to provide open democratic societies for citizens of countries ranging from Moldova to Mongolia and from Estonia to Albania.  In hindsight, the reunification of Germany and the expansion of the European Union were, while formidable outcomes, the easy part.  In most instances the raw materials needed to promote change— institutions, aptitude, and political will—were readily at hand.

Not surprisingly, the transition towards more liberal economic and political systems has not been smooth or easy, even for those infused with the euphoria of 1989As a recent public opinion research by the Pew Foundation reveals, two decades of reform have taken a toll on attitudes toward democratic freedom in Central and Eastern Europe.  While majorities of people in most former Soviet republics and Central European countries are pleased with the emergence of multiparty systems and free markets, enthusiasm about these changes has diminished in most of the countries surveyed by Pew.[1] 

 This is especially true in Russia and Ukraine, and other parts of the former Soviet Union, where a longer history of communism have made advancing democracy more challenging.  An uneven and rocky transition to democracy in many former Soviet republics has confronted the promise and potential unleashed by the fall of the Berlin Wall.  The struggle to undertake dual economic and political transitions upon the wreckage of institutions designed to serve a command economy and a one party state has illustrated the complexity of the liberalization process.  The starting point, or the antecedents, for transforming institutions of governance and the relationship of a citizen to the state, were varied and thus results have differed.

 As we marked this important anniversary, its significance as a force for change and the expansion of freedom is undisputed. The occasion also reminds us that the transition to greater democracy is complex and requires constant attention and support in order to succeed.  The democracy movement remains indebted to the events of 1989, but they also mindful of the work that remains before us both within Europe, the former Soviet Union, and beyond. 

 

Michael Svetlik currently serves as IFES’ Vice President of Programs, responsible for IFES’ technical assistance and democracy promotion programs. His areas of expertise include political change, institutional development, election system design, civic awareness and activism, and project management, evaluation and design.

 

ACE reaches 1 000 000 visitors!

ACE reaches 1 000 000 visitors! The ACE website has now reached over one million individual visitors per year, representing virtually every single country in the world. This is an increase of 70% as compared to the same period last year. New and more accessible content, improved Google rankings and translations of key material in Spanish, French and Arabic are likely to be the main reasons for the increase. The ACE server will be updated in November to meet the new demands and increase the speed of the website.

 As you may have noticed, technical improvements and new features have been implemented throughout the ACE website over the past few months. Among other things, the ACE website now offers an RSS news-feed function for easy access to the latest electoral news, a new and highly advanced search function, newly updated comparative data from around the world and regional pages displaying regional electoral news and events and provides direct access to country pages. 

 A new design of the ACE website will be launched first half of 2010. In the lead up to this launch new technical improvements, such as structural changes and new features, will be systematically implemented.

We hope that you enjoy the developments of the site and look forward to receiving your feedback at [email protected] so that we can continue our efforts to always improve ACE.

BRIDGE Strategic and Financial Planning Workshop in Moldova

By Pavel Cabacenco, IFES Moldova and Member of the ACE Practitioners' Network.

A BRIDGE workshop on Strategic and Financial Planning took place in Chisinau, Moldova from March 29 to April 2. It was conducted by the Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) and the UNDP Electoral Support to Moldova Project. The workshop became an integral part of the strategic planning process undertaken by CEC and facilitated by International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). 

This is the first time the Central Election Commission is engaged in such a planning exercise. The main purpose of the strategic planning process is the optimization of the management practices and creation of a modern institution capable to face challenges of the current political and economic situation in Moldova. Besides the uncertainty surrounding the electoral process generated by repeatedly failed attempts of Moldovan Parliament to elect a president, Moldova is experiencing many problems of a country in transition: economic crisis; lack of vision and long-term planning; poor implementation of legal and administrative decisions; lack of transparency in decision-making and finances; need for training and education. 

The five day workshop was run by lead facilitator Skye Christensen of UNDP, facilitator Olya Azatyan of the ACE Regional Centre of Central Asia and North Caucasus (RBI) and semi-accredited facilitators Renata Lapti, Vice-Chairman of the CEC, Iurie Ciocan, Secretary of the CEC and Doina Bordeianu, Head of the Civic Education, Training and Secretariat Department. The workshop completed the following objectives: 

 

• Trained representatives of the apparatus of Moldovan Central Electoral Commission in various aspects of strategic and financial planning. Representatives of the local authorities were involved in the training as well as they are playing an important role in election management in Moldova;
  

• Facilitated internal discussions about the strengths and weaknesses of the CEC and simulated a strategic planning process. Central Electoral Commission has recently initiated the process of strategic planning and assisted by IFES completed internal organizational assessment of CEC. Results of the discussions within the BRIDGE workshop will be analyzed by the CEC strategic planning committee and will serve as a good basis for the forthcoming assessment of the external factors influencing activity of CEC. Internal and external assessments will be analyzed by CEC at the strategic planning workshop in summer. Given the current unsettled nature of the Parliament of Moldova and possibility to have snap parliamentary elections in autumn 2010 or spring 2011, it is critical for the Central Electoral Commission to draft a strategic plan, which will also take in consideration immediate future;
  

• Accredited BRIDGE facilitators who will become core staff of the CEC Training Center in the nearest future, thus increasing the capacity of the CEC to conduct trainings for professional development of its staff;

 

This workshop was provided in the framework of the Electoral Support to Moldova Project Funded by the European Union, co-funded and implemented by the United Nations Development Programme.

 

More information is available at:

- CEC: www.cec.md
- IFES Moldova: www.ifes.org/moldova.html
- UNDP Electoral Support to Moldova Project:
www.undp.md/projects/electoral_assistance.shtml

- BRIDGE website: http://bridge-project.org/news/europe-cis/832-strategic-a-financial-planning-workshop-in-moldova

 

Pictures by the courtesy of the BRIDGE project.

Donor Strategy for Electoral Assistance

DONOR STRATEGY FOR ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE

BY Hadija Miiro

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

 

Donors are special friends who need to be treated as such through personal relations, effective engagement and provision of unique insider information. This is an emerging conclusion from a review of the donor mobilization and coordination mechanisms in many developing democracies and the increased demands from funding governments for moving away from taking “a back end position” to staying connected to the recipients and implementing agencies all throughout the development process.

With the current credit crunch and increasing demand for donor funds, mobilizing sufficient funding to support electoral activities in post conflict countries presents special challenges which are unique to address, given the fact that the processes involve a multitude of stakeholders and most decisions are loaded with political connotations. Typically, there is no one-model for resource mobilization and donor coordination for electoral assistance in post conflict countries. Reasons include the fact that most such countries have emergency democracies, and electoral behavior is difficult to predict. As a result, decisions on electoral legal frameworks, processes and procedures are made late, and the cost of electoral processes is not always obvious, making it even more difficult to mobilize sufficient and timely resources. This strategy seeks to supplement existing mechanisms for donor mobilization and coordination by adopting a multi techniqueä-, more personalized- and participatory approach that engages the suppliers, beneficiaries and implementing partners in mobilization of resources for electoral processes.
 
The strategy is based on careful review of funding needs, an analysis of the donor community as a whole, so that its behaviors can be forecast, identification of  donor interests and requirements, presentation of a compelling and responsible business case, understanding the obstacles to effective resource mobilization in a given environment, engaging staff in building relations with donors, and implementing effective information sharing and coordination mechanisms that merit an investment of time and resources to support electoral processes in the short, medium and long term.

 
OBJECTIVES:

1. To increase electoral assistance through effective  resource mobilization and effective donor coordination
2. To provide accurate and timely insider information that donors need and is relevant to their role
3. To make donors feel more valued 
4. To reach out to each donor individually including those who may not have contributed to the process but who have the capacity to fill the funding gaps
5. Develop a more common and in-depth understanding of the country dynamics, its challenges, required interventions
6. To help build transparency as a key to good governance and the peace building process

PROBLEM BEING ADDRESSED:
 

Donors do not only contribute resources but play an oversight role in the development process. Achievement of the strategic objectives of each donor in support to a development or political process depends to a large part on the actions of other donors. Nonetheless virtually all donor agencies are under increased pressure to show results from their governments or sponsors by ensuring that resources from their governments are used well. The demand on every single unit of support is extremely high and almost every action taken by donors is heavily weighed down in light of its political implications for the donor and the beneficiary country. Inevitably choices need to be made between regions, countries and activities. Quite often resource mobilization for electoral assistance is even more difficult due to the unpredictability of the outcome and limited consideration of the link between political/electoral processes and the development process.

At the same time there is often unsatisfactory coordination among donors, implementing partners and beneficiaries. Donor coordination is mainly through donor representation on the oversight and Steering Committees. Periodic and sometimes Ad-hoc briefings to the Donor Coordination Working Group are provided. These high level policy meetings established for specific purposes do not sufficiently provide timely, continuous and up to date information on the key requirements and quite often do not act as catalysts for further or increased funding.   As a result, there is degeneration of exchange of information, frustrations and loss of interest in providing support to a given process.

Another limiting practice to effective resource mobilization and donor coordination is the adoption of a supplier driven approach, where implementing partners assume that they know what donors want to know, what they want to fund or what aspects of the process donors are unhappy about. The tendency is to selectively determine the level of donor engagement, what information they provide and what activities they should fund without prior consultations and engagement with the suppliers of the funds. This is even more so when fund raising for electoral process are characterized by political tradeoffs.

On the other hand, donors and implementing agencies cannot afford to waste time on non essential coordination activities. A review of the current coordination mechanisms is essential for each organization or country to ensure that the mechanism remains relevant and productive and that the electoral process is not only looked at as a political process but as a processes that hinges significantly on the development of other sectors.

This proposed strategic approach is to provide better “customer service” to donors through provision of clear funding needs, timely and relevant information, personalized recognition, improved coordination, and engagement without burdening either party with routine and sometime less useful information. In doing so, the strategy ensures that all donors are valued regardless of the dollar tags on their contributions.

PROPOSED STRATEGY:

 

Identification of Funding Needs:

This usually involves a needs based assessment in your focus area(s). It is more difficult to break into completely new grounds and most donors would prefer to fund an organization whose reputation is known in a particular field. Organizations / countries tend to have a multitude of needs. Funds may be required to support a particular programme or project, or aspects of a process. For an electoral process, funds may be required to support electoral reforms, constituency demarcation, voter registration, civic/voter education, voter tabulation and counting, election security, domestic observers and the media. In limited instances, donors may agree to fund capital developments for an Elections Management Body: construction of offices, a resource or media center, procurement of furniture or IT equipment. In the majority of cases, funds are required for the entire electoral/referendum process especially where the country has just emerged from a violent conflict. In all circumstances it is important to determine your priorities.

 

Identify Donor Interests and Requirements:

It is unlikely that a donor will meet all the organizational needs.  Most donors tend to fund particular activities or aspects of a process. A quick assessment of donor interests and requirements is hence necessary: Who are the major donors, what are their core areas for funding, what processes they have earmarked funds for, which donors have left overfunding for similar activities, what approaches were previously used successfully, what aspects of the current mechanisms are beneficial and which ones need to be reviewed. What frustrations are donors are having, what kind of information donors require, how often the information should be provided? More importantly, how do donors want to be treated?

 

Engage Staff in the Strategy Design :

Hold special meetings and one to one consultations with your staff to generate proposals and how each member or department can play a meaningful role depending on their portfolios. Both national and international staffs have surprisingly important informal contacts and can provide useful guidance on what government and the donors are saying. This process should result in a well designed, compelling and responsible project document matching organizational needs with funding sources.

 

Identify Activities and Design a Strategy for Donor Engagement:

The next step will be to identify and agree on activities that can be implemented and design a strategy for resource mobilization and donor coordination. The activities may include regular visits by staff or senior management,  one to one briefings, personal telephone conversations, using mail, weekly updates, using the media, using events (dinners, breakfast meetings) setting up a donor club, using special circumstances like visiting of father/mother figures, donor branding, scheduled meetings and customization of the organization website.

 

Establish a Donor Coordination Calendar:

The calendar should list down the agreed activities, set up optimum dates, identify lead persons and track each activity by date. The outcome of each activity is a basis for review of how well the strategy is working and devising corrective action.

 

PROPOSED ACTIVITIES:

 

• Provide Donor Benefits: The purpose is to make every donor feel valued by handling each donor with the same personal care regardless of the amount contributed. This could include acknowledging each contribution quickly within the shortest time possible preferably within 24 hours, request to each donor to grant your organization permission to publically air its contributions and naming its dollar amount, using their logos or emblems on procured materials, using personalized or hand written thank you notes by the Senior Manager, briefing them or inviting key persons to them to important events and sharing with them proposed activities before submission of official requests.
• Establish a Donor Club: The organization or a country office can establish a donor club in the capital or other regional offices, where, senior managers, ambassadors and donor representatives could meet regularly and share information.  This could also include a donor bar, special lunches, dinners or breakfast meetings. Individual members of the donor club like ambassadors may be contacted to arrange similar functions at convenient times and venues. People tend to attend such occasions more than regular scheduled meetings. On such occasions, the senior managers do not only get an opportunity to update the donors with relevant information; but to express gratitude and ask for more or supplementary funding.
• Donor Branding: In a few instances, donor branding has helped to increase donors’ planned and actual contributions especially for political processes where many donor would want to leave a land mark on their participation in the process. This is a situation where donors are branded as Gold, Silver or Bronze or with other distinctive titles based on the dollar value of their contributions. This may be mentioned lightly and occasionally, “I thank the Japanese Ambassador for putting the Japanese Government at a Gold Level through its contribution of USD 14 million to the Basket Fund” other donor will get the message. A careful analysis of the circumstances under which donor branding is used is necessary to ensure that donors who deserve gold and silver branding receive the benefit without alienating bronze or no medal holders.
• Do not Stop Asking for More and Ask for Specific Amounts: “If you do not ask, you do not get”.  Donors are like fruit trees, they do not walk to find birds. It’s the birds that find the trees. The way you ask, the type of support, the timing, the packaging of your request all determine whether you get and what you get. Governments and Electoral Management Bodies should prepare their budgets and funding requests well in advance of the event and embark on informal negotiations for funding as early as possible. Governments and EMBs also need be open, responsible and tactful when raising requests to ensure transparency. If you do not specify your request, you risk getting less than the required amount.
• Written Requests: Traditionally most requests are written in form of official email or letters. Informal consultations before the official request provide in-depth insights, on how much is available, what the requirements are, whom else you need to involve etc.
• Scheduled Meetings, Bulletins and Regular Updates and the Web: Regular meetings, bulletins, regular updates are traditional methods to donor coordination. These however are easier said than done. Most implementing partners stick to the mandatory reporting and tend to wait until a quarterly, bi- annual or annual report is submitted. In between they tend to neglect the power of continuous feedback. Donor need to be up to speed with current developments on issues where money from their governments is spent. Electoral processes are very volatile and once the process rolls, there are constant changes probably on a daily basis.  Scheduled meetings and regular updates through bullets and the organizational website should be used interactively to provide legitimate information.  These increase the opportunity to share information, understand what is going and put forward your business case. Information posted on the WWW should be constantly updated. Brief sections bulleting Key Issues, Action Points, Statistical and Pictorial Information increase readability. More still regular contact with donors is one way of making them feel valued. If you do not constantly engage with your donors, by the time your country or organizations submit a request; most decisions would have been made.  
• Email, Postal, Hard Copy Letters: A part from “Face Book” and “Twitter” which are not yet widely accepted forms of official communications; electronic mail is the fastest and most convenient form of official communications. A brief summary of the attachment in the mail body would ease the burden of reading long documents which should have been channeled to the relevant authority instantly. Marking the email with an appropriate level of “Urgent”, “Importance””New” all helps the reader to filter through and attend to mails that are urgent or important. Upcoming events like material handovers, decisions, declarations, timelines etc should be flagged out to the donors before the actual events occur or are published by reporters. In the developing world and particularly in post conflict countries, the challenges to electoral administration are enormous and the costs for conducting elections and referenda events are vast. Occasional communications on high quality headed paper to major donors requesting for financial support should not be ignored, especially if they are dropped at the door or by post. This also breaks the monotony of electronic mails that are currently clogging every top executive’s inbox.
• Events for Special Occasions: The organization can take advantage of events that are held under special circumstances. Electoral processes provide greater opportunities for special events. These may include a visit by internationally reputable dignitaries.  On such occasions, arrangements can be made to meet with Ambassadors and Heads of donor agencies. Instead of donors reading of such events from the news papers, they will feel valued if they are part of the process and have obtained the information from the “horse mouth”.
• Identify a Lead Agency: The organization may ask countries with good reputation and reputable coordination ethics to take a lead in coordinating other donors. Such countries include Canada and the United Kingdom. In such cases, the organization will provide the necessary information and may provide administrative support. There are organizations that are particularly known for electoral assistance: The United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems and many others. Because of internal repute of such organizations, many donors prefer to channel their funding through such organizations. Once a lead agency has been identified, ensure that electoral support is included in their Country Action Plans.
•  Direct Participation: Occasionally donor representatives may be invited to attend some of the regular activities. Electoral process provide great opportunities for such activities: launch of voter registration, public outreach, announcement of results etc. Donor representatives may also be invited occasionally to attend an insider activity like a staff meeting, to travel with a senior manager to a land mark event or to inspect a production line or some of the procured item. This participatory approach enables donors to get a more in-depth understanding of organizational operations, the challenges they are facing.
• Meet Donor Expectations: Donors generate funds from tax payers in their own countries. Each donor hence wants to feel that their contributions have been used in the most effective way. This means getting the highest value for every donor and ensuring transparency and accountability. Meeting donor expectations increases the likelihood of getting more resources for electoral processes.
• Have a Buffer from your Own Government: Funds pledged are not always timely released. Many Governments and Electoral Management Bodies complain of unfilled pledges or delays in release of funds. For electoral processes to be successfully implemented, even when donor support is inevitable, the EMB and the government must always have a fallback position: the national treasury. Domestic contributions also increase national ownership of an electoral process.

CONCLUSIONS:

 

Implementing a successful donor strategy requires substantive resources in terms of time, finances, expertise and dedication.  It also requires flexibility and willingness to compromise on the side of coordination providers and recipients. The time and resources are not always enough. Nonetheless, because of the importance of the successful and harmonious conclusion of electoral processes and the significant roles donors are playing in the process, adoption and implementation of a well thought out and effectively implemented resource mobilization and donor coordination strategy will generate unimaginable results.

 

The Electoral System for South Sudan: Apportioning Immediate to Long-term Needs

 

By Robert Gerenge

The people of Southern Sudan overwhelmingly voted for self-determination in the January 2011 referendum that gave rise to the world’s newest state, the Republic of South Sudan. With 98% voting for secession, this seemed the yearning of a lifetime, thanks to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that made this democratic exercise possible, among a plethora of other provisions. As the six-year old CPA that marked an end to Africa’s longest civil war pitting the Khartoum Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) lapses in July 2011, and formally giving way for the sovereigns in South Sudan to determine their future, the new political dispensation will pose opportunities, challenges and choices.

One of the most crucial choices that will face framers of the new Constitution will be the type of electoral system that will be adopted. This system will need to take cognisance of the social and political fabric of the new South Sudanese state. Beyond its primary effect of translating votes cast into seats in Parliament, an electoral system shapes party systems. For instance, the 50 per cent plus one system for presidential elections is susceptible to creation of party coalitions as seen recently in Guinea and Democratic Republic of Congo. An electoral system also plays a role in societal conflicts, either by aggravating or reducing tensions especially in relation to the question of inclusivity or exclusivity of groups or interests in governance. The First-Past-the-Post system (FPTP), at times referred to as "Winner-Take-All" may have had a bearing on the ubiquitous conflicts that have characterised Kenyan elections since 1992 with its epitome in 2007. There, contests have been characterised by political elites manipulating the electoral system to preserve and enhance their grip on power, through practices such as gerrymandering; all because of the perceived or apparent gain of those with access to political power to the exclusion of the rest. Nonetheless, the Kenyan experience does not prejudice some of the benefits of the FPTP system, such as direct lines of accountability between MPs and their constituents. Within the broader democratic framework, the electoral system also has a bearing on the system of government of a country; especially the relationship between the executive and the legislature, which may produce governance paralysis or efficacy depending on the system of government, and to some extent, the type of electoral system.

The ensuing complex and rather delicate state-building process in post-July 2011 South Sudan will take place against the backdrop of very high expectations for the dividends of secession by the citizens, which the new state may be incapable of attending to, both in the short-term and medium-term, posing a further threat to the fragile state. With hopes high, people expect their social and material conditions to change soon in this highly impoverished society. Having dealt with the common "enemy" (the North) through the referendum, political and social fissures that had previously been sublimated in the South have now begun to re-emerge. Since January 2011, over 1000 people have lost their lives due to conflict between the Government of Southern Sudan and armed militia. This is intra-Southern Sudanese conflict, not between North and South as was the case previously. More so, should the people of Abyei choose to unite with South Sudan in the impending referendum, the latter will need to consider the unique dynamics of this oil-rich territory: the perennially conflictual relationships between the Misseriya Arabs who are akin to the North and the Ngok Dinka who are akin to the South.

When deciding which electoral system to adopt, most countries look at their history and the prevailing social and political factors such as the existence of minorities and ethno-demography, political configuration such as diversity of interest and ideological groups including demobilised militia groups in post conflict settings who have political aspirations and so forth. For South Sudan, all these issues are relevant in their considerations. Often, highly segregated societies opt for Proportional Representation (PR) systems in order to promote politics of geometrical tolerance, otherwise referred to as politics of accommodation. The immediate objective here is normally to promote representation with ultimate goal of attaining peace and political stability. South Africa is a case in point. However, this system deprives accountability of the elected to the electorate and hence has the propensity for nurturing poor governance.

In South Sudan, the numerical dominance of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) within the government does not augur well for proponents of direct accountability, and by implication, for democratic development. Yet for ordinary people with high hopes for dividends of secession, what will ultimately matter is whether their social and economic needs are met, not in ten years time but "very soon" with potential backlash effects if these dividends are not forthcoming. Even though such social and economic needs cannot be attended to instantaneously, regardless of the type of government, ceteris paribus, a government that does not shoulder a reasonable amount of accountability for its performance will leave a lot to be desired. This is the dilemma between "needs and necessity" that is likely to face South Sudan.

Plurality/Majority systems such as FPTP and Two-Round Systems that carry the promise of accountability deprive the representational aspects which a PR system delivers, especially when it comes to minority groups or interests. Mixed systems have been appropriated by countries such as Lesotho to accommodate the benefits of both proportional representation and plurality/majority systems. But experience in Lesotho has shown that such benefits can be circumvented by party interests. The gist of this thread of argument is not to create some sort of a ‘no way forward’ but to bring to fore the essence of calibrating both immediate and medium/long-term needs for the people of South Sudan within the strand of choice of an electoral system. After all, electoral system is just a segment in the Constitution and overall democratic architecture. That said, the framers of the new Constitution for South Sudan must keep these issues in mind when deliberating on their preferred electoral system. Unlike most African states, which systematically inherited colonial relics that shaped their post independence state-building processes, South Sudan has, arguably, relatively more latitude in terms of [political] choices. Even so, it is essential to apportion immediate to long-term needs when making such choices in order to be successful.

Robert Gerenge is a Programme Officer for Elections and Political Process at the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA)

Robert Gerenge is a Programme Officer for Elections and Political Process at the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA)

Nigeria after the 2011 General Elections

By Jide Ojo

Nigeria’s general elections were held from April 9 – May 6, 2011. The elections started with the National Assembly (Senatorial and House of Representatives) elections on April 9, followed by the presidential elections on April 16 and gubernatorial elections on April 26. Gubernatorial elections in Bauchi and Kaduna State were postponed and held on April 28 as a result of post election violence that trailed the presidential election in which Human Rights Watch claimed in a May 18, 2011 report that 800 lives were lost and property worth billions of Naira were destroyed. A political logjam ensued in Imo State as the April 26 gubernatorial election in the State was declared inconclusive. A supplementary election was thereafter held in four local governments and one ward on May 6 before the governorship election was concluded.

Thereafter, observer groups have taken turns to release their final reports on the polls. The European Union Observation Mission (EU EOM) presented its final report on the elections on May 31. In the opinion of the Mission: “The legal framework, the general performance of the Independence National Electoral Commission INEC and of other stakeholders provided for the 2011 General Elections an overall democratic foundation for further democratic development in accordance with international principles and with international instruments ratified by the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”

In its closing report on the elections released on May 18, Project Swift Count 2011 made up of Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN), Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC)/Caritas, Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) and Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) observed thus “....the Nigerian voting populace were provided with opportunity to exercise their franchise and in general their votes were counted. The April general elections were conducted within the frameworks of and conformed to the Nigerian Constitution, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocols on Democracy and Good Governance, and the African Union (AU) Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa.

While the elections were not perfect, they marked a departure from flawed and sour elections that this country has experienced over the last twelve years, particularly the 2007 elections. The elections were generally characterized by the determination of INEC to halt the history of fraudulent elections and the desire of many Nigerians to restore and sustain the democratic process.” The reports of other observer groups such as the Commonwealth, AU, ECOWAS and International Republican Institute (IRI) were not markedly different from the aforementioned two.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had accepted the commendations and criticisms with respect to the last general elections in good faith. The Commission had participated in several post-election roundtables by the civil society organisations such as the one organised by Reclaim Naija and Election Situation Room on May 26 and June 1 respectively, as well as the one put together for CSOs by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa in Enugu on July 25 and 26. Not only that, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) had also partnered INEC to conduct some post election audit retreat for different cadres of the staff of the Commission including the Electoral Officers, Heads of Departments at both the headquarters and the State offices of INEC, Resident Electoral Commissioners and the board of the Commission (made up of 12 National Commissioners and the Chairman). The tenure of 13 out of the 37 Resident Electoral Commission had also ended with new appointments made by the President to fill some of the vacant positions.

On August 18, in pursuant to the provisions of S. 78 (7) (ii) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) de-registered the following Political Parties: Democratic Alternative (DA); National Action Council (NAC); National Democratic Liberty Party (NDLP); Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN); Nigeria People’s Congress (NPC); Nigeria Elements Progressive Party (NEPP) and National Unity Party (NUP). This has reduced the number of registered parties in Nigeria to 56 from 63. At present, the
Commission has been supported with an eight member Registration and Election Review Committee which was inaugurated on August 2 to among other things “critically review the registration and elections of 2011 and transmit its findings to the electoral body.” The committee, headed by Prof. Adele Jinadu, was given six weeks to carry out its assignment. The Commission had also promised to restructure its departments and units to enhance better efficiency and effectiveness.

A presidential committee on post election violence was set up on May 11, 2011. The 22-man panel of inquiry headed by Sheikh Ahmed Lemu is probing the post election violence. According to its terms of reference, the panel is, in part, intended to “investigate the immediate and remote cause(s) of the pre-election violence in Akwa Ibom State, as well as the tide of unrest in some states of the federation following the presidential election and make appropriate recommendations on how to prevent future occurrence; ascertain the number of persons who lost their lives or sustained injuries during the violence; identify the spread and extent of loss and damage to means of livelihood during the period in question and assess the cost of damage to personal and public properties and places of worship and make appropriate recommendations. Moreover, the Committee will investigate the sources of weapons used in the unrest and recommend how to stem the tide of the illegal flow of such weapons to the country; and, to examine any other matter incidental or relevant to the unrest and advise government appropriately.” Meanwhile, out of the 321 cases of electoral malpractices charged to court by INEC, the Commission has so far secured 24 convictions nationwide while 21 others were discharged, according to the Chief Press Secretary to INEC Chairman, Mr Kayode Idowu.

In terms of election dispute resolution, the number of election petitions filed at the tribunals bears witness to the credibility of the 2011 General Elections. As against about 1, 750 petitions filed after the 2007 elections, only 733 petitions were filed at the various election petition tribunals across the country post 2011 elections.

Some of the petitions have been dismissed at the pre-hearing stage while few of the 2011 election results have been upturned with some of them currently on appeal. Unfortunately, controversy from adjudication over the 2007 elections, particularly Sokoto governorship election, had led to the suspension of the President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Isa Ayo Salami on August 18, 2011 and the appointment of an acting President for the appellate court in the person of Hon. Justice Dalhatu Adamu who was sworn in on August 22. This has led to a lot of protests from civil right groups and the Nigerian Bar Association who alleged victimisation by the National Judicial Council against the suspended PCA.

On the issue of legal reform, the spokesperson to President Goodluck Jonathan issued a statement to the press on July 26 signifying the intention of the president to initiate a bill to the national assembly for amendment of the relevant sections of the Constitution to peg the terms of office of president and governors from maximum of two terms to a single term from 2015. This has generated a lot of furore with many commentators arguing that it is not a priority issue worth dedicating attention to by the President. The electoral commission, INEC
had however joined several civil right groups to demand for the establishment of Electoral Offences Commission.

On August 3, INEC announced the timetable for the conduct of gubernatorial elections in some states. According to the INEC Commissioner in charge of information and publicity, Prince Solomon Adedeji Soyebi, the Commission would conduct governorship elections in Kogi, Adamawa, Bayelsa, Sokoto, Cross River and Edo states in 2012, Ondo and Ekiti states in 2013; while Anambra and Osun states would have their turn in 2014. The dates of the 2011/12 governorship elections are as follows: Kogi, December 3, 2011; Adamawa, January
14, 2012; Bayelsa, February 11, 2012; Sokoto, March 10, 2012; Cross River, April 14, 2012 and Edo, July 14, 2012. INEC had also commenced preparation for continuous voters’ registration exercise which will start in Kogi State before the end of September 2011. Many of the State Independent Electoral Commissions have started arranging to hold council polls. While Lagos State Independent Electoral Commission, (LASIEC) has fixed October 22 to hold local government elections in Lagos State, Rivers SIEC had conducted elections in the
State’s 21 local government areas on May 21 while Sokoto State had followed suit on July 23, 2011.

All the aforesaid underscore the fact that Nigeria’s post election period had been action-packed. It remains to be seen if future polls will bring significant improvement on the widely acclaimed 2011 elections. To achieve this, all stakeholders’ viz. security agencies, national assembly, media, civil society organisations, political parties, donor community and members of the executives must continue to support the two electoral commissions (INEC and SIECs) in their onerous task of consolidating the nation’s democracy.

Jide Ojo is Nigeria Program Manager for IFES

Feature Articles

Combining Civil and Voter Registration: Advantages and Limitations

By Hadija Nassanga Miiro.

Introduction and Background:

A number of countries generate voter lists from civil registries which contain detailed information on all citizens of all ages. Such registries may be supplemented by information from other government agencies like the police, insurance companies, passport offices and retirement schemes. Voter registration databases tend to have only information that is required to identify eligible voter and allows them to cast their votes in an election. The degree of success depends on a number of factors including the efficiency of the civil registry, legal framework for information sharing. Most democracies have separate voter registration processes. Typical examples where voter lists are generated successfully from civil registrations systems include Norway and Sweden, Albania, and Spain among others.

This paper discusses the benefits and limitations of combining civil and voter registration based on experiences of both developed and growing democracies.

Principle Objective:

The author conducted the above study to respond to a growing need by election administrations and governments for information on the benefits and limitations of combining civil and voter registration processes. The main objective was to enable election administrators, governments and donors make informed decisions

Methodology:

The research was based on literature review and telephone interviews with persons in countries that had implemented a combined CVR. The researcher received written information from national election administrators and international advisors on their experiences with CVR projects and had the opportunity to speak with a number of actors who had participated or supported CVR projects. The author also reviewed literature in election administrations where single line voter registration had been conducted successfully with maximum efficiency and minimum costs and where the reverse had been experienced.

With funding from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) the author analyzed in depth the conditions of the civil and voter registries of Afghanistan (Miiro H, 2006). The findings formed the basis for the CVR pilot project in Afghanistan. While the results from this study are a prerogative of IFES and not presented in this report, the author used her experiences in the IFES study to supplement arguments in this report.

Main Findings:

In many cases where joint voter registration processes had failed, governments and election management bodies had rushed to combining civil and voter registration in the heat of an election. Suddenly donors and governments realized that it was too expensive to conduct a national wide voter registration especially where previous registration had not generated an accurate register. Civil registry authorities rushed to use the opportunity to achieve what was difficult before: getting funding for a civil registry. Below are advantages and limitations reported most frequently in the study

Joint Civil and Voter Registration:

Advantages:

1. In a number of cases, combining civil and voter registration was reported to have significantly reduced the cost of the two processes. This only happened in countries like Sweden and Norway where the joint CVR had stabled over years and was properly administered.
2. Combining CVR processes allowed data sharing among government departments and partners. For example when persons change their residence, they may inform the post office, tax bureau, housing authorities, insurance authorities. Data sharing partnerships are particularly important regarding deletions since the voter or his or her family often does not provide this information, vital statistics  and other such officers who have access to such information play an important role providing this information
3. Continuous civil registration reduced voter fatigue as most registered voters need not report to registration offices to update their particulars. The register in most cases was updated automatically from information obtained by the civil registration authority or other such offices like the police, tax authority and insurance agencies.
4. A combined CVR reduced the burden of voter registration from the election administrations giving them time to concentrate on other electoral activities like planning and procedures, production of ballot papers, coordination and management of Election Day activities and tabulation and announcement of results.

Limitations:

1. On the other hand, where the CVR process was not well planned, it became very costly, took a long time to stabilize and did not generate reliable data for voter registration purposes. Successful implementation of a combined CVR was limited by a number of factors:
2. Conflicting mandates: By law, most election administrations were mandated to conduct voter registration while government departments: ministry of internal affairs/interior, department of home affairs or department of civil registry were mandated to conduct the civil registry. In many cases, decisions to combine the civil and voter registration processes were done without clear definitions of policies in relation to issues like: where the data centre would be houses, which agency would chair the steering committee and who would own and control the CVR database. While governments had interests in controlling civil registration data, EMBs had the mandate to control voter information. Conflicts among implementing agencies and beneficiaries resulted into delays or failure of CVR projects.
3. Disabling Legal Frameworks: In many cases, laws governing different governments that would benefit from a CVR restricted access to information. For example Canada, Britain and Australia have laws that prohibit elections officials to access personal information without expressive permission from the individuals concerned. Consequently only particulars for less than 50% of eligible voters can be automatically updated which reduces the cost benefits of a combined CVR process as resources are spent seeking permission from potential voters to include them on voters’ lists or update their particulars.
4. In many countries where voter lists are derived from civil registry databases, there were still legal requirements for annual or periodic national wide updates of the voters’ register  during the immediate period prior to an election. In Cambodia for example, the law for election of the members to the national assembly required updating the voters’ register on an annual basis. In Canada information derived from other agencies did not guarantee 100% of voters’ particulars. In many electoral constituencies, election officers still needed to conduct door to door visits to ensure new residents and those who had become of voting age were included on the voter’s list
5. Lack of sufficient consultation and cooperation among implementing agencies: Combining civil and voter registration involved a chain of activities including data sharing and production and distribution of permanent national ID cards. These processes needed wide consultation and coordination among implementing agencies and beneficiaries, The CVR pilot project evaluation for Afghanistan cited lack of sufficient consultation and cooperation as major factors that limited the implementation of a joint CVR in Afghanistan. Statements like:

“The management and staff of the ministry of interior did not have good cooperation with the staff of the Independent Elections Commission.”

“The ministries of interior staff were not interested in the joint CVR and they left all the work to IEC staff.”

On the other hand, the ministry of interior accused the Independent Elections Commission of failure to consult them on key issues.

Lack of political understanding and agreements between different political forces was cited as one of the factors that delayed successful creation of a fully functional civil register intended to generate voter lists for 2006/7 local council elections in Albania

6. Production of national identity documents, creating linkages with other government department, and covering an entire population were some of the factors that made joint CVR more costly.
7. Limited Public Understanding and political perceptions: While the majority of ordinary voters viewed CVR as cost sharing process and an opportunity to obtain national identity documents, there were a number of opposition leaders who were skeptical and viewed a combined CVR as an attempt for their governments to identify and victimize opponents
8. Limited Capacity of Lead Agencies: Combining civil and voter registration is time consuming and requires very careful planning, sufficient technical capability and high organizational capabilities. While voter registration is the responsibility of election management bodies in many democracies, civil registry tends to involve more players, and beneficiaries. Sharing information among different government departments for example may require database linkages based on sophisticated soft ware and hard ware that may involve high technological skills to institute, operate and maintain. Lack of such skills and high costs for hire limited successful implementation of joint CVR especially in developing countries
9. Lack of location addresses, and Identity Requirements: While the OSCE/ODIHR had earlier recommended adopting a system of creating of a fully functional civil registration system in Albania whereby before each election voter lists would be extracted from the computerized updated civil registry kept in the civil status offices of local government units, such a civil registration system could not be established in time for the 2006/2007 local council elections. The process suffered from, lack of a fully functional system of addresses, lack of update identification documents and the constant and often unreported in country migration among others.
10. Variance in Donor Interest: Donors interested in funding voter registry were not necessarily interested in funding a combined process making it more difficult to mobilize funds for a joint process
11. Limited Time: The time available to conduct a CVR was reported as the single biggest challenge. Constitutional mandates defined timelines for voter registration and other election activities. To avoid constitutional crises and deliver credible elections according to legally defined timelines, EMDs needed increased autonomy in producing and providing the voters’ register. Lack of accurate and comprehensive civil registry data, delays in enacting enabling laws and obtaining funding made it most difficult for EMBs to obtain and deliver accurate voter lists in instances where civil registration processed were in their initial stages and had not stabilized. Countries like Sweden, Norway, and Canada who successfully produced voter lists from civil registry data had built their processes over decades. In many young democracies, the time available to prepare and conduct an election was usually too short to allow effective and efficient conduct of voter and civil registration exercises.
12. Some civil registration systems are very complex. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, civil registration requires linking each individual to his family members creating a family tree for each individual. In Afghanistan, the need by government to maintain family tree tracking system by tracking everyone’s ancestry, resulted in many deceased persons remaining on the civil registry and was a major factor that limited the creation of a joint CVR.
13. Vested interests and Influence Peddling: Undue influence by interested suppliers of services, registration materials and soft ware particularly from international suppliers was reported as a major factor that limited successful implementation of CVR projects. There were reports of lead agencies being compromised by suppliers to select non appropriate or more costly systems in expectations of kickbacks from suppliers

Separate Voter Registration Process: Advantaged and Limitations

Advantages:

1. Due to the fact that data required for single VR processes was limited to voter information and the target population in most cases was smaller consisting of only adults, 18 years or above, voter registration required shorter periods and less funds to conduct and complete.

2. Voter registration put more control into the hands of election authorities hence making them accountable for the quality of the register. Election Management Bodies (EMBs) in countries like Uganda and South Africa were more in control of the registration process than countries like Pakistan were voter lists were generated from civil registry data and in the hands of other government bodies like the ministry of interior.

3. Voter registries created by EMB were reported to be more accurate in most of the cases especially where CVR processes had not stabilized. Many people reported that it was easier to control non eligible voters from the registry if the register was in the hands of an EMB

4. Voter information was reported to be more secure in processes solely for voter registration purposes. This was again related to the fact that fewer information was collected all of which was in the control of a single organization

5. In countries like Cambodia, the costs of voter registration were reported to have decreased over years in spite of the fact that voter registration was not a direct result of the civil registry

6. Most EMBs with an ongoing VR carried periodic updates a short period to the elections. During the non election period, they did not need to report changes in domicile, deaths, and voter be coming of age. Civil registration required continuous reporting of population changes: births, deaths and change of residence

7. Many VR processes had generated accurate and comprehensive voter lists although in several cases this had taken time and in repeated updates and changes in registration procedures and technology.

Limitations:

1. Voter registration was not compulsory in most countries where it was a single process. Consequently the register left out many eligible voters especially disadvantaged voters like women and persons with disabilities.
2. In many developing democracies, like Afghanistan, separation of the voter registration process did not generate the desired results. Registration processes that has been conducted more than twice and at e exorbitant costs did not generate registers that meet internationally acceptable standards
3. In many countries registration of voters had been left to the last hour: due late enacting of laws, lack of sufficient funds, poor security and limited administrative potential among others. The result was inaccurate voter lists with significant numbers of voters’ particulars missing out on the final lists used on Election Day. This was the case in almost all first registrations after constitutional and or electoral reforms regardless of whether the registration process was single or combined.
4. Vested interests and fight for tenders were not only limited to combined CVR processes but were equally experienced in single VR processes. Influence of the tendering processes resulted into purchase of registration technologies that were unsuitable for particular environments. Consequently many processes did not produce accurate registers due to delays in implementing solutions or to contaminated choices of registration solutions
5. Voter registration is a comprehensive process. Naturally, single VR processes put a bigger burden on the EMB to organize and conduct. Ordinarily high numbers of staff are required to do field recording of voter data and to process the data into a register at central or regional offices. Voter registration requires periodic updates especially during the time before an election. The result is voter fatigue as voters need to continuously check if their names still exist on the register or to report changes in voting locations or to identify and report persons who dies or left the area.

Conclusion:

While combining civil and voter registration is apparently cheaper and may allow sharing a bulk of information across government agencies, reducing voter fatigue and generating voter lists in a relatively shorter period where the process is administered efficiently, rushed decisions to combine the two processes, without sufficient consultation and planning, limited funding, lack of coordination among implementing agencies, limited time frames and a series of other factors combine to make joint CVR projects less beneficial than single voter registration processes. The decision to combine civil and voter registration processes must be based on the particular circumstances of a country and the ability of both government and the EMB to overcome the limitations associated with a joint process. All likely limitations must be carefully evaluated and the choice should be based on which option will deliver the most accurate and timely register under the particular circumstances.

Hadija Nassanga Miiro is the Chief Technical Advisor/Elections for UNDP/Yemen.

References:

1. Miiro HN.; “Analysis of the Civil and Voter Registrations Systems in Afghanistan” A basis for the CVR pilot Project in Afghanistan: Independent Elections Commission of Afghanistan and IFES (2006)

2. Miiro NH.; Dauphinais D.; “Evaluation Report: Civil and Voter Registration Pilot” Ministry of Interior and the Independent Elections Commission and IFES- Afghanistan (2007)

3. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network: “Managing the Cost of Voter/Civil Registration-Country Experiences” aceproject.org

4. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network: “Voter Registration Trends and Practices Around the World” aceproject.org

5. Rosenberg JS.; Chen M “Expanding Democracy: Voter Registration Around the World” Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law

6. United Nations Information Services.; “Council Members Concerned About Low Voter Registration of Monitors for Kosovo Wide Elections” New York 28 August (UN Head Quarters)

7. Roberts E.; “ Voter Registration: An International Perspective” Fair Vote Research Report www.fairvote.org

8. OSCE/ODIHR “Needs Assessment Mission Report–Albania November 2006” OSCE/ODIHR Publication 2006

9. “Continuous Registration in Uganda” The Electoral Commission of Uganda www.ec.or.ug

10. Merloey P.; “Building Confidence in the Voter Registration Process: An NDI Monitoring Guide for Political Parties and Civic Organisations” National Democratic Institute (2001)

11. “Post Transitional Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo” aceproject.org

12. “Ensuring Free and Fair Elections”.; IEC South Africa [email protected]

13. “Proposed Constitution of Sudan” www.dcregistry.com/

14. “President on Voter Registration for Kosovo Elections 2001” OSCE Mission in Kosovo Press Release (2001)

15. “Voter Registration”.; Interim Independent Electoral Commission Republic of Kenya www.wck.or.ek/

16. “Support to National Elections in Pakistan”.; UNDP Pakistan www.undp.org.pk/

17. Elections in Pakistan: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

18. Australian Electoral Commission,; www.aec.gov.au/

Deepening Social Justice in Egypt through Elections (Women’s Representation and Electoral Management Bodies)

by Marwa Othman

Introduction

Since the events of January 2011, which led to the ouster of President Mubarak, Egypt continues to undergo a political transition. One of the main demands and aspirations, which the Egyptian people hoped to achieve after the events of January 2011, was “social justice”. The definition of social justice is: "governments are compelled to represent and serve their populations and act in their best interest. A faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and women."[1]

Egypt has seen remarkable transformation in recent years where changes are occurring more rapidly than any time in recent history. One of these changes is the Egyptian people having a voice in the elections process. UNDP played a major role in the change, by collaborating with the Egyptian government, in raising awareness to the Egyptians on the importance of their votes when electing their future leaders and at the same time highlighting the importance of establishing an independent, permanent body to overlook all electoral aspects taking place in the country. Gender inequalities faced in the elections process are prevalent on a global scale, more so in Egypt. Women's participation in bringing about change in the elections process was strong and impactful. However, this influence was not reflected in the number of elected officials. The reason for this disparity is not clear-cut, but it is multifactorial. The Egyptian culture has not been accustomed to women giving their voice in making decisions where the stakes include electing government officials. Furthermore, many women fail to see the value of their voice due to unfamiliarity with the voting process, which is more commonplace among rural dwellers, where illiteracy rates are high and poverty is rampant.  

The political participation of women is clearly defined in the 2011 General Assembly resolution on Women’s Political Participation (A/RES/66/130).[2] To date, women continue to be under-represented around the world in positions at decision-making levels, and more efforts need to be exerted to reach the target of 30% critical mass, as proposed at the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action. Representation of Egyptian women in public service positions has always stood at very low figures. Of the 688 members elected to both chambers of the 2011/2012 Parliament, only 16 were represented. Only four women ministers were included in the first Cabinet appointed after January 2011, and later reduced to two. Currently, the Cabinet includes four women, two of which are continuing their posts from the last government. Women are also under-represented in the judicial authority, forming only 10%. In the last two Constitutional Drafting Committees appointed, women did not occupy more than a handful of seats ranging from 5-10%. Again, the current Egyptian Cabinet includes only four women ministers out of 34, indicating further need for effective political participation by women. This paper will focus on how some interventions played a role to address these weaknesses.

Interventions

Strengthening social justice through empowering women’s political participation has been implemented through two key successful components.

(a)    Women’s representation in the electoral legal framework

Many developmental interventions have taken place in the past three years to strengthen institutional capacities and national electoral practices in the long run. UNDP engaged in fruitful efforts to assist the authorities with the electoral legal framework through exposure to comparative international experiences and knowledge sharing. A range of activities also focused on including special measures to ensure women’s representation in elected bodies. The House of Representatives law,[3] which would elect a new legislature, was ratified by former interim President Adly Mansour on 5 June 2014. The new parliamentary body will be composed of 567 seats total (59 larger than the previous body), with the majority of seats- 420 (75%) elected under the majoritarian system and 120 (20%) under the closed absolute list system. The President will appoint the remaining 5% (27 seats). Initially, the draft law had ensured only a 4% women’s representation. However, the draft was amended after the National Council for Women (NCW) and several women groups applied political pressure and pushed for a higher representation. The “block vote” system established special measures as the means of representation for marginalized and disenfranchised groups. Women, Christians, workers and farmers, youth, disabled and expatriates living abroad were all assigned quotas in the 120 seats system (distributed across four districts). In the two 15-seat districts, each list must include seven women. In the two 45-seat districts, each list must include 21 women.[4] Additionally, half of the seats appointed by the President must be women.[5] Therefore, the new law would ensure that women gain 56 elected seats plus 14 appointed seats, thus yielding 70 seats or a 12.3% quota. 

Although this quota is still not considered appropriate representation, it is seen as a positive intervention for one of Egypt’s most marginalized groups, particularly when compared to the previous parliament where women held less than 2% of seats. Nearly 70% of women candidates were placed at the bottom half of the lists, even among the most liberal parties, in the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections. Without a quota, it was left to the political parties to decide on the number and position of women on the lists, which did not guarantee adequate representation.

 (b)   Awareness-raising initiatives

Since 2011, UNDP collaborated with UN Women and the Ministry of State for Administrative Development and the Social Fund for Development, on the implementation of the “Women’s Citizenship Initiative”[6] to issue national ID cards for rural women to enable them to vote, access public services and to benefit from full citizenship rights. So far, over 115,000 cards have been successfully issued. 

In early 2013, the NCW launched two training programs for women voters and candidates. The program named “Choose your Candidate” [7] aims to train women on how to make an informed decision when choosing a candidate. The “How to Manage an Election Campaign” program[8] is designed to train women who wish to run as candidates for the parliamentary and local elections on campaign management skills. Other training courses offered by BRIDGE or the (Building Resources in Democracy and Electoral Assistance) were useful to expose national electoral stakeholders, judicial members, opinion leaders, academics and journalists to modules related to gender and elections. Among other activities, UNDP and UN Women hosted a sub-regional conference on women’s participation in post-revolutionary parliamentary elections, focusing on comparative experiences from Egypt and other Arab countries. Such initiatives have managed to set a platform for gender experts and electoral administrators to share experiences and define good practices.

Proposals for Sustainability

(a) Electoral Management Body

Ad hoc electoral committees in Egypt have managed the process of electoral administration, since the early 2000s.[9] The 2012 constitution was the first to introduce the principles of an electoral management body (EMB), which was considered a milestone in the system. The 2014 constitution continues to foresee this permanent, independent body to oversee the electoral process.[10] According to international standards and norms, the EMB should be founded on five principles: independence, impartiality, integrity, professionalism and transparency. However, the concept of the EMB is yet to be spelled out in a law, to be ratified by the upcoming House of Representatives, before its establishment. The EMB can serve as a sustainable tool to ensure that elections are conducted in a transparent, neutral manner and will encourage women to participate in the electoral process as both voters and candidates; a long-term goal that will lead to social equality in the form of political empowerment. The EMB, referred to in the constitution as the National Electoral Authority (NEA), will be administered by a Board composed of senior judges with a permanent executive secretariat.[11] The NEA could be responsible for all aspects of the electoral administration ranging from voter registration, public outreach, nomination of candidates, electoral campaigns, voting and counting and the resolution of all complaints and appeals on all procedures in the process. These responsibilities should always be gender sensitive in order to further incorporate women in the political environment of Egypt, as candidates and voters. It is highly recommended that these gender-mainstreaming policies extend to integrating women within its permanent staff.

(b) Increased training and capacity building

More work needs to be done to guarantee a higher representation of women. It is essential to build on the momentum of the citizenship initiative by expanding the program to reach more women across the country, particularly the rural areas. Also, the training of women candidates from political parties is not sufficient. Sustainability requires encouraging more women voters to become women candidates. This can be achieved through raising awareness and providing training to reach more women across the governorates, in order to create generations of women who understand how to choose their candidates and may potentially look into the possibility of running for public office. In addition, training electoral stakeholders, such as electoral commissioners, polling staff and security personnel would be vital to enhance the electoral process. 

It is also recommended to invest in the training of new staff once the NEA is established, with an emphasis on gender mainstreaming, in order to build capacities within the institution. In the long run this would contribute to awareness raising, increased political empowerment of women and hence deepen social justice in Egypt.

Challenges

The main shortcoming of the new electoral law is the chosen distribution of parliamentary seats, particularly after several Egyptian political parties have campaigned for a proportional representation system that would favor party representation. In contrast to the two-thirds proportional representation system of the 2011 law, the party list that wins an absolute majority in each electoral constituency will gain all seats; essentially a block vote or a variation of the majoritarian system. Many parties have criticized this electoral system of a “winner takes all”, which will limit the role of political parties, stifle their development and compromise political inclusiveness. Some experts criticize the gender quotas for putting an emphasis on quantity rather than quality, which in turn weakens the role of women members of parliament. Despite its potential drawbacks, it may be useful in Egypt’s transitional phase, in order to overcome predominant gender biases, and in the long run, can secure an improvement in women representation and reinforce social justice.

An immediate challenge for the formation of the EMB would be the transfer of authority from the national electoral stakeholders and the challenge of its sustainability, as experienced in other emerging democracies. Another obstacle of an EMB is its high financial cost. Financial management of an EMB could incur a high cost and training new staff may pose a financial burden for the current state of the economy.

Conclusion

Despite these modest advances, progress nevertheless remains slow in increasing women’s political participation in Egypt. The guarantee of a larger women’s representation in the new electoral law and the introduction of a permanent EMB are both developmental interventions that can contribute to substantial, foreseeable social justice in Egypt. Elections bridge the gap of social justice by not only giving the people the power to choose their leaders, but more specifically, be inclusive of women's voice in the elections process. In March 2014, the first woman was elected to head “Al-Dustour” political party. This is an empowering step for women, and it’s imperative to build on this momentum, considering longstanding patriarchal tendencies that are deeply rooted in Egyptian culture that have marginalized many women from political life. The previous electoral experiences (parliamentary, presidential and referendum) have played a major role in women realizing their importance as a voting power. In the future, it is likely that women will play a larger role in the elections with further political participation as both voters and candidates. In order to achieve a credible elections process in a young democracy like Egypt, it is key to push forth more of these sustainable interventions, to pave the way in achieving one of the fundamental demands of the revolution: social justice. 

* Marwa Othman was the National Electoral Officer for UNDP’s electoral assistance project  “Strengthening of the Democratic Process in Egypt” from 2011-2014. In this capacity, she acted as a reporting officer, and supported the development of procedures and training manuals for the High Electoral Commission for parliamentary and presidential elections and referenda in Egypt’s post-revolution/transitional period. She is an accredited BRIDGE facilitator and has conducted several workshops on gender and elections. Mrs. Othman has four years of experience as a research assistant at the Security Council Affairs Division, in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) at UN Headquarters in New York and has also worked in the Electoral Assistance Division in DPA. Originally from Egypt, Mrs. Othman obtained a bachelor’s degree in Economics from Tufts University and holds an MPA from the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.

 

Burundi Election Update

by Jonathan Stonestreet, Alden Mahler Levine, and Luke Tyburski*

The 2001 Arusha Accords and the 2005 Constitution raised hopes that Burundi could build democratic institutions and escape a cycle of ethnically-based violence.  Burundi had been relatively peaceful and had seen diminished ethnic tensions reflected by multiethnic representation in government institutions and the military. Although most of the opposition boycotted national elections in 2010, opposition parties were poised to contest the 2015 elections. Despite a number of significant problems, a vocal civil society advocated for democratic rights, and independent media was able to report relatively freely on political developments.

As the 2015 cycle of local, parliamentary and presidential elections approached, however, the electoral environment deteriorated dramatically. Burundi is increasingly affected by political tension, fear and violence. Protests take place almost on a daily basis in the capital Bujumbura. At least 40 people have been killed, many more wounded, and over 100,000 refugees have fled Burundi due to intimidation and fear of violence. Parliamentary and communal elections (originally scheduled for May 26) and the presidential election (originally scheduled for June 26) have now been postponed until June 29 and July 15 respectively.

Key issues that have impacted the run-up to elections include a lack of political space for the opposition, the perceived lack of independence of the election commission (CENI), voter registration problems, and intimidation by the ruling party’s youth wing, the Imbonerakure. At the heart of the crisis, however, is the question of whether the president can run for a third term in office. The opposition, civil society groups, and the Catholic Church note that the Constitution clearly specifies that the president can only serve a maximum of two terms and that President Nkurunziza is ineligible to run since he was re-elected in 2010. The president has taken the position that the two term limit does not apply, as he was indirectly elected by parliament in 2005 rather than being directly elected by the people.

Following the announcement that the president would run again on April 26, 2015, popular protests began in Bujumbura. The Constitutional Court validated the president’s position, although one member subsequently fled to Rwanda citing pressure on the court. After several days of protest, a military coup attempt took place on May 13 while President Nkurunziza was out of the country to attend a summit of the East African Community (EAC). The coup was put down and most of the leaders arrested, but in the turmoil election preparations were disrupted and independent radio stations were destroyed, leaving only the government run station in operation. Protests against the president’s decision to run for a third term immediately resumed. The response of security forces to the protests has often been violent, while protestors have also attacked police on some occasions.

The United Nations sponsored a dialogue process including the government, opposition leaders, and some civil society leaders. The dialogue made progress on several issues but was unable to address the third-term issue before being interrupted when the leader of an opposition party was assassinated on May 23. On May 31, an emergency EAC Summit urged postponement of the elections by six weeks in order to give more space for negotiation and for the improvement of the electoral environment. In particular, the EAC also called for the disarmament of youth groups allied to political parties.

On June 8, the CENI proposed a new electoral calendar, which delayed the presidential election by three weeks, stating that this was the latest date the election could be held in accordance with constitutional requirements. On June 10, the opposition rejected the new election dates, and subsequently called for a boycott of the elections. The government announced that no further delays would be considered and that the issue of the third term was not negotiable.

The credibility of the process continues to deteriorate. The main domestic observer coalition COSOME suspended its observation activities in early May, and the Catholic Church has withdrawn its members from the provincial and local election commissions. Two of the five CENI members resigned at the end of May and fled to Rwanda. This would have prevented the CENI from having a quorum to take decisions. A presidential decree was subsequently circulated giving the CENI the authority to take decisions with only three members. This step further undermines the legitimacy of the election process.   

The African Union decided not to deploy an observation mission as conditions for democratic elections did not exist. The Carter Center was unable to deploy its planned limited observation mission due to the coup attempt and has placed its mission on hold. On May 26, opposition parties released a statement vowing not to recognize the results of any election held in the present environment and calling on international observers to withdraw from the elections. The European Union’s election observation mission suspended its operations on May 28, leaving the United Nations observation mission as the sole international observer presence in Burundi. International donor support for the elections has also been suspended. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has warned that violence by armed militias, especially the Imbonerakure, could “tip [Burundi] over the edge.”[1]

The UN, AU and EAC continue to work towards a negotiated solution to the crisis. Unless an acceptable compromise is reached, there is a real risk that, in addition to holding an election which would be widely perceived as undemocratic, the achievements of the Arusha Accords could be lost and that Burundi could slide further into violence and potentially into ethnic conflict.

 

* This article is the result of collaboration between Jonathan Stonestreet, Alden Mahler Levine, and Luke Tyburski. Luke is an intern at The Carter Center and a rising junior at NYU Abu Dhabi, where he studies Political Science and Economics. Alden is a Program Associate in the Carter Center’s Democracy Program currently focusing on Burundi. Jonathan is an Associate Director in Democracy Program and manages projects in Burundi and Myanmar.

 

Update: Burundi’s controversial parliamentary and presidential elections took place on June 29 and July 21, respectively, despite the boycott by 17 opposition groups and the insistence of the international community that conditions for free and fair elections were unattainable. The ruling party won 77 of the 100 available seats in the National Assembly (Narodno Sabranie), and President Nkurunziza was elected to a third term with 69.4 percent of the vote in a disputed presidential election. Nkurunziza was sworn in a week ahead of schedule in August. Political unrest, including the murder of an opposition party spokesman and the attempted assassination of Burundi’s army chief of staff, continues to plague the country.

* This update was produced by ACE. The original authors of this Feature were unavailable for further contributions after the Burundi elections were held.

 

Myanmar’s Historic Elections

by Jonathan Stonestreet, Maura Scully, and Justin Cradit* 

In 2015, Myanmar overcame decades of entrenched mistrust between the government, civil society, political parties and voters to host an election leading to a peaceful transition of power.  As the new government stands ready to take their seats and tackle the challenges that remain with Myanmar’s transition to democracy, it is worth considering the factors that have facilitated this change. 

From 1962 to 2011, Myanmar was ruled by military regimes. Prior to 2015, the country held only two multi-party national elections (in 1990 and 2010)—neither of which resulted in a transfer of power to a genuine civilian government.  The 2010 election was the result of a seven step roadmap to transition to democracy issued in 2003.  This roadmap included establishing the 2008 Constitution, which, while an important step towards democracy, maintained 25 percent of parliamentary seats for the military (giving the military veto power over constitutional reform), kept key ministries under the control of the military, and effectively barred opposition leader Aung San Sui Kyi from becoming president due to her family’s citizenship status. 

The 2010 elections resulted in a transfer of power to a nominally civilian government, but the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a party composed of former military generals, won a majority in both chambers of parliament. The main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, boycotted the election. Though more credible by-elections were held in 2012, doubts lingered over whether the military and the USDP-led government would permit credible elections in 2015. The international and domestic community were concerned about whether a credible election could be held given the legal limitations set out in the 2008 Constitution, the challenges facing the administration of the elections and the potential for disenfranchisement.

The Union Election Commission (UEC), Myanmar’s election management body, was the institution responsible for coordinating the 2015 elections. A major challenge the institution faced was a long-standing lack of trust in its impartiality. Although the UEC is constitutionally independent from the government, its members are appointed by the president. Political parties, the media and civil society questioned whether it would fairly administer the elections. Perhaps the highest-profile issue that the UEC faced in the run-up to the 2015 elections was the voter list.  In previous elections, observers criticized the decentralized, largely hand-written list for being inaccurate and open to manipulation as the list was not secure.

Although Myanmar is a diverse country, home to over 130 ethnic groups and a large population of internally displaced persons, the pre-election period also saw a growth in Burman nationalism and anti-Muslim sentiment propagated by extremist Buddhist groups such as Ma Ba Tha. The government’s cancellation of temporary registration cards in early 2015 resulted in the disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of ethnic and religious minorities. This decision particularly affected the marginalized Rohingya community, who are already living in conditions that prevent them from exercising most civil and political rights, including basic freedom of movement.

Parallel to election preparations, Myanmar conducted a ceasefire negotiation between the military and ethnic armed groups (EAGs), which was intended to end one of the world’s longest civil wars. This resulted in the signing of the nationwide ceasefire agreement by the government and eight EAGs in October 2015. Despite this, voting was cancelled in five townships and 403 village tracts, primarily in Shan State, Kachin State and Kayin State. As a result of the cancellations, seven seats in the lower house of the parliament and 14 Shan State assembly seats remain vacant.

Yet on November 8, 2015, more than 20 million people queued at polling stations across Myanmar to vote in the country’s first competitive national elections since 1990, with turnout reaching approximately 69 percent. Voters cast their ballots for members of two houses of the national parliament and 14 state and regional legislatures. The vote took place peacefully, and NLD won a large majority in both houses of parliament. Both the military and USDP stated that they accepted the outcome and that they were willing to work with the incoming NLD-led government.

Based on preliminary findings of The Carter Center and other international and domestic observers, Election Day surpassed expectations. The people of Myanmar exercised their political rights and demonstrated their commitment to the democratic process as voters, observers, political party agents and polling officials. The polling and counting processes were generally well-conducted, with 95 percent of monitored stations assessed as “very good” or “good.” Furthermore, the polls were competitive: more than 90 parties ran candidates, and candidates were generally able to campaign freely in most areas of the country. 

Nevertheless, there were some significant shortcomings. For instance, little to no provisions  were made for the observation of the casting of out-of-constituency advance ballots by the military, security forces, and civil servants, raising questions about the integrity of the process. In addition, the tabulation of votes was not conducted transparently in a few constituencies observed, with observers denied meaningful access to the process.

Despite concerns about the voter list before the election, the vast majority of registered voters were able to vote on Election Day. Observers reported that only seven percent of monitored stations saw voters turned away due to their name not being on the list and, even in those stations, small numbers were turned away. Observers also commended the UEC’s efforts to make the list as inclusive and accurate as possible within a limited timeframe. This was a result of the UEC’s efforts to correct the voter list through two national display periods when eligible voters could verify their names, as well as a concerted effort to involve stakeholders in the process. 

During the year, the UEC worked to collaborate with stakeholders on a variety of electoral issues. The UEC institutionalized national and regional meetings with both civil society and parties and worked together to develop materials, such as codes of conduct, through a consultative process. In partnership with civil society and parties, the UEC also conducted a national voter education campaign and provided them with voter education materials to use in their own outreach efforts.  

Civil society played an important part in the 2015 elections, both in election observation and in outreach to voters. The UEC accredited 31 organizations to observe elections, and numerous CSOs undertook efforts to increase the participation of traditionally marginalized groups. The Myanmar Independent Living Initiative (MILI) and Yaung Chi Thit (YCT), both supported by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), were two such organizations. The work of MILI, a disabled persons’ organization, led to the adoption of new election regulations to support persons with disabilities and the piloting of accessible polling sites and braille ballot guides. YCT also played an important role in the 2015 elections, implementing a women’s leadership program entitled She Leads that trained more than 500 women to participate in the election. 

This snapshot of challenges and improvements illustrates the complex electoral environment in which Myanmar held the 2015 elections. Without a committed electorate, active civil society, engaged political parties and an election commission open to improving the electoral process, the elections would have likely had a different outcome. Still, it is important to note that significant challenges remain, including improving the legal framework for elections, undertaking constitutional reform, strengthening the independence of the UEC, addressing disenfranchisement and citizenship issues, making the advance voting process more transparent, developing civic education programs, and advancing the peace process. The extent to which the new government is able to make progress on these issues will shape the environment for the successful conduct of the 2020 elections.

* This article is the result of collaboration between Jonathan Stonestreet, Maura Scully, and Justin Cradit. Jonathan is an Associate Director in the Carter Center’s Democracy Program and manages projects in Burundi and Myanmar. Maura is a Program Coordinator and Justin is Program Associate for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems Myanmar team.

Violence Against Women in Politics and Elections: The Need for Increased Data and Measurement

"Virginia Spinks, The Carter Center – additional contributors include Dr. Gabrielle Bardall (IFES) and Aleida Ferreyra (UNDP)

 

On March 14, 2018, black Brazilian activist and politician Marielle Franco was murdered in Rio De Janeiro. The city councilwoman was an outspoken feminist and human rights defender who decried police violence and gun violence affecting impoverished neighborhoods. On her way home from an event she planned called Young Black Women Shifting Social Structures, she and her driver were shot and killed in their car. Following her death, thousands of protesters took to the streets, many holding signs suggesting she was killed because of her activism.

 

Franco is not the first female politician to be killed for her views. In recent years, women politicians around the world have been victims of online attacks, as well as high-profile acts of physical violence. Diane Abbott, a prominent female Member of Parliament (MP) of color in the United Kingdom, received over 8,000 abusive tweets in the six weeks prior to the 2017 Parliamentary elections. This is a prevalent type of harassment faced by female politicians, and in some cases, this harassment has escalated into physical violence. Jo Cox, British Labour Party MP, was murdered in 2016; the perpetrator attributed his actions to Cox’s defense of the European Union and immigrant communities. Bolivian councilor Juana Quispe was found strangled in 2012; she had been helping other female politicians file harassment complaints. Angiza Shinwari, a provincial councilor in east Afghanistan and advocate for women’s rights, was killed by a targeted bomb attack in 2015.

 

While some may suggest that violence targeting female politicians is simply a result of increasing representation of women in politics, research suggests that female politicians experience violence because they are female, and in gendered ways. This violence can be physical (including sexual), psychological, and/or economic; occurs in both public and private spaces (including online and domestic violence); and is perpetrated both by political opponents and people known to the victims, such as their intimate partners or members of their own political parties (Bardall/IFES, 2011).  A 2016 study conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) surveyed 55 women parliamentarians in 39 countries, focusing on their experiences as politicians and violence they may have experienced. The majority of those surveyed experienced psychological violence: 65%% said they had been subjected to humiliating sexist remarks, and 44%% reported receiving threats of death, rape, beatings or abduction. This study notes also that these types of violence against female parliamentarians have the intent and impact of dissuading them or female colleagues from participating in politics.

 

Some organizations have already made important strides in understanding this field and working to mitigate these disturbing trends of violence and harassment, including the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which are both ACE partners, and UN Women. IFES has created the Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) program, which collects publicly-verifiable data on election-related violence. It has been used in 13 elections since 2003, and there is gender-disaggregated data available for six of these cases. IFES also developed Violence Against Women in Elections: A Framework for Assessment, Monitoring, and Response to identify and address specific challenges related to gender-based violence in elections. In collaboration with UNDP, UN Women has also published Preventing Violence Against Women in Elections: A Programming Guide, which seeks to aid technical assistance providers in identifying and documenting Violence Against Women in Elections (VAWE). In addition, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) launched its Votes Without Violence toolkit in 2016, which serves to aid citizen observer groups in collecting data about VAWE in every phase of the electoral cycle.

 

Violence against women in politics is a burgeoning field of research, but more data needs to be collected to fully understand the nature of the problem, particularly from a comparative perspective. This need informed the setting of a recent workshop on Violence Against Women in Elections, held by The Carter Center’s Democracy Program and Emory University’s Institute for Developing Nations, following a preliminary 2017 meeting in Uppsala, Sweden. Some of the world’s leading scholars in this field attended the workshop including Gabrielle Bardall, Mona Lena Krook, Elin Bjarnegard, and Jennifer Piscopo, as well as representatives of organizations working on violence against women in politics and on broader election issues.

 

One of the goals of the workshop was to foster collaboration between different stakeholders to fully understand the scale and scope of violence against women in elections, and to think more deeply about the challenges of data collection and analysis.  For example, much of psychological violence against women occurs in online spaces, which are difficult to study because of the sheer volume of threats and the anonymity and privacy of perpetrators.

 

Additionally, violence against women in politics often occurs in the private sphere, which poses barriers to observation. Participants also discussed the roles that different election stakeholders in both the election and human rights arenas can play in addressing these challenges and providing a fuller understanding of women’s experiences as candidates, elected officials, election officials, voters and other electoral stakeholders. For example, election observation missions can address data collection challenges by training staff to ask context-specific questions related to women’s absence from the electoral process and their experiences of political violence. Additionally, observers and election management bodies can disaggregate data they already collect on physical violence by sex. Election observation missions can also be more intentional in ensuring that gender is streamlined into the recommendations of needs and assessment reports.

 

The Carter Center shared these reflections and suggestions at a subsequent Expert Group Meeting on Violence Against Women in Politics.  This meeting was organized by UN Women and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in collaboration with IPU and NDI, and convened by Dubravka Šimonović, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences. The lessons and recommendations shared during this Expert Group Meeting will support a thematic report to be presented by the Special Rapporteur to the UN General Assembly later this year.  The meeting is one small part of UN Women’s ongoing work to raise awareness and shape policy regarding violence against women in politics.

 

The impact of violence on elections is recognized as the subject of academic study and targeted programming.  Now it is critical that the forms of violence that affect women and adversely impact their political participation, receive equal attention from practitioners, election managers and observation groups. ACE partners are among those charting new paths forward.

Countering Hate Speech in Elections: Strategies for Electoral Management Bodies

The following excerpt is from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) white paper “Countering Hate Speech in Elections: Strategies for Electoral Management Bodies.” The full paper is available here.

IFES’ white paper, “Countering Hate Speech in Elections: Strategies for Electoral Management Bodies,” aims to help election management bodies (EMBs) better understand the range of issues surrounding hate speech during the electoral cycle and the regulatory and non-regulatory options that may be brought to bear. The opening of the briefing paper summarizes applicable international standards, foremost the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); discrimination based on race, gender, and disability are also highlighted.

This summary is supplemented by a discussion of national legislation that may directly or indirectly deal with the issues of hate speech, incitement to hatred, and hate crimes. EMBs are primarily concerned with constitutional provisions, election law, political party law, and legislation governing media and elections. At the same time, EMBs should be aware of all the legal and regulatory instruments that may come into play. By doing so, EMBs can identify other responsible regulatory, oversight, and enforcement bodies with whom to share information and coordinate a response.

EMBs need to be aware that regulatory responses to hate speech are controversial in that they involve restrictions on access to information, free speech, and even political and electoral rights. Fundamental guarantees such as free speech and anti-discrimination can come into conflict with each other and can be difficult to balance. As such, EMBs will need to tread carefully.

Moreover, regulatory responses are fraught with a range of other potential problems, including definitional issues, implementation and enforcement challenges, and politicization and abuse of the law. EMBs will face additional considerations including the centrality of free speech and competing ideas to election campaigns, the need to maintain neutrality and treat candidates equally, the application of appropriate and proportionate penalties, and the need to provide for a safe electoral environment.

This paper also makes the point that incitement of hate directed against women in the electoral process is indeed hate speech, as some national and international definitions tend to leave gender/sex out of the definition. The authors refer to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ (IFES) comprehensive violence against women in elections (VAWIE) framework to address physical and psychological violence and intimidation against women.

The remainder of the briefing paper looks at non-regulatory options available to EMBs and emphasizes the importance of external stakeholder outreach and collaboration as follows:

Engage other stakeholders: Making inroads against hate speech will be contingent upon forming strategic partnerships and alliances, and working collaboratively. To achieve greater scope, scale, and sustainable success, EMB strategies to counter hate speech will need to leverage the existing mandates, capabilities, and resources of government institutions, independent agencies, and civil society.

Model good behavior: The baseline of any EMB strategy to combat hate speech should be to ensure that it does not engage in or tolerate discrimination or hateful speech toward any individual or group by the members of the institution or any of its election staff (permanent and temporary). This modeling behavior will extend to human resources practices, internal and external communications, the substance of regulations, the provision of services, the content and delivery of public information and voter education messages, the handling of complaints and appeals, and advocacy directed at electoral reforms.

Speak out against discrimination and hatred:  As public officials, EMB chairpersons and commissioners have a platform from which to speak out against hate speech. By speaking out, EMB leaders can help to raise awareness of hate speech and its consequences, which, in turn, can help to mobilize a public response. EMB leaders, especially when they have public confidence, are well-positioned to explain the dangers of hate speech and incitement to hatred to the electoral process and democracy.

 

Open space for pluralistic public dialogue: EMBs are in a position to create opportunities and promote activities that expand public dialogue and debate during election campaigns. This may involve providing airtime to a diverse set of stakeholders. EMBs should support public forums, such as televised candidate debates, town hall meetings, and roundtable discussions, that are designed to promote issue-based discussions.

 

Contribute to learning: EMBs face a challenge in designing and delivering better strategies, programs, and messages during elections when information is lacking about the extent to which various electoral stakeholders understand hate speech and how this affects their mindsets and behaviors. Investments in public opinion surveys and focus groups can help EMBs better understand how, in what manner and to what extent speech impacts behavior. Research is also essential to understanding what counter strategies are effective in a given context.

 

Monitor, collect and report data: The collection, monitoring, and reporting of data on the occurrence of hate speech, as with instances of electoral violence, will also be essential to developing and putting into place effective risk-mitigation strategies and security plans, as well as informing investigation and adjudication processes. Government agencies and civil society actors may be involved in this process.

 

Mitigate risk through security planning: EMBs should apply available data on hate speech to mitigate electoral violence and safeguard the security of all electoral stakeholders. EMBs will need to engage various security actors in joint security planning and implementation. When police act as perpetrators or supporters of hate speech in elections, EMBs will need to collaborate with human rights commissions or police oversight commissions to hold them accountable. EMBs should also engage organizations and service providers addressing gender-based violence to effectively respond to the differential forms of violence against women and men in the electoral process.

Adjudicate effectively and responsibly: If EMBs are responsible for adjudicating cases involving hate speech and incitement to hate during election campaigns, EMBs will need to avoid the pitfalls encountered by other judicial and administrative bodies. These include slow adjudication, broad interpretation, inconsistent jurisprudence, political bias, legal overreach and abuse, disproportionate penalties, and non-compliance with international obligations.

Train electoral stakeholders: Typically, EMBs are involved in training a range of electoral stakeholders from their own personnel to political party representatives, candidates and their surrogates, NGOs, and the media. Training programs should integrate themes relating to human rights, voting rights, non-discrimination, gender equality, protected and prohibited speech, what constitutes hate speech and incitement of hatred, and obligations under national law and international instruments.

Raise awareness and educate voters: Public information campaigns and voter education programs provide accurate information that dispel myths and misconceptions. Such efforts can help voters identify and address intolerance in their own lives and recognize and resist hate speech purveyed by officials, candidates and their supporters, and the media. Longer-term civic education is also important to raising civic literacy levels and reducing the public’s vulnerability to hate speech and calls to violence.

The use of hate speech during elections is a dynamic and rapidly evolving issue. Its scope and complexity will require a strategic approach that connects with and mutually reinforces the efforts of a range of stakeholders. Regulatory solutions can be controversial, difficult to reconcile when fundamental rights come into conflict, and their effectiveness is limited. As such, EMBs would be well advised to explore non-regulatory solutions in collaboration with both state and non-state actors. To date, rigorous quantitative research about how distinct populations understand and react to (or act upon) hate speech and about the effectiveness of counter measures in specific country contexts is limited. Comparative practice of EMBs is not readily accessible to the broader community of election practitioners, nor is information about how EMBs have successfully leveraged the experience of other government bodies or civil society.

 

To better capture and disseminate learning about effective strategies and successful multi-stakeholder efforts, IFES invites EMBs and practitioners to share their experiences with [email protected].

Electoral Institutions New and Old: The ‘Youth’ Factor in Democratic Sustainability

The United Nations established the International Day of Democracy as an “opportunity to review the state of Democracy in the world.”i In keeping with this opportunity, scholars and practitioners of electoral systems critically reflect on how electoral institutions contribute to democracy. Electoral institutions lay the foundation for democratic development, and the process of electoral participation links notions of inclusivity, accountability, and sustainable development. In 2016, the International Day of Democracy focused on the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN in 2015. Goal 16 centers its agenda on promoting peace through inclusivity and creating effective and accountable institutions.ii

Electoral institutions serve as an accountability mechanism. Theoretically, through casting a ballot, constituents can sanction “bad” politicians who enact poor policies and fail to promote sustainable development. In a thriving democracy, the process of casting a ballot should empower citizens, regardless of their age and sociodemographic background. However, electoral institutions lose this ability when certain segments of the electorate fail to participate. Elections risk serving as an ineffective link between citizens, political institutions, and sustainable development when they suffer from poor turnout rates, or when a particular demographic is marginalized. 

Every democracy, new and old, faces its own unique obstacles in promoting electoral participation. There is one group, however, that is becoming increasingly absent from the ballot box across the globe: youth. Youth turnout globally declined starting in the 1980s. For example, youth turnout in Great Britain’s parliamentary elections fell from 82% in 1974 to 39% in 2001, and in Japan youth turnout fell from 81% in the late 1960s to 39% in 2011.iii Currently, young people in Israel are two times less likely to turnout than older generations, and this age gap persists in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and the United States, among other places.iv

Youth aversion to the ballot box is a problem in new democracies as well. One of the newest democracies in the world is Tunisia. Famously dubbed the “beacon of hope” for democracy in the Arab World, Tunisia successfully held two rounds of democratic elections after its revolution in 2011. During the “Jasmine” revolution, young Tunisians protested government corruption in a context where socioeconomic advancement for many of the country’s marginalized youth was impossible.

Once change had been achieved, however, youth did not capitalize on this event by voting in subsequent democratic elections. Per a report published by Reuters, about 4.1 million people (over half of the country) registered to vote in the National Constituent Assembly elections of 2011, but only about 17% of Tunisians aged 18-25 registered.v In the 2014 elections, youth under the age of 21 represented only 4.59% of registered voters, and youth under 30 represented barely 20%.^vi

In short, youth are often forerunners of social movements and protests, but are generally less attracted to the routine of casting a ballot. This global trend matters because of its implications for sustainable democracy. Youth abstention in the present could greatly undermine the legitimacy of elections in the future. Scholars argue that voting is habit forming, and young people who do not vote during  their 20s are unlikely to vote in the future.vii This has important ramifications for the future of democracy in a country like Tunisia where over 42% of the population is under the age of 25, and 54% is under the age of 30.viii If this pattern of behavior continues, then the overall turnout rate for elections is likely to decline, possibly resulting in a weak democracy where citizens no longer sanction bad officials when their interests are not being met.  Tunisia is not the only country with a youth bulge; over half the world population is under the age of 25, and 85% of youth live in developing countries.ix

Scholars often explain that young people do not vote because they lack socioeconomic resources like education and income at this point in their life cycle. However, a more nuanced understanding of youth and political participation potentially shows that framing youth as an apathetic citizenry misses the mark.

The Brookings Institute published an article comparing the youth turnout in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections to that in the presidential elections following the Tunisian revolution. The U.S. case was puzzling as youth came out in unprecedented numbers during the 2016 primaries.x However, during the general election, youth participation was again low. The Brookings Institution argues that even though the U.S. and Tunisia differ in the longevity of their democracies, American and Tunisian youth are both abstaining from the ballot box for similar reasons. Young people in both Tunisia and the U.S. are politically interested and engaged, but both of their elections featured older candidates who were out of touch with youth. No candidate in either country made youth-related issues a cornerstone of their platform. This comparison signals that general trends beyond demographic characteristics may explain declining rates of youth turnout across democracies.

Efforts to promote youth electoral engagement include civic education programs and “get out the vote” tactics that specifically target youth. However,  the “problem” with youth is not that they are uninterested and apathetic, but their lack in participation reflects the reality of their political climate. Youth do not feel connected to political parties and feel  excluded from the political process. What is missing from discussions surrounding youth and their lack of engagement is a hard look at the legitimacy of democracy in all democratic countries.

Democracies could face even bigger inclusivity issues in electoral participation if young people continue to be treated as simply “apolitical” or a demographic “problem” instead of extraordinary agents of change. A continuation of current trends in youth voter turnout could render democratic electoral institutions ineffective. By 2030, the UN Sustainable Development Goals could be undermined by a continued decrease in electoral participation across the world. The Sustainable Development Goals agenda states that “people who are vulnerable must be empowered,” and this specifically includes youth.xi To ensure the continued and strengthened legitimacy of political institutions throughout the democratic world, youth must be re-conceptualized as positive agents of change who possess enormous political power. A re-orientation towards this bulging demographic will aid the prospects for global democratic sustainability. 

i United Nations. (n.d.-b). International Day of Democracy: September 15: Background. Retrieved here.

ii United Nations. (n.d.-a). Goal 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.

iii Yerkes, S. (2016, November 6). Youth voting: What a new democracy can teach us about an old one.

iv Millenials across the rich world are failing to vote. (2017). The Economist.

v Parker, E. (2013, June 14). Tunisian Youth: Between Political Exclusion and Civic Engagement. Tunisialive: Living Tunisia.

vi Legislative and Presidential Elections in Tunisia: Final Report. The Carter Center. (n.d.).  May 27, 2015.

vii Gerber, A., Green, D., & Shachar, R. (2003). Voting may be habit-forming: evidence from a randomized field experiment. American Journal of Political Science, 47(3), 540–550.

viii National Institute of Statistics. (2016). Statistiques Tunisie. Retrieved from www.ins.tn/en/themes/population

ix International Foundation for Electoral Systems. (2017). Youth Engagement.

x Yerkes, S. (2016, November 6).

xi The General Assembly. (2015, October 21). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015. United Nations.

excluded from the political process. What is missing from discussions surrounding youth and their lack of engagement is a hard look at the legitimacy of democracy in all democratic countries.

Democracies could face even bigger inclusivity issues in electoral participation if young people continue to be treated as simply “apolitical” or a demographic “problem” instead of extraordinary agents of change. A continuation of current trends in youth voter turnout could render democratic electoral institutions ineffective. By 2030, the UN Sustainable Development Goals could be undermined by a continued decrease in electoral participation across the world. The Sustainable Development Goals agenda states that “people who are vulnerable must be empowered,” and this specifically includes youth.xi To ensure the continued and strengthened legitimacy of political institutions throughout the democratic world, youth must be re-conceptualized as positive agents of change who possess enormous political power. A re-orientation towards this bulging demographic will aid the prospects for global democratic sustainability. 

i United Nations. (n.d.-b). International Day of Democracy: September 15: Background. Retrieved here.

ii United Nations. (n.d.-a). Goal 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.

iii Yerkes, S. (2016, November 6). Youth voting: What a new democracy can teach us about an old one.

iv Millenials across the rich world are failing to vote. (2017). The Economist.

v Parker, E. (2013, June 14). Tunisian Youth: Between Political Exclusion and Civic Engagement. Tunisialive: Living Tunisia.

vi Legislative and Presidential Elections in Tunisia: Final Report. The Carter Center. (n.d.).  May 27, 2015.

vii Gerber, A., Green, D., & Shachar, R. (2003). Voting may be habit-forming: evidence from a randomized field experiment. American Journal of Political Science, 47(3), 540–550.

viii National Institute of Statistics. (2016). Statistiques Tunisie. Retrieved from www.ins.tn/en/themes/population

ix International Foundation for Electoral Systems. (2017). Youth Engagement.

x Yerkes, S. (2016, November 6).

xi The General Assembly. (2015, October 21). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015. United Nations.

Women and Elections: Interview with Ms. Halima Ismail, Chairperson of Somalia’s National Independent Electoral Commission

ACE is excited to share an interview with Halima Ismail, the first woman Chairperson of Somalia’s National Independent Electoral Commission and the only female chairperson in the Arab World. Ms. Ismail discusses how her career working with women and girls in civil society led to her election as the first president – and first female president – of the election commission in Somalia. She also provides insight into the challenges she faces as a woman in this field, as well as her vision for strengthening the role of women in the electoral process and improving election management in Somalia more broadly.

How did you career development start and ultimately lead you to the field that you are in?

My work in this field started with a simple idea; to have an active role in civil society at a time when my country needs it the most. After the civil war in Somalia in 1990, whose biggest victims were women and children, a group of Somali women gathered to form a women's development organization called the International Development Association (IDA) forming the women's agenda for the Republic of Somalia. My role as this organization’s regional coordinator taught me the significance and impact that civil society can have, whether youth or women, but especially women in influencing our society. I then joined [United Nations] operations in Somalia, where I served as a political officer to assist in the reconciliation processes and to build regional and local councils based on women's participation in political leadership and decision-making processes.

How did your involvement in the political and electoral field start?

The political situation in Somalia between 1993 and 1997 caused the UN operations in the Somali Republic to withdraw, and the unsafe conditions forced me to leave Somalia and move to the United States of America. However, I soon felt the need to return and focus my energy on standing with my community and my country. With determination for change, I first started working with the province of Lahud in central Somalia, a region that had been marginalized and financially neglected by international organizations over the years. I raised funds to be allocated to girls' education, social cohesion, and meeting the basic needs of the governorate. [Because of] my work in the development of communities in Lahud, as well as the trust of the citizens that I had gained throughout the processes, I was appointed as chairperson of the committee responsible for the formation of the central regional state and was a member in the high-level discussions on the formation of the new government in the Republic of Somalia. This was the beginning of my experience in political and therefore later electoral processes. 

 How did this work lead to the establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission, and how were you selected as its president?

 While Somalia was undertaking a political transition, the [Constitution was amended in 2012]. The amendment to the law declared that a national committee for electoral matters should be established and nine commissioners appointed to lead it. The Somali parliament then announced a subsequent law to outline how the commissioners were to be chosen. At the time, I had applied to work in the Commission, which my active role in civil society pushed me to do. Of 367 candidates, I was chosen as one of the 9 commissioners. An election was then held amongst the 9 commissioners for a president for the commission, and to my surprise, I was chosen. And so here I was, the first ever Somali woman to be elected as the first president of the election commission in Somalia.

In what context was the commission established? And what is your vision for its work in the future management of elections in Somalia?

At the time of the establishment of the commission, no elections had been held in Somalia since 1969, due to the army's seizure of power for 21 years and the subsequent civil war which lasted a devastating 25 years. This situation in the country made the establishment of a national body that can manage elections in the country an even more important and pressing priority. The establishment of a body that can hold free and fair elections for the first time in nearly 50 years was now a must. My vision for the commission is first and foremost to fulfill its objective to hold such elections successfully. I aim to establish the infrastructure needed for this, and to gain the confidence of Somali citizens in the electoral process.

What were some challenges you faced as a woman in your field?

Being a woman in Arab society is in itself a challenge. It was very difficult for the Somali society, with many customs and traditions, to accept me, a woman, as a head of the election commission. In the past, the norms in Somali society have limited the role of women to being mothers and housewives, which prevents women here from achieving what they set out to do. There were many instances where intimidation was used against me and other women in this field. However, I rejected the traditional "role of women" and the mold set for us by society, and persisted to complete my mission.

 If you were to give advice to girls and women in the Arab world who want to pursue a career in politics or elections, what would it be?

One of the most important factors that contributed to my success in this work, and continues to do so, is the support from my female colleagues. It is extremely important for women out there not to be the obstacle standing in the way of another woman’s success, but rather enable and encourage it. Women must stand side by side, especially in our Arab societies. In addition, women should not be intimidated to challenge existing customs and traditions and not allow them to stop them from reaching their goals.

Finally, what role does the NIEC play in promoting women’s participation in the electoral processes in Somalia?

One of our most important goals at the commission is to strengthen the role of women in the electoral process, both as decision makers and as voters. While it is true that there is a long way ahead, I am optimistic and believe greatly in the capacity of civil society in Somalia. We are currently working on mainstreaming gender in all aspects of our work, in order to create a secure and accessible environment for women to participate in the electoral process. We want to enable women’s voices to be heard, as they are without doubt a vital part of their country's future. Finally, I would like to add that the commission is currently working on establishing a quota of 30% for women in parliament.

What Constitutes ‘Effective’ Remedies to Electoral Grievances?

Where there is a right, there must be a remedy[1]

The right to an effective remedy is well established in international law, and stems from the fundamental rights of political participation and universal suffrage. It is the violation of these rights – intentional or otherwise – that necessitates a remedy to restore them. Election experts from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) were recently invited to contribute four chapters to a publication of the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Standing Committee on Election Law, entitled International Election Remedies, published in November 2016. In the book, IFES Senior Legal Specialist, Katherine Ellena, and Director of the Center for Applied Research and Learning, Chad Vickery, note that election observers frequently identify the failure to provide effective remedies as a key weakness in the electoral process, but it is not clear what constitutes an “effective” remedy. Further research is needed on just how the efficacy of different remedies might be better measured – and ultimately their application better refined.

What is being remedied?

Effective remedies are needed to respond to mistakes and violations by different actors throughout the electoral cycle that may cast doubt on the integrity of the process itself. One approach used by IFES to analyze challenges to the integrity of the election process distinguishes between violations related to systemic manipulation, malpractice, and fraud.2 One key benefit of integrity distinctions is that they can help identify appropriate remedies depending on the type of vulnerability identified – for example the remedy for a procedural mistake will be different than for intentional fraud.

Who is the remedy for?

The effectiveness of a remedy depends in part on the parties that it affects. Whose rights have been violated?  Who can bring a complaint or appeal against the violation? Is there broader public interest in a particular remedy? In  principle, all actors who assert knowledge of an electoral irregularity should have legal standing to bring complaints, regardless of injury.3 Conversely, a principle of broad legal standing can lead to burdensome caseloads and increase the number of frivolous claims, which can undermine the efficiency of electoral dispute resolution (EDR) systems.⁴ Ultimately, the legal framework must find the right balance in terms of who can file a complaint to ensure that the legal system has the capacity to properly investigate and adjudicate legitimate claims in a timely and effective manner. 

What are the core elements of effectiveness?

There are arguably several core elements comprising the concept of “effectiveness,” and these elements concern both the effectiveness of the election dispute resolution system itself and the actual remedies the system produces:

A remedy must be effective in practice as well as in law

Even when the right to a remedy resides in the legal framework, access to an effective remedy may remain elusive. In Petkov v. Bulgaria, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that a remedy must be “effective in practice as well as in law in the sense either of preventing the alleged violation or remedying the impugned state of affairs, or of providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred.”5 While it is important for remedies to be clearly set out in the legal framework, the application of these remedies must also be guaranteed: “winning the case is not the same as winning the remedy.”6

A remedy must be timely

It is crucial to resolve disputes or violations in a timely manner while they can still be redressed in a meaningful way. If the public considers the settlement of disputes too slow, trust in the EMB and judicial institutions (and ultimately in the results of an election) may be lost. In Nigeria, for example, the court system took nearly two years to resolve a dispute regarding the 2007 election, with a rerun finally ordered  

in 2009 after the declared winner had spent two years in office.⁷ The need for the prompt resolution of electoral issues must also be balanced with the requirement for due process. In Namat Alieyev v. Azerbaijan, the ECtHR held that time restraints “may not serve to undermine the effectiveness of the appeal procedure.”8

A remedy should be proportional to the violation

While irregularities often have relatively minor consequences and do not amount to violation of any fundamental human right, election contestants should not be permitted to flout the law with impunity.9 Rather, remedies for these violations should be proportionate to the harm caused. The availability of a range of remedies is necessary to ensure proportionality of the sanctioning system. Fines are particularly conducive to proportionality, since they can easily be varied from a small amount that is more symbolic in nature to a more substantial amount that can curb the activities of political actors.10 To ensure proportionality, one must consider the regularity of the violation, the impact of the violation on the process, what will correct the issue, and what deterrence is required to ensure others do not repeat the illegal act or careless mistake.

A remedy must be enforceable

A lack of proper enforcement can undermine the right to an effective remedy and must be addressed if the EDR process – and the electoral process as a whole – is to be respected by the electorate and if electoral and judicial institutions are to be seen as legitimate. In Petkov v. Bulgaria the ECtHR stressed that the “rule of law…entails a duty on the part of the State and public authorities to comply with judicial orders or decisions against them.”¹¹ The enforcement of remedies and sanctions is important not only to give substance to rights, but also to deter future instances of malpractice and fraud.

A remedy should be effective in deterrence

An effective remedy implies the availability of sanctions and penalties, such as decertifying a candidate, disqualifying a political party, suspending the right to campaign, invalidating a ballot, or ordering a recount.¹² To effectively deter, the availability and application of sanctions must be known. Without clear procedures and publication of resolutions or remedies, the deterrence value decreases. Beyond these clarity and transparency measures, penalties or sanctions must be sufficiently strict to deter each different kind of violation, and sanctions will be more effective in deterrence if all parties engaged in a violation are penalized.13

A remedy should reinforce the perception of fairness and the credibility of the process

 

Finally, effective remedies are essential for undergirding the credibility of the electoral process. Research focused on the effectiveness of institutions suggests that people largely react to the fairness by which authorities make de­cisions and exercise authority, and that these reactions “shape both their willingness to accept decisions and their everyday rule-following behavior.”14 Citizens must believe the will of the voter is ultimately reflected in the election result, and that losing candidates have a right to redress via an effective dispute resolution process that considers all legitimate complaints.

 

 

 

For further information on this publication or to purchase a hardcopy, please contact Elizabeth Yang at [email protected] or Katherine Ellena at [email protected].

 

 

 

[1] William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 23 (1768).

 

2 Chad Vickery & Erica Shein, Assessing Electoral Fraud in New Democracies: Refining the Vocabulary, in IFES White Paper 9 (2012).

 

3 Guidelines for Understanding, Adjudicating, and Resolving Disputes in Elections [GUARDE] (Chad Vickery ed., 2011), 21.

 

⁴ A case can be made that exceptions to ordinary rules on standing are justified with regard to certain types of grievances.  See Carter Center, Electoral Resolution Experts’ Meeting 2, 10 (2009).

 

5 Petkov v. Bulgaria, Nos. 77568/01, 178/02, & 505/02, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74 (2009).

 

6 Miyagawa v. Peru, Case 11.28, Rep. No. 119/99, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. doc. 3 rev. ¶ 1262 (Oct. 6, 1999).

 

⁷ This provision of the electoral law recalls section 294(1) of the Nigerian Constitution, that “every court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses.” Constitution of Nigeria (1999), § 294(1).

 

8 Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 18705/06, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 72 (2010) at ¶ 90.

 

9 Cameron Quinn and David Ennis, International Election Remedies, Chapter 6

 

10 Magnus Ohman and Megan Ritchie, International Election Remedies, Chapter 10

 

¹¹ Petkov v. Bulgaria, Nos. 77568/01, 178/02, & 505/02, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74 (2009) at ¶ 62. (“The applicants complained of the electoral authorities’ refusal to comply with the final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court declaring their striking off the lists of candidates null and void, and of their resulting inability to stand in the parliamentary elections on 17 June 2001.”).

 

¹² Electoral Law art. 5 of 2014 (Afg.) at art 54 § 1; Electoral Reform Law §§ 22-25 of 2004 (Liber.) (penalizing fraudulent registration and bribery); The New Elections Law, § 10.25, 10.26 of 1986 (Liber.).

 

13 Magnus Ohman and Megan Ritchie, International Election Remedies, Chapter 10

 

14 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, Princeton University Press (2006)

Using Biometric Voter Registration for the 2015 Elections in Nigeria – An Interview with Professor Attahiru Jega

1.      What was the context of the 2015 elections in Nigeria?

The period leading to the March 2015 national elections in Nigeria was marked by very high expectations. Specifically, there was the expectation that the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) would improve on previous elections in Nigeria. People wanted a more efficient and effective INEC capable of enhancing the integrity of Nigerian elections. Given some of the experiences in previous elections in Nigeria, people were anxious about INEC’s ability to address fraud, multiple voting, and to develop a more valid voter register. On its own part, INEC considered all these concerns and became determined to address them. It made a commitment to administer an election with much improved integrity and started preparations for the elections very early. We started preparing immediately after the April 2011 national elections and all preparations were geared toward fulfilling the commitment to conduct remarkably improved elections in Nigeria. This was the background to 2015 elections. 

2.      Why did you want to introduce biometric voter registration?

The use of biometric voter registration (BVR) in the 2015 elections was not new to elections in Nigeria. INEC used BVR before the 2011 elections. The reason for introducing it at the time was that INEC realized that the quality of an election was closely related to the integrity or validity of the voter register.  

INEC was also convinced that using biometric technology not only for registration process, but also for maintaining a database of registered voters would help improve the overall quality of elections in Nigeria. 

At the time when BVR was done in January/February 2011, many people were concerned that it may not be possible to utilize the system for the 2011 elections due to the short time period. The elections were to be held in April of 2011. INEC was able to conduct the BVR within three weeks. This entailed equipping each of the 120,000 polling units in Nigeria with a data capture device. Between February and March of 2011, INEC was able to remove close to one million multiple registrants from the voter register. 

For the 2015 elections, we used Advance Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) for de-duplication and removal of multiple registrants in the national database. INEC ensured that this technology was widely used to match fingerprints, and to eliminate multiple registrants. This helped us to improve on the national database, which INEC had established since 2011. Since the AFIS we used was about 95% accurate, we also made provisions for it to be complemented by a manual, physical verification system. Through this manual verification process, INEC detected and removed more multiple registrants from the register. At the time of the elections, INEC was confident that it had the cleanest register ever used in elections in Nigeria.  Despite this, we were also conscious of the possibility of multiple voting and knew we needed to prevent it. This was why INEC issued every registered voter with the Permanent Voters Card (PVC), which contained his/her demographic and biometric information on a chip. We then used the Smart Card Readers (SCRs) during the 2015 elections to identify, verify and authenticate voters before they were allowed to vote. The combination of the PVC and the card reader helped to prevent multiple voting. 

3.      What factors did you consider when selecting a system?

A significant consideration was whether the technological system chosen could address unique challenges associated with the Nigerian electoral system. After assessing the challenges that we had to address, INEC developed its own requirements and specifications for a technological system. The requirements demanded a system that is robust, could ensure efficiency and promote transparency in the electoral process. 

4.      What impact does trust in the independence of the EMB have on acceptance of the new technology?

Trust is very important. Indeed, an electoral commission has a responsibility to be honest and earn the trust of citizens. In Nigeria, INEC held series of meetings with a broad range of stakeholders including political parties and civil society groups. These meetings availed us the opportunity to liaise with other stakeholders and this proved to be key in the efforts of INEC to build trust and confidence. This is very important.

5.      How did you get buy-in from political parties, CSOs, etc.?  When and how did the consultations take place?

INEC started meeting stakeholders very early as part of its preparation for the 2015 elections. Between 2011 and 2015 when the elections took place, we had stakeholder meetings, especially with representatives of registered political parties, quarterly. That is, every three months. These meetings served as an avenue for INEC to share its ideas and plans for the forthcoming elections. It was during some of these meetings that  INEC presented the new technologies it used for the elections to stakeholders and got their buy-in. We also demonstrated to them how the technology works. This included explanations about procedure and guidelines for use of the card readers on election-day. We also did public demonstrations and testing and sensitization and public enlightenment. 

As the elections drew closer, INEC-stakeholder meetings were more regular. We held meetings with political parties – the party chairs and secretaries – every month before the elections. This helped to build trust and to foster consensus on key issues relating to the elections. There were instances, however, when political parties appeared subsequently to kick against some decisions that were agreed on at these meetings. The card reader was a case in point. As the elections drew closer, one of the political parties kicked against using the card reader even though it had earlier given support to its use. But INEC, knowing that the party’s change of mind was purely political – and as the legally mandated body to make such decisions – proceeded with the use of the card reader technology for the elections. 

Since there were extensive consultations, many stakeholders, especially civil society groups who were involved in the process, understood the situation and knew exactly what INEC was doing. In most cases, it was these civil society groups that were advocating for INEC and defending the arrangements and plans for the elections. In addition, inclusiveness maximizes the inputs from others and this serves to reduce the chances for mistakes. The mutual trust that is fostered through an inclusive process also helps to ensure that even when mistakes occurred, people were more willing and able to show support and understanding. 

 

This interview has been condensed. The full version is available on ACE here.

Ukraine’s elections through a gender lens

Ukraine’s local elections in October 2015 were yet another critical democratic milestone for the country following the 2013 pro-democracy uprising that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych replacing him with a pro-western coalition of parties.

 

 

 

These elections were a critical test of the new government in their pledge to implement robust democratization reforms, and through them, take necessary steps to meet outstanding global development goals, such as promoting gender equality and empowering women in political and public life. When it comes to gender equality the Ukraine still has a long way to go even if the country has made some efforts in recent years.

 

 

 

The newly adopted local election law includes legal requirements to nominate no less than 30 per cent of women as candidates in local elections but has no effective sanctions to ensure compliance.

 

 

 

Women’s under-representation in politics has been one of Ukraine’s long standing democratic deficits, with only 12 per cent of women elected in the 2014 parliamentary elections. This low number is unfortunately also the highest number of women ever elected to the country’s legislature. At the sub-national level, women have traditionally fared marginally better averaging 18 per cent among different levels of elected councils in the last elections.

Understanding particular challenges and biases that women face, particularly during the nomination process and in campaigning, is vital to develop effective strategies for women’s political empowerment and electoral success. In the run up to the 2015 elections, International IDEA therefore partnered with the Women’s Consortium of Ukraine (WCU), to conduct a gender-based analysis of the local elections, including candidate nomination and campaigning processes.

 

The initiative built on similar initiatives to assess elections through a gender lens and support national reform processes by providing local evidence-based and international comparative insights.

 

The IDEA-WCU gender-based analysis focused on identifying the extent to which parties complied with electoral gender quotas, how women and men contesting electoral seats differed in their campaigning capabilities and strategies, how parties supported women and men candidates, and how voters engaged with candidates of different sex in various campaign events.

 

On a positive note

 

Compared to previous local elections, the October 2015 campaign showed increased levels of voter outreach by women candidates. While most parties increased the number of women candidates compared to past elections, smaller parties showed higher compliance rates with the 30 per cent minimum quota. The final outcome demonstrated a significant contrast between the number of women elected, 18 per cent on average, and the number of women nominated as candidates, 32 per cent on average, likely due to the fact that women were rarely nominated to head the parties’ lists.

 

Monitors noted that male candidates, particularly those running for seats in oblast councils, were better financed with more expensive campaign materials. Female candidates were instead more likely to disseminate leaflets and newspapers with general information about their party. Yet, women were more innovative in their outreach using social networks, placing their articles in local periodicals, speaking on the radio, and organizing social events as part of their campaigns. This helped them establish direct links with voters. Women were also noted to be frequent guests on TV, likely due to the introduction of gender quotas, which resulted in increased public interest in women candidates and policy proposals and messages that they carried.

 

While outdoor campaign advertising was overall dominated by men women were more publicly visible than ever before.

 

Party support varied

 

In observing party support and endorsement of different candidates, monitors noted that male candidates were usually accompanied by five to seven party representatives compared to women who were accompanied by one or two.

 

Deeply entrenched stereotypes

 

As a sign of the deeply entrenched gender stereotypes among voters, women candidates were often asked  

questions such as: “Why would you want to go into politics, young lady?”, ‘Where did you get money to participate?’, ‘Where do you work? And what can you possibly know at this young age?’

 

Contrary to popular belief that women candidates typically deal with education, healthcare and social protection, monitors reported that women participating in the local elections focused on the same issues as their male counterparts. Economic development, jobs, wages, quality of life, urban infrastructure, and the like. Some women candidates drew voters’ attention to illegal construction, environmental issues such as a polluted river running across the city or the problems surrounding alcohol sales at night.

 

Agenda for future reforms

 

Results of the IDEA-WCU gender analysis point to several key gender equality issues that future electoral reforms will have to address. Recommendations include enhancing electoral quota rules to increase opportunities for women to be nominated as leading candidates, adopting affirmative action measures, and enhancing public funding criteria to ensure that parties receiving public funding will allocate these funds equitably to women and men candidates.

 

These recommendations are likely to feature as main advocacy goals by women’s organizations and gender equality advocates during the 2016-2017 period when the new electoral system for parliamentary elections will have to be discussed and adopted – an important commitment that Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan government has made to its people. More details on the process and findings are available in Ukrainian here.  

Cybersecurity in Elections: a HEAT Process for EMBs to protect themselves against cyber threats

The following is an excerpt from an IFES white paper. The full paper is available in the ACE “Cybersecurity in Elections” Encyclopaedia Topic and on IFES.org.

In June 2017, 100 election experts from across the United States penned an open letter to Congress noting that many jurisdictions were “inadequately prepared to deal with rising cybersecurity risks.”¹ This concern is echoed globally, as increasing reliance on complex technology-based systems in electoral processes has left troves of sensitive information potentially vulnerable to adversaries.² Experiences in several recent elections around the world highlight threats to cybersecurity, as well as how the implementation of certain electronic data management technologies can impact post-election disputes.³ However, many election management bodies (EMBs) lack the capacity, resources, or appropriate framework to test whether their data management systems are secure from these vulnerabilities, and to put measures in place well in advance of elections to protect data integrity.

Cybersecurity⁴ should be considered and implemented at the inception phase of building or upgrading any technology-based election system, as a key component of digitizing specific elements of election administration. At the same time, international good practices around cybersecurity and open data require EMBs to act transparently and to ensure election results are verifiable and can ultimately be accepted by the electorate. Therefore, it is important to protect both cybersecurity and transparency in the electoral context – a challenge that is unique to EMBs.⁵

Beyond striking this balance, election administrators must focus on cybersecurity as an ongoing and ever-changing concern. As soon as cybersecurity good practices are developed, they may become outdated, because technology moves forward very quickly, as does the technical expertise of those who seek to find and exploit its vulnerabilities. While it is important to learn from experience, rapid technological innovation means that EMBs should endeavor to secure the next election, not focus on vulnerabilities in the last election. This means identifying potential future vulnerabilities, not only addressing issues that have been identified or exposed in the past.   

It also means looking at cybersecurity holistically, as one type of vulnerability may be addressed in isolation while another is exploited instead. Or, different types of cybersecurity exposure may compound to produce a unique vulnerability that can result in significant problems, whether through malpractice (negligence or mistake) or fraud (deliberate exploitation).⁶ While existing guidelines on cybersecurity, discussed in the literature review, provide sound guidance on mitigating technological exposure in elections (for example, by ensuring sound cyber hygiene practices and implementing two-factor authentication), they may not consider other types of exposure, such as restrictive laws, weak procedures or untrained staff, that can undercut cybersecurity frameworks and lead to breakdowns in the electoral process or in public trust of electoral outcomes.

Given all these considerations, how can EMBs secure systems from technical vulnerabilities that leave them exposed and may lead to post-election challenges, while at the same time protecting principles of  open data and transparency?

In this paper, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) outlines strategies for EMBs to strengthen their technology and procedures to resist vulnerabilities, by following what we have termed a Holistic Exposure and Adaptation Testing (HEAT) process. While no electoral process or technology is infallible, the HEAT process aims to secure automated or digitalized electoral processes – as far as possible – against unanticipated threats, illicit incursions, system failures, or unfounded legal challenges.  

As the name suggests, the HEAT process focuses on the types of exposure an EMB may face when implementing different types of technology systems (technology, human, political, legal and procedural). Because the HEAT process seeks to provide a holistic approach to cybersecurity in elections, we have drawn lessons from international principles, election cybersecurity case studies, risk-mitigation methodologies and technology-related election court judgments. The proposed process is also guided by international best practices on data management and cybersecurity, as well as transparency, open data and privacy.  

A thorough HEAT process, as described in this paper, has significant time and cost implications. However, without such a process in place, an EMB may experience an electoral crisis that far exceeds the time and resources invested in such a risk-mitigation process. It is important to note that a HEAT process is only suitable for the earlier part of the electoral cycle when there is significant time for the EMB to implement measures to mitigate identified deficiencies. While the HEAT process itself may be achievable in a short time period, it is often the case that cyber vulnerabilities cannot be addressed by “quick fixes,” but require significant lead time to address properly. For example, if certain legal or procedural vulnerabilities are revealed, several months or more may be required to draft or pass amendments, or to adjust procedures and then train and publicize new procedures effectively. If a HEAT process is conducted and reveals vulnerabilities too close to an election to be able to rectify, this could then have an adverse effect on stakeholder confidence in the electoral process.⁷ This is particularly true in environments with pre-existing low trust.   

This paper outlines the existing literature on cybersecurity and data protection in elections, including international standards, good practice guidelines, cybersecurity frameworks, election observer guidelines, and jurisprudence. This literature is then applied to discuss the various types of exposure EMBs may face when implementing technology and seeking to protect data and data processing in elections. This application is important, as while much of the standard-setting is taking place in North America and Europe, in IFES’ experience many developing democracies outside of these regions are also considering and using election technologies. Finally, the paper introduces the IFES HEAT process as a holistic tool for identifying and mitigating different types of cybersecurity exposure in elections.

To read the new ACE Encyclopaedia Topic on Cybersecurity, please click here. 

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1. “Election Integrity Open Letter to Congress,” National Election Defense Coalition.

2. Two 11-year-olds altered election results in hacker convention’s replica of U.S. voting system, Reuters, 2018.

3. For example, electronic transmission of results at the polling station level or maintenance of national biometric voter registration databases, but also penetration of less high-profile databases such as personnel records for ad hoc staff, that could undermine the public’s confidence in the EMB and its capacity to secure more sensitive databases.

4. In this paper, IFES uses the terms “cybersecurity,” “data security” and “data protection” inter-changeably, in line with ISO standards and academic literature. See, e.g., Basie Von Solms, Rossouw von Solms, Cyber security and information security – what goes where?, which offers that: "Cyber Security [is] part of Information Security, which specifically focuses on protecting the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of digital information assets against any threats, which may arise from such assets being compromised via (using) the Internet.”

5. For example, other agencies such as defense, or institutions such as banks or insurance agencies, can focus primarily on cybersecurity without the same transparency concerns.

6. IFES has defined these terms further in Assessing Electoral Fraud in New Democracies: Refining the Vocabulary.

7. The Venice Commission’s Good Practice in Electoral Matters includes a provision that the fundamental elements of the election legislation should not be fundamentally amended one year prior to a forthcoming elections