The characteristic feature of the Latin American model of electoral
tribunals is the establishment of specialized electoral tribunals (courts,
juries, boards or councils) in charge of resolving disputes on electoral
results. The nature of these tribunals can be either judicial or executive and
they can function as higher or lower courts. This can be considered as a
major Latin American contribution to political science and electoral law
as an important condition of recent democratic processes in this region, and it
validates as well the rule of law and dispute resolution through legal bodies.
Main advantages to the specialized tribunal process include more timely resolution and adjudicators with
strong experience and familiarity with the issues and law.[i]
The jurisdiction to resolve electoral disputes granted to these specialized
Latin American electoral tribunals (courts, juries, boards or councils), which
in some cases have autonomy with similar powers to the judiciary, has fulfilled
the need of guarding the judicial nature of qualifying the election. In this
way, resolutions are made in accordance with constitutional and legal
principles and without exposing either the judiciary or the Supreme Court to
frequent criticism at their response to political or party interests. This
competence has been extracted from political assemblies whose members were not
impartial, allowing their political interest to influence their resolutions.
During the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the following one,
electoral systems for dispute resolution in Latin America were politicized. In
contrast, in the last seventy years there is a gradual but definite trend in
the region towards specialized electoral tribunals (courts, juries, boards or councils) in charge of resolving
electoral disputes, and in some cases even in charge of organizing the
election. These electoral authorities have an executive or judicial nature
(some of them are independent and others are part of the judiciary or executive
power). Two early examples of this model are the Electoral Court of Uruguay,
which was first introduced in the law in 1924, and the Qualifying Tribunal of
Elections in Chile included in the Constitution since 1925.
The gradual establishment of these specialized electoral tribunals (courts,
juries, boards or councils) in the region comes after the politicized system of
conflict resolution. They were first introduced –generally and taking into
account that each country has its own history–by means of an administrative
electoral organ prescribed by law and with a temporal character. This structure
is made up by representatives of the political parties and the executive power.
The next step resulted in awarding these structures a constitutional level and
granting them protection to guarantee their autonomy and impartiality
(political parties are less present and in contrast citizens participate more
in their functioning; qualified majorities are also required in the structure that
finally designates its members). Most of the time, such a transformation also
implies that these models of electoral authority become permanent, specialized
and aimed at resolving conflicts (yet keeping administrative powers or establishing
parallel electoral authorities, some of them in the judiciary).
[i] Avery Davis-Roberts, Senior
Program Associate in the Carter Center’s Democracy Program, “International Obligations
for Electoral Dispute Resolution.”
Electoral Dispute Resolution Discussion Paper presented at the Electoral
Dispute Resolution Experts Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, February 24-25, 2009. 13.
