Media and Elections

Media and Elections Index

Media and Elections Quiz

The mass media are essential to the conduct of democratic elections. A free and fair election is not only about casting a vote in proper conditions, but also about having adequate information about parties, policies, candidates and the election process itself so that voters can make an informed choice. A democratic election with no media freedom would be a contradiction in terms.

But the paradox is that, in order to ensure that freedom, a degree of regulation is required. Government media, funded out of public money, should be required to give fair coverage and equitable access to opposition parties, for example. Media often may not be allowed to run reports - for example on exit polls or early results - before every vote has been cast.

The mass media – often referred to as just “the media” – are usually understood to refer to the printed press and to radio and television broadcasters. In recent years, the definition has perhaps become broader, encompassing the Internet in its various forms and other new forms of electronic distribution of news and entertainment, such as short message services to mobile telephones.

The prime concern is the right of voters to full and accurate information. But this is not the only right involved. Parties and candidates are entitled to use the media to get their messages across to the electorate. The media themselves have a right to report freely and to scrutinize the whole election process. This scrutiny is itself an important additional safeguard against interference or corruption in the management of the election. Finally, the electoral management body (EMB) has a crucial need to communicate information to the electorate – and to a variety of other groups, including the political parties and the media themselves.

The relationship of the EMB to the media is hence a fairly complex one. Potentially, electoral managers may stand in three distinct relations to the media:

• As regulator: the EMB may sometimes be responsible for developing or implementing regulations governing media behaviour during elections (especially relating to direct access to the media by parties and candidates). It may also be responsible for dealing with complaints against the media.
• As communicator: the EMB will also, invariably, want to use the media as a vehicle for communicating its messages to the electorate.
• As news story: the EMB will be a focus of media interest throughout the election process. The media will be interested in the information that the EMB can provide, as well as trying to scrutinize the EMB’s performance and the efficiency and integrity of the elections.

Overview of Media and Elections

It is a truism that the media play an indispensable role in the proper functioning of a democracy. Discussion of the media's functions usually focuses on their "watchdog" role: by unfettered scrutiny and discussion of the successes and failures of governments, the media can inform the public of how effectively its representatives have performed and help to hold them to account. Yet the media can also play a more specific part in enabling full public participation in elections, not only by reporting on the performance of government, but also in a number of other ways:

• by educating the voters on how to exercise their democratic rights.
• by reporting on the development of the election campaign.
• by providing a platform for the political parties to communicate their message to the electorate.
• by allowing the parties to debate with each other.
• by reporting results and monitoring vote counting.
• by scrutinizing the electoral process itself in order to evaluate its fairness, efficiency, and probity.

The media are not the sole source of information for voters, but in a world dominated by mass communications, it is increasingly the media that determine the political agenda, even in less technologically developed corners of the globe. Thus, election observation teams, for example, now routinely comment upon media access and coverage of elections as a criterion for judging whether elections are fair. In parallel, monitoring the media during election periods has become an increasingly common practice, using a combination of statistical analysis and the techniques of media studies and discourse analysis to measure whether coverage has been fair.

There are, broadly speaking, three areas of media election coverage. Each operates according to different principles and requires a different role of the electoral supervisory body.

Editorial Coverage

This broadly refers to all aspects of news, features, current affairs, and opinion coverage that are under the editorial control of the media themselves. Aside from some limited areas - such as the reporting of results, or a restriction on reporting opinion polls shortly before voting - the role of the supervisory body is to do no more than facilitate the free operation of the media.

Direct Access Coverage

There is a bewildering variety of possible systems for regulating political advertising or free direct access coverage. This refers to that portion of election coverage that is under the editorial control of the parties or candidates themselves. There may be obligations on some sections of the media to carry such material, and there will almost certainly be conditions that they must abide by if they do.

Candidate debates and panel interviews, which are increasingly common in election broadcast coverage, fall somewhere between these first two categories and may sometimes be subject to a degree of regulation that would not apply to ordinary editorial material.

Voter Education

This topic area does not deal in detail with voter education, which is covered in detail elsewhere. However, especially in a new democracy, the mass media may be a vital tool not only for keeping voters informed about the issues and candidates, but also for imparting basic information about how to vote and what the vote is for. Voter education, like direct access, will be subject to strict standards that ensure its impartiality.

This topic area is primarily concerned with the responsibility of election administrators and legislators to develop a regulatory framework for media activities during election periods and to facilitate media freedom. However, much of it may also be of value to others, such as media practitioners themselves and political parties.

It begins by looking at overarching principles: the role of the media in a democracy and the development of international and comparative jurisprudence on media and elections. It also discusses how the different levels of economic development and pluralism of the media and differing professional standards will affect the nature and quality of media coverage of elections.

The central part of this topic area is a discussion of the different models for a regulatory framework for the media in elections, ranging from an independent electoral commission to a specialized media regulator, such as a broadcasting commission or a voluntary media council or press complaints body. It looks at the different obligations of the print media and broadcasters, as well as those of media that are privately owned and those that are funded out of public money.

The topic area goes on to look at the ways in which electoral management bodies can develop their own communications strategies to enable them to get their messages across, through the media among other channels. It looks at how to define messages and audiences and then to identify suitable media techniques to convey these messages. It examines the tasks of the EMB at different stages of the election process, from the pre-campaign period of voter education, through the campaign itself, to voting day, the count, and the announcement of results.

The topic area explores the basic techniques and uses of media monitoring during an election campaign. It outlines quantitative and qualitative methodologies and looks at how media monitoring has been used by EMBs, non-governmental organizations, and international observer missions.

The final section of the topic area looks at the issue of campaign reporting from the perspective of the media themselves. It considers issues of planning and training for election coverage and then examines various ethical and practical questions arising in reporting the election process.

Guiding Principles of Media and Elections

The single guiding principle underlying the role of the media in elections is that without media freedom and pluralism, democracy is not possible. This has been underlined in the decisions of numerous international tribunals. It has also been stated very clearly in the recent past by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, who went on to elaborate a series of steps that governments should take to guarantee freedom of media during elections.

There are a number of different dimensions to media freedom that are of relevance in elections:

• Freedom from censorship.
• Freedom from arbitrary attack or interference.
• Free access to necessary information.
• A pluralism of voices in the media.

The last of these is especially important. It is often interpreted to mean that the media should be owned by a variety of different interests, resulting in a "market-place of ideas". This is important, but it is only one aspect. For countries emerging from authoritarian rule, usually characterized by tight state control over the media, ensuring pluralism within the publicly funded media may be equally important. This is because often it is only a government-controlled national broadcaster that has the capacity to reach all sections of the electorate.

In order to ensure that the publicly funded media are not, in practice, government-controlled, a clear regulatory intervention may be required. This is the central paradox of the management of media in elections - the frequent need to establish a fairly complex regulatory system in order to enable the media to operate freely and without interference.

At stake are three interlocking sets of rights:

• the right of the voters to make a fully informed choice.
• the right of the candidates to put their policies across.
• the right of the media to report and express their views on matters of public interest.

Of course, these rights, which are essentially all aspects of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, apply at all times, and not only when there is an election pending. But it is the very formality of the election process - the fact that it is conducted according to procedures that are clearly set out in law - that has stimulated the interest of those who are concerned with issues of media freedom. How far media freedom and pluralism are respected during an election period can be a fairly sensitive index of respect for freedom of expression in general - itself an essential precondition for a functioning democracy. Conversely, an election can be an ideal opportunity to educate both the authorities in their obligation to respect and nurture media freedom and the media in their responsibility to support the democratic process.

Looking at relations with the media from the perspective of the electoral management body, two other important principles come into play: transparency and confidentiality.

• Transparency means that the operations of the EMB are open to public scrutiny and hence accountability.
• Confidentiality means that the security of the EMB’s operations are safeguarded against those who have no right to unauthorized information and who may undermine the integrity of the election process.

Clearly these principles may come into conflict in practice. Complete transparency and confidentiality are clearly incompatible. However, establishing the precedence of these principles in any given case may be less difficult than it might at first appear.It will almost invariably be true that the plans and activities of the EMB should be open to public scrutiny. It will, without exception, be true that the vote itself should be secret. The borderline cases in between are likely to be few.

Context of Media and Elections

For as long as there have been mass media, they have reported political events, but across most of the globe the central role of the media in elections is a very recent development.

In many countries, free elections are themselves a new phenomenon. For large parts of Asia and Africa that were once under colonial rule, free and sovereign elections are a development of the second half of the twentieth century, while for those countries in the former Communist bloc they are even more recent than that. Even the countries of Western Europe and Latin America only fully democratized in the years shortly before or after the Second World War with the extension of the franchise to women. The United States only finally ended limitations on the franchise in the 1960s. Latin America's democratic tradition was blighted by a history of military dictatorship, particularly from the 1960s to the 1980s, a development that was echoed in many countries of Africa and Asia. Some countries, particularly in Europe and North America, had a vigorous free press even when the franchise was limited. Others developed independent media only as they were struggling to install a system of elected government.

Europe, North America, and Latin America evolved a theory of the media as a "Fourth Estate", offering a check on the activities of governments. This approach has increasingly been incorporated into international law, although the practice has fallen short of the ideal. Generally, an independent press evolved in parallel with the more general development of political freedoms.

Until relatively recently, the printed press was the sole mass medium. It had a limited reach, simply because functional literacy only extended to a minority. Thus the development of broadcasting was potentially revolutionary in communicating political ideas to a mass audience. Yet in many instances, the very potential of radio and television was frightening to those responsible for administering broadcasting. The British Broadcasting Corporation operated a "14-day rule" that prohibited coverage of any issue within two weeks of it being debated in Parliament. It was not until 1951 that the first party election broadcasts were screened. The compulsory blackouts of coverage in the days before an election that continue in countries like France are a relic of that period - when the media seemed to go out of their way not to influence the outcome of an election.

Times have changed. Received wisdom is that contemporary elections are dominated by television, a development that can be traced back to around 1960 - the date of the historic first television debate between United States presidential candidates. But this view is only partly accurate. The majority of the world's population do not watch television - they do not have electricity or they could not afford the set. Nor is this only a phenomenon of dictatorships - the world's largest democracy, after all, is India. For such countries, radio remains the most important medium.

But even in countries where television dominates political debate, this has been a fairly recent phenomenon. In many Western European countries, commercial broadcasting was only legalized in the 1980s, and television coverage of elections remains highly regulated as a legacy of the long years of state control of broadcasting.

For all the talk of "spin doctors" and "globalization", much of what passes through the media at election times would be readily recognizable to a previous generation of voters, accustomed to a style of political campaigning through public meetings and hustings. The American tradition of paid television advertising, drawing upon the most sophisticated techniques of Madison Avenue, is an important one, but not dominant worldwide. The more regulated tradition of European broadcasting still enjoys wide adherence, at election time more than at any other. This tends to favour lengthier policy messages and debate over quick sound bites.

The "medium is the message", according to a celebrated media theorist. But there is no doubt that during elections a variety of different types of message are communicated through the same medium. The most celebrated debates in American campaign history were between Kennedy and Nixon in 1960 and between Lincoln and Douglas a century earlier. The former was the harbinger of the age of television elections. But the striking thing is that the similarities between the two exchanges were greater than their differences.

What remains to be seen is the long-term impact of the most recent developments in media technology. The Internet has already transformed the way in which elections are reported. It has effectively ended, for example, the practice of “news blackouts” or “reflection periods”, since it operates largely beyond the reach of regulators. But if the majority of the world’s population still does not have television sets, still fewer have personal computers. The precise impact on election coverage remains to be seen.

Potentially even more significant is the future role of mobile telephony as a news medium. In many parts of the world, access to telephones has skipped a technological generation. Many relatively poor people who have no land line own a mobile telephone. Text messages have already been used in political campaigning and for distributing news. The next stage, which is already developing fast, is the use of “Podcasting”, broadcasting audio and video files.

Probably no aspect of the administration of elections is more determined by the political and social context than the functioning of the media. This is principally to be seen in two overlapping dimensions:

• The level of social and economic development of the country, with its consequences for the structure of media audience and ownership - and where people get their political information from.
• The extent to which the media have experience in reporting democratic elections - and how far media freedom has prevailed in the past.

It has become commonplace to talk about the globalization of information. Equally many bemoan the "Americanization" of election campaigning - meaning the use of slick televisual images with little substantive content. Both these viewpoints, although apparently coming from different political standpoints, make the same assumption: that a certain type of media and certain type of campaign language prevail throughout the world. Yet this is far from the case. Very large numbers of voters are excluded from access to television through poverty. Many others are excluded from newspaper readership through a combination of poverty and illiteracy. (Although interestingly newspaper readership is higher than television viewing in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa.) So although the information order is no doubt more globalized than in the past - more than when Marshall McLuhan coined the term "global village" in the 1960s - national particularities are still very important. And at no time are they more important than in elections, which are quintessentially national events.

Countries with recent histories of authoritarian rule will often have in common that the publicly-funded media operate under tight government control. Elsewhere, in most of Western Europe for example, there is a strong history of public broadcasting being independent of government and enhancing media pluralism. But in countries with a weak culture of political pluralism, state journalists will not usually be bold or independent. This may require a greater degree of intervention from the regulatory body to ensure that they discharge their public service functions properly.

Another similar circumstance in which the regulatory authority may be called upon to intervene more regularly is when there is a history of "hate speech" and incitement to violence by partisan media representing different political or ethnic groups.

But in these circumstances, the role of the regulatory authority is to guarantee a plurality of voices in the media, not to silence anyone.

Some of the more practical questions may be more difficult to address in a new democracy than in a well-established one. For example, how do you decide how much free broadcasting time to give each party when there was no previous democratic election as a means of gauging their popular support? But even this difficulty - or difference - should not be overstated. Many advanced democracies - the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, for example - take little or no notice of previous election results when they allocate broadcasting time. They do it on the basis of equality between the parties. So for administrators from new democracies planning a regulatory system, there is a wealth of existing examples to choose from.

Legal Principles

The role of media in elections is governed by a growing body of law, both at the national and international level. It is important to understand that this jurisprudence is directed overwhelmingly at regulating the behaviour of governments in relation to the media, rather than in regulating the media themselves.

The fundamental principles set out in international law embrace two aspects:

• the right to freedom of expression and freedom of information
• the right to participate in the government of the country, through elections

In their original form these are to be found in Article 19 and Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. They are echoed in a number of UN and regional human rights treaties adopted since then. Decisions of the various treaty bodies, such as the UN Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, have further refined these principles, making them an increasingly rich and applicable source of legal guidance.

A further source of international law on media and elections is to be found in the decisions of other types of international institution, such as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, who in 1999 laid out a number of important principles on the role of media in elections and the obligation of governments to guarantee media pluralism.

The approaches of other international bodies - such as UN administrations in internationally supervised elections - also provide a source of "soft law". That is, they have no binding power over UN member states, but they provide an important indication of prevalent international standards.

In addition to the international sources of law, many national laws and decisions of national courts provide a source of comparative law. In many countries, especially those with a common law system, decisions of other national courts may be invoked as a source of guidance and precedent. Again they have no binding power, but, depending on the seniority of the court whose decision is being cited, judges will take serious note of its reasoning and findings.

International Law on Media and Elections

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948, is the definitive statement of principle on human rights. It contains two Articles, 19 and 21, which are fundamental to the obligations of governments regarding the role of media in elections. The first of these, Article 19, guarantees the right to freedom of expression. The second, Article 21, guarantees the right to take part in periodic secret elections.

The UDHR imposes obligations upon all members of the international community. But, as a declaration, it is only what is termed customary international law. With the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966, these same provisions were amplified and given the force of binding and enforceable law over all those states that ratified. Article 19 of the ICCPR states in part:

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

Article 25 of the ICCPR states in part:

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 [distinctions of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status] and without unreasonable restrictions:

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.

Taken together, these two provisions have been understood to impose an obligation on governments to ensure the diversity and pluralism of the media during election periods.

The main regional human rights treaties - the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights - contain a similar combination of guarantees of the right to freedom of expression and information and the right to political participation without discrimination.

The documents adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe go a step further. In the Copenhagen Document of 1990, the participating states of the CSCE committed themselves to ensure:

"That no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process."

The CSCE documents are not treaties and therefore do not have the same binding force. But they have been accepted as part of customary international law and therefore impose obligations on participating states.

The decisions of both international and national tribunals give greater detail and substance to these broad principles on media and elections. They can be summarized as follows:

• The media play a vital watchdog role in holding governments accountable and ensuring the effective functioning of a democracy.
• Governments are obliged to ensure the existence of a democracy that ensures media pluralism, especially in elections.
• Freedom of political debate is a fundamental right.
• Political parties and individuals have a right of access to government media during election campaigns.
• Government media are obliged to publish opposition views.
• There exists a right of reply, correction, or retraction in response to wrong statements in the government media.
• There may be limits on the legal liability of the media if they reproduce unlawful statements.
• Political expression may be restricted only for extraordinary reasons.
• There is enhanced protection for criticism of politicians and government.
• There is enhanced protection for political opinions.
• There is a right to an effective remedy for those whose rights have been violated.
• Governments are obliged to protect the safety of media personnel and institutions.

Media and Democracy

It is the mass media that make the exercise of freedom of expression a reality. [1]

The words of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights succinctly state a principle that is now universally acknowledged in international law: the exercise of freedom of expression in a democracy has little meaning if it can only be exercised on an individual level. Freedom of expression is not only about what you are allowed to tell your neighbour - or to hear from him or her. Crucially, it is also to do with the expression of facts and opinions and receiving of information through the media.

The international tribunal that has gone furthest in developing this approach is the European Court of Human Rights. It has concluded that media freedom is vital for keeping citizens informed:

Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of their political leaders. In particular, it gives politicians the opportunity to reflect and comment on the preoccupations of public opinion; it thus enables everyone to participate in the free political debate which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society. [2]

The media inform the public about matters of public interest and act as a watchdog over government:

it is ... incumbent on [the press] to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. Not only does it have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of "public watchdog". [3]

According to the European Court, then, there are two aspects to this democratic role of the media: to inform the public and to act as a watchdog of government. This role does not impose particular duties on any particular newspaper or broadcasting station. Rather it imposes a duty on governments to ensure that the media are able to carry out these functions. This principle clearly has practical implications in the election context.

Governments may regulate the technical aspects of broadcasting, according to the European Court. Frequencies should be allocated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. The media are subject to the law of the land - in matters such as defamation or incitement - but as a general rule governments may not restrict the contents of the media.

[1] Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Adv. Opn. OC-5/83 of 13 Nov. 1985, Series A no. 5, reprinted in 7 Human Rights Law Journal (1986), 74 and in 8 EHRR 165.

[2] Castells v. Spain, Judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236, para. 43.

[3] Thorgeirson v. Iceland, Judgment of 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239, para. 63.

Obligations of Pluralism

The media in an election play a key role, not only as a means of scrutinizing government actions, but also ensuring that the electorate has all the necessary information at its disposal to make an informed and democratic choice. Governments have an important negative obligation not to impede the media in playing these functions. In addition, and at least as importantly, governments have a positive obligation to facilitate media pluralism in order to expose the public to the widest variety of sources of information. Indeed, the obligation contained in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), guaranteeing freedom of expression and freedom of information, applies only to governments and certainly not to individual media organizations.

As the Human Rights Committee stated in its only General Comment on Article 19 of the ICCPR:

"Because of the development of the modern mass media, effective measures are necessary to prevent such control of the media as would interfere with the right of everyone to freedom of expression...." [1]

It was in a similar vein that the Zimbabwean Supreme Court concluded that the monopoly enjoyed by the parastatal Posts and Telecommunications Corporation was unconstitutional on grounds of freedom of expression. The court found that the protection of freedom of expression applies not only to the content of information, but also to the means of transmission and reception of such information. A restriction imposed on the means of transmission or reception necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information. Any monopoly that has the effect, whatever its purpose, of hindering the right to receive and impart ideas and information violates the protection of this right. [2]

Jurisprudence from countries as varied as Ghana, Sri Lanka, Belize, India, Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia underlines the twin points that media monopolies are an unacceptable interference with freedom of expression and that publicly-funded media have an obligation to convey viewpoints other than that of the government of the day. A number of these judgments (Zambia, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago) refer to the right of political opponents of the government to have their viewpoint heard in the public media. This right extends to other types of minority as well. The following recommendation is drawn from a UN report on minority rights:

"Members of different groups should enjoy the right to participate, on the basis of their own culture and language, in the cultural life of the community, to produce and enjoy arts and science, to protect their cultural heritage and traditions, to own their own media and other means of communication and to have access on a basis of equality to State-owned or publicly controlled media." [3]

It is important to stress that the role of the media is not just as a vehicle for expression in the narrow sense. The media are important also - indeed, primarily - as a means to enable the public to exercise their right to freedom of information. The media play a role of watchdog over the activities of the government and other powerful institutions. Clearly they cannot play this role if they owe a narrow loyalty to the government or ruling party of the day. The most detailed guidelines produced by the United Nations reflecting best international practice on pluralism and access to the media were those issued by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia. These stated:

"An independent and free media should have a diversity of ownership, and it should promote and safeguard democracy, while opening opportunities and avenues for economic, social and cultural development." [4]

In the most definitive statement from a United Nations authority, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Abid Hussein, concluded in his 1999 annual report:

"There are several fundamental principles that, if promoted and respected, enhance the right to seek, receive and impart information. These principles are: a monopoly or excessive concentration of ownership of media in the hands of a few is to be avoided in the interest of developing a plurality of viewpoints and voices; State-owned media have a responsibility to report on all aspects of national life and to provide access to a diversity of viewpoints; State-owned media must not be used as a communication or propaganda organ for one political party or as an advocate for the Government to the exclusion of all other parties and groups..." [5]

The Special Rapporteur then went on to list a series of obligations on the State to ensure "that the media are given the widest possible latitude" in order to achieve "the most fully informed electorate possible":

• There should not be bias or discrimination in media coverage
• Censorship of election programmes should not be allowed
• Media should be exempt from legal liability for provocative statements and a right of reply should be provided
• There should be a clear distinction between news coverage of functions of government office and functions as a party candidate
• Air time for direct access programmes should be granted on a fair and non-discriminatory basis
• Programmes provide an opportunity for candidates to debate each other and for journalists to question them
• Media should engage in voter education
• Programmes should target traditionally disadvantaged groups, which may include women and ethnic and religious minorities.

[1] Adopted by the Human Rights Committee at its 461st meeting on 27 July 1983, UN Doc. A/38/40, 109.

[2] Retrofit (Pty) Ltd vs Posts and Telecommunications Corporation, Supreme Court, 1995(9) BCLR 1262 (2).

[3] Positive ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving minorities (Report by Special Rapporteur Asbjorn Eide), Addendum 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34/Add.4, part II, paras 11 and 12.

[4] UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992).

[5] Report of the Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/64 29 January 1999.

Freedom of Political Debate

Freedom of political debate has been recognized by international courts, other international bodies, and national tribunals as a fundamental right. The European Court of Human Rights noted in 1978: "freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society". [1]

Part of the importance of political debate is as a way of giving the electorate information that allows it to exercise its political choice. The UN Technical Team on the Malawi referendum of 1993, which chose between a single and multi-party system, stated: "If voters are to make an informed choice at the polling station, then an active exercise of the freedom [of expression] is essential." [2] The Enugu High Court in Nigeria made a similar observation:

Freedom of speech is, no doubt, the very foundation of every democratic society, for without free discussion, particularly on political issues, no public education or enlightenment, so essential for the proper functioning and execution of the processes of responsible government, is possible. [3]

And the Israeli Supreme Court stated:

Real democracy and freedom of speech are one. Freedom of speech enables each individual to crystallize his or her autonomous opinion in the decision-making process vital in a democratic state. The essence of democratic elections is premised on being able to reach informed opinions, evaluating them and exposing them to open debate ... [4]

[1] Lingens v. Austria, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, at para. 42.

[2] Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 26.

[3] The State v. The Ivory Trumpet Publishing Co. [1984] 5 NCLR 736, High Court, Enugu, 31 Jan 1983.

[4] Zeveli v. Central Committee for the Elections to the 13th Knesset, and Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. the Israeli Broadcasting Authority, HC 869/92 and 931/92; 46(2) Piskei Din, 692.

Right of Access to Government Media

There is a growing weight of decisions by national tribunals on the right of opposition parties to access to the government media. There is a clear trend towards recognizing that governments have an obligation to ensure such access. This was the approach taken by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression in his 1999 report.

In 2000, for example, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court made two rulings addressing this very issue. In January, the court instructed the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) to broadcast advertisements and campaign material prepared by the "No" campaign in the country's referendum on a proposed new constitution. The "Yes" campaign, favoured by the government, had had its material broadcast at considerable length. [1]

On 13 June, a few days before parliamentary elections, the Supreme Court, ruling on an application from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, ordered the ZBC to stop its biased political broadcasting and to fulfil its functions under the Broadcasting Act to carry on TV and radio broadcast services impartially, without discrimination on the basis of political opinion and without hindering persons in their right to impart and receive ideas and information. [2]

A few years earlier, the High Court in Zimbabwe's northern neighbour, Zambia, had been called upon to rule on a similar issue. The point under dispute was a directive issued by President Kenneth Kaunda in the weeks before the country's first multi-party elections in 1991. This instructed the three government-controlled newspapers not to report statements by leaders of the main opposition party or to accept its advertisements. The court held that the directive violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression:

"Since the petitioners were not allowed to publish their views on political matters through the government newspapers, and by necessary implication even through the radio and TV, they were denied the enjoyment of their freedom of expression ..." [3]

The court then made a more general comment on the proper role of publicly-owned media:

"In the case of newspapers they are supposed to be run on the basis of journalistic principles and ethics free from any outside interference. These principles dictate the coverage of all newsworthy events regardless of the source of such news. Anything less than this, and it is very easy for the general public to assess whether or not a given newspaper is working according to sound journalistic principles and ethics, is not acceptable from a publicly owned medium - print or other." (ibid)

The High Court of Trinidad and Tobago had earlier made a similar finding in relation to television. The state-owned television station had refused to broadcast a pre-recorded speech by an opposition member of parliament. The court ruled that this action violated the right to freedom of expression:

"With television being the most powerful medium of communication in the modern world, it is in my view idle to postulate that freedom to express political views means what the constitution intends it to mean without the correlative adjunct to express such views on television. The days of soap-box oratory are over, as are the days of political pamphleteering ..." [4]

International observer missions and supervisory and advisory groups have taken a similar approach in recent years. The UN observer mission at the 1989 Nicaraguan elections, for example, stated that it was necessary for "all political parties [to] have equitable access to State television and radio in terms of both the timing and the length of broadcasts." [5] The UN Technical Team for the 1993 Malawi referendum made a similar recommendation:

In the case of government-owned media, it is customary that equal access, both in terms of timing and length of broadcast, should be given to the competing sides to put forward their arguments." [6]

(Note that in this case the recommendation was for "equal" rather than "equitable" access since this was a referendum where the choice was between two propositions rather than a number of political parties.)

Likewise, in the UN-supervised elections in Cambodia in 1993, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was concerned to ensure fair access to the media, as set out in its election guidelines:

In the exercise of its responsibilities under the Agreement, UNTAC will ensure "fair access to the media, including press, television and radio, for all parties contesting the election". [7]

[1] Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A Question of Balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum, Harare, 2000.

[2] Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, Election 2000: The Media War, Harare, 2000, p.11.

[3] Arthur Wina & Others v. the Attorney-General (1990) HP/1878 (High Court: Lusaka).

[4] Rambachan v. Trinidad and Tobago Television Co. Ltd and Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, decision of 17 July 1985 (unreported).

[5] Establishment and Terms of Reference of the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN), The Situation in Central America, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., "Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives," UN Doc. A/44/375 (1989), Annexe 1, at 3.

[6] Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 27.

[7] UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992), pream. para. 4.

Publishing Opposition Views

The obligation on publicly-owned or government-controlled media to publish or broadcast the views of the opposition derives from the prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of rights. This is strongly stated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as in other human rights treaties. It means that if the ruling party has an opportunity to exercise its right to freedom of expression through the government media, then the opposition must be given the same opportunity.

The European Commission of Human Rights rejected an application by an association that had been refused air time during an election by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The Commission stated that although there was not, in its view, a general right of access to the broadcast media, political parties should be given such access on an equitable basis:

It is evident that the freedom to "impart information and ideas" included in the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, cannot be taken to include a general and unfettered right for any private citizen or organization to have access to broadcasting time on radio or television in order to forward its opinion. On the other hand, the Commission considers that the denial of broadcasting time to one or more specific groups or persons may, in particular circumstances, raise an issue under Article 10 alone or in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention [prohibiting discrimination]. Such an issue would, in principle, arise for instance if one political party was excluded from broadcasting facilities at election time while other parties were given broadcasting time. [1]

This is a common sense view that is reflected in remarks by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, as well as in policy or practice in many countries. It guarantees the continued editorial independence of the media, at the same time as providing a minimum standard of access by political parties.

[1] X and the Association of Z v. the United Kingdom, European Commission on Human Rights, Admissibility Decision of 12 July 1971, App. No. 4515/70, 38 Collected Decisions 86 (1971).

Right of Reply to Media Reports during Elections

The idea of creating a legally enforceable right of reply or correction has never found much favour with freedom of expression campaigners, who fear that it would stifle free and robust expression - clearly something that is particularly needed in the context of elections. However, both international advisory bodies and some national courts have favoured such a mechanism, especially when the matter being replied to is in the government-controlled media, to which the opposition may not have ready access.

This is the guideline, for example, developed by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

Media outlets should give parties, groups or individuals whose views have been misrepresented or maligned by a publication or broadcast the "right of response" in the same media outlet. [1]

The Indian Supreme Court recognized a right of reply that was specific to government publications, stating that "fairness demanded that both viewpoints were placed before its readers, however limited be their number, to enable them to draw their own conclusions." [2]

The High Court and Court of Appeal in Belize found in favour of a right of reply in a case with a particular relevance to elections. The Belize Broadcasting Authority (BBA) had refused permission to a senior opposition politician and the director of a television station to broadcast a series of programmes replying to government statements on the economy. The High Court ruled that the BBA had acted arbitrarily, stating:

"Today television is the most powerful medium for communications, ideas and disseminating information. The enjoyment of freedom of expression therefore includes freedom to use such a medium." [3]

The Court of Appeal supported the High Court's ruling and held that the BBA's refusal to broadcast the programmes violated the applicants' constitutional rights to both freedom of expression and protection from discrimination. Political parties must be given the opportunity to reply on television to statements made by the government that "provide information or explanation of events of prime national or international importance or ... seek the co-operation of the public in connection with such events." Only where there was a "general consensus of opinion" would the opposition not have a right of reply. [4]

[1] UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992).

[2] Manubhai Shah v. Life Insurance Corp. of India [1992] 3 SCC 637.

[3] Belize Broadcasting Authority v. Courtenay and Hoare, Court of Appeal, 20 June 1986; (1988) LRC (Const.) 276; 13 Common L Bull (1987), 1238.

[4] Ibid., citing Halsbury's Laws of England (4th edn, Vol. 8, para. 1134).

Limits to Liability of Media During Elections

Both journalists and politicians are concerned – rightly – with the issue of defamation. Specifically, how far are the media legally liable if they report statements by politicians that are subsequently found to be defamatory?

In his 1999 report, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression came down firmly in favour of exempting the media from liability for publishing unlawful statements made by politicians in the context of an election. The type of statements envisaged might include those that were defamatory or incited to hatred. This does not mean that there would be no liability for such statements - the person who made them would still be liable - but that the media would be free to reproduce them without, for example, having to review every party election broadcast or advertisement before transmission.

"The Special Rapporteur was offering a clear guideline on a matter that has been hitherto unclear and controversial. Thus, for example, the United Nations Transitional Authorities in Cambodia in its guidelines took precisely the opposite view, assuming that media would be legally responsible for statements that "incite discrimination, hostility or violence by means of national, religious, racial or ethnic hatred"." [1]

The Special Rapporteur was reflecting a growing trend in national courts and legislatures. The Danish Parliament passed a law exempting the media from liability for publishing statements inciting racial or national hatred, providing that they themselves did not intend to promote hatred. This followed the conviction of a journalist who had been convicted and fined for broadcasting a television interview with members of a racist gang. He applied to the European Commission of Human Rights, which ruled his application admissible. [2]

The Spanish Constitutional Court similarly found that a newspaper could not be held liable for publishing a statement by a terrorist organization:

"Both the right of the journalist to inform and the rights of his readers to receive full and accurate information constitute, in the last resort, an objective institutional guarantee, which effectively prevents the imputation of any criminal will on the part of those who only transmit information." [3]

This reasoning is important, because it stresses that the argument against applying liability to the media in such cases is primarily to do with protecting the public right to receive information.

[1] UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992).

[2] Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, decision on admissibility issued 8 Sept. 1992.

[3] Egin case, STC 159/86, Boletin de Jurisprudencia Constitucional 68, at 1447 para. 8.

Restrictions on Political Speech

Freedom of expression is not an absolute right and it may be limited in certain circumstances. But such limitations must conform to clearly defined standards. Almost invariably it will not be legitimate to restrict political speech before it is spoken. So, while a person who is defamed may have a legal remedy, it is not acceptable to apply prior censorship to politicians’ words to ensure that they do not contain defamatory content.

Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides in paragraph 3 a number of grounds on which the right may be restricted.

"The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights and reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals."

Jurisprudence has established that freedom of expression under international law may only be limited by the application of a three-part test in order to establish that the limitation is:

• Established by law - that is, that it must pre-exist in national or binding international law;
• Serving a legitimate purpose - that is, one of the purposes contained in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR;
• And necessary in a democratic society. This means, among other things, that the restriction should be proportionate to its purpose and that it should not detract from the essence of the right itself.

Article 20 of the ICCPR may also be relevant on occasions. This prohibits propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.

The UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum applied these principles to national law governing a poll campaign. It stated that an restriction on freedom of expression:

"should not be so vague or broadly defined as to leave an overly wide margin of discretion to the authorities responsible for enforcing the law, since uncertainty over legal boundaries has a dampening effect on the exercise of this right [to freedom of expression] and may encourage discrimination in ... [the restrictions'] application." [1]

[1] Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 29.

Criticism of Politicians and Government

International tribunals - and increasingly national ones as well - are clear that politicians and governments may be subject to greater criticism and insult than ordinary private individuals and that consequently the law will offer them less protection. This is, of course, the opposite of the situation that has so often prevailed, with government officials often invoking charges such as criminal defamation against critics.

International law also distinguishes between factual allegations and opinions. Political opinions may only be restricted in the most extreme circumstances. They cannot be restricted on the grounds that they are "untrue" since, as the European Court of Human Rights observed, to require someone accused of defamation to prove the truth of an opinion "infringes freedom of opinion itself". [1]

The European Court of Human Rights has ruled unanimously that because "freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society ... the limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards private individuals." In addition, "the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government than in relation to a private citizen, or even a politician." Penalties for defamation in such cases would only apply where the accusations are "devoid of foundation or formulated in bad faith." The court also stated:

While freedom of expression is important for everybody, it is especially so for an elected representative of the people. He represents his electorate, draws attention to their preoccupations and defends their interests. Accordingly, interferences with the freedom of expression of an opposition Member of Parliament... call for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court. [2]

The civil law of defamation can legitimately be used to protect reputations against reckless and malicious allegations. But increasingly, national courts have ruled that the scope of defamation law must be such that it does not prevent the media from carrying out their proper function - or stifle vigorous political debate. The historic judgment of the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v Sullivan (1964) established the principle that there should be greater latitude in criticizing a public official, even to the extent of mistaken or inaccurate statements, provided that these were not made maliciously. The court pointed out that public figures had far easier access to channels of communication to counteract false statements. [3] In recent years, this approach has been adopted, in different ways, in a wide variety of other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Pakistan, India, and Zambia. [4]

[1] Lingens v. Austria, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103.

[2] Castells v. Spain, Judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236.

[3] New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964).

[4] Joanna Stevens, "Sullivan's Travels", Southern African Media Law Briefing, Vol.2 No. 1, April 1997.

Right to an Effective Remedy

International law provides that any person who believes that their rights have been violated shall be entitled to an effective remedy in a national tribunal. In relation to media and elections, this means that there is an expectation that the courts will be able to deal with any unjustified restrictions on media coverage, denial of access to the media, denial of the right of reply, defamatory or inflammatory material, or any other issue where media, parties and candidates, or the electorate feel that their rights have been infringed.

Inherent in the notion of a remedy is the idea that it will actually offer the complainant a timely and practical solution. This is especially important in the context of an election. If, for example, defamatory or inaccurate information is broadcast, the remedy required will not be a correction or even monetary compensation at some distant future date. The important thing is that it should be corrected while it is still fresh in the electorate’s collective mind (and while it is still relevant to the outcome of the poll).

So, while the normal courts will still be the ultimate arbiters of whether rights have been infringed, many countries also have administrative procedures that will be able to deal with complaints more rapidly. These may be regular complaints mechanisms operated by a broadcasting regulator or a media council. Or they may be special procedures that are only in place during election periods.

When the body that decides the complaint is administrative (rather than judicial) in nature, then it should be separate from the body complained against. This would apply, for example, in the case of complaints against a broadcaster.

The UN Technical Team for the Malawi Referendum recommended that "a recourse mechanism should be present providing for independent review of cases where restrictions on this right [to freedom of expression] have been applied." [1]

[1] Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 29.

Protecting the Safety of the Media

Journalism is a dangerous occupation. Statistics collected by media freedom organizations show that each year dozens of media professionals are killed or injured in the course of their work. Elections are not the most dangerous part of their work - but a tense and sometimes violent campaign will carry its dangers for those trying to report honestly and accurately.

The responsibility for protecting the physical security of everyone within its territory rests with the government, which has a particular obligation in relation to the media. It was in recognition of this that the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights resolved:

The World Conference encourages the increased involvement of the media, for whom freedom and protection should be guaranteed within the framework of national law. [1]

There are a few basic steps that governments can take to ensure this protection:

• Repeal all laws restricting media freedom.
• Create a specific offence relating to violence or threats against the media.
• Ensure that all reports of violence or threats against the media are investigated promptly and those responsible brought to justice.

In addition, an electoral management body can promote a code of conduct that stresses the importance of both political parties and security forces allowing journalists to go about their work unimpeded.

[1] World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration, para. 26.

Media Environment

In an age of multinational media corporations we are constantly persuaded to believe that we live in a "global village" - a single, undifferentiated information society. Undoubtedly the flow of information through the media is greater and faster than it was, say, in the 1960s when the term "global village" was coined - still more by comparison with the age before mass broadcasting. Nevertheless, access to information by the mass of people - and the mass of voters in particular - differs enormously according to the national context. Globalization of information no doubt affects the rural African, Asian, Latin American or East European. But it does not mean that they have the same information sources as a West European or North American, or indeed their own urban compatriots.

The media environment will largely determine the role that the media play in an election. And that environment in turn will be decided by a variety of factors. The first of these is the level of economic development. In situations of severe poverty, most people will be unable to afford newspapers and probably unable to read them either. Often televisions will be prohibitively expensive and ownership and audience will be almost exclusively urban. Some of the poorest countries, such as Malawi and Tanzania, have only very recently established national television networks. Radio is likely to be the most important national medium of communication in these circumstances. But even so it is likely to be constrained by shortage of advertising revenue. A higher level of economic development is likely to mean a greater number of media outlets. Increasingly this even overrides the significance of constraints of political control over the media.

Economic development in turn may influence the ownership structure of the media. As a general pattern, poorer countries, including most in Africa, will tend to have a larger governmental media sector, because of the shortage of advertising. Independent media in these countries are likely to be owned by small, private business interests. In the larger economies of regions like Latin America, East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, media houses are more likely to be under the control of substantial national businesses (that are also likely to have political interests). Either prominent political figures acquire media in order to advance their own political careers. Or wealthy individuals use their control of media outlets to launch a career in politics. The best known (and most extreme) example of the second phenomenon is in Italy, where businessman Silvio Berlusconi used his media interests to become head of government. However, what some media theorists describe as the “Italian model” can be seen in less extreme variants in many countries.

Increasingly media throughout the world, except in the poorest countries, fall under the control of multinational media companies. These too are likely to have their own political inclinations. These may take the form of backing for particular political parties or candidates, or they may entail a more general tendency to set the terms of political debate.

But wealth is not the only factor determining the structure of media ownership. Political and cultural traditions play a large part. Most European countries, for example, have a strong tradition of state or public ownership of broadcasting. France only legalized private broadcasting in the 1980s. The United States, by contrast, has almost no history of publicly owned broadcasting. Not surprisingly, countries with a history of military or single-party rule may have developed their own tradition of state control of the media. Clearly, the extent to which the government or public authorities are involved in owning or controlling the media is likely to have a direct impact on the role of the media in elections.

Another critical dimension of the media environment is the strength of the traditions of political freedom and respect for freedom of expression. Media with a long history of pluralism, freedom and independence will have developed a greater capacity to deal with political issues in a frank and forthright manner. They will also probably have developed higher professional standards (although the low ethics of some media in advanced democracies show that the correlation is not an exact one). Most importantly, a recent history of censorship or physical intimidation of the media is likely to loom as a constant threat over journalists and editors in their election coverage.

The media environment is also to some degree a legal environment. Preferably the media will operate under the protection of strong constitutional and statutory guarantees of freedom of expression and access to information. Legal traditions differ greatly in this area. Common law countries tend towards an approach marked by an absence of explicit laws regulating the media. The assumption is that the media are free to do whatever is not explicitly prohibited by law. The civil law tradition, by contrast, usually requires statutory regulation of media activity. There are strengths and weaknesses in both approaches, although in practice they are tending to converge. Broadcasting is one area where differing legal traditions are seeking to find common solutions. Almost all countries demand some form of statutory regulation of broadcasting, even the traditionally unregulated United States, as a way of ensuring pluralism over the airwaves. The extent to which the allocation of broadcasting frequencies is a fair and transparent process is likely to have a significant influence on how the broadcasters discharge their responsibilities at election time.

Image:

Ghana's election on the BBC by bbcworldservice is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 2.0 Generic License.

Where do people get their information?

It is often assumed that the media are the main source of information for most voters. But this is not necessarily true. Even in an advanced, media-saturated democracy like Britain, between one quarter and one third of television viewers are estimated to switch channels when a party election broadcast starts. There used to be a convention that all channels would screen these broadcasts simultaneously so that there was no escape for the audience, other than making themselves a cup of tea. Perhaps as a result, a survey in 1968 found that party election broadcasts were the main source of information for undecided voters. Since 1987, however, simultaneous broadcasts have been abandoned, and the audience has declined. And a 1990 survey found that party broadcasts were the least believable source of political information, apart from the Sun newspaper. [1]

Before the rise of modern electronic media, political information was conveyed through the two mechanisms of the print media and direct personal contact. In those days, newspaper readership was higher than today, but this still excluded a very large proportion of the population that was either too poor to afford a newspaper or that simply could not read. Hence direct personal communication assumed great importance. This would include public political meetings addressed by candidates or hustings, where the different candidates would debate and be questioned. It would also include door-to-door canvassing by the candidate or party activists, as well as leaflets and posters produced by the parties or candidates.

In industrialized countries with extensive electronic media, these methods have declined dramatically in importance. Elsewhere, however, the political meeting and personal contact with the candidates remains important. In rural Africa, for example, radio is usually the only accessible mass medium. The stations that broadcast to this rural audience are usually government-controlled and give little, if any, voice to opposition parties. Sometimes, the obstacles to the communication of information are even more basic. Most radio sets require batteries. These are expensive and unlikely to be a priority in communities that are struggling to survive. So personal contact remains important.

Yet, even in conditions of dire poverty, the media still have a role in communicating political information. Even when rural communities do not have direct access to independent media, the information generated by, say, the private press will still go into general circulation and may reach the rural voters at some stage. So, although word of mouth may be the direct source of political information, the media will contribute importantly to the mass of information in circulation.

In rural Africa, like other parts of the world generally regarded as "information-poor", the means for circulating information by mouth are quite sophisticated, and were often honed in the difficult conditions of colonialism and single-party or military dictatorship. Audiences became skilled at interpreting the highly controlled messages contained in the official media and relaying an alternative interpretation. They were assisted in this by cultural conventions allowing the oblique communication of sensitive information and views. For example, the Ngoni of Central Africa have a convention known as kukulawika - women's pounding songs that are able to convey explicit messages about sex, but without using obscenities. The Tonga have a similar mechanism. Under British colonial rule, African staff at the Central African Broadcasting Corporation in Lusaka would broadcast a type of political kukulawika, allowing them to convey hidden nationalist messages. This means of veiled political communication was especially useful during subsequent restrictive one-party rule. [2]

The informal communication of political news is often described, disparagingly and not entirely accurately, as rumour. Colonial administrators used to call it the "bush telegraph", while French-speaking Africans have invented a rather better term: radio trottoir or "pavement radio". Whatever name it is given, there can be little doubt that millions of people the world over form their political opinions on the basis of their own experience and what they learn personally from those whom they trust. Much of this information may originate in the media, but how much is difficult to determine.

How far the media influence the behaviour of voters remains a great imponderable. In Zimbabwe, for example, in a referendum and election in 2000, a majority of voters rejected the advice being offered by the most important media. The state enjoyed a monopoly of all broadcast media, which were under tight government control. In a referendum on constitutional reform, and then in parliamentary elections, the opposition was given minimal access to radio and television, and the editorial line of both was shrilly in favour of the ruling party. Yet in each poll, a majority of voters favoured the opposition. Perhaps the critical information placed in circulation by the privately-owned press was influential. But ultimately, many people's voting choices seem to have been determined by other factors. An independent media monitoring group even suggested that last-minute broadcast propaganda in favour of the government may have influenced marginal voters in the referendum to vote for the opposition. Unfortunately, the quality of audience research is not good enough to allow a clear answer.[3]

Focus group studies in Ukraine suggest a similar popular scepticism towards the media, which were described as being "not free" and therefore not enjoying the confidence of the citizens. They say that the media are "short of analytical articles in the first place" and that the mass media play an "insufficient" role in elucidating the issues in the campaign and preparing the public for the elections. The focus groups said that "attempts of the mass media to shed light on political and economic developments in a timely and qualitative fashion cannot be successful". [4]

Even in industrialized democracies where the media occupy a very important place as a source of political information, the answer to this question of media influence is not clear. In Britain, for many years, the largest circulation newspaper, the Sun, supported the Conservative party, yet the majority of its mainly working class readership supported the Labour party. Of course, the paper may have influenced a marginal but potentially significant section of its readership to change their vote. In 1997, the Sun shifted its allegiance to Labour and claimed the credit when that party won - even though public opinion surveys and the size of the Labour majority showed that there were much broader factors at work. In fact, the paper probably had a greater influence on the new government than on the electorate. Labour leaders were anxious to be on good terms with the Sun's owner, Rupert Murdoch - an indication of the new globalized order where media houses are also powerful multinational corporations.

More generally, Britain provides an interesting case study of the political influence of the media. A large majority of the press supports the Conservative party. If its influence over the electorate were decisive, then there would never be a Labour government. Things clearly do not work like that. Yet the indirect influence of the media is more difficult to assess. Arguably, they influence the political agenda by emphasizing issues that are of priority to the right wing, such as law and order and restricting immigration. Hence a Labour government may adopt more conservative policies because it believes that the media influence the electorate in that direction.

Notes:

[1]Margaret Scammell and Holli A. Semetko, "Political Advertising on Television: The British Experience", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[2]David Kerr, "Ideology, resistance and the transformation of performance traditions in post-colonial Malawi", University of Botswana, Gaborone, 1993.

[3]Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A question of balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum Harare, March 2000.

[4]Gary A. Ferguson, Ukrainian Political Issues and Media Focus Groups: Summary of Findings, International Foundation for Elections Systems, Washington DC, 1999.

History of Respect for Media Freedom

The extent to which a country's government has a history of respecting media freedom will have a great bearing on the capacity of the media to report elections. Often, a country with little history of respect for freedom of expression also has little experience of elections, or at least of free and democratic ones.

The significance of this history is that, even where restrictions have been lifted - for example in a transition from autocratic to democratic rule - the media may still be influenced by the memory of past repression and be reluctant to report in a bold and independent fashion. Or the opposite may be the case: the media revel in a new-found freedom, but exercise it in an unprofessional and irresponsible way. The legacy of restrictions on media freedom may linger in the form of a state-owned and government-controlled broadcasting station that, even in the context of a newly democratic political system, is reluctant to act independently of government. Very often, a mixture of all these elements is in play.

Of course, sometimes the media may have developed its own professional standards and effectiveness in adversity. In that respect, they may be well-prepared for the challenge of reporting an election. But they are still unlikely to have much practical experience of election coverage.

In each of these contexts, media regulatory authorities and electoral authorities have an important role in creating a more favourable environment that will allow the media to carry out the unfamiliar functions of election coverage freely and professionally.

There are a variety of means whereby governments can infringe media freedom. The most common include:

• Physical attacks on the media and journalists. The most serious attacks on the media usually have the aim of silencing some critics and intimidating others. Journalists are beaten or even killed or "disappeared". Media premises are attacked, illegally raided or fire-bombed. Newspaper vendors may be targeted, with papers illegally confiscated or the vendors themselves beaten.
• The use of extreme legal powers against the media. The most threatening of these is pre-publication censorship, whereby each issue of a publication must receive prior official approval. Licensing of publications, or of journalists, gives the authorities massive leverage over the media. A whole battery of laws may be used to restrict freedom of the media, often on grounds of national security. These are often used as the basis for criminal charges against journalists and media owners, which can lead to long periods of imprisonment. Sometimes, a succession of sedition or criminal defamation charges are used against the media, even when cases are unlikely to come to trial, with the aim of intimidating journalists and draining their resources. Legal measures against printers and distributors are a particularly effective way of hampering the operation and the independent-minded media. Restricting the importation of newsprint has often been used as a tool to constrain media freedom.
• Tight regulation of the media. A total or virtual state monopoly of the media is a highly effective way of preventing critical voices from being heard. Although it is the deaths of journalists in the line of duty that grab the headlines, there can be little doubt that direct government control over the media has been - and continues to be - the commonest means for restricting what the public learns.
• Even when independent media exist and are nominally free from legal constraint, government control of vital resources such as electricity, printing presses, transmitters, and computers can often be used to cow or silence independent voices.

It is in new or "transitional" democracies that the legacy of these restrictions will loom largest. Often restrictive laws remain in place, even if they are not used as frequently as before. Their very existence may exercise what is usually known as a "chilling effect" on media freedom. Sometimes, during a transitional period, violence against the media may actually increase, as repressive governments no longer have recourse to the same legal measures to control the media and resort instead to secret and informal means of repression. Most frequently, the third set of restrictions - government control over a large section of the media - is likely to remain in place. Governments may also exercise tight control over the system of broadcast licensing, with the result that even "independent" media are in fact owned by their close political allies.

But it is not only dictatorships that restrict media freedom. Even in long-established democracies, there is tension between governments and the media. This is inevitable and not entirely undesirable - since, after all, the media are meant to act as a "watchdog" over government. But these tensions are not entirely healthy. Journalists in established democracies are less likely to face physical threats in carrying out their duties, but many have to contend with legal actions, for example to compel them to reveal confidential sources of information. Many of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights that have laid down standards on governments' obligations to respect media freedom have arisen from cases where European journalists' rights have been infringed.

Relative Importance of Different Media

A whole variety of economic, political and cultural factors determine which media are most important in different countries. It is widely claimed that the media - and particularly their role in election campaigns - has become "Americanized". Among other things this is generally understood to mean that television plays a dominant role as the medium of information. While this is increasingly true, it is not universally so. Also, what may be true for one section of a particular society may not be true for all. For example, those who are poorer or live in areas that are more geographically remote are less likely to have access to television than higher income or urban people.

Structure of Media Ownership

Who owns the media clearly has an enormous bearing on the way in which they will cover elections - or any other political issue. State-owned media are often under direct government control and will therefore tend to favour the ruling party. Privately-owned media may also serve the political interests of their proprietors, while in some countries, the political parties themselves may own significant media outlets.

The structure of ownership is also likely to have a bearing on questions such as how far political advertising is permitted during elections. It is well known that the United States, with media that are almost exclusively in private hands, organizes direct access by political parties to the media by means of paid advertising. But that is not an isolated example. For example, Finland, where commercial broadcasting developed rather earlier than in most of Europe, has a far freer approach to paid political advertising than most European countries. Countries like Britain and Denmark, with a stronger tradition of public ownership of the media, do not allow paid political advertising at all, but instead have a system of free direct access broadcasts.

Media ownership is sometimes seen as a simple reflection of political conditions: dictatorships or authoritarian regimes control the media directly, while democracies allow pluralism of ownership. There is a grain of truth in this, but it is clear that the reality is much more complex. Most Western European democracies, for example, had a state monopoly of broadcasting until relatively recently. Britain legalized private commercial broadcasting in the 1950s, but France, Germany, and Denmark did not do so until the 1980s. Britain and France are particularly important examples because of their extensive colonial legacy that influenced the organization of broadcasting and media in scores of countries.

In Britain and France, there was historically a strong distinction between broadcasting, with its strong public element, and the privately-owned print media. The argument for the involvement of the state in broadcasting - or at least in the allocation of broadcasting licences - has been that the frequency spectrum is a finite public resource. Access should therefore be allocated impartially. However, in some long-standing democracies - for example in Scandinavia - there is a tradition of public funding of the print media, usually as a means of ensuring pluralism.

Conversely, the private media in Latin America were often closely identified with the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s. Far from facilitating pluralism, these media houses advocated its suppression. Indeed, many would argue that the large corporations dominating the US media are not conducive to the expression of alternative political viewpoints. Whatever the truth of such contentions, it is clear that there is not a direct correlation between private ownership and pluralism.

Economics also play an important part in determining the structure of media ownership. The size of the advertising "cake" varies according to economic conditions, but there is generally not much that individual media organs can do about it. All private - and some public - media are dependent upon advertising to make their business sustainable. One reason for the great weight of the public sector in the media of poorer countries is the small size of this cake - and in particular the fact that government advertising comprises a large proportion of it.

In African countries, for example, as well as parts of Asia and Latin America, this explains why national radio stations, broadcasting on medium- and long-wave frequencies, are almost entirely a publicly-owned phenomenon. Private advertisers are primarily interested in reaching an urban audience with disposable income - the type of audience served by private FM stations (most of which primarily broadcast music). Even when broadcasting regulations permit - and often they do not - neither private broadcasters nor advertisers have much interest in broadcasting to the entire nation. In this context, pluralism over the airwaves can only be ensured by developing a clear public service mandate for the state media.

The emergence of media such as satellite and cable television complicates this picture but, contrary to some of its most fervent advocates, does not change it fundamentally. Obviously, those who can afford to subscribe to a pay channel will not be among the poorest - television owners seldom fall into that category anyway. Local cable and satellite providers are subject to the same political and economic constraints as those broadcasting on terrestrial channels. Multinational broadcasters such as Cable News Network (CNN) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) can play an important role in breaching broadcasting monopolies. That is why many countries, especially in the Middle East, have prohibited ownership of satellite dishes (a prohibition that was circumvented in one memorable North African case by the widespread substitution of cous-cous pans). The Middle East has been fertile soil for satellite viewing because it shares a single language, Arabic. Few other regions of the world have a common language, with the result that English-language broadcasts from Atlanta or London will have only limited impact.

For the sake of simplicity, the different types of media ownership can be summarized thus:

• public or state-owned media, primarily in the area of broadcasting.
• private broadcasters.
• predominantly privately-owned print media.
• community media.
• media directly owned by political parties.

Public/State Media

A very large proportion of the world's media - especially radio and television - are owned by the public or the state. Three different terms are used that, in principle at least, have very different meanings:

• Public media use public money to broadcast in the interests of the public as a whole. They are not partisan towards any particular party, including the incumbent ruling party.
• State media are owned by the state (although of course the state is financed out of public money) and directly controlled by it.
• Government media are owned by the government of the day (but still using that same public money) and are controlled by the government of the day.

Two models of public/state broadcasting developed in parallel. In Western Europe most broadcast media were initially under public ownership, but usually with strict legal guarantees of independence from the government of the day. At the same time, in the Soviet Union (and later in many countries that followed its lead) was a model of broadcasting under the control of the government, directed towards achieving the objectives of the state.

The European public service model generally functioned well in its countries of origin but did not travel well. Colonial broadcasters on the British or French model enjoyed little of the independence of their metropolitan models, based as it was more upon convention than strong legal guarantees. After independence, post-colonial governments continued in the same tradition of broadcaster-as-government-propagandist. Hence the clear distinction in principle between government and public media has been largely lost in practice.

Yet the distinction is still important. Public service broadcasting was founded on a belief that still holds true in most of the world: the private sector alone cannot guarantee pluralism in broadcasting. The trouble is that government media have largely failed to do that too. In many countries, the advent of private broadcasting has made governments even more determined to cling onto editorial control of the public broadcaster.

In some cases there have been bold attempts to retrieve and modernize the public service ideal: for example, in South Africa where since 1993 the public broadcaster has statutory independence and even, at one stage, had its board members appointed after public hearings.

Public or state media may be financed out of one or all of three main sources:

• A licence fee paid by television viewers
• The government budget
• Commercial advertising.

In a few cases this may be supplemented by other income, such as the sale of programmes. These different revenue sources have potential implications for the broadcaster's day-to-day independence. A licence fee or commercial advertising may make it easier for the broadcaster to maintain a distance from government, although it will still depend on government mechanisms (often the postal service) to collect the fee.

Much of the discussion about "regulation" of the media in elections - a term that creates nervousness among some freedom of expression advocates - is in fact to do with ensuring that publicly funded media operate with due independence of the government of the day, rather than trying to restrict the operations of media that already enjoy full editorial independence.

Public or government-owned media are usually broadcasters. But there are still many government-owned newspapers in existence. They do not enjoy the same economic rationale as public broadcasters and often function as little more than government propaganda sheets. There are exceptions - Uganda's government paper, for example, has a reputation as a reliable and independent source of news. But often even innovative approaches to newspaper ownership end up in the same old pattern.

Corporate Media

The conventional division of media into publicly and “privately” owned is arguably outdated in an era of corporate media ownership. To own a newspaper or a broadcasting station has long been an expensive undertaking. But to describe media as “corporate” is not just to say that the media are owned by large companies. The striking development of the last quarter of the twentieth century was the diversification of media companies into other business interests and the acquisition of media companies by corporations active in other types of economic activity.

The second of these developments slightly preceded the first, with US firms such as Westinghouse and General Electric acquiring media houses. The acceleration of a communications revolution spurred the second development, with media companies holding diverse portfolios in broadcasting, newspapers and magazines, book publishing, cinema, sound recordings, computer software, and the internet.

The result of these developments has been a media landscape that is far removed from the ideal of the neutral “fourth estate” – press that are independent and detached from the political process. The media owners have a partisan interest in the political process in the same way that any company will have.

Many theoretical models have been developed to explain the role of the corporate media in the political process. The “propaganda model” developed by Herman and Chomsky is influential. [Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, 1988] They explain the tendency of the mass media to conform to the political consensus in Western countries with reference to five “filters” through which all news passes:

• Ownership: mass media tend to be owned by large corporate interests with a vested interest in the political and economic status quo.
• Advertising: most income derives from advertising, not sales. Advertisers are themselves large corporate interests that disapprove of dissenting voices.
• Sourcing: there is a preponderance of official or “establishment” sources for political and economic stories.
• Flak: Critical reporting is met by a systematically hostile response from government and corporate officials, including lawsuits, informal pressure, withdrawal of advertising, or placing of damaging stories.
• Ideology: Herman and Chomsky described anti-communism as a shared and guiding ideology in the US media of the 1980s. This could be updated as an anti-terrorist, anti-Islamic or pro-globalization ideology in Western societies of the 2000s. Of course, other societies have their own official ideologies.

Herman and Chomsky were heavily criticized for the allegedly conspiratorial nature of their explanation. Actually they were at pains to point out that theirs was a structural explanation that operated independently of the individual choice of the editors and journalists involved. Whether or not the explanation is accepted, it is clear that the political role of media corporations is a fact of life in the twenty-first century.

Private Broadcasters

There is a wide range of different types of private broadcaster - from giant multinational corporations run by some of the richest and most politically powerful men in the world to small, local FM stations. The category is artificial, since what divides them is as great as what unites them.

What they do have in common, however, is that they are owned by private interests - usually a company that seeks to make a profit, though sometimes a non-profit making trust. In most cases, broadcasting will be under the terms of a licence granted on a periodic basis by a public authority. How prescriptive or restrictive are the terms of that licence will also vary. Sometimes a broadcasting licence will expressly prohibit the broadcasting of news. This is the case with the licence granted to the South African multinational M-Net, for example. M-Net is happy to provide pure entertainment channels, so elections, with their turmoil and debate, pass it by entirely. [1]

More often, a broadcasting licence will lay down certain terms under which news or current affairs can be broadcast. Sometimes this will include prescriptions as to what election coverage should be carried. There may also be an explicit public service component to the licence - for example, obliging the licensee to carry public education programmes.

How important private broadcasting stations are as an information source for voters is a question that cannot be answered separately from the role of the public broadcaster. In the United States, at one extreme, public broadcasting plays a minimal role, so voters derive a very large part of their election information from private broadcasters. Paradoxically, a country like Tanzania, where television has only been introduced in very recent times, private commercial television has much greater weight than the public broadcaster. (This contrasts with most African countries where state television still dominates - and indeed with Zanzibar, the one part of Tanzania where television has existed for a long time.) [2]

Private television is the fastest growing sector of the media in many parts of the world - not only in Western Europe, where it made a comparatively late start, but also Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. In many cases the owners of private broadcasting stations have explicit political and electoral ambitions. The clearest example is of Italy's Silvio Berlusconi, whose broadcasting stations successfully promoted his ambition to become his country's Prime Minister. A similar phenomenon can be seen in many countries of Latin America, as well as Central and Eastern Europe.

[1]Richard Carver, South Africa, in Richard Carver and Ann Naughton (eds) Who Rules the Airwaves? Broadcasting in Africa, ARTICLE 19 and Index on Censorship, London 1995, p. 91

[2]Richard Carver, "Trends and Themes in African Broadcasting" in Richard Carver and Ann Naughton (eds) Who Rules the Airwaves? Broadcasting in Africa, ARTICLE 19 and Index on Censorship, London 1995, p. 5

Print Media

The print media display the greatest diversity of all, in both ownership and content. They range from daily to weekly newspapers, from news magazines to a range of special interest publications. For the purposes of elections we are primarily concerned with newspapers, although many of the observations and standards might also apply to other types of print media.

Even in situations where the state retains a large stake in broadcasting, the print media are usually in private hands. The main exceptions are likely to be authoritarian or dictatorial systems under which free elections are unlikely to be on the agenda. But there are also countries, such as some in northern Europe, where a public subsidy is paid to newspapers to ensure the political diversity of the press. In countries emerging from dictatorship, aid donors sometimes subsidize private newspapers with a similar aim. By and large, however, newspapers derive their income from advertising and sales revenue (with the former usually much more significant than the latter).

The ideal of the "Fourth Estate" - the media keeping a check over government - is perhaps more effective in the print media than broadcasting. At least some newspapers in any country are likely to conduct serious news investigations and to comment in a reasonably sophisticated manner on political developments. The same is not always true of broadcasters.

But newspapers still have their own political agenda, which may not necessarily be a democratic one. A notorious example was the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio, which campaigned against the elected government in 1973 and in favour of a military coup - a clear case where the press dismally failed to promote political pluralism. The usual argument, however, is that the existence of a variety of newspapers reflecting different viewpoints will ensure a better informed public and a free interplay of political ideas. The Herman/Chomsky “propaganda model” of the mass media applies as much to mass circulation newspapers as to broadcasters.

Newspapers are perhaps more likely than broadcasting stations to endorse a political candidate or party explicitly. Political culture varies from country to country. In many countries explicit editorial endorsement of a political choice would be unthinkable; in others it is regarded as normal. Classical journalistic ethics would still demand that news reportage of fact be strictly separated from the expression of editorial comment. Nevertheless, a chosen political agenda will almost inevitably affect the selection of which news is to be covered.

In a more general sense the newspapers, along with other media, apply an overall selection of which are legitimate issues to be debated in an election campaign. The aspiration would always be that these are the issues of particular concern to voters. Unfortunately, it is often the cases that the media and political parties are complicit in their choice of the priority issues.

Community Media

In many parts of the world, community media are a rapidly growing phenomenon. Debates rage about who exactly are entitled to call themselves community media. Usually, the definition includes something about being produced by the community, for the community. In other words, it is not just enough for it to be aimed at a small local area; it should be produced with the involvement of that community.

But then, what is a community? Traditionally it has been assumed to refer to a geographical community. But in South Africa, for example, with one of the widest networks of community radio in the world, the term is also used to refer to a community of interest, especially among disadvantaged sectors of society. Thus there might be a "women's community", a "gay community" or a "community of people with disabilities". There may also be community media aimed at people of a certain religious faith. [1]

The media themselves will also vary. Community newspapers have a long history, but the last 20 years have seen the emergence of lower cost broadcasting technologies, accompanied by a liberalization of licensing regimes. This has facilitated the emergence in some countries of a vibrant community radio sector (and to a lesser extent television).

In some countries, national public broadcasters will also play a community role, carrying material produced by (or aimed at) particular local communities, or communities of interest.

The significance of this for elections is immediately apparent. Community media, almost by definition, have a small but highly loyal audience. For purposes of voter education, community media will be very important, especially since they can reach sections of society that may be bypassed by more traditional media.

The terms of community broadcasting licences often prohibit explicit political campaigning. It will be particularly important for a regulatory authority to monitor compliance with the terms of a licence during election periods.

[1] Richard Carver, South Africa, in Richard Carver and Ann Naughton (eds) Who Rules the Airwaves? Broadcasting in Africa, ARTICLE 19 and Index on Censorship, London 1995, p. 93. See also http://www.amarc.org (World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters).

Party Media

It is a paradox that those media that are directly owned and controlled by political parties - which are likely to be the most concerned about the outcome of an election - fall outside most systems of media regulation. If a newspaper is simply a campaigning sheet for the party that owns it, it is not effectively bound by any of the professional or legal standards that govern the behaviour of the media as a whole.

In many countries, political parties are not allowed to own broadcasting stations, since this is deemed to be an unfair allocation of a national resource - the frequency spectrum - to a narrow political interest.

Essentially, political party media will fall into one of three categories, and it will be for the regulatory authority to decide which:

• Propaganda sheets that do not fall under a media regulator, but may be monitored if, for example, they constitute campaign spending , which may be limited by law.
• Conventional private media that just happen to be owned by a party. In that case, they will have to conform to the prevailing standards or regulations for other private media.
• Government media, in a situation in which the ruling party and government have been intertwined. In that case, media using public funds should conform to the same standards as any other public media - which in practice probably means that they cannot campaign for the party at all.

Increasingly, however, another type of media is emerging that straddles the distinction between party and private media. Individual politicians, or business leaders with political aspirations, own media that appear to be regular outlets. For all intents and purposes, these are conventional private media that are subject to the same laws and regulations as any other.

"New" Media

The practices and principles of media behaviour in elections were developed for what we now regard as “old” media: newspapers, radio, and television. Yet new forms of media are developing at a rapid rate. The Internet is the obvious example, but there are other technologies that have a clear relevance to elections: short messages (SMS) transmitted over mobile telephones, for example.

Are the regulatory practices and styles of reporting that have developed over the years for conventional media equally applicable to “new” media?

First, there is a potential confusion to clear out of the way. There are many possible uses for electronic communications technology in the electoral process itself. These include registering and voting online using the internet or SMS. However, these are quite specific and need to be distinguished from the role that these technologies may play as news or campaigning media. These are not discussed here.

Many of the assumptions that underlie the regulation of conventional media simply do not apply to new media. For example, the space to publish material on the World Wide Web is literally infinite, compared with the assumption behind broadcasting regulation that the frequency spectrum is a finite resource that must be shared.

New technologies may, to some extent, also challenge the dominance of powerful corporate or governmental voices. It is far easier for individuals or small groups to set up web sites or campaign using SMS messages than it is for them to launch newspapers or television stations. Ultimately, however, the internet and other new technologies are carried on media (such as telephone lines) that are owned by governments or large corporate owners.

The regulatory challenge posed by new media so far has been the following: old media can be regulated in a way that does not constitute censorship and enhances, rather than restricts, freedom of expression. Such regulation of new media has proven impossible. New media can be regulated, but the content of the Internet, for example, is so diverse and widespread that regulation has been heavy-handed and has amounted to censorship: interception of emails, closure of web sites, and pressure or legal action against Internet service providers.

The Internet, in particular, poses a challenge to traditional views of media conduct in elections. Election reporting blackouts, for example, have been rendered virtually obsolete by the activities of unregulated web sites. The characteristic of the Internet that places it beyond regulation is its international nature. Attempts by national regulators to close down websites are met by the creation of mirror sites (replicas) beyond the country’s borders.

This regulatory challenge is likely to extend beyond the written word, with the development of Internet radio and, with time, television. Other variants, such as podcasting – the transmission of audio files – RSS (Really Simple Syndication) and peer-to-peer networks, will only increase this challenge.

The Internet

The Internet has been hailed as the next revolution in electoral communications, just as it is claimed to have revolutionized the global flow of information. Already, opinion polls are conducted by Internet (though one hopes that the findings are treated with extreme caution). Treating such assertions with due scepticism does not mean dismissing them out of hand - simply taking a sober approach to how the Internet fits into the overall media structure.

The first point is that the Internet is dependent upon telecommunications - for the most part still land lines rather than mobile telephony. Two further examples immediately underline the significance of this. First, there are more telephones in Manhattan than in the whole of Africa. Second, in South Africa, which has about the eighteenth highest level of Internet connectivity in the world, more than half the population have never made a telephone call. [1] Put simply, the Internet remains a communications medium for the relatively rich, rather than the mass of the world's voters. In this it is unlike radio, or even television, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, the Internet has rapidly become a vitally important means of political communication - witness the lengths that governments such as the Chinese will go to in order to limit access to "subversive" Web sites. In a context where the conventional media are highly censored, the Internet can be an important means for small numbers of people to receive politically sensitive information that can then be more widely circulated. In other words, for most of the globe, the significance is more that the Internet will enable alternative ideas to be put into circulation rather than serving as a means of mass communication by parties, candidates, or electoral authorities.

The "convergence" between the technology of broadcasting and that of telecommunications is also likely to lead to a closer linkage between traditional media and the Internet. Certainly the major providers in one field can cross easily into the other. Telephony has moved towards the use of satellites, while broadcasting has moved towards the use of fibre-optic cable. The likely economic and social consequence is the growth of private media monopolies in the broadcasting and Internet field.

Even in the United States, where Internet use is most widespread, political parties have made surprisingly little and unsophisticated use of the Internet. The reluctance of modern politicians to engage in spontaneous interaction with the electorate perhaps explains this. Politicians' Web sites tend to be the same material that is available in other, more traditional formats, repackaged for the Internet.

Where the Internet has developed faster in relation to elections has been in the material posted by non-governmental organizations. In the US, this has included searchable online databases that allow the public to research campaign contributions to the different candidates or to research a politician’s voting record- developments that can only enhance democracy.

A more problematic development, however, is the use of Internet reporting to subvert conventions that have been widely accepted by "traditional" media - for example by reporting exit polls before voting has ended.

An important characteristic of the Internet – good or bad depending on one’s point of view – is the ease of access of individuals and small organizations. The Internet poses none of the traditional constraints on publishing: neither expense nor quality control. This has led, for example, to the emergence of “blogging” (a contraction of the term “Web log”). These independent and often intemperate individual political diaries have been condemned and praised in equal measure. But they are a political phenomenon that is here to stay.

Other technological developments within the Internet will also have political ramifications. Really Simple Syndication (RSS) is a means of disseminating news stories rapidly and at virtually no cost. Peer-to-peer networks allow the simple, low-cost transfer of large files (such as audio and video files) to a wide audience. “Podcasting” is a term coined to describe the broadcasting of audio materials over the Internet (and in theory their downloading to personal stereo players).

The combination of these technologies – such as the syndication of podcasts – has enormous potential significance. These are media with potentially mass audiences that are beyond the control of any regulatory authority. This is a largely beneficial development, something that evades censorship and increases freedom of expression. For example, in Singapore, where the main media are under official control, the opposition leader has used podcasts to distribute his political messages.

Taken in conjunction with the conventional media, the Internet can only grow in importance. After all, many journalists now use the Internet as an important source of stories. Electoral authorities increasingly use a World Wide Web site as a means of publishing information. This will then be picked up by the conventional media and made available more widely. This is particularly important, for example, in publishing results. If the Web site can be linked to the results database of the authority's computer, this will mean that results are publicly available immediately.

The Internet can also be an important way of distributing items such as packages for radio broadcast. This is a particularly effective way of making programming available to local or regional radio stations in large countries - Indonesia, for example, has experimented with this approach. This has a potential use for distributing voter education material or direct access slots.

[1] Sally Burnheim, The Right to Communicate: The Internet in Africa, ARTICLE 19, London, 1999. (http://www.article19.org.)

Cellular Telephones and Election Campaigning

Cellular telephones are potentially a very important medium for electoral communication, for two reasons:

• Ownership and access to cellular phones (cellphones, mobiles, handphones….) far outstrips access to landlines. This disparity is especially apparent in poorer countries, but it is a general phenomenon
• Cellphones have a potential as a “broadcasting” medium that is not comparable to traditional landlines. Whereas the landline could be used for voice calls and transmitting documents, the cellphone can send and receive text messages, audio and video files.

The use of cellphones in political campaigning or broadcasting is not yet well developed, but the potential is obvious. So far this has focused on the use of text or short messages (SMS). There are two well-documented examples from the Philippines. In 2001 President Joseph Estrada was forced to resign after a popular campaign against him orchestrated by SMS. Then, in the 2004 presidential elections, SMS was a very popular campaigning tool for the main candidates.

It is hard to see how SMS could easily be brought within the regulatory ambit without resorting to heavy-handed censorship. Also, SMS, like email, can easily be “spoofed”. This means that messages can be sent from masked or fake addresses (as with email “spam”), making the regulator’s task even more difficult.

What has so far been confined to SMS could rapidly develop through audio and video files, with the development of “third generation” (3G) phones capable of exchanging these easily. This is a point where Internet-based techniques (such as podcasting) and cellular telephony overlap. Political broadcasts could be distributed by a mixture of media, to be watched or listened to on telephones or personal stereo players.

These technologies are potentially available to all the players in election campaigns. Parties can use them to distribute campaign material; media can enhance the audience for their broadcasts; and electoral managers can use them to educate the public and increase political participation, especially among young voters.

Level of Media Professionalism

An important element in the media environment is the degree of professionalism and experience of journalists and other media practitioners. It is common that journalists in a country that has only recently emerged from a highly restrictive political system will lack many of the skills and professional standards of their counterparts in a country with a long history of media freedom.

Sometimes, the media will be emerging from a situation in which journalism was not freely practised at all. In that case, there may well be a tendency to abuse new-found freedoms with poorly researched and inaccurate stories. Often, journalists in these situations will simply not know what professional standards are expected of them: they will not have professional bodies or trade unions with codes of conduct. They will lack the basic skills for investigating, checking, and writing or broadcasting stories. In particular, journalists who are approaching their first free election are likely to be unfamiliar with even the simplest aspects of the process. Often, there will be no facilities for training journalists - or at least none that equips them with the skills that they need to play the "watchdog" role of the media in a democracy.

However, the experience of an authoritarian regime may not be entirely negative. In many cases, courageous independent journalism has played an important part in pressuring dictatorships to open up the political space. Journalists who have successfully investigated and published sensitive stories in such a media environment will have developed professional skills that are unmatched by their colleagues in friendlier circumstances. In the context of an election, the professional challenge will be to bring these skills to bear on a new and unfamiliar set of stories to be reported.

Journalism Training

The standards of journalism will be determined in part by the existence of training institutions. This, in turn, will be influenced by two main factors: the political and economic climate.

In a situation where the media environment is greatly restricted, there is unlikely to be any academic or training institution that can teach journalists the necessary skills. It is unlikely also that professional bodies will be willing or able to provide such training. In poorer countries, providing journalism training is seldom seen as a priority. This is often a result of the low social status accorded to journalists.

In either circumstance, it may help to develop training facilities on a regional or even international level. International journalists' organizations such as the International Federation of Journalists have considerable expertise (including in the area of election reporting) and can provide training, especially in new or transitional democracies Regional training institutions can provide a type of journalism training that is well geared to the experience of a journalist's home country, without the same political or economic constraints. Aspiring journalists with access to the Internet will be able to learn a great deal from various websites.

Legal Framework for Media

An important factor in determining the pluralism, independence and vibrancy of the media will be the legal context within which they operate. Journalists themselves often tend towards the view that the less the law has to do with them the better. Certainly the ideal is probably that the legal framework for the media is aimed at creating an enabling environment in which journalism can flourish, rather than regulating its every aspect.

The broad legal framework within which the media operate derives in the first instance from international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is customary international law, which informs the way in which all other law is interpreted. In Article 19, the UDHR provides a fundamental guarantee of the right to freedom of expression, which encompasses the freedom of the media. This is echoed and elaborated in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):

"Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice."

This is a treaty, which is binding upon any state that ratifies it.

Further, there are regional treaties in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, each of which contains similar guarantees of freedom of expression and media freedom.

At a national level, freedom of expression and of the media will be affected by laws at several different levels:

• The Constitution - the basic or supreme law of the land.
• Statutes passed by the legislature.
• Decrees, regulations, or other statutory instruments, which will usually have lesser force than statutory law.

In principle, of course, all these areas of law will relate to each other in a harmonious fashion. If a country has ratified the ICCPR or its regional human rights treaty, then its provisions will be reflected in the Constitution, which in turn will determine the content of subsidiary law. But life is seldom that simple.

In many legal systems, ratified treaties do not automatically find their way into enforceable national law. Constitutions may have been drafted long ago, before a treaty was ratified. Or the Constitution may reflect progressive developments in freedom of expression law, but other statutes may not have been amended to take account of this. In principle, ratified treaties may take precedence over the Constitution and provide the means for interpreting it. Or they may be deemed to be of equal status to it. Or they may still be part of the domestic law, but regarded as inferior to the Constitution. Likewise, the Constitution will usually be sovereign in relation to statutes, which will be deemed ineffective if they come into conflict with it.

All this, in turn, is contingent upon how far governments respect the rule of law in practice. Even in stable democracies, this is not something that can be taken for granted. A government can easily be irritated by what it sees an inquiring and interfering press and take illegal measures to try to stop its investigations - ranging from unlawfully seizing a journalist's notes to organizing death squads. In this area, as in any other, the vigilance of the judicial system and its readiness to confront the executive branch of government are vital.

Constitutional Protection for Media Freedom

The trend in recent years has been towards strengthening the role and supremacy of the constitution in law and government. Increasingly, notions such as the "sovereignty of parliament" are being superseded by the idea that there should be a single supreme law that governs everyone. Even Britain, the home of the "sovereignty of parliament" concept, with its supposed "unwritten constitution", has now incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into its domestic law as a type of Bill of Rights. The United States, by contrast, has a long history of constitutional rule. The first amendment to the US Constitution famously provides that "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" - in other words the supreme law is set above the legislature.

More generally, older constitutions that provide a general protection of freedom of expression are now understood to encompass freedom of the media and a right to freedom of information, two of the most relevant aspects where media and elections are concerned.

The South African Constitution (1996), in its Section 16 on freedom of expression, represents some of the most progressive modern constitutional thinking on media freedom:

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes - (a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.

(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to - (a) propaganda for war; (b) incitement of imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.

The exceptions in Section 16(2) echo those in Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

When a strong constitutional protection of freedom of expression is introduced, a government may conduct an audit of existing laws to determine whether they conform to the constitution. Any that do not will have to be repealed or amended to bring them into line with the constitution.

But in many instances, such an audit does not take place. The constitutionality of existing laws will then only be tested by litigation when the government tries to apply a law that may be outdated. It is in these circumstances that the existence of an independent judiciary that is prepared to enforce the constitutional protection of rights becomes especially important.

Under most constitutions, the right to freedom of expression may be suspended or "derogated from" in certain exceptional circumstances. According to international standards, this should only be when there is a lawfully declared state of emergency. The suspension of rights should only be for the duration of a genuine emergency threatening the life of the nation.

Statutes Affecting the Media

Different legal traditions have very different approaches to the role of statutory law in relation to the media (or other aspects of national life). Countries with a civil law or socialist legal tradition tend as a matter of course to have a comprehensive statute governing the media. Common law countries tend not to, instead assuming that the media are subject to the general law of the country except in narrowly specified areas.

The variety of different systems makes it difficult to generalize about the laws in force relating to the media. The following, however, is a list of principles derived from various international standards that give some indication of what laws that permit a healthy degree of media freedom might look like:

• Anyone is free to set up a media outlet, provided that they abide by the basic business law of the country. There will be no procedure for licensing the print media. Broadcast media may be licensed by a publicly accountable regulatory body according to publicly available standards.
• Anyone is free to practice as a journalist. There will be no legally prescribed qualification or registration process.
• Defamation law will provide a civil remedy in the event of wilful harm to reputation - but this will not be a criminal offence. Politicians and other public figures will be offered less protection by defamation law than private individuals.
• "Sedition" laws will not penalize journalists or others merely on the basis of the reporting of facts or the expression of opinions. "National security" provisions will be narrowly drawn and will only apply in the case of a genuine threat to the life of the nation - not in order to protect politicians or government agencies from legitimate scrutiny.
• There will be a presumption that official information belongs to the public. It will only be protected in order to safeguard a legitimate national security interest or for a number of other closely defined reasons. Otherwise there should be mechanisms in place to ensure public access to official information.
• Journalists should not be compelled to disclose the confidential source of information, except in very narrow circumstances - in practice only when maintaining confidentiality would impede a criminal investigation and where the information is not available from any other source.

Other Statutory Instruments Affecting the Media

Many statutes passed by the legislature will require the enactment of further detailed regulations to give them force. For example, the legislature may pass a broadcasting statute, but regulations will need to be drawn up to lay down the exact licensing procedure. Such regulations will usually be issued by the Minister responsible. This sort of statutory instrument is indeed legally binding, but it is inferior to a statute passed by the legislature. Should there be a conflict between the two, the statute will prevail.

Another type of statutory instrument is more problematic. Authoritarian governments will often rule by decree. A decree is also a law. Although most legal systems would take it to be inferior to a law passed by parliament, sometimes a decree may declare itself to be superior to other law, including even the Constitution. (The Nigerian military dictatorship, for example, enacted many decrees of this type.) In such difficult circumstances it will be the responsibility of the judiciary to assert the superiority of established law over the declarations of dictators.

Case Law Affecting the Media

The relevance of previous cases in interpreting law differs according to different legal systems. In general, common law systems work very largely on case law since the "common law" is not written down anywhere and depends on judges "discovering" it. A judge in any particular case will rely heavily on previous judges who have decided upon similar cases or involving similar issues. Although precedence is naturally given to cases from the judge's own country (and from the more superior courts), this approach allows precedents from other countries with a similar legal system to be taken into account also.

Historically, civil law countries did not share this approach. However, the development of international law has provided new interpretative standards in many instances. Thus, for example, Spanish law requires the application of the European Human Rights Convention to be taken into account in interpreting Spain’s own constitution. The case law of regional human rights courts such as the Inter-American and the European cuts across distinctions between common and civil law jurisdictions and is intended to be invoked under either system.

In practice, common law systems have an increasing body of statute law, while civil law systems draw upon the approach in previous cases - including in both systems in relation to the media and elections. The two systems are undoubtedly growing closer together.

Existing Media Regulatory Frameworks

A vital part of the media environment - and one that will be of particular relevance during an election - is the existing regulatory system. These come in all shapes and sizes but, for the sake of convenience, can be broken down into three main types:

• Broadcasting regulator: these will exist in some form wherever there is broadcasting. Their basic function is to allocate frequencies to the broadcasters. To some extent, this will entail deciding who gets a licence to broadcast and who does not. It may also involve drawing up the terms of a licence to prescribe what type of content the licensee may or may not broadcast. It may also include a complaints mechanism.
• Voluntary media council: this is a form of self-regulation that is very common among print media especially. Media councils may develop codes of conduct, consider complaints and conduct training of journalists. This is not, however, a mechanism for licensing journalists or determining who may practice.
• Other statutory regulator: a large variety of institutions fall under this heading. These range from constitutional bodies designed to ensure the independence of the media to state licensing authorities that control who may publish a newspaper or practise as a journalist.

The regulatory system will in many cases have a considerable influence on the independence and professionalism of the media. A system that is under tight governmental control is unlikely to promote pluralism and diversity among the media. A voluntary system, or one with strong legal or constitutional guarantees of independence, can safeguard pluralism in the media from government interference and can help to develop professional skills and standards.

An independent and trusted regulatory body can be important in an election, since it may take on some or all of the specialized functions involved in regulating the media during an election campaign.

Broadcasting Regulator

The word "regulation" is one that makes many journalists and broadcasters nervous, yet the reality is that in almost every country of the world someone decides who may broadcast and on what frequency. The main argument in favour of having such a body is that the airwaves are a finite resource. It is a matter of national policy how they are distributed - unlike newspaper publishing, for example, which can be largely determined by what the public chooses to read. If there were no statutory allocation of frequencies, then anyone with a large and strong transmitter could drown out a broadcaster with a weaker signal simply by broadcasting on an adjacent frequency. Hence broadcasting regulation, when carried out properly, is not a means of censorship but of ensuring that a variety of voices are heard.

There is a growing argument that in the age of satellite broadcasting, digital technology and convergence between broadcasting and telecommunications the old rationale for regulation has become redundant. Now, it is argued, there are enough channels for everyone to have their say. But the reality is that most of the audience for broadcasting still uses the old technologies - often a battery-powered or even clockwork transistor radio, or an ordinary terrestrial TV set. Satellite technology may be more widely available than before, but community and small private broadcasters (not to mention public national broadcasters) still depend on the old ways.

The frequencies available within any one country will be allocated, after negotiation, by the International Telecommunications Union. How they are then distributed to broadcasters within the country will vary enormously. An example of modern thinking on the issue comes from South Africa, where the Constitution provides for the existence of an independent regulatory body. The South African Communications Regulatory Authority (formerly the Independent Broadcasting Authority) has responsibility for regulating broadcasters in three sectors: public, private and community. It is unusual for a regulatory body to have authority over public broadcasting, but this has the advantage that it should allow the development of a coherent national broadcasting policy. The US Federal Communications Commission also has overall responsibility for frequency allocation, but that is in a situation where there is very little public broadcasting. In Canada, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is answerable to Parliament, while a separate body, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, is responsible for regulating private broadcasting.

It is now generally recognized that broadcasting licences should be allocated by an independent publicly accountable body, according to pre-determined criteria. A regulatory body will often incorporate a complaints procedure, which may allow it to impose sanctions on broadcasters for breach of the terms of their licence. In extreme cases, the sanction would be to refuse to renew a licence after its term had expired, or even to revoke it before the term had ended.

All this is relevant in an election context, since a broadcasting regulator already carries out some of the functions that an electoral supervisory body may wish to assume in relation to the media. It may be more practical, therefore, for the broadcasting regulator itself to play that role.

Voluntary Media Council

Many countries have a voluntary media or press council, formed by the media profession itself. This is a regulatory body only in the sense that it may act as a complaints mechanism for members of the public who have a grievance about the way a newspaper or broadcaster has covered a particular issue. Clearly, a voluntary body of this sort cannot fulfil functions such as granting broadcasting licences.

The value of voluntary media councils is that they may be a way of dealing with problems - such as public complaints - without resort to litigation. An informal solution, such as the publication of an apology or retraction, replaces a lengthy and costly legal process. The media often also adopt this sort of mechanism as a way of pre-empting statutory regulation that may interfere with their own independence.

The role of a voluntary media council may be broader. It may, for example, undertake training of journalists or formulation of codes of conduct. These are also activities that may be useful for election coverage. There are clear advantages in a media professional body organizing training, while a voluntary code of conduct may be a useful and non-confrontational way of introducing the necessary professional standards to journalists who are inexperienced in election reporting. The media council's own complaints mechanism would then be able to address a matter if journalists fall short of the required standards.

Statutory or Constitutional Regulators

Some countries have statutory or constitutional bodies that are charged with regulating the media, or some section of it. It is a type of structure that is more typical of civil law than common law systems. Usually what it entails is some system of registration of publications, as well as broadcasters, and sometimes of journalists as well. This type of approach is generally opposed by media practitioners, who take the view that only the profession itself is competent to decide who can practise. It is a short step from registering publications or practitioners to licensing them - with all the negative implications that that would carry for media independence and the right to freedom of expression.

However, constitutional bodies may sometimes be charged with protecting the independence of the media, including the publicly owned media, from the government of the day. This, for example, is the role of the National Media Commission in Ghana. Where a regulatory body genuinely does play this role, it may be well placed to help to supervise the media in elections.

Law or Regulations on Media During Elections

Many countries have nothing in their laws to govern the behaviour of the media during elections and see no reason why they should. Others see some measure of special media regulation during an election as being part of the process of "levelling the playing field". Still others are somewhere in the middle, with a system of voluntary self-regulation, whereby the media agree to adopt a series of self-limiting regulations because of the special demands of an election period.

Even in long-established democracies, there are widely divergent views on how far the media should be subject to formal regulation in election periods. The US tradition is one of minimal regulation, while the European one tends more towards the establishment of enforceable rules. One reason for the difference is that Europe, unlike the United States, has a history of state involvement in domestic broadcasting. The implication of this is that the precious resources of broadcasting and the frequency spectrum should be used fairly to reflect the views of the different candidates and not improperly favour the ruling party. As in its broader approach to media freedom issues, the US view is generally that the "marketplace of ideas" is most readily achieved by recourse to the economic marketplace. Thus, the pluralism of many privately owned media is assumed in itself to ensure that the full spectrum of political views find their voice.

But whatever the differing political culture as regards media regulation, it is generally acknowledged that the media have a vital role to play in communicating information to the electorate. This makes it rather surprising that so few electoral laws deal to any great extent with the media. The absence of formal statutes or regulations might indicate a mature media environment in which there is a free interchange of political ideas in the press and over the airwaves and where every party has fair access to the media to get its ideas across. Or it might not.

Zimbabwean electoral law, for example, makes no mention of the media at all. In every election in the country's history, the state has had a monopoly of broadcasting (which is under tight government control) and, for most of that time, a monopoly of the daily newspapers too. The absence of any specific regulation of the media in elections, far from "levelling the playing field", has allowed the government to "move the goal posts". For example, the refusal of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) to run opposition advertisements during a referendum in February 2000 prompted the opposition to seek a High Court order against the broadcaster. They succeeded in doing so, but arguably it should not have been necessary. In subsequent parliamentary elections, the ZBC decided not to run political advertising at all - until election day, when it broadcast advertisements for the ruling party, too late for other parties to respond. Under election law (though possibly not under Zimbabwean broadcasting law), the ZBC was entitled to do this. [1]

In situations where large sections of the media are either publicly owned or under the control of one particular political interest group (this may in practice be the same thing), then it probably makes sense for the law to set out some basic rules for election coverage. These will often differ in their provisions for public and privately owned media. The areas that the law (or subsidiary regulations) may cover include the following:

• how time or space will be allocated to candidates and political parties
• whether paid political advertising is to be permitted
• what duty the media have to carry voter education material or candidate debates
• whether there is to be a right of reply to factual misrepresentation in the media
  
  

In addition, the regulations may deal with other more specific issues such as:

• news blackouts or "reflection periods"
• restrictions on reporting of opinion polls
• policies on "hate speech" and defamation
  
  

The law or regulations will probably create a statutory body with responsibility for oversight of the media during election, or will assign that responsibility to some existing body such as the electoral commission or broadcasting regulator. Included in the law, there is likely to be some speedy mechanism for dealing with complaints about media coverage.

[1] Media Monitoring Project Zimbabawe. Election 2000: The Media War, Harare, 2000, p. 11.

Image:

Election night 07/06/2009 by European Parliament is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.0 Generic License.

Who Should be Involved in the Drafting Process?

Laws are made by the legislature, so in principle the answer to this question is simple. In practice it is less so. Any law that "regulates" the media is profoundly sensitive, even when the purpose of regulation is to ensure pluralism in the media and a full voice to different political viewpoints.

In any event, good legislative practice involves consultation and the following are the main stakeholders to be consulted in drafting laws or regulations on the media and elections:

• The media themselves - directly, as well as through professional bodies and trade unions.
• The political parties - since part of the purpose of regulation is to ensure that they have fair access to the media.
• Any existing regulatory body, whether it be a broadcasting regulator involved in the distribution of frequencies or a media council responsible for the development and enforcement of professional standards.
• Election administrators - many aspects of the media's work during elections depend on a close working relationship with those responsible for supervising and administering the election.
• The electorate - since it is they whose information needs are ultimately at stake. To consult "the electorate" as a whole is clearly problematic, but it should be possible to identify representative organizations, for example of those who may have special information requirements. These might include national or ethnic minorities, women, the illiterate or people with disabilities.

A Specified Campaign Period?

If there is to be some regulation of what the media may or may not do during an election, then this is likely to apply to a specified campaign period. There will be a given period of official campaigning during which the regulations will apply, while otherwise normal practice will prevail. This is logical, perhaps, but can still be rather problematic.

One issue is voter education. Information on issues such as voter registration will usually need to be communicated to the electorate well in advance of the official campaign. Regulations will be aimed to ensure that this information is communicated in an accurate and impartial manner.

Voters may be just as much influenced by what they learn from the media at an earlier period. Media monitoring teams, for example, would always start their work well in advance of the official campaign period.

Political wisdom (and experience prior to the 2000 election) in the United States has it that the candidate who is leading on Labor Day (in September) will win the presidential election (in November). So nothing that happens in the final two months of the campaigning (longer than most countries' official campaign period) has much influence. The American approach is to have no designated campaign period at all - indeed roughly two years out of every presidential term are taken up with campaigning. But this would not suit most countries.

The opposite extreme is represented by Israel, where the electoral law relating to media coverage covers a time frame of 150 days before the election - that is, nearly five months. During the 30 days immediately before the election, no campaigning is permitted in cinemas or on television, although there are no such limitations on radio.

And few countries have election periods quite as closely defined as Estonia, where the law relating to the obligations of broadcasters in the election creates a clearly separated pre-election and election period, with the latter then subdivided into four further periods, each with its own different reporting rules: the application period, the election campaign, the voting period, and the period of determining and publishing the election results.

But the application of such strict regulation presupposes that there will be a set date for the election. In many countries, particularly those that have an electoral system based on the British one, choice of the election date lies with the incumbent head of government. Alternatively, in most systems, an election may be precipitated by an event such as parliamentary vote of no confidence. In such cases, it will be impossible to apply media regulations that extend beyond a fairly limited campaign period.

The best option, perhaps, is for the system of electoral media regulation to be well meshed with the general system of media regulation - ensuring that the media are pluralistic, vibrant, professional, and free from censorship at all times, not just during campaign periods.

[1] Akiba A. Cohen and Gadi Wolfsfeld, "Overcoming Adversity and Diversity: The Utility of Television Political Advertising in Israel", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

Different Obligations of Public and Private Media

What we refer to here as the "publicly owned" media covers a variety of different phenomena: from media that are under tight government control of their editorial content to those that are funded out of money raised from taxes and licence fees, but with a statutory guarantee of their total independence from the government of the day. Most probably lie somewhere in between. But what they have in common is that the media or election law usually treats them all similarly - and as distinct from the private media, which are held to have different obligations.

Public media, by virtue of their source of funding, are a resource for the entire electorate. It is generally accepted that they should not be politically partisan in their editorial coverage. This was the view set out by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, in his 1999 report, when he spoke of the obligation of the state-owned media to give voice to a variety of opinions and not to be a propaganda organ for one particular political party. Also, they have particular obligations to provide civic education, as well as to provide a platform for the different political parties.

This point is fundamental. Use of a public resource for partisan political campaigning carries all the same legal and ethical implications whether the resource is funds, a vehicle, a building, or a radio station. That is why there are so often clear laws or regulations protecting public media against government interference.

The obligations of the private media are far fewer. The essence of a free media environment is that broadcasters and journalists are not told what they may or may not say or write. The best guarantee that the variety of political ideas are communicated freely and accurately is often understood to be for the media to be allowed to get on with their job unhampered. But this does not mean that private media have no obligations at all. Professional journalistic standards will demand accurate and balanced reporting, as well as a clear separation of fact and comment.

Broadcasting stations usually have their licences allocated by a public body. This will often come with terms attached about whether they are allowed to support any political party; what, if any, news coverage they are allowed to broadcast; and other conditions such as whether they have an obligation, for example, to broadcast public service announcements such as voter education spots.

Likewise, any general laws or regulations relating to media reporting will probably apply equally to both public or private media: for example, provisions relating to "blackout" periods before the vote or the coverage of opinion polls. Similarly, general legal provisions such as the law of defamation - although they may be somewhat modified in their effect during the campaign period - will still apply equally to both public and private media.

Provisions that Affect Both Private and Public Media

Although the regulatory system will probably make some distinction between the publicly and privately-owned media, a number of aspects of the law or regulations governing the media in elections are likely to affect both sectors. These may include:

• an expedited procedure for hearing complaints against the media by the public or political parties.
• any regulations relating to the reporting of opinion polls.
• policies relating to "hate speech", defamation, media liability for the statements of politicians and other related issues.
• any policy on news blackouts before or during the election.
• journalists' right of access to election events.
• accreditation of journalists.
• provisions to ensure the safety of journalists.

The regulatory authority may place different obligations on the private and public media over matters such as whether they carry voter education or direct access materials. But the usual practice is that where the private media carry such coverage - even when they are not obliged to - they should conform to the same standards of equity and impartiality as the public media.

Implementation Mechanism for Media and Election Regulations

One of the most important practical aspects of the law or regulations on media in elections is who is responsible for implementing it. There will often be much greater day-to-day contact between editors and the regulatory authority responsible for media during elections than there would normally be with, for example, a broadcasting regulator. The relationship is likely to be (or at least should be) a collaborative one.

There are several possible approaches that can be taken:

• An existing regulatory body may be given responsibility for the specific issues that arise during election periods.
• The media may set up their own regulatory body, possibly in collaboration with the political parties themselves.
• The existing electoral supervisory body, such as an electoral commission, may take on this responsibility, sometimes through a specialized sub-committee.
• A specialist body may be set up specifically to regulate the media during elections - an unusual solution that was adopted, for example, in South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994.
• The responsibility may be assigned to the judiciary.

This presentation is inevitably a little schematic. It is quite common for different aspects of electoral coverage to be regulated by different bodies. In Poland, for example, regulating the broadcasting of free direct access slots is the responsibility of the State Electoral Commission, while responsibility for campaign coverage rests with the usual broadcasting regulator, the National Broadcasting Council. [1] The advantage of such an approach is that it separates areas where the regulator may have to develop strict and binding rules from those matters of professional practice that are best left to the media themselves to determine. The disadvantage is that two different regulatory bodies are operating in two closely related areas, with the danger that they may step on each other’s toes.

Whatever system is adopted, the media (and anyone else affected, such as an individual complainant) will have a right of appeal to a higher independent body, usually a court of law.

[1] Karol Jakubowicz, "Poland and the 1993 Election Campaign: Following the Line of Least Resistance", in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

Implementation Mechanism: Existing Media Regulatory Body

Often an existing regulatory body will take on the function of supervising aspects of media coverage of elections, either on its own or in conjunction with the election administration itself.

This was the approach taken, for example, in the South African elections in 1999. The Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), the constitutionally mandated body that regulated all public, private, and community broadcasting, issued regulations governing a series of issues:

• Advertising and election broadcasting
• Timing of election broadcasting
• A formula for allocating election broadcast time to different parties
• General observations on the quality of coverage expected.

The latter section includes this general observation:

Every broadcaster who transmits news or current affairs programmes in respect of the elections shall do so in an impartial and objective manner and in a manner which treats all parties fairly.

In an annex to the regulations, the authority went on to elaborate what were the responsibilities of broadcasters (and the role of the IBA):

The Authority does not intervene in the news and programming operations of the broadcasters. Broadcasters' role during elections does not differ from their normal journalistic role during non-election periods. Normal ethical considerations will continue to apply. A distinguishing feature of the election period is the obligation to achieve equitable coverage of political parties without abdicating news value judgments.

Italy is another country where the existing media regulators have principal responsibility for supervising media coverage of elections. In that case, there are two separate bodies: a parliamentary commission that has responsibility for public broadcasting, and a Guarantor for radio, television, and the press, who is responsible for the privately-owned media. Both institutions make regulations governing coverage by the respective media sectors in elections.

Implementation Mechanism: Media Self-Regulation

Many in the media would see a system of self-regulation in elections as an ideal solution. This clearly works best where there are well-entrenched independent media and a long tradition of democratic elections, so that the solutions adopted to the problems of election coverage are sanctified by long-established practice.

Perhaps the best-known example of this approach is in Britain, where direct access Party Election Broadcasts are allocated by a joint committee of broadcasters and political party representatives. This is a strange hybrid solution, since the requirement for Party Election Broadcasts is established in law. The broadcasters then use the rough division of direct access broadcasts as a guideline for measuring their own allocation of time to the different parties in the course of news programmes.

Denmark also has a self-regulating system. The law forbids paid political advertising but says nothing about how (or whether) other forms of direct access broadcasting should be allocated. In practice, the public Danmarks Radio has allocated direct access slots equally between all parties running for parliament. This approach has been reinforced by decisions of the Ombudsman and Supreme Court, but is essentially voluntary. Danmarks Radio also traditionally broadcasts a panel debate involving all political parties. Also, on the last day before the election, television has been kept free of election broadcasts. However, the advent of private independent television has led to some changes in this tradition: the new TV2 also held a pre-election panel debate, but excluded some smaller parties, while it also introduced election coverage the day before the vote. [1]

However, it has not only been long-established democracies that have adopted a self-regulatory approach. Before the independence elections in Namibia in 1989, the state-controlled South West Africa Broadcasting Corporation (as it was then known) invited political parties to join a standing committee to consult on election coverage. The committee agreed on a schedule of direct access slots, although it was not able to address the problem of biased news coverage.[2]

The state broadcaster in another Southern African country, Zimbabwe, also tried to adopt a self-regulating approach towards direct access slots. This was prompted by a series of highly controversial advertisements for the ruling party in the 1990 election, which many saw as being in poor taste. The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation established a special committee before the 1995 elections in an attempt to avoid a recurrence of the problem. But, as in Namibia, it was not able to provide a serious solution to the problem of biased news coverage.

Hungary in 1990 also adopted a self-regulating approach. National television and the news agency, in collaboration with representatives of 12 political parties and the Independent Lawyers Forum, drafted a voluntary Electoral Code of Ethics. All the major parties adopted the code, along with most major news organizations.[3]

The state-owned Polish Radio and Television have adopted an approach that is similar to the BBC. Allocation of direct access broadcasting is the responsibility of the State Electoral Commission, but in their campaign news coverage, radio and television are answerable only to the National Broadcasting Council, the general regulatory body. The management of Polish Radio and Television have issued detailed guidelines to staff, including the following:

[Polish Radio and Television should] provide comprehensive coverage of the campaign and information about the candidates. News and current affairs programmes should provide extensive information about the parties, their election platforms and candidates, without any bias in favour or against any party and without promoting any set of political views. The main principle should be equality of access which puts channel controllers, programme departments and regional stations under an obligation to maintain records of the amount of airtime devoted to particular parties or candidates and to make sure that principle of equality is honoured.

[1] Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995, pp. 38-9

[2] Karen Siune, "Political Advertising in Denmark", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[3] ARTICLE 19, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies, London, 1994, p. 38.

Implementation Mechanism: Electoral Commission

In many instances, responsibility for implementing regulations on the media during election campaigns rests with the main electoral supervisory body itself. This is often seen as appropriate if the electoral supervisory body has sufficient guarantees of independence, as well as the expertise to conduct the specialized work of media regulation.

In France, the Commission national de controle de la campagne presidentielle (CNCCP) was responsible for many years for regulating broadcasts in the presidential election campaigns. However, this responsibility shifted with the advent of privately-owned television stations. A new Commission national pour des communications et des libertes was set up to ensure a continuing public service content in private broadcasting, and it was to this body that regulation of broadcasting passed. However, the CNCCP retained responsibility for regulating election campaigns in the print media. [1]

Malawi offers an extremely positive example of an electoral commission in a new democracy that, by an effective show of independence, was able to ensure that the different political parties and candidates received a fair share of coverage from the government-controlled broadcaster. But it was able to do this not only through a display of political will, but also because it had established a specialized media sub-committee that had the experience and expertise to deal with the broadcasters.

Using the electoral supervisory body may be a preferable option in a small country where a plethora of overlapping institutions is not an attractive or cost-effective choice. In Barbados, for example, it is the Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the body with overall responsibility for the election, that is also responsible for regulating media coverage.

Nicaragua's 1987 Constitution established a Supreme Electoral Council as an independent branch of government - separate from the executive, legislature, and judiciary. Its responsibility includes applying the mass media law during elections and administering a complaints procedure. It established a specialized Mass Media Department to deal with broadcasters, in particular trying to negotiate changes in practices that are the subject of complaints.[2]

[1] Anne Johnston and Jacques Gerstle, "The Role of Television Broadcasts in Promoting French Television Candidates", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[2] ARTICLE 19, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies, London, 1994, p. 38.

Implementation Mechanism: Specialist Body

A number of countries have opted to create a specialized body whose responsibility is to regulate media during election periods - that is, it is neither a general election administration body nor a general media regulatory body. This option has been seen most often in transitional elections in which the role of the media is expected to be particularly problematic for some reason.

Thus, South Africa, in 1994, established an Independent Media Commission in addition to a widely respected Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The law establishing the IMC went to some lengths to ensure the independence and competence of the commission through its membership. The chairperson was to be a judge or senior lawyer, while at least two other commissioners (out of a maximum of seven) were to have media experience - one in print and one in broadcasting. The commissioners were to be persons of high standing who "when viewed collectively, represent a broad cross-section of the population of the Republic". Various categories of people were disqualified from being commissioners, including state employees, office bearers in political parties, and those with a financial interest in the media.[1] But it was a solution that was only adopted and retained for the one election. In subsequent South African elections, responsibility has rested with a combination of the IEC and the independent broadcasting regulator.

The Media Experts Commission (MEC) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was also a specialized body for regulating the media in elections. As in South Africa, it was only in existence for a short transitional period. Part of its rationale was that inflammatory material in the media of the former Yugoslavia had played a significant part in inciting violence, resulting in civil war and the break-up of the federal republic. Where the MEC was unique was that it was an international body, operating under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), rather than being part of and answerable to any Bosnian structure. The MEC was in existence for two years, from 1996 until 1998.

The Russian Federation has a specialized "information court" - the Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes. This is not strictly speaking a body that is confined to dealing with media and election issues, since it also functions outside election periods. However, it was established in 1993 specifically because of the need for a body to resolve disputes that had arisen during election campaigns.

[1] Articles 4-6, Independent Media Commission Act.

Implementation Mechanism: Judiciary

In some countries responsibility for administering elections may lie with a specialized branch of the judiciary. Uruguay, for example, has an Electoral Court that administers the vote, can rule on disputes between the parties and can investigate challenges to the election results. It may also consider complaints about election campaigning in the media, including attempts to pressure the media into biased campaign coverage.

This is a common model in Latin American countries. In Costa Rica, for example, elections are run by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which also has responsibility for regulating media coverage. The tribunal is an independent constitutional body composed of judges, with its finances approved by the legislature. It is entirely independent of the executive branch of government. The exercise of its authority over the media has not been without controversy. In 1999, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal instructed a privately owned television channel, Teletica Canal 7, to invite all 13 presidential candidates to appear on a scheduled debate, rather than just the top four candidates as the station had planned. The Supreme Court refused to hear the station’s appeal on the grounds that this was an electoral matter.

In most instances, whatever the precise mechanism that has responsibility for regulating the media in elections, there will be a right of appeal to a judicial body against the regulator's decisions. Such an appeal may come from the media organ itself, a political party, or an individual complainant. Like any such procedure during an election period, this is likely to be an expedited process. A well-considered judicial decision may not be much use if it is handed down after the election is over.

Complaints Procedure on Media Coverage

An essential element of most media regulatory bodies, during election periods and at other times, will be a complaints procedure. This is the means by which the public, political parties, and the media themselves can seek adjudication on alleged breaches of the law or regulations on election coverage. Since the election period is usually short, complaints mechanisms will need to be geared towards the speedy resolution of complaints. If, for example, the complaint concerns a factual inaccuracy that may influence voters' intentions, there is little use in correcting the error once the election is over.

Complainants will always have the right to take whatever legal proceedings are laid down in the country's laws - a civil suit claiming defamation, for example. And there should always be a built-in appeal process that allows disappointed complainants or the media themselves to seek a higher judgment from an independent court of law. But in general, the emphasis is likely to be on a speedy, no-cost, non-confrontational resolution of disputes. This may be particularly important in a situation in which hostility between parties or communities is great and there are likely to be many issues of dispute. For example, the complaints mechanism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), was able to deal rapidly with a whole series of complaints referred to it by the Media Experts Commission (MEC) in the 1998 presidential election. This helped to reduce tensions between the different communities, by not allowing disputes between their different parties and media to escalate. This was especially important in light of the significant role played by the media in instigating political violence in the former Yugoslavia.

The variety of complaints procedures is as great as the number of different types of regulatory body. There may not even be a single uniform procedure. Britain, for example, has a statutory Broadcasting Complaints Authority to deal with the electronic media and a voluntary Press Complaints Council with responsibility for the print media. Neither of these is confined to elections in its mandate. The advantage of a specialized election complaints body is that it will be geared to the need for speedy resolution of disputes. The Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council, for example, receives complaints and, through its Mass Media Department, issues private rulings to the media outlets against which findings are made. It only publicizes the ruling if the media organ fails to comply.[2] In Montenegro, by contrast, publicly-funded media are obliged to publicize any findings of the competent authorities "about any infringement on the principles of equality and objectivity relating to informing citizens on agendas and candidates..."

Few complaints systems are quite as elaborate as the Russian. The Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes is not a specialized election complaints body, although it arose because of the need for a body to deal with disputes that arose during the 1993 parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum. Its predecessor was the Arbitration Court on Information Matters that had been set up specifically to deal with election disputes.[2]

[1] ARTICLE 19, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies, 1994, p. 38.

[2] Viktor Monakhov, "Information Disputes Relating to Election Campaigning Via the Mass Media: The Experience of the Judicial Chamber in the 1999 Election Campaign, in IFES, The Media and the Presidential Elections in Russia 2000, Human Rights Publishers, Moscow, 2000.

News Blackouts

Some countries practice a blackout on all election news before or during voting. Usually, this is a voluntary arrangement. This is almost always preferable, since the alternative would be for the regulatory body to intervene to prohibit coverage if the rule were breached - a less than happy outcome. However, in those instances - most famously France - where a "reflection period" is decreed by law, then the regulatory body is likely to have some responsibility for enforcing it. In Israel, for example, which has the most extensive prohibition on campaign news, the Independent Broadcasting Authority is required to police its observance. The implementation of this prohibition illustrates the dangers inherent in such restrictions: the IBA tends to interpret the application of the law in a particularly strict manner, to avoid being held responsible for its breach.[1]

Estonian law divides its election campaign into four periods, with a blackout of election campaigning for three of them. The application (or nomination) period, the voting period, and the counting and publication of results are all periods when campaigning is forbidden. In Barbados, the law requires that there be no direct access broadcast on the eve of the election, or on election day itself.

The Media Experts Commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was an example of a regulatory body that vigorously enforced a blackout from 24 hours before polls opened in the 1998 presidential elections until the polls closed. It did this by issuing clear statements in advance of the blackout period and then relying on the findings of its own media monitoring unit. It concluded that most of the violations of the blackout were a consequence of uncertainty in applying the rules. One television channel, for example, when it broadcast film of candidates at polling stations mentioned the names of their parties - which it was not allowed to do. In one case regarded by the MEC as more serious, a station broadcast interviews with two political leaders. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe referred the case to the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), the complaints body, which struck nine candidates of the party from its election list. The MEC itself commented that most countries, in most conditions, would probably regard such an approach as draconian, unnecessary, and an interference with media freedom.[2]

[1] Akiba A. Cohen and Gadi Wolfsfeld, "Overcoming Adversity and Diversity: The Utility of Television Political Advertising in Israel", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[2] Media Experts Commission, Final Report: Media in Elections 1998, 1998, pp. 33-34.

Regulating Coverage of Opinion Polls

Publication of opinion poll findings is a subject that arouses strong passions. Established democracies take quite contrary positions on the issue, with France, for example, continuing to prohibit publication in the period immediately before an election, while in the United States media coverage of opinion polls is regarded as an integral part of free speech in elections. The problem is that opinion poll results - like almost any other form of expression - are not just the reflection of people's views but may also shape the views of others. That is, people may be influenced in how they vote by what they have learned from an opinion poll... or what they think they have learned.

For this reason, laws or regulations on media coverage of elections may attempt to control how (or even whether) opinion polls are reported. In Montenegro, for example, publicly-owned media are forbidden to publicize the results of opinion polls or any other projection of the election results. On election day, it is even forbidden to publicize the results of previous elections.

However, a total ban on reporting opinion poll findings, whether or not desirable, is scarcely practical. France has long had a ban on the reporting of opinion polls during elections (although not at other times). In the 1997 legislative elections some newspapers broke this regulation. They included Le Parisien and La Republique des Pyrennees. Liberation got round the ban by putting the findings of an opinion poll on its Internet site, which is linked to the Tribune de Geneve in Switzerland. France Soir followed this by publishing a poll before the second round of voting took place. [1]

This seems a fairly clear case of a law becoming ineffective once it has fallen into disrepute - despite the fact that it had been respected for many years. In the UK, where there is a voluntary practice of not reporting opinion polls on the day of elections, this restriction is widely respected.

With opinion polls, more than most other issues, much hinges on how professionally the findings are reported. The Montenegrin position of imposing a total ban on the public media's reporting opinion polls might find some favour in a situation where distorted reporting could materially affect the outcome of the elections. Generally, however, this is an issue that is best addressed by applying a light touch and encouraging the media to develop their own standards for reporting. The British Broadcasting Corporation, for example, has clear internal guidelines on reporting opinion polls that have been applied effectively for many years.

[1] Helen Darbishire, "Media and the Electoral Process" in Media and democracy, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1998, p. 96.

Policies on Hate Speech and Defamation

No issue is more problematic for those concerned with media freedom than "hate speech". The term is generally used to refer to advocacy of national, racial, religious, or other hatred. The issue, in essence, is how far it is proper or acceptable to limit the right to freedom of expression, when the views being expressed support the limitation or infringement of the rights of others.

One of the problems is that this may just be a matter of point of view. One person's "hate speech" will be another's legitimate opinion. There is thus a general reluctance to impose restrictions on what may be said.

This dilemma becomes even more acute in the circumstances of an election. This is for two reasons:

• An election is precisely the moment when a variety of political views should be expressed. To limit expression of some of these views potentially limits not only rights of free speech but also rights of democratic participation.
• On the other hand, the highly charged atmosphere of an election campaign may be precisely the moment when inflammatory statements are likely to have the effect of inciting people to violence - thereby infringing the democratic and free speech rights of others.

These issues are more difficult to address in a country with a history of communal or ethnic violence, where the media are known to have played a role in fanning hostilities. That is why, for example, the matter of "hate speech" was given so much attention in the Bosnian elections of 1998 - the media on all sides having played a considerable role in inciting the wars that led to the break up of Yugoslavia.

The issue of defamation is a similar problem to that of hate speech in one respect: it is an area where freedom of expression may legitimately be limited for the protection of the rights of others. Yet it does not have the same collective implications in an election campaign. Vigorous - and even sometimes insulting - debate is part of the substance of democratic campaigning. International and comparative jurisprudence has established clearly that politicians - especially government politicians - must have thick skins. They should have less protection than the ordinary citizen, not more. From the standpoint of the media in an election campaign, the clear similarity between defamation and hate speech lies in the issue of who will be held liable for any unlawful statement: the media or the person whose words they report.

International and Comparative Law

Neither international law nor the experience of various national courts offers any definitive answer on how to balance freedom of expression and protection of other rights. Precisely because it is a balance, the answer will be determined by national and local circumstances, as well as precise context.

International treaties provide a clear basis for criminalizing advocacy of hatred or discrimination. In extreme circumstances, such as the case of Radio television libre des mille collines in Rwanda, where a radio station incited genocide, journalists have been convicted before an international tribunal for crimes against humanity.

However, the general trend in interpreting this balancing act has been towards promoting many voices to counteract the effect of hate speech, rather than banning those voices that express obnoxious or unpopular views. Experience has shown that laws prohibiting hate speech are often used far more broadly than for their ostensible purpose. The country with the largest battery of laws prohibiting advocacy of racial hostility was apartheid South Africa. Invariably the victims of these laws were black.

The practice in most jurisdictions where this issue has been considered tends towards prohibiting hate speech only when it constitutes a direct incitement to violent activity. That may not itself be a very easy concept to define, but it contains the idea that no one in election campaigns will be penalized for the expression of opinions - only for interfering with the rights of others.

Media Liability

Discussion of hate speech and the media in elections is really about two separate issues:

• The media reporting advocacy of hatred by campaigning politicians;
• The media directly advocating hatred themselves.

On the former issue, the international consensus is coming down firmly on the side of absolving the media from liability for reporting the remarks of politicians, within the limited time span of an election campaign. This means that a journalist or media house would not be open to either a civil or criminal suit for reporting remarks by a politician that constituted advocacy of hatred. But this would not absolve the journalist from a professional responsibility to balance such statements with countervailing facts or voices.

Attempts to Regulate

When the media themselves directly advocate hatred - especially in circumstances that could constitute incitement - they clearly cannot expect to be absolved from liability. In these circumstances, the regulatory body would be expected to monitor the media's output closely. But this in itself creates practical and ethical problems. For example, how is it possible to distinguish between poor or irresponsible reporting of violent statements and active endorsement of those statements?

As in much else, the distinction between editorial and non-editorial content is important. Non-editorial content - primarily direct access material of various sorts - is beyond the control of the media themselves, generated as it is by the political parties. The regulatory body will have to determine how far, if at all, it chooses to vet the content of direct access items.

Right of Reply

Granting a right of reply to those who have been wronged or misreported is not a popular option among either journalists or freedom of expression advocates. Their argument is that in a free media environment these things will balance themselves over time. Unfortunately, within the confines of an election campaign, there may not be the time for this natural balancing process to take place. Hence most regulatory systems have some provision for balancing or correcting, even if only on a voluntary basis. The process of balancing conflicting views, along with an opportunity to reply or correct errors or distortions of fact, may often prove the most effective way of neutralizing the effects of hate speech without having to resort to banning it.

International and Comparative Law on Hate Speech

International standards on the issue of "hate speech" are determined by a balance of Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The former guarantees:

the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers...

Article 19 then outlines possible restrictions to this right, including "for respect of the rights or reputations of others".

Article 20 states:

1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

The American Convention on Human Rights requires states to declare advocacy of hatred on national, racial, or religious grounds a criminal offence. The European Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights do not require hate speech to be prohibited by law, but they allow that it may be.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has an even broader prohibition. Article 4 requires all states who are party to the treaty to declare as a criminal offence "all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination,... the provision of any assistance to racial activities", and participation in "organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination."

In a case that related to participation in elections (but not to the media), the European Commission declared inadmissible an application from a Dutch right-wing political leader who had been imprisoned for two weeks and had his name removed from the electoral lists for advocating the repatriation of non-white guest workers.[1]However, in a case that did relate to the role of the media, the Commission admitted an application from a Danish journalist who had been convicted for broadcasting a television interview with members of a white supremacist youth gang. Danish law was changed as a consequence to exclude liability for journalists unless, by publishing racist ideas, they intended to "threaten, insult or degrade".[2]

This distinction is an important one: the attitude of the law (and the regulatory authorities) will be different depending on whether the media are actively advocating hatred or violence or they are simply reporting the advocacy of hatred or violence by politicians and others. The point is fundamental, although this does not avoid the problem of grey areas.

Decisions of International Courts

The principle that incitement to carry out crimes against humanity is itself a crime against humanity dates from decisions of the Nuremberg trials of Nazi leaders in the 1940s. Much more recently, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has found four journalists or media executives, as well as the former Minister of Information, guilty of incitement to genocide through broadcasts or newspaper articles.

Decisions of National Courts

The Israeli Supreme Court has found that freedom of expression may be infringed only when there is an imminent probability that the statement will cause damage to public order. It ruled, as a consequence, that the Broadcasting Authority had violated the rights of the leader of an extreme anti-Arab political party by reviewing his statements before broadcasting them.[3]

In Sweden, the Freedom of the Press Act prohibits the expression of threats or contempt against racial, ethnic, or religious groups. The provision is rarely used, but in 1991, a newspaper editor was prosecuted for publishing a letter from a reader expressing racist opinions. The editor's argument was that such views should be allowed to surface, in order that they could be debated. The jury acquitted the editor.[4]

The Hungarian Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional a provision of the law on incitement to hatred. The provision made it an offence to

insult or humiliate the Hungarian nation, or a group of the population based on religion, race or similar features.

The court observed:

Freedom to express ideas and opinions, including freedom to express unpopular or unconventional ideas, is the fundamental condition for the existence of a truly vital society which is capable of self-improvement...

Freedom of expression protects statements of opinion regardless of their implicit value or truth.[5]

[1] Glimmerveen and Others v. The Netherlands, App. Nos. D 8348/78 and 8406/78, 4 EHRR 260 (1982).

[2] Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890?89, Decision of 8 September 1992.

[3] Meir Kahane and Others v. Board of Directors of the Broadcasting Authority, Israeli Supreme Court, 41(3) PD 255 (1987).

[4] H-G Axberger, "Freedom of the Press in Sweden", in ARTICLE 19, Press Law and Practice, 1993.

[5] Constitutional Court, AB Hatarozat, No. 30/1992 (26 May)

Media Liability for Reports of Unlawful Statements

The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion has strongly stated that the media should not be held legally liable for unlawful statements that they report in the course of election campaigns. This has been a controversial issue in the past, with other international authorities, such as the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, taking the contrary view. The assumption that the media may not be prosecuted in a civil or criminal suit for reporting the words of politicians reinforces a trend that was laid down by, among others, the Spanish Constitutional Court. This approach stresses the right of the public to be informed about what politicians say - even if it is unlawful and potentially incites violence. It must be stressed that this is different from a situation in which the media itself deliberately incites violence.

This removal of liability has implications for both news coverage and direct access programmes. It means, for example, that the newspaper or broadcaster may not refuse to run direct access or advertising material from a party on the basis that it may expose the media organ to prosecution. The Constitutional Court in Germany, for example, decided that that was a matter for the courts to decide, not the media. But it is only reasonable to put the media in that position if they are definitely not liable. If a media organ might be prosecuted for the contents of a direct access broadcast, then they must have the right to refuse to run it. However, since that is not a satisfactory position, being clearly open to abuse, the position advocated by the UN Special Rapporteur is clearly the correct one.

Hate Speech - Operations of the Regulator

There are several possible ways in which a regulatory body may address the problem of hate speech.

Prior Approval of Direct Access Material

The regulatory body may require that all direct access material be submitted to it in advance to ensure that it conforms to certain legal or voluntary agreed standards for political speech. Whether such an approach is taken is likely to depend on whether the country has an immediate history of inflammatory speech as a serious political problem. The drawback in principle to such an approach is that it may be seen as an interference in political speech and smack of prior censorship. The difficulty in practice is that it imposes an additional administrative burden on the regulator.

Codes of Conduct

However no such possibility presents itself in relation to news coverage: international law and practice entirely rejects "prior restraint" or pre-publication censorship. The problem of inflammatory speech will therefore have to be addressed primarily at source - that is, with the political parties and candidates themselves. This would be best achieved with a code of conduct agreed between the parties in advance of the election campaign. Sometimes, as in South Africa and Cambodia, such a code will have the effect of law.

Complaints

The problem of unprofessional or biased reporting of statements by politicians will have to be addressed primarily through the complaints mechanism established by the regulatory - whether this be a media regulator or an election authority. The most effective remedy will be to allow correction of inflammatory material through a right of reply. There are useful examples of this from Bosnia and the United Kingdom.

Promoting Professional Standards

The most important measure that the regulator can take to promote balanced and unprovocative reporting of inflammatory statements is to ensure adherence to professional standards among the media. In doing this, collaboration with the journalists' own professional and trade union bodies will be vital. The regulatory body may also wish to engage in training of journalists in election reporting.

Right of Reply to Criticism or Adverse Statements

A right of reply is not popular with the media, but it has found increasing favour with tribunals and other standard-setting bodies internationally. Journalists may have to accept that this may be the least-worst option. The alternative to balancing views may be to be held responsible for endorsing the opinions of one candidate or another.

The best way of avoiding an enforced right of reply is clearly to ensure balance in coverage. Even the generally unregulated US media have been obliged to comply with a Fairness Doctrine in election reporting that ensures that all the main parties get a say in news and current affairs programmes. Broadcasting stations are obliged to offer "reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views". [1] The wording is important: "reasonable" rather than equal. Coverage is not measured with a stopwatch. It is simply that all sides of the debate get heard.

Sometimes this general approach of fairness is not adequate. The personal attack rule under the US Communication Act requires that if an attack is made on the personal qualities or character of an individual, then that person should be notified and given an opportunity to respond.[2]

In the South African election of 1994 there was a provision, slightly broader than the US personal attack rule, but based on the same principle. This is a common rule in election laws and regulations and provides a sensible opportunity to achieve balanced debate. It stated that if a criticism were levelled against a political party without that party being given the opportunity to respond at the time, or without its view being reflected, then the broadcasting licensee was obliged to give the party a reasonable opportunity to respond to the criticism.

If within 48 hours of the beginning of the vote a broadcaster intended to broadcast a programme in which a particular political party was criticized, then the broadcasting licensee should give the party the opportunity to respond within the programme, or as soon as possible afterwards. These provisions only applied to coverage under the editorial control of the broadcaster and not to party election broadcasts or political advertisements. [3]

Brazil has a right of reply provision that applies specifically to knowingly making false statements in the course of direct access broadcasts. In this case the offended party can appeal to a judge. If the application is successful the complainant wins an amount of free time for rebutting the false statement that is then subtracted from the amount of free time granted to the offender.

[1] Robert M. Entman, "The Media and U.S. Elections: Public Policy and Journalistic Practice", in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Article 21, Independent Media Commission Act, 1994.

Journalists' Right of Access to Election Events

The media cannot cover elections properly if they are unable to gain access to relevant events and places. This is obvious enough, but unfortunately many countries that are embarking on democratic elections for the first time may have little experience of the culture of media freedom. The purpose of laws or regulations on the media in elections - and the function of the regulatory body - is to create an environment in which the media can go about their business freely. Election campaigns are not state secrets to be winkled out by dedicated investigative journalists; rather, they should be conducted in the public eye. There is thus an argument of principle that journalists should be given the fullest access to election events. For the body organizing the election, there is also a pragmatic consideration: if the media are present at all relevant events, such as briefings and news conferences, then it will be much easier for the electoral administration to convey its messages and concerns to the public.

In order to ensure access to some aspects of the election - for example, the count - it will be necessary for the electoral administration to establish some form of accreditation. In principle, however, this should not be necessary for all events, since the ultimate responsibility for determining who is or is not a journalist should lie with the relevant professional bodies, not the state.

It is important that access be non-discriminatory. It would be unacceptable, for example, if journalists from certain media organs were excluded from rallies by certain political parties. It should be an explicit element of the parties' code of conduct that they allow free access of all media to all their public events. It would be worse, however, if the electoral authorities themselves were to exercise any discrimination in determining which media were given briefing materials or invited to a press conference.

This right of access by journalists flows directly from the freedom of information principles that underlie the role of the media in a democracy. Accreditation procedures cannot be used to limit this access, either by being applied in a discriminatory manner or by being made a universal requirement for attendance at all election-related activities. Except in very limited circumstances when the security of the election process is at stake, accreditation is an administrative tool, not a principled means of determining who may or may not report on the election.

Freedom of information means, among other things, that the media are entitled to investigate and report critically on the efficiency and probity of election administration. Election administrators may not always welcome this, but essentially they have no choice on this matter. This scrutiny is not an interference with the organization of the election but facilitates and promotes efficiency. This is true as a matter of broad accountability, but it is also of practical use to election administrators in communicating their messages. If the media have good access to those organizing the elections, then they will convey their concerns rapidly to the public. This functions as an effective, no-cost method of voter education.

Accreditation of Journalists

The question of who is or is not a practising journalist is one best left to journalists' organizations - although many governments, through the Information Ministry or similar body, have a system for accrediting journalists. Whatever the merits of these different systems, however, some accreditation system is required for journalists in elections. This is because the media will be entitled to attend events - such as the voting itself or the count - that will not be open to ordinary members of the public.

The preferable system for accreditation of journalists in elections is one that is conducted jointly by the electoral supervisory body and the media regulatory body (if any) . Accreditation should be available to all representatives of local, national, and international news organizations on production of credible identification. The accrediting authority should have no discretion to refuse credentials to any bona fide news representative.

The nature of the credentials issued should be agreed upon with the police or any other body responsible for security in the elections, as well as with electoral staff. These credentials would usually consist of a laminated photocard, clearly identifying the bearer as a media representative. These arrangements should also be made known to the political parties, who would be expected to ensure that their members and supporters facilitated (and did not impede) access by anyone bearing these credentials.

When the approximate date of an election is known in advance, accreditation of most local journalists can be organized in time to avoid a last-minute rush. There should be no limit on the number of media personnel issued with accreditation. News organizations have no obligation to limit the number of journalists who are accredited, although it would be reasonable for organizers of an event to limit the numbers from a particular news organization allowed into any particular event or location if that is necessary to secure access for the widest range of media.

Although a photocard - visible evidence of accreditation - is no doubt useful at many public events connected with elections, this should only be required as a precondition for attendance in two circumstances:

• when the security of the electoral process is at stake - as at the voting or the count
• when logistics determine that only a limited number of journalists can have access.

In the latter case, it will be up to the journalists themselves to operate a pool system, whereby they will select which of their representatives attend an event and they then share the information gathered. Election officials can also set up a rotation to ensure that some journalists are always present, allowing the journalists to decide among themselves who will benefit from the various time slots made available.

In other words, accreditation is for the most part an administrative tool that only very occasionally has a security dimension. In general, the principle that anyone can have access to the public electoral process and write or broadcast about it is the paramount one.

Foreign Media

Everything that has been said about the journalists' right of access to election events and the process of accreditation applies with equal force to any foreign media who are present. It is important to stress that this is a matter of principle. The fundamental sources of the right to freedom of expression - the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - explicitly define this right as entailing the communication and receipt of information "regardless of frontier".

In most instances, there will be foreign correspondents resident in - or at least accredited to - the country on a long-term basis. Since these journalists will invariably have some form of accreditation as a condition of their residence in the country, their further accreditation to cover the election presents little problem in principle or practice. A problem is more likely to arise if the election is a matter of some international interest (as elections do tend to be), with the attendant possibility that large numbers of foreign media staff will arrive at the last minute expecting to be able to cover it.

Precise arrangements will need to be coordinated between the body ordinarily responsible for accrediting foreign media and the organizers of the election. For immigration reasons, all foreign journalists will need to be accredited, but as with domestic media personnel, neither the government nor the electoral administrators should have any discretion to decide who may or may not come to report the election. Accreditation is an administrative measure, not a means of keeping people out.

Common sense suggests that a measure of prior planning is needed, with an assessment of how many foreign media staff are likely to want to cover the elections. Not only can accreditation be planned in advance, but also other facilities such as the necessary telephone and computer links from the media centre.

A measure of mutual patience and understanding is required. Elections are organized for the benefit of the electorate, not the international media (a fact that the latter sometimes need reminding of). International media do not directly benefit the electorate by scrutinizing the process and the politicians (although the growth of international broadcasting stations and Internet news outlets is changing this). But international accountability is part of the process of organizing free and fair elections, and, to this extent, foreign media play a similar role to that of external election observers. It is therefore in the interests of democracy and the election process itself that they are allowed and enabled to do their job.

Measures to Protect Journalists

When election campaigns turn violent, journalists are likely to be in the thick of it. Unfortunately, danger is often part of the job for reporters, but it is the responsibility of governments and those organizing elections to ensure that this is kept to a minimum.

Any physical attack or interference with a journalist is likely to be a crime under the ordinary law of the country. However, in view of the particular importance of the media in elections, some countries create specific offences related to attacks on journalists during elections. For example, Section 8 of the South African Electoral Act penalizes offences against media workers with fines of up to R200,000 (about US$30,000), imprisonment, and disqualification from further participation in the election.

The corollary to this is that laws restricting media freedom and the safe conduct of journalism should be repealed in advance of the election. Part of the safety of journalists is not being at risk of arrest for normal professional activities. This would include, for example, police or judicial powers to compel a journalist to divulge confidential sources of information.

However, just as important as what the law says is the message that is clearly communicated to all those taking part in the elections. Journalists' organizations, such as the International Federation of Journalists, usually recommend that governments (and electoral authorities) give a clear public statement at the start of the election campaign, informing all parties and the law enforcement agencies that the media are an essential part of the democratic process - and that anyone preventing them from going about their business will be dealt with using the full force of the law. Of course, the danger to journalists does not come only from over-enthusiastic party activists - often they are at risk from law enforcement officials trained in the ways of dictatorship. Hence the importance of clear public instructions - with the essential follow-up that any attacks are fully investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice.

Codes of conduct for political parties are a device sometimes used in situations where violence is likely. These too should include a clear statement on the importance of the media to the election process and the need to refrain from attacks on them.

Physical protection of journalists may be more difficult, since an intrusive police presence may interfere with the media's freedom to gather information. However, law enforcement officials should also be under instructions about the responsibility to protect journalists against attack, physically if necessary.

Provisions for Public Media

In most systems, different regulations will apply for the publicly and privately-funded media. In addition to the ethical obligations attaching to all journalists and broadcasters, public media are also accountable to the electorate, who are their funders and, ultimately, their owners. Hence it is usually assumed - and this assumption is clearly based on international law - that the public media should be politically impartial.

There are other obligations that may attach to the public media alone. In some systems, there is no legal requirement for private media to carry direct access broadcasting or advertisements from political parties during an election campaign. Yet, for the public media, there usually is such a requirement. Much of this section is devoted to the issues that flow from this:

• will direct access be through paid political advertising or free party election broadcasts?
• how will the amount of time be allocated between the parties or candidates?
• at what time of day will direct access slots be broadcast?

This section also looks at how far it is appropriate for the regulatory body responsible for the media in election times to regulate the editorial content of the public media - that is, those parts of the media's output that are normally under its own editorial control.

Another aspect of the responsibility of the public media flows from the government's obligation to inform and educate the electorate on how to exercise their rights in an election - voter education.

The obligations of public media have been well summarized in a series of guidelines developed by the freedom of expression group ARTICLE 19. First elaborated in 1994 to address the problem of ensuring fair coverage in state broadcast media that may have no history of impartial reporting, these guidelines have been widely disseminated and adopted since then.

Allocation of Time to Candidates and Parties

Almost invariably, the public media are thought to have a duty to publish or broadcast election statements by competing parties. It is generally accepted that the publicly funded media have some obligation to allow parties and candidates to communicate directly with the electorate.

Beyond that, however, there are many issues to be determined.

Paid Advertising, Free Access, or a Mixture of the Two?

It will have to be determined whether direct access by political parties will be free or paid or, as is often the case, a mixture of the two. Different rules are often adopted for print and broadcast media. Sometimes all parties are allocated free direct access but can top this up with paid advertising.

How Is the Time or Space Divided?

In a system of paid advertising, this may not be an issue - time is simply allocated to those who can pay. (Many would argue that this is why paid advertising is an unfair option.) But if direct access broadcasts are to be allocated by a regulatory body, how will this be done? What criteria have to be taken into account to divide up the available time? Is it to be done on the basis of equality - so that every party gets the same time - or equitability (fairness), whereby parties are allocated time according to the degree of popular support they enjoy. If the latter, then how is that determined? Should time be allocated on the basis of past electoral support (the number of seats currently held in parliament), opinion polls, the number of candidates standing - or some other criterion or a mixture of all of them? Different countries have adopted widely varying systems.

Timing of Slots

Will there be regulation about the times that slots are broadcast? If everyone is to get a chance to broadcast in peak time, how can slots be allocated? What order will the parties be allowed to broadcast in?

Who Pays - and Who Makes the Programme?

Will the party be responsible for making its own broadcast or will facilities be made available by the public broadcaster? And who foots the bill for the production of these spots?

Who Decides What is Broadcast?

Does the regulatory body have any say in the content of direct access broadcasts or political advertising? Can the parties say what they like? What are the limits?

Equal or Equitable Direct Access Coverage?

One of the fundamental decisions to be made in organizing direct access broadcasts by the parties is whether slots are to be allocated on the basis of equality or equity. Equality, clearly, means that every party or candidate gets the same access. Equity means that everyone gets fair access - the idea being that a party with large popular support should have more airtime than one that does not.

The Argument For Equality

Everyone gets an opportunity to put their point of view to the electorate. It will be the electorate that chooses, rather than a broadcaster or an electoral regulator. This is a simple system to administer and everyone can understand it. It is particularly attractive in a first democratic election when there is no sure way of knowing how much support the different parties have.

The Argument Against Equality

Equality gives a built-in advantage to the incumbent party, which has many other opportunities to convey its policies through the media. What equality does is to promote the no-hope opposition parties at the expense of those with a genuine possibility of ousting the ruling party. Equality may also mean that there is simply too much material being generated for the electorate to absorb. They will get bored and the direct access process may become a waste of time. Again this is likely to favour the incumbent.

Another argument against automatic equal access is that it will encourage frivolous candidates who are only interested in the free publicity.

The Argument For Equity

If direct access is allocated on a fair (or equitable) basis, this ensures that all parties are given an opportunity to speak to the electorate, roughly in proportion to their popular support. This means that the electorate gets to hear the arguments between the main contenders for office, while parties with less support also get a say (but a smaller one).

The Argument Against Equity

This system is an obstacle to the emergence of new parties, since it is always based on what support they achieved last time. And what if there was no last time? How is popular support determined in a first democratic election? The system could thus be open to abuse.

And the Answer?

There is no right or wrong answer to this problem, as can be seen by the variety of solutions in both well-established and new democracies. But the different approaches may suit different political systems better. Here are some further considerations:

• Equality may work better when there are fewer parties or candidates. When there are too many then the "cake" may have to be cut into impossibly tiny slices, or made so large that there is too much election broadcasting for anyone to take in.
• Equality may work better in a new or "transitional" democracy. This perhaps contradicts the previous point, since new democracies often have many parties (and ruling parties in new democracies may encourage this). But the point is that if there has been no previous democratic election, then there will be no commonly agreed measure of how much popular support each party has.
• Conversely, equity may work better in an established democracy where there are clear measures of past electoral support. Or are the equality advocates right, and does this just obstruct the emergence of new political alternatives?

But even these considerations are only pointers. Many established democracies - France, Italy, Denmark - allocate direct access broadcasting in the public media on the basis of equality (in at least some elections). And many new democracies - South Africa, Brazil, Namibia - have allocated time on a proportional or equitable basis.

Whichever approach is adopted, its success will depend in large measure on the credibility and impartiality of the regulating body that allocates the broadcasts. This is a very strong argument for having the political parties themselves involved in drawing up the regulations governing media and elections. Parties are more likely to be committed to a process in which they have been consulted and have contributed to designing the system.

All these arguments clearly apply primarily to criteria for allocating direct access time - that is, direct access broadcast programmes that are available free to parties. Paid political advertising, where it is allowed, will usually be on the basis that parties can have as much direct access time as they can afford (or as they are allowed within campaign spending limits). But this may not always be the case. And if limits are to be applied to paid advertising, then the same considerations of equality and equity may apply.

Equal Access for All Parties?

Many countries have allocated direct access broadcasting time on the basis of equality between the different political parties or candidates. Even so, there may be certain differences in the way that these systems work. Sometimes, for example, there may be a qualification criterion or threshold of support that must be met before equality applies.

France

The formula for allocating direct access broadcast time in the French presidential elections is one of equality for all candidates, who usually number about 14. If no clear winner emerges there is a second round run-off between the two leading candidates, and again air-time is allocated equally between them. [1]

Denmark

Denmark allocates equal time to all political parties in parliamentary elections, so long as they satisfy certain basic criteria: they must have been registered with the Ministry of the Interior, which requires that they will have collected signatures equivalent to one in 175 of the votes cast at the last election. [2]

Norway

In Norway, time is allocated equally, but again certain criteria must be met. Parties must have been represented in one of the last two parliaments, have a national organization and be fielding candidates in a majority of districts. Smaller parties that do not meet this threshold nevertheless have a short programme. [3]

Italy

The state broadcaster, RAI gives equal time to all competing parties in an election. However, private commercial broadcasters have no such obligation. [4]

Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia's first democratic election, all parties received the same allocation of broadcast time - a total of four hours over a campaign period lasting 40 days. The slots were then divided up into slices of different time lengths. The exact schedule was then determined by lots. [5]

Armenia

Armenia gave equal access to each party, but the amount was limited to five minutes for each candidate or party. This avoided the problem of information overload but perhaps created an opposite problem. Was this really enough information for the voter?

Japan

Japan has a system of equal access but with a minimum qualification threshold. In order to receive equal broadcasting time a party must field at least 12 candidates. In the Upper House, however, all candidates receive five and a half minutes of free broadcasting time.

Netherlands

The Netherlands, like Japan, has a system that is a sort of modified equality. In principle all parties have equal broadcasting time. However, the regulatory body, the Media Commissariat, may allocate extra time to parties running candidates in all electoral districts. [6]

[1] Anne Johnston and Jacques Gerstle, "The Role of Television Broadcasts n Promoting French Television Candidates", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[2] Karen Siune, "Political Advertising in Denmark", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Gianpiero Gamaleri "Italy and the 1994 Elections: Media, Politics and the Concentration of Power", in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

[5] Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries, Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 58.

[6] Kees Brants, "The Blank Spot: Political Advertising in the Netherlands", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

Equitable (or Fair) Access for Political Parties?

If the approach of equality is rejected, there is a wider range of approaches that can be adopted in order to achieve a fair or equitable distribution of broadcasts between the parties or candidates. The main considerations are likely to be:

• a party's strength in previous elections
• the number of candidates it is fielding

There is usually a minimum allocation of time to all parties, or at least to those fielding a certain number of candidates. This is an attempt to address the criticism that an "equitable" approach is not very fair to new parties.

These calculations are more difficult to make in a presidential election, where a candidate may be standing for the first time. In Brazil, this is overcome by allocating broadcast time in the presidential election on the basis of a party's strength in parliament. In the second-round run-off, time is allocated equally.

South Africa

Broadcasting time is allocated on the basis of a combination of criteria: a minimum allocation to all parties, a portion on the basis of the number of candidates standing and a portion on the basis of past support. The latter is ordinarily measured on the basis of the number of seats held in the outgoing national and provincial legislatures. However, the Independent Broadcasting Authority may take account of opinion polls if it chooses.

Greece

The three largest parties in the previous Parliament are entitled to at least thirty-eight minutes weekly on televised programmes. Smaller parties with members in the previous Parliament are entitled to eight minutes weekly. Parties with no representation in the Parliament, but with a list of candidates in seventy-five percent of the electoral districts, are entitled to five minutes weekly. In addition, each of the three largest party is entitled to one forty-five minute broadcast.

Spain

Parties that did not win seats in the previous election have ten minutes' broadcasting time. Parties that won less than five per cent of the vote have 15 minutes' broadcasting time. Parties that won up to 20 per cent have 30 minutes and those that won more than 20 per cent have 45 minutes' broadcasting time.

United Kingdom

The formula for allocation of broadcasting time is reviewed by a committee of broadcasters and political parties at each election. It is roughly as follows: all parties fielding 50 or more candidates are allocated one free broadcast. The two main parties receive equal broadcasting time - usually about five ten-minute broadcasts. The third main party receives slightly less - usually four ten-minute slots. [1]

Israel

All parties contesting an election are given a basic allocation of 10 minutes broadcasting time. Parties that were represented in the outgoing Knesset (parliament) receive an additional three minutes for each seat they held. [2]

Turkey

All parties contesting the election are entitled to ten minutes broadcasting time. Parties with parliamentary representation may receive an additional ten minutes. In addition, the governing party is entitled to an additional 20 minutes, and the main opposition party to another ten minutes. [3]

[1] Brian Wenham "The United Kingdom: Impartial broadcasters and a Partisan Press", in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

[2] Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 58.

[3] Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 194.

Criteria for Allocation of Direct Access Time

Applying criteria for allocating direct access broadcasts is primarily an issue when some consideration of equitability is applied, rather than simply allocating slots on an equal basis. However, in systems of "modified equality", such as in the Netherlands, the regulatory body may have some discretion to allocate additional time to the major parties.

In any system, the first criterion to be established is whether there is a qualification threshold. Even some equality-based systems (such as Denmark, Norway, and Japan) require a form of qualification - such as number of seats contested or a minimum of public signatures.

Equity systems will also have to decide on a qualification threshold. In new democracies, it is more likely that the threshold will be set low, because of the difficulty of knowing what level of popular support each party enjoys. Thus in South Africa, for example, all parties receive a minimum allocation. In long established democracies, the threshold is often higher. The threshold should usually be determined by the number of seats contested, rather than the number previously held, since the latter would be a great obstacle to the emergence of new parties. Hence in the UK, for example, the threshold is 50 contested seats - roughly seven per cent of the total.

Once the threshold has been established, the other two criteria that are usually taken into account in allocating direct access broadcasting are:

• How many seats are the parties contesting (or how many candidates are they fielding)?
• How much popular support have they enjoyed in the past?

In answering the first question, it is immediately clear that this will be determined to a considerable extent by the nature of the election and the electoral system. Presidential elections, for example, are likely to be far more equal in the allocation of broadcasting because they are generally based on a more individual competition than simply a difference of parties. Hence France allocates broadcast time in its presidential elections on a purely equal basis, although Brazil has done so on the basis of the level of parliamentary support for the candidates' parties.

In parliamentary elections, the nature of the voting system clearly determines how significant smaller parties are likely to be to the outcome, which may in turn determine what time allocation they receive. In a first-past-the-post system, a party that wins 10 per cent of the vote nationwide is likely to be completely marginal (and possibly unrepresented in parliament), while the same party in most proportional representation systems could be an important player. Thus the allocation of broadcasting time under the latter system is likely to tend towards greater equality, or at least a lower threshold for qualification.

But strangely, the classic first-past-the-post model, the United Kingdom, makes a conscious effort to compensate for the inequities of the electoral system in its allocation of time. Thus the third national party, the Liberal Democrats, which consistently receives parliamentary representation much lower than its share of the popular vote, nevertheless receives a time allocation that is actually proportionally higher not only than its number of parliamentary seats, but also than its vote.

An interesting recent approach is that developed in South Africa, a new democracy where the media regulatory body has devised a formula that:

• Gives all parties some access
• Allocates time on the basis of seats contested and presumed popular support
• Takes into account the fact that national and provincial elections are held simultaneously.

Timing and Length of Direct Access Slots

The timing of direct access slots is clearly of paramount importance. A broadcast when everyone is asleep or at work will be of little use to anyone. As with commercial advertising, everyone will aim for "prime time".

All this is obvious, yet it is surprising how often it is overlooked. In the 2000 Zimbabwe referendum campaign, the Yes vote campaign (supported by the government) almost invariably received slots at around the time of the main evening news. The No campaign had to go to court to get its own broadcasts aired - yet the ruling did not specify when these were to be aired, so they received less advantageous times.[1]

The issue may not only be when a slot is broadcast, but also what is on the other channels. In the 2000 presidential elections, Serbian television tried to reduce audiences for broadcasts by opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica by scheduling them simultaneously with a popular soap opera.

Yet the issue can be exaggerated. In Chile's 1988 plebiscite, broadcasts were deliberately put out at obscure off-peak times in order to dampen down political enthusiasm. But a population denied any active political debate for 15 years was not to be deterred and watched them eagerly.[2]

The key point is equality of access to the best slots, whenever these may be. A popular way of achieving total equality is by drawing lots - an approach that is most common when there is also equality in the amount of time allocated.

A mechanism that found favour in the past was the simultaneous broadcast of party election broadcasts on all channels. This approach has something to recommend it, but has been generally abandoned in favour of a philosophy where viewer choice is sovereign. In practice, the proliferation of television channels in many countries made it unenforceable.

A second issue is the length of broadcasts. There are two competing trends here. Traditionally, the purpose of law and regulations has been to ensure that slots are long enough for parties to get their message across.

But in the age of slick advertising and sound bites, it is increasingly felt that the 10-minute election broadcast is a thing of the past. In the United Kingdom, for example, the main parties are allocated five 10-minute slots - but only actually broadcast for five minutes of each of them. If the rules permitted they would no doubt take 10 five-minute slots, but they do not. So the parties prefer to forego half their time allocation in order not to repel the voters by going on at too great length.

In the United States, there are moves to ensure a minimum length for political advertisements in order to compel politicians to make appeals to the voters' reason rather than their emotions.

For the regulator, there are two alternative approaches. One is to specify precisely the time slot available - say a five-minute broadcast - and then it is up to the party to fill it. If they choose not to, then they lose the time not used. The second is to give an overall allocation of time that the party can then use as it chooses. The problem with the second approach is that it makes planning on the part of a broadcaster almost impossible.

A third approach might represent a compromise between the two. Parties could be given a total allocation of broadcast time in accordance with an agreed system. That time allocation could then be broken into different length time slots, allowing parties a mixture of lengthy and reasoned argument on the one hand and snappy advertising messages on the other.

[1] Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A question of balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum Harare, March 2000.

[2] ARTICLE 19, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies, London, 1994, p. 16.

Who Pays for Direct Access Broadcasts?

Party election broadcasts, as distinct from political advertising, are usually described as "free". But all this means is that the parties themselves do not pay for the time that is allocated to them. This leaves unanswered two questions:

• Who does pay for the time?
• And who pays to make the programme itself?

In practice there are two possible answers to the first question: either the broadcaster is required to provide the time for free, or the government or electoral authority will purchase the time from the broadcasting company. For public broadcasters, the answers will almost always be the first. The charter or regulations governing the public broadcaster will require them to provide this service. In some cases a similar public service obligation might exist for private broadcasting licensees. But in the latter case it is more common that a supervisory body will buy the time on the parties' behalf. This is what happens in Mexico, for example, where the Federal Electoral Institute buys and allocates 15 minutes a month of television and radio time for each party.

The second question - who pays for the programme itself - is altogether more complex. Usually, the answer is the party, although this in itself may be constrained by legal limits on campaign spending. Costs can be kept relatively low by the use of sympathetic personnel - most famously the Hollywood film directors John Schlesinger, Hugh Hudson and Mike Newell, who have made party election broadcasts for the main parties in Britain (although in each case the saving on the director's fee was probably more than offset by the high production costs).

If the party makes its own election broadcasts, this clearly favours the richer parties. This led South Africa's Independent Broadcasting Authority to prohibit television slots in 1999 on the basis that smaller parties could not afford to make them.

The alternative solution is for the public broadcaster to put production facilities at the parties' disposal. This was the approach in the early days of party political broadcasts, which were studio-bound and really just an extension of the old-fashioned ministerial address to camera. It has been revived in transitional democracies where new parties are unlikely to have either the funds or expertise to produce their own broadcasts.

Who Produces Direct Access Broadcasts?

In certain circumstances – especially transitional elections in poorer countries – political parties may have no facilities to make their own election broadcasts. A well-designed system will take account of this, making sure that parties have easy access to private or (more likely) public broadcasting studios where they can plan and record their material.

In Mozambique in 1994, a number of parties did not have the facilities to make their own election broadcasts and were unaware of the procedures for providing video cassettes to the broadcaster. The result was that their slots went out with a blank screen, or at most a caption urging viewers to vote for the party. [1]

In the Polish elections of 1990, by contrast, state-owned Polish television provided facilities for the parties to produce their broadcasts according to strictly defined criteria. It made available a studio for recording, or a camera team consisting of three technicians and a journalist. (The parties could decide not to have the journalist if they felt that his or her presence would compromise their own editorial control of the broadcast.) The role of the team was purely technical:

Any technical assistance rendered by Polish Television staff which has a bearing on the substantive contents of the broadcast may take place only in the presence of a member of the candidate's staff. Proper note of this must be entered into the production log.

The candidate's staff were allowed to be present at any time during the recording, editing or post-production phases of preparing the broadcast. [2]

[1] Diana Cammack, Election reporting: a practical guide to media monitoring, ARTICLE 19, London 1998, p. 4.

[2] Karol Jakubowicz, "Poland and the 1993 Election Campaign: Following the Line of Least Resistance" in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

Direct Access in Referenda

In a referendum or plebiscite, many of the complex questions related to allocating of broadcasting time fall away. The choice is a straight yes or no. Since the question will not have been asked before, there can be no question of taking into account previous voter opinion on the matter. Equality and equity coincide: both sides should have equal time to put across their arguments.

This was the conclusion of the UN Technical Team on the 1993 Malawi Referendum:

In the case of government-owned media it is customary that equal access, both in terms of timing and length of broadcast, should be given to the competing sides.[1]

Such also was the practice in, for example, the 1988 Chile plebiscite on the restoration of democracy.

However, things may be slightly more complex. Commonly, more than one party may line up on each side of the referendum debate – indeed, sometimes parties may be divided within themselves. Who, then, has a right to speak for each side?

In 1979, a Scottish court had to determine just such an issue in a referendum on devolution of political power. Both the main UK parties were divided on the issue, with members campaigning for both sides in the referendum debate. Broadly speaking, three main parties in Scotland lined up in favour of devolution and one against. The court concluded, nevertheless, that the Yes and No camps should have equal time - party support was irrelevant.[2]

Yet more complex issues will arise if different groups support the same proposition in a referendum but from a different perspective and organized in different campaigns. In that case, some of the normal allocation criteria used in elections will have to be brought into play to determine how much broadcasting time each group is allocated. However, the overall principle of equality between the two sides will not be affected.

[1] Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 27.

[2] Wilson v. Independent Broadcasting Authority, 1979 SLT 279.

Paid Political Advertising

Whether or not a country allows paid political advertising in broadcasting is likely to depend heavily on the traditions in its style and ownership of broadcasting and consequently the type of regulatory system that has evolved.

Some may regard it as curious that the issue of paid advertising for political parties or candidates in newspapers is scarcely controversial. The practice worldwide is almost universally the same: advertising is permitted, subject only to other limitations such as campaign spending ceilings and sometimes restrictions on content.

However, the fact that many countries have followed a different course with regard to political advertising on radio and television can be put down to two factors:

• First, the cost of advertising on radio or, especially, television is usually much greater than in the print media.
• Second, broadcasters are either publicly owned or receive their share of the frequency spectrum from a public body.

Of course, neither of these factors in itself automatically leads to a prohibition on political advertising over the airwaves. But they do perhaps explain why the approach has been different.

Broadly speaking, countries with a long tradition of public ownership of broadcasting, such as France, the United Kingdom, and Denmark, have tended to be hostile to paid political advertising. Those with a stronger commercial broadcasting tradition - the United States represents the extreme - have tended to regard political advertising as natural. It is notable that the European country where commercial broadcasting is most dominant - Finland - should also be the one where unrestricted political advertising is permitted.

This is the rough tendency, but there are many exceptions. Canada, for example, which has a public broadcasting tradition similar to the British, has an approach to political advertising much closer to its southern neighbour. Nor is the issue necessarily to do with whether a public broadcaster accepts commercial advertising. The British Broadcasting Corporation has always maintained a strict prohibition on commercial advertising, but French public broadcasting has permitted it since the 1960s. Each maintains an equally strict embargo on political advertising.

A common pattern, of course, is for the public broadcaster to give free direct access slots according to predetermined criteria, while private broadcasters sell advertising slots to parties and candidates, often according to different criteria. This is the case, for example, in Germany, and was too in Italy immediately after the legalization of private commercial broadcasting.

The Argument For Political Advertising

The argument in favour of paid political advertising is a freedom of speech argument and finds its apogee in the United States. There it is generally assumed that the First Amendment to the Constitution - prohibiting Congress from passing laws "abridging" free speech - protects paid advertising. Indeed, existing campaign contribution limits are often criticized as being in violation of the First Amendment.

The assumption behind this argument is that being allowed to spend money on advertising equalizes the debate between incumbent and challenger. This does not take account of the problem that being in possession of abundant campaign finance is not necessarily the same as having worthwhile political ideas. A party representing the aspirations of the poor and underprivileged may be at a disadvantage under such a system. It is also very much a First World argument that does not readily transfer to countries where wealth is primarily generated by government office or political patronage. In many countries, the ruling party is the richest and can afford the most advertising.

The Argument Against Political Advertising

The argument against paid political advertising is an equality argument: all parties or candidates should have equal or fair access to direct broadcasting regardless of the state of their campaign finance. Countries that favour an equal direct access system almost always have a prohibition on paid advertising. But so do many, such as the United Kingdom, which operate "equity" systems.

Another unrelated argument against paid advertising is that it increases the "dumbing down" of political debate. It is clear that paid commercials are generally much shorter in length than free direct access slots and generally tend to sell a candidate or party (or denigrate the opponent) rather than develop an argument. The difference in length is striking: the average length of paid advertising slots in Finland is 10-25 seconds and in the United States 30-60 seconds. In France, the United Kingdom, and Denmark the length of free slots ranges from five to 10 minutes.

What is striking, however, is the number of countries that have a mixture of paid and unpaid direct access broadcasting. Usually, the approach will be to allocate parties a basic share of free direct access time, which can then be topped up with paid advertising if the party chooses to do so and can afford it.

[1] ee, for example, Nadine Strossen, "Freedom of Speech: Issues for a new election and a new century", Media Studies Journal, Winter 2000, http://www.mediastudies.org/nq5.htm.

[2] Christina Holtz-Bacha and Lynda Lee Kaid, "A Comparative Perspective on Political Advertising: Media and Political System Characteristics", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

Countries that Allow Paid Political Advertising

The general characteristic of systems in which there is political advertising is that advertising is unlimited - parties can buy as much as they can afford - whereas free direct access broadcasts are limited to a pre-determined share.

But this is not always the case, and a number of countries that operate a mix of paid advertising and free direct access limit the share of the former in proportion to the latter. Canada has a system in which a ceiling is set on the amount of advertising time that each party can purchase, on a basis that is closely akin to systems elsewhere for allocating free direct access time.

It is, in fact, relatively unusual to find a system that is characterized solely by paid political advertising with no free direct access. For many years Finland was an almost solitary example in Europe, with most other examples to be found in the Americas.

Venezuela, for example, allows no political advertising on the two government broadcasting channels, but unlimited advertising on private commercial channels. Political parties generally appear to be prepared to pay the same rates as other advertisers. There is a state subsidy for spending on advertising. The electoral law authorizes the Supreme Electoral Council to contribute to parties' advertising campaigns. The way this has generally worked is that after the election the Supreme Electoral Council gives grants to parties that obtained at least 10 per cent of votes cast in congressional elections.

An extraordinary characteristic of the Venezuelan system is that the incumbent administration is also allowed to buy advertising. The administration's commercials are not allowed by law to promote the ruling party - but the government's and the ruling party's commercials can be broadcast one after the other creating a strong argument in favour of the incumbent. In 1978, the government spent almost as much on television advertising as the two main political parties. Venezuela has an extremely high level of spending on political advertising - according to some estimates the highest per capita rate in the world. [1]

The United States is the best-known example internationally of a system of paid political advertising. But contrary to first impressions, the US system is far from unregulated. Legislation on campaign financing has a particular impact on television advertising, which is by far the largest item in the campaign budget.

But that is not by any means the full extent of regulation. The Federal Communication Act of 1934 as amended requires broadcasters to offer to sell equal time to all candidates for federal office. This must be available at the lowest rate charged to non-political advertisers. Equal opportunity means that stations that sell time to one candidate must give the opportunity to others. [2] These are important principles, which ensure that political advertising does not entirely become the preserve of those with the biggest campaign war chests. They have been emulated in political advertising regulations worldwide:

• Advertising is offered at the lowest rate.
• If advertising space is offered to one candidate it is offered to all.

[1] Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, "The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies", Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

[2] Robert M. Entman, "The Media and U.S. Elections: Public Policy and Journalistic Practice", in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995

A Mixed System of Advertising and Free Access

A number of countries provide for a mixture of free direct access broadcasts and paid advertising. This may be an effective compromise between the "freedom of expression" argument that will not allow prohibition of advertising and the "equality of opportunity" argument that says that all parties or candidates should have a voice.

Barbados, for example, has just such a mixed system. Parties and non-party candidates are allowed to buy radio and television advertising to top up their allocation of free broadcasts. But they can only buy slots up to a predetermined number, calculated on the basis of the number of candidates they are fielding. The system for determining this limit is in fact different from that used to allocate free broadcasts, but has the same effect. There is also a time limit on each advertisement (30 seconds on radio and 60 seconds on television).

In Montenegro, the regulations for state media in the elections provide for a mixture of paid and free advertising. Each electoral list is entitled to five minutes direct access time in total, of which two minutes are free and broadcast at times specified in the regulations. The remaining three minutes are purchased at market rates and their broadcast time is a matter of arrangement between the election list and the broadcaster. Presumably, this means that variable rates would apply (as they would for commercial advertisers) depending on when the political advertisement was broadcast.

The Canadian system is also, in effect, a mixed one. Between elections, there is an allocation of free party political broadcasts: 60 per cent for the opposition parties and 40 per cent for the governing party. The exact allocation of these broadcasts is generally made by the parties themselves (although the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation will make the allocation if the parties cannot reach agreement). In addition to these "free time broadcasts", there are occasional ministerial and prime ministerial broadcasts. There is an opposition right of reply to the latter, but not the former. In election periods, however, this system is overlaid by one of paid political advertising.There is a given amount of advertising time available, which is allocated to the parties according to a formula that they agree among themselves. They are then allowed to purchase advertising time up to the limit of their allocation.[1]

[1] Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, "The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies", Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

Political Advertising and Campaign Spending Limits

An indirect form of regulating paid political advertising in many countries is a limit on campaign spending. Such limits apply widely, and, since television advertising will usually be the largest item in the campaign budget, it is here that the greatest impact will be felt. In Canada, for example, spending limits mean that parties can never use up their allotted share of advertising time. Sometimes these limits are made explicit by law. In the 1994 South African election, for example, it was stated that all political advertising was subject to any legal limitations on campaign spending.

Venezuela, estimated to have the highest per capita spending on political advertising in the world, not surprisingly has no limit on spending. The United States, generally regarded as the home of political advertising, has a fairly complex system to regulate campaign financing, especially in presidential elections. The 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (amended in 1974 and 1976) established equal federal financing of presidential elections and federal subsidy of primaries. It also set ceilings on what candidates could spend on TV advertising, although these were removed when the law was amended. In an important 1976 case - Buckley v Valeo - the Supreme Court upheld the principle of public financing but struck down limits on spending by "political action committees" if these were independent from the presidential campaigns themselves. The court also decided that there would be no limit on spending by individuals.[1]

The effect of this is to create routes whereby presidential campaigners can bypass the limitations. Donors can give money to parties or political action committees rather than to the candidates themselves. It also means that a wealthy individual, such as the independent Ross Perot in 1992, can stand without any spending cap at all.

All political advertisements in the United States must carry a disclaimer indicating who paid for them. [2]

Japan is another country that makes the distinction between parties and candidates in its control of campaign spending. Candidates themselves are not permitted to buy broadcasting time. Parties, on the other hand, can buy advertising time, provided that their advertisements call for support for the party, not for specific candidates.

Controls on campaign finance can be used as a means of giving opportunities to poorer parties in an environment of paid advertising. In Mongolia's first parliamentary elections, for example, each party was allocated the same amount of free and paid time. But the government subsidized the paid time of the smaller parties.

It is sometimes proposed that this "topping up" option be used to equalize campaign spending - as a way of enforcing spending limits but not in a heavy-handed manner. The idea would be that spending limits are set. If one party exceeds them, then the others would receive a top-up out of public funds.

[1] Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, "The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies", Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

[2] Robert M. Entman, "The Media and U.S. Elections: Public Policy and Journalistic Practice", in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

Regulation of Content of Direct Access Material?

The question arises whether the regulatory body should attempt in any way to control the format or the content of direct access programmes, whether they be free party election broadcasts or paid political advertising. There is a strong presumption against any such regulation, given the general hostility of international law to prior censorship of any kind. The arguments in favour of some sort of regulation fall into two categories:

• Regulation of format - usually in order to ensure that a serious political message is conveyed.
• Regulation of content - in order to prevent the broadcast of improper or illegal material.

The latter argument clearly relates closely to the question of the policy adopted on issues of "hate speech". It also relates to the question of how far the media themselves are liable in law for the content of political messages that they broadcast. It is often the media themselves who are most vocally in favour of restrictions on the content of political broadcasts if they fear that they will be subject to legal action as a consequence. They favour a system, such as that in Israel, whereby party broadcasts have to be approved by the Electoral Commission in advance of being aired.

In 1994 the South African Independent Media Commission addressed this issue in a slightly different way. The law laid down that a party election broadcast should not contain material that might reasonably be expected to expose the broadcasting licensee to legal liability. In other words, the onus was on the parties to ensure that their material complied with the law, even though the broadcaster could be liable if illegal material were broadcast. [1]

Barbados law (which is typical of that in a number of countries) sets out a number of specific prohibitions:

• any matter in contravention of the laws of Barbados
• any abusive comment upon any race, creed or religion
• any obscene, indecent or profane matter
• any malicious, scandalous or defamatory matter.

The third of these opens up a particularly perilous area. Attempts to regulate on grounds of "good taste" are notoriously difficult and, of course, highly culturally specific. Few countries, for example, would share the Finnish approach to direct access broadcasting, where negative campaign messages are strictly prohibited - yet party representatives appear on screen in the nude, within the traditions of Finnish sauna. [2]

Clearly the distinction between regulation of form and content is a slightly artificial one. Some countries propose a minimum length for political broadcasts in order to ensure that there is a serious argument conveyed and not just an advertising message. But others prescribe a maximum limit: Barbados, for example, limits advertising to a maximum of 60 seconds.

Venezuela has, in most respects, an extremely unregulated system of political advertising. Yet the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) has the power to order the withdrawal of an advertisement that is not in "good taste" or that significantly misrepresents the position of an opponent. The SEC has also prohibited the use of subliminal propaganda or other means of "hidden psychological persuasion" in television political advertising. (This led in turn to an overall ban on subliminal advertising in Venezuela.) [3]

France, which has a far greater degree of regulation in these matters than most advanced democracies, has various formal restrictions that are aimed at affecting the quality of the message conveyed. In the 1988 presidential election, for example, only one of the broadcasts allocated to each candidate could be filmed outside the television studio and only 40 per cent of each broadcast could contain archive film footage. The aim of these restrictions was to ensure that there was a high element of the candidate presenting policies to camera. The regulations also provided that candidate broadcasts could not use archival footage without the consent of those who appeared in them - clearly a way to forestall personal attacks on opponents. [4]

Some countries follow the Finnish example and have an explicit prohibition on personal attacks. (Finland also prohibits product advertising in political broadcasts.) [5] In Costa Rica the Supreme Election Tribunal can order a negative political advertisement off the air if it comprises a personal or unverifiable attack. In one such case in 1990, an advertisement suggested that the incumbent candidate's law degree was acquired illegally. The Tribunal halted the broadcast of the advertisement after one showing.

The French have further regulations that are more content-related and aim, in particular to reduce the incumbent's advantage. For example, in 1988 presidential candidates were not allowed to use the flag or national anthem, or to show the places where they perform their official duties - in other words, the President would have to broadcast from a studio like his opponents and not from the Elysee Palace.[6]

Probably no country has agonized over these matters more than Germany, with its history of "hate speech" and extremist politics and its tight constitutional restrictions on certain types of political advocacy. Yet in political advertising it is accepted that certain types of false statements may be communicated. The Federal Constitutional Court has stated that these are not a basis for refusing political advertising. [7]

It has been broadcasting stations that have tried to refuse material from some parties, especially neo-Nazis. The Federal Constitutional Court partially supported such an approach:

"It is not within the power of a broadcasting station to deny an election slot with the argument that its contents appear unconstitutional, since the competence to decide upon the constitutionality of a party and its announcements lies only with the Federal Constitutional Court. The station has however the right to expect that the party uses its airtime only for legal campaigning, and in particular that no relevant and evident breach of criminal law will take place. The station is therefore entitled to control the content of the slot and - in the case of such a breach of law - to refuse transmission." [8]

[1] Article 29, Independent Media Commission Act, 1994.

[2] Tom Moring, "The North European Exception: Political Advertising on TV in Finland", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[3] Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, "The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies", Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

[4] Anne Johnston and Jacques Gerstle, "The Role of Television Broadcasts n Promoting French Television Candidates", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[5] Tom Moring, "The North European Exception: Political Advertising on TV in Finland", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[6] Anne Johnston and Jacques Gerstle, "The Role of Television Broadcasts n Promoting French Television Candidates", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[7] Helmut Druck "Germany: Equality within the Constitution", in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

[8] Cited in Ibid.

Government's Duty to Inform - Voter Information

International law and standards increasingly recognize the obligation of governments and publicly funded media to educate and inform voters about fundamental aspects of the electoral process.

These might typically include:

• how, when, and where to register as a voter
• how, when, and where to inspect the voters' roll
• how to make a complaint about the voters' roll or any other aspect of the election
• what the election is for - who is being elected
• what are the constituency boundaries
• where and when to vote
• how to mark the ballot so that the vote is considered valid
• that the vote is secret

It is essential that all voters are in possession of the basic information that they need to exercise their democratic rights. The obligation on governments to ensure participation in democratic elections "without discrimination" means that they are obliged to make a special effort to inform those who are at a particular disadvantage in exercising their democratic rights. Such groups may include:

• women
• racial, national, or ethnic minorities
• the poor, especially those who are illiterate
• people with disabilities

One of the strongest arguments in favour of public ownership of sections of the media is that this gives the public authorities the means to conduct programmes of information and education. Voter information, voter education, and civic education are among the most important examples of the public service role. National broadcasting stations, which are accessible to the illiterate and often to the relatively disadvantaged, play an especially important part in this.

However, this is also where the obligation on publicly-owned media to behave impartially becomes especially important. It is a fundamental principle of voter education that the information provided should be impartial and not favour any of the participants in the election.

Balanced News Coverage

International law establishes the general obligation on publicly-funded media to report fairly on the election process. In many countries, this obligation will be set out in specific legislation such as the law relating to broadcasting or the electoral law itself. Elsewhere, there may be a general obligation of balance and fairness established in the founding legislation of the publicly-funded media, but how this works in practice is left up to voluntary self-regulation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation, with its "stopwatch rule", is an example of the latter approach. The corporation keeps a record of the time allocated in news bulletins to the different political parties, with the aim of keeping the balance in conformity with the proportional allocation of time for party election broadcasts. The principle of record-keeping is an important one: the public broadcaster (or any other, for that matter) should know exactly what it has broadcast in order to be able to answer any subsequent complaints.

Two transitional democracies are examples of countries that have taken a far more regulated approach towards the public broadcaster. The rationale for this is that the state broadcaster in a new democracy will have little experience of operating independently of government and requires more clearly defined rules to enable it to report in a balanced manner.

Malawi

In Malawi in 1994, the electoral commission set out very detailed guidelines, which dealt among other matters with news coverage by the publicly-funded (and government-controlled) Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). The MBC was

required to provide fair and balanced reporting of the campaigns, policies, meetings, rallies and press conferences of all registered political Parties during the period of campaigning and thereafter to provide news of the electoral process up to the close of poll.

The guidelines went on to extend this requirement of balance to other special election programming such as debates and phone-ins. They set out extremely detailed provisions for the format and organization of these special programmes.

The guidelines imposed an obligation on the MBC to ensure that parties did not use other programmes to campaign. (In fact this did occasionally happen - for example, when football matches were used as an occasion for songs in praise of the incumbent president.)

And the guidelines contained a strict injunction to the staff of the public broadcaster:

MBC staff, as public service broadcasters, may not broadcast their own political opinions. Any commentaries or assessments must be clearly identified as such and carefully balanced to avoid bias.

Montenegro

Likewise, the Montenegrin Assembly in 1998 agreed a resolution on the role of state media in election campaigns that established a general obligation on the staff of the public media:

Each editor or presenter of the political-news programs and special programs or columns in the public media founded by the Republic of Montenegro is obliged to independently and objectively present all election list submitters and their candidates throughout the election campaign and to ensure impartiality in relation to all political, social, ethnical/cultural and other agendas presented therein.

But the resolution goes beyond a general obligation to prescribe in some detail how this objectivity is to be achieved. As well as setting out standards for special debate programmes and reporting of opinion polls, the resolution removes certain call-in and panel discussion programmes from the regular schedule and obliges the public media to

observe the principles of professionalism and journalist ethics and abstain from inviting/hosting leaders or popular members of the parties to their regular and thematic programs.

The resolution states in great details how many reports the television, radio, and state newspaper must carry. For example:

The Montenegrin Television network and Montenegrin Radio network are obliged to provide 5 footage and/or sound recordings respectively with excerpts from speeches of participants in the election rallies of election list submitters and this shall be increased for one footage and/or sound recordings each on every fourth election rally held.

And so on.

This type of highly detailed regulation of content raises a genuine dilemma. The need for such prescriptions arises because of the history of bias and unprofessional reporting by state and government-controlled media. On the other hand, the impulse towards microscopic content-regulation is itself part of the legacy of political dictatorships. How far regulatory authorities should prescribe how the publicly-funded media report - and how far the media will best learn by making their own mistakes - is an imponderable question to which every new democracy will have to find its own answer.

Provisions for the Private Media

Most countries make a clear distinction between private and publicly-owned media in their regulatory systems, and in particular in the obligations that are placed upon them in election periods.

There are a number of different options, as well as a variety of different issues to be addressed.

Different System for the Private Media

One approach is for the private media to operate in elections under completely different rules. This will apply most often in the area of direct access broadcasting or political advertising. For example, when Italy first introduced private broadcasting the state broadcaster, RAI, continued with the existing system of free direct access broadcasting, while private broadcasters were allowed to carry paid advertising. These media also operated under a different regulator from the public media.

Venezuela similarly operates a system in which public media carry no paid advertising, but the private media do. Likewise, in the quite different, public-dominated Scandinavian broadcasting systems, the private media operate different rules on direct access.

Public Service Obligations in Certain Areas

Another common approach is to impose certain public service obligations on the private broadcast media as one of the terms of a broadcasting licence. This is the system that operates in the United Kingdom, for example. Thus a system of direct access programming that originated with the public service broadcaster is applied, without modification, to private broadcasters. In the UK these obligations apply to the older, terrestrial commercial channels but not to cable and satellite television.

Choice Whether to Assume Public Service Obligations

Also a popular approach is one that imposes no public service obligations on the private media. However, if the private broadcasters choose to run direct access slots, paid political advertising or voter education slots, then they must do this on the same terms as the public media

Role of the Regulator

Whichever of these options is taken, there is a role for the regulatory body in relation to any non-editorial material run by private media: that is, advertisements, direct access slots, voter education etc. The regulator will either be responsible for supervising adherence to any special rules affecting private media - if they follow the first option - or to general rules governing media (the second or third options). There does not exist the same basis for regulation of content in the private media as there is in the public. Hence the regulator will not intervene with the private media to ensure balanced news coverage. However, the private media are likely to be obliged to adhere to the same policies on hate speech and defamation, as well as being subject to a complaints procedure.

In principle a pluralism of ideas and political viewpoints is best maintained by having private media that are unfettered and able to go about their business without interference. The first responsibility of the regulatory body is to facilitate this. It is only when the private media behave in a manner that, through unfairness, obstructs the flow of information to the electorate, that the regulator will be empowered to intervene. And this will almost always apply in relation to non-editorial, rather than editorial, content.

Why Communication Matters

The single greatest obstacle to effective collaboration between electoral managers and the media is a culture of mistrust – and sometimes outright hostility – from both parties.

One aspect of this mistrust or hostility is a breakdown in communication. A lack of communication between an EMB and the media is a serious problem. It is an obstacle to achieving many of the objectives discussed in this topic area. A failure of communication will make the policy and regulatory role of the EMB much more difficult to achieve. It will also create serious obstacles to accurate media reporting of the electoral process. The breakdown of accurate media reporting will not lead to a vacuum – it will lead to inaccurate reporting.

Yet, far more serious than a breakdown of communication between EMB and media is the impact that this can have on the EMB’s capacity to communicate with the electorate. Media relations, important as they are, only form part of an overall communications strategy. An EMB’s media work will be more effective if it is clearly placed within a well-considered approach to communications.

Too many electoral management bodies downplay the importance of communication. They proceed on the assumption that all that is required is for them to work in an efficient and professional manner. Yet their efficiency and professionalism is not taken for granted by the public, the political parties or the media. EMBs need to develop strategies and skills to project what they do and how they do it to a wider audience.

Better communication will lead to an improved public image for the EMB, which brings obvious advantages in various aspects of its work. However, there are also two principled reasons why EMBs have an obligation to communicate:

• Voters have a right to information about how they are to exercise their right to vote. This includes information about the work of the EMB.
• The EMB is accountable to all stakeholders in the electoral process, including the voters and the candidates or political parties. With accountability comes an obligation to be transparent in its workings.

Developing a communications plan

The temptation in planning communications is always to do it in reverse order, starting with the well-tested techniques – press releases, news conferences etc – rather than with the overall objectives, messages and audience. This is tempting, but dangerous. Organisations (not just EMBs) stick with what is familiar and easy for them. This may not necessarily be the most means to communicate their messages to the required audience.

There are, of course, different approaches to communications planning. That developed by the Institute for Media, Politics and Civil Society is a particularly good one. But all effective approaches are likely to have the following steps in common (in more or less this order):

• Analysing your own strengths and weaknesses.
• Defining your message.
• Defining your audience.
• Developing a media strategy.
• Developing techniques of media relations.

Analysing Your Strenghts and Weaknesses

A credible and effective communications plan will be based upon a realistic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the electoral management body.

These strengths and weaknesses will obviously include the attributes and resources of the EMB itself. Is it well funded? Does it have a trained and experienced press office?

Just as important, however, is an evaluation of how the EMB is perceived in the world outside. Does it have a high public profile? Is it trusted by the public? By the media? Is it perceived as professional and competent? Is it seen as being independent of the government of the day? These are all important questions that should be answered honestly. If there are negative perceptions of the EMB these need to be addressed. Any communications plan will need to include strategies for dispelling mistrust.

A technique commonly used in planning (not just for communications) is the SWOT analysis. SWOT stands for

• Strengths
• Weaknesses
• Opportunities
• Threats

Defining Your Message

People planning a communications strategy are usually advised to define a clear and simple message, reducible to a single slogan. This works for many organisations, from a company selling a product to a group lobbying for policy change.

Electoral managers, by contrast, have a large number of different messages that they need to communicate to different audiences at different stages in the campaign.

Here is a genuine list of messages formulated by an African electoral commission in the course of its communications planning:

• Don’t sell your vote
• Where you register is where you vote
• Who is entitled to vote
• Card is not for sale/no bribery
• Vote is secret
• Do not register more than once
• Respect other’s views
• Encourage women to vote
• When to vote
• Where to vote
• How to vote
• Have you registered?
• Nomination deadlines
• Campaign lull
• Exercise your right to vote
• What were the results?

It is apparent that these messages, while all important, are aimed at different audiences and will assume different importance at various stages in the electoral process. For example, “Do not register more than once” is aimed at those entitled to vote and is specific to the registration period. “Where to vote” is aimed at the same audience, but is specific to the period immediately before polling day. “Nomination deadlines” is aimed primarily at potential candidates and is specific to the period before nominations close. “What were the results?” is aimed at everyone, but is again specific to the period after votes have been counted.

For practical purposes, it is usually useful to break down target audiences further. Hence, although “Have you registered?” may be a message of general relevance, the EMB may in practice want to target it at first-time voters, voters with disabilities or others who may not know how to register or be able to do so.

For a matrix example, click here

It may be useful to develop a simple matrix to define this relationship between messages, audience, and timing.

 

Defining Your Audience

Defining the audience is an essential step in developing a communications plan.

For an electoral management body, this might seem too obvious to need doing: the audience is the electorate, of course. However, there are three reasons in particular why defining the audience is indispensable:

• In practice many EMBs do not follow the logic of tailoring their communications strategy to their audience. Instead they take the easiest opportunities to communicate their message through the media without considering whether they are really reaching the people they want to speak to.
• Equally, many EMBs tend to talk not to their primary audience but to many other audiences – political parties, the media themselves – who are more demanding and often easier to reach.
• The audience is not a single undifferentiated mass. Breaking it down into its component parts will help EMBs to devise the different messages that are required by these different sections and identify the different media that should be used.

In general terms, then, defining the audience is not difficult. An EMB will wish to communicate information to the entire electorate at different points during the electoral process. The messages will vary, as will the means of communicating these, but this something to consider later in the planning cycle.

However, it will be useful to break this primary audience down into a number of sub-categories. These are defined by the fact that they either require different messages or can only be reached by different media than the main electoral audience as a whole. Examples of important sub-audiences might include:

• Voters outside the country.
• Voters with disabilities.
• Illiterate voters.
• First-time voters.
• Members of linguistic minorities.

In each of these examples it is clear that there is likely to be a distinct message, as well as a different medium to be used. Hence, for example, voters overseas will need information about casting a postal or proxy ballot. They cannot be reached through the national media of their home country, so other channels of communication must be found. First-time voters may require detailed information about registering to vote, as well as the mechanics of voting. They are likely to be reached more effectively through those media targeted at young people. And so on.

A clear example of an important secondary audience is the candidates and political parties. The media themselves are also a secondary audience for the EMB, both because they are a means of getting the message across to the primary audience and because there are specific messages that the EMB may wish to communicate to them.

Developing a Media Strategy

When an electoral management body has identified its primary and secondary audiences, as well as the messages that it wishes to communicate to each of these, it is then ready to devise a strategy for its media work.

A strategy is something concrete. It is determined by the particular strengths and weaknesses of the EMB, as well as by the particular characteristics of the media and the electoral environment. An EMB’s media strategy will vary enormously, for example, depending on whether there is a long history of democratic elections. It will be affected by the degree of public confidence in the EMB itself and whether its management of the elections its likely to be the subject of criticism.

One EMB did a SWOT analysis, identifying its Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. It is an under-resourced electoral commission in a poor country. The results of its analysis looked like this.

This is probably typical of many EMBs in similar circumstances. Its strengths lay in the qualities of its staff, while the weaknesses were all caused by lack of resources. Opportunities were all drawn from the possibilities of collaboration: with the media, civic educators and external funders. Threats were the high cost of advertising and the danger of government interference in the commission’s work.

This particular EMB evolved a strategy that was, as far as possible, proactive. That is, the EMB would strive to convey its messages at the time and through the media of its choosing, rather than reacting to external events or media inquiries. Not only was this seen as a better way of communicating its chosen messages; it was also more cost-effective, because it allowed media materials to be prepared in advance. These materials would largely be prepared in private production facilities – see the opportunities column – during the slack periods of the electoral cycle. This would allow the commission to use its small staff most effectively: preparing proactive material during periods of low media interest and being available to react to media inquiries during busy periods.

This strategy took advantage of the strengths and opportunities available to the EMB. However, it was not dictated by these. It was directed towards conveying its chosen messages to a carefully identified audience. In this case, most voters did not read newspapers and could not afford television. Hence the offer of columns in newspapers was less important to the strategy than the use of radio production facilities.

The strategy should not be confused with the various techniques or tactics that an EMB might use to get its message across. This is not the best point in the planning process for the EMB to decide how many news releases it is going to issue, or who is going to speak at press conferences. These are questions that can be resolved when the strategy is decided upon.

In summary, an EMB developing a media strategy will probably need to answer the following questions:

• Is the strategy proactive or reactive?
• Is it low profile or high profile?
• Is it local or national?
• What are the major communications opportunities?
• What are the major communications impediments?
• What communications strengths are available in the EMB?
• What other organizations can the EMB collaborate with (NGOs, community groups and others)?
• What are the primary and secondary audiences?
• What are the key messages to be conveyed to those audiences?
• What are the most effective media for reaching the primary audience?
• Will the EMB use paid advertising through print, radio and/or TV? Can it afford to do so?
• Who is likely to be critical of the EMB’s running of the election?
• What might their key messages be?

Developing Techniques of Media Relations

The techniques of media relations that an EMB can use are mostly well known: media briefings, press releases, briefing packs, websites and so on. It is important, however, to emphasize three points about developing and using such techniques:

• First, the techniques of media relations are subordinate to the communications strategy than an EMB has developed. This strategy is fashioned to the messages that need to be communicated and the audiences that need to receive the messages. The strategy can be seriously subverted if inappropriate techniques are chosen.
• Second, while EMBs need to have the capacity to react quickly to events, most techniques of media relations can be prepared in advance and their use planned carefully.
• Third, wherever possible media relations should be handled by a specialist department (or, failing that, by a specialist media officer, preferably with experience of working as a journalist).

There is no time when an EMB will cease its relations with media altogether, but outside election periods the pressure from the media will be less, giving the EMB the opportunity to develop its media materials. This will be the time, for example, for website development, as well as producing voter education materials for dissemination through the mass media, or background information on issues such as the electoral system or previous election results to go into media briefing packs.

This is also the time to carry out basic preparatory tasks such as putting together contact lists of media houses and of the editors and journalists with particular responsibility for covering the elections. Broadcasters will have several different programmes all interested in election coverage. Each of these will need to be listed separately.

Various techniques available to EMBs will be examined on separate pages:

• Briefing packs;
• Pre-recorded audio and video material;
• Websites;
• Media briefings;
• Press releases;
• Media centre.

Briefing Packs

Preparing a package of basic information for the media can be an immense time saver, as well as helping ensure that their reports are accurate. Journalists need to know a mass of background information: the number of registered voters (per electoral district, if that applies), the names of the candidates, the offices being contested, the results last time, the number of broadcast slots and their timing, and so on. Foreign journalists may need even more basic political, institutional, and demographic information. In addition, all journalists will want to know what regular facilities are at their disposal: a media centre, regular briefings, facilities for the count, and so on.

Much of this information can be compiled in advance of the campaign. All of it is readily available to a moderately well-organized electoral authority and can be put together by a competent press officer without enormous effort or expenditure. Much of the material may double up with information that is made available to others, such as election observers.

Here is a typical checklist of material that might be included in a briefing pack:

• Election timetable
• List of candidates
• Background on Electoral Management Body (history, mandate, profiles of members)
• Registered voters – nationally and by constituency or electoral division if relevant
• List of constituencies or electoral divisions (if relevant) and polling locations
• Results of past elections
• List of sitting members of legislature (where relevant)
• Registration procedures
• Voting procedures
• Digest of electoral law and relevant regulations and procedures
• Sample electoral materials
• Party campaign code of conduct
• Journalists’ code of conduct
• Voter education material produced by EMB
• Frequently Asked Questions
• Contact details
• Briefing schedule and other information on Media Centre

Pre-recorded Audio and Video Material

Electoral management bodies often fail to make the best use of their media opportunities because of lack of preparation. Especially through the electronic media, EMBs can often be reactive rather than proactive. Officials are interviewed by news programmes but often fail to get their messages across to the electorate, either through lack of interview skills or a conflict between the different agendas of interviewer and interviewee. Preparing audio or video material in advance will often be a way of ensuring that the EMB gets its own message across in exactly the way that it chooses.

EMBs may be assigned voter information slots on public broadcasters (or sometimes as a licence condition for private broadcasters). Alternatively, they may buy airtime from broadcasters (or even persuade them to donate it free of charge). In countries where broadcasting is underdeveloped and there is a shortage of available material for airing, EMBs may easily get their materials broadcast for free, especially if they are lively, creative, and entertaining.

The advantages of pre-recording electoral material are the following:

• The EMB can decide exactly what is its message and formulate this message in its own words.
• The EMB can provide the materials in advance to broadcasters.
• The EMB can use creative techniques to convey its messages.

Pre-recorded materials are most likely to cover basic voter education and information issues. But the fact that the information is simple and basic does not rule out the use of imaginative means to convey messages. One popular and effective means is to use soap operas or songs to communicate messages – broadcasts that will be entertaining in themselves, as well as having serious meaning.

In Sierra Leone, for example, a radio soap opera called Atunda Ayenda (“Lost and Found”) dealt with various issues relating to peacebuilding after the country’s long civil war. Part of this focused on voter education. One episode, for example, dealt with misplacement of voter ID cards, interference by paramount chiefs in the election process, the voting process, and non-violent political campaigning.

Similarly, in Tanzania’s transitional elections in 1995, a soap opera broadcast as part of the Mnazi Mmoja radio magazine programme introduced voters to political and electoral issues. There were also animal fables. One told of a toothless old lion who did not see why he should stand for election: he had always been leader. He is supplanted by the self-confident lioness who does all the hunting.

Providing Information on Electoral Authority Web Site

The Internet enables electoral authorities to do many of the things that they do traditionally in their relations with the media in a much more rapid, efficient, and cost-effective manner. The potential of the Internet is constantly extolled, but for the purposes of media management in elections, its utility is fairly straightforward.

Through email, the electoral authority can distribute press releases, statements, and other material at very low cost and with relatively little effort on the part of its staff. By maintaining a web site, the authority can create, in effect, a virtual briefing pack. Moreover, it is one that can be constantly updated by the addition of new material as it becomes available. It will also be possible to run a results service through the web site.

Where the electoral authority is generating its own broadcast material - such as voter education slots - these can be made available through the web in digital format. However, anything that is available in digital format should also be available in hard copy.

An enormous variety of techniques can be used to make website material interesting and accessible, such as quizzes and games.

Click here to see an example of a well-maintained and interesting election website run by a public broadcaster. Click here for a good example from an EMB.

Media Briefings

A press conference is a means of conveying more information than can be carried in a single press release. It is also a way of occasionally putting senior officials in the election administration before the public (in the form of the media) to explain the electoral process.

Broadcasters like press conferences, of course, because a press release will only give them "white copy" - that is, a story with no picture or sound. At a press conference, broadcasters will be able to record and film. If a customized media centre is available, then this will make the practical requirements of broadcasters easer to meet. Otherwise, the organizers of a press conference will have to prepare for the needs of television and film crews, radio journalists, and photographers.

The usual format for a press conference is for a representative of the electoral authority to make a statement, which is then open to questions from journalists. The press conference should be chaired by someone other than the official making the statement. It helps to establish a clear time for the conference (and to start promptly - journalists have deadlines). The chairperson should ensure that journalists from a variety of different media, with different political viewpoints, have a chance to ask questions. Broadcast journalists will insist on the chance to ask their question (because they will want it broadcast). That is reasonable, but no one should be allowed to hog the questioning. Sensitive and balanced chairing will create a trust between the media and the authority holding the press conference.

A media briefing is usually something rather different. This will normally not be for broadcasting and sometimes is completely "off the record". If the latter, then the strict rule is that the person doing the briefing may not be identified. Politicians brief "off the record" the whole time. It is scarcely possible to envisage any circumstances where it would be proper or appropriate for an electoral official to do so. With detailed briefings, as with other information for the media, invitations should be issued to all media, regardless of political persuasion or ownership.

Press Releases

The press release is old technology par excellence, but can scarcely be bettered, even in the days of the Internet. Indeed, the Internet (whether through a web site or an email listserver) is often nothing more than a sophisticated means for distributing an old-fashioned press release.

From the point of view of the electoral authorities, the value of the press release is that they have control over what is being distributed to the media and can therefore determine its accuracy. For the media, of course, it means that the information is authoritative and that they have no excuse for misreporting it.

Press releases are obviously particularly useful for conveying information such as statistical data, verbatim statements, or lists of candidates - information that is tedious to relay in any other way, and where there is a danger that errors could creep in if the information were relayed orally.

Press releases can be distributed by a variety of means: hand delivery, fax, post, or posting on the notice board of a media centre, as well as by email. They may often accompany press conferences as a way of ensuring that detailed information is recorded accurately.

There is a delicate balance in how often to issue press releases. The danger of too many is that the media will lose interest. The danger of not enough is that the press officer will be left constantly responding to questions. The precise balance will be a matter for his or her judgment.

Writing a Press Release

This is why EMBs need a press officer - and why he or she should be a trained journalist. The technique of a press release is essentially the same as that for a news story in a newspaper. Journalists in most countries are trained to write stories in an "inverted pyramid" style, starting with a lead paragraph that conveys the essence and essential fact of the story, which is then developed in detail in subsequent paragraphs. Aside from making it clear to the reader from the outset what the story (or press release) is about, this also allows the item to be cut from the bottom upwards, without losing its essence. And that is how a press release should be too.

Like a good news story, a press release should be presented in plain language, not jargon. The average journalist does not necessarily have an attention span any longer than the average newspaper reader, so it is not safe to assume that they will read the press release come what may.

But the major reason for writing a press release like a news story is to have a written record. There also is a hope that it will be used directly in the newspaper. For this reason, keep the release short (and print it double-spaced so that there is room on it for sub-editor's marks). In poorer countries, where editors often scramble to fill their papers each day, they may be grateful for a ready-made piece of well-written copy.

Finally, make certain it is proofread carefully by one or more responsible senior staff members to ensure that it is absolutely correct in every detail.

Media Centre

The practicability of having a media centre, and the facilities that are put into it, will depend entirely upon the resources available to the electoral authorities. There is no doubt that if the funding is available to provide such a centre, then the quality of media coverage will improve. Gathering the media in a single centre makes many of the basic functions of media management - press releases, press conferences, briefings, etc - much simpler. Donors are sometimes willing to provide funding for at least a modest media centre, particularly if it is seen as building the long-term capacity of the EMB. For many electoral authorities, however, it is simply beyond their capacity.

A media centre could include some or all of the following:

• Telephones, faxes, and internet connections
• Computers for media use, but also linked to a results service
• Television monitor screens
• Pool feeds for audio and video so that individual journalists do not have to struggle to place their microphones on the speaker’s podium or jostle for limited camera space
• Radio and television studios for conducting interviews.

Where space constraints dictate, it is reasonable to establish time slots and sign-up procedures to ensure that all journalists will have at least some access to these facilities.

In large countries or those with federal political structures, a single media centre may not be enough. In India, for example, the Election Commission of India requires there to be a media room in each counting centre, as well as a media centre with full facilities in each State.

It is useful to have the Media Centre up and running a week or so before the election so that journalists will become familiarized with the facility and the briefing schedule prior to Election Day. Contacts with service providers (e.g., the telephone company) should be undertaken well in advance to ensure that the Centre is up and running on schedule. It is best to maintain the Centre in operation at least until the final announcement of official results.

Timing Work with Media

The communications work done by an EMB (as well as any regulatory responsibilities that it has in relation to the media) naturally falls into several different phases:

• Pre-election phase: this period is a preparatory one. Depending on exactly how the electoral system functions, it may include general voter education, registration of voters and parties, boundary delimitation, and nomination of candidates. The EMB will need to communicate to the public, through the media, on all these issues.
• Election campaign: this period will be the most intense, involving as it does preparation for voting itself, along with a variety of campaign issues. If the EMB has regulatory responsibilities in relation to the media, these will also come to the fore.
• Election day: immediately before and on the days of voting, the EMB will need to communicate a variety of messages about how and where to vote, as well as the progress of the poll. It will also need to ensure that the media understand clearly their rights of access to the voting process and the limits to this.
• The count: the EMB will be responsible for communicating regular and accurate information from the counting process, as well as regulating the access of the media to the count.
• Post-election phase: the post-election period may throw up a number of issues where the EMB is required to communicate with the public. This may be the case, for example, if there are disputes over the probity of the election process or challenges to the results. But in many instances, merely communicating the results may be a long drawn-out process.

Much of the preparation for this communication can be done in advance. Even when the exact content of media materials cannot be predicted, the schedule of communications can be included in a comprehensive plan that can be developed at a very early stage in the election process. This will allow the whole process to run more smoothly by, for example, establishing exactly the moments when a press release needs to be distributed or a media briefing held.

Pre-Campaign Issues

The notion of "pre-campaign issues" of course presupposes that there is a specified campaign period. Some countries, such as the United States, effectively impose no limits on the time of campaigning. Of course, in many systems, there may be little gap between different sets of elections: presidential, legislative, local, or provincial - even, in the case of the European Union, supranational.

But under any electoral system, there are issues that relate to elections and the media that occur, essentially, outside election periods. These are primarily:

• Voter education
• Discussion of the electoral system

In media coverage, these two are clearly related. Informed debate about the workings of the electoral system can take place only in the context of thorough public education on how the system works.

The content of voter education is not the focus of this subject area. However, pre-campaign voter education is likely to focus on a number of issues, depending on the electoral system and the political context:

• The composition and integrity of the EMB
• Who is eligible to vote
• Why it is important to be on the voters' roll
• How to register to vote
• Where and when to register to vote
• How constituencies are divided up

Another important question is what systems exist for ensuring fair coverage and access by political parties outside election campaign periods. Many countries have systems that allow political parties regular opportunities to put their views to the electorate in direct access programmes. Many of the same considerations apply in devising such systems as are used in allocating direct access slots during elections. These will, of course, be issues for legislators and broadcasting regulators more than for election administrators. But they do have an important bearing on the question of how level is the playing field when an election comes round.

Yet another fundamental issue - again for legislators and broadcasting regulators - is how far publicly-funded media are independent of the government of the day and the ruling party. The opportunity for direct access during an election campaign is helpful up to a point, but if the general tenor of broadcasting outside campaign periods is strongly biased, then it is difficult to regard the playing field as level.

Campaign Issues

For the media themselves the start of the campaign period is when election coverage really takes off. By contrast the smooth operation of the regulatory process will depend very largely on the system that has been put in place before the elections. By this stage the fundamental questions should already have been answered, with the media and political parties clearly understanding their roles and responsibilities:

• What laws or regulations govern media coverage of the campaign?
• Who is responsible for implementing these?
• What are the regulations governing direct access broadcasting?
• What are the regulations governing paid political advertising?
• What are the policies on hate speech and defamation, and any miscellaneous provisions on issues such as news blackouts and opinion polls?
• What is the mechanism if any member of the public, a political party or the media themselves has a complaint?

At this point the process of accreditation of journalists can be started.

It cannot be stressed too strongly that these issues should be determined in advance of the campaign. Determining these important questions of policy on an ad hoc basis will diminish the authority of the supervisory body in relation to the media and create the impression that some media are not receiving equal treatment.

Role of the Regulatory Body - Monitoring the Process

The central function of the regulatory or supervisory body, once the campaign process has begun, is to ensure that the regulations or agreements put into place in an earlier period are complied with: that direct access time is distributed according to the rules, that voter education is impartial and meets the required standards, and that parties and media are adhering to agreed practice on hate speech.

Very importantly, the regulatory body should also be on the lookout for any interference with the freedom of the media to cover the campaign freely, whether from the state or from any political party. It will need to convey information about any such interference to the appropriate governmental authorities, as well as issuing its own clear public condemnation. This is one of the most concrete ways in which the regulator acts as a facilitator and guardian of media freedom in the electoral process.

It is also during this process that the complaints procedure comes into play. It is vital that this mechanism is able to receive, investigate, hear, and resolve complaints quickly during an election period - long-term, post-election solutions will satisfy no one.

However, in order to address complaints - as well as all these other functions - the regulatory body will need to have the capacity to monitor media coverage of the election. This will enable it not only to respond swiftly to complaints with reference to its own observation of media coverage, but also to initiate its own action if parties or the media have breached laws or regulations.

In many cases, regulatory bodies simply are not able to carry out this monitoring function, which puts them at an immense disadvantage when it comes to evaluating complaints - but also makes them unable to initiate action if, for example, direct access slots are not being broadcast as they should. A monitoring unit undoubtedly costs money - mainly in wages, since it is labour-intensive. The budget for a fairly substantial nongovernmental media monitoring project lasting three months in an African country in late 2000 was about US$250,000.

One common alternative in well-established democracies is for the media to be required to submit a copy of all relevant material to the regulatory body. Assuming such an agreement is complied with, this meets the need to have material at hand to evaluate complaints, but it does not allow the body to initiate its own actions, unless it has staff available to evaluate all material submitted.

A third alternative, which is becoming increasingly common, is for the regulatory body to work in conjunction with non-governmental media monitors. Such a collaboration can be loose and informal or the subject of a detailed contract. In South Africa in 1999, for example, the non-governmental Media Monitoring Project was formally contracted to work with the Independent Broadcasting Authority. More often, the non-governmental monitors will submit their findings to the regulatory body, which will then decide whether further action is required.

Role of Non-governmental Organisations

Increasingly, electoral supervisory bodies work in collaboration with non-governmental organizations of different sorts. This co-operation is a practical realization of the general proposition that an active civil society is needed to safeguard democracy. There are three main areas where this collaboration is likely to take place in relation to media coverage of elections.

Training of Journalists

The regulatory body itself will often not have the capacity to organize training of journalists in election reporting skills, yet it is very much in its interests that those skills be imparted. In such circumstances, it can work in collaboration with journalism training institutions - and with the media houses themselves when they have in-house training schemes. The Tanzanian National Election Commission in 2000 went further afield and contracted the British Broadcasting Corporation to provide training for journalists.

Media Monitoring

International non-governmental organizations such as ARTICLE 19 and the European Institute of the Media have acquired considerable expertise in media monitoring. In a number of national elections, domestic non-governmental organizations have worked in partnership with international groups and have themselves acquired skills that allowed them to monitor. Hence, the Malawi Electoral Commission in 1994 relied heavily in its media work on the findings of a non-governmental monitoring project launched by local freedom-of-expression activists in collaboration with ARTICLE 19. In 1994, the South African Independent Broadcasting Authority contracted the non-governmental Media Monitoring Project to work with it.

Monitoring Media Freedom

Non-governmental human rights groups, as well as professional media bodies and journalists' trade unions, will monitor respect for media freedom as a matter of course. The regulatory body, by developing a working relationship and an exchange of information with such groups, can lend its authority to condemnation of violations of media freedom. It can also use its powers over government and political parties to prevent such incidents or to hold their perpetrators accountable.

Media Monitoring

Monitoring media output is increasingly recognized as an essential part of electoral management. If regulations governing media conduct are to be enforced, then it is necessary for the body responsible to know what the media have been doing. This applies whether that body is the electoral management body or some other media regulator.

Media monitoring may also have a secondary function: it is a way of determining how far the EMB has succeeded in communicating its messages through the media.

The actual monitoring process can vary in scope and sophistication and may be carried out in a number of ways: by a monitoring unit within the EMB or regulatory body , by a contracted non-governmental organization, by an academic body, or by a commercial company.

The issues that monitoring may address include the following:

• whether media have complied with the allocation of time for parties’ direct access;
• whether the timing of direct access slots has been fair;
• the manner in which inflammatory or defamatory statements by candidates have been reported;
• whether media have complied with any rulings by regulatory bodies (for example requiring the right of reply or correction).

Election Day Reporting

Once the polls have opened, the role of the media changes from what it was during the campaign period - and specific rules may be devised to govern this shift. In practice, the shift may have taken place earlier, with an embargo placed on political campaign reporting, opinion poll reporting, direct access broadcasts, or advertisements - or all of these.

Many countries, whether by law or custom, have a period when no news of the election is reported through the media. It is very common for this to be the case once voting itself has started. This is analogous with the usual prohibitions on campaigning within the vicinity of a polling station. The United Kingdom, for example, has a customary and voluntary abstention from reporting election campaigning on polling day itself, and many Commonwealth countries observe a similar practice.

Perhaps the best-known example of an obligatory reflection period is France, where - up until 2002 - it lasted for seven days. Italy and Sweden are other countries where this news blackout is prescribed by law, in both cases for one day before polling. Denmark also has a one-day blackout before polling day, but in that case it is traditional and not legally binding.

Without question, the country with the most extensive news blackout is Israel, where television (though not radio) is prohibited from showing political campaigning for at least 30 days before the election.

The issues posed by a ban on reporting during the poll become proportionally more complex depending on how long the voting takes, as well as how large the country is. In the later case, if the electorate is voting across several time zones, this poses especially complex issues since results in one zone may become available before voting has finished in another.

In essence there are two issues at stake:

• Preserving the integrity of the electoral process and the security of the vote
• Ensuring that the untimely release of information does not influence the vote in any way

The first of these is more straightforward than the second. It is usually not difficult to strike a balance between allowing the media some sort of special access to report on the voting process, but ensuring that voters' secrecy and security is not breached.

However, ensuring the maximum transparency and flow of information without improperly interfering with the process is more difficult, and a greater variety of approaches have been adopted.

Media Access to Polling Stations

The question of media access to the polling stations themselves can sometimes be a cause of some tension - most of it unnecessary.

What the media require, for the most part, is fairly general access - film or still photographs of queues of potential voters, of people actually casting their vote and so on. Journalists are often given a degree of access that is not granted to the general public. Sometimes non-voters are excluded from polling stations altogether - an attempt to avoid last-minute intimidation - but journalists and observers who can produce their accreditation are exempt from this. However, it needs to be made absolutely clear to the media that, despite this privilege, they are subject to the same legal constraints as everyone else. Therefore nothing that they do inside a polling station (or anywhere else, for that matter) may constitute intimidation or influence on the election process. It should also be made clear that journalists' access to polling stations is only under the strict control and with the agreement of the election officer presiding.

It is vital to ensure that the precise policy on media access to polling stations is communicated in advance to presiding officials, as well as to the media themselves.

The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) (http://www.eisa.org.za) produced a useful list of "do's and don'ts" for the media in the 1999 South African elections. Media workers could:

• Show their press card to the presiding officer at polling and counting stations.
• Take photographs and conduct interviews with the agreement of the presiding officer.
• Take part in a "pool" system where large numbers of journalists who want a photograph or an interview with a personality are represented by selected few.

The guidelines also pointed out that in sensitive areas some voters might not want to have their photograph taken or be interviewed.

What media workers were not allowed to do was:

• Undermine the secrecy of the vote and orderliness of the election.
• Publish false information with the intention of disrupting or preventing the election.
• Publish information that caused hostility or fear to influence the outcome of the election.
• Publish information that may influence the conduct or outcome of an election.
• Publish the result of an exit poll during voting hours.

The EISA guidelines also pointed out that there were a number of general prohibitions that also applied to media workers, who could not:

• Interfere with the independence and impartiality of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).
• Force or persuade anyone to register or not to register to vote.
• Force anyone to support or not support any political party or candidate.
• Take part in illegal political activity.
• Pretend to be a representative or candidate of a political party.
• Pretend to be involved in the IEC.
• Provide information about voting, counting of votes, or break the seal or open a ballot box in which there were voting materials. [1]

[1] Raymond Louw, A Handbook on the Media and Electoral Law, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 1999.

Reporting the Vote

enjoy, there is the rather separate question of how they may report the vote as it proceeds. It is generally good practice to stop all direct access programming - party election broadcasts and advertisements - before the actual voting begins. The danger otherwise is of tactically targeted advertising based upon early assessments of how the vote is proceeding. That would be unfair and would offer no possibility of reply.

Some electoral laws or guidelines lay down specific restrictions on news coverage as well, on the basis that late coverage of campaign issues could have an undue influence. In particular, there is often a prohibition, voluntary or statutory, on reporting opinion poll findings.

The Montenegrin election reporting regulations prohibit publicly funded media from publishing either previous election results or "any predictions whatsoever about the election outcome before the polling stations are closed on the election day".

There are, of course, a variety of factors that may influence the vote as it progresses. Voter turnout is an important issue, since high or low turnouts are generally reckoned to favour one party or another. Reporting turnout may sometimes be the subject of some restriction.

In practice, these issues can usually be resolved by professional practice and sensible self-regulation. The British Broadcasting Corporation offers these guidelines to its producers on election day coverage:

Polling day reporting at all elections must avoid any references to election issues and, until the close of poll, we restrict ourselves to factual news about the election. Public opinion polls and reviews of the morning papers may be included. So too may statements of news importance by the parties, but we must ensure that counter-statements by opposing parties are broadcast as well.

Promoting Professional Coverage of Results

Reporting results sounds in principle like the least complicated part of the whole election reporting process. Yet it is remarkable how often it is very poorly carried out. In the Zimbabwe referendum of 2000, not a single newspaper or broadcasting station succeeded in reporting the correct results as issued by the Registrar General's Office! [1]

A major part of the problem lies with the media themselves - if they cannot correctly copy a column of figures, there is little that the election administrator can do about it. But there is much that can be done to promote accurate and professional results reporting.

Provision of a media centre will enormously facilitate media access to results. The mechanisms of counting will vary enormously between centralized and decentralized systems. For the purposes of media reporting, the significant point is whether results are released centrally or locally. If the latter, then media reporting is also likely to be decentralized. In either case, the media should be briefed – orally or in writing – as early as possible on the counting process: where it will take place, how it will take place, approximately how long it is expected to take, and where/when/how the results will be released.

When the system of local counts prevails, as in the United Kingdom, a massive media bandwagon has developed for projecting final results out of available results. Provided that no results or projections are released before the end of voting, this is essentially harmless fun (although dressed up in great statistical seriousness). The worst that can be said about it is that it encourages the treatment of an election as a horse race rather than a democratic choice.

What is particularly important, however, when results emerge gradually - especially true of a first-past-the-post constituency system - is that all results are reported promptly and accurately. This facilitates public scrutiny of the counting process and lessens the possibility of manipulation of the count. It is therefore a potentially important media function.

A rather different aspect of results reporting is media coverage of projected results in the form of exit polls and quick counts.

[1] Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A question of balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum Harare, March 2000.

Exit Polls

The exit poll was developed because of the thirst of the media for up-to-the-minute information on polling day. It is a survey of people who have just voted – as they “exit” from the polling station. The essential part of an exit poll is that those surveyed say how they voted. This allows pollsters to predict the overall result.

The information gathered in exit polls can often be complex. Detailed demographic information – sex, age, ethnicity, and income, for example – will allow more reliable prediction. Sometimes, exit pollsters also gather additional information about why voters made the choice that they did.

The potential pitfalls are obvious: voters providing misleading information or refusing to take part, poor sampling, and so on. However, well-constructed exit polls are usually an extremely accurate means of predicting the result. Hence their popularity with the media.

In reporting exit polls, all the same considerations apply as with opinion polls. Only exit polls run by reputable organisations should be reported. Reporting should include information about the location of the polling and the sample size, along with the margin of error. However, since exit polls are not, strictly speaking, predictive, there are various other points to take account of:

• Will reporting of exit polls influence those who have yet to vote? This is a particular concern in large countries where voting takes place across different time zones.
• What conclusions should be drawn if the actual poll result does not correspond to the exit poll findings? Some influential commentators have concluded that exit polls should not be reported at all. Three examples illustrate some of the issues surrounding whether and how exit poll findings should be reported.
• Part of the problem with exit polls is whether people will honestly report how they have voted. This is likely to be a particular issue in transitional democracies or in situations where there has been widespread intimidation. Voter education should have stressed that each person's vote was secret. In the Zimbabwe elections of 2000, a South African organization, the Helen Suzman Foundation, designed a complex exit poll questionnaire to take account of the danger that people would not honestly state how they voted. But one of the results of this complexity was that the findings were not released until later. Its main purpose, in the end, was to provide some evidence of how intimidation might have affected the result.
• In the Venezuelan referendum of 2004, there was a massive discrepancy between exit poll predictions – which predicted a substantial opposition victory – and the actual result, which was a government victory by more or less the same margin. Critics of the government took this to be evidence that the result had been rigged. Supporters of the government said that the company that carried out the exit poll was hired by the opposition and that it had used a biased methodology in order to discredit the official result.
• In the United States presidential election of 2004, exit polls predicted a narrow margin of victory for the ultimately unsuccessful Democratic candidate, John Kerry. Mainstream media comment did not see this as evidence of voting irregularities, but rather questioned why the exit pollsters had been mistaken. Indeed, one of the television companies sponsoring the exit polls, CNN, altered the exit poll predictions on its web site when it became clear what the actual result was going to be.

The initial attraction of exit polls to the news media was as an early taster in results programmes, before actual results are available. Morning newspapers, whose deadlines are often before any significant results are available, will also make use of them.

However, these three examples show how exit polls have acquired an additional significance, allowing the media to explore whether inconsistency between exit polls and actual results is symptomatic of problems in the electoral process. Well-designed exit polls in Zimbabwe provided a good indicator of electoral malpractice.

Inconsistencies between exit polls and results are only indicative. They do not prove that there was rigging or malpractice. As in Venezuela, further investigation would be needed to establish the cause of the inconsistency. There would be cause for concern, however, if news media did not try to explore and explain these inconsistencies, as in the US in 2004. And actually altering exit poll findings is seriously unethical.

Reporting on Quick Counts

Unofficial quick counts are a parallel counting mechanism that it is important to distinguish from exit polls. A quick count is a partial count of actual results (whereas exit polls are simply a species of opinion poll), used to predict the actual full result. A quick count may often be used as a means of forestalling any manipulation of the results. For the media, of course, the interest is similar to an exit poll in that it enables them to run an early results story.

What they have in common with opinion polls, is the need for the media to report with precision what the count actually measures - in other words, what sample it draws upon and the degree of accuracy that can be expected.

Post-election Reporting

Media interest in an election does not stop with the announcement of the result. For them, it is a continuing story, leading on to the inauguration of those who are newly elected, the selection of a new government, and so on.

For the election authority, however, any formal regulation of the media ends with the announcement of the result. But there is one area where a formal media involvement may continue: if there are challenges to the results, this will be a legitimate story that media will no doubt cover. It should do this in accordance with the usual professional standards governing reporting of court proceedings.

An important twist, however, will be if the behaviour of the media itself forms a dimension of a challenge to results. This has increasingly been the case, for example after the Kenya elections of 1997. The growing interest in the role of media in elections means that serious imbalance may be taken as evidence that an election is unfair.

Findings of media monitoring projects may be used as evidence, and the regulatory methods of the supervisory body may come under scrutiny. Monitoring findings will establish if coverage was unbalanced or biased, but this in itself would be insufficient to demonstrate impropriety in the conduct of the election. To prove this, a court would probably need to be satisfied either that a government interfered directly (and perhaps consistently) with media content, or that a regulatory body failed to implement rules guaranteeing access by the parties to the media and balanced news coverage.

Media Monitoring

Media monitoring is, in a sense, the precondition for much else that has been discussed regarding media regulation during elections and the development of best practices. Without a serious and systematic picture of what the media are actually producing, any discussion about standards or policies can be little more than anecdotal.

Yet, despite the obvious importance of media monitoring, it is only fairly recently that it has become a standard practice in the management of elections.

Who monitors the media?

Three main groups undertake monitoring of the media during elections:

• Electoral management bodies;
• International electoral observation missions;
• Non-governmental organisations and other civic bodies.

The purpose in each instance is rather different. Electoral administrators will normally monitor the media in order to determine whether they have adhered to the regulations or laws governing media behaviour during elections. If EMBs have a direct regulatory function, they will use their monitoring findings to make sure that media comply with the required standards.

International observers are also concerned with media compliance with local rules and laws. However, they are also more broadly concerned with monitoring the contribution that the media make to a free and fair election. They also, of course, have no powers of enforcement and will usually withhold their monitoring findings until after the election has taken place. The value of media monitoring by international electoral observation missions is that it integrates the question of fair media coverage into an overall assessment of whether the election was fairly conducted.

Non–governmental organisations and other civil society groups will have more freedom in the way that they can monitor election coverage. They can devise more varied methodologies to determine different types of media bias. (EMBs and international observers, by contrast, are likely to be restricted to a simple analysis of the allocation of time to parties and candidates.) Civil society monitors, unlike international observers, can also make their findings public whenever they choose, not being restricted until after the election has been held. They can communicate their findings directly to the media. This means that civil society monitoring can often be used as part of an effort to raise journalistic standards while the election campaign is still going on.

The efforts of these different monitoring groups can be complementary and even co-ordinated. In some cases, as in Malawi’s first multi-party election in 1994, an electoral management body may take notice of civil society media monitoring and use its powers to try to make media coverage fairer. In other instances, as in South Africa in 1999, the EMB may hire a non-governmental monitoring group to be its eyes and ears.

Likewise, in the Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004 there was media monitoring from both intergovernmental groups and local human rights and media freedom organisations. The local groups were able to publish their findings regularly (and on a broader set of issues), with their conclusions bolstered by those of the international monitors.

What do media monitors do?

The intellectual origins of media monitoring are to be found in the development of academic media studies, such as the work of the Glasgow Media Group. Academic media analysis, which is primarily geared to the sophisticated media of developed industrial societies, tends to focus in large measure on what it calls "discourse analysis". This is primarily concerned with the hidden messages conveyed by the language selected - or the visual language of television and the subtle or subliminal impact that these can have on the viewer's understanding or interpretation of a subject. Discourse analysis is certainly an element of media monitoring in elections. But usually the emphasis will be on two other standards that are easier to apprehend and then to measure. These are usually described as "quantitative analysis" and "qualitative analysis". The first is the simplest, the least controversial and often has the greatest impact. It simply entails counting and measuring election coverage in the media - number and length of items devoted to different parties, length in column inches, timing and number of direct access programmes and so on. The amount of coverage each party or candidate receives is usually the first criterion that will be looked at in order to evaluate allegations of bias.

"Qualitative analysis" is, as the name suggests, an approach that measures the quality of the coverage that parties and candidates receive. This applies primarily to news coverage, although it should also be applied to voter education. A qualitative evaluation will look at the language used and the message conveyed - not the hidden messages of discourse analysis - and use this to "qualify" the quantitative measure. It may not be very useful to say that Party X has received a certain percentage of news coverage, if a large part of that coverage is biased in its content. Inevitably the measurement of bias is more subjective than simply counting the minutes, seconds or column inches accorded to each candidate. But there are ways of minimizing potential bias on the part of the monitor. One is to count and attribute the sources of a story.

Media monitoring has become a common feature of elections since the mid-1990s. There has been a convergence of methodology among those groups carrying out media monitoring regularly, whether in partnership with national NGOs, with intergovernmental observer teams or on behalf of EMBs. International NGOs such as the European Institute for the Media, along with national organizations such as the Osservatorio di Pavia (Italy), MEMO98 (Slovakia), the Media Monitoring Project (South Africa) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (United States) have popularized easy, effective and surprisingly subtle monitoring methodologies and created a large pool of people familiar with their use.

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Media Monitoring by Electoral Management Bodies

Electoral management bodies may monitor media coverage for a number of reasons:

• To determine whether the law or regulations on access to the media are being respected – for example, in the allocation and timing of free direct access or advertising slots, the observance of “reflection periods”, respect for regulations on content of advertising and direct access and so on.
• To review more broadly whether political parties and candidates are receiving fair access and coverage, for example in news coverage.
• To identify any emerging issues relating to electoral management or the conduct of the campaign that the EMB itself may have to address.
• To see how the activities of the EMB itself are being reported.

The first two of these aims will entail gathering extensive quantitative data - in effect, a full-scale media monitoring project. The other two could be achieved by a more casual and non-systematic review of media coverage, of a type that the EMB may anyway conduct as a matter of routine.

As experience of media monitoring grows and methodologies are more widely disseminated, it has become more common for EMBs (or other regulatory bodies) to contract outside experts to monitor the media. These may be university media studies or other social science departments or non-governmental organisations. The shift can be observed, for example, In South Africa. In 1994, media monitoring was the responsibility of a specialised regulatory body, the Independent Media Commission, established specifically for the duration of the election campaign. By the next elections, in 1999, the broadcasting regulator contracted the non-governmental Media Monitoring Project to monitor on its behalf.

The advantage of contracting outside expertise is clearly that it reduces the administrative burden on the EMB (at a time when other pressures are going to be at their maximum). There are, however, two potential disadvantages, which will be of varying significance depending on other circumstances.

The first potential disadvantage of contracting out is that the media and political parties may not perceive the monitoring findings as being authentically those of the EMB. If the EMB needs to act upon them, the findings may be regarded as a basis for negotiation rather than authoritative. Some EMBs have concluded that setting up their own media monitoring unit for the duration of the election period is a preferable option.

The second potential disadvantage is that the EMB will not develop its own expertise on media issues. Given that many EMBs tend to be inward looking and rather conservative in their dealings with the media, encouraging media literacy among the institution’s staff may have broader benefits. In the long term – given that elections are recurrent events – developing in-house expertise may also be more cost-effective.

Media Monitoring by International Election Observation Missions

Since the late 1990s media monitoring has become a common component of international election observations missions (EOMs). This is an acknowledgment of the importance of fair access to the media as a criterion in assessing the overall acceptability of an election process.

Some organisations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union, invariably include a media team in their EOMs. Other intergovernmental EOMs, such as those from the Commonwealth, may not include their own media monitoring component but will increasingly draw on the media monitoring findings of others. Commonwealth bodies such as the Commonwealth Press Union have themselves undertaken media monitoring, quite separately from the EOMs organised by the Commonwealth Secretariat.

The work on the media undertaken by international EOMs should properly be described as media analysis rather than media monitoring. Organisations such as the OSCE have refined their methodology to the point where a member of the core observation team is responsible for developing an overall analysis of the media scene and its potential impact on the election. This general understanding of the media environment – ownership, laws, past history of restrictions on media activity – will be vital in interpreting the quantitative data gathered in the course of monitoring.

The media analyst in the core team is responsible for training a team of monitors. These will necessarily be nationals of the country concerned, because of the requirement that they have the necessary language skills, as well as an understanding of the local political scene. Monitoring will always have a strong emphasis on quantitative data, primarily the question of the allocation of time and space to different parties and candidates.

Monitoring by international EOMs differs from monitoring by local organisations in two important respects.

• Local monitoring, whether by NGOs or by the electoral management body itself, is intended as a constructive intervention in the election process. If media coverage is unfair, the aim of monitoring is to point this out before the election and attempt to prompt corrective action. International observers cannot intervene in an election process and, for the most part, will not present detailed monitoring findings until after the election is over. The OSCE publishes summary data from its media monitoring in an interim report, but does not release its full conclusions until later.
• International monitoring confines itself to a fairly narrow reading of international or regional standards on access to the media by political parties and candidates. Local monitoring, especially by NGOs, can choose to focus both on a wider range of qualitative indicators and on quantitative measures addressing questions such as gender and ethnic imbalances, or the extent to which the media reflect the campaigning agendas of the different candidates.

The value of incorporating media analysis into international EOMs is that this makes for a more complete and rounded evaluation of the validity of an election. For both media and election managers within the country, international media monitoring findings can be used as a comparison with the conclusions from domestic media monitoring, as well as providing benchmarks for media coverage of future elections.

Domestic media monitors can also learn from the methodologies used by media monitors in international EOMs. The OSCE has developed a manual for its media analysts, describing the international and regional standards underpinning its work, techniques of media analysis and the basics of its media monitoring methodology.

Media Monitoring by Non-Governmental Organisations

Non-governmental organizations have a broad range of reasons for monitoring media coverage of an election. Their primary aim is likely to be the same as that of an electoral management body or international observation mission: to ensure that news coverage is fair and professional and that different parties and candidates have access to the media.

Beyond this primary aim, the aims of NGOs (or of other non-governmental monitors) may be more complex. They may be concerned, for example, with the content of electoral coverage. What topics do media reports cover? How far do these reflect the particular agendas of parties or candidates? Is electoral debate portrayed in a professional and dispassionate manner or do the media inflame partisan sentiments by their language or the style of their coverage?

Do the media actually meet the information needs of voters (an obvious question, but one that is perhaps asked too infrequently)? Are the positions of parties and candidates evaluated from viewpoint of the voter – see Voter’s Voice Reporting – or are the media complicit with the candidates in the uncritical presentation of their policies? Are the media playing an effective educative role? Do they tell voters what they need to know about where, how and why to vote?

How far are the interests and voices of minority or marginalized groups reflected in the media? Are women’s voices being adequately heard in the election campaign through the media? If not, why not? Are the media reflecting social gender bias uncritically, or are they making an effort to challenge it?

The range of issues that non-governmental media monitors have tackled is broad. Seldom is a media monitoring operation going to be able to address all these issues. What they can do, however, is to being their particular expertise to bear upon particular aspects of media coverage.

Most often this area of expertise will be in the area of the media itself. NGOs concerned with media freedom and with professional standards are most often engaged in monitoring. The purpose may be both to defend the media against political interference, whether from governments or private proprietors. Or it may be to promote professionalism in coverage.

At the minimum the published findings of media monitors may influence the quality of media coverage. Sometimes, as in Mozambique in 1994, the dialogue between monitors and journalists may go a step further. The news room of Radio Mozambique used to hold a weekly meeting to discuss the monitors' observations, decide whether they agreed with them or not and make plans for improvements. The improvement in the balance of radio coverage - away from heavy bias to the ruling party - was measurable over the campaign period.

In Tanzania’s 2000 elections, the media monitoring project was initiated by the Media Council, a voluntary professional body, in conjunction with other NGOs concerned with media freedom and professionalism. The project began with a conference, attended by representatives of the main media, which drew up a code of conduct for election coverage. The purpose of monitoring was explicitly to examine whether coverage complied with the standards that the media themselves had agreed upon. Inevitably, media houses often disputed the findings of the monitors. But they proved ready to engage in dialogue, which can only have benefited the quality of coverage.

On other occasions, the relationship between non-governmental monitors and media has been more difficult. Hostility between government media and non-governmental monitors is common. The latter are accused of promoting their own quasi-political agenda. Sometimes private media houses exhibit a similar reaction – for example in Moldova in 2005 – questioning the qualifications and bona fides of a monitoring group that produced critical findings.

On occasions, monitoring groups will address other issues too.

A good example of this broader focus came in media monitoring of the Ukrainian presidential election in 2004. One non-governmental group, Equal Access, carried out a lengthy and comprehensive monitoring that addressed the sole issue of the media access allocated to the different candidates. In parallel, two other organisations, the Institute of Mass Communication and the Kharkiv Human Rights Group, ran a monitoring project that addressed other issues in addition to the allocation of time and space to candidates. They looked at coverage of issues of particular concern to minority ethnic groups – including Crimean Tatars – and at the representation of women in election coverage. Their findings were scarcely surprising – under-reporting of minority concerns and a low frequency of women’s voices as news sources – but they provide important baseline information if these issues are to be tackled in future.

Media Monitoring Methodology

Media monitors – whether they be electoral administrators, international observers, civic activists or academics – will need to settle a number of methodological questions before embarking on their project:

• What media are to be monitored? Will it be just public media, or all media? Will it be just broadcasting outlets or print media too? Will it be a selection of media or all major national outlets?
• Which parts of the media output are to be monitored? Will it be specified news bulletins, all output during particular times of the day, or all output?
• What content will be monitored (and with what purpose): news, advertising, free direct access slots, special programming, voter education, or all of these?
• Will the monitoring seek to gather only data about how much time was allocated to the different parties or candidates or will it also look at other aspects of coverage, such as the use of language, the selection of news stories etc?
• Is the monitoring intended as part of an intervention into the election campaign – for example, to require the media to adhere to professional standards – or is it primarily aimed at documenting whether media coverage was fair and balanced?

The answers to each of these questions have an important impact on the monitoring methodology that is adopted.

Most methodologies used to monitor media coverage of elections draw on a technique known as content analysis. This is an essentially quantitative methodology. That is, it is concerned with elements of media output that can be measured and counted. Content analysis has been criticized for reducing media coverage to what is measurable, leaving out important aspects such as tone and language, whether spoken or visual. The criticism may be valid. There are many things that content analysis cannot do – most simply and obviously it cannot reveal whether news coverage was accurate or inaccurate. However, most organisations that have undertaken media monitoring of elections do use the content analysis, quantitative approach, at least as part of their work.

Typically quantitative monitoring of media election coverage will focus on the amount of time allocated to parties and candidates. This may then be qualified by an assessment of whether the coverage is favourable or unfavourable. Although these measures may also be quantified, they are essentially qualitative judgments.

Some monitoring methodologies introduce other types of quantitative measure in an attempt to avoid relying on monitors’ assessment of whether coverage is positive or negative. They may, for example, count the sources that journalists use, assigning them to different political or social categories. This may be a more objective measure of balance. They may classify media items by topic. This can be useful since, in an election campaign, political parties often campaign not only with different positions but also on different issues. The media’s selection of topics may therefore be a sensitive indicator of their political sympathies.

Another aim of quantitative monitoring may simply be to measure the amount, and perhaps timing, of political advertising or free direct access programming. This may be to ensure that what is actually published or broadcast conforms to the laws or regulations governing direct access.

When media monitoring findings are reported, the greatest attention is usually paid to the allocation of coverage by parties and candidates (along with an evaluation of who is favoured or disfavoured by that coverage). It will be essential in reporting these findings to distinguish clearly between allocation of time in news coverage and in the various other types of coverage – paid advertising, free direct access, opinion pieces and so on.

Media Monitoring and Media Analysis

Monitoring the output of the media will never tell the whole story about how far they are doing a professional job of keeping the electorate informed. Monitoring focuses on what the media produce. Looking at the content of media coverage cannot answer important questions about the legal and political environment in which the media operate.

Media monitoring – whether by electoral managers, observer missions or non-governmental groups – should always be part of a broader process of media analysis. Indeed, many monitoring findings will be inexplicable without placing them in context. Who owns the different media houses? What laws restrict the operations of journalists? Have there been physical attacks on the media? Without answers to these and other questions the quantitative and qualitative findings of media monitoring will be meaningless.

Analysis of the media role in elections will take account of a number of factors, which can be grouped under the following broad headings:

• Media environment: Who owns the media? What are their political leanings? What is the structure of any publicly funded media? How do the media make their money? What is the audience for different media outlets?
• Media law: What is the legal environment in which the media operate? Are there generalised restrictions on media freedom? Does the law relating to media and elections enable the media to report freely or does it restrict them? Are any restrictive laws in regular use?
• Professional standards and traditions: Does the country have a tradition of media freedom? Is there a long history of independent professional journalism? Is there professional regulation of the media (for example through a code of conduct and a self-regulatory complaints procedure)? Have most journalists received professional training?
• Attacks on the media: Have journalists been allowed to go about their work unhampered? Have there been attacks on journalists by government agents? By supporters of different political parties? Have journalists been arrested and imprisoned?
• Informal controls over the media: Do the government or important political figures exercise informal political control over what appears in some media outlets? Does this happen through bribes and inducements? Threats and penalties? Self-censorship? Or a combination of all of these?

Quantitative Media Monitoring Methods

Quantitative media monitoring methodology is often described as content analysis. This has been an influential, but not universally accepted, approach to media studies for more than half a century.

The various criticisms of content analysis boil down to the common charge that it entails imposing arbitrary and inflexible categories upon texts that may in reality be open to much subtler interpretations. Hence, for example, content analysis takes no account of how an audience will understand a message conveyed through the news media. It simply undertakes a quantitative analysis of that message. Quantitative analysis implies the selection of elements of the content of media output that can be counted. In many examples of academic content analysis, the indicators selected may be words. Researchers will measure the frequency with which certain words, or combinations of words, appear.

Whatever the validity of the criticisms of content analysis, the fact is that it is often used in media monitoring in the context of elections. The analysis very seldom focuses on selection of words. Rather, monitors will identify and count one or more of the following variables:

• Frequency with which parties or candidates are mentioned.
• Length of time allocated to parties or candidates.
• Frequency with which various other political or social actors are mentioned.
• Frequency or time allocated to different topics.

There are a number of other variables that monitors might wish to identify. These might include: gender of cited sources, geographical origin of the story, the time that an item is broadcast, the position of an item in a news bulletin and so on.

Different methodologies will incorporate different indicators. The common characteristics of any well-chosen indicators, however, will be that they are reliable and valid.

Reliability means that there will be the same results, whoever the monitor is. In other words, there will be a scientific classification system that can be replicated in most instances. For example, measuring the amount of time directly spoken by a particular candidate is reliable. Classifying topics according to a predetermined set of codes is also reliable, provided that monitors are trained in how to apply that classification system and will usually – say 95 times out of 100 – yield the same result.

Validity means that the data gathered actually show what they are supposed to show. For example, a mere counting of the sex of the voices cited by the media is unlikely to be a valid measure of gender bias. Too many other factors would have to be taken into account: general social attitudes towards women, the gender distribution of candidacies in the different political parties, and so on. Likewise, the amount of time allocated to a particular candidate would not be a valid indicator of bias on behalf on the part of a media outlet. (Other considerations would need to be taken into account, such as the content of the coverage.)

Quantitative monitoring – some possible approaches

All quantitative media monitoring of election coverage is likely to focus on the time allocated to different parties or candidates. Exactly how this will be computed is a matter of choice, with various advantages or disadvantages to the differing approaches.

Many European media monitoring organisations – including the European Institute of the Media, the Osservatorio di Pavia and MEMO98 – use an approach that is predicated upon the frequency of mention of a number of predetermined “political subjects”. Each mention of these subjects within the monitoring period will be logged separately and the amount of direct speech times allocated will be recorded. Each mention will also usually be classified as positive, negative or neutral towards the “subject”.

A slightly different approach is not to count frequency, but to break broadcasting bulletins and publications into “items”. An item will normally correspond to a story within a news bulletin or a newspaper, or a political advertisement. All overtly identified sources for the item will be recorded, both by name and by category (such as political party). Direct speech times will also be counted. The entire item will be assessed to determine whether it favours and/or opposes any candidates or parties. The advantage of this method is that counting the number of sources for each item and evaluating their diversity gives an objective measure of the professionalism of media coverage. The disadvantage is that it does not strictly count the frequency of mentions of a party or candidate. Methodologies of this type are used by organisations such as the Media Monitoring Projects in South Africa and Zimbabwe and ARTICLE 19, which does media monitoring in Africa and Eastern Europe.

Each of these methodologies has to address the common problem of how to assess whether a mention of a political subject or an entire news item (depending on the exact methodology) favours or opposes a candidate or party. Some methodologies use a scale of assessment, in which the monitor places the item somewhere on a measure between +2 (very positive) and -2 ((very negative), passing through positive, neutral and negative.

There is clearly always going to be an issue of reliability. How will it be possible to ensure that monitors apply the same evaluation? This can only be achieved thorough training and practice. This will determine the margin of error in evaluating items on the scale.

Determining positive and negative coverage

The more fundamental problem, however, is how to apply objective criteria. It is important, first, to understand that evaluating whether an item or speech is positive or negative about a particular party or candidate is not the same as determining if it is biased. The measurement of bias comes only when it is possible to assess the aggregated measures of positive or negative coverage.

One effective approach is to use two sets of criteria in determining whether an item is positive or negative: context and content.

The first of these, content, refers to the way in which the story is framed. For example, if a story is about a politician appearing in court on charges of fraud, the frame is clearly negative. (Note that this has nothing to do with whether the story is accurate or fair.) If the politician is rather receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, the frame is positive. If the politician is addressing a political rally, the frame is most likely to be neutral.

The second criterion, content, refers to the overt facts and tone of the story. If the politician charged with fraud makes a particularly effective speech from the dock, this may be positive (despite the negative framing of the story). If the journalist says that the politician did not deserve to receive the Nobel Prize, this is negative, despite the positive framing. More commonly, of course, the framing and content coincide.

If context and content do coincide, then it is clear how the item will be classified. If the context and content lead to opposite conclusions (one positive, one negative), then they will cancel each other out and the item will be classified as neutral. If either content or context is neutral, while the other is positive or negative, then the latter will determine how the item is classified.

Other quantitative methods for evaluating coverage

In the second family of methodologies already described, there are a number of other quantitative indicators that can be used:

• Number of sources is an indicator of journalistic professionalism. Distribution and balance of sources may indicate political bias.
• Gender of sources may be a useful indicator if carefully interpreted.
• Geographical distribution of stories may be significant in some instances.
• Selection of topics is likely to be important.

The final point – selection of topics – may often be a sensitive quantitative indicator of the political inclinations of the media. Political parties usually campaign on somewhat different issues from their opponents. The selection of stories covered by the media will often suggest how far they subscribe to the political agenda of one party or another.

Statistics on sources say something about balance, but not automatically about bias. A one-source story is unbalanced, but it need not be biased. If the governor of the central bank announces a rise in interest rates, no other voice is required because it is a straight news item. (Good journalistic practice might suggest that a comment from the political parties and independent experts would be helpful.) On other hand, coverage of political violence that only quoted from one party would probably be biased.

Qualitative Media Monitoring Methods

Quantitative analysis alone will not adequately explain the strengths and weaknesses of media coverage. It is not enough to complain that the ruling party is receiving more media coverage than the opposition - there may be good reasons for this, for example in terms of their public support. But equally, simply counting the number of items may conceal the fact that some parties' "quota" of coverage may include items that show them in a bad light. For example, in South Africa before the 1994 elections the state broadcaster kept its own statistical record of party coverage, which showed that the African National Congress, then in opposition, was receiving extensive coverage. Yet this proportion included much negative coverage, such as the reporting of Winnie Mandela's trial for kidnapping. Hence the bare statistics do not tell all.

Extremely important aspects of election coverage are not readily susceptible to quantitative monitoring. Reporting of inflammatory speech, for example, will require close textual analysis of the approach that the media uses.

Monitors will also analyse the content of voter education material to ensure that no party political message is being conveyed. Often they will wish to compare the treatment of the same stories in different language services. There is often a quite different content to broadcasts in the colonial language - English, French, Spanish or Portuguese - and indigenous languages. The former will, to some extent, be for external consumption. Broadcasters and politicians often assume that no independent monitor is paying attention to what they say in their own languages.

One very important consideration is how far media reporting is accurate. Media monitors will measure bias by comparing media reporting to their own understanding of events derived from a variety of sources. One way of doing this is "source monitoring": the media monitors themselves attend an important newsworthy event such as a political rally or a press conference, in order to see how media coverage compares with their own perceptions. The Internet has made it easier for monitors to compare domestic coverage with international reporting on their country. The two sometimes bear little relation to each other.

Evaluating the implicit messages contained within media coverage is at the same time important, difficult and highly contentious. Under this heading come all the subtleties of language and visuals that convey a message that is understood by the audience, but sometimes not in a conscious manner. This can be most clearly shown in the use of words, whether in print or broadcast. For example, pro-government media may have the President "stating" something, while his opponent only "alleges". Reporting does not have to be inaccurate to be an improper influence on the audience's perceptions. In South Africa before the 1994 election, for example, monitors noticed that reports of ANC demonstrations always mentioned the amount of litter left behind by the participants. The message was that the ANC was disruptive and irresponsible. Foreign news items can be used to encourage a particular interpretation of domestic news. In Malawi in 1994, coverage of opposition parties on the state broadcaster was placed alongside news of the Rwandan genocide. The subliminal message was that an end to one-party "stability" would lead to bloodshed.

Television has a whole complex visual vocabulary. Figures who are regarded as authoritative - such as incumbent politicians - may be portrayed at an upward angle, while others are filmed at a level angle or from above. Figures in authority will more often address the camera directly, while others will address an unseen interviewer to one side of the camera and thus will not address the viewer directly. Ordinary interviewees - opposition members, trade unionists, the public - will usually be interviewed in the open air. Government members will be seen in their office, often shuffling papers and apparently engaged in some urgent and important activity. An office background tends to emphasise the authority and expertise of the interviewee. And so on.

Even the graphics and logos that accompany a news broadcast may convey a message. The graphic on South African television for the running story of political negotiations in 1993 showed two white men and one black man. This was later changed to one white man, one off-white woman and one black man. Neither of these reflected the actual composition of the negotiations. More blatantly, in the Zimbabwean 2000 elections, a special current affairs programme that run through the campaign period had as its logo the tower at the Great Zimbabwe ruins - exactly the same as the symbol of the ruling party.

Reporting Media Monitoring Findings

The way in which media monitoring findings are reported is a crucial aspect of media monitoring methodology. Exactly how this is approached will vary depending on the type of monitoring exercise and who is conducting it.

For example, international election observation missions usually do not report their findings until the election is over (or at least the campaign is complete) except perhaps for a single interim report. An electoral management body or a national non-governmental organisation is more likely to want to report their findings on a regular basis – as often as once a week, or even daily in the later stages of an election campaign. The reason is that their purpose in reporting is to have an impact on media coverage, either as a regulatory authority or as a pressure group.

All reports – even short weekly reports – will need to contain certain standard elements, even if they may be very brief in a shorter report:

• A summary of findings.
• A description of the project and methodology.
• A presentation of data and findings.
• Conclusions and recommendations.

Longer reports will all also include information about the overall media landscape (including such elements as any violations of media freedom).

All serious media monitoring reports will have certain common elements in their style and presentation. The language used should always be neutral and politically non-partisan. Conclusions and observations will be presented clearly and substantiated by the statistical data and other evidence presented. The limitations and possible weaknesses of the data should also be explained.

Data will be more clearly comprehensible if it is presented graphically – for example as bar or pie charts. However, care should be taken with this. Absolute data should also be shown as percentages to help readers understand their significance. But percentages should also be qualified by showing the absolute data on which they are based. It is all to easy to write something like: “There was 100 per cent more coverage of Party A than of Party B.” But perhaps there were just two stories about one party and one about the other.

Recommendations are also important. If the report is a reflective one covering the whole election period, these will be aimed at future changes in media practice and perhaps also the law and regulations governing the media in election periods. For interim reports, recommendations are likely to be more specifically focused in order to encourage the media to report more fairly.

Distributing reports

In most cases it is now easiest to distribute regular media monitoring reports by email. But in doing so, do not ignore the important audiences that may not be readily accessible by this medium. Here is a quick check-list of the possible audiences for media monitoring reports. They will vary, of course, depending on local circumstances as well as the nature of the monitoring exercise.

• Media houses.
• The electoral management body.
• Political parties.
• Media regulatory bodies.
• Relevant non-governmental organisations.
• Professional media bodies (such as journalists’ unions, voluntary media council etc).
• Civic and community organisations.
• Observer and monitoring groups and missions.
• Diplomatic and donor bodies.

Covering an Election Campaign

This section of the Media and Elections topic area is aimed mainly at journalists and editors.

Much of the discussion in the topic area focuses on the crucial role that the media play in democratic elections – their political and social responsibility. Yet on a day-to-day basis editors and journalists do not think much about their role in society – rather they are concerned with reporting the news in a way that is quicker, better and more interesting than their rivals. This focus is quite legitimate, yet being first and best with the news is not incompatible with professional responsibility. Indeed, proper planning and training, combined with ethical standards, will make for better election coverage.

• There is often a dearth of training in election reporting. This is an area that is typically ignored in the curricula of journalism training institutions. Editors will need to approach other institutions to make sure that their journalists receive the proper training. Or they could collaborate with electoral management bodies to provide this.
• Editors need to plan election coverage. Elections are massive stories requiring a major redeployment of human and financial resources. Much of what needs to be done can be foreseen before the beginning of an election campaign.
• Journalists and editors need to keep sight of the specific ethical issues that may arise in election reporting. Ideally, they will formulate a voluntary code of conduct for election coverage, in consultation with other stakeholders – notably the EMB and political parties.
• Journalists need to develop an understanding of the media strategies adopted by political parties to communicate their messages. They will have to make sure that they do not become unwitting servants of the parties’ media campaigns, as well as having the capacity to explain the parties’ behaviour to the public.
• Good and innovative election reporting takes as its starting point the needs of the voters. This certainly encompasses the need to report on what the parties and candidates are saying but is more broadly focused on what voters want – which may be different from what candidates are offering. This “voters-voice reporting” is not only more socially responsible; it is also likely to be more popular with the public.

Training Journalists to Report Elections

If journalists are to report elections professionally it is clear that they must be trained to do so. The need is self-evident but often it is not met.

Fundamentally, the professional requirements of reporting elections do not differ enormously from reporting anything else. In particular the ethical imperatives of accuracy, impartiality, responsibility and probity assume great importance in covering elections – but these should be the bedrock of a journalist’s working method in any case.

However, there are many additional areas of knowledge that journalists will need if they are to report elections effectively. These include:

• An understanding of the political and electoral system;
• An understanding of the overall electoral process;
• Familiarity with electoral law, especially as it affects media reporting;
• Understanding of the role of the media in covering elections;
• Knowledge of the country’s election history;
• Detailed knowledge of the mechanics of voter registration, boundary delimitation, the vote, the count and any other issues of relevance (such as the use of technology in voting or the use of postal votes, if these are potential matters of controversy);
• Types of reporting that are fairly specific to elections (such as reporting opinion polls).

Many of these are matters that could easily be covered in the basic curriculum of a journalistic training institution. In practice, however, they seldom are. Certain types of specialized coverage, such as court reporting, are routinely included as part of the basic training for a journalist (even though many journalists will never employ these skills). In practice most journalists will end up reporting on elections, but many are unprepared to do so.

The consequences of this lack of knowledge may be serious. Not only is there a likelihood that the media will report inaccurately or, at best inadequately. They will also be unable to play their role of monitoring the electoral process and holding administrators to account for any shortcomings.

This frequent lack of training is often part of a more general problem of access to training by journalists. Many poorer countries do not have any journalism training establishment at all.

The lack of training of journalists in covering elections is often made up by ad hoc training courses run by a large variety of institutions. These may take place either in the country concerned (with the advantage that more journalists can attend) or at the training institution.

There are a number of potential problems to be overcome when outside training institutions organize training:

• How can it be made relevant and specific to the conditions of the country concerned?
• How will it be possible to reach enough journalists to have an impact?
• When can journalists be trained to have the maximum benefit but not interfere with their actual reporting duties?

There are no simple answers to these questions. However, they can best be addressed if training is organized with close consultation of the most important stakeholders: the electoral management body, media regulators, media proprietors and journalists’ professional bodies and trade unions.

Planning Election Coverage

All media will need to plan their coverage of an election. Whether planning entails the complex deployment of massive resources or the skilful maximising of scarce ones, election coverage will not work properly without it.

A good election plan will have to take account of the following considerations:

• What resources are available? Is there a special budget for election coverage, or will it have to be met out of the normal editorial budget? What staff are available – is there a budget to hire additional staff or freelancers?
• What is the timetable of the campaign? When are the crucial moments and how far will it be possible to prepare coverage for these in advance?
• What are the particular issues in this campaign and how far will this influence the way in which a particular media outlet organises its coverage?
• What innovations in coverage will the media house make? What will be the distinct features of its coverage?

The answers to these questions will differ enormously depending on whether the media house concerned is an international satellite television network or a local newspaper. The scale of operations will differ enormously, but the planning issues are essentially the same.

The following checklist highlights issues that editors will need to address before the start of an election campaign:

• Check key dates of the election process: registration, nomination, campaign period, polling day, announcement of results etc.
• Check the regulations and laws affecting election coverage.
• Set a budget for election coverage.
• Identify the team who will cover the election – as well as political staff, other specialised reporters will need to cover particular aspects of the campaign.
• Identify the team in charge of election coverage – senior editors who will decide on any sensitive matters that emerge in the course of the campaign.
• Plan technical and operational arrangements.
• Recruit additional personnel.
• Contact resource people, such as election experts and pundits, who can advise you on election matters.
• Contract a reputable company to run opinion polls for you.
• Check photo and video libraries.
• Plan for emergencies.

This list is adapted from the International Federation of Journalists’ Election reporting Handbook. Read the full document here.

As important as the practical arrangements is thinking about how to cover the election. Finding new angles is both a way of competing effectively with rival media houses and of making the election fresh and interesting to the audience. In particular, media houses should try to identify what they think are the crucial issues of an election campaign. Once the campaign starts, the political parties will each be attempting to set the agenda that suits their own interests. The media should consider what are the most important issues for voters and attempt to follow these regardless of the candidates’ own agendas.

One effective way of doing this is through “voters’ voice” reporting.

Ethical and Professional Issues for Media in Elections

Most of the ethical and professional issues that journalists will encounter in covering elections will be variants of what they confront in their everyday working lives. However, these issues and dilemmas may present themselves in particular ways during elections.

Examples of such professional dilemmas might include:

• Newsworthiness v. balanced coverage: News coverage is typically driven by considerations of what is distinct and therefore of particular interest in an event. Yet electors require a fair and balanced presentation of the manifestoes and agendas of the different parties (which may be far from distinct or interesting). How can the media reconcile their news function with their public service function?
• Transparency v. integrity of the election process: One of the reasons that the media play in essential role in democratic elections is that they are able to subject the election process to scrutiny and expose any malpractice. However, proper administration of an election also depends on security and confidentiality. Balancing these two elements is an issue for lawmakers and those responsible for drawing up electoral regulations. But it is also a day-to-day practical issue for journalists themselves.
• Reporting inflammatory speech: The paradox is that election campaigns are the times when politicians are most likely to express extreme and inflammatory sentiments – with the chance of these reaching large audiences. They are also the time when these are most likely to have a negative impact – but also the time when expression of differing political views is most important. The regulatory implications of this dilemma are for policymakers to resolve. For journalists the challenge is to report inflammatory political speech in a manner that is both accurate and least likely to provoke violence or fear.

Journalism is sometimes described as a profession and many journalists are proud to be considered professionals. Other journalists regard their calling as a trade rather than a profession like medicine or the law. Whatever the conclusion on this point, however, there should be agreement that the practice of journalism needs to be regulated by a professional or ethical code of conduct.

Codes of conduct may be promulgated by associations or trade unions of journalists, by media houses, individually or collectively, or by regulatory bodies. Such codes are most effective if they are the outcome of a collective process in which journalists and editors themselves participate. There are overarching codes of conduct, such as that agreed by the International Federation of Journalists. This enunciates several principles that will be relevant to journalists in election coverage:

• Accuracy.
• Impartiality.
• Honesty and resistance to corruption.
• Avoiding the use of language or sentiments that promote violence or discrimination.
• Correction of inaccurate factual reporting.

It is often good practice to develop a code of conduct that covers issues specific to elections. These might include:

• Reporting opinion poll findings.
• Reporting political rallies and other campaign events.
• Using exit polls.
• Reporting the count.

Codes of Conduct for Media in Elections

Many countries have codes of conduct to guide (or regulate) journalists in their work. These may be promulgated by professional or trade union bodies, by media houses or by regulatory authorities. There are also international codes of conduct, such as that adopted by the International Federation of Journalists.

The general principles contained in these ethical codes have equal applicability during election periods and form the basis for the professional standards that journalists and editors should apply at all times. However, it is often considered useful to develop a specific code of conduct to address the particular professional dilemmas that may arise during elections in greater detail.

Codes of conduct for journalists and editors are most effective when the media practitioners themselves are involved in drawing them up. The standards in the code are then seen as aids to effective journalism and not restrictions. Sometimes this will be done by the media alone; on other occasions it may be done in consultation with other stakeholders, including the electoral management body and political parties.

Elements of a code of conduct

A code of conduct for election reporting will include a mixture of general ethical standards, applicable in all circumstances, and those specific to election periods. This is a possible check-list of standards, derived from International IDEA’s proposed code of conduct (which is itself based upon many existing codes from different countries):

• The first duty of a journalist is to report accurately and without bias.
• A journalist shall report only in accordance with facts of which s/he knows the origin. A journalist shall not suppress essential information.
• A journalist shall observe professional secrecy regarding the source of information obtained in confidence.
• A journalist shall report in a balanced manner. If a candidate makes an allegation against another candidate, the journalist should seek comment from both sides wherever possible.
• A journalist shall do the utmost to correct any published information that is found to be harmfully inaccurate.
• As far as possible, a journalist shall report the views of candidates and political parties directly and in their own words, rather than as they are described by others.
• A journalist shall avoid using language or expressing sentiments that may further discrimination or violence on any grounds, including race, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinions, and national or social origins.
• When reporting the opinions of those who do advocate discrimination or violence, a journalist shall do the utmost to put such views in a clear context and to report the opinions of those against whom such sentiments are directed.
• A journalist shall not accept any inducement from a politician or candidate.
• A journalist shall not make any promise to a politician about the content of a news report.
• A journalist shall take care in reporting the findings of opinion polls. Any report should wherever possible include the following information:
  • who commissioned and carried out the poll and when
  • how many people were interviewed, where and how were they interviewed and what is the margin of error
  • what was the exact wording of the questions.

• A journalist shall regard the following as grave professional offences:
  • plagiarism
  • malicious misrepresentation
  • calumny, slander, libel or unfounded accusations
  • acceptance of a bribe in any form in consideration of either publication or suppression.

Many of these standards are examined in greater detail on separate pages.

Accuracy of Media Reports

It may seem self-evident that journalists should seek to report accurately. However, the very large amount of inaccurate reporting – particularly noticeable at election times – suggest that the point bears repeating.

The requirement of accuracy works at many different levels. At its simplest it means that journalists report candidates’ names accurately, that they give accurate numbers for those attending election events, that they report candidates’ words accurately and so on.

Journalists have a broader responsibility to place the words and events that they report in a clear and accurate context. A news report can easily become skewed in favour or against a particular candidate if the context of a statement is not given accurately. So often this will require a journalist or editor to place one candidate’s remark in its correct relationship to the stated position of other candidates.

The media will always compete to get a story quickly. But there is an ethical responsibility not only to be quick but also to be accurate – or at least as accurate as possible in the circumstances. There are pragmatic reasons for this, as well as principled ones. Media or journalists that are cavalier with the facts will not be trusted and will find it more difficult to gather information.

Impartiality

One of the measures of good election reporting is impartiality. Impartial reporting is closely related to the issue of accuracy. Accurate reporting is a precondition of impartiality, but it is not a sufficient one.

The quantitative measure that media monitors use to assess impartiality is balance. They look at the variety of sources a journalist uses in a particular story, or that a media outlet uses over a period of time. Although this measure is not foolproof it usually serves as a reliable indicator. Election coverage is bedevilled by one-sided reporting that conveys the position of a favoured party or candidate without reporting the alternative positions. A news story that includes different points of view is always going to be a stronger and more balanced one.

It will often be difficult for media to establish balance within a particular story. A journalist may be assigned to a particular party campaign and will not have the opportunity to seek comment from other parties. In that case, the responsibility lies at the editorial level to make sure that the different party positions on the same issue are reported, either by compiling composite stories or by running parallel stories portraying the different positions.

One of the elements of impartiality in election coverage is the separation of fact and comment. This is regarded as fundamental principles of professional journalism. It applies even to committed, campaigning journalism. In elections this will be especially important. A media outlet might have a stated political position in favour of a particular party or candidate. But there is still an ethical obligation that news coverage be factual, even when accurate reporting might seem to undermine the editorial stand it has taken. This ethical obligation lies with the individual journalist and editor, as well as with the higher management of the media house.

Finally, an important measure of journalists’ impartiality is that they do not hold prominent office in any political party or movement. Journalists are as entitled as anyone to their political beliefs and loyalties, but a position of individual political prominence will compromise a journalist's credibility as an impartial chronicler of events.

Responsibility

Journalists have various ethical obligations, both to society as a whole and to various individuals with whom they have professional contact. An obvious one is the undertaking that journalists make to confidential sources of information to keep their identity secret. Equally journalists undertake to use honest and legal methods to gather the news.

The idea that journalists have a broader social responsibility flows out of the notion that it is not just a job, but an exercise of the right to freedom of expression – a crucial human right that is essential to the functioning of democracy. Certain other obligations flow from this social responsibility.

It is crucial, for example, that journalism be original and not derivative. Too often inaccurate observations become widely disseminated through repetition. This is something where well-established and reputable media houses are often as blameworthy as those that are small and ill-resourced. Journalists often use cuttings libraries – or latterly the Internet – and reproduce claims that they are unable to substantiate.

Good journalists exercise responsibility in the way they report damaging allegations against individuals or social groups. They give those affected the chance to respond, creating a balanced and non-inflammatory report. They are aware of the potential impact of their reports. At worst inflammatory media reports can cause protests or violence. Inaccurate reporting may swing the outcome of an election.

Journalists are honest. They do not accept bribes or other inducements in exchange for writing something favourable about a politician or other prominent individual. In election reporting, they take care in the way they accept, for example, offers of transport from political parties. A good journalist will always make it clear that he or she is not aligned with a political party.

Legal Issues in Election Reporting

A thorough understanding of the laws governing elections is a precondition of both planning and reporting elections.

Senior editors and executives involved in planning coverage will need to know what their legal obligations are. What, for example, are they obliged or permitted to run in the way of paid or free political advertising? How can broadcasting schedules be arranged to accommodate these requirements? What rates can be charged for advertising?

Are there any laws or regulations relating to the content of either direct access programming or news coverage? If so, what systems can the media house put in place to meet its obligations?

Are there reporting restrictions at any particular moment in the campaign or on polling day? What access will journalists have to the count and are there any restrictions on reporting results?

Editorial planners will need answers to all these questions and more. In some cases – those that involve reporting – ordinary journalists will need this information too.

There is, however, another sense in which journalists need to be familiar with the law on elections. If they are to report accurately – and especially if they are to try to hold election administrators to account – they need to know exactly how the system is meant to work. If this seems obvious, the reality is too often that reporters simply do not understand the basic functioning of the electoral system. They are unable too analyse whether the delimitation of electoral boundaries has been carried out fairly, because they are unaware of the criteria by which these are delimited. They do not know whether there is adequate security for ballot boxes, because they do not know what the law prescribes on this issue.

To a large degree these issues can be addressed through training. A good training programme will certainly cover at least the rudiments of election law. However, it is unlikely that a single training workshop can answer all questions that might arise on legal matters. Editorial managers will need to ensure that reference material is available for all reporters – preferably in the form of a customized manual on electoral law. Collaboration with the EMB to produce such information would be in the interests of all concerned.

Reporting Opinion Polls

Used properly, opinion polls can be an important way of measuring what voters think about particular issues, parties and candidates. Newspapers and broadcasters often commission their own polls to give them information about voters' intentions. An opinion poll can also be a way of finding out what voters think about a particular issue - or what they think the important issues are. These might not be the same as the issues that seem important to politicians. Arguably, opinion polls help to enhance democratic choice. For example, in a first past the post system they may assist those who wish to vote tactically to ensure that a certain candidate fails.

The danger with opinion polls is that they are subject to manipulation at many levels: choosing the questions, choosing the sample, choosing the time to ask the questions and so on. This is quite apart from the normal margin of error in any opinion poll - which in a closely fought election may be greater than the margin that separates the parties. A well-conducted poll is usually remarkably accurate. It is reckoned that a sample of 1,000 can accurately reflect the views of more than 200 million US adults to within a few percentage points. But their limitations must be clearly understood too. That is why media reporting of opinion poll findings demands the highest professional standards. It is also why, arguably, reporting of opinion polls should be subject to regulation by the electoral supervisory body to make sure that the media are not communicating deliberate falsehoods.

In the United Kingdom, internal guidelines remind British Broadcasting Corporation staff to downplay the significance of opinion poll results and to emphasize that they represent only a snapshot of opinion at a particular moment. Accuracy is clearly improved if media report the result of all opinion polls, especially if they then average the results, hence minimizing the impact of "rogue" polls, which can occur even with the most professional of polling techniques.

Professional coverage of opinion polls means asking a number of key questions about how the survey was conducted - and telling the audience the answers:

• Who conducted the poll? Are they reputable and independent?
• How many people were interviewed?
• How were they chosen?
• Are the published results based upon the answers of all those interviewed?
• When was the poll conducted?
• What is the sampling error?
• What questions were asked - and how were they worded? In what order were they asked?
• How do the results of this poll compare with other findings?

Reporting Exit Polls

Exit polls have become an extremely popular device in media reporting of elections.

An exit poll is really just a species of opinion poll (as compared with quick counts, which count a sample of real votes). Voters are asked whom they voted for as they leave – exit – the polling station. Well-conducted exit polls achieve a high degree of accuracy, but many exit polls are not well conducted.

Reporting of exit polls should be subject to all the same strictures as reporting opinion polls: who conducted the survey, how many people were interviewed, where, and so on. However, there are additional considerations in reporting exit polls. These relate to the two main purposes for which the media are interested in exit polls:

• To try to predict the actual result of the election.
• To try to see if discrepancies between exit polls and real results indicate any faults in the election process.

For as long as exit polls have been reported, this has generally been at the moment when actual polls close. The exit poll “results” fill the gap in news coverage while the newspapers and networks wait for the real results to arrive. This use of exit polls is fairly harmless and is now scarcely controversial.

What has become a matter of controversy is the reporting of exit poll results before actual voting has finished. This is particularly an issue in large countries spread across several time zones. It has been Internet reports, rather than reports in the traditional media, that have stoked this controversy.

The country where this has been a particular issue is the United States – spread across several time zones and with widespread Internet access. The main argument against reporting exit poll findings before the end of voting is that these might influence people who have not yet voted.

Internet journalists have argued, on the contrary, that to stop reporting of exit polls at this time is a restriction of freedom of expression. The political elite has this information; all that the Internet is doing is making it available to a wider public. It is also sometimes argued that the nature of the Internet would require a voter to seek out such information, rather than hearing it on radio or television. However, the development of syndicated news feeds and email list servers rather undermines the latter argument.

Traditional journalists in print and broadcasting maintain that just because they have acquired a piece of information (like an exit poll result) this does not mean that they have to publish it. Sometimes they may consider that there is an ethical obligation not to do so. This is a debate that has no definitive resolution.

The use of exit polls as an indicator of electoral malpractice is equally problematic, hinging as it does on the quality of the exit poll methodology. If the media are going to use exit polls to damn the administration of an election, then they need to be sure that they understand the quality and methodology of the exit poll. In some instances – Ukraine 2004, for example – exit poll findings have provided a prima facie case for alleging electoral malpractice. Of course these allegations would have to be sustained through detailed investigation into the actual conduct of the election. In other instances – Venezuela’s 2004 referendum was a case in point – the exit poll methodology was so dubious that the findings cast no serious doubt on the result of the actual vote.

Reporting Hate Speech

One of the greatest professional challenges for journalists covering an election campaign is how to report inflammatory language and sentiments spoken during political campaigning. From the journalist’s point of view, the challenge is how to balance two potentially conflicting ethical obligations: to report accurately and not to write anything that will discriminate on racial, religious, national, gender or other grounds.

In practice, however, using good professional reporting practices, the dilemma may be more imagined than real. As well as the obligation to report accurately, the journalist also has to be balanced. Balance involves citing differing or opposing viewpoints. It also entails placing the words of politicians in an accurate context.

Sometimes accurate reporting of inflammatory or hateful language may serve to undermine the intentions of the politician using such words. Often extremist politicians present themselves to the electorate as “moderate” who are simply articulating widely held sentiments (about immigrants, national minorities, or whatever). Exposing the words that they use when speaking to their own supporters at political rallies may actually undermine their broader credibility. It will also be the responsibility of the media to document the consequences of such speech. If militants leave a political rally and inflict violence on opponents or members of demonized communities, this is vital context that must be reported.

Even when this is not the case, the balancing of hate speech by the voices of those who are being maligned play s a positive and useful purpose. Not only does it provide the opportunity for the factual content of hate speech to be challenged. By giving a voice to those who are being demonized, it humanizes them – dehumanization being the immediate purpose of most hate speech – and creates the possibility of sympathy.

More broadly, accurate reporting of hate speech is a valuable early warning tool, indicating potentially more serious social conflict or human rights violations to come. One of the most important arguments against banning hate speech is that it provides an opportunity to address the causes of prejudice and hatred rather than driving them underground. Responsible media reporting plays a crucial part in this.

Reporting the Campaign

Most training materials on election reporting focus, not surprisingly, on reporting the campaign itself. This is the longest part of the electoral process, the one where the greatest media resources are allocated, and the one where the media are most likely to exert influence over the electorate.

Although campaign reporting might reasonably be seen as an extension of the normal skills involved in reporting, there are several distinct aspects that need to be considered separately:

• Parties’ media strategies: how do party managers try to manipulate media coverage in order to have their own candidates portrayed in the most positive light and to influence voters in their favour?
• How can political events, such as meetings and rallies, be reported in a way that is simultaneously interesting, newsworthy, fair and informative?
• How should journalists tackle the problem of reporting inflammatory or defamatory speech?
• What are the professional and practical issues involved in reporting opinion poll findings?
• Are there alternative ways of reporting elections that more adequately reflect the preoccupations and priorities of ordinary voters?

Parties' Media Strategies

Journalists need to understand the strategies that political parties use in order to convey their messages through the media. This is important, both in order to ensure that they are not themselves manipulated, but also so that they can uncover and explain these strategies for their audience.

There is much contemporary talk about “spin doctors” and other purportedly innovative media weapons. But although the precise techniques might have evolved in the age of the cellular telephone and the hand-held computer, the approaches that parties take to election campaigns have not changed much over the years. These could be summarized as follows:

• Dictate the agenda. Very often competing political parties or candidates fight the campaign on their own chosen terrain. One party may fight the election on the issue of, say, management of the economy. Another may fight it on national security. The success of their campaign strategy will lie in how far they get the media to talk about the priority issue for their own party and avoid the one that is being stressed by their rival. Journalists need to be alive to these intentions and try to focus on what they see as the genuine priority issues for voters.
• Use soft news to make themselves voter-friendly. This tactic is as old as politics. Politicians shake hands, kiss babies, drink a pint of beer, go bowling – whatever is the culturally appropriate way to show that they are fully paid up members of the human race. Voters know that these soft news opportunities are staged, but they still work as a way of giving politicians a human face. Better still, they use up time avoiding issues that might be potentially damaging. Journalists face a dilemma. These stories are not really proper news – but they risk being scooped by rival media outlets if they do not run them. This is a reason why so much election coverage is superficial and uninformative.
• Change the subject. This is closely related to the previous two points. When there are events that may damaging to a party’s candidates, they will hastily seek to change the media focus elsewhere: kissing babies, the other party’s shortcomings, a different manifesto pledge – anything to avoid negative news. Incumbent parties are especially well placed to do this, since they can create official events or announcements that will themselves constitute diversions.
• Keep their name in the news. But notwithstanding the previous point, all party media managers work on the assumption that there is no such thing as bad publicity. There is an element of truth in this proposition during elections. No one ever voted for a candidate they had not heard of.
• Plant negative stories about the opposition. The attitude towards negative political campaigning varies enormously depending on political culture. However, in most cases frontal assaults on a rival candidate are much less effective than cleverly placed negative stories about a rival party or candidate. It is this art of feeding the negative story that has developed most rapidly with the emergence of “spin-doctoring”. The responsibility of the journalist, when confronted with negative stories, is to ask the question: “Who is telling me this – and why?”

Reporting Political Events

In most countries, in most election campaigns, the staged political event remains an extremely important part of parties’ media strategies.

In many countries, of course, the political rally remains important in itself. It is a way of the candidates speaking directly to the voters. There is still an echo of the hustings, where rival candidates put forward their policies, debated and were questioned. Primarily, however, the political rally or other campaign event serves two purposes:

• To keep the candidates in the public eye.
• To allow them to put across their political positions unchallenged.

The modern political rally may do other things. Celebrity endorsements, for example, are an important element of political campaigning. Political rallies are often used to showcase the support of a well-known singer, actor or television personality.

All these aims require, to some degree, the complicity of the media themselves. Candidates are only in the public eye if the media report the events. Positions are only unchallenged if the media fail to quote alternative views. Celebrity endorsements are most effective if – as they generally do – the media focus on these (and continue to promote the celebrity’s latest song, film or television programme).

This presents journalists and editors with a genuine dilemma. Rallies are big events and are in that sense newsworthy. On the other hand, the content of such rallies is usually highly predictable and the exact opposite of newsworthy. The pack mentality tends to rule – the assumption always being that other media will report and so must we.

However, subjecting the statements of politicians to critical scrutiny is a necessary part of election reporting. Mere stenographic repetition of politicians’ statements is not good journalism. Balance needs to be sought, both through quoting reactions to what politicians say and by ensuring that political events of different parties and candidates are fairly and adequately reported.

What politicians say is an essential and important part of the way in which a campaign event is reported. But it is not the only part. A good report on a political rally or other event is likely to include all these elements too:

• How many people attended the event – the journalist’s estimate, not that of the organizing party, opponents or police?
• What was the reaction of the audience to the speeches, both as a group and individually?
• What was the reaction of other parties or candidates?
• Were there any other significant incident surrounding the event, such as attempts at disruption, heckling of speakers, violence by the audience and so on?

Voters-Voice Reporting

Traditionally, elections are reported in a top-down manner. The media relay, and perhaps comment upon, the manifestoes, pledges and speeches of the parties and candidates. The electorate consumes the messages relayed by the media and makes its political choice accordingly.

A more constructive approach is what has been labelled “voters-voice reporting”. This takes as its starting point the concerns of voters in elections, rather than the promises of politicians. From this starting point it attempts to do two things.

• To inform the voters about how effectively politicians are meeting their concerns.
• To inform politicians about what the concerns of voters really are.

The concept of voters-voice reporting has been developed by the Institute for Media Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS). IMPACS argues that journalists need to think like the people, not like the politicians. They need to discover voters’ preoccupations – which may often be very local and unnewsworthy, judged by traditional news criteria. IMPACS points out that this is harder work for the journalist – it involves going out and interviewing voters, as well as attending press conferences and rallies. It will require background research on the issues.

Policy-Making and Evaluation

Relations with the media are an important part of the communications strategy of an electoral management body, but they are not the only part.

The broader point is that EMBs do not work in isolation. Communicating their plans and decisions is an essential part of what makes an EMB effective. It is possible to organize the best elections in the world – but it is also necessary to be able to communicate. Or, to put it more precisely, if an EMB cannot communicate then it certainly will not organize the best elections in the world.

EMBs work in a constant cycle. Once a country has gone through its initial, transitional democratic election, it will be bound into an endless process of election organization: legislative (two houses perhaps), presidential, regional, local – even, in the case of Europe, international. There may be plebiscites or referenda. There may be votes on particular proposed laws. Democracy, in its nuts and bolts, is hard work. And the work does not stop.

The traditional phases of project management do not therefore sit easily with an EMB. It may be difficult to separate out planning, implementation and evaluation, when the next election begins almost before the last one is finished. Nevertheless, planning and evaluation are both an essential part of the process of organizing elections. Communication, in turn, is crucial to both.

Planning works much more effectively if other stakeholders are involved. One clear example relating to media and elections concerns the development of regulations and codes of conduct. These will work best when all those affected, particularly in this instance the media and political parties, are involved in the planning process. Another concerns timetables. It s important for both media and EMB to understand each other’s differing priorities and deadlines.

Communication is equally important in evaluation. There is a danger in organizational evaluation to focus on measuring outputs rather than impact. This is partly because this is much easier to achieve. There is little difficulty in using, for example, the number of press releases issued by an EMB’s media department as an indicator of effectiveness. The problem is that the press releases in themselves only show what has been put out, not what has been used and understood. Real effectiveness indicators are harder to develop and require communication and consultation with those affected. In that particular example a survey of media asking them the most effective forms for releasing news would be a more useful evaluative tool. Monitoring the media to see how far they made use of materials issued by the EMB might be even more effective.

A Process of Consultation

Organizing an election entails a constant process of communication. One of the most useful and effective forms of communication is consultation between the EMB and other stakeholders.

Key stakeholders in relation to the media role in elections include the following:

• The electoral management body itself.
• The media, including both editors and senior management, and ordinary journalists.
• Political parties and candidates.
• Non-governmental organizations, especially those responsible for defending media freedom or monitoring media output.
• Representatives of voters themselves, such as community organizations.

Here are two examples of how stakeholder consultations might work in practice.

Before the Tanzanian parliamentary elections of 2000, the Media Council convened a meeting of media, journalists, non-governmental groups concerned with media freedom and the national electoral commission. This gathering drew up a code of conduct for media coverage of the elections. The media Council and other NGOs then organized a media monitoring project that was aimed at determining how far the media complied with the code of conduct. It reported regularly throughout the campaign, before issuing a final report after the elections.

The final report was only released after a further consultation, involving all the same stakeholders, along with political parties and candidates. The monitoring findings were thoroughly debated and the code of conduct evaluated, with lessons drawn for future elections.

Before the Zimbabwean elections of 2002, the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe convened a stakeholder consultation to try to develop proposals for a system of direct access by political parties to the media. Media, political parties, the EMB and NGOs were invited, along with many community organizations such as residents’ associations and trade unions. The meeting was widely attended – but unfortunately not by the EMB or by the ruling party. MMPZ had developed a paper offering a series of options for different possible direct access systems. These were thoroughly debated and a set of proposals finally agreed by consensus. In this case, however, the absence of the EMB and one of the main political parties meant that the proposals could not be adopted.

Media and Elections Case Studies

Bosnia: The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech

Canada: Paid Political Advertising

Canada: Canada prohibits bloggers from reporting results

Gambia: The Independent Electoral Commission of The Gambia develops a communications plan

Italy: An Existing Regulatory Body

Russia: Complaints Procedure (1993)

United Kingdom: The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech

United States: bringing the bloggers to heel?

Zimbabwe: An Example Of Unbalanced Coverage

Bosnia: The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech

The rules and regulations of the Provisional Election Commission for the 1998 election required, without any ambiguity:

"Media and journalists shall not use inflammatory language, hate language, or language which could incite hate or violence." [1]

The Media Experts Commission (MEC) was empowered to impose "appropriate" penalties for repeated violations of this provision. It was also empowered to refer violations to the media regulatory body, the Independent Media Commission.

The MEC and its local Media Experts Sub-Commissions dealt with a large number of complaints during the election campaign, many of them relating to the use of inflammatory language. The remedy provided in most cases was a requirement that a reply, retraction or correction be broadcast or published. The MEC's report of its activities suggests that these recommendations were largely complied with.

However, to the extent that the MEC was successful in minimizing the incidence of hate speech in the 1998 elections, it was probably through general standard-setting in advance of the elections. The fact that the MEC was also seen as a defender of journalists' freedom of expression helped its credibility. The MEC's own evaluation was as follows:

"More was expected of journalists and more was provided to journalists. Consistently, journalists showed improved accuracy in reporting and greater restraint, particularly with regard to libellous, slanderous and defamatory reporting. Reporting in all media during the election period showed heightened professionalism. Equally noteworthy, journalists credited the MEC with raising the bar on professional standards for journalists. The MEC also made substantial progress in documenting violations of journalists' rights and in establishing this as a significant priority for future action in BiH." [2]

[1] Provisional Electoral Commission, Rules and Regulations, Article 9.35.a, in Media Experts Commission, Final Report: Media in Elections 1998, 1998.

[2] Ibid., p. 14.

Canada: Paid Political Advertising

The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission has devised the following rules for allocating time for paid political advertising:

• There is a limited total amount of time to be purchased - set at six and a half hours in 1990.
• Only parties properly registered with the election authorities are eligible to purchase time.
• The CRTC then calls a meeting of the representatives of all eligible parties to divide the time among them. If the party representatives are unable to reach agreement the CRTC makes its own allocation. In the 1979 and 1980 general elections the formula agreed by the party representatives was composed of the proportion of the vote each party received in the previous general election; the number of seats held in the national House of Commons before dissolution and the number of candidates nominated in the previous elections, with the first two factors double-weighted. This method allows flexibility between elections so that, for example, a different formula could be utilised in the event of a new party fielding candidates at any particular election.
• Once the total time has been allocated, each party is free to purchase as much of its allotted time as it wishes and to use that time as it wishes. However, the overall spending limits set on election spending mean that usually none of the parties is able to purchase its full allocation. [1]

[1] Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, "The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies", Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

Canada: Canada prohibits bloggers from reporting results

The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in January 2006 that the media could not report election results until after all polling stations had closed. Internet sites, including web logs, were included in the ban.

Much of the debate about regulation of the Internet in elections centres on whether it can be considered part of the “media” as conventionally understood. Many argue that the decentralized character of the Internet makes it qualitatively different from traditional media such as newspapers and broadcasting. They say that it is more like a debate than a broadcast – the view taken by the growing number of political bloggers. However, for its 2006 general election, Canada’s Supreme Court took the opposite view.

The issue of results reporting is particularly acute in countries such as Canada that straddle several time zones. Polling stations are still open on the Western seaboard after counting is complete in the East.

In 2000, Paul Bryan, a blogger from British Columbia on the West Coast, deliberately broke the law, publishing results on his electionresultscanada.com website. This was an offence under section 329 of the Canada Elections Act, which states:

"No person shall transmit the result or purported result of the vote in an electoral district to the public in another electoral district before the close of all of the polling stations in that other electoral district."

Bryan was charged and faced a maximum fine of $25,000. He challenged the constitutionality of this provision, arguing that it infringed the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In February 2003, the Provincial Court of British Columbia ruled that while section 329 did limit the right to freedom of expression, it was demonstrably justified inn a free and democratic society. Bryan was subsequently convicted on violating the provision and fined $1,000.

In October 2003, the Supreme Court of British Columbia found that section 329 did indeed infringe the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Bryan was acquitted on appeal. Elections Canada and the Attorney General were granted leave to appeal the decision, but the 2004 elections were held before the case could be heard. Elections Canada would not enforce section 329 in order to maintain the uniform application of the Act across the entire country. The media consequently reported the earlier results from the Eastern provinces as they were announced.

In May 2005, the British Columbia Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Supreme Court and found that section 329 was constitutional. Although the Supreme Court of Canada granted Bryan leave to appeal, this had not been heard by the time the next general election was held in January 2006. Since section 329 was now back in force in British Columbia, Elections Canada announced that the provision would be enforced across the entire country.

A group of media organizations applied to the Supreme Court to suspend the ban, pending Bryan’s appeal, on the grounds that the impact of reporting the results would be minimal and should “not justify infringing the expression results of literally several millions of Canadians”. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the existing law would stay in place.

The main media organizations had no alternative but to abide by the law. So did most bloggers, but a number pointed out the potential problems:

"Blogging on election day is going to be a tricky thing. In this election, unlike the last one, Section 329 of the Canada Elections Act will be in effect, meaning it will be effectively against the law to blog about election results until 10:00 ET, since blogging is considered transmitting "to the public.""

Writing e-mail or instant messaging or for that matter talking on the phone about election results is fine, since those aren't public transmissions.

But what if you're blogging election results on your LiveJournal and protecting the posts so that only your LJ friends can read it? How big does your friends list have to be before it's considered transmitting to the public? [1]

The last comment highlights how laws fashioned for traditional media do not address the specific characteristics of new media. One of the other peculiar features of the Internet is its international character. Bloggers outside the country – expatriate Canadians and US bloggers – did post

[1] http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes/analysiscommentary/blogreport.html, accessed 23 February 2006.]

Gambia: The Independent Electoral Commission of The Gambia develops a communications plan

In early 2004 the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of The Gambia decided it needed to develop a communications plan. It identified five key reasons why such a plan was important.

• The IEC had limited resources, in communications as in all its work. A communications plan would allow it to focus those resources, human and material, on the areas of most importance. It would also help it to marshal its resources through preparing materials for distribution to the media. As far as possible the IEC would be able to be proactive in its relations with the media, rather than always reacting to requests. It would be able to put in the work preparing these materials at a time of its choosing, rather than in the busy period just before elections.
• Planning imposes discipline that would help the IEC to think clearly about its objectives, the messages that it wanted to get across and the different audiences for those messages. From there it could determine the most effective media for conveying those messages.
• Communications planning would allow the IEC to integrate all its communications work – not just media relations, but also voter education, contacts with political parties etc.
• Communications planning would ensure that all staff and commissioners communicated the same message to the outside world.
• A communications plan would help the IEC to develop a toolkit of techniques and measures that it could use in its media relations.

The IEC had already gone through a process of strategic planning, which placed it in a strong position to look at its communications needs. It adhered to the following sequence in its planning process, adapted from material produced by the Canadian organization, the Institute for Media, Politics and Civil Society (IMPACS):

• Situation analysis: organizational background
• Situation analysis: external environment
• Objectives of the IEC
• Communication objectives
• Target audiences
• Key messages
• Strategies
• Tactics
• Timing
• Timelines
• Spokespeople

The essence of this approach was that it looked at the strengths and weaknesses of the IEC, along with its communications objectives, before looking at specific messages and target audiences. Only once all this had been established, would they look at the specific techniques to be adopted.

Situation analysis: organizational background

Here the IEC addressed three questions:

• What is the mission of the IEC?
• How do you evaluate the past success of the IEC in performing that mission?
• What indicators do you have of your performance?

The IEC’s mission was to organize free and fair elections. The overall balance sheet was extremely positive, using indicators such as voter turnout, the reaction of international observers, and the reaction of political parties.

Situation analysis: external environment

The IEC then attempted to address questions about how it was perceived in the outside world:

• Is the IEC generally perceived as being effective and competent?
• Is the IEC generally perceived as being trustworthy and reliable?
• Is the IEC generally perceived as being independent?
• Is the IEC generally perceived as being approachable?
• Does anyone communicate messages hostile to the IEC?

It tried to answer these questions from the different points of view of the general public, the media and political parties. The conclusion was that the voters perceived the IEC in a generally positive way, with most of the negative perception coming from political parties. The view of the media was more mixed.

Organisational goals and key objectives

The next step was to situate the media coverage that the IEC sought within the framework of its overall goals and objectives. It identified its key goal as being to organize free and fair elections. There were a number of interim objectives, or steps on the way to achieving that goal:

• Comprehensive and fair registration
• Level playing field for campaign
• Fair party access to the media
• Informed electorate
• Peaceful, tolerant campaign
• High turnout
• Secrecy of ballot
• Orderly voting
• Transparency/accuracy/credibility of count
• Effective dissemination of results

Communications objectives

Next the IEC addressed a series of questions about how their communications would help to realize these objectives:

• What is the IEC trying to achieve through its communications campaign?
• What does it want people to do with the information provided?
• How will the IEC measure its success?

Target audience

Then the IEC looked at the nature of the audiences for its communications:

• What is the primary audience for the communications campaign? Can that be broken down into sub-groups?
• Are there secondary audiences for the IEC’s messages? If so, who?

It concluded that the primary audience was the entire electorate, but that this could be subdivided into urban and rural voters, who would need to be addressed in different ways, perhaps with somewhat different messages. There would also be particular messages to be conveyed to women voters and to young or first-time voters.

Secondary audiences included political parties, the media themselves (for example on reporting rules), international observers and governments in the sub-region.

Key messages

Communications planning for commercial enterprises, non-governmental organizations or even political parties usually requires a rigid prioritization of message. For EMBs, however, there are a multiplicity of messages, some of which need to be reiterated constantly, while others are specific to a particular period of the electoral cycle. The Gambian IEC identified the following messages as important:

• Don’t sell your vote
• Where you register is where you vote
• Who is entitled to vote
• Card is not for sale/no bribery
• Vote is secret
• Do not register more than once
• Respect other’s views
• Encourage women to vote
• When to vote
• Where to vote
• How to vote
• Have you registered?
• Nomination deadlines
• Campaign lull
• Exercise your right to vote
• Results

Strategies

To work out the best strategy for communicating the above messages to the identified target audiences, the IEC carried out a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats). To see their conclusion, have a look at the SWOT-table on the right hand sidebar.

It was concluded that the communications strategy must be proactive. It was necessary to prepare clear messages in advance of when they might be used and thereby reduce the time it would take to respond to media inquiries.

Priority would be given to radio and to traditional media, including social communicators in the rural areas, since these are the media that reach the entire population. Television and newspapers, with an overwhelming urban audience, had a lower priority.

Tactics

Before determining the precise media techniques that they would use, the IEC considered:

• What was its communications budget?
• Was it possible to supplement that?
• What personnel resources were available?
• What were the other demands on their time? How much time would they be able to devote to external communications?

These techniques were identified as a priority:

• Pre-produced information broadcasts for radio (including mini-dramas). These could be prepared in advance and are re-usable with a long shelf life.
• Comprehensive media kit. This would be prepared in advance, distributed, and updated prior to the election. This would minimize incoming media queries.
• The website would re-use media kit materials, code of conduct, guidelines etc.
• Comprehensive updated media list.

Other techniques would also be used, but were of lower priority:

• Press releases
• Press conferences
• Paid newspaper advertisements
• Newspaper columns
• Letters/rejoinders/clarifications
• Response to inquiries.

Timing

The IEC next developed a timetable of dates that would determine when messages needed to be communicated. This was not just the next national elections, but also registration, by-elections and other events.

Timeline

Next, the IEC put together the information on timing, messages and techniques to create a specific plan stating what needed to be done when and by whom. The information is summarized in the table on timeline information on the right hand side.

Spokespeople

Finally, the IEC considered who should be responsible for communicating with the media. Past practice had been for the chairman of the IEC to be principal and often sole spokesperson for the commission. This was felt to be cumbersome and to slow down response time. While the chairman remained principal media contact, much of the day-to-day contact was to be devolved to staff. They and other commissioners were to receive training in media interview techniques.

Italy: An Existing Regulatory Body

The Italian parliament in 1993 passed a law (no 515) concerning "Discipline in the electoral campaigns for the election of the House of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic". It governs access to the media by candidates, creating different procedures for the public and private media.

Public Broadcasting

The public broadcaster, RAI, is answerable to the Parliamentary Address and Surveillance Commission, which is composed of 20 members of each house of parliament. In 1994 the commission issued guidelines for RAI to guarantee "equal opportunities for appearances for all the parties and movements participating in the electoral campaign". It established a viewing centre that allows it to monitor all RAI output during the campaign period. The commission also formulated rules for direct access election broadcasts by the parties on RAI.

Private Media

A regulatory body known as the Guarantor for Radio, Television and the Press was created by the Italian press law. Its mandate was extended to radio and television in 1990. The Guarantor is appointed by the (non-executive) President of the Republic on the basis of parliamentary recommendations. Law No 515 gave the Guarantor additional powers in relation to elections. In summary these are to:

• Ensure equal access by the political parties to the press and private broadcasters
• Determine the maximum and minimum fees for political advertising.

He or she is obliged to issue a regulation governing electoral coverage.

The Guarantor is assisted by Regional Committees for Radio and Television. Again, these are pre-existing regulatory bodies. They play essentially a monitoring role, informing the Guarantor where the regulations and Law No 515 have been complied with. [1]

[1] Gianpiero Gamaleri "Italy and the 1994 Elections: Media, Politics and the Concentration of Power" in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

Russia: Complaints Procedure (1993)

The Russian Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes originated in an institution called the Arbitration Court on Information Matters, an ad hoc body established specifically for the 1993 parliamentary elections. The temporary body had proved reasonably successful as an impartial adjudicator of disputes during a controversial period. It was therefore decided to replace it with a permanent complaints body.

The Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes is an independent state body "under the President of the Russian Federation". Its functions are to be carried out without interference from any other body. A number of these functions relate to the role of the media in elections, including:

• helping to assure non-partisan and truthful media coverage of matters of public interest;
• guaranteeing the principle of parity in the mass media;
• helping to apply the principle of political pluralism through television and radio news and political talk shows;
• issuing guidelines to correct mistakes in media reporting on matters of public interest.

Clause 8 of the regulations establishing the Chamber provides that it shall adjudicate on "the disputes and other cases that involve the mass media". The legal basis for resolving these disputes, aside from Russian law, is "the universally accepted principles and rules of international law and requirements of the Russian Federation's international treaties", as well as the standards of journalistic ethics.

Although the body is described as a "Judicial Chamber", its jurisdiction is explicitly separated from that of the normal courts. It can examine any matter within its competence "except for the matters formally referred to in the jurisdiction of courts of the Russian Federation". In practice, this means that a decision of the Chamber can be appealed in a court of law. But it also means that a complainant can take a matter to court instead of to the Chamber - a right guaranteed under the Constitution - or can file a separate court case after the Chamber has already heard the matter. [1]

[1] Viktor Monakhov, "Information Disputes Relating to Election Campaigning Via the Mass Media: The Experience of the Judicial Chamber in the 1999 Election Campaign, in IFES, The Media and the Presidential Elections in Russia 2000, Human Rights Publishers, Moscow, 2000

United Kingdom: The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech

In 1997 the Broadcasting Standards Commission in the United Kingdom - the body that considers complaints against broadcasters, including on election matters - received 76 complaints about party election broadcasts by the British National Party (BNP), an extreme far right group.

The complaints described the broadcasts as being racist and "likely to encourage racial hatred or violence, in part because of the nature of the illustrative material used in the television version, and the use of sensational newspaper headlines".

The responses from the broadcasters are an interesting illustration of the difficulties facing the media when they transmit extreme statements. The broadcasters sought prior legal advice on whether the broadcasts constituted incitement to violence and were assured that they did not. The voluntary guidelines for broadcasters on party election broadcasts (PEBs) indicated that the content of the broadcast was a matter for the party, which was not expected to be impartial. The British Broadcasting Corporation stated that the broadcasts promoted a party whose views were "considered offensive by many, but it was not the function of the broadcaster to substitute its judgment for that of the electorate".

The independent London Weekend Television said that it had been placed in an invidious position:

"It was inappropriate and unreasonable to expect or anticipate that broadcasters should take what are essentially public policy decisions as to the propriety of those with racist views being accorded PEBs. Moreover the currently legitimate use of PEB by single issue pressure groups with minute support, propagating views found offensive by many and lowers the esteem with which viewers regard ITV [Independent Television]. However, refusing to transmit the BNP broadcast was not a valid option if society allows the BNP to function as a political party."

Another independent television channel, Channel 5, had required the BNP to make sure that no image was shown of any person who had not consented to being included in the broadcast.

The Commission praised the broadcasters for acting responsibly and did not uphold the complaints. It concluded:

"The requirements of democracy, and the rights of free speech, especially in an election period, mean that PEBs are not programmes in the conventional sense. It is an inevitable part of an election campaign that things will be said which cause offence, as well as disagreement. The Commission fully understands the concern of those who were outraged or made fearful by the broadcast, but it considers that in an election period the balance of rights is tipped in favour of freedom of speech. Ultimately, the electorate makes its judgment on a party's policy at the ballot box."

See United Kingdom: Decision of Broadcasting Standards Commission (1) for the full text of the decision.

United States: bringing the bloggers to heel?

Successive US Presidential elections have been hailed as marking the advent of the “Internet election”. However, the 2004 election did indeed see the arrival of a phenomenon that few had even heard of four years earlier: blogging. Blogs – a contraction of web logs, or online diaries – were considered by many commentators to have been highly influential. Many of the most celebrated bloggers were political conservatives who were thought to have made a major contribution to the re-election of the Republican incumbent, George W. Bush.

However, even before the 2004 election, a US District Court judge had ruled that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) should apply the law on campaign finance to the Internet. When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA - popularly the McCain-Feingold law) was passed in 2002, the FEC decided that the Internet should be exempt from its provisions. The McCain-Feingold law was an attempt to address the issues of “soft money” – spending that is ostensibly unrelated to the campaign itself – and “sham issue ads”, that is advocacy apparently unconnected with the campaign that in fact serves to boost a particular candidate.

The case of Shays v FEC was brought by the BCRA’s sponsors in the House of Representatives, Christopher Shays and Martin Meehan. Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold filed amicus briefs supporting Shays and Meehan. The congressional representatives argued that the FEC’s regulations applying the BCRA undermined the law and were inconsistent with it. They argued that as candidates they were obliged to seek re-election in unlawfully constituted electoral contests. The District Court found in their favour, striking down 15 FEC regulations, a decision subsequently upheld by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

The BCRA defined “public communications” as “any… form of general public political advertising.” Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly in the US District Court was particularly critical of the FEC regulation excluding the Internet from this definition:

"To allow such expenditures to be made unregulated would permit rampant circumvention of the campaign finance laws and foster corruption or the appearance of corruption. . ..To permit an entire class of political communications to be completely unregulated irrespective of the level of coordination between the communication's publisher and a political party or federal candidate would permit an evasion of campaign finance laws, thus 'unduly compromiseing the Act's purposes' and 'creating the potential for gross abuse.'"

The issue is that of “coordinated communications”. In the context of the Internet this could mean, for example, that a hyperlink to a candidate’s website constituted an element of coordination.

Opposition to the court decision among the blogging community has focused on the claim that it would somehow require the FEC to regulate the content of blogs. However, so far bloggers have been assumed to be exempt from regulation by an extension of the “press exemption”. That is, as journalists (of a sort) they are free to express their opinion. Where they may be subject to regulation, however, is in being required to disclose whether they have received money from a campaign committee or candidate. This is relatively straightforward in principle, as is the likelihood that paid political advertisements on the Internet would have to declare who funded the ad, which is the practice with broadcast spots.

However, some aspects of regulation pose greater difficulties. The value of a hyperlink, for example, is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. If a corporation makes a contribution in kind to a campaign (since they are not allowed to make cash contributions) FEC practice has generally been to value this on the basis of the money raised rather than the resources expended (the cost of postage and envelopes, a secretary’s time or whatever). Would the same approach be applied to Internet links? And if so, how would the benefit to the campaign be quantified?

Zimbabwe: An Example Of Unbalanced Coverage

Zimbabwe provides an interesting case study of media coverage of elections because this coverage has been so extensively monitored in recent years. The Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ), a non-governmental organization, was established in 1999 and monitored a series of controversial polls, starting with a referendum on constitutional reform in 2000.

Although several subsequent elections were marked by heavily unbalanced coverage in the government-controlled media, the 2000 referendum provides a particularly clear example because international standards on allocation of time in referenda are so clear. Each proposition – acceptance or rejection of a new government-sponsored draft constitution – should have received equal direct access air time. News coverage in the government-controlled media should also have reported the positions of each campaign roughly equally.

In 2000, broadcasting in Zimbabwe remained a state monopoly. Both radio and television were run by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, formally an independent public corporation. The main daily newspaper, the Herald, was owned by a company, Zimpapers, that was ostensibly controlled by a public trust. In reality, it was well documented that editors were hired and fired by the Ministry of Information. The monopoly enjoyed by the Herald and its sister paper, the Chronicle, over the daily newspaper market had been breached in 1999 by the launch of the privately-owned Daily News. This rapidly acquired a mass readership. There were a number of other private quality weekly newspapers with smaller, predominantly urban readerships.

Quantitative analysis of coverage by ZBC and Zimpapers – media outlets that directly or indirectly used public funds – provided telling evidence of their overwhelming bias in favour of the Yes proposition, acceptance of the draft Constitution. For example, television current affairs programmes devoted 16.12 hours of coverage to the Yes campaign and its arguments, against just 1.33 hours for No (and 1.28 hours of general information on the issue). There were 17 opinion or editorial articles in the Herald favouring the Yes vote and not a single one favouring No. Of the 38 opinion articles across the Zimpapers titles, all favoured a Yes vote.

MMPZ’s methodology also places considerable stress on the importance of the sources of information used by news media. Here is the breakdown (typical of the government-controlled media) of sources in stories on the constitution in the run-up to the referendum. It refers to two of the ZBC radio stations:

• Ruling party and government: 53%
• Constitutional commissioners: 18%
• Other Yes voices: 18%
• Newsreader: 6%
• Members of the public: 4%
• Opposition political parties: 1%

These are examples of purely quantitative methods, which seem to tell the story of media imbalance quite clearly. Yet even quantitative analysis requires further explanation. Take, for example, this striking statistic. In the month before the referendum, television ran 139 advertisements for the Yes campaign and just 14 for the No campaign. Clinching evidence of bias – or is it? The figures only have any meaning if the reasons for the imbalance are known. Here are some possible explanations:

• The No campaign may have decided not to place many TV advertisements.
• The No campaign may have had little money to spend on advertising.
• ZBC may have applied different advertising charges for the two campaigns.
• ZBC may have refused to accept advertisements for the No campaign.

In reality, the first of these explanations was not true. The second was true but irrelevant – it was not in fact the reason why so few No advertisements were broadcast. The third of these factors may have been true but was not relevant. (It is unclear that the Constitutional Commission, campaigning for a Yes vote actually paid for its advertising at all.) The reason was the fourth factor: a refusal of ZBC to run No material. The National Constitutional Assembly, the main No campaigner, obtained a High Court order requiring ZBC to run its advertisements, but the corporation still refused to comply. Indeed, its news programmes failed even to report the court’s decision. ZBC stated that the No material was “unbalanced” and of low technical quality. (Yet there was no requirement of balance – these were campaigning advertisements.) Later ZBC issued a statement saying that it was legally barred from showing “pornographic material”. The implication was that the NCA’s material was pornographic, although no evidence was ever presented for this claim.

The methodological point is this: each quantitative finding only makes sense if it is given context and explained. In other words, media analysis is required, not just media monitoring.

Other failings of ZBC’s coverage cannot be depicted in quantitative terms at all. For example, the broadcasters and Zimpapers repeatedly reported the case of a young man in Harare allegedly beaten to death by supporters of the No campaign. This was adduced as evidence of the ill intentions of those campaigning against the draft Constitution. Yet it was clearly documented (in a police statement) that the dead man had died in a traffic accident.

Voter education was another area where the government-controlled media fell short of proper standards. One of the most elementary shortcomings was that it almost entirely failed to explain what the outcome of the referendum would be. It was assumed that the vote would be binding – that if the Yes campaign succeeded the new Constitution would automatically become law. Yet this was not the case. The effect of a positive vote would simply have been that a Constitution of Zimbabwe Bill would have been placed before Parliament for a vote.

However, there was an even greater failure in the “voter education” material prepared by the Constitutional Commission. In an animated slot purportedly telling voters how to complete their ballot, the box next to the word Yes was shown being filled with a tick. This was a flagrant breach of the principles that voter education should be impartial. But it may have been that the No campaign had the last laugh: voters were actually required to place a cross in the box. A tick would have constituted a spoilt ballot.

However, there was a certain irony in all this. When votes were cast on 12-13 February 2000, Zimbabwean voters rejected the draft constitution by a large margin. MMPZ, in its report on the referendum, remarked on this irony and speculated on the effect of the media coverage. Perhaps voters ignored biased coverage. Perhaps they were repelled by it and voted against the draft for that reason. Perhaps biased coverage reduced the size of the No campaign’s victory. Or perhaps media coverage was irrelevant to voters’ decision-making. MMPZ accepted that its monitoring methodology gave it no basis for reaching any of these conclusions. The question would simply have to remain open. So MMPZ ended with a more modest conclusion. The draft Constitution on which the public voted had scarcely been distributed: “So, to the extent that people voted on the draft and not according to some other factor, they will have done so on the basis of information in the media. And that information was lamentably inaccurate and biased.” [1]

[1] Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A Question of Balance: The Zimbabwean Media and the Constitutional Referendum, Harare, 2000.

Contributors to Media and Elections

The Media and Elections topic area was first added to the ACE website in 2001. The topic area’s lead writer was Richard Carver of Oxford Media Research Limited and developed under the supervision of IFES. 

International IDEA managed the revision of the Media and Elections topic area for this current version of ACE.  Richard Carver was again the lead writer, working under the supervision of Virginia Beramendi Heine.  Linda Ederberg and Maiko Shimizu of IDEA provided extensive administrative and copyediting services and uploading material to the website.