The establishment of international election observation as a
norm in the 1990s brought certain challenges. Critics voiced concerns about the
quality of observation and the frequency with which groups observing the same
election reached conflicting conclusions.
In 1997, Thomas Carothers attributed the first shortcoming
to overcrowding of the field and amateur techniques of less experienced groups,
citing the example of Nicaragua’s 1996 general elections, for which the country
had hosted 80 international observer groups.[i]
Aside from a handful of experienced organizations (including those already
discussed), he wrote, “many of the rest are ‘dabblers’ who come in for
high-profile elections with short-term, poorly prepared delegations.”[ii]
He also criticized the overemphasis on polling and consequent failure to catch
violations occurring in other parts of the process; the phenomenon of
“electoral tourism” by those driven more by curiosity than methodological
rigor; and lack of impartiality.[iii]
The abundance of observers also fostered a diversity of
methodologies that sometimes resulted in discord. Observer groups commonly used
“free and fair” as the standard for a successful election. Yet even in cases
where the somewhat less ambiguous phrases “met international standards” or
“fulfilled international commitments” were used, organizations were often
unclear about what those standards and commitments were or, most often, what constituted
meeting them – especially when an election’s results were not overtly
fraudulent.
The lack of clear and consistent methodologies and
assessment criteria among observers was compounded by the question of whether
observers’ assessments should be conditioned by the country context. Carothers
found in 1997 that some groups applied lower standards in places with a poor
track record of democracy or a lesser degree of political development. “The
notion that it is important to offer at least some encouragement to societies
that are struggling with the basics,” he writes, “leads them to downplay
serious problems.”[iv]
Zimbabwe’s conflicted national elections in 2000 and 2002
demonstrated how contradictory assessments could dull the impact of observation
and exacerbate domestic tensions. The fraught context of the 2000 vote raised
questions about the conditions under which observers should agree to operate in
the first place. The government of President Robert Mugabe attempted to
cherry-pick groups and categories of observers it thought would reach favorable
conclusions, restricting the size of missions, denying accreditation to some
groups, and preventing observers from monitoring critical pre-election
activities. Some groups adapted their delegations to the government’s
restrictions, while others denounced the move even ahead of polling.[v]
No definitive conditions existed in the election observation community for
withdrawing.
In Zimbabwe, observer groups’ assessments reflected the
obstacles they faced. NDI and IRI, which were refused accreditation, flatly
denounced the process, as did the EU, whose delegation was restricted.
Referencing Zimbabwe’s constitution as well as both the UDHR and African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights, NDI stated: “The conditions for credible
democracy do not exist in Zimbabwe at this time.”[vi]
The Commonwealth voiced concerns, particularly with electoral violence and
intimidation, but ultimately concluded that “the conditions constitute a
climate for the growth of multiparty democracy” after a long period of
single-party rule.[vii]
SADC and the OAU, neither of which bore the brunt of Mugabe’s anti-Western
rhetoric, were even more positive about the election: SADC’s Parliamentary
Forum noted that it hoped for an electoral climate like Zimbabwe’s to prevail
in all its member states.[viii]
The overall message of the international community was unclear and
contradictory, placing the efficacy of observation missions and validity of
their methods into question. Mugabe’s relative success at manipulating missions
in 2000 empowered him to employ similar tactics in 2002. This time, however,
the SADC Parliamentary Forum and Commonwealth were far less complimentary in
their reports. Only the OAU issued a statement that praised the electoral
process.[ix]
[i]
Thomas Carothers, “The Observers Observed,”
Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): 21, doi: 10.1353/jod.1997.0037.
[iv]
Carothers, “Observers Observed,” 25.
[v]
Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 200-201.
[vi]
NDI, Zimbabwe Parliamentary Elections 2000:
Report of the NDI Pre-election Delegation, May 15-22, 2000 (Harare: National
Democratic Institute, 2000), 9.
[vii]
Commonwealth Secretariat, The Parliamentary
Elections in Zimbabwe: 24-25 June 2000: Report of the Commonwealth Observer
Group (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000), 34.
[viii]
SADC, “Zimbabwe 2000: SADC Parliamentary Forum
Mission Interim Statement,” SADC Parliamentary Forum, accessed August 18, 2014,
http://www.content.eisa.org.za/old-page/zimbabwe-2000-sadc-parliamentary-forum-mission-interim-statement.
[ix]
Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 195.
