The professionalization of international
observation along the lines laid out in the Declaration of Principles aims for
high common standards among practitioners. Host countries and the international
community should be able to trust the independence and methodological rigor of
observers based on their endorsement of the Declaration of Principles. As the
document has gained recognition, many new groups have sought to add their names.
This has raised the question of variances across groups with respect to their
degree of professionalism and methodological credibility. While the Declaration
of Principles aims to raise standards for observation among all practitioners,
and not to be exclusive, there is no mechanism in place for assessing or
monitoring the quality of observation carried out by endorsers. There is no
vetting process or trial period. In contrast, The Declaration of Global
Principles acknowledges that “Non-partisan election observation and monitoring
by citizen organizations employs a variety of methodologies and techniques,”
which contributes to a similar problem that international observers face, in
that there is no mechanism to evaluate the quality of a large number of methodologically
diverse citizen observer groups.
A separate question is whether groups blur
the lines between various democracy-building activities. As funding for
international observation has waned among some donors and in some parts of the
world, groups have broadened their reach, trying to conduct observation as well
as follow-up activities. While in principle this kind of holistic approach is
logical, it complicates the traditional boundary between observation and
assistance. Advising an EMB on procurement or a legislature on boundary
delimitation precludes the possibility of assessing the performance of these
bodies or their affiliates in a neutral manner.
The third challenge related to quality of
observation is the criticism that observers are not accurate or critical enough
in their assessments. Kelley (2012:60), for examples, holds that the
objectivity (and thus credibility) of otherwise rigorous and well-intentioned
organizations can be hamstrung by inherent or implicit biases. As she points out,
not all “biases,” or influences, are by definition bad, but an awareness of
them is necessary if groups are to mitigate their effects and strengthen their
credibility.[i]
Kelley (2012:65) contrasts intergovernmental observer organizations with
nongovernmental organizations, arguing that intergovernmental groups whose
membership consists of less democratic states are least likely to criticize
other less democratic states (perhaps to deflect criticism of member states’
own practices).[ii]
Second, she demonstrates that negative
overall assessments are much more likely when fraud is overt and occurs around
election day, while administrative or pre-election problems are less likely to
trigger a negative evaluation.[iii]
While Kelley (2012:66) labels this the “subtlety bias,” it can be difficult to
separate from observers’ intentional weighting of different parts and
obligations. The third “bias,” already mentioned, is the influence of donor
governments’ policy priorities – particularly where control of aid is concerned.[iv]
The fourth comes from the fact that while observer groups are impartial with
regard to political actors, they are not without a stance: they are inherently
pro-democracy. Because building democracy is explicitly a goal, Kelley
(2012:71) writes, “When progress is partial but the election still falls short
of meeting democratic standards, monitors may praise the progress, hoping their
encouragement will help consolidate the gains.”[v]
Observers may be tempted, in other words, to downplay the missteps of a country
that appears to be advancing overall toward democracy, and whose authorities
seem to have the will to guide the country thus. The fifth consideration is that of how
assessments will influence stability in the host country.[vi] It
is important to note, however, that high-quality observation does not require
desensitization from the impact of one’s statements. Where a statement has a
good chance of inciting violence, the issuing organization may appropriately
delay its release until the electoral climate calms.
Citizen observer groups necessarily have different
relationships to the states whose electoral process they are observing, leading
to unique complications with bias, impartiality, and non-interference,
elaborated upon in Section 5.2
