[i]
These technological tools, in addition to other older ones such as email and
voice over IP communications (i.e. Skype and Viber) facilitate free
communication and access to information by bypassing traditional forms of
censorship. While significant disparities exist between “connected” and
“unconnected” citizens, information and communication technologies have created
a new immediacy in the manner in which people interact.
The development of new technologies also
poses the problem of how to observe their use by electoral stakeholders. This
is particularly true of social media, and the increasingly intensive use made
by political parties and candidates of such platforms in their electoral
campaigns. How can social media be observed in a useful, systematic,
comprehensive and accurate manner? There is still no effective and tested
methodology to observe these flows of information in a manner that allows for
systematic analysis.
Another challenge that national (and
international) observers face lies in the observation of new voting
technologies. E-voting and related technologies have provided a new frontier in
observation methodology. While harmonizing methodologies, groups must
understand whether and how each type of technology is observable. “Technology”
can range from biometric voter registration (BVR) to use of the direct
recording electronic system (DRE) for voting, to mobile ballot boxes, to ballot
scanning tabulation systems like optical mark recognition (OMR). As noted, they
require a substantial degree of technical knowledge to evaluate, and any
mission operating in a country employing voting technologies requires some
specialized field staff. Yet observers also must be able to assess how aspects
of the technology’s implementation correspond with core international
obligations. Even if technology is soundly built, it is unlikely to inspire
public confidence if its design and use are not transparent enough to be
observed and assessed by impartial monitors. As ODIHR’s 2013 manual on new
voting technologies (NVT) underscores, successful implementation of these
technologies relies on voter confidence in election administrators.[ii]
Observers meanwhile cannot contribute to building public confidence in the
electoral process if unable to draw informed conclusions about the integrity of
technologies used.
In addition to the challenge of
observability, new technologies bring overt risks of “technical failure,
external interference…, internal malfeasance, and the loss of oversight by and
the accountability of the election management bodies.”[iii]
One of the most serious concerns in this regard is the regulation and observation
of development by the vendors who design, provide, and may advise on the
implementation of technologies. In many cases, authorities look to foreign
companies with expertise unavailable in their own country. Transparency or the
perception thereof can be clouded by lack of information regarding the
compensation of vendor staff or their design process. Regardless of where and
by whom a technology is developed, even if by electoral management body staff,
the observation of coding is extremely difficult.
Certification of voting technologies by
experts is often discussed and some bodies, including the Council of Europe,
have developed guidelines for doing so. The Council of Europe’s “Certification
of E-voting Systems” includes a provision ensuring that all steps in the
certification process are open to accredited observers.[iv]
But these guidelines are neither binding nor universal. The Council leaves the
decision to engage a certifying body and the design to individual member
states. However, the recommended principles against which certifiers would
evaluate technologies can be used by observers even if no certification process
is in place. If allowed full access, observers with the proper training can
assess, for example, whether the system offers robust security, adequate
protection of ballot secrecy, and a paper trail for verification of votes – as
well as whether those assigned to operate the technology use it properly. A key
challenge remains linking technology-specific lines of inquiry to the obligations-based
assessment framework that guides reporting on the rest of the process.
[i]
Hussain, M. M., and Howard, P. N., “What
Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the
Arab Spring”, International Studies Review, 15, 2013, p. 48-66.
[ii]
OSCE/ODIHR, Handbook for the Observation of New
Voting Technologies (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2013), 5.
[iii]
Carter Center, Electronic Voting, 1.
[iv]
Council of Europe, Certification of E-voting
systems (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Directorate General of Democracy and
Political Affairs, 2011), 5.
