Many countries are studying the feasibility of e-voting. Although electronic distance voting is not yet a reality, various systems have already tried out on-line voting from traditional polling stations and other public sites. [1]
Electronic distance voting could make voting easier, encouraging participation by people who are less inclined to go to the polling stations. However, it could be more difficult to protect integrity, entailing risks to the democratic principles of free and secret voting. How can we ensure that someone voting on-line is doing so freely and without coercion? How can we be sure of the identity of someone voting on the Internet and at the same time protect the secrecy of his or her vote? [2]
E-voting sidesteps many of the safeguards found at a polling station, such as the possibility of verifying that the person truly exists and is eligible to vote, or the ability to dip the voter’s finger in ink to prevent repeat voting. It is also more difficult to detect errors and their source. In addition, e-voting raises questions concerning public confidence, voter competence and accessibility, which could threaten election integrity. [3] Last, with a system based entirely on e-voting, there is a risk that results could not be saved effectively, making a vote recount impossible.
NOTES
[1] For an overview of these experiments, see Guérin, Daniel and Akbar, Asifa, “Electronic Voting Methods: Experiments and Lessons,” Electoral Insight, March 2003.
[2] For an in-depth discussion on the impossibility of guaranteeing free and secret voting from a legal and democratic perspective during electronic distance voting, see Birch, Sarah and Watt, Bob, “Remote Electronic Voting: Free, Fair and Secret?” The Political Quarterly, 75(1), 2004, pp. 60–72.
[3] On the subject of social acceptance of e voting at polling stations, see Delwitt, Pascal, Kulahci, Erol and Pilet, Jean-Benoît, “Electronic Voting in Belgium: A Legitimised Choice?” Politics, 25(3), 2005, pp. 153–54.
