Citizen Observers often have a different
relationship with government authorities than international observers, though
they similarly need to seek accreditation, and security. States—at least those
bound by the ICCPR—must take all necessary steps to give effect to the rights
protected by the ICCPR, which include the right to participate as exercised by
citizens through national observation.
Respecting the right to freedom of association (as established in Article
22 ICCPR) is a prerequisite for effective citizen
electoral observation. It is essential that CSOs be legally allowed to be
founded, to register and to operate. This requires that any limits on the
freedom of association or their freedom to operate, be necessary and
proportionate. Limitations on their ability to access foreign funding, or
restrictions on the scope of their work following acceptance of foreign funding
will damage their capacity to operate effectively. Restrictions on the
enjoyment of the right to freedom of association are contrary to ICCPR States
Parties’ international obligations.
For observer groups to contribute fully to an electoral process, they must
be granted freedom of movement (Article 12 ICCPR) and access to all stages of
the electoral process. The latter requirement is essential for observers to
carry out their role in enhancing transparency. Observers’ right to freedom of
opinion and expression (Article 19 ICCPR) must also be respected. Restrictions
on the publication of findings must not hinder the enjoyment of this right
beyond what is reasonable for the maintenance of public order. The publication
of reports and statements is observers’ most powerful tool and is firmly rooted
in the fundamental right to freedom of expression. Any restrictions on national
observers’ freedom to publish findings or statements, including PVTs, must fulfil
the twin conditions of necessity and proportionality.
The security of electoral observers must be guaranteed by the state and its
security forces, as established by the ICCPR enshrined right to the security of
the person (Article 9). Citizen electoral observers must be protected from any
pressure or intimidation that can jeopardize their security and work. National
electoral observers have been victims of innumerable acts of intimidation,
harassment and violence over the last 30 years. Although there are no compiled
statistics, the reports of attacks against citizen observers from the Zimbabwe
Election Support Network (ZESN) in Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections, including torture
and at least one killing, are chilling examples.[i]
Accreditation is also a critical threshold for a citizen observer group.
Although many observer groups have carried out limited observations without
being officially accredited, accreditation is usually a precondition for the
lawfully recognized exercise of citizen electoral observation. Observation
carried out without any legal foundation or administrative permission may be
risky. Without the support of an accredited organization, individuals who carry
out observation activities are even more vulnerable to arbitrary abuse; [ii] and the outcome and repercussions
of observers’ work might not correspond to their commitment.[iii] As noted in the ACE
Encyclopedia, “Integrity problems may arise if accreditation procedures or
requirements are used to limit the number of observers, or to deny access to
certain groups of observers or monitors. If the procedure is too time-consuming
and cannot be completed before election day, or if accreditation is selective,
the electoral process may lose credibility and the election management body
will be viewed as having something to hide.”[iv]
The Declaration of Global Principles explicitly
calls on national observers to “seek to cooperate with EMBs and
other governmental authorities related to election processes.”[v] EMBs and other government
authorities must not perceive citizen observers as a threat. They should
recognize the inherent value of national observers, whose comments and
recommendations on the process—even an ongoing one—can help to improve it,
better aligning it with the state’s international and regional obligations, and
national law. In their dealings with each other, it is essential that both
arrive at a common understanding that despite their different roles, their
objectives are actually the same—to contribute to genuine democratic elections.
The work of citizen observer groups between elections, working towards
electoral reform or following up on recommendations made by observers, provides
an opportunity for fruitful cooperation between CSOs and EMBs.
In some cases, CSOs’ expertise in electoral processes can lead to
recruitment by EMBs, even as commissioners, as has been the case with Nigeria’s
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Indonesia’s General Elections
Commission and the Philippines’ Commission on Elections. In other countries,
such as Niger, a background in civil society is a requirement for at least one
of the EMB commissioners.
[i]
Human Rights Watch, Bullets for Each of You: State-Sponsored
Violence since Zimbabwe’s March 29 Elections, Chapter VII, Attacks on Election
Observers, June 2008.
[ii]
See, Declaration of Global Principles for
Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations,
GNDEM, 2012, para. 18(a)
[iii]
Lidauer, M., “Democratic Dawn? Civil Society and
Elections in Myanmar 2010-2012”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs,
31, 2, p.102-105.
[iv]
ACE Project, Encyclopaedia, “Electoral
Integrity”, p. 65.
[v]
Declaration of Global Principles for
Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations,
GNDEM, 2012, Preamble.
