Introduction
The
uncertainty surrounding the election results is no doubt one of the major
challenges effectively undermining the integrity of the election in
Afghanistan.
The
various EMBs in that country have tried to overcome these challenges by
adjusting the election results management system during the ten years since
multi-party election was introduced in 2004.[1] Given
the various results systems used, Afghanistan is an interesting case, as it has
proactively tried to adjust and tackle results management challenges.
The
overriding objective of Afghanistan’s election results system has always been
to ensure a timely, correct and transparent system. The variables and
challenges shaping the results system are common to a number of other
transitional societies, while others are more unique. The more common factors
are a rudimentary infrastructure, poor telecommunication system, and low
literacy and numeracy levels. The more unusual challenges are the severe
security conditions under which elections are organized. Furthermore, the
cultural barriers to women participation as election officials, part
representatives, domestic observers or even voters further complicates the
implementation of a results system across the country covering both male and
female polling stations.
It is
worth noting that a widespread fraud problem has further undermined Afghan
stakeholders’ confidence in the IEC as a professional and independent EMB in
general, and the results system in particular as over 20% of the ballots were
deemed fraudulent in both 2009 and 2010 elections.[2]
Description of current results management
system
Once polling stations are closed and polling is
over, the counting of ballot papers will immediately commence in the very same
polling station where ballots were cast. These procedures are spelled out in a
comprehensive and yet user-friendly manual outlining the individual steps poll
workers must perform in order to complete the count.[3] This
also holds true when deciding if a ballot paper is valid, or not. Several
useful examples are included to facilitate the implementation of the
“intention-of-the-voter-is-clear” principle governing this process.
The
process is following best international practise enabling observers and party
agents clear access to the counting process, including when presiding officers
decide whether a ballot paper is deemed valid, or not. They are also requested
to sign the actual results form and invited to note the numbers of the ballot
box’s security seals and serial number on tamper evident bag (TEB) used to
transport the sensitive election material, including ballot papers and results
form, among other things.
Before
the results forms are inserted into the tamper evident bag, the Polling Centre
Manager is supposed to review the form to ensure these are filled out correctly
and completely. The sensitive material is then picked up by the District Field
Coordinators who are temporary workers of the IEC and employed during election
year to assist with planning and implementing all election-related activities
within his/her district of responsibility. In some instances the sensitive
material will only be picked up the following day, as counting will only
commence the day after election. In a number of districts of Afghanistan, no
transportation was deemed secure enough after dark and subsequently ballot
boxes and tamper evident bags only moved in a convoy the following day to the
provincial centre, often with a significant security presence. Given the poor infrastructure and vast distances the retrieval
plan envisaged several days for some material to arrive at the provincial
capital.
At the
provincial centres, the IEC and its UNDP support program have developed and
introduced a web-based retrieval management system. This new system enhanced
and facilitated IEC HQ’s ability to track the retrieval of ballot boxes and
results forms from the polling stations. As soon as convoy arrived with
materials from the polling centres within the DFC’s area of responsibility, the
provincial intake team logged the identifiers of the polling centre and the number
of results forms retrieved from the centre in question.[4]However,
IEC officials at the provincial level do not open the tamper evident bag
holding the actual results forms. This TEB is transported to National Tally
Centre in Kabul, while the ballot box with other sensitive material remains
behind at the provincial centre.
The IEC
had learned important lessons from the 2009 election results process and
therefore made drastic changes to the tabulation and aggregation of results
process in Kabul leading up to the 2010 election.
Once
TEBs arrived at the National Tally Centre, they were processed to following
way:
- Intake – IEC
staff members checked the handover form’s details against the TEBs serial
number and seals on the transport boxes to the ones logged via the provincial web-based
entry.
- Data
Entry Batching – TEBs were inspected for physical tampering followed by
scrutiny of the results forms to ensure these were complete and filled out
correctly.
- Entering
Results – Based on the results forms, data-entry clerks entered the results
using software containing fundamental mathematical validation of the results
entered. If mathematically inconsistent, the software wouldn’t accept the
figures entered by the clerk. This reduced human error rates. Ina addition, to
avoid manipulation by data-entry clerks result forms were entered twice by two
different data-entry clerks thereby significantly reducing the risk of fraud at
this stage of the results process.
- Once the
forms were cleared and approved by the IEC Board of Commissioners, they were
scanned and made available to the public on the IEC’s website thereby enable
observers and party agents to cross-reference results data obtained at polling
stations with the official final results.
- Interim
results were released throughout the process based on cleared results forms and
not based on interim results reported from polling stations using a secondary
communications channel, which is often the case in many countries.
Use of ICT
The IEC has been especially prone to introduce
ICT-solutions in areas often ignored by many EMBs, such as deployment and
retrieval of sensitive election-results related material and tracking of
polling station results forms. The Commission also implemented a reporting
system for Election Day to facilitate data-transfer to its Headquarters to be
used by the IEC during its press conferences primarily on Election Day.
However, no interim results system was used and with the tabulation and
aggregation process highly centralized to the national Tally Centre in Kabul
the results management system was subsequently expected to be slow. In the end,
it took the IEC more than a month to release most of the results.[5]
Tracking of sensitive election results material
using technology
In
2010, the IEC bar-coded the ballot papers packs, as well as tamper-evident
bags, using barcode readers. This information was stored in a database enabling
the IEC to track these materials from its headquarters down to polling centre
level. As a result, the Commission would be able to identify ballot papers
emerging from polling stations other than originally allocated to.
In
addition to tracking sensitive material, the IEC also utilized a tracking
system for a significant number of the convoys deploying the materials as well
using mobile phones and satellite equipment to provincial centres. However, the
system had significantly less coverage outside provincial capitals when the
material was delivered to District Field Coordinators for onward distribution
to polling centres.
Results reporting and tracking system
The TEBs arriving with the results forms from
polling stations to the provincial centres were logged into a web-based system,
which was connected to the National Tally Centre in Kabul. The database
contained the serial numbers of TEBs, polling centre codes and the number of
polling stations. As the TEBs were not opened at this stage no results data was
extracted. The main purpose of the database was instead to track the retrieval
of results forms from the polling stations and to reduce the risk of
manipulation of results during transportation of material by tracking the
serial numbers of the TEBs holding results forms. However, in spite of the new
system the IEC failed to notice that 511 polling stations had not been accounted
for more than five weeks since Election Day.[6]
Although
the IEC established a system for polling centre reporting on Election Day, the
focus was not results, but how many polling stations opened, security incidents
and turnout at mid-day and at closing. As no results were communicated from the
polling stations to a higher administrative level within the IEC following the
end of the count, no interim result system was used in Afghanistan during the
2010 election. Instead, released results were based on legal results forms that
were checked and cleared by the IEC’s Board of Commissioners.
Reporting
opening and closing times of polling stations, as well as turnout numbers at
noon and at close of polls, is an effective way for the election authority to control
the information flow on Election Day. Several other EMBs are availing
themselves of the very same strategy, which is widely regarded as an
appropriate approach and thereby often recommended by technical assistance
service providers.
The
newly introduced reporting system from polling stations gave the IEC
headquarters a good overview of the number of polling centres and polling
stations opened in the morning (and reasons if not open).[7] The
system was, as mentioned above, also designed to generate turnout numbers at
noon and at the close of polling.
Polling
Centre Managers phoned in the requested data to DFCs, who conveyed the same
information to their respective Provincial Office for data-entry into the
web-based software. Unfortunately, the system had some shortcomings. Based on
this reporting system, the IEC initially announced a voter turnout of
4,265,354. A month later, when publishing interim results, the turnout had
jumped to 5.6 million voters representing a discrepancy of more than 30%.[8] The
possible reasons for this discrepancy are numerous, as the reporting system
itself had weaknesses that made errors more likely.
Existing strengths in the results management
system
Preparing
and holding elections in Afghanistan have proven challenging, given extreme
security challenges, socio-economical conditions, as well as cultural barriers
effectively preventing women to participate fully as voters, election
officials, candidates or observers. The IEC has, cognizant of these
extra-ordinary challenges, developed and implemented several improvements to
strengthen the integrity of its election results system.
An area
sometimes overlooked by managers and developers of results management systems
is the ability for people to actually implement the results protocols. In other
words, sufficient time and resources need to be allocated to ensure an
effective training program. The IEC has been fully cognizant of this and
therefore dedicated extensive attention to ensure poll worker manuals that are
adapted to suit also individuals whose literacy levels are not ideal for the
tasks at hand, thereby make extensive use of pictures and samples. The training
course is also significantly longer than in most countries, as poll workers are
trained during four days (two days focusing on voting and the remaining two
days on counting and reporting).
The IEC
is also aware of the security features used to reduce the risk of fraud are
essential to the credibility of the results process. It therefore spends
significant resources at procuring ballot papers printed on high-quality
security papers with several unique features effectively minimizing the risk of
counterfeit ballots entering the electoral process without being detected
during the count.
According
to the public perception, the main threat to the results management system is
however not the actual tabulation of the votes cast, but multiple-voting by
individuals holding more than one voter registration card. The reason being
that Afghanistan has never had a workable voter registration system. In fact,
in spite of four elections and several hundred millions spent on various voter
registration processes the afghans are yet to find voters lists in their
polling stations on Election Day.[9] The
sub-standard voter registration methodology stems from the Joint Election
Management Body-era (JEMB).[10]
Undoubtedly,
voter registration cards will constitute a very real and significant threat to
the integrity of the Afghan elections by creating the appearance of
impropriety. The fact that voter registration lists are not used in polling
stations further facilitates fraud by individuals holding more than one voter
registration card. Hence, the vulnerability for fraud due to a non-functional
voter registration system is very high in Afghanistan. It is important to note,
however, that high fraud vulnerability does not automatically translate into
actual fraud. The question is, however, the extent to which a significant
number of individuals are able to vote multiple times on Election Day and thereby capitalize on the dysfunctional voter
registration system to affect the outcome of the election.
The
main question here is not whether a substantial number of eligible voters own
multiple registration cards, but if they are able to vote more than once. The IEC has been using election-specific hole punch
tools to mark used cards. Unfortunately, in both 2009 and 2010 the hole punches
proved to be of uneven quality and failed after limited usage on Election Day
in various polling stations across the country. Regardless, even if the hole
punch tools had worked for the duration of the day, voters could still vote in
multiple polling stations by simply using a different registration card.
Indelible
ink has de facto become the only
deterrent against multiple voting in Afghanistan, as polling stations lack
unique voter lists. Unfortunately, in spite of the procurement of ink of the
highest quality and with specifications in line with international best
practice, the IEC continues to struggle to instil confidence in stakeholders
about the effectiveness of the inking practice. This issue stems from mistakes
made by the JEMB Secretariat during the 2004 presidential election, when poll
workers sometimes mistook regular marker pens for the marker pen-style indelible
ink dispenser and as a result voters were able to remove the ink.[11]
It is
worth noting that in cases where high-quality ink is properly stored, applied
and allowed to dry on the voter’s finger, the indelible ink actually represents
a generally sufficient deterrence against multiple voting. It is by no means
fool proof, but certainly plays a significant role in reducing fraud on
Election Day in many countries.
In
spite of all the criticism raised against the voter registration system and the
significant risk of fraud by voters abusing the system by voting multiple
times, the largest domestic observer group found very limited proof of multiple
voting during the 2010 elections.[12]The
reasons could be numerous. For example, in rural areas, moving from one village
to another costs money and given the rudimentary infrastructure also takes a
significant amount of time. Queuing and transportation to polling stations also
reduce the number of hours available to individuals to conduct multiple voting.
Furthermore, due to the social cohesiveness of local communities, it is
sometimes difficult for strangers to appear at a polling station to cast a vote
without causing suspicion and being questioned.
In
order to overcome a significant fraud risk during the tabulation of the
results, the IEC made two strategically important changes to the election
results forms. Instead of requiring poll workers to only write the numerical
numbers for votes received by political parties and candidates, the results
need to be spelled out in writing thereby closing the loophole whereby a 290
suddenly becomes 1290 votes on the form during results aggregation. The second
important improvement made to the results form and procedures was to require
Polling Centre Managers to cover the results’ portion of the form with
scotch-tape thereby preventing attempts to change the reported results by
altering the figures. In addition, attempts to remove the tape would tear the
form and thereby render the attempted manipulation unsuccessful, as the form would
be set aside for further investigation. The IEC also made extensive use of
serial numbered tamper-evident bags and hand-over forms to supervise
transportation of results forms from polling stations to the National Tally
Centre in Kabul.
Existing weaknesses in the results management
system
In
spite of numerous safeguards and an appreciation of the results system’s fraud
risks by the IEC leadership, the Commission still threw out some 1.3M ballots
during the 2010 elections thereby affecting the outcome in many of the
parliamentary seats.
The
reasons for the large number of invalidated votes are numerous, but certain
factors are more salient than others. For instance, even though the IEC made
changes to its recruitment policies and even blacklisted a significant number
of ad hoc workers from future employment due to improper behaviour and actions,
recruitment and training of poll workers and DFCs remain a challenge. The IEC
still faces challenges to identify poll workers with sufficient literacy and
numerical skills to perform the required duties. This problem is especially
significant for women polling stations. Effective supervision of these
categories of employees also remains insufficient by IEC’s permanent officers
something that directly impacted the training of polling officials as many of
the trainings were significantly curtailed and training material not used as
planned. On top of that, intimidation, violence, bribery and politically
compromised poll workers and DFCs further compromised the results system
generating a highly problematic tabulation and aggregation process as a very
large number of results forms proved incorrect.
Based
on experiences from the 2009 election, the IEC had made significant
improvements to the intake and investigative part of the results system at the
National Tally Centre. The decision-making process had also been streamlined
and clarified thereby avoiding inconsistencies and a more formalized system
before the IEC Board of Commissioners made decisions to include, or exclude,
polling station results. However, the investigative teams - reviewers and
auditors of results forms - at the National Tally Centre in Kabul faced a major
challenge: they only had access to the results forms and not actual ballot
papers as ballot boxes were stored in the provinces. Subsequently IEC’s
headquarters and its provincial offices were tasked with auditing or recounting
3,345 polling stations thereby affecting almost 18% of all polling stations in
the country.[13]
Although additional resources had been allocated in
anticipation of some challenges with the results tabulation, the Commission had
not foreseen a problem of such a magnitude. In order not to derail the results
aggregation process, fraud triggers, which should have initialized investigation
and collection of corroborating evidence, were instead improperly treated as
sufficient evidence in and of themselves to invalidate ballots. [14] Thus, the categorization of all invalid ballots as
fraudulent by the IEC was inaccurate and served to undermine the credibility of
the IEC. Improvements to the election results management system are therefore
required in Afghanistan without which reliable and timely results cannot be
released by the IEC.
[1] The 2004 and 2005 elections were organized
by the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), which was a joint UN-Afghan composition
made up of both national and international election commissioners. Since 2009,
the Independent Election Commission (IEC) has had fully responsibility to
prepare and organize elections in Afghanistan.
[2] And footnotes from TAF’s two surveys referenced
in our AFG audit; www.iec.org.af.
[3] Add reference to the IEC’s poll worker
manual here.
[4] National Tally Center Operations and
Procedures. Independent Election Commission (IEC) Afghanistan. 2010 Wolesi
Jirga Elections. Pages 1-2.
[5]
http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/wolesi-pressr/press_release_on_wj_election_priliminary_result_english_final.pdf
[6]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/07/AR2010110701381.html
[7] For additional information, please see E Day Reporting Web User Guide. IEC IT
Department. August 21, 2010. Kabul.
[8] For more details, see The 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections in Afghanistan. National Democratic
Institute. Page 38.
[9] Reference the report I wrote
back in 2009/10 on the VR in AFG under STEP.
[10] The JEMB was the joint UN-Afghan
institution created to plan and organize the first 2004 and 2005 elections in
Afghanistan.
[11] International Panel of Experts’ report (2005) .
[12] Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), Afghanistan Parliamentary Election
Observation Mission 2010.
[13] The 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections in
Afghanistan. National Democratic Institute. Washington DC. Pages 32; 38.
[14] Several different triggers were
implemented. For instance, each polling station was allocated 600 ballot papers
and if the results form exceeded or was equaled 600 the ballot box was
rejected. Other examples were if more than 90 percent of valid and invalid
votes were cast for one candidate (against the total of invalid and valid
votes); and if there were inconsistencies greater than 4 percentage points
between the total number of ballot papers withdrawn from the ballot box and the
total number of valid and invalid votes reported.
