To establish and maintain public confidence in the
electoral process, results management systems should incorporate certain fundamental
principles governing a democratic election.
These fundamental principles are:
- Transparency
- Security
- Professionalism
- Accuracy
- Secrecy
- Timeliness
- Accountability
- Uniformity
- Integrity
- Chain of custody
Transparency
Traditionally EMBs almost
exclusively associated transparency with the actual counting process by allowing
representatives of political parties and candidates to witness and/or
participate in the process, as well as granting them permission to receive an
official copy the statement of the results of the counting process. National
and international electoral observers should also be allowed to witness the
process and be issued an official copy of the statement of the results. The
concept of transparency has become much broader as EMBs take a holistic
approach in the vote counting process and see it as one integral part of the
results management system. Subsequently transparency must also be ensured when
developing the overall concept of the results management system, as well as its
individual components including: counting of votes, tabulation of results solutions,
communication systems for transmitting interim results, transportation of
sensitive election results material, storage of the legal statement of counts
and other election-results related material.
Just as access to the counting of votes by non-EMB officials is
essential for transparency guaranteeing accessibility for party agents and
observers to the tabulation of results is equally important. International best
practice now requires that where EMBs present aggregated results they should
also disclose the results from individual voting stations and thereby enable
accredited observers, party agents and media representatives to track results
from a voting station through the entire results process. Utilizing the EMB’s
website is a fast and accessible means for distribution of nation wide voting
station-based results. Voting station breakdowns of results should also be
readily available for the constituency in question where results are tabulated
and interim results announced at constituency levels.
Manual
counting is by its nature more transparent than computerized counting. If vote
counting, transmission of results and aggregation of results are based on
ICT-solutions, then new mechanisms for ensuring transparency need to be
introduced. However, is important to look at cases were ICT-solutions have
reduce the possibility of committing fraudulent activities. In Brazil, when the
e-boxes were introduced in the electoral process, there was a decrease in fraudulent
activities that were possible before, such as changing ballots to different
boxes, or altering partial results in each electoral section[1].
Moreover, the EMB must have an active campaign explaining citizens how the
ICT-solutions will be strengthening the system.
[1] Filho Brunazo, Amilcar. "Voto Electrónico - Las nuevas tecnologías en los procesos electorales". 2005: http://www.brunazo.eng.br/voto-e/textos/CIPPEC-Brunazo.htm
Security
The security of a results process encompasses a broad range of
considerations and actions. An EMB would often include the following
considerations in its security plan for the results system:
- Physical security of sensitive
election material (for instance ballot papers, ballot box, security seals,
official results forms, official stamps, voters list) during storage and
transportation;
- Physical security of facilities
utilized for counting, tabulation, release of results and storage of material.
The threats could range from fire, water damage, electrical wiring to riots and
terrorist attacks;
- Cyber attacks to results
transmission, communications systems, computer systems used for tabulation,
aggregation and release of results; and
- Safety of election officials,
as the integrity of the results process could be jeopardized if officers
engaged are threatened, intimidated or bribed to disregard the code of conduct
governing their work.
Today there exist numerous security features to
control access to and movement of sensitive material. The more common features
are barcoding voting station kits prior to distribution for proper tracking,
plastic security seals with unique numbers to detect unauthorized access to
sensitive material while in transit, use of tamper evident bags to transport
completed results forms and ballots when not resealed in a ballot box. While
materials are in the voting station, sensitive material is always in the custody
of the authorized election officials and often, translucent ballot boxes locked
with uniquely numbered security seals.
In centralized counting facilities or results aggregating centres access
control is instrumental for the security of the facility. This is valid for
personnel, materials, as well as vehicles. Depending on the threat level,
various measurements are taken to ensure safety, such as compulsory ID card
checks, metal detectors, mandatory searches of all vehicles and material prior
to entry to the compound. Inside the facility, only authorized personnel is in
charged of movement of sensitive material. The chain of custody is as follows: check-in,
temporary storage, quarantine area, counting or aggregation and permanent
storage (see chain of custody for additional details).
In other societies the major security concern could be related to the
data system and communications systems used to transmit, tabulate, aggregate
and release results. As such, extensive security features such as firewalls, preparations
for denial-of-service attacks are performed, strict use of passwords enforces,
and encrypted data communications are introduced.
Regular
offsite backups of data are another method to avoid catastrophic loss of data
due to hacking, flooding, fire or malfunctioning hardware.
One of
the more difficult security risks facing an EMB is the protection of its staff
members. Election Commissioners, the Chief Election Officer and a handful of
other key permanent officials of the EMB can often be enveloped by a security
umbrella, but an EMB often employs hundreds of permanent staff and tens of
thousands of temporary workers during peak season. Election officials, or a
close family member, are all susceptible to threats or intimidation. Procedures
and actions to be taken in such a case could form an integral part of the
mandatory training all election officials receive, irrespective of their
position in the organization.
Professionalism
EMBs
have come to recognize that one of their most valuable assets is its staff.
However, it can also be its weakest link, as even the best laid plan utilizing
the simples forms and most user-friendly technologies risk failing of the staff
is not properly trained and motivated.
For a
long time, EMBs primarily focused its training to voting station and counting
officials, as they were expected to conduct their duties and responsibilities
in a professional manner. They should be thoroughly trained in the counting
process, as distinct from the voting process; thorough in their procedures; and
committed to treating electoral materials with care and respect. However, as
the requirements for what constitutes a credible election results processes
have grown so has the staffing categories expected to display professionalism
when executing their respective duties. In addition, as new technologies are
introduced into the electoral process, greater emphasis could be put on the
computer literacy skills of staff recruited. Traditionally, older, more
experienced election workers lack the computer and smart phone literacies,
while younger more technology literate recruits lack the electoral experience.
In order to meet the increasing demands put on election officials (both
permanent and ad hoc workers) training programs need to
be more sophisticated and specialized. Subsequently, extensive preparations by
the EMB are required to meet the expanding training demands.
Awareness
of the electoral process in general and knowledge of the task at hand are two
important traits of a professional election official. However, once a person
accepts work as a counting official, he or she must be also non-partisan
throughout the entire process. Some jurisdictions require that all election
officials sign an oath to this effect, creating awareness that they can be
legally prosecuted if their work or conduct is proved to be partisan, or if
they violate laws, regulations and the EMB’s code of conduct. The oath should
also include a confidentiality clause that ensures that sensitive information
and the identity of voters is not divulged. Having a signed code of conduct on
record, can be particularly important when investigation accusation of
malfeasance by an election official (see Integrity subsection below for
additional information).
Accuracy
Accuracy
of the election result is directly related to the integrity of the count,
tabulation and aggregation process. Later discovery of errors and correction of
mistakes can lead to accusations of malpractices or even fraud.
The
accuracy of the count will depend on clear procedures and manuals, correct
software programs and communications system that are properly tested, adequate
staff training, appropriate checks and balances, and officials' commitment to
the process. Clear audit trails of ballots, ballot boxes, statement of result
and tabulation forms, as well as checking and rechecking mechanisms, will
contribute to the accuracy of the results. Whilst ICT solutions may enhance
accuracy, this must be balanced against the resulting apparent loss of
transparency.
Secrecy
Secrecy
of the vote is important because it ensures that voters cannot be victimised
for the way they vote, or intimidated into voting in a particular way. To
preserve the secrecy of the vote, a voters' identity should never be linked to
his/her choice. However, in a voting station with a very small number of
registered voters, the secrecy of the vote can easily be violated, should they
all vote for the same party.
If the
secrecy of the vote of individuals or a community is a concern, measures such
as counting at counting centres, rather than at individual voting stations, or
mixing ballots from different voting stations, can be considered. Sequentially
numbered ballot papers corresponding to matching stubs with the voter details
compromise secrecy and are best avoided. However for audit purposes, it is
sufficient if ballot papers and counterfoils are printed with the numerical
range contained in the booklet of ballot papers in question and, thus, avoid
violating the secrecy of the vote. Alternatively, if numbers are used, they
could also be random on ballot stub and ballot paper – but matched in a
database only available to EMB and judicial authorities.
Timeliness
EMBs
need to cater to two distinct yet intertwined processes: tabulation and
reporting. Each of these must generate timely election results. Delays in
completing the count and in the release of unofficial preliminary results, and
subsequent final results, can negatively affect the level of integrity and
confidence in the voting process.
The
responsible Electoral Management Body should carefully plan all stages of the
counting process to facilitate the early announcement of results, or at least
to realistically assess when results can be announced, taking into
consideration the communications and transport infrastructure.
However,
it is instrumental that EMBs are not pressured into releasing results
prematurely. The EMBs must give themselves sufficient time to properly
transmit, tabulate and check results before releasing both interim and final
results. In order to manage such expectations, EMBs must clearly and repeatedly
reinforce the expected timeline for release of results during the lead up to Election
Day, as well as informing voters if the process is going according to schedule,
or if the schedule has changed.
Accountability
Clear
responsibility and accountability for each stage of the election results
process are important. The legal electoral framework and the EMB’s own Code of
Conduct outline the general responsibilities that all election officials must
adhere to. The Terms of Reference for each position clarifies in more detail
what is expected of individual officers, as do procedures and regulations
governing the various stages of the results system. All election officials have
a duty of care responsibility.
At the
national level, the EMB should be accountable for ensuring that all necessary
preparations are completed and the results system put in place is suitable for
the tasks at hand. At the electoral district level, it may be a senior election
officer or commission official who is accountable for ensuring that the results
process is operationalized within their respective area of responsibility.
At
voting stations and centralized counting/tabulation facilities, specified
officers may be responsible for voting, counting and tabulation. The very same
is the case for transportation, of sensitive results related material,
communication of interim and final results. Clearly defined complaints and
appeals processes are also important. There should be structures in place with
the authority and competency to address complaints and appeals. These may
include political party liaison committees, conflict management and resolution
bodies and legal structures.
Counting
rules, including criteria for rejecting ballots, should be clear, agreed upon
and known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election,
including election officials, the general public, political parties,
candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national and international electoral
observers. If a results form is incorrectly completed by a voting station and
the deficiency spotted during tabulation, unambiguous and well-known procedures
as who and how corrections can be made must be in place in order to avoid
accusations of tampering with the results tabulation by the EMB (for additional
information regarding this very topic, see the 2008 Kriegler report on the 2007
Kenyan elections). Thus, clear audit trails are essential to ensure
accountability.
Uniformity
Uniformity
means that all rules and regulations treat all voters equally and are applied
equally to all voters and stakeholders. Ensuring uniformity across the entire
country would require that all officials making up the results management
system are well trained and non-partisan, as well as the EMB has an effective
command and control capability in place to supervise compliance. The presence
of political party representatives and candidate representatives, and observers
will help to ensure that various steps of the results system are conducted in a
fair and correct manner.
Integrity
The
credibility of the results management system is directly related to the
integrity of the entire results generating process, and not just the count
itself. Subsequently EMBs must make every effort to safeguard the integrity of
the results management system by pro-actively combat electoral fraud risks, as
well as systemic manipulation and electoral malpractices (See Chad Vickery and
Erica Schein (2012) for additional information). By conducting a comprehensive
fraud risk assessment of the results management system the EMB will be better
positioned to identify potential vulnerabilities. Based on the identified fraud
risks, the EMB will be able to rank the risks based on the plausibility of the
vulnerability occurring and potential impact if it takes place. This ranking
will be an important instrument and effectively guide the EMB as it develops a
fraud risk control plan enabling it to deter, detect and overcome fraud risks
(For additional information see Darnolf 2011).
However,
all EMB officials and officers also have an individual duty to protect the
integrity of the results process and could be held responsible for
unintentional breaches of their duty of care. If they have been negligent and
violated the code of conduct, or the rules and regulations of which they have
been trained they may have committed malpractice. EMBs are therefore often
recommended to introduce a Code of Conduct and integrate the duty of care
concept in the induction training of all its officers, irrespective if they are
Commissioners or ad hoc poll workers.
Chain of Custody
A chain
of custody is instrumental when adjudicating a challenge to the election
results. The EMB must therefore handle its sensitive election material in such
a way that the chain of custody is not compromised while moving or storing
physical evidence from the time it is obtained until the time it is presented
in court.
Election
authorities often utilize a special form logging the movement of election material
from the central warehouse to the voting station in question. Based on such a
form, authorities will know who was in possession of the material during any
stage of the process. EMBs use the same system for retrieval of the material
from a voting station to its storage facility, as well as to the
counting/tabulation facility where applicable. One of the main challenges to
the chain of custody is often experienced at central counting and tabulation
facilities.
Inside
the facility, movement of sensitive material from check-in, temporary storage,
potential quarantine area, counting or aggregation, and permanent storage is to
be performed only by authorized personnel and properly documented. In some
cases where sensitive materials and ID cards are barcoded, a log is established
by using hand-held scanners. Alternatively, procedures identifying who is
authorized to obtain, and how to move, materials from the various areas of the
facility is to be established. A log sheet should clearly identify the person
who signed for the material in question. A similar procedure is used for the
return of material.
