Irrespective of the method of vote counting; manual or automated, each jurisdictions vote counting process should consist of the following:
- verification and reconciling of the ballots and other voting material,
- sorting of the ballots into piles representing the different political parties, candidates and, in the case of referendum, choices,
- counting of the ballots,
- completion of the results forms or statement of results,
- capturing the results,
- announcement of results.
Verification
Verification includes:
- Recording the number of unused ballots and spoiled ballots. (Spoiled ballots are those that a voter has inadvertently spoiled by marking it incorrectly, and then exchanged for a new blank ballot, or ballots that are improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote secrecy):
- Determining the total of number of voters who voted according to the voter’s list;
- Unsealing the ballot box and counting the number of ballots;
- Reconciling the number of ballots in the box with the number of voters according to the voters' list or other record of the total number of persons who cast ballots.
Sorting
The ballots are sorted according to political
parties or candidates (in the case of referendums, by choices).
In
some jurisdictions party and candidate agents will have an opportunity to
object to the sorting by objecting to the counting officer in charge of
counting, either verbally or in writing as prescribed by legislation. The
counting officer in charge of the counting will then have to determine action
on the objection(see Criteria to determine when votes should count as valid).
Counting
The counting officers then count the number of votes
cast for each party or candidate.
In some jurisdictions party and
candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the counting by
objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in writing,
as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the counting
will then have to determine action on the objection.
The
counting officer will set aside challenged ballots and determine acceptance or
rejection of challenged ballots according to established rules.(see Criteria to determine when votes should count as valid).
Completing the results sheet or statement of the vote and capturing the results
The
statement of the vote, or the results sheet, is compiled, signed, and
transmitted to a local office before being transmitted to the regional or
national level. Representatives of political parties and national and
international electoral observers can copy the results.
There
is no interruption in the process until the statement of the vote of the voting
station is released and sent to the local office of the electoral management
body. Once the counting process is completed, electoral materials are taken to
a local office for secure storage.
Interim
results are also sent to the national level and publicized. Special measures
and procedures need to be followed during the entire counting process in case
results are challenged.
As with
all other aspects of conducting an election, there are administrative
considerations, which are directly or indirectly related to vote counting at
voting stations. Each of these procedural components has particularities and
subtleties associated with it.
Representatives
of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the ballots, and
if they do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, be allowed to
make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of
the count.
Using a
count sheet, all valid ballots are recorded, as well as spoiled and rejected
ballots. All ballots are counted and none are destroyed. A verification of the
count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement
of the vote.
The
ballot box can then be re-sealed (with the new seal number duly noted by party
and candidate representatives and observers), and appropriate counting
documentation can either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a
separate sealed envelope.
Party
and candidate representatives should have the opportunity affix their seals or
signatures to the resealed ballot box/es.
The voting
recorded results will be communicated to the local/national office of the
electoral management body by the counting official through telephone or other
means. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and observers, if
present, can make a copy of the statement, where the law provides for such.
The
count at the voting station itself is now over, and all the electoral materials
may be transported to a secure local storage room. In the event of a recount,
all the prepared documents are needed, so elaborate precautions, and sealing
the ballot box contents, are important.
The
local/national office of the electoral management body totals the results
transmitted by all voting stations of the electoral district, as well as
results of any special ballots, advance polls, mobile voting stations, etc.
Interim
results should include all types of ballots, so as to avoid discrepancies
between interim results and final results. In addition, these results should be
for each political party and candidate and posted on a wall, board, or
spreadsheet, as they become available.
Unofficial
interim results should be publicized as soon as possible. The media or
political parties are often in charge of publicizing these interim results,
leaving the announcement of final results to the electoral management body.
In the
following days, the local offices of the electoral management body may perform
the final count and prepare the official results. If results are challenged,
additional procedures may apply.
Manual
or automated vote counting, or a combination of both?
While
the use of manually counted paper ballots is still the most common method of
voting, automated methods of voting and vote counting are becoming more accessible
and effective, and more countries are opting to use them.
Automated
technology can be cheaper, faster, and more accurate than manual counting.
It can
also improve the democratic process by making the counting of complex electoral
systems easier to use.
Technological
approaches can be used to replace traditional paper ballots. Voting directly
using mechanical or electronic devices, or using machine-readable ballots, can
eliminate the need to count ballots manually and greatly speed up the counting
process.
Computing
technology is often used to count the results of manual ballot counts, to
produce summaries at the counting centre, and regional, or national level.
Standard off-the-shelf office software products, such as spreadsheet or
relational database software, can be used to aggregate individual counts and
produce summary totals and various reports, either in paper or electronic
format.
Computer
vote counting systems require care to function correctly. Faulty calculations,
data entry errors, or loss of data can seriously compromise the conduct of an
election.
Rigorous
testing is necessary to ensure electronic election systems work flawlessly
before they are placed in production, even if they are to be used only to
compile preliminary results, or used only for a short time.
Data
entry forms should be designed to minimize error and to facilitate the data
entry process. It is common practice to design data input forms so that they
mirror the data entry screen. Training of persons who manually complete these
forms must stress the importance of legibility and arithmetic accuracy.
As with
any vote counting process, it is crucial that checks and balances be built into
any computerized counting system. Clear audit trails should be in place to
track the progress of the count. Balancing figures should be used to check that
output results are consistent with inputs.
For
example, it should not be possible to calculate a total vote figure for any
level of counting that is higher than the number of ballot papers issued to
voters at that level.
Data
entered into a computerized vote counting system should always be checked
against the original input data. This can be done by checking figures, after
data has been entry against the input documents, or by entering each set of
data twice, using different operators to produce a parallel count.
Contingency
plans should also be built into any computerized vote counting system. Data
should be regularly backed up (and stored off-site if the counting proceeds for
some time). Spare hardware should be available in case of hardware failure.
Where a network server is used, it is common to have a duplicate server set up
that can take over if the main server fails.
Technicians
should be on hand if problems arise. Back up power supplies should be available
to guard against power failure, even in the most developed countries.
Power
supplies should be protected against power surges that can corrupt or destroy
computer files. Even simple steps, such as regularly saving live data from RAM
memory to hard disk, are sometimes overlooked, and can cause serious problems.
Worst-case
scenarios should also be anticipated. Provision should be made to switch to a
completely manual operation if the computer system fails and cannot be
recovered. Portable calculators are valuable emergency devices. (See Elections and Technology).
