Publication of Official Final Results
Discrepancies
between interim results and final official results are to be expected. The most
problematic scenario is if when the interim result, based on an almost complete
count, indicates a narrow victor and then the final results reveals a swing to
another party or candidate. However, developing an accurate and transparent
results-generating process that is implemented accordingly and supported by a
known results release modality will significantly reduce the risk of violence
or refusal to accept the final results by the losing competitor.
Where
discrepancies do occur, the electoral management body should issue statements
explaining the reasons for the discrepancies, to ensure that public confidence
in the system is maintained. In some cases, special meetings between the EMB
and leading politicians and activists are advisable.
It is
of paramount importance that the EMB explains the difference between partial,
interim and final results to the stakeholders. In jurisdictions where the EMB
is not certifying the results, this should be made clear too. Equally
important, stakeholders must know how they can lodge complaints against the
results process even before the results aggregating process begins.
The
overall principle is that the appropriate authority should make the official
final election results available as soon as possible after the counting process
has been concluded, the statement of votes checked, and results validated. Some
electoral laws stipulate a fixed day for announcing the official results.
Depending
on the geography of the country, the communication networks in place, and the
electoral system used, an average of one to two weeks is generally needed
before detailed verifications of interim results are complete for making an
official announcement. Often the legislation will provide for the designated
period in which the results should be publicized.
In many
cases the official count can only be concluded once all the ballot papers have
been returned to the local electoral management body and all counting steps
have been completed, including resolution of any disputes about vote counting
(which may result in recounts), and statement of votes validated. Great care
must be taken to ensure that the figures are accurate, especially when the
margin of victory is narrow. Procedures must be in place to ensure that all
appropriate checks and balances have been taken into account before the final
results are announced.
Formal
documents showing the results of the count are normally prepared, certified,
and signed by the responsible electoral district officer, or other appropriate
official. These documents are usually officially published, such
as in a Government Gazette, tabled in Parliament, or presented to an
appropriate official. Some EMBs are making the extra effort of scanning all the
statement of votes forms and making them available online for public
consumption.
Often,
formal election results are declared at a public ceremony. Candidates,
political party representatives, the media, observers, other interested
persons, and the general public are often invited to attend these ceremonies.
In some cases, candidates and political party representatives are given the
opportunity to make speeches.
It is
desirable to produce detailed publications of election results showing the
results of the counting at all levels of voting, from voting stations to
regions or electoral districts, and the national level. Most often these are
done electronically and the specific result breakdown is provided to parties
and candidates. However, in some cases it is desirable to merge some results.
As a general principle, EMBs should seek to provide data in a format that
allows analysis. Providing results from tens of thousands of polling stations,
but only doing so in a human-readable format such as PDF, amounts to a less
than complete commitment to transparency.
Make
the data available in the most generic format possible – such as CSV (comma
separated values) text file or similar.
Merging Results to Protect the Secrecy of the Vote
It may
be desirable to merge or amalgamate results from several voting stations to
protect the secrecy of the vote. This is generally done if the publication of
results at a detailed level might identify the names and votes of particular
individuals. This can happen if the number of votes at a voting station is so
small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one
candidate or party.
This
can also be done in cases where there is a real risk that publishing the voting
results at a particular voting station could result in retribution against the
persons who voted there. This problem can be mitigated by mixing the ballots
from two or more voting stations from different areas.
Merging
results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other categories
of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the
head office of the electoral management body, results can easily be merged with
other results in order to protect the secrecy of the vote. For internal use
only, a special notation can be made in order to keep the verification trail
clear.
Role of Judicial Courts
In some
countries, judicial courts are only involved in the electoral process after the
election, when offenders against the electoral law are brought to trial, or
when an electoral result is challenged.
In
other jurisdictions, the courts may have a significant role to play in
confirming the outcome and official results of the election, where the results
are certified only when the court has confirmed them. Such confirmation should
be done as soon as possible, in order to avoid political instability and
potential delays associated with a transition from one government to another.
It is therefore important that not only the EMB, but also the affected courts
proactively engages with political stakeholders thereby enabling them to better
understand, access and accept their decisions.
The
courts may also be directly involved in the official count, along with the
electoral management body. This will generally be the case if final approval of
the count must come from the courts.
When a
lot of technology is used in the electoral process, the judicial courts may
also benefit from some training in order to better fulfil their role. It is
difficult for a court to find neutral technical expertise in the event that the
EMB or the technology vendor is the plaintiff.
