Once
the vote counting process is over, the counting officer prepares the statement
of the vote for a voting station.
This
form indicates the election results and should include standard information,
such as the name of the electoral district, the name and/or number of the
voting station, and election date.
Specific
information on the count should include:
- number of ballots received at the opening of voting from
the electoral management body,
- number of spoiled ballots,
- number of unused ballots,
- number of valid ballots for each candidate or political
party,
- number of rejected ballots,
- total number of valid ballots, and the
- total number of voters who voted on election day.
The presiding officer and the representatives of
political parties and candidates sign the form. They should provide their
printed names, addresses, and telephone numbers, if any, along with their
signatures. If there is a problem, it will then be easier for the electoral
management body to locate and contact them.
Some jurisdictions require all counting officers
present at the voting station to sign the statement of votes.
Once the form is completed the results should be given
orally, or transmitted electronically, to the local office of the electoral
management body to allow them to gather interim results as soon as possible.
The presiding officer is responsible for communicating the interim results.
The transmission can be done by telephone, cellular
phone, or Internet using a unique security code to ensure the proper
identification of the person transmitting the results. However, the
communications infrastructure in parts of some countries does not permit oral
or electronic reporting of interim voting results. In such
locations, the use of the presiding officer or other officially designated
person carrying the statement of the vote may be the only available
alternative.
After
the interim results have been reported orally or electronically, the original
of the statement of the votes should be transmitted to the pre-determined
office of the electoral management body by hand in a sealed tamper-evident
envelope. This measure is essential to prevent fraud and ensure chain of
custody of the legal document based on which final results are verified.
Representatives
of a political party and candidates should be allowed to copy the results.
The
counting officer should post an official copy of the statement of the votes at
the voting station. The original is placed in a sealed envelope and attached to
the ballot box for use by the electoral management body. Observers and party
and candidate representatives should have the right to a copy of the official
statement of the vote for the voting station or the counting centres.
Issue of Transparency
Transparency
is very significant, particularly at the time of the release and transmission
of interim results. Representatives of political parties and candidates should
sign and have a copy of the statement of the vote and should be allowed to
witness the transmission of the corresponding results to the electoral
management body.
Such
transparency of actions is essential in the acceptance of the general outcome
of the election.
Importance of Contingency Plans
Communications
technology plays an increasingly important role in the transmission of voting
results. If the supporting systems used by the electoral management body fail,
postponement of interim results can ensue, creating numerous administrative,
technical, security, and logistical problems. In addition, such failures tend
to be politically embarrassing to the electoral management body, and often
cause mistrust from constituents towards the EMB.
To
avoid such failures, a contingency plan should be implemented, and fully tested
prior to Election Day. Identification of a second telephone in close proximity
to each voting station can be made prior to Election Day, and can represent an
economical alternative in case of technology failure. Where mobile phones are
used, technical support staff can be deployed with replacements for failed
units. Where multiple mobile networks are available, local roaming or
alternative SIM cards can be provided to presiding officers.
Where
transmission of data from devices at the polling station or perhaps from
tallying centres is planned, devices can be configured with a number of target
servers offering redundancy at the back end and increasing the
likelihood that results will reach at least one of the configured servers.
Radio
handsets can also be used. Finally, a manual alternative to electronic
transmission of results, such as the use of couriers or hand delivery, can be
used as a final back-up plan.
The
selection of a contingency plan is driven by local context and circumstances in
that particular jurisdiction. In some circumstances, prior agreement with
security forces to use their communications equipment can be negotiated, or
partnership or collaboration with private companies to use their facilities can
be made as a backup plan.
security concerns