Before
the ballot boxes are opened, a check could be made that there are only
authorised persons present in the counting centre. In some instances the list
of authorised persons might include members of the armed forces and media.
Once
the ballot boxes are at the counting centre and ready to be counted, the
counting officer will verify the seals on the ballot box and open it. The
contents are emptied on a table in the presence of counting officers,
representatives of political parties and candidates, observers, etc.
Sealed
envelopes attached to the ballot boxes are opened and verification of the
reconciliation done at the voting station is made.
The
ballots on the table are counted to establish quantity. The number of ballots
in the ballot box should match the number of voters who voted. This figure
should be compared to the one written on the ballot account form completed at
the voting station.
A last
reconciliation is done once all ballots are sorted and tallied by candidate and
party to verify that all totals are correct before making the official entries
and completing the statement of the vote for the ballot box.
Everybody
(observers and security personnel may be excluded) involved in the counting
process should sign the forms to confirm that the accounting of ballots was
satisfactory, or to state that they are aware of the source of the discrepancy
(if any) and that they agree with the decision taken by the counting official.
Once the forms are completed and the ballots bundled, the ballot box will be
closed and re-sealed with all the ballots inside.
In case
of discrepancies, the counting process should be repeated until the missing
ballots are found, even if only one ballot is missing.
If,
after verification, the missing ballots are still not found, the electoral
management body should be informed of the problem and verification of their
ballot accounts should be done (especially verification of the number of
ballots sent to the voting station). Keeping higher authorities informed of any
problem is part of the transparency required in an election.
If no
solution is found, appropriate amendments should be made on the ballot account
forms (and on any form on which this information is required) and on the
statement of the vote signed by the counting official and representatives of
political parties and candidates. This new figure should then become the
official one for the ballot box.
In some
jurisdictions, counting of ballots that cannot be reconciled or that are not
within a certain tolerance, (i.e. difference is not more than 2, 3 or 5
ballots, legislation, regulations, or directives may prohibit proceeding with
the count. If significant discrepancies are discovered, local rules could apply
to the level of action taken.
In some
cases, if significant fraud is suspected, it may be necessary to delay opening
and counting the contents of a ballot box until the electoral management body
investigates the problem and decides what to do with
the ballot box. Electoral officers and others involved should be aware of these
provisions through their training.
Merging Results to Protect Secrecy
In some
situations, electoral management bodies will combine, merge, or amalgamate
results of several ballot boxes. This is generally done if the voting procedure
makes it possible to identify every person whose vote has gone into a
particular ballot box; or if the number of votes in the ballot box is so small
that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate
or party.
In such
cases, the secrecy of the vote could be compromised. Results should be combined
(mixed or amalgamated) with another ballot box. This can also be done in cases
where it appears that the secrecy of individual votes can be secured. There is
real risk arising from the fact that a particular voting station, having voted
predominantly in a particular way, could result in retribution being visited on
the persons who voted at that voting station.
Mixing
the ballots from two or more boxes from different areas, and then attributing
all the votes to one ballot box with proper notation in the results form can
mitigate these problems. The counting centre approach is appropriate for making
this type of modification effective in counting procedures. For internal use
only, a special mention of ballot numbers per box can be made to keep the audit
trail clear.
Combining
(merging) results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other
category of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted
at the head office of the electoral management body or in a specific counting
centre, results can easily be combined (merged) with other results to protect
the secrecy of the vote.
Once
again, for internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers by category
can be made to keep the audit trail clear.
