By Dimpho Motsamai and Hawa Noor M
I. Background
A discussion on young people’s democratic participation
in Kenya’s political processes immediately stokes debates concerning their role
in the violent aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 general elections – and the country’s
failures to engage its
youth constituency effectively in political, governance and electoral
processes.[1]
The 2010 Kenyan Constitution defines youth as any individual between 18 and 35
years in age. Equally, many of the country’s different youth development
programmes have the same categorization. According to this categorization, youth constitute more than
a third of the entire population, while nearly 80 per cent of Kenyans are less
than 35 years old.[2]
Just over fifty per cent are young women. The population of Kenya’s youth grows
annually by an estimate of about 400,000.[3]
Young people in Kenya’s political landscape therefore represents the largest
demographic unit and political constituency.[4]
According to various reports, among the primarily responsible
for engaging in the devastating violence that ensued post the 2007 election
period were young people (70 per cent of the perpetrators).[5]
More than 600,000 people
were internally displaced, with hundreds of lives lost and billions in
infrastructure damage. Youth criminality in Kenya is also a longstanding
phenomenon and some of the youth groupings that orchestrated the
violence existed prior to the 2007 elections. While the 2007 post election
violence was largely defined as ethnic and politically motivated, the
ethno-political framework undergirding Kenyan politics reflects a diverse set of
structural challenges the country continues to face. These include land grievances, weak government
institutions, growing
income inequalities and negative ethnic relations – all of which manifest
politically. Kenya is comprised of more than 40 ethnic groups. But 2 (Kikuyu and Kalenjin) of the majority 4 (Kikuyu,
Kalenjin, Luhya and Luo) have dominated political life since independence.[6] President
Kenyatta is the son of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first African president
while his deputy, William Ruto is from the same ethnic group as Daniel Moi who
ruled the country through a dictatorship for 24 years. The duo ascended to
power in 2013 by successfully mobilizing their regional votes. But deep ethnic animosity
reigns silently and poses a threat to peace especially during electoral
periods. This is because structural grievances, particularly on the issue of
land are yet to be addressed despite inquiries having been launched and recommendations
produced by various regimes. The emergence of violent groups in marginalized
areas of the country poses an even larger threat.
Indeed Kenya is gradually emerging and transforming
politically and economically since 2007. In its general elections held in March
2013, the country broke from its violent electoral past because it was largely
peaceful and was the first to
be conducted under a
new legal framework, defined by a new constitution that was adopted through a national referendum in August
2010. Moreover the elections were under the management of a new electoral management,
the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) set up in 2011. Of
additional significance was the high voter turnout at 85 per cent of registered
electorates. The country witnessed a peaceful political transition notwithstanding
the narrow margin of
victory between the two main presidential candidates – current President
Uhuru Kenyatta from the
Jubilee Party with 50.07 per cent of the vote and his opponent Raila Odinga
from the CORD party with 43.31 per cent.[7] Despite
election recount and general discontent regarding the outcome from the losing coalition and others,
violence was largely averted. The elections were generally deemed free, fair and
credible by most international and domestic observer missions – who also noted some
irregularities.
But
a break from the violent past has not translated into improved prospects for stability
and development for Kenya. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB),
while Kenya has the potential to be one of Africa’s best-performing
economies, the country still
exhibits some fragility that undermines
its democracy and development.[8]
Most importantly, the AfDB cites high levels of poverty, regional developmental
disparities as well as high youth unemployment (64 per cent of the nation’s
total unemployed population) as threats to the country’s overall stability. The
country also faces a large skills gap of its work force as the massive numbers
of unemployed young people, constitute a large group of those unskilled. In essence,
Kenya’s economic growth
has not been sufficiently inclusive with almost half of its overall population
living below the poverty line. Limited access to basic services, inadequate
infrastructure, inequality and unemployment has had a negative affect
especially on the poor. Other factors include terrorist activities and
ethnic tensions compounded with a postcolonial land allocation that left minority
communities and vulnerable groups such as young people feeling dispossessed and
created unrest. There is, a strong need to create opportunities for
disadvantaged and marginalized groups, in particular young people, to avoid
conflict and violence in the future and to build inclusive societies. Young
people’s inclusion and addressing disenfranchisement is therefore not only a socioeconomic
imperative but also key to preserving stability and building peace. In this
context, there has been a renewed impetus for reforms in inclusion of young
people and political participation from the government and from the IEBC.
During the 2007 elections, over 3.7 million young people voted,
making them a critical political constituency. However, beyond elections, they
rarely have a say in the country’s affairs and this fuels perceptions among
them of being sidelined. This prevails despite a variety of interventions
introduced by the government. For instance, Article 55 of the Constitution elaborates on the rights of
the youth and their contribution to national development. It places an obligation
on the state to
take measures, including affirmative action programmes to ensure that young
people have access to
education, training and opportunities for association, representation and
participation in political, social, economic and other spheres of life. Article 100 further charges
Parliament with an obligation of enacting legislation to promote the
representation of women, persons with disabilities, youth, ethnic and other
minorities, and marginalized communities in Parliament. There is also a provision for young people in governing
bodies. For example, Article 98 of the Constitution states that the composition
of the Senate must include 47 members, two of which must represent the youth.[9] Moreover, the Kenya National Youth Policy has
been designed to
recognize the needs and concerns of young women and men and attempts to address
issues affecting young people to enable them to reach their maximum potential. Kenya´s National
Youth Council as established through the National Youth Council Act in 2009 is
mandated to co-ordinate youth organizations, design and continuously review the
National Youth Policy. In addition, Kenya has also ratified the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child.[10]
However,
legal provisions and existing initiatives are far from enough in improving young
people’s political engagement and participation. Youth Kenyans interviewed for
this study reinforced feelings of exclusion concerning decisions that impact
their lives and marginalization from political and governance processes. These
sentiments have been flagged as some of the major sources of alienation and
anger that often trigger political and election violence.
III. Youth participation in politics and elections
Despite constituting more than 60 per cent of the
country’s population, Kenya’s young people have had low formal participation in
both the electoral and political spheres. They have been insufficiently represented in
public policy and
decision-making forums. Prior to the 1990s multiparty politics political
apathy was high. But throughout the 1990s the trend shifted to more political
engagement but often in the form of activism, rebellion and violence.[11]
There are also criminal groups in Kenya's cities and towns constituting young
people – which have been growing from mid-2003 and oftentimes mobilised for
political ends. Some
violent youth movements have also sprung up in recent years with many of the
country’s young people having been mobilized into such political-militant
networks. This is attributed to a combination of many factors including
social-economics, politics, religion and the manipulation of
generational identities. The latter also concerns the mobilisation of youth
wings by parent political parties to reinforce their coercive strategies. Outside
party structures has become common for young people to receive bribes from
politicians to destabilize the political and electoral process or give them an
upper hand.
In spite of this, young people’s formal political participation
has been improving. There is notable increase in their participation mainly as
voters from 2010 with the promulgation of the new constitution and
supplementary youth laws mentioned earlier in this paper. That said, some of
the recent efforts to
improve youth political participation emerging from the National Youth Policy
have been shrouded with controversies and allegation of political manipulation
and corruption.
Voter participation was notably high during the 2013
elections with an 85 per cent turnout.
This was out of 14,3
million voters registered to vote in the 2013 elections. In terms of youth
registration, initial
figures at the beginning of the registration drive indicated some voter apathy
among young Kenyans. According to the IEBC, they appeared non-responsive to
political campaigns and continuous voter registration programmes. A final breakdown
of youth registration figures and the component of women and youth are
represented in figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1: Voter registration among youth
Figure 2: Voter
registration among youth, by gender
|
|
Male
|
Female
|
Total
|
|
18-25 YRS
|
1,292,178
|
1,127,552
|
2,419,730
|
|
26 - 30 YRS
|
1,268,521
|
1,271,281
|
2,539,802
|
|
31 - 35 YRS
|
909,707
|
758,235
|
1,667,942
|
|
Total youth (18-35 YRS)
|
3,470,406
|
3,157,068
|
6,627,474
|
|
Total registered voters
|
|
|
14,388,781
|
|
% youth of total registered
voters
|
|
|
46%
|
Source: IEBC 2015
Only
about 57 per cent of the eligible youth were registered during the last
registration drive prior to the 2013 presidential elections, leaving
approximately 43 per cent of the eligible not registered.[12] According
to the IEBC, the figures could have been higher. More than three million
eligible voters were not registered because they did not have the national
identity card (ID) required by the Elections Act. Many Kenyan communities and marginalized groups
including unemployed young people were disenfranchised as a result of not
having national identity cards (ID) cards. According to research conducted by
one of the IEBC’s partners, the Institute of Education in Democracy
(IED), the system of
registration for ID cards contributes to disenfranchisement due to the
bureaucratic process
of registration and some of the unreasonable requirements that makes its acquisition
expensive for the poor.[13]
There is also evidence that the young people were heavily engaged in electoral
malpractices. For example, about 46 per cent of rural young people and 41 per
cent of urban young people were reported to have sold their ID Cards to
individuals representing politicians’ interests so as to increase the latter’s
chances of winning an election. [14]
The IEBC also experienced delays in the initiation of the voter registration process
and was only able to do so within a constrained 30-day time span.[15] This
is in addition to criticism that the IEBC’s voter registration drive fell short
of sensitizing young people to vote and
to remain engaged in overall political matters beyond polls. The
shortfall was also thought to be taken advantage of by some politicians who ´had
to do the work of sensitizing their constituents on the importance of
registration and voting, something that is ideally the work of the IEBC´.[16]
Additionally, the looming fear of election violence as experienced in the previous
polls contributed to lower participation in both political and electoral
processes.
Beyond electoral periods, many challenges hindering youth
participation remain. These include:
- Public confidence and trust in the IEBC: As a relatively new
entity, perceptions of the IEBC as an unaccountable and politicized institution
remains. Segments of the young people are aggrieved about the 2013 electoral
outcome. Moreover, the voting process has been misused and so for many, elections
are easily predictable based on candidates´ financial power and ethnicity.
- Mistrust in political leadership: Young people’s perceptions of national and local
government are consistently low; and access to established channels to voice
grievances regarding governance issues have been ineffective.
- Party politics: Young people’s participation in the political party
nomination process is constrained by internal politics, which has demotivated
them from participating. Political
parties’ tendency to violate the age limit of 35 years for youth candidates by
having older people vying for these positions adds to this situation.
- Cultural hindrances such as those against women
participation in politics limits their participation. For example, there are
often more male candidates compared to women because women’s rights are often
violated in political campaigns and so this does not offer motivation for
younger women willing to vie for political seats.
- Financial constraints and the issue of money in
politics: The lack of finances among young people to fund their candidature
when they wish to vie for elected positions represents an additional
limitation.
III. EMB entry points
The IEBC is a relatively new institution created after
the 2007 elections. The latter replaced its predecessor, the Electoral Commission of
Kenya (ECK) – then thought to be partisan towards incumbent President Mwai
Kibaki. Following the 2007 polls, a commission of inquiry into the conduct of
the 2007 general elections - the Kriegler Commission recommended the establishment of a new electoral
management body as
a measure to bolster the credibility of elections and ensure peaceful elections
in future. According to Article
88 of the 2010 Kenyan, the IEBC is mandated to conduct referenda and elections
to any elective body or office established by the constitution and any other
elections as prescribed by an act of parliament.[17]
The IEBC is responsible for: continuous registration of voters and revision of
the voter’s roll; delimitation of constituencies and wards; the regulation of
political parties; the development of electoral code of conduct and monitoring
of compliance with electoral legislation; electoral dispute settlement; voter education; facilitation
of the observation, monitoring and evaluation of elections; and the regulation
of party funding and expenditure.[18]
The Commission has a secretariat, which
manages its day-to-day affairs.[19]
With regard to young people’s participation, constitutional
provisions for inclusive representation bind IEBC. But the IEBC is yet to develop a specific policy on special
groups’ participation (including youth) in elections as well as related monitoring
mechanisms. Furthermore, the IEBC does not have adequate strategies and budget for a continuous, standardized
and targeted voter education to reach out to all young people.
In the 2013 election, the IEBC’s young people’s engagement
activities were largely confined to voter education and the acquisition of
identity cards. This, according to the IEBC was because of pervasive
misunderstandings related to participation in electoral processes; and
motivations for their political engagement. The strategy involved developing
targeted civic education campaigns, sensitizing young people on the importance of
voting and of having national identity cards. The IEBC also worked with the
Ministry of Education to develop curriculum for voter education that will be
part of the school curriculum. A number of implemented actions related to this
included incorporating civil education as part of the school subjects, having a
voter education week in place and using specific mediums such as vernacular
radio to encourage debates in the local language. The Commission also provides
support to school and college election processes to instill a culture of political/electoral
participation in young minds. The IEBC also used strategic communication to
sensitize the public. For instance, it sponsored music and drama festivals with
targeted youth electoral participation messages. Communications using ICTs was also
employed throughout the election phase that included mass media messaging and distribution
of information materials to different youth groups. There was also a short message
service (SMS) systems available for immediate reporting of violence on the day
of election dubbed the Uwiano platform for Peace that was developed in
collaboration with other stakeholders.[20]
Additionally the IEBC supported other institutions youth
programs. A case in point is the ‘Yes Youth Can’, program, a partnership between
government and international partners which, under the ‘My ID, My Life’
campaign helped over 500,000 Kenyan youth to obtain their ID cards required for
voter registration and established over 22,000 village-level youth bunges (Swahili for parliaments) to
provide structures for young people to ´take action and improve their lives,
develop new leadership skills, promote transparent decision-making, prioritize
key issues and emerge as positive forces for change in their communities´.[21]
The IEBC equally supported an initiative by the National Youth Sector Alliance
(NYSA), which provided forums for the government and private sector to engage
with youth leaders and to help traverse tribal differences.
Since the 2013 elections, the IEBC has further sought to strengthen
its capacities for young people’s engagement and also develop conflict
mediation programmes throughout the country that focus on young people. Key
areas for electoral reforms ahead of the 2017 General Elections have also been
identified namely; voter registration and in particular the registration of
Kenyans residing outside the country, the rights of prisoners to vote, the
nomination process, dispute resolution process and election petition
management. All these will in one way or the other impact positively on the
cause of young people by making them aware of political participation
processes.[22]
IV. Challenges and lessons learned
Essentially, the IEBC is a relatively nascent
organisation and still grappling with emphasizing its role as an apolitical,
independent, non-partisan electoral management body. Given past scandals of the
ECK, negative perceptions have dented its image. Restoring credibility and
public confidence – especially from the youth has been a challenge. Policy
development and strategic programme development can also be slow in new
institutions. However, despite IEBC’s youth policies and programmes still being
weak, it is slowly gaining some traction. The Commission is yet to mainstream young people’s
inclusion into all its programming and integrate it into important activities such
as voter registration, voter education, polling and post polling processes
throughout the electoral cycle. IEBC also has to address women and youth
participation and the barriers that hinder their engagement. Another challenge
is developing the most suitable instruments among young people with high
illiteracy levels. On the operational side, the most marked challenge was ensuring accessibility of ID cards to young people in a timely
manner and finding alternative measures to allow the registration of youth
voters.
The wider policy environment within which the IEBC operates
is also a constraint for its work. Of specific mention is government’s failure to
create longer-term activities that addresses underlying grievances of the youth
and meaningful and viable economic opportunities that directly impacts on the
work of IEBC. On the legislative side, the constitutional requirements for
increased participation by young people are yet to be fully realised. Some
provisions to do with young people’s inclusivity are yet to be legislated upon
and complemented by a sound
policy framework. Similarly, there is a need to put in place proper
regulations for sanctions against political parties that fail to comply with young
people’s inclusivity provisions. Failure by political parties to adhere to the
law and promote the participation of young people in the electoral process peacefully, also
affects the IEBC’s approach to their engagement.
V. Recommendations
Five sets of recommendations for the IEBC
from this study include:
- Developing a coherent strategic plan
comprising a youth policy to expand the programmatic reach and impact of its activities.
The plan should incorporate areas where IEBC is
already working including for instance sensitisation of young voters; promoting
awareness of democracy and election-related issues in the educational systems. It
may also evaluate how the IEBC can work with young electoral candidates as well
as young election administrators as part of the IEBC itself. Given the specific
context of Kenyan electoral politics, the policy may also feature IEBC engagement
to prevent or mitigate elections-related violence linked to young people. The
policy should also ensure careful monitoring of election results.
- Promoting inter-agency cooperation when approaching young people’s participation
issues. Cooperation with the youth ministry, non- governmental
organisations, religious groups, community associations and others involved in
political engagement of young people is recommended. This will help build
political will and momentum within government and broader society.
- Strengthening IEBC’s internal research
capacities on young people’s political participation. This could include research on factors that make young people more resilient to election
violence triggers such as electoral and political events and the types of strategies that
would most influence young people’s propensity towards political engagement. Evaluating patterns of young
people’s participation can also be improved by using the available disaggregated election registration data to understand the practices of various age groups. The mechanism through which young people participate during political
parties’ registration processes can be better captured and used to inform
future policy interventions.
- Improving< civic and voter education as well as sensitisation
throughout elections. IEBC’s
work with the educational system ought to be institutionalised. Taking into
consideration the technology literacy among young people, the IEBC may need to
strategize around how the commission can use the opportunities presented by such
technologies such as the internet and social media in engaging with young
people.
- Strengthening
political party engagement on young people’s political participation.
The IEBC could encourage political parties to revise their
constitutions, recruitment rules and procedures, nominations and other basic
documents, which govern their internal affairs to ensure effective inclusion
and participation of young people in elections. In liaison with the political
parties, IEBC may also consider the possibility for engaging in capacity
development for young electoral contestants.>
Annex 1: List of references
African
Development Bank, Kenya Country strategy Paper, 2014-2018
C.
Schulz-Herzenberg, P. Aling’o and S. Gatimu, The 2013 general elections in
Kenya: The integrity of the electoral process, ISS policy Brief No. 74, 2015,
FIDA
- Kenya, Key Gains & Challenges: A Gender Audit of Kenya’s 2013 Election
Process
Independent
Electoral and Boundaries Commission website, at
http://www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/about-iebc/vision-mission-and-mandate
Institute
for Education in Democracy, Post 2013 Learning and Dialogue Forum on election
and electoral processes in Kenya, 25-28 November 2014, Learning Platform
Report, April 2015
Mercy
Corps, Understanding Political Violence Among Youth: Evidence from Kenya on the
links between youth, economic independence, social integration and stability,
June 2011
P.
Kagwanja, Power to Uhuru': Youth Identity and Generational Politics in Kenya's
2002 Elections, African Affairs Vol. 105, No. 418, 2006
The
National Youth Council Act, 2009
The
Kenyan Section of the International Commission
of Jurists; International Human Rights Standards: Reporting Obligations.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 2005.
UNDP
Discussion Paper, Kenya’s Youth Employment Challenge, January 2013
UNDP
Website at
http://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/operations/projects/
peacebuilding/uwiano-peace-platform-project.html
[1] See Mercy Corps, Understanding Political
Violence Among Youth: Evidence from Kenya on the links between youth economic
independence, social integration and stability, June 2011
[2] UNDP Discussion Paper, Kenya’s Youth
Employment Challenge, January 2013, p5
[3]See Institute for Education in Democracy, Post 2013 Learning and
Dialogue Forum on election and electoral processes in Kenya, 25-28 November,
2014, Learning platform report, April 2015
[4] See UNDP Discussion Paper, Kenya’s Youth
Employment Challenge, January 2013
[5] See Mercy Corps, Understanding Political
Violence Among Youth: Evidence from Kenya on the links between youth, economic
independence, social integration, and stability, June 2011
[7] Collette Schulz-Herzenberg, Peter Aling’o and
Sebastian Gatimu, The 2013 general elections in Kenya The integrity of the
electoral process, ISS policy Brief No. 74, 2015, p.2
[8] African Development Bank, Kenya Country strategy
Paper, 2014-2018, p. 4
[9] See FIDA- Kenya, Key Gains & Challenges: A Gender
Audit of Kenya’s 2013 Election Process, p.15
[10] The Kenyan Section
of the International Commission of
Jurists; Internaitonal Human Rights Standards: Reporting Obligations. Convention
on the Rights of the Child, p4
[11] P. Kagwanja, Power to Uhuru': Youth
Identity and Generational Politics in Kenya's 2002 Elections, African Affairs
Vol. 105, No. 418, 2006, p 52
[12] See Institute of Education in Democracy, 2013 Learning and Dialogue Forum on election and
electoral processes in Kenya, p. 25
[15] Collette Schulz-Herzenberg, Peter Aling’o and
Sebastian Gatimu, The 2013 general elections in Kenya The integrity of the
electoral process, ISS policy Brief No. 74, 2015, pp.2-3
[16] Author
interviews with political party representatives.
[19] The secretariat is
furthermore composed of the Chief Electoral Officer, 2 Deputy Commission
Secretaries, 9 Directors, 17 Managers and Regional Election Coordinators and
290 Constituency Election Coordinators. In terms of its internal operation, the
IECB has nine directorates and 17 departments. A director heads each
Directorate, while each department has a manager.
[22] Institute
of Education in Democracy, From Pillar to Post:
Transforming the Election Agenda in Kenya',
