Regardless of which model is used, every EMB should be certain that it can ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the processes for which it is responsible. This can be done if electoral management is founded on fundamental guiding principles.
These guiding principles form the basis of electoral administration and are essential to ensure both the actual and perceived integrity of the electoral process.
Independence
There is some confusion over the meaning of EMB independence because the term ‘independent’ embraces two different concepts: (1) structural independence from the government (the Independent Model) and (2) the ‘fearless independence’ expected of all EMBs, no matter which model is used, in that they do not bend to governmental, political or other partisan influences on their decisions. While one issue is formal and the other is normative, they are seen as linked; in many parts of the world, the Independent Model is regarded as the one most likely to ensure an EMB’s independence of decision and action.
Institutional or ‘structural’ independence can only be found in the constitution or the law. The simplest way to promote independence of decision and action in an EMB is to create a legal framework that embeds EMB independence, as provided in the constitutions and principal EMB laws of many countries, such as Mexico, South Africa, Uruguay and Zambia. While this is always feasible with the Independent Model and may be feasible when the Mixed Model is used, it may be more difficult to embed under the Governmental Model, apart from strict requirements for impartiality of action, given the integration of the EMB(s) into ministries or local governments.
For both Independent and Mixed Model electoral management, a culture of independence and the commitment of EMB members to independent decision- making are more important than formal ‘structural’ independence. Strong leadership is important for maintaining an EMB’s independence of action. For example, a senior member of the judiciary may fill the position of chair of an independent EMB within either model. Such a link to the judiciary may make undue interference by the government or opposition parties in EMB operations less likely. However, it would not be appropriate where the judiciary is not regarded as impartial or free of corruption, or does not have enough members for it to be able to avoid conflicts of interest in election-related court cases. Countries that use judges or former judges as EMB chairs include Australia, Brazil, Costa Rica and Zambia.
Alternatively, the appointment of a respected public figure who is known for political non-alignment may advance the independence of the EMB. For example, Burkina Faso tackled this issue by appointing a civil society leader as the EMB chair. In governmental EMBs, the appointment as executive head of a public servant known for his or her integrity and unwillingness to be politically directed, as in Northern Ireland, can have a similar effect.
Impartiality
To establish the integrity and credibility of electoral processes, and promote the widespread acceptance of election results, an EMB must not only conduct electoral events in a fearlessly independent manner; it must also be impartial in its actions. Without impartial electoral management and independent action, the integrity of the election is likely to fail, making it difficult to instill widespread belief in the credibility of electoral processes, especially among the losers.
Every EMB is expected to manage elections impartially. Irrespective of the model, its source of accountability, management control or funding, the EMB should treat all election participants equally, fairly and even-handedly, without giving advantage to any political tendency or interest group.
In theory, an independent EMB made up of non-aligned ‘expert’ appointees might be best able to achieve impartiality. Other independent EMBs, for example where nominees of the contesting political parties are appointed to the EMB, may have a more difficult time establishing their credentials with the public as completely impartial bodies. Except in countries that have a tradition of a non-aligned civil service, the decisions and activities of EMBs under the Governmental or Mixed Models may be publicly regarded as likely to favour the incumbent government.
Yet governmental EMBs in some countries that use the Mixed Model (such as Spain) and some countries that use the Governmental Model (such as Finland and Sweden) are generally regarded as impartial. Conversely, some EMBs that follow the Independent Model may be independent in name only. Impartiality may be imposed by the legal framework or EMB structure, but it has to be put into practice through the EMB’s behaviour and attitudes toward its stakeholders. Impartiality is a state of mind more than a statement in law, although it can be encouraged by a constitutional and legal framework that enables the effective external review of EMB decisions and by an EMB code of conduct with strong sanctions that are independently administered.
It is important that the general public perceives EMBs as impartial. This can best be achieved by ensuring that all EMB actions are transparent and just, and are effectively publicized and communicated.
Integrity
The EMB is the primary guarantor of the integrity and purity of the electoral process, and EMB members are directly responsibility for ensuring this. Integrity may be easier to maintain if the EMB has both full independence of action and full control of all essential electoral processes, including full control over budgets and staffing. Where other bodies have electoral functions, EMBs need to be empowered to monitor their activities closely to ensure that they meet the highest integrity standards.
Electoral law and EMB regulations benefit from incorporating clear powers for the EMB to deal with electoral officials who threaten electoral integrity by acting to benefit political interests or who are corrupt. Ignoring such problems can create larger public issues of integrity and credibility than the public use of disciplinary powers. To the extent that it is possible, it is in the EMB’s interest to ensure that breaches of the electoral laws, rules and codes of conduct are followed by appropriate sanctions.
Transparency
Transparency in operational and financial management lays out for public scrutiny the decisions and reasoning of the EMB. Transparency is a basic good practice for all EMB activities. It can help an EMB combat perceptions of and identify actual financial or electoral fraud, or a lack of competence or favouritism toward particular political tendencies, which can enhance its credibility. Electoral transparency may be backed by electoral law, for example by a requirement that the EMB inform the public of its activities, as in Indonesia. Or it may be required by the EMB’s code of conduct, for example the frequent media briefings and releases and stakeholder consultations undertaken by the Liberian EMB for the 2011 elections. Even without such formal backing, an EMB may adopt a transparency policy.
The absence of transparency in electoral processes invariably leads to the suspicion that fraudulent activities are taking place. For example, where observers and the public are unable to access progressive vote count and aggregation data, and where there are significant delays in announcing and validating election results (as in Belarus and Ukraine in 2004 and Ethiopia in 2005) the credibility of the election suffers.
Efficiency
Governments and the public expect that funds for elections will be used wisely and services delivered efficiently. In the face of expanding and ever more expensive technological solutions, and demands for increased effort in high-cost areas such as voter education and information, EMBs have to be careful that their programmes sustainably serve electoral efficiency, as well as integrity and modernity.
A successful EMB is one that has displayed integrity, competence and efficiency. These qualities help generate public and political party confidence in electoral processes. The legal framework can assist by defining efficient standards for electoral and financial management. However, sometimes members of an EMB may be unfamiliar with electoral practices and procedures; at other times they may not be used to dealing with contracting for equipment and materials in a cut- throat corporate environment. The resulting inefficiency in election organization may easily be perceived as corrupt and fraudulent behaviour, which may lead to more serious challenges to the EMB’s credibility. Where trust is lacking in the political process generally, an EMB is unlikely to be given the benefit of the doubt.
Professionalism
Professionalism in electoral managements requires accurate, service-oriented implementation of electoral procedures by suitably skilled staff. EMBs need to ensure that all election officials, whether core staff or temporary workers, are well trained and have the necessary skills to apply high professional standards in their technical work. Professional training prompts public trust that the entire process is ‘in good hands’. However, while a continuous training and skill development programme is an essential part of creating and maintaining a professional EMB, professionalism depends just as much on the attitude of every member and secretariat staff person. A personal commitment from each individual in an EMB to equity, accuracy, diligence and service in all they do, and to self-improvement, is necessary to maintain professionalism in electoral management.
Visible professionalism in an EMB also gives political parties, civil society, voters, donors, the media and other stakeholders the confidence that electoral managers are capable of undertaking their tasks effectively. A lack of visible professionalism in electoral management, on the other hand, will create public suspicions of inaccurate and perhaps fraudulent activity, and a lack of trust. It will make it easier for complaints from election losers to find public support, whether the complaint is valid or not.
Service-mindedness
EMBs not only have a responsibility to provide a service to their stakeholders— it is the major reason for their existence. Developing and publicizing service delivery standards for all their activities provides both internal motivators for EMB members and staff to provide high-quality service, and external yardsticks with which stakeholders can assess the EMB’s performance. Some basic service standards are often included in the electoral legal framework, as in Canada: these include time-based standards such as deadlines for announcing election results, compiling the electoral registers, distributing voters’ identification (ID) cards or distributing information on voting location.
Further useful service delivery standards can be adopted by the EMB itself as part of its procedures for each electoral process. These may be time-based service standards such as the average, maximum and minimum times voters spend queuing to receive ballot papers, the time within which an enquiry from a member of the public will be answered, or the average time taken to process voter registration data for an elector. They may also be quality-based standards such as the percentage of electors being refused a vote due to errors on the electoral register, the proportion of materials missing or not delivered on time to polling stations, the proportion of polling stations that did not open on time on election day, or the accuracy and timely availability of preliminary voting results.
As well as such hard facts, stakeholder perceptions of EMB service performance are critical in influencing public judgments of the EMB’s integrity and effectiveness. Regular public or stakeholder surveys (for example, after elections) can provide useful information to help an EMB assess and improve its service delivery. These may be conducted by the EMB itself or be external, for example as part of the EMB’s accountability responsibilities—such as a performance review by the legislature.
