The increasing use of computer-based systems for electoral operations and management creates some additional challenges for EMBs’ accountability. Apart from the issue of sustainability (dealt with in chapter 10), public confidence in their accuracy and reliability needs to be assured.
Lack of any tangible evidence of transactions in many computer systems, the lack of transparency and the incomprehensibility of computer programming to the bulk of the population, and the risks of interference with data, are widely publicized through media reports of computer worms, viruses and hackers. These can affect the credibility of EMBs relying on computer systems for vital tasks such as voter registration, voting and vote-counting, unless they are openly accountable for their use.
There is still intense debate about the reliability and security of computer-based systems for voting and counting of votes. In the aftermath of the 2000 US presidential election, the question of standards for such systems received renewed and extensive attention. One response to concerns about the integrity of such systems has been the use of a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) process, under which the voter is provided with a printout of the vote just cast, which can be checked on the spot, and then placed in a ballot box, to be used if necessary to audit the validity of figures produced by the automated system. In India, the EMB, in the light of court rulings, has taken steps towards the introduction of VVPAT after more than 20 years of experience in the use of electronic voting machines which did not provide such a facility. More generally, the Venice Commission has undertaken a detailed analysis of the compatibility of remote voting and electronic voting with the broader electoral standards of the Council of Europe.
Beyond technical performance issues, in the USA some of this debate entails the propriety of politically-aligned supplier behaviour. Media reports of alleged integrity problems with mechanical and electronic voting machines in the USA, including with direct recording electronic (DRE) ‘touch screen’ vote-recording machines (as in the state of Maryland in 2004) has increased pressure on EMBs to be open and accountable in their use of technology. These concerns led the 2005 report of the Baker – Carter Commission on Federal Electoral Reform to deal at length with concerns about electronic voting, and the literature on the subject is growing rapidly.