Some electoral legal frameworks specify that EMBs have a mixed membership of party representatives and politically non-aligned members, such as judges, academics, civil society representatives and career public servants. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, EMB members are appointed by political parties, law and judicial societies, and government ministries. This may combine advantages from both models, producing even-handed bodies that have both political party buy-in and transparency in their operations.
This combined model can be implemented in various ways. In Mexico, the members nominated by political parties can take part in debates but cannot vote on decisions. In Mozambique, the five members designated by the parties in the legislature then select the eight expert members from nominees provided by CSOs. In Croatia, a standing national EMB comprising Supreme Court judges and other distinguished lawyers is expanded for the electoral period by representatives of the majority and opposition blocs of political parties in the national legislature. Each electoral district has similarly constituted EMBs.
Like multiparty EMBs, combined EMBs can find decision-making difficult. For example in the 1999 Indonesian elections, the combined EMB was unable to validate the election results because members representing some very minor political parties refused to sign the validation unless their parties were allocated seats to which they were not entitled by their votes. Table 7 on page 113 shows some key advantages and disadvantages of multiparty, expert and combined EMBs.
