Some countries emerging from conflict have relied on donor assistance, through the UN or other agencies, to fund the whole or a significant part of their electoral budget. Examples include Cambodia (1993), Mozambique (1994), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), Timor-Leste (2000), Sierra Leone (2002), Afghanistan (2004), Iraq (2005) and Palestine (2005–06). In post-conflict elections, donor assistance can be essential, especially if a breakdown of state institutions has destroyed their ability to collect revenue.
Donor assistance from the UN, the European Commission, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other sources has made a significant contribution to funding electoral processes in many other countries. There is a growing pattern of regional donor assistance. For example, South Africa and other SADC countries offer electoral support to EMBs of other SADC member countries, and the OAS has provided regional assistance in countries such as Haiti.
In emerging democracies such as Libya, assistance may be necessary to implement electoral processes that meet international obligations. Assistance may also be necessary to allow fledgling opposition parties to contest elections in a comparatively competitive manner. In countries wishing to upgrade their electoral services, such as Papua New Guinea, general institutional capacities and awareness may not be sufficiently developed to deal with the ‘intangibles’ in electoral costs—such as training and education. Even in relatively consolidated democracies, flagship projects in fields such as data processing and communications may require donor assistance. Some emerging democracies rely heavily on foreign donor assistance to fund their core election budget. The resulting sustainability issues are examined in Chapter 11.
The availability of donor funding will be affected by donor funding cycles, which may be difficult to coordinate with the timing of EMB needs. Donor assistance is usually channelled either directly to the EMB or through a government ministry. Channelling it directly to the EMB facilitates easier disbursement and provides a direct line of accountability. In Cambodia, the EMB has a dedicated account in the National Treasury established for electoral management funding from all sources. Different accounting requirements from multiple donors may complicate the EMB’s financial reporting mechanisms. Yet, exposure to these different requirements can encourage EMBs to review and improve their own financial accountability systems.
Control of donor funds can be a contentious issue. Channelling donor funds through government ministries may lead to delays or diversions in the disbursement of funds due to government bureaucracy or corruption, but host countries may insist on this to ensure that their funding priorities, rather than those of the donor, are followed. Steering committee mechanisms —involving representatives of all donors, the EMB and possibly the government — can be an effective solution, and can prevent duplication of funding. Formal or informal use of an agency such as the UNDP to coordinate all donor funding for an EMB can also be effective. In Indonesia in 2004, a significant proportion of multiple donors’ electoral assistance funds was disbursed through a UNDP trust fund under priorities established by the EMB.
EMBs need to be careful that donor assistance meets their priorities and is not driven by the interests of consultants provided by the donors or by equipment providers from the donor country. Technical assistance provided by donors needs to include training and skills transfer to EMB counterpart staff so that the EMB can assume full ownership of future electoral processes. Donors may prefer to directly contract suppliers of products or services for an EMB, but this can raise public questions about foreign interference. Donors may also require that systems, equipment and other tangible items they provide be purchased from their home country suppliers. Yet experience shows that externally driven equipment solutions, such as the choice of equipment for voter registration in Timor-Leste in 2000, may be inappropriate for the local environment.
