By Dimpho Motsamai
1. Background
Namibia has
a pluralistic political system characterized by regular, free, and fair
elections. Most observers have generally lauded the country’s stability and
democracy, which are strongly anchored in its constitution.[1]
Although Namibia has a multiparty democratic dispensation, the Southwest Africa
People’s Organisation (SWAPO), a former liberation movement, has dominated the
political landscape since independence. SWAPO’s liberation credentials have
played a significant role in securing party loyalty across the board. The party
has enjoyed comfortable majorities in Parliament since the country’s
independence in 1990. In fact, it has secured two-thirds majority wins in all
national elections. SWAPO has also retained control of most authorities in
regional and local elections. The opposition is small in Namibia and their
numbers in parliament have been decreasing in past elections.[2]
However,
each election is unique and so is the nature of the political competition. They
tend to depend on the domestic context within which the election takes place. An
important context of the 2014 poll was that the country had just made changes
to both the constitution and the electoral legislation.[3]
The changes not only created uncertainty over their impact on the electoral
outcome. Questions were also raised on how they could impact voting patterns and
demography. The demography in question was the youth, which in Namibia constitutes
a third of Namibia’s total population. Youth turnout
in past elections has been far lower than any other group.[4]
Months
before the 2014 elections, various political stakeholders including youth
organisations, political parties, and the Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN), raised concerns over low turnout from
young voters.[5]
The ECN specifically highlighted that apathy among the youth had to be addressed to avoid the
credibility of the election outcome being undermined.[6] Voter apathy has been a strong
feature of Namibian elections since independence. The trend has been worsening
if one contrasts the 97 per cent turnout in the 1989 founding elections with 67
per cent in 2009.[7]
The 2014 elections
reversed this. Both registration and turnout especially of the youth, increased
substantially. The group recorded the largest percentage of registered voters at
44 per cent. According to the ECN, it was the largest registration turnout of young people
since independence.[8]
The ECN also indicated that a sub category of this group, referred to as ‘born-frees’, basically those born after Namibia’s independence,
constituted 19.73 per cent of the overall registered voters.
‘Born-frees’
are usually disaggregated in voting figures to analyse generational trends in
voting behaviour and the extent to which younger voters break with historical
ideals and brands of post-independence parties.
The ECN disaggregated ‘born-frees’ from the data because the 2014
poll was Namibia’s second election open to them. According to the Namibia Youth Council (NYC), an
umbrella body of all youth organisations in the country established in 1994, Namibia’s
‘born-frees’ generally feel alienate from political parties and they vote less
in comparison with other youth.[9] So their participation signalled a change in
political engagement. [10]
Namibia,
like the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, has a large youth population. The number of Namibian youth aged 18-35, eligible to vote, is around 600,000
out of a total population of 2.2 million.[11] The ECN recorded 508,459 young voters in
2014, which is 44 per cent of the overall number of registered voters. When
calculated against the total youth population of around 600,000, it translate
to 85 per cent of Namibian youth who registered to vote in 2014. The youth
therefore represent the
largest age grouping eligible to register and vote in Namibia. They are an important political constituency.
2. Youth participation in politics and elections
Namibia
does not fare well in terms of the participation of young people in politics
compared to other countries in the sub-Saharan region. While the desire for
change and improvement is strong, youth political participation is uneven
across the electoral cycle.[12] Namibian youth are generally
disillusioned with electoral politics. Many factors drive youth apathy in
Namibia. These include: perceptions that political activism and engagement does
not yield results; the distrust of political parties; and the lack of access to
political leadership.[13]
In 2012,
the ECN conducted a baseline survey to measure the level of public
understanding of electoral and democratic processes and the effectiveness of
its programmes.[14]
This was to improve its civic and voter education initiatives with a view of
increasing voter turnout for the 2014 elections. The survey measured
the success of the ECN’s voter education aims and objectives, focusing on the
levels of: understanding of democracy and democratic processes; public and
voter confidence in the electoral system; perceived violations of the electoral
laws; turnout in national, regional and local elections; communication
approaches to voter education; stakeholders’ satisfaction with electoral
service delivery; gender mainstreaming and people with disabilities in
electoral processes; youth involvement; and the effectiveness and the
efficiency of the legal framework. The
study used a quantitative opinion survey and targeted all Namibian citizens
aged 18 years and older in Namibia’s 14 regions.
The survey found that the main challenges for
youth participation include: limited opportunities to participate in
decision-making processes; distrust between youth and institutions; and the
lack of capacity development especially of young women.[15]
On youth political participation, it concluded that: more than half of the respondents (54.6 per cent) thought
that its communication tools were not attractive to the youth; and 74.8 per
cent of respondents felt that its youth activities had to be linked to national
initiatives. In many ways, the baseline survey highlighted
challenges it has in being more visible and attractive to young voters.
3. EMB entry points
Following
the baseline survey in 2012, the ECN initiated voter engagement activities for
young voters, from late 2013. These initially focused on increasing youth voter
registration. But as they were implemented, it became clear that the ECN needed
a broader and more distinct framework on youth political participation.[16]
Developing it took time, partly because the ECN had to wait for the electoral
reform process to be concluded. The
process resulted in a new electoral act, which the ECN thought would alter its
mandate and focus. It did not. Its objectives, which were to: organize,
direct, supervise, manage and control the conduct of elections and referenda, remained the
same. [17]
The new electoral act also maintained its other functions, relating to
cooperation with electoral stakeholders, research and development, and promoting
electoral expertise and technology in all spheres of government.
But, the
new legislation does not have a provision on youth political participation. It
only makes a small reference to ‘the youth’ in section 49, which covers voter
and civic education. It states that,
“..the ECN must, when promoting voter
and civic education: ensure that they particularly address the young population; and should cooperate with the ministry
responsible for education regarding the development of a
syllabus for material relating to voter and civic education and
involve the ministry responsible for information in voter and civic education”.[18]
There is no other reference to the youth beyond this. Shortly after the
elections, the ECN started drafting a comprehensive Youth policy. It was yet to
be concluded at the time of this research was conducted.
The ECN’s Youth activities
In past elections, the ECN’s youth engagement activities
were conducted under its voter education program. As highlighted, the ECN used findings
from its 2012 baseline study to shape its approach to youth engagement, opting
for long-term activities instead of ad hoc
ones. This approach to electoral programming, where organisations look beyond the
immediate electoral event, is referred to as the “Electoral Cycle Approach”.[19] It
divides the electoral process into three main periods: the
pre-electoral period, the electoral period and the post-electoral period. The approach treats elections as continuous processes rather than isolated events
and interventions are tailored in advance before elections are held. Between 2012 and 2014, the ECN initiated the following programs:
- Targeted voter registration
campaigns: the ECN’s General Registration Drive (GRD) was ongoing during the
pre-election phase. Specific GRD activities were implemented in areas where
young people reside and frequent.
- The Youth ambassadors initiative:
the ECN recruited 112 young people as its youth ambassadors for two to
three months to support voter education, and advocacy targeted at young voters.
[20]
- Road shows: the ECN recruited music artists
to perform at its road shows as a way to draw crowds and encourage local populations
to vote. It used music as a tool to attract young people to its events.
- Trade Fairs: the ECN organised trade
fairs with the Town Councils as a way of increasing its reach. Trade
exhibitions usually have a high turnout in Namibia and the ECN was able to
conduct youth targeted civic and voter education activities at these events.
- ICTs and social media messaging: The
ECN’s Public Relations Office used Facebook and Twitter, to raise awareness of registration
and voting processes.
- Customised media messaging: this included
radio, TV, billboard advertising, as well as cell phone messaging, targeted at young
voters. The ECN’s voter education officers also participated in youth focused
radio and TV programs.
|
Box 1. The National Youth Council’s Stop
Waiting campaign
The NYC’s Stop
Waiting Campaign targeted Namibian youth between the ages of 18–35. The
initiative complemented the ECN’s GRV mandated to get eligible Namibian
population to register for the 2014 elections. The NYC’s main consideration
for the campaign was that it must be fresh, innovative
and cut across all demographic and socio-economic youth segments in the country. Its key objectives were to:
(1)
Encourage Namibian youth to go out
and register between the 15th January – 02 March 2014;
(2)
Promote conversations and debates
around the registration and voting process among Namibian youth;
(3)
Promote a sense of national pride
and a culture of responsibility among Namibian youth; and
(4)
Get Namibian youth to vote during
the November elections.
The NYC established
a National Youth Election Drive (NYED) Steering Committee with ECN officials to
provide technical and substantive input as the campaign was implemented. The
Steering Committee also monitored and evaluated the project.
Source: National Youth Council of Namibia,
2014
|
4. Key partners
The ECN
works with a host of stakeholders involved in youth engagement, electoral and
political processes to increase the reach, scope and effectiveness of its youth
outreach programs. These include:
- The
Ministry of Education: The Ministry plays a role in supporting the ECN’s civic
and voter education initiatives. Among
others, it assists in developing outreach programmes in schools and
universities to encourage young people’s involvement in election processes.
- The
National Youth Council: its flagship project as illustrated
in Box 1 was important in supporting the implementation of the ECN’s voter registration
drive targeting young people.
- Regional
councillors and traditional leaders: Namibia is divided into 14 regions and regional
councils and councillors mainly drive planning and development.[21] Regional councillors are important
interlocutors at the local level and the ECN partnered with them to get buy-in
for its regional activities.
- Media
institutions: the ECN gets into short-term partnerships with electronic and
print media houses, from time to time, to raise awareness of its youth programs.
- Donors:
these include international foundations and embassies that sponsor some of the ECN’s
civic and voter education activities.
4. Challenges and lessons learned
The ECN’s
main challenge has been that it lacked a comprehensive strategy on youth
engagement. Its youth related activities were conducted under its civic and
voter education program. This often led to intervention
being ad hoc, limited and unsustainable.
Other constraints include:
- The lack of sustainable funding
for youth initiatives: Funds from the ECN can often be diverted to other areas,
which often scales down these projects.
- Weak internal research
capacities on youth participation: The ECN is yet to conduct research that would provide technical and substantive insight on its
youth engagement strategies.
- Little focus on internal capacity
development for the youth: at the time of writing, the ECN had few young staff
and also lacked training opportunities for them to drive its policies from
within.
- Weak support to the ECN from
political parties: usually, political parties neglect their responsibility to
increase the engagement and participation of young people in their processes. Consequently,
they fail to support the work of the ECN in this regard.
- Cultural sensitivities: These have to do with gender and
generational roles in certain contexts where young people and women are
discouraged from political participation.
- Limitations
of ICT based programs: the ECN reported that most of these were time consuming and expensive.
Aside from the costs, not all youth have access to these mediums.
5. Recommendations
The main
recommendations from this study that can also be used by other electoral
management bodies (EMBs), include the need to:
- Develop
a coherent youth strategy: Although important, civic and voter education
targeting young people, should not substitute the development of a distinct youth
engagement strategy. A coherent strategy will support better planning and
implementation.
- Plan
for the sustainability of initiatives: The electoral cycle approach remains a
best practice for interventions that have long-term impact. But this should be adequately catered for by
the EMB. Consequently, financial support should be linked to a longer-term and
integrated youth strategy.
- Invest
in internal research and development: rigorous commitment to youth engagement
by an EMB requires continuous understanding of the dynamics affecting youth in
a given context. It is therefore critical for EMBs to generate their own
research as a basis for their interventions.
Conclusion
The opportunities
for youth to engage in political processes in Namibia largely depend on the
country’s political, socioeconomic and cultural contexts. While Namibia
is an upper middle-income country, inequality, poverty and unemployment are
still disturbingly high. These negatively affect young people. The issue of
youth political engagement therefore needs to be viewed in conjunction with
problems of social, political and economic exclusion. The study recommends a range of actions for the ECN to encourage greater
youth political participation throughout the electoral cycle. This includes the
need to:
- Follow
up on the findings of the 2012 baseline survey on youth political participation.
Among others, the report recommended that the ECN conduct more research on
youth political participation and try address some of the causes of apathy.[22]
- Conduct
studies on how national policies respond to youth concerns and how the ECN can
improve its work with government agencies in its activities.
- Encourage the ECN to make recommendations
regarding legal reforms that can improve youth representation in the political
system.
- Improve
collaboration with youth organisations and promote regular interaction with
them. This would also help the ECN to develop tangible programmes for youth
participation beyond elections.
- Engage political party and their youth wings on how to involve the youth in their activities. The ECN could
introduce clauses on youth participation in the guidelines it has for political
party liaison. It would have to monitor implementation regularly.
Annex 1: List of references
African
Development Bank, Republic of Namibia Country Strategy Paper 2014-2018,
prepared by Southern Africa Resources Centre
Electoral
Commission of Namibia, 2012. Namibia National Electoral and Democratic Process,
Baseline Survey, Windhoek, Namibia
Electoral
Commission of Namibia, Official Announcement of final election results of the
2014 presidential and national Assembly elections, at http://www.ecn.na/en/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/ZWZZbh7wiVh7/content/official-announcement-of-final-election-results-of-the-2014-presidential-and-national-assembly-elections
Electoral Commission
of Namibia Performance Assessment and Post election Report, 27 November 2015, at
http://www.ecn.na/documents/27857/193258/ECN+Elections+Report.pdf/be9c1c04-7e37-4bf9-9cb8-c6d1a29ec988
Gerhard KH
Tötemeyer, Electoral Law and Reform Project: Revision and Reform of the
Namibian Electoral Act (Act No. 24 of 1992), Law Reform and Development Commission
(LRDC) Consultative Discussion Paper 19, Windhoek, June 2012, 28
National
Youth Council Namibia, a report on the NYC Youth Registration Drive, February-
March 2014
Partnership
for Local Democracy, Development and Social Innovation, Unemployment and the
Youth in Namibia, A booklet for Stakeholders
Republic of
Namibia, Electoral Act, 2014, No. 5 of 2014.Government Gazette, No 5583, 8
October 2014
The ACE
Electoral Knowledge Project at http://aceproject.org/
UNICEF, the
Fourth Session of the Children’s Parliament of Namibia Special Edition 6 - 10 May
2013
[1] See EISA Election observer Mission report, Namibia
Presidential and National Assembly Elections 15-16 November 2004, EISA Election
Mission Report No. 18; EISA, Technical Observer Team Report, Namibia
Presidential and National Assembly Elections 27 and 28 November 2009; African
Union, Preliminary Statement of the Africa Union Observer mission
[2]This is best illustrated by a comparison of
the country’s 2009 election results to those in 2014. In 2009, the 72-member
National Assembly was dominated by SWAPO with 54 elected seats. Eight was the
highest number of opposition seats held by, the then official opposition, the Rally for Democracy
and Progress(RDP).The remaining seats were divided among seven other opposition
parties, with the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance(DTA), the National Unity
Democratic Organisation (NUDO) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) obtaining
two seats each. Four parties obtained one seat each, namely the Congress of
Democrats (CoD), the Republican Party (RP), the All People’sParty (APP) and the
South West Africa National Union (SWANU). In 2014, SWAPO won 77 out of a total of 96 seats in parliament and got 86
per cent of the overall vote.
[3] See Gerhard KH Tötemeyer, Electoral law and reform
project: revision and reform of the Namibian Electoral Act (Act No. 24 of
1992), Law Reform and Development Commission (LRDC) Consultative Discussion
Paper 19, Windhoek, June 2012, 28.
[6] The official range for
youth eligible to vote is between the ages of 18–35
[8] Author interviews with ECN staff, Windhoek, Namibia,
8-9 July 2015
[9] Author interview interviews with officials from the
NYC, 9 July 2015
[10] See National Youth Council Namibia, A report on the
NYC Youth Registration Drive, February- March 2014, p3
[11] These statistics are contained in the ECN,
2012. Namibia National Electoral and Democratic Process, Baseline Survey,
Windhoek, Namibia
[12] Author interviews with officials from the ECN and the
National Youth Council of Namibia, July 2014
[13] Author interviews with ECN officials, Windhoek,
Namibia, 7 July 2015
[14] ECN, 2012. Namibia National Electoral and
Democratic Process, Baseline Survey, Windhoek, Namibia
[15] ECN, Namibia National Electoral and
Democratic Process Baseline Survey 2012, p.68
[16] Author interviews with ECN staff, Windhoek, Namibia,
8-9 July 2015
[17] See Republic of Namibia, Electoral Act, 2014, No. 5 of 2014.Government Gazette, No 5583, 8 October 2014
[18] As above, Section 49.
[22] ECN Baseline Survey 2012 p, 82
