Some countries emerging from conflict have relied on donor assistance, through the UN or other agencies, to fund the whole or a significant part of their electoral budget. Examples include Cambodia (1993), Mozambique (1994), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), East Timor (2000), Sierra Leone (2002), Afghanistan (2004), and Iraq and Liberia (2005). In post-conflict elections, donor assistance can be essential, especially if breakdown of the institutions of the state has destroyed their ability to collect revenue.Donor assistance from, for example, the UN, the European Commission, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has made a significant contribution to funding electoral processes in many other countries. There is a growing pattern of regional donor assistance: for example, South Africa and other Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries offer electoral support to EMBs of other SADC member countries; the Organisation of American States (OAS) has provided regional assistance in countries such as Haiti.

In emerging democracies such as Albania, Indonesia, Lesotho, and Palestine, assistance may be necessary to implement electoral processes that meet international standards. Assistance may also be necessary to enable fledgling opposition parties to contest elections in a comparatively competitive manner. In countries wishing to upgrade electoral services, such as Papua New Guinea, general institutional capacities and awareness may not yet have developed sufficiently to deal with the ‘intangibles’ in electoral costs – such as training and education. Even in relatively consolidated democracies, ‘flagship’ projects in fields such as data processing and communications may require donor assistance. Some emerging democracies are relying heavily on foreign donor assistance to fund their core election budget.

Donors’ funding availability will be affected by their own funding cycles, which may be difficult to coordinate with the timing of EMB needs. Donor assistance is usually channelled either directly to the EMB or through a government ministry. Direct channelling to the EMB has the advantage that it facilitates easier disbursement and has a direct line of accountability. In Cambodia and Yemen, the EMB has a special account in the National Treasury established for electoral management funding from all sources. Different accounting requirements from multiple donors may complicate the EMBs financial reporting mechanisms. On the other hand, exposure to different donors’ accounting requirements can encourage EMBs to review and improve their own financial accountability systems.

Control of donor funds can be a contentious issue. Channelling donor funds through government ministries may lead to delays or diversions in the disbursement of funds due to government bureaucracy or corruption, but host countries may insist on this to ensure that their, rather then the donors’, funding priorities are followed. Steering committee mechanisms, involving representatives of all donors, the EMB, and possibly the government, can be an effective solution, and prevent duplication of funding. Formal or informal use of an agency such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to coordinate all donor funding for the EMB can also be effective. In Indonesia in 2004, a significant proportion of multiple donors’ electoral assistance funds were disbursed through a UNDP Trust Fund under priorities established by the EMB.

EMBs need to be careful that donor assistance meets the EMB’s priorities, and is not driven by the interests of donor-provided consultants or equipment providers from the donor country. Technical assistance provided by donors needs to include components for training and skills transfer to EMB counterpart staff, so that the EMB can assume full ownership of future electoral processes. Donors may prefer to directly contract suppliers of products or services for the EMB, which can raise public questions about foreign interference. Donors may require that systems, equipment, and other tangible items they provide be purchased from their home country suppliers. Experience shows externally driven equipment solutions, such as for voter registration in East Timor in 2000, may be inappropriate for the environment.