Many countries, especially those that have experienced difficult transitions from authoritarian rule to multiparty democracy, have chosen multiparty-based EMBs. In such societies, public servants are likely to have been largely discredited as electoral policymakers because of a history of being agents of the authoritarian former ruling party or military regime. The fight against authoritarianism may also have polarized society to the extent that it is difficult to find public figures who are widely accepted as impartial to serve on an EMB for a transitional election. Many Central and Eastern European countries adopted multiparty-based EMBs during their transitions.
Multiparty EMBs comprise a mixture of political party nominees. The legal framework may entitle all recognized or registered political parties contesting an election to be represented equally on the EMB (as in Guam), or a threshold may restrict representation — for example, to parties represented in the legislature or with more than a specified proportion of members in the legislature. Of the 20 members nominated by political parties in Guinea, half are nominated by the political party of the president and the others by the opposition parties. In Albania, the party-affiliated members represent the distribution of seats in the legislature. In Venezuela in the mid-1990s, the larger parties each had their own representative, while smaller parties of the left and right were represented collectively.
Political party-based appointment often implies that EMB members are serving on the EMB as political party representatives or agents and, as well as impartially managing electoral processes, serve to protect their nominating parties’ interests. However, while each individual member is seen from the outside as partisan, each also ensures that the others do not take partisan advantage — so the EMB can nonetheless be credibly perceived as an impartial body. Political party-based members often hold office for a fixed term and cannot be dismissed except for cause, such as a breach of their duties, or upon their withdrawal by their nominating authority. Frequent replacement by parties of their representatives, however, has the potential to disrupt the work of the EMB.
In Guinea and Mozambique, political party nominees to an EMB are eminent persons who are required to maintain high standards of impartiality and professionalism, and thus they do not serve as political party representatives.
Many electoral analysts believe that having political party representatives on an EMB engenders consensus among actors in the electoral contest and enhances transparency, both of which improve confidence in the electoral process. Voters may feel more encouraged to participate in elections if the leaders of political parties play an active role in the electoral process, specifically through representation on the EMB.
Multiparty EMBs may help promote trust and confidence in electoral processes in the initial stages of democratic transitions. Depoliticization of EMBs may be more appropriate as confidence in the electoral process grows.
Yet a political party-based EMB can imperil or cripple decision-making, especially where political parties’ critical interests are at stake. The presence of politicians on the EMB may undermine confidentiality in matters such as the security of ballot materials. Multiparty-based EMBs also tend to generate dissatisfaction, especially among minority parties that might be excluded from the EMB either because they are not represented in the legislature or because they did not participate in the negotiation that led to the initial appointments of EMB members.
