Structuring of Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs)
There is consensus among election analysts that the structure and functioning of election administration has a significant impact on the credibility of the Electoral Management Body (EMB) and its effectiveness in terms of service delivery. However, there is no single structure that fits all and works in every environment. EMB structures are, by and large, products of politico-legal and cultural traditions and the experience of the democratic evolution in different countries. Factors that determine EMB structures include constitutional and related legal frameworks, reform measures undertaken during transition periods, and the resource endowment of the country concerned.
The form of the EMB may result from a holistic design process. Equally, it may be a more or less appropriate graft onto an existing system of state administration. In post-colonial environments, it may be strongly influenced by colonial administrative patterns. While there are many variations of detail, there are three broad types or models of EMB.
Sub-sections of this chapter:
What is an electoral management body (EMB)?
The complexity and specialist skills necessary for electoral management requires that an institution or institutions be formed to be responsible for electoral activities. Such bodies have a variety of shapes and sizes, with a wide range of titles to match, which include ‘Election Commission’, ‘Department of Elections’, ‘Electoral Council’, ‘Election Unit’, or ‘Electoral Board’. The term ‘electoral management body’ or EMB has been coined as a name to refer to the body or bodies responsible for electoral management whatever wider institutional framework is in place.
An EMB is an organisation or body which has been founded for the purpose of, and is legally responsible for, managing one or more of the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections, and of direct democracy instruments – such as referendums, citizens’ initiatives, and recall votes – if those are part of the legal framework.
These essential elements include:
- determining who is eligible to vote;
- receiving and validating the nominations of electoral
- participants (for elections, political parties and/or candidates);
- conducting balloting;
- counting votes; and
- totalling votes from polling locations.
If these essential elements are allocated to various bodies, then all bodies which have a share of these essential elements can be considered as EMBs. An EMB may be a stand-alone institution, or a distinct management unit within a larger institution which may also have non-electoral tasks.
In addition to these essential elements, an EMB may undertake other tasks which assist the conduct of elections and direct democracy instruments, such as:
- conduct of voter registration;
- boundary delimitation;
- procurement of electoral materials;
- voter education;
- management or oversight of campaign financing;
- media monitoring; and
- electoral dispute resolution.
However, a body which has no electoral responsibilities other than, for example, boundary delimitation (such as a boundary delimitation commission), electoral dispute resolution (such as an electoral court), election media monitoring (such as a media monitoring commission) or the conduct of voter education (such as a civic education commission) is not an EMB as such because it is not managing any of the ‘essential elements’ of elections as identified above. Similarly, a state population or statistics bureau which produces electoral registers as part of the general process of population registration is not considered to be an EMB.
Some bodies not engaged in any of the ‘essential elements’ of elections may be popularly regarded as EMBs due to the breadth of election-related activities which they undertake. An example is the New Zealand Electoral Commission, which is responsible for party registration, the allocation of broadcasting time and official funds to parties, oversight of party funding and expenditure, and voter education. However, such institutions do not qualify as EMBs under the definition of an EMB above.
In addition to the division of functional responsibility for different elements of the electoral process, electoral responsibilities may be divided between bodies at different levels. For example, some elements of the conduct of elections may be managed by a national-level Electoral Commission, a ministry (such as the Interior Ministry), or a national government agency, while others are implemented by local-level commissions, regional branches of government departments, or local authorities. The term ‘EMB’ may also apply to a national Electoral Commission which co-manages elections with local authorities, and can include in its functions things such as the coordination of ballot paper printing, and the distribution of seats and announcement of results at the national level.
Independent Model EMBs
The Independent Model of electoral management
exists in those countries where elections are organized and managed by an EMB
which is institutionally independent and autonomous from the executive branch
of government, and which has and manages its own budget. Under the Independent
Model, an EMB is not accountable to a government ministry or department. It may
be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary, or the head of state. EMBs
under the Independent Model may enjoy varying degrees of financial autonomy and
accountability, as well as varying levels of performance accountability. They
are composed of members who are outside the executive while in EMB office. Many
new and emerging democracies have chosen the Independent Model of electoral
management.
Examples of EMBs under the Independent Model as of 2006 include:
Indonesia
Liberia
Mauritius
Nigeria
Poland
South Africa
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Uruguay
Armenia
Australia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Burkina Faso
Canada
Costa Rica
Estonia
Georgia
India
In some countries, two bodies are established
for the management of elections, both of which are independent of the executive
and can be considered as independent EMBs. One of these bodies is likely to
have responsibility for policy decisions relating to the electoral process, and
the other to be responsible for conducting and implementing the electoral
process. Provisions may exist which insulate the implementation EMB from
interference by the policy EMB in staffing and operational matters. Examples of
this ‘double-independent’ framework under the Independent Model include:
Jamaica
Romania
Suriname
Vanuatu
What an Independent Model EMB Is, May Be, and Is Not
Governmental Model EMBs
The Governmental Model of electoral management
exists in those countries where elections are organized and managed by the
executive branch through a ministry (such as the Ministry of the Interior)
and/or through local authorities. Where EMBs under the Governmental Model exist
at national level, they are led by a minister or civil servant and are
answerable to a Cabinet minister. With very few exceptions they have no
‘members’. Their budget falls within a government ministry and/or under local
authorities.
Countries
whose EMBs fall into this model include:
Denmark
Seychelles
Singapore
Switzerland
Tunisia
UK (for elections but not referendums)
United States
In Sweden, Switzerland, the UK
and the United States,
elections are implemented by local authorities. In Sweden
and Switzerland
the central EMB assumes a policy coordinating role.
What a Governmental Model EMB Is, May Be, and Is Not
Mixed Model EMBs
Mixed Model EMBs have dual structures, with a policy, monitoring or supervisory component that is independent of the executive branch of government (as for the Independent Model) and an implementation component located within a department of state and/or local government (as for the Governmental Model). Under this model elections are organized by the governmental implementation component of the EMB, with some level of oversight provided by the independent component of the EMB.
The Mixed Model is used in France, Japan, Spain and many former French colonies, especially in West Africa, for example Mali, Senegal and Togo.
The powers, functions and strength of the independent component in relation to the governmental component vary in different examples of this model, and the classification of a particular EMB as a mixed model is sometimes not very clear. In some cases, the independent component is little more than a formalized observation operation, although this version is dying out, having been abandoned for example in Senegal. In other cases, the independent component has a role to supervise and verify the implementation of electoral events by the governmental component, as in Madagascar, and sometimes also to tabulate and transmit results, as in Congo (Brazzaville) and Togo. In some francophone countries, the Constitutional Council is engaged in the tabulation and declaration of results and can be considered as an independent component of the EMB. In Chad, this applies to referendums only, and not to elections. In Mali, both the Independent National Election Commission and the Constitutional Council undertake their own tabulation of results: the EMB may therefore be said to have three components, one which is governmental and two which are independent.
The relationship between the components of a mixed model EMB is not always clearly defined in legislation or interpreted by stakeholders, and friction can result. In the 1999 elections in Guinea-Conakry (which used the mixed model at that time), the majority representatives and the opposition representatives in the independent component had strongly differing approaches to its role to supervise and verify the elections, and its effectiveness was therefore heavily disputed.
Examples of Formats for a Mixed Model EMB
Mixed Model EMBs have a variety of structures, internal relationships, and attributes, and it is difficult to codify the essential and possible attributes of Mixed Model EMBs. The relationship between the two components in a Mixed Model EMB is significant in determining its attributes and methods of operation. Effective legal frameworks for Mixed Model EMBs clearly specify the division of powers and functions between the policy, monitoring, or supervisory component and the implementing component of the EMB, and their interactions.
The table “Examples of Formats for a Mixed Model EMB” shows some attributes of some examples of Mixed Model EMBs.
What Can Be Expected of the Different EMB Models?
It is simplistic to think of the three models of EMBs as having distinct behaviours. EMB behaviour depends not only on type but also on the electoral framework, political and social expectations, and the cultural environment within which each EMB exists.
Influences include the political commitment to allow the EMB to act freely and impartially, the range of powers and functions given to an EMB, the qualifications of members or staff for appointment and their terms of office, the way in which members and/or staff are selected and appointed, the oversight and accountability framework, and whether the EMB has a legal personality and is thus able to sue and be sued. For example, an Independent Model EMB comprising representatives of competing political parties and an Independent Model EMB comprising non-aligned academics, or others free of political association, both follow the ‘Independent Model’ but are likely to operate differently. Similarly, a Governmental Model EMB whose sponsoring department controls local electoral management offices is likely to behave differently from one that is dependent on numerous local authorities to implement electoral activities.
Factors that influence EMB behaviour
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Electoral management model (independent, governmental or mixed)
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The electoral framework
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Political and social expectations and
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The cultural environment within which each EMB exists
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Political commitment to allow an EMB to act freely and impartially
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The range of powers and functions given to an EMB
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The qualifications of members or staff for appointment and their terms of office
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The way in which members and/or staff are selected and appointed
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The oversight and accountability framework
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whether the EMB has a legal personality and is thus able to sue and be sued.
Permanent and Temporary EMBs
In determining whether a permanent or temporary EMB is appropriate, electoral workloads throughout the electoral cycle need to be considered and compared to the expense of maintaining a permanent institution versus the expenses and time required to establish a new body for each election. In situations where electoral events are regularly occurring – such as regular partial or by-elections and continuous voter registration – or there are needs for continuing electoral development work, such as on-going voter education, or advocacy of electoral law reforms, a permanent electoral institution is justifiable.
Some countries have EMBs which exist during the election period only. Such EMBs may follow the Independent, Governmental, or Mixed Models. In some cases, the Governmental Model EMB needs to be temporary, because the public servants who run elections have other full-time duties and are redeployed to the EMB during election periods only. However, some countries with a Governmental Model EMB, such as Sweden, maintain a small skeleton staff to take care of electoral issues between elections, including updating the electoral register. In some Mixed Model EMBs, the governmental component is permanent, to preserve institutional memory, while the Independent Model component is temporary during election periods.
Some countries whose EMBs follow the Independent Model have permanent central EMBs which coexist with temporary subordinate EMBs at the district or local levels; depending on their responsibilities and on the logistics required, the latter structures are appointed anywhere from two to six months before elections.
There are many phases to the electoral process: in an election, for example, these include the design and drafting of legislation, the recruitment and training of electoral staff, electoral planning, voter registration, the registration of political parties, the nomination of parties and candidates, the electoral campaign, polling, counting, the tabulation of results, the declaration of results, the resolution of electoral disputes, reporting, auditing and archiving. After the end of one electoral process, it is desirable for work on the next to begin: the whole process can be described as the electoral cycle, illustrated in figure 2.
In determining whether a permanent or temporary EMB is appropriate, workloads throughout the electoral cycle need to be considered, and the expense of maintaining a permanent institution has to be compared with the expense and time required to establish a new body for each election. Where a temporary EMB appears appropriate, it is important to consider how institutional memory relating to elections will be maintained. In situations where electoral events occur regularly—such as regular partial or by-elections and continuous voter registration—or continuing electoral development work, such as ongoing voter education and information or advocacy of electoral law reforms, is needed, a permanent electoral institution is justifiable.
Countries that maintain permanent EMBs:
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Armenia
-
Australia
-
Brazil
-
Canada
-
Indonesia
-
Mexico
-
the Philippines
-
South Africa
-
Thailand
Some countries have EMBs which exist during the election period only. Such EMBs may follow the Independent, Governmental or Mixed models. In some cases, the Governmental Model EMB has to be temporary because the public servants who run elections have other full-time duties and are redeployed to the EMB during election periods only. However, some countries with a Governmental Model EMB, such as Sweden, maintain a small skeleton staff to take care of electoral issues between elections, including updating the electoral register. In some Mixed Model EMBs, the governmental component is permanent to preserve institutional memory, while the independent component is temporary and is set up only during election periods, as in Togo.
Countries such as Bulgaria, Georgia, Niger, Romania and Russia, whose EMBs follow the Independent Model, have permanent central EMBs which coexist with temporary subordinate EMBs at the electoral district or local levels. Depending on the responsibilities of the subordinate EMBs and on the logistics required, these structures are appointed from two to six months before polling day. Until recently, Bulgaria and Romania did not have permanent EMBs even at the national level. Permanent EMBs were created following encouragement from the Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO) and the recommendation of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) election observer missions that such structures would enhance institutional memory and operational continuity.
Centralised or Decentralised EMBs
The nature of the EMB, in terms of power concentration or devolution, depends very much on the system of government in the country and will usually be defined in the electoral law. The legal framework may distinguish between powers and functions given to a central or national EMB and those given to regional or lower-level EMBs. Such vertical divisions of powers and functions may be between different branch levels of the one national EMB, between a national EMB and separate provincial EMBs, as in Indonesia, or between national and local EMBs, as in the UK.
It is common in a unitary system, such as those of Costa Rica, Ghana and the Philippines, to have one central EMB that is responsible for all elections but with subordinate offices at both provincial and local levels. Countries whose laws define separate, hierarchically accountable EMBs at national, regional, administrative district, and even village level often assign devolved or different powers and responsibilities to each level. Electoral legal frameworks that are modelled on a central EMB devolving responsibilities for implementing some electoral functions are in place in many countries, such as Lithuania and Slovakia.
Countries with Governmental or Mixed Model EMBs may rely on local authorities to conduct all or part of electoral activities. For example, Sweden operates a highly decentralized EMB structure which consists of a national EMB for policy coordination and local authorities which manage elections, and Hungary and Switzerland devolve some powers to local EMBs. Devolving electoral powers and responsibilities to local authorities without appropriate oversight may make it more difficult to maintain electoral consistency, service, quality, and ultimately the freedom and fairness of elections. The United States provides a good example of this difficulty.
- Decentralised EMB structures can ensure continuity in the EMBs work, especially where the EMB has responsibility for recurring tasks such as continuous voter registration.
- Decentralised EMBs, even if only temporary at lower levels, can enhance inclusiveness and transparency in electoral management.
- The sustainability and relative costs of permanent over temporary EMBs at regional and/or lower levels needs to be considered, as well as the advantages.
EMBs in Federal Countries
In federal countries, separate EMBs may exist at the national level and in each state/province, often operating under different legal frameworks and possibly implementing different electoral systems. Both the national-level and provincial-level EMBs may each have separate, devolved structures. The nature of the relationship between such EMBs and the powers and responsibilities of each EMB depend on the provisions of the law.
There are a variety of approaches to this relationship. Examples include the following:
- In Australia and Canada, the national EMB is responsible for national (federal) elections, while provincial EMBs are responsible for provincial and local elections.
- In Brazil, the state EMBs are generally responsible for running all elections, with the national EMB involved in the tabulation and declaration of the results for national offices.
- In India, the national EMB exercises overall superintendence, control and direction over state elections. The conduct of these elections is the direct responsibility of the state chief electoral officer, a senior civil servant appointed by the national EMB.
- In Nigeria, the national EMB assumes responsibility for federal and state elections while the provincial EMBs are only responsible for local elections.
- In the Russian Federation a central EMB at the national level is responsible for all federal elections; regional EMBs are responsible for elections in the 89 regions that make up the federation; and lower-level EMBs are responsible to the central EMB for federal elections and to the regional EMB for republic, regional and local elections.
- In Switzerland a national EMB is responsible for policy coordination, while local authorities manage elections.
While there are often rivalries between EMBs at national and provincial levels in federal systems, there are examples of cooperation. For example, in Australia, state electoral laws specifically provide that the electoral registers for provincial and local elections are to be jointly maintained with the national EMB, rather than the provinces also maintaining their own registers. Such coordination in electoral laws has significant cost-savings benefits.
Transitional International EMBs and National EMBs
The term ‘transitional EMB’ refers to those EMBs which are set up temporarily to facilitate transitional elections. Transitional international EMBs are normally set up under the auspices of the international community, for example through the United Nations (UN), and consist of or include international experts as members. Countries where transitional international EMBs have been set up include Cambodia (1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996) and East Timor (2000).
While not strictly ‘international’ EMBs, the EMBs in Afghanistan (2004) and South Africa (1994) were national institutions with provision for the appointment of international members. The 1994 South African EMB consisted of five international experts, but since 1996 South Africa has had a national EMB following the Independent Model.
An advantage of transitional international EMBs is that they benefit from the presence of international election experts who have vast technical knowledge and comparative electoral experience. This type of EMB structure is useful in deep-rooted conflict situations where there is a need for consensus building through mediation and dialogue. The presence of international experts on the EMB may bolster domestic and international stakeholder confidence in supporting the electoral process.
Transitional EMBs may also consist of nationals only, often mainly political party representatives: an example was the 53-member EMB of Indonesia in 1999. This EMB was larger than usual in order to ensure representation and inclusiveness. In 2001, Indonesia amended its electoral law to provide for an 11-member expert-based EMB.
Representation of the EMB to Cabinet and the Legislature
No matter what the model or type of EMB, it needs to deal with the executive branch of government and the legislature on issues such as electoral law and budgets. It is a good practice for a multiparty committee of the legislature, such as the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters in Australia, to deal with EMB matters, and for a member of the Cabinet to handle all EMB issues in Cabinet and also to speak on its behalf in Cabinet and the legislature. For a Governmental Model EMB, the relevant minister would usually be from the department within which the EMB is located.
Unless an Independent or Mixed Model EMB also has somebody to speak on its behalf—a task which may be allocated to a specified minister—it is difficult for matters pertaining to the EMB to attract sufficient attention from either the legislature or Cabinet. For example, the arrangement in Namibia under which the speaker handles all EMB matters, including electoral law and the EMB budget, has in the past presented some problems for the EMB because the speaker is not represented in Cabinet, and Cabinet rules in Namibia state that proposals for legislation must first be presented to Cabinet by one of its members. A crisis over delays in electoral law reform in 2003 led to the appointment of a temporary ‘guardian’ minister to the EMB and a review of the relationship between the EMB and the Cabinet.
Summary: Structuring of Electoral Management Bodies
- Elections are complex and specialised processes which are more effectively managed by a body with specific electoral management responsibilities.
- An Electoral Management Body (EMB) is an institution or body founded for the purpose of managing one or more of the essential elements of electoral management , which include :
- determining who may contest an election
- determining who is eligible to cast a ballot
- conducting balloting
- counting votes
- aggregating voting results
- Essential and other electoral tasks may be conducted by a single body, or be allocated to multiple bodies.
- There are three broad models of EMBs:
- Independent Model
- Government Model
- Mixed Model
- A key characteristic of an Independent Model EMB is that it is institutionally independent from the executive branch of government. A Governmental Model EMB, on the other hand, is part of and accountable to the executive branch of government. Mixed Model EMBs typically consist of a component similar to the Independent Model, with varying policy and/or monitoring powers, and an implementation component similar to the Governmental Model.
- Each EMB Model has some basic attributes, but also many variations. The behaviour of EMBs depends not merely on the Model used, but on other electoral framework, social, cultural, and political factors.
- There are many types of electoral management bodies within the three broad models. EMBs may be permanent or temporary, and may be centralised or decentralised to varying degrees. Each structure has its advantages and disadvantages that need to be carefully assessed according to the country’s conditions.
- Special coordination considerations may be necessary for EMBs in federal countries, and in transitional environments where an international presence on the EMB may assist in conflict management.
- EMBs preferably have a line Minister representing their views to Cabinet, and a multi-partisan Committee of the legislature dealing with electoral matters.
- No matter what Model is used, all EMBs need to follow some guiding principles, which include independence of decision-making and action, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, and service orientation. These principles are sometimes more fully achieved under an Independent Model EMB.
