Electoral Management

Electoral Management Index

Electoral Management Quiz

The Electoral Management topic area seeks to bring together the knowledge and expertise that has been gathered worldwide about Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), their roles and functions, and the organisation, financing, and management of election administration. It focuses on the institutional structure of EMBs, their administrative infrastructure, the work they do, and their external environment.

This topic area identifies three EMB types or models and discusses the implications of each in terms of:

• The Independent Model EMB
• The Governmental Model EMB
• The Mixed Model EMB

The topic area also identifies examples of practices which have proven to be successful and less successful. It recognises that different models may be appropriate in different contexts, and does not in general seek to be normative or prescriptive beyond the basic characteristics sought in good electoral processes: freedom, fairness, equity, integrity, voting secrecy, transparency, effectiveness, sustainability, service-orientation, efficiency, impartiality, and accountability.

By highlighting key principles and good practices from different parts of the world, the aim is to promote professional, impartial, accountable, and sustainable electoral management and EMBs that perform in the best interest of the voters. For more general information on the subject matter, please select Overview.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Overview of Electoral Management

The quality of election administration, especially in emerging or newly-restored democracies, significantly determines the credibility of electoral processes. Unless all stakeholders, such as the political parties, observers, and the general public, are convinced that the election management body (EMB) is properly protected from the political control and influence of the governing party and that its actions are motivated by impartiality and professionalism, they will question its decisions or even the legitimacy of election results. This could lead to disillusionment with the EMB and public distrust, which in turn could engender violence and political instability.

Unfortunately, the issues of how election administration is structured, where, when, and why, have not been the subject of widespread rigorous research in the fields of political science or public administration. Where attention has been given, it has concentrated on the legal issues of electoral systems or the allocation of seats, the socio-cultural issues of election campaigns, the mechanics of voter registration, voting and vote-counting, and the use of technology in elections.

While the concept of universal suffrage is relatively new, election management is an essential part of any democratic process and has existed in some manner for more than twenty-five hundred years. Someone was responsible for counting the hands and reporting the results in the Athenian assemblies. Throughout the centuries, whilst great importance has been placed on the outcome of elections because of the ability of the result to legitimise government activity, election management has received little attention, few staff, and only scarce resources at best.

A map of the Electoral Management Models of the World:

(Click on the image to enlarge the map)

 

 

An election or direct democracy poll is often one of the largest single activities that is ever organized in a country. It is a very complex administrative task, implemented in a politically charged atmosphere. Still, the organisation and administration of multiparty democratic elections did not traditionally attract a high profile or become newsworthy. The administration of many electoral events largely passed unnoticed, except by those directly affected, even though the losing political parties often challenged the election conduct and results. From about 1989 onwards, this began to change. The conduct of democratic elections started to be seen, and reported, as a central element of transitions from authoritarianism or resolution of past conflict. It became more closely scrutinized by political parties, by the media, and by election observers, both from high-profile international missions and increasingly by domestic civil society organisations.

Elections and election management have, along with other public services, developed more in the last twenty-five years than in the preceding two hundred and fifty years. The pace of change has gone hand in hand with increased automation, the re-emergence of democratic governments in many Latin American countries in the 1980s, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the break up of the Soviet Union. These events led to an awakening of the international community's interest in democratic elections and to its rapid and at times deep involvement in providing electoral assistance. Beginning with the United Nations' engagement in the management and shadowing of South Africa's arrangements for elections in Namibia in 1989 as part of the decolonisation, then in Cambodia (1994), East Timor (2001), Afghanistan (2004), and Iraq (2005), numerous bilateral assistance agencies, international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and others have become active participants in the electoral assistance field.

Public interest has occasionally focused on reforming electoral systems to enhance representation, but during the past two decades, there has been a commitment to electoral administration reforms around the world, driven by political and electoral administration circles and by the critical gaze of the media and observers. Of equal importance have been reforms to the machinery for organizing and administering electoral events. These include the establishment in many countries of autonomous electoral management bodies with wide ranging powers and responsibilities, and the improvement of electoral organisation so as to deliver higher-quality electoral services more effectively while concurrently enhancing the freeness and fairness of electoral events.

As the administration of elections has received more scrutiny, so too has it become more professional. Electoral managers have learnt from experience – their own, and that of non-electoral organisations – and have formed links and networks through which ideas and practices are shared and electoral standards may be raised. There are different organisational approaches to the design and conduct of elections, but there are many common themes and issues faced by all electoral administrators.

Improvements in the quality of election management can be highlighted by considering the ways in which elections were managed before 1990. There now exist examples of well-managed elections that recognise the need for a professional, service-oriented approach to the electoral process. The commitment to improving election management is also shown by increased international cooperation through EMB networks all over the world. These bodies aim at promoting EMB cooperation and professional development, and they have developed training, examination, and accreditation programs for people working in the field.

Trends in election management include the emergence of permanent independent EMBs as the preferred form of EMBs in virtually all countries that have undertaken electoral reform over the last few years, and the new millennium has seen the adoption of regional and global standards for democratic elections by many countries, including fledgling and transitional democracies. Many countries, especially in Africa, have endorsed peer review mechanisms to demonstrate their commitment to democracy, rule of law, and good governance, and electoral democracy forms a key pillar of this commitment.

Election management was once an area that received little attention either locally, nationally, or internationally. That view has changed and will continue to change as the importance of democracy continues to be demonstrated.

Next: Guiding principles of electoral management

 

Guiding Principles of Electoral Management

There is little point in holding elections, which are expensive operations, if the outcome is questionable. The EMB should be certain that it can ensure the legitimacy of the processes for which it is responsible. This can be done if the election management is founded on basic, but fundamental, guiding principles; independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, and service orientation. These principles form the basis of electoral administration and are essential to ensure both the appearance and the actual integrity of the electoral process. The principles are not developed in a vacuum; instead they have emerged in the context of international electoral standards and norms and are guided by national legal frameworks and good practices based on country-specific and global innovations. The guiding principles should be considered the ethical framework for conducting elections and for the operations of EMBs. These principles are a guide for meeting the needs of the management of elections.

Independence

EMB independence is one of the most hotly debated issues in election administration, yet there is still no clear, accepted view on what EMB independence really means. Partially this is because the term ‘independent’ embraces two different concepts: that of structural independence from the government (the ‘Independent Model’ EMB) and that of the ‘fearless independence’ expected of all models of EMBs, in that they do not bend to governmental, political, or other partisan influences on their decisions. The two are separate issues, one being formal and the other normative; nonetheless, they are seen as being linked in that an independent EMB is regarded in many parts of the world as the model most likely to ensure the EMB’s independence of decision and action.

It is of crucial importance for a country’s electoral process that the EMB managing the elections be seen to be independent of any party and of the sitting government. If the EMB does not have this confidence of independence, the entire electoral process and the election results might be questioned. For natural reasons, an EMB cannot be independent in every aspect; in many cases, the financing of the EMB and the appointment of key personnel is dependent on the legislature, but it is essential that the EMB at the least be structured to protect it from political influences. In many cases, both a culture of independence and the commitment of EMB members to independent decision making are more important than the formal ‘structural’ independence.

Institutional or ‘structural’ independence can only be found in the constitution or law. The simplest way to promote independence of decision and action in an EMB is to create a legal framework that embeds EMB independence, as provided in the constitutions and principal EMB laws of many countries. This may or may not be feasible, depending on the EMB model, but to merely cherish and respect the independence of an EMB without further measures being taken to safeguard that independence is in critical times often insufficient.

A strong leadership is important for maintaining an EMB’s independence of action. For example, some EMBs may fill the position of chair by a senior member of the judiciary. Such a link to the judiciary may make undue interference by the government or opposition parties in EMB operations less likely. However, it would not be appropriate where the judiciary is not regarded as impartial or free of corruption, or is not of sufficient numbers to avoid conflicts of interest in election-related court cases. Alternatively, the appointment of a respected public figure, a person who is known for political non-alignment, may be another way to advance the independence of the EMB.

Impartiality

Every EMB is expected to manage elections impartially. Irrespective of the EMB’s model, source of accountability, management control, or funding, it should treat all election participants fairly, without giving advantage to any political tendency or interest group. It is not a demand that an EMB be entirely non-partisan. An EMB may comprise representatives of various political parties, but the functions carried out by its members and staff must be performed in a politically neutral and impartial manner. An EMB must be impartial but capable of operating in a political environment.

An EMB is responsible for conducting an impartial election administration, impartial treatment of parties and candidates, and impartial and valid poll. Impartiality is also required for the recruitment of personnel, for the allotment of public funds to political parties and candidates, for the election campaign and for voter education programme, if such programme exists.

The impartiality of an EMB is essential for the credibility of a country’s electoral management and thereby for the electoral process and the results of an election. If the participants in an election do not trust that the process has been carried out in an impartial manner, the credibility of the election will be questioned and confidence for the EMB will be lost. To establish integrity and credibility of electoral processes, and the widespread acceptance of election results, it is critical that an EMB not only conducts electoral events in a fearlessly independent manner, but that it is impartial in its actions. Without impartiality of electoral management and independence of action, the integrity of the election is likely to fail, and it can be difficult to instil widespread belief in the credibility of electoral processes, especially among the losers. It is also important that EMBs be seen to be impartial by the general public. The best way to achieve this is through transparent actions, backed by vigorous marketing and public relations efforts.

Integrity

The EMB is the primary guarantor of the integrity and purity of the electoral process and EMB members have the direct responsibility for ensuring this. Integrity may be easier to maintain if the EMB has both full independence of action, and full control of all essential electoral processes. Where other bodies have electoral functions, EMBs need to be empowered to closely monitor their activities to ensure that they meet the highest integrity standards.

Electoral law or EMB regulations benefit from having clear powers for the EMB to deal with electoral officials who threaten electoral integrity by acting to benefit political interests or who are corrupt. Ignoring such problems can create larger public issues of integrity and credibility than will the public use of disciplinary powers. To the extent possible, it is in the EMB’s interests to ensure that breaches of the electoral laws, rules and codes of conduct are followed by appropriate sanction.

Transparency

If transparency is not a prerequisite for accountability it is at least a principle that makes way for an accountable administration and one that promotes trust in the electoral process. Every electoral administration has a need for openness at all stages of the electoral process, and transparency in operational and financial management is a basic good practice for all EMB activities. Transparency helps ensure that electoral managers are held accountable for the decisions made during election administration and that electoral expenses are accounted for. Participants in the electoral process, whether political candidates or voters, must be able to judge if decisions taken by the administration are appropriate and must have the right to demand justification for the decisions made by electoral authorities.

An open and transparent process that lays out for public scrutiny the decisions and reasoning of the EMB, will promote the understanding of the electoral process and increases the public credibility for its management. Transparent procedures eliminate the appearance of impropriety, limit the possibility of electoral fraud, corruption and/or favouritism towards particular political tendencies, and promote public confidence in electoral authorities – which effectively will encourage participation and help build public support for the EMB.

A critical issue for electoral transparency is providing credible progressive information on essential electoral processes, such as the progress of the counting and aggregation of votes, or by effective access to relevant documents and information. Electoral transparency may be backed by electoral law. It may be a practice required by the EMB’s code of conduct, or may be adopted as an EMB policy.

Accountability

Confidence in the integrity of the electoral process requires accountable administration for each stage of the electoral process. An accountable electoral administration is one where both the EMB as an institution of government and the electoral managers, without whom the election would not take place, are responsible to their constituents. The electoral management body should be accountable both before the legislature and the citizenry. It is of little value to have standards of behaviour concerning the management of elections if there are no means of checking whether the appointed members or the electoral officials have adhered to them. Accountability is vital; for parties, and candidates, the ordinary voters and the press must all have reasonable assurance that the EMB and the electoral process have obeyed the rules. If authorities responsible for managing elections are able to explain and justify their procedures electoral fraud can be avoided.

Efficiency

Governments and the public expect that funds for elections are used wisely and services delivered efficiently. In the face of expanding and ever more expensive technological solutions, and demands for increased effort in high cost areas such as voter education and information, EMBs have to be wary that their programmes sustainably serve electoral efficiency, as well as integrity and modernity.

A successful EMB is one that has displayed integrity, competence and efficiency. These qualities help to generate public and political party confidence in election processes. The legal framework can assist by defining efficient standards for electoral and financial management. However, sometimes members of an EMB may be unfamiliar with electoral practices and procedures; at other times they may be unused to dealing with contracting for equipment and materials in a cut-throat corporate environment. The resulting inefficiency in election organisation may be confused with corrupt and fraudulent behaviour, leading to more serious challenges to the EMB’s credibility.

Service Orientation

Election management is essentially a service industry, and people have rising expectations of the ability of the industry to deliver a quality service. Elections are all about providing the public with democratic governance and to endow the voters with this service the EMB and the electoral administrators must work to achieve for every voter the highest quality service possible. The voters must have the right to adequately understand the election process as well as they must be able to exercise their rights with the least possible inconvenience, regardless of given circumstances and of legal frameworks. Disabled citizens and people with special needs must be provided with necessary help to vote. The use of technology can in some cases be used as a means of assistance to facilitate and smoothen the electoral procedure for the voters.

Perceptions of EMB service performance are critical in influencing public judgments of the integrity and the effectiveness of the EMB. Post election evaluations are a good way to review stakeholder perceptions of EMB service delivery performance. These may be conducted by the EMB itself, or may be external, for example through a part of its accountability responsibilities, such as review by the legislature of EMB performance.

Professionalism

An EMB must recognise the importance of professionalism and the need to have a properly trained and motivated staff. All participants in the electoral process - the voter, the candidate, the party manager, the media and the observers - feel their own contributions are vitally important, but in reality the key people in the process are the electoral managers, without whom the election would not take place. Professionalism has to a great extent to do with election management as a vocation. It is essential that electoral officials act in a professional manner. They should be properly trained and disciplined as well as they should be committed to treating electoral materials with care and respect. Failure to deliver the service of free and fair elections as a result of non-professional behaviour or lack of competence may have the consequence of calling into question the key principles of independence and impartiality. Administrative inefficiencies may jeopardize the public trust for the EMB and for the whole electoral process. Not even a completely independent and impartial EMB can avoid being questioned if the management of elections is handled unprofessionally.

A professional EMB needs to ensure that all candidates, parties, and voters are treated equally and fairly and that electoral resources and facilities, like technical means are used as efficiently as possible. A professional EMB should also faithfully administer and review the electoral law and the ways in which it advises its staff, political parties and candidates, and voters about the electoral process. It should also consider how best to inform and educate the voters about the electoral process.

Rule of law

The success of an election depends on the extent to which the participants in the political process accept it as a legitimate and binding procedure. If the participants question the outcome of an election, the public will question it to. In order to hold legitimate elections the election administration must comply and demonstrate respect for the laws of a country. If the election administration does not follow the law, and apply it equitably and clearly explain the legal rationale for its decision, the common understanding of the participants and the public may be affected, and support for the election process may be weakened.

An EMB needs to ensure that within the legal framework of the country, laws relating to elections are fully implemented in an impartial and equitable fashion. It is also crucial to ensure that every party, candidate, voter or other participant is treated equally, fair and just.

Next: Context of electoral management

 

Context of Electoral Management

The status, function, and activity of an election management body (EMB), as with any arm of government, is influenced by the social and political context within which it operates:

• the level of democratic consolidation and political stability,
• literacy rates,
• urbanisation,
• population,
• mobility,
• affluence,
• culture,
• traditions, and
• many others
  

The ethical principles of election administration should, nevertheless, be capable of being fulfilled whatever the economic, social, and political conditions. If they are not, the very basis of the democratic process will be brought into question.

In established democracies, administration and management of elections are often carried out by officials of the national or local government, and disputes are settled in ordinary courts. Traditions of fairness and neutrality mean that both the EMB and the courts enjoy the confidence and respect of the participants in the electoral process.

The context of election management also includes a country's history. Many developing countries have electoral practices based on the electoral laws of former colonial powers; many countries in Africa, especially, can show direct linkage to the legal tradition of the former colonial power.

In the cultural context, traditional methods of decision making that have been handed down for hundreds or even thousands of years tend to influence people's perceptions of the electoral process and should be taken into consideration by electoral policy makers and election officials.

The ability of the EMB to discharge its functions is also critically dependent on the social context of the country. A number of factors are tied to the EMB's functions, including literacy rates, costs and availability of local labour, electricity, and other utility supplies. For example, a country that is poorly endowed may opt for a temporary and centralised election administration, while an affluent country may have permanent and decentralised election management. The same goes for the conditions of service for EMB members and staff.

Voter education is particularly influenced by literacy. In countries with low literacy rates, the use of party symbols has had a significant impact in making the campaign and the voting process more easily understood by the electorate.

If there is no electricity, or an undependable supply, or poor broadcasting facilities, information for voters must be disseminated by means other than radio or television. Election managers may need to set up their own radio network for administrative purposes, using shortwave radios to link local, regional, and national election offices, if telephone service is unavailable or unreliable.

Computerisation can take a great deal of the monotonous routine out of election work, improve the flow of management information, and improve the speed and quality of the whole process. To work effectively, though, computer systems need a guaranteed power supply (to the point that even large back-up generators are usually advisable as a cautionary measure) and a trained workforce. The cost of the computer system, including all the related equipment, must be measured against the cost of employing and training as necessary a local work force to meet the needs of the election management body.

The procurement of supplies is an area in which there are more and more companies able to supply ever more highly specialized equipment and supplies, at a cost. Local suppliers may be able to supply many items, such as voting screens, at the best final cost if realistic specifications are set, if adequate time is available, and if the process is properly managed. In some places such as Honduras (1993), voting screens are simply pieces of fabric tacked across the corner of a room.

The social and political context is especially relevant in any consideration of election security. In some countries such as Peru (1993), the military or police are seen as allies of the civilian population in an ongoing struggle against terrorists, and their participation in the electoral process is therefore welcomed by the people. Elsewhere, the voters may perceive any military involvement in the electoral process even in the delivery of equipment and supplies to be almost sure evidence of an intent to defraud the process, in which case other measures may be needed to deliver necessary materials and ensure the security of the process.

 

Structuring of Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs)

There is consensus among election analysts that the structure and functioning of election administration has a significant impact on the credibility of the Electoral Management Body (EMB) and its effectiveness in terms of service delivery. However, there is no single structure that fits all and works in every environment. EMB structures are, by and large, products of politico-legal and cultural traditions and the experience of the democratic evolution in different countries. Factors that determine EMB structures include constitutional and related legal frameworks, reform measures undertaken during transition periods, and the resource endowment of the country concerned.

The form of the EMB may result from a holistic design process. Equally, it may be a more or less appropriate graft onto an existing system of state administration. In post-colonial environments, it may be strongly influenced by colonial administrative patterns. While there are many variations of detail, there are three broad types or models of EMB.

Sub-sections of this chapter:  

• What is an electoral management body (EMB)?
• Independent Model EMBs
• Governmental Model EMBs
• Mixed Model EMBs
• What Can Be Expected of the Different EMB Models?
• Permanent and Temporary EMBs
• Centralised or Decentralised EMBs
• EMBs in Federal Countries
• Transitional International EMBs and National EMBs
• Representation of the EMB to Cabinet and the Legislature

 

What is an electoral management body (EMB)?

The complexity and specialist skills necessary for electoral management requires that an institution or institutions be formed to be responsible for electoral activities. Such bodies have a variety of shapes and sizes, with a wide range of titles to match, which include ‘Election Commission’, ‘Department of Elections’, ‘Electoral Council’, ‘Election Unit’, or ‘Electoral Board’. The term ‘electoral management body’ or EMB has been coined as a name to refer to the body or bodies responsible for electoral management whatever wider institutional framework is in place.

An EMB is an organisation or body which has been founded for the purpose of, and is legally responsible for, managing one or more of the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections, and of direct democracy instruments – such as referendums, citizens’ initiatives, and recall votes – if those are part of the legal framework.

These essential elements include:

• determining who is eligible to vote;
• receiving and validating the nominations of electoral
• participants (for elections, political parties and/or candidates);
• conducting balloting;
• counting votes; and
• totalling votes from polling locations.

If these essential elements are allocated to various bodies, then all bodies which have a share of these essential elements can be considered as EMBs. An EMB may be a stand-alone institution, or a distinct management unit within a larger institution which may also have non-electoral tasks.

In addition to these essential elements, an EMB may undertake other tasks which assist the conduct of elections and direct democracy instruments, such as:

• conduct of voter registration;
• boundary delimitation;
• procurement of electoral materials;
• voter education;
• management or oversight of campaign financing;
• media monitoring; and
• electoral dispute resolution.

However, a body which has no electoral responsibilities other than, for example, boundary delimitation (such as a boundary delimitation commission), electoral dispute resolution (such as an electoral court), election media monitoring (such as a media monitoring commission) or the conduct of voter education (such as a civic education commission) is not an EMB as such because it is not managing any of the ‘essential elements’ of elections as identified above. Similarly, a state population or statistics bureau which produces electoral registers as part of the general process of population registration is not considered to be an EMB.

Some bodies not engaged in any of the ‘essential elements’ of elections may be popularly regarded as EMBs due to the breadth of election-related activities which they undertake. An example is the New Zealand Electoral Commission, which is responsible for party registration, the allocation of broadcasting time and official funds to parties, oversight of party funding and expenditure, and voter education. However, such institutions do not qualify as EMBs under the definition of an EMB above.

In addition to the division of functional responsibility for different elements of the electoral process, electoral responsibilities may be divided between bodies at different levels. For example, some elements of the conduct of elections may be managed by a national-level Electoral Commission, a ministry (such as the Interior Ministry), or a national government agency, while others are implemented by local-level commissions, regional branches of government departments, or local authorities. The term ‘EMB’ may also apply to a national Electoral Commission which co-manages elections with local authorities, and can include in its functions things such as the coordination of ballot paper printing, and the distribution of seats and announcement of results at the national level.

 

Independent Model EMBs

The Independent Model of electoral management exists in those countries where elections are organized and managed by an EMB which is institutionally independent and autonomous from the executive branch of government, and which has and manages its own budget. Under the Independent Model, an EMB is not accountable to a government ministry or department. It may be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary, or the head of state. EMBs under the Independent Model may enjoy varying degrees of financial autonomy and accountability, as well as varying levels of performance accountability. They are composed of members who are outside the executive while in EMB office. Many new and emerging democracies have chosen the Independent Model of electoral management.

Examples of EMBs under the Independent Model as of 2006 include:

Indonesia
Liberia
Mauritius
Nigeria
Poland
South Africa
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Uruguay

Armenia
Australia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Burkina Faso
Canada
Costa Rica
Estonia
Georgia
India

 
In some countries, two bodies are established for the management of elections, both of which are independent of the executive and can be considered as independent EMBs. One of these bodies is likely to have responsibility for policy decisions relating to the electoral process, and the other to be responsible for conducting and implementing the electoral process. Provisions may exist which insulate the implementation EMB from interference by the policy EMB in staffing and operational matters. Examples of this ‘double-independent’ framework under the Independent Model include:

Jamaica

Romania

Suriname

Vanuatu

 

 

What an Independent Model EMB Is, May Be, and Is Not

 

 

Governmental Model EMBs

The Governmental Model of electoral management exists in those countries where elections are organized and managed by the executive branch through a ministry (such as the Ministry of the Interior) and/or through local authorities. Where EMBs under the Governmental Model exist at national level, they are led by a minister or civil servant and are answerable to a Cabinet minister. With very few exceptions they have no ‘members’. Their budget falls within a government ministry and/or under local authorities.

Countries whose EMBs fall into this model include:

Denmark
Seychelles
Singapore
Switzerland
Tunisia
UK (for elections but not referendums)
United States

In Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the United States, elections are implemented by local authorities. In Sweden and Switzerland the central EMB assumes a policy coordinating role.

 

What a Governmental Model EMB Is, May Be, and Is Not

 

 

Mixed Model EMBs

Mixed Model EMBs have dual structures, with a policy, monitoring or supervisory component that is independent of the executive branch of government (as for the Independent Model) and an implementation component located within a department of state and/or local government (as for the Governmental Model). Under this model elections are organized by the governmental implementation component of the EMB, with some level of oversight provided by the independent component of the EMB.

The Mixed Model is used in France, Japan, Spain and many former French colonies, especially in West Africa, for example Mali, Senegal and Togo.

 

The powers, functions and strength of the independent component in relation to the governmental component vary in different examples of this model, and the classification of a particular EMB as a mixed model is sometimes not very clear. In some cases, the independent component is little more than a formalized observation operation, although this version is dying out, having been abandoned for example in Senegal. In other cases, the independent component has a role to supervise and verify the implementation of electoral events by the governmental component, as in Madagascar, and sometimes also to tabulate and transmit results, as in Congo (Brazzaville) and Togo. In some francophone countries, the Constitutional Council is engaged in the tabulation and declaration of results and can be considered as an independent component of the EMB. In Chad, this applies to referendums only, and not to elections. In Mali, both the Independent National Election Commission and the Constitutional Council undertake their own tabulation of results: the EMB may therefore be said to have three components, one which is governmental and two which are independent.

 

The relationship between the components of a mixed model EMB is not always clearly defined in legislation or interpreted by stakeholders, and friction can result. In the 1999 elections in Guinea-Conakry (which used the mixed model at that time), the majority representatives and the opposition representatives in the independent component had strongly differing approaches to its role to supervise and verify the elections, and its effectiveness was therefore heavily disputed.

 

Examples of Formats for a Mixed Model EMB

Mixed Model EMBs have a variety of structures, internal relationships, and attributes, and it is difficult to codify the essential and possible attributes of Mixed Model EMBs. The relationship between the two components in a Mixed Model EMB is significant in determining its attributes and methods of operation. Effective legal frameworks for Mixed Model EMBs clearly specify the division of powers and functions between the policy, monitoring, or supervisory component and the implementing component of the EMB, and their interactions.

The table “Examples of Formats for a Mixed Model EMB” shows some attributes of some examples of Mixed Model EMBs.

 

What Can Be Expected of the Different EMB Models?

It is simplistic to think of the three models of EMBs as having distinct behaviours. EMB behaviour depends not only on type but also on the electoral framework, political and social expectations, and the cultural environment within which each EMB exists.

 

Influences include the political commitment to allow the EMB to act freely and impartially, the range of powers and functions given to an EMB, the qualifications of members or staff for appointment and their terms of office, the way in which members and/or staff are selected and appointed, the oversight and accountability framework, and whether the EMB has a legal personality and is thus able to sue and be sued. For example, an Independent Model EMB comprising representatives of competing political parties and an Independent Model EMB comprising non-aligned academics, or others free of political association, both follow the ‘Independent Model’ but are likely to operate differently. Similarly, a Governmental Model EMB whose sponsoring department controls local electoral management offices is likely to behave differently from one that is dependent on numerous local authorities to implement electoral activities.

 

Factors that influence EMB behaviour

• Electoral management model (independent, governmental or mixed)
• The electoral framework
• Political and social expectations and
• The cultural environment within which each EMB exists
• Political commitment to allow an EMB to act freely and impartially
• The range of powers and functions given to an EMB
• The qualifications of members or staff for appointment and their terms of office
• The way in which members and/or staff are selected and appointed
• The oversight and accountability framework
• whether the EMB has a legal personality and is thus able to sue and be sued.

 

Permanent and Temporary EMBs

In determining whether a permanent or temporary EMB is appropriate, electoral workloads throughout the electoral cycle need to be considered and compared to the expense of maintaining a permanent institution versus the expenses and time required to establish a new body for each election. In situations where electoral events are regularly occurring – such as regular partial or by-elections and continuous voter registration – or there are needs for continuing electoral development work, such as on-going voter education, or advocacy of electoral law reforms, a permanent electoral institution is justifiable.

Some countries have EMBs which exist during the election period only. Such EMBs may follow the Independent, Governmental, or Mixed Models. In some cases, the Governmental Model EMB needs to be temporary, because the public servants who run elections have other full-time duties and are redeployed to the EMB during election periods only. However, some countries with a Governmental Model EMB, such as Sweden, maintain a small skeleton staff to take care of electoral issues between elections, including updating the electoral register. In some Mixed Model EMBs, the governmental component is permanent, to preserve institutional memory, while the Independent Model component is temporary during election periods.

Some countries whose EMBs follow the Independent Model have permanent central EMBs which coexist with temporary subordinate EMBs at the district or local levels; depending on their responsibilities and on the logistics required, the latter structures are appointed anywhere from two to six months before elections.

There are many phases to the electoral process: in an election, for example, these include the design and drafting of legislation, the recruitment and training of electoral staff, electoral planning, voter registration, the registration of political parties, the nomination of parties and candidates, the electoral campaign, polling, counting, the tabulation of results, the declaration of results, the resolution of electoral disputes, reporting, auditing and archiving. After the end of one electoral process, it is desirable for work on the next to begin: the whole process can be described as the electoral cycle, illustrated in figure 2.

 

In determining whether a permanent or temporary EMB is appropriate, workloads throughout the electoral cycle need to be considered, and the expense of maintaining a permanent institution has to be compared with the expense and time required to establish a new body for each election. Where a temporary EMB appears appropriate, it is important to consider how institutional memory relating to elections will be maintained. In situations where electoral events occur regularly—such as regular partial or by-elections and continuous voter registration—or continuing electoral development work, such as ongoing voter education and information or advocacy of electoral law reforms, is needed, a permanent electoral institution is justifiable.

 

Countries that maintain permanent EMBs: 

• Armenia

• Australia

• Brazil

• Canada

• Indonesia

• Mexico

• the Philippines

• South Africa

• Thailand

 

Some countries have EMBs which exist during the election period only. Such EMBs may follow the Independent, Governmental or Mixed models. In some cases, the Governmental Model EMB has to be temporary because the public servants who run elections have other full-time duties and are redeployed to the EMB during election periods only. However, some countries with a Governmental Model EMB, such as Sweden, maintain a small skeleton staff to take care of electoral issues between elections, including updating the electoral register. In some Mixed Model EMBs, the governmental component is permanent to preserve institutional memory, while the independent component is temporary and is set up only during election periods, as in Togo.

 

Countries such as Bulgaria, Georgia, Niger, Romania and Russia, whose EMBs follow the Independent Model, have permanent central EMBs which coexist with temporary subordinate EMBs at the electoral district or local levels. Depending on the responsibilities of the subordinate EMBs and on the logistics required, these structures are appointed from two to six months before polling day. Until recently, Bulgaria and Romania did not have permanent EMBs even at the national level. Permanent EMBs were created following encouragement from the Association of Central and Eastern Euro­pean Election Officials (ACEEEO) and the recommendation of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) election observer missions that such structures would enhance institutional memory and operational continuity.

 

Centralised or Decentralised EMBs

The nature of the EMB, in terms of power concentration or devolution, depends very much on the system of government in the country and will usually be defined in the electoral law. The legal framework may distinguish between powers and functions given to a central or national EMB and those given to regional or lower-level EMBs. Such vertical divisions of powers and functions may be between different branch levels of the one national EMB, between a national EMB and separate provincial EMBs, as in Indonesia, or between national and local EMBs, as in the UK.

It is common in a unitary system, such as those of Costa Rica, Ghana and the Philippines, to have one central EMB that is responsible for all elections but with subordinate offices at both provincial and local levels. Countries whose laws define separate, hierarchically accountable EMBs at national, regional, administrative district, and even village level often assign devolved or different powers and responsibilities to each level. Electoral legal frameworks that are modelled on a central EMB devolving responsibilities for implementing some electoral functions are in place in many countries, such as Lithuania and Slovakia.

 

Countries with Governmental or Mixed Model EMBs may rely on local authorities to conduct all or part of electoral activities. For example, Sweden operates a highly decentralized EMB structure which consists of a national EMB for policy coordination and local authorities which manage elections, and Hungary and Switzerland devolve some powers to local EMBs. Devolving electoral powers and responsibilities to local authorities without appropriate oversight may make it more difficult to maintain electoral consistency, service, quality, and ultimately the freedom and fairness of elections. The United States provides a good example of this difficulty.

• Decentralised EMB structures can ensure continuity in the EMBs work, especially where the EMB has responsibility for recurring tasks such as continuous voter registration.
• Decentralised EMBs, even if only temporary at lower levels, can enhance inclusiveness and transparency in electoral management.
• The sustainability and relative costs of permanent over temporary EMBs at regional and/or lower levels needs to be considered, as well as the advantages.

 

EMBs in Federal Countries

In federal countries, separate EMBs may exist at the national level and in each state/province, often operating under different legal frameworks and possibly implementing different electoral systems. Both the national-level and provincial-level EMBs may each have separate, devolved structures. The nature of the relationship between such EMBs and the powers and responsibilities of each EMB depend on the provisions of the law.

There are a variety of approaches to this relationship. Examples include the following:

• In Australia and Canada, the national EMB is responsible for national (federal) elections, while provincial EMBs are responsible for provincial and local elections.
• In Brazil, the state EMBs are generally responsible for running all elections, with the national EMB involved in the tabulation and declaration of the results for national offices.
• In India, the national EMB exercises overall superintendence, control and direction over state elections. The conduct of these elections is the direct responsibility of the state chief electoral officer, a senior civil servant appointed by the national EMB.
• In Nigeria, the national EMB assumes responsibility for federal and state elections while the provincial EMBs are only responsible for local elections.
• In the Russian Federation a central EMB at the national level is responsible for all federal elections; regional EMBs are responsible for elections in the 89 regions that make up the federation; and lower-level EMBs are responsible to the central EMB for federal elections and to the regional EMB for republic, regional and local elections.
• In Switzerland a national EMB is responsible for policy coordination, while local authorities manage elections.

 

While there are often rivalries between EMBs at national and provincial levels in federal systems, there are examples of cooperation. For example, in Australia, state electoral laws specifically provide that the electoral registers for provincial and local elections are to be jointly maintained with the national EMB, rather than the provinces also maintaining their own registers. Such coordination in electoral laws has significant cost-savings benefits.

 

Transitional International EMBs and National EMBs

The term ‘transitional EMB’ refers to those EMBs which are set up temporarily to facilitate transitional elections. Transitional international EMBs are normally set up under the auspices of the international community, for example through the United Nations (UN), and consist of or include international experts as members. Countries where transitional international EMBs have been set up include Cambodia (1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996) and East Timor (2000).

While not strictly ‘international’ EMBs, the EMBs in Afghanistan (2004) and South Africa (1994) were national institutions with provision for the appointment of international members. The 1994 South African EMB consisted of five international experts, but since 1996 South Africa has had a national EMB following the Independent Model.

 

An advantage of transitional international EMBs is that they benefit from the presence of international election experts who have vast technical knowledge and comparative electoral experience. This type of EMB structure is useful in deep-rooted conflict situations where there is a need for consensus building through mediation and dialogue. The presence of international experts on the EMB may bolster domestic and international stakeholder confidence in supporting the electoral process.

 

Transitional EMBs may also consist of nationals only, often mainly political party representatives: an example was the 53-member EMB of Indonesia in 1999. This EMB was larger than usual in order to ensure representation and inclusiveness. In 2001, Indonesia amended its electoral law to provide for an 11-member expert-based EMB.

 

Representation of the EMB to Cabinet and the Legislature

No matter what the model or type of EMB, it needs to deal with the executive branch of government and the legislature on issues such as electoral law and budgets. It is a good practice for a multiparty committee of the legislature, such as the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters in Australia, to deal with EMB matters, and for a member of the Cabinet to handle all EMB issues in Cabinet and also to speak on its behalf in Cabinet and the legislature. For a Governmental Model EMB, the relevant minister would usually be from the department within which the EMB is located.

Unless an Independent or Mixed Model EMB also has somebody to speak on its behalf—a task which may be allocated to a specified minister—it is difficult for matters pertaining to the EMB to attract sufficient attention from either the legislature or Cabinet. For example, the arrangement in Namibia under which the speaker handles all EMB matters, including electoral law and the EMB budget, has in the past presented some problems for the EMB because the speaker is not represented in Cabinet, and Cabinet rules in Namibia state that proposals for legislation must first be presented to Cabinet by one of its members. A crisis over delays in electoral law reform in 2003 led to the appointment of a temporary ‘guardian’ minister to the EMB and a review of the relationship between the EMB and the Cabinet.

 

Summary: Structuring of Electoral Management Bodies

• Elections are complex and specialised processes which are more effectively managed by a body with specific electoral management responsibilities.
• An Electoral Management Body (EMB) is an institution or body founded for the purpose of managing one or more of the essential elements of electoral management , which include :
  • determining who may contest an election
  • determining who is eligible to cast a ballot
  • conducting balloting
  • counting votes
  • aggregating voting results
    
• Essential and other electoral tasks may be conducted by a single body, or be allocated to multiple bodies.
• There are three broad models of EMBs:
  • Independent Model
  • Government Model
  • Mixed Model
• A key characteristic of an Independent Model EMB is that it is institutionally independent from the executive branch of government. A Governmental Model EMB, on the other hand, is part of and accountable to the executive branch of government. Mixed Model EMBs typically consist of a component similar to the Independent Model, with varying policy and/or monitoring powers, and an implementation component similar to the Governmental Model.
• Each EMB Model has some basic attributes, but also many variations. The behaviour of EMBs depends not merely on the Model used, but on other electoral framework, social, cultural, and political factors.
• There are many types of electoral management bodies within the three broad models. EMBs may be permanent or temporary, and may be centralised or decentralised to varying degrees. Each structure has its advantages and disadvantages that need to be carefully assessed according to the country’s conditions.
• Special coordination considerations may be necessary for EMBs in federal countries, and in transitional environments where an international presence on the EMB may assist in conflict management.
• EMBs preferably have a line Minister representing their views to Cabinet, and a multi-partisan Committee of the legislature dealing with electoral matters.
• No matter what Model is used, all EMBs need to follow some guiding principles, which include independence of decision-making and action, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, and service orientation. These principles are sometimes more fully achieved under an Independent Model EMB.

 

The Legal Framework: The Context for the EMB’s Role and Powers

Because most EMBs make and implement important decisions that can influence the outcome of an election, the primary objective of a legal framework is to guide the EMB and to facilitate its delivery of a free and fair election to the electorate. The success of the election process depends heavily on the formulation of appropriate electoral laws embedded in a legal framework. The incorporation of election regulations into parliamentary legislation is an important step when building a tradition of independence and impartiality, and when trying to inspire the electorates’ confidence in the electoral process.

 

International Treaties and Agreements

Many United Nations (UN) member countries incorporate into their domestic law (using a variety of constitutional means) key UN decisions and treaties, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1952 Convention on the Political Rights of Women. In such cases,, domestic electoral laws, and the EMB’s policies and actions, need to consider the treaties’ provisions relating to issues such as:

• universal and non-discriminatory suffrage,
• secret and free voting,
• the rights of women to be elected and hold public office,
• and the rights of minority language groups.
  
  

Bilateral agreements between countries and regional bodies on supranational bodies (such as for the European Union) may also contain electoral requirements. While complementary laws are usually required to give effect to such treaties, EMB actions in contradiction to rights stipulated in ratified treaties may still be legally challengeable.

It is also common in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Organisation of American States (OAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regions for member countries to implement treaties and decisions adopted by such regional bodies, either through legislative or executive ratifications. One example of such regional and enforceable treaties that affect the legal frameworks for EMBs is the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001, which provides for member countries to commit themselves to independent or impartial election administration and timely election dispute resolution.

In addition to the ratified, binding treaties and decisions, there are non-binding decisions by international and regional bodies. In October 2005, the Global Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct for International Electoral Observation was adopted by the United Nations and by a wide range of global and regional organisations. In the SADC region, for example, the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) and the Electoral Commissions’ Forum of SADC countries (ECF) have developed and adopted jointly the “Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation” (PEMMO), while the SADC Parliamentary Forum has established its own election norms and standards. These sets of principles, guidelines, and standards serve as benchmarks against which observer missions in the region assess whether an election is free and fair.

 

The Constitution

A growing number of countries are incorporating fundamental electoral provisions in their constitutions, often including the specification of the EMB. Countries like Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Fiji, Ghana, India, Indonesia, and Uruguay set up their respective EMBs as constitutional bodies. This makes the altering of the EMB’s status and other constitutionally defined elements more difficult. Constitutional provisions are almost always more entrenched than mere laws, requiring for example an extraordinary majority in the legislature or a referendum to change them. The barrier that constitutional entrenchment imposes on ruling parties which wish to change electoral provisions to their advantage gives opposition parties a feeling of greater protection than if those provisions were contained in statutory law, which can be altered by a majority in the legislature, or in government regulations.

The range and nature of electoral-related provisions which are considered appropriate to be set out in a country’s constitution varies widely according to local considerations. Some examples follow.

• Austria’s Constitution sets out EMB membership, the franchise, the Constitutional Court’s role in election disputes, and the election system;

• the Constitution of Bangladesh defines the powers, independence, and functions of the EMB, the franchise, candidate qualifications, and election date deadline;

• Cameroon’s Constitution deals with political party rights, candidate qualifications, election date deadlines, and the powers of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Council relating to electoral disputes;

• in Costa Rica, the Constitution establishes the independence, membership, and functions of the EMB, and deals with the franchise, political party rights (including government funding), election systems, and qualifications for candidacy;

• for elections in the Czech Republic, the Constitution defines the franchise, the election system, and election date deadline;

• Ghana’s Constitution deals with the franchise, establishment of the EMB, the right to form or to join a political party, and the delimitation of electoral districts;

• in India, the Constitution has provisions establishing an EMB, dealing with the franchise, the electoral register, barring the interference of the courts in electoral matters, and reserving seats for legally defined “Castes” and “Tribes” in the House of the People;

• Madagascar’s Constitution sets out candidacy rights, the election systems for the senate and the presidency, and the Constitutional Court’s role in elections and election disputes;

• the Namibian Constitution enunciates the qualifications and procedures for presidential elections;

• Peru’s Constitution deals with the autonomy, membership, and functions of the National Elections Board, which supervises election processes, and is responsible for party registration, the announcement of the results, and electoral dispute resolution. The Constitution also empowers the National Office of Electoral Processes to organize materials and logistics, funding, and vote count information for all electoral events, and sets out the qualifications for its chief executive; and empowers the National Registry of Identification and Civil Status to create the voters register from its civil registry database.

Similarly-targeted electoral provisions in constitutions may also be drafted in very different ways. Consider the following two examples of constitutionally defined ‘independence’ of an EMB:

"Except as provided for in this Constitution or any other law not inconsistent with this Constitution, in the performance of its functions, the Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any authority or person" – article 46 of the Constitution of Ghana.

"General elections shall be organized by a general election commission of a national, permanent, and independent character" – article 22E(5) of the Indonesian Constitution.

While enshrining major electoral provisions in the constitution generates confidence in the electoral system, there may be disadvantages if these provisions are too detailed. The legal framework may then be difficult to change in the light of experience because of the difficulty in meeting constitutional change barriers or the length of time it takes to effect constitutional change.

The extent to which electoral provisions are incorporated in the constitution is significantly affected by the level of public trust in the election administration of the country. In many established democracies where a high level public trust exists in law-making and public administration in general, and the organisation of elections in particular, constitutions do not make reference to EMB design issues. Yet it is common – and not only among fledgling democracies – to have independent and robust EMBs which are supported by sophisticated and detailed legal frameworks which incorporate key electoral provisions in the constitution. This practice fosters stakeholder confidence in the electoral process.

 

 

Electoral Laws: Acts and Ordinances

An EMB may be established by statute, through an act of the legislature. Countries like the UK, which has no written constitution, Australia, Burkina Faso, and Canada, established their respective EMBs entirely by statute law. It is generally good practice to lay down transparently the legislative framework for electoral processes, and clearly allocate the responsibility for filling in the gaps and/or detail through subsidiary legislation or regulation, or the EMB’s administrative procedures.

It is good practice for such legislation to define the status of the national EMB and any subsidiary EMBs, including accountabilities, powers, responsibilities, and functions. It is also good practice for it to provide a clear and sufficiently detailed framework to ensure effectiveness and integrity in all matters relating to electoral administration, such as:

• EMB member and staff appointments and tenure;
• operational management issues relating to voter registration, political party and candidate registration, political campaigns, voter education, EMB transparency, voting, vote counting, and announcement of results;
• financial and asset management issues; and
• electoral offences and manners of election dispute resolution.
  
  

Other issues which may be covered in electoral legislation include boundary delimitation principles and processes, and codes of conduct for EMB members and staff, political parties, the publicly-owned media, and election observers.

Parts of the legal framework may also be enacted as subsidiary legislation, for example:

• by the EMB itself under a power to make regulations;
• by some form of executive decree;
• by a state or provincial legislature in the form of subsidiary legislation;
• or by municipal authorities in the form of ordinances.
  
  

Provisions for the conduct of provincial and local elections are often contained in separate legislation. In federal countries, separately defined national and provincial electoral legal frameworks may be necessary, depending on the constitutional split of powers between the national and provincial levels. Inconsistencies or overlapping provisions between national and provincial electoral legislation, for example for voter registration or voting procedures, may confuse electors. Regular consultations between federal and provincial lawmakers and electoral administrators can assist in minimising confusion and duplication.

In addition, where elections to a supranational body are contemplated, national legislation is likely to be necessary to define the electoral management structure within the overall supranational agreement. Looking at the example of the European Parliament, the provisions contained in the European-level legal instruments are for the most part very general in nature, and the definition of the electoral management structure for European Parliament elections is left to each member state.

As with the balance between electoral provisions in the constitution and legislation, the balance between electoral provisions in legislation and subsidiary regulation or procedures needs to be finely judged. Electoral legislation needs to be sufficiently detailed to ensure integrity and effectiveness, but not so detailed that legislative amendment would be required to permit EMBs to deal with minor changes in their operations. Too much detail in the legislation can result in, for example, an EMB being unable to change the staffing structure in its divisions, or the design of an administrative form, or introduce office automation systems, without legislative change. Particularly in environments where election processes take place after legislatures’ terms of office have ended, electoral legislation needs to allow EMBs the flexibility to respond to changing electoral circumstances.

A modern electoral legislative scheme may entail one or several different laws. Traditional legal drafting for electoral legislation has often been precise but in a structure and language that is not very accessible. The legislation may become particularly difficult to understand if it is subject to successive amendments over time, without a fully revised and consolidated law being produced.

A single omnibus law covering all electoral activity can be cumbersome but may facilitate reference and review. Separate laws on individual issues – such as the EMB, political parties, electoral registers, legislative elections, presidential elections, and local government elections provide clear and easy reference to specific electoral activities, but it may be too time-consuming or difficult to ensure there is no conflict in their content. Another possible solution is that the substantive norms (such as suffrage rights, eligibility, number of rounds, majority or proportional system) are in separate laws (legislative elections, local elections, referendum) and the electoral process is regulated in a common law that consists of a general part (binding on all types of elections) and special norms for each type of election.

International IDEA’s publication International Electoral Standards: IDEA’s Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of Elections discusses a number of issues to consider when designing or reviewing a legal framework for electoral management. Key considerations are summarized in the following file.

 

Checklist for Electoral Management Legal Framework

1) Does the legal framework provide for the EMB to be constituted as an independent and impartial institution?

2) Does the legal framework require and enable the EMB to operate in an impartial and transparent manner?

3) Does the legal framework protect EMB members and staff from arbitrary dismissal?

4) Does the legal framework define the accountability, powers, functions, and responsibilities of the EMB at each level and relationships between the levels?

5) Does the legal framework adequately define the EMB’s relationships with external stakeholders?

6) Does the legal framework provide clear guidance for all EMB activities yet allow the EMB practical flexibility in its implementation?

7) Does the legal framework allow timely and enforceable review of an EMB decision?

8) Does the legal framework allow the EMB sufficient time to organize electoral events effectively?

9) Does the legal framework ensure that the EMB has sufficient and timely funding to manage its functions and responsibilities effectively?

 

EMB Rules, Regulations and Proclamations

In some countries, the EMB has legal powers to regulate the electoral framework either by enacting new laws or making rules and regulations which complement existing principal legislation. Such an arrangement is time effective and allows for speedy amendment of the legal framework. For example, the EMB of Uruguay can make decisions and dictate actions which cannot be reviewed by any other branch of the government. This means that the EMB has legislative powers (making laws which govern elections), judicial powers (reviewing and interpreting laws with binding effect), and implementation powers for the laws and norms it has enacted.

A more usual practice is for the EMB, particularly Independent Model EMBs, to be empowered to make reviewable regulations filling in the detail of concepts contained in the law, or filling existing gaps in the law. For Governmental Model EMBs, this power may be held by the Ministry within which the EMB is located. Such regulations in most countries are subject to review, generally by a court or constitutional court, to test whether they are within the powers of the EMB (or Ministry) to make, and whether they are otherwise consistent with the law.

In countries such as Fiji and Yemen, the EMBs have powers to make regulations to facilitate their mandate, including the conduct of elections. In Namibia, the EMB has the power to issue proclamations which by law must be gazetted and which cover issues such as political parties’ code of conduct, some procedural issues on voter registration, and parties’ disclosure of foreign donations. The Indonesian EMB has specific regulatory powers in some critical areas, including boundary delimitation, voter registration, candidate registration, conduct of election campaigns, campaign funding reporting, and voting processes.

Many EMBs have powers to formulate administrative policies and directions on operational issues such as their relationships with their own staff (on issues such as gender equality, affirmative action, performance management, and staff development) and external stakeholders. These external stakeholders include government ministries – including the Finance Ministry –, the legislature, political parties, civil society organisations, and the media.

Unlike regulations, which by law must be issued publicly, the EMB may have no legal obligation to publicize administrative directives and policies, though it is always good practice for it to do so. It is important that the EMB consult its stakeholders when formulating new policies or reviewing old ones, in order to foster stakeholder awareness and buy-in.

 

Summary: The Legal Framework

• Electoral processes are complex, standardised activities requiring clear, simple, and relatively comprehensive legal definition to promote consistency, equity, and a common understanding of electoral frameworks by all electoral stakeholders.
• The electoral legal framework within which the EMB operates may be defined in many different types of instruments – including international treaties, the constitution, national and sub-national statute law, and EMB and other regulations
• International treaties and agreements provide a framework of norms within which a country’s electoral legal arrangements can be defined and assessed against.
• There is a trend towards defining key electoral issues in the constitution, as this may provide a workable means of entrenching electoral norms against ruling party manipulations. Electoral arrangements may be further defined in statute law and subsidiary law and regulations.
• Electoral statute law may be a single law, or multiple laws which need to be kept in harmony. EMBs or the executive branch of government may be able to make regulations filling in gaps in the law: usually these would be subject to some form of judicial or other review. EMBs may also be able to set their own administrative policies. For confidence in election processes, it is important that all parts of the electoral framework – treaties, constitution, statute laws, EMB and other regulations, and administrative polices – are freely and publicly available and that changes are discussed and shared with key stakeholders.
• A balance needs to be struck between providing for certainty and consistency in the legal framework, whilst allowing the EMB the flexibility to respond effectively to changing electoral circumstances. The amount of electoral detail in higher level instruments – constitutions and statute laws - will often depend on the level of trust in political participants and in the performance of the EMB.
• International IDEA’s publication International Electoral Standards: IDEA’s Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of Elections provides guidelines for assessment of electoral legal frameworks.
• EMB powers to make regulations should always be exercised in consistency with both the constitution and the electoral law.

How Legal Instruments Define Electoral Processes

The structure, powers, functions, and responsibilities of the EMB are defined in those parts of a country’s legal framework dealing with electoral processes. Especially in emerging democracies, the current trend is to develop a comprehensive legal framework that guarantees the independence and integrity of the electoral process, promotes consistency and equality in electoral management, and promotes full and informed participation in electoral events by political parties, civil society organisations, and electors. The full legal framework for elections can be based on a variety of sources. These include:

• International documents, for example Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states in clauses (1) and (3) that ‘Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives’ and ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures’;
• the constitution;
• national laws, the relevant portion of which may take the form of one comprehensive electoral code. Alternatively, there may be a set of laws covering different aspects of the electoral process. Some countries define the structure, composition, and powers of their EMB in a separate law;
• provincial or state laws, which, particularly in federal countries, may govern processes for provincial or state and local electoral events (as in Australia) or for national electoral events (as in the United States);
• ordinances and regulations made by national or lower level authorities;
• regulations, proclamations, and directives issued by an EMB, if it has powers to do so;
• customary laws and conventions which may be integrated into electoral law, or EMB regulations or policies, dealing with issues such as separate voter registration and voting arrangements for women and men;
• administrative policies made by an EMB or other bodies; and
• codes of conduct (voluntary or otherwise) which may have a direct or indirect impact on the electoral process, such as for EMBs, election participants, observers, and election reporting by the media.
  
  

The organisation and administration of electoral processes always involves a substantial mass of detail, and is, particularly to those unfamiliar with it, surprisingly complex. It is therefore usual for it to be specified in written laws and regulations, rather than determined through unwritten tradition or administrative policy making. Written law and regulations provide the benefits of certainty, visibility, and transparency, are easier to subject to judicial review, and are accessible to interested parties, including electors. The legal certainty provided by a detailed exposition of electoral processes embedded in law, backed by constitutional authority, will tend to promote confidence in the consistency, fairness, and even-handedness of electoral administration, and provide clear opportunities for legal redress. The level of detail specified at different levels of the legal framework will vary from country to country, depending on factors such as systems of law and the levels of trust in EMBs to make fair and consistent decisions and policies.

Further detailed discussion of the legal framework for elections can be found in the topic area Legal Framwork.

 

The Powers, Functions and Responsibilities of an EMB

There is often no clear distinction in electoral law or practice between the powers and functions of an EMB. In some electoral laws, all EMB activities sanctioned by law are referred to as powers. In many electoral laws, ‘powers and functions’ are referred to jointly and in others, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the law merely lists activities that the EMB ’shall’ perform. It could be argued that an EMB’s powers refer to those activities for which an EMB can make, of its own accord, rules, directions or determinations that affect rights and activities of others, such as making regulations, and determining electoral disputes. These may be reviewable by other bodies. An EMB’s functions could then be described as those activities in which it merely implements decisions – for example in training staff or informing voters. These may also be subject to external review.

EMB powers and functions are influenced by many factors.

• The result of the negotiation processes among political forces, within the country or beyond, which paved the way for the EMB’s establishment, is generally a strong influence, particularly in countries recently emerging into democracy.
  
  

Other specific political, administrative, and geographic influences can include:

• the structure of the state (e.g. unitary or federal, presidential or parliamentary),
• demographics,
• the electoral system (for example single or multi-member electoral districts),
• and the existence of other electoral service providers.

 

The historical interaction of these factors within each country has created a wide variety of models for EMB powers and functions.

 

EMB Powers and Functions

The majority of EMBs have powers to make rules, regulations and determinations which are binding on all players in the electoral process: voters, political parties and candidates, the media and observers, provided such rules, regulations, and determinations are consistent with both the constitution and electoral laws.

There are some EMBs whose powers are executive, legislative, and judicial. For example, the establishment of powerful EMBs was necessary to curtail the dominance of the executive over the other branches of government under the oligarchic governments of Latin America at the turn of the 20th century. In countries such as Costa Rica and Uruguay, EMBs became known as the fourth branch of government. These EMBs can make regulations, directions, and reviews of regulations that are binding on the electoral processes, and their decisions cannot be reviewed by any other branch of government. They also have executive powers to call and conduct elections, to certify or nullify election results, and to resolve election disputes.

In other parts of the world, EMBs’ regulations are subject to review by the courts and must also be consistent with the electoral laws. Some EMBs have powers which combine executive powers with a greater or lesser degree of adjudicative power. For example, the EMBs in Cameroon, Romania, Papua New Guinea, and Philippines have powers to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute violations of electoral laws. In Cambodia, the EMB has powers to investigate and resolve disputes of an administrative nature or disputes which do not necessarily fall within the jurisdiction of the courts.

The majority of EMBs have powers which are primarily of an executive nature, related to implementing electoral activities. The Yemen EMB can initiate secondary legislation, while in many countries, EMBs can make regulations or issue proclamations.

In some countries, these powers extend to determining the election date, within parameters set by law that are often fixed to a time period defined by the end of an elected body’s term of office.

Some examples of EMB powers:

 

• In India and Pakistan, the EMB has the power to draw up an election schedule and issue the election writ.
• In Russia, the EMB can call an election if the legislature has failed to do so.
• In Yemen, the EMB has the power to call a by-election but not a general election.
• In some cases, such as Thailand and Uruguay, the EMB has the power to order re-polling if an election did not proceed in an honest and fair manner as defined in the law.
• Sub-district level committees of the Indonesian EMB can do likewise for individual polling stations.
• The Namibian EMB can order a re-poll in the event of violence or an emergency.

 

However, many EMBs have no influence on when an election is called. In countries such as Mexico and the United States, elections are held on a fixed date, and in many countries following the Westminster Model, the power to call elections is vested in the leader of the government or the president of the state.

 

Extent of Powers and Functions

Particularly in emerging democracies, electoral legal frameworks are being designed to cover all electoral process matters relevant to the delivery of free and fair elections. This can have the advantage of promoting electoral integrity by ensuring that the EMB exercises controls that reflect its responsibility for the entire process. In many countries, the EMB is responsible for a wide range of activities throughout the electoral cycle.

Apart from the essential (or core) powers and functions of:

 

• determination of who is eligible to vote;
• determination of political parties and/or candidates eligible to contest an election;
• organisation and conduct of polling;
• counting of votes;
• aggregation of votes;

 

other EMB activities may include:

 

• making national or regional electoral policies;
• planning of electoral services;
• training of electoral staff;
• conduct of voter information/education and civic education;
• delimitation of electoral district boundaries;
• electoral logistics;
• identification and registration of voters;
• development and maintenance of a national voters register;
• registration of political parties;
• regulation of financing of political parties;
• political party pre-selections or primaries;
• regulation of the conduct of political parties and candidates;
• regulation of the conduct of the media during elections;
• regulation of opinion surveys;
• training of political parties’ and candidates’ poll watchers;
• accreditation and regulation of the conduct of election observers;
• announcement and certification of election results;
• adjudication of electoral disputes;
• reviews and evaluations of electoral framework adequacy and EMB performance.
• advising the government and legislature on electoral reform issues;
• participating in international electoral assistance services, including observation missions in neighbouring countries.

 

Responsibility for Voter Registration

Voter registration is sometimes required by the electoral legal framework to be attached to a national identification or civil registration system, which is controlled by an authority other than the EMB. In these cases, the voter registration made by an authority other than the EMB is a purely administrative action. If there is any dispute (for example, if someone is alleged to be registered without being eligible for suffrage, or has allegedly been wrongly omitted from the voters register), the EMB has to determine voter eligibility, and not the civil registration authority. In other countries, a body other than the EMB is responsible in electoral law to develop and compile the electoral register.

However the voters register is compiled, the basic concern is that the data contained in it must be accurate and credible. Implementation of voter registration by an Independent Model EMB may result in more publicly credible voters registers than if they were derived from or compiled by a government department, even though using existing civil registration or ID system data may be more cost-effective. Whatever institution prepares voter register data, the EMB must verify that voters registers for use at polling stations are accurate.

In Peru, the electoral framework gives the EMB responsibility for issuing national identification documents and voter registration cards. This has worked well and has made the task of compiling and maintaining the electoral register a lot easier for the EMB. Quality control measures on voter registration, such as opportunities for public inspection by voters, are commonly embedded in electoral laws. In many developed countries where (electronic) population registers exist, the EMB regularly compares its voter registration records against the population register to identify unqualified or ‘phantom’ voters for removal.

 

Responsibility for the Registration and Funding of Political Parties

The registration of political parties, supervision of the contributions they receive and/or their expenditure, and disbursement of any public funding for parties and candidates, also sometimes fall outside the functions given to the EMB by the electoral legal framework. Political party registration can fall under i.e. a Ministry or the county courts, and political party funding and expenditures may be controlled by an agency other than the EMB. In countries such as Fiji, Russia, and Thailand, the EMB administers political party registration, funding, and disclosure provisions, and also serves as the guardian of political party symbols and independent candidates’ logos. In some countries, the EMB is responsible for auditing the accounts of political parties.

 

Election Campaign Responsibilities

Political party and candidate campaign codes of conduct may be included in the legal framework or be an EMB-brokered voluntary arrangement between parties. These codes are more effective if they have voluntary agreement from parties, but benefit from the EMB or election dispute resolution bodies being legally empowered to impose sanctions for breaches.

Several EMBs have a mandate in the electoral legal framework to regulate political parties’ campaign methods and conduct in general. Other EMBs have a role in regulating media allocations for party campaigns, or regulate the allocation of public media air time to parties and candidates. In Canada, the EMB appoints a broadcasting arbitrator to allocate paid and free time to registered political parties on the electronic broadcasting networks.

Elements of election campaigns that are not directly related to political party activities are also under the jurisdiction of some EMBs. For example, electoral law in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Russia regulates the publication of political opinion polling. Jurisdiction over this and other issues relevant to the media’s treatment of election ’news’ is more commonly left either to self-regulation or to a media council.

 

Voter Education Responsibilities

Voter education is a responsibility which is increasingly being added to EMB functions. Some EMB legal frameworks have clearly provided for the EMB to conduct voter education, while others have not. It is preferable that an EMB’s legal framework includes a voter education function, as this is indispensable for democratic consolidation especially in emerging democracies where both the art and the essence of voting are yet to be mastered and internalized. However, it would be harmful for the EMB or any other body to be given exclusive voter education rights or powers to restrict who may conduct voter education.

One cogent reason why the legal framework should empower the EMB to conduct voter education as a way of consolidating democracy is that otherwise, the government will be reluctant to fund voter education, citing as the reason that this function is not part of the EMB’s official mandate.

Voter education is too important, and its implementation too complex, to leave to the EMB alone 

• political parties,
• civil society,
• corporations, and
• government agencies such as education systems

may all have an important complementary role to play to help ensure that voters have all the information they need to make informed choices.

An EMB’s voter education responsibilities could be partially or wholly delegated to other institutions, including civil society. In Ghana, for example, there is a sister commission to the EMB which is responsible for civic and voter education, and in Thailand, the EMB is empowered to outsource voter education to private organisations

 

Validation of Election Results

It is common for electoral legal frameworks to give the function of certifying and announcing election results to the EMB, and to prescribe a time period within which the results must be announced. In a few cases, these functions are given to the Constitutional Court, or a Constitutional Council. In Denmark, the legislature is responsible for validating the results of national elections.

The Chief Justice of Zambia is the returning officer for the presidential election and is thus responsible for announcing its results. The National Technical Committee on Elections which was set up following the 2001 general elections recommended that the EMB take over the function of returning officer for the presidential election.

 

Supervision of Political Party Candidate Selections

It is not a common practice for the EMB to assume responsibility for parties’ selections of candidates, but the increasing pressure for internal party democratization has caused some election analysts to support this role for the EMB. Many EMBs in the US are involved in running primary elections for party candidates for elected offices. The EMB in the Australian state of Queensland has powers to conduct inquiries and audits of pre-selection or primaries of candidates for state and local elections. In Indonesia, Kenya, and Nigeria, candidates are required by law to submit to the EMB the minutes of the meetings where they were selected as candidates for a particular election.

 

Responsibility for Boundary Delimitation

It is common in many countries, especially those which follow the Commonwealth tradition, for the electoral legal framework to create a separate body or commission to assume responsibility for boundary delimitation. Such countries include Australia, Botswana, Canada, and India. Countries where the EMB takes responsibility for boundary delimitation include Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Georgia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Uganda, and Yemen. There are countries such as the United States in which the electoral law assigns boundary delimitation to the legislature. However, this practice can easily lead to the imposition of electoral district boundaries that are favourable to the current majority party in the legislature, thus institutionalizing a hold on power.

There are operational and cost-effectiveness advantages in the EMB taking responsibility for electoral district boundary delimitation. Boundary delimitation is, however, a politically divisive issue, and leaves an EMB open to attack by those who perceive their interests are not served by its results. Some electoral analysts therefore argue that boundary delimitation is best handled by a body other than the EMB, to shield it from potential politically motivated attacks that may damage the EMB’s credibility.

 

Electoral Observation Responsibilities

While independent election observation, by its nature, is conducted outside the control of the EMB, electoral legal frameworks often give EMBs functions related to observation. It is good practice for an EMB to accredit observers, guarantee their rights of observation, provide them with accreditation credentials and comprehensive background briefing materials, and define observers’ responsibilities, often in a legally enforceable code of conduct. Independent observation, especially in emerging democracies, can be a critical component of building public confidence in electoral processes.

Independent observation, by both domestic and international observers, by its nature must be free of control and interference by the EMB or any other authority, except those controls necessary to ensure observers’ authenticity, impartiality, and safety and to prevent disruption of electoral processes. Just as electoral laws take note of a country’s international treaty obligations, so too an EMB’s powers and functions in relation to observers need to recognize international standards – such as the United Nations-endorsed Global Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct for International Electoral Observation from 2005. Attempts to place impediments in the way of observation – such as charging a high fee for registration of each observer, or to over-regulate observation, such as the requirement in Indonesian electoral law that observers report all observation results to the EMB before publicly announcing them - may be seen as contrary to international standards.

 

International Activities

Although many EMB legal frameworks do not provide for participation in international electoral assistance missions, many EMBs do undertake these tasks on both a small and a large scale. EMBs which regularly participate in international technical cooperation include those of Australia, Canada, France, Ghana, India, Mexico, South Africa, and the UK, and such cooperation is both bilateral and multilateral. Many other EMBs regularly participate in international observation missions, particularly in neighbouring countries, or in professional contact and exchange activities facilitated by regional networks of election officials. The mandate of the Bangladesh EMB provides for EMB ‘support to the United Nations and its member states in organising elections by fielding of election monitors and observers and organising training for electoral personnel’. It is important that the legal framework for elections provide a mandate for the EMB to participate in international electoral activities. No EMB or country is an island unto itself and many EMBs are called on from time to time to render assistance to other EMBs, either as observers or technical advisors, or to host study missions from other EMBs.

 

Community Responsibilities of EMBs

Electoral legislation in some countries not only defines the powers and functions of the EMB, but also its responsibilities, or ‘obligations’. These would often include accountability measures, such as the requirement for audit or reporting on its activities to an external body such as the legislature.

The EMB's responsibilities may also include more normative elements of how it is expected to behave, which may be further elaborated in the EMB's code of conduct. Electoral legislation in Indonesia includes obligations on the EMB to provide a good service to all election participants and treat them fairly, determine and implement quality standards for election materials, maintain comprehensive electoral archives, inform the public fully of its activities, be accountable for its funding, and report to the president on the conduct of each election.

Even where not defined in the electoral legal framework, EMBs as upholders of democratic values have behavioural and access responsibilities to the community which they serve.

Some of these responsibilities relate to

• the probity and integrity of electoral management,
• others to issues such as transparency,
• gender balance,
• sensitivity to customs and traditions,
• treatment of ethnicity,
• providing electoral access to marginalised groups, and
• creating electoral conditions conducive to fair competition.

EMBs have overarching obligations to adopt good practice, so that their levels of integrity promote free and fair elections, their efficiency ensures that public funds are not wasted, and their service standards meet with public approval. If the best practice in election organisation could be easily identified, it would be the goal that electoral management bodies would strive to achieve. It is perhaps more realistic to aim to achieve targeted elements of good practice: this has the potential to straddle the barriers of the differences in electoral systems, and still achieve the delivery of free and fair elections.

 

Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest

EMBs make decisions involving the fast and effective spending of large budgets. High-value individual supply agreements – for items such as ballot boxes, ballot papers, and computer equipment – can be of huge benefit to the winning supplier. Connections between EMB members or staff, and suppliers, other election participants, and stakeholders who can gain benefit from EMB decisions can lead to perceptions of conflict of interest, damaging to the EMBs public credibility, or real conflicts of interest damaging to its integrity. General public service legislation may cover these issues in relation to public servants serving in EMBs. In Hungary, the law on public procurement, which deals with conflicts of interest, applies to the electoral process as well.

Conflict of interest provisions could be included in legislation or EMB regulations, and can be part of an enforceable code of conduct for EMB members and staff. They would usually specify that EMB members and staff who have an interest or potential interest in a matter that comes before the EMB for consideration and decision, should notify the EMB of their interest in a timely manner and refrain from participation in the consideration of that matter. To be effective, realistic enforceable sanctions for breaches of conflict of interest provisions are necessary, such as dismissal from the EMB or other disciplinary action.

The same is true of EMB members’ and staff contacts with or links to political parties and candidates. Such contacts or links should be disclosed in a timely manner and refrain from participation in making any decision that might benefit the relevant parties or candidates.

 

Gender Balance Responsibilities

EMBs have a responsibility to ensure that in their internal and external activities they reflect the gender composition of society. Elements of this responsibility may be defined in electoral law, such as ensuring that political parties nominate at least the specified levels of women candidates as required by law. Some may be taken on by the EMB as a social campaign, such as the EMB in Indonesia in 2004 returning party candidate lists for reconsideration where they did not meet the recommended (but not enforceable) 30 per cent women candidate quota. It is good practice for EMBs to promote equity by advocating that gender balance measures be included in electoral legislation, and by including such measures in their own regulations or codes of conduct.

Ensuring that there is gender balance in its own personnel and activities, whether or not required by electoral legislation or government policy, will promote EMB credibility and allow it to fully tap available resources for its membership, professional and support staff, permanent and temporary or ad hoc staff, consultants, and advisers. For example, in 2004, two of the five EMB members in Cambodia were women, as were two of the five members in Jamaica, five of the nine members in Latvia, and two of the five members in South Africa. It is equally important to ensure that women are represented fully throughout all levels of the EMB secretariat, and in its temporary election staff – as polling station managers, as well as polling station staff. The EMB needs to provide a good example on gender balance issues in all its activities. Some essential considerations are ensuring gender balance in the invitees and participants at workshops and seminars organized by the EMB, and the inclusion of gender-based issues in training and voter education programme content. This not only promotes the participation of women in political life, but enables the EMB to communicate more effectively with and respond to the needs of all of society.

 

Account of Ethnicity Issues

Ethnicity and diversity have become important factors in the organisation of multiparty democratic elections, especially in many emerging democratic societies, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In some countries, this has had an effect on public expectations of the EMB. Many stakeholders in elections in Nigeria have expressed strong views that the electoral system in that country should be reviewed to take full account of the ethnicity (diversity) issues that give rise to frequent regional and local conflicts. Through a selection and appointment of its members and senior staff that considers ethnic, regional, and linguistic balance, the EMB can convey a positive signal about the inclusiveness of the EMB’s management. This approach is more likely to gain the confidence and support of all ethnic groups for the EMB’s credibility and even-handedness, with positive effects on the eventual acceptance of election results.

 

Equality and Equity

The quality of non-partisanship and the ability to create a ‘level playing field’ for political participants are pillars on which an EMB can build good practice electoral management. A lack of electoral equity – for example, an electoral environment which is tilted in favour of the governing party - can undermine free and fair elections and the credibility of the EMB. While some of the factors and practices which contribute to electoral equity may lie outside the strict ambit of the EMB’s powers and functions, EMBs can work to ensure that the legal framework is fully utilised to promote equality and equity.

Some emerging democracies find the concept of ‘a level playing field’ unfamiliar. Countries influenced by Westminster models of government, or where the public service and state media have been required to have strict political loyalty to the ruling party, have traditions of electoral advantages lying with the government. Such advantages could be in the power to determine an election date without consultation, in the use of public resources for campaign activities, and in favourable access for the ruling party to the media.

In some countries, electoral law for transitional elections has attempted to even out the playing field by strictly controlling and limiting media advertising by the political contestants, requiring all campaign activities to be allocated equally by the EMB to each contestant, and forbidding the use of public resources for election campaigns.

The use of public resources for election campaigns is a challenge to EMBs in all countries. This is an area that is rarely covered in electoral legislation itself, although there are a few exceptions. Some EMBs, such as those of Bangladesh and India, have issued a code of conduct to govern the electoral use of public resources by ministers of government.

 

Broadly-based Access

Electoral law and public pressure are increasingly requiring EMBs to provide services to ensure that all eligible electors have genuine access to the electoral process. For example, the 2002 International Bill of Electoral Rights for People With Disabilities promotes equal rights of access to all electoral processes for people with disabilities. All access-extending services are costly, and need to be considered by the EMB and legislators in relation to its budgetary constraints.

Voters' special access needs may include:

 

• mobile registration and voting facilities for those in hospital, confined to the home or in prison;
• out of country voting;
• provision of voter registration and voting facilities for internally displaced persons, and in locations outside the country for significant refugee populations (as has been implemented for elections in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia and Sierra Leone);
• facilities for voting by post or before election day;
• ensuring that registration, polling stations, and equipment are accessible to voters with disabilities;
• providing electoral information materials suitable for those with visual or aural disabilities and providing registration or voting assistance to them where needed; and
• providing voting equipment such as ballot paper templates for the visually impaired (as in Canada).
  
  

EMB processes may also adopt preferential treatment for pregnant women, nursing mothers, the elderly, and people living with disability, especially during voter registration and polling.

Partnerships with civil society organisations or relevant government instrumentalities will assist the EMB in identifying the precise needs and may even help defray costs of providing access to marginalized groups.

The legal framework or EMB’s policies on electoral access may be informed or constrained by customary rules or traditions. These may relate to issues such as who may nominate candidates for particular offices, or the need to establish separate voting queues or locations for men and women. Other issues where custom or tradition may impinge on access (and electoral integrity) include the photographing of women for electoral ID cards, voting methods, and the use of visible indelible ink to mark voters. Where customary laws are deeply entrenched, the EMB can enhance its acceptance throughout society if its structures, policies, and procedures demonstrate respect for such customary practices, especially if this will not contradict EMB laws and policies or hinder its activities.

 

Direct Democracy Instruments

The conduct of electoral direct democracy instruments – referendums, citizens’ initiatives, and recall votes – raises issues which are for the most part similar to those raised by the conduct of elections. Additional issues may include the phrasing of the question(s) put to voters, verification of correct use of processes to call direct democracy votes – a contentious issue, for example, in Venezuela’s presidential recall vote in 2004 - and the regulation of campaigning and voter education. In the US state of Oregon, the EMB is required to distribute to every household, a collection of the position statements submitted by citizens on each issue submitted to referendum. It is usual for EMBs to be responsible for the organisation both of elections and of direct democracy instruments.

 

Functional Divisions between Electoral Institutions

It is common for some of the non-core potential functions, such as managing electoral logistics and training of electoral staff, of an EMB to be assigned in the electoral legal framework to another institution. It is also becoming more common for some non-core functions to be contracted out by an EMB – but this is a management, rather than a legal framework, issue. Functions that are often assigned in the legal framework to an institution separate from the EMB include boundary delimitation, voter registration, the registration and funding of political parties, electoral dispute resolution, the certification and announcement of election results, and voter education. If electoral functions are assigned to more than one institution, the legal and policy framework needs to be very clear on each institution’s functional responsibilities.

 

Summary:The Powers, Functions and Responsibilities of an EMB

• An EMB’s powers and functions may not be separately identified in its legal framework, and, apart from the essential elements of an EMB, can cover a greater or lesser variety of tasks, depending on factors such as the structure of the state, the electoral system and the number and type of organisations that provide electoral services.
• EMB core powers and functions (essential features) are:
  • determination of who is eligible to vote;
  • determination of political parties and/or candidates
  • eligible to contest an election;
  • organisation and conduct of polling;
  • counting of votes;
  • aggregation of votes;
• Most EMBs have powers and functions which are ‘executive’ - relating to the implementation of elections; some have adjudicative and a very few have legislative powers. Most EMBs’ activities are reviewable by judicial or other bodies.
• There may be advantages and disadvantages, which need to be carefully assessed, of assigning some electoral activities, such as boundary delimitation, compiling of data for voters registers, registration and funding of political parties, monitoring of political campaigns, voter education, and validation of election results, to be implemented by specialist bodes other than the EMB.
• EMBs have behavioural and access responsibilities to the communities they serve, which may extend beyond the minimum requirements of the electoral legal framework. These include promoting gender balance within the EMB itself and in political life, dealing fairly with issues of ethnicity, promoting equality and equity in electoral contests, providing equality of access to electoral services for all, and especially marginalized, members of society, and recognizing customary practices where these are in harmony with electoral management principles.
• The electoral legal framework and EMB policies can assist in guarding against inappropriate behaviour by EMBs by including provisions requiring that members and staff of EMBs avoid situations of conflict of interest.

 

EMB Composition and Roles

An EMB’s activities generally require both determining policy and implementing major administrative and logistics operations. In Governmental Model EMBs, both these functions are undertaken by public servants, employed within one or more bodies of the executive. While members of the executive branch of government, such as Ministers, may also take an active role in a Governmental Model EMB’s policy making, it is more common that its Secretariat head, who may be termed Director of Elections or the like, is responsible for policy. It is not usual for Governmental Model EMBs to have members: rather, they are fully composed of secretariat (public service) staff.

In Independent Model EMBs, the policy function is undertaken by a person or persons from outside the executive branch of government, specially appointed for this task. This person or persons are the EMB’s ‘members’. Their role is similar to that of the board of a corporation – to guide the direction of the EMB - though in many cases EMB members have a fulltime job and a more ‘hands on‘ role than would be usual for a corporate board. Similarly, in Mixed Model EMBs, the Independent component of the EMB is guided by a ‘board’ of members.

 

EMB Membership

EMB members need a very high level of management skills and commitment to maintaining integrity under pressure.

Given the range of skills necessary to ensure that an EMB can function effectively – such as legal, communications, education, logistics, corporate management – it would seem useful for the EMB to include members with a wide range of appropriate skills. Public confidence in EMBs is enhanced where the electoral legislation contains qualifications for appointment to EMBs that are clearly defined and appropriate for the complex task of impartially managing electoral processes, and mechanisms for selection and appointment that are transparent and based on the candidates’ merits. The mode of selection and appointment, and provisions for tenure, of members of the EMB vary from one country to another.

There are various titles for the members of EMBs, with similar meaning, but each with its own nuances, related to the basis, role, and powers of the policy-making members of the EMB. In Canada, where the Chief Electoral Officer is both the chief and sole policy maker and the head of administration (secretariat), he or she is called the EMB member or commissioner. ‘Commissioner’, however, is a term that is inconsistently applied. In Australia, the Electoral Commissioner is both the head of the secretariat and a full voting member of the EMB (although not the head of the EMB), while the deputy and assistant commissioners are staff of the secretariat. Similarly, the Jamaican Director of Elections, who is both the head of the secretariat and also a member of the EMB (but without a vote), may be referred to as a Commissioner. In Francophone countries and Latin America, the head of the EMB may be termed ‘President’.

Some EMBs have a chair who by law is known as the Chief Electoral Commissioner, and who serves as the EMB’s chief executive. The role of such a chair should be understood in the same way as that of an executive chair or executive director in the corporate world. Unlike other chairs in other EMBs, the Chief Electoral Commissioner has executive powers and is more hands-on in directing the electoral process. Although he or she may be assisted by other commissioners and the secretariat, the Chief Electoral Commissioner in these countries will have the final say in matters of finance and administration and also on key aspects of the electoral process.

 

Status of EMB Members

For an EMB to operate effectively, its members need to have a status that entitles them to respect from and an equal relationship with the government, the legislature, and society. The head of the EMB especially needs a status that affords her or him access to the highest levels of government, and ensures adherence to the EMB’s decisions. The Chair of the EMB in Pakistan (also known by law as Chief Electoral Commissioner) has the same conditions of service as the Chief Justice, as do his counterparts in numerous other countries. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Brazil, and Romania, the chair of the EMB has the rank of Minister, guaranteeing access to the legislature and the government, and in Yemen, the EMB chair has the rank of a Deputy Prime Minister, and EMB members have the rank of Minister.

While it is important that EMB members have a high status, it is also important that members do not then behave as though they are bigger than the EMB institution that they are serving, or come to be regarded by society as ‘the EMB’. Personality-based institutions can be highly polarising. A good practice model for EMB members to follow is to personalise the institution they serve, rather than institutionalise the person or persons leading the EMB.

 

The EMB Chair: A Special Role?

In some countries, the legal framework provides for a two-stream procedure for the appointment of EMB members: one for the chair and another for all other members. In some cases, the EMB chair serves as a "first among equals" appointed by the head of state/government at a level higher than the other members, and in others the legislature appoints the EMB chair, while the other members are appointed by the Head of State and the Prime Minister respectively. An EMB Chair can also be appointed at the level of a senior judge, while other members are at the level of judges of a lower court.

Where the EMB chair is appointed on different terms from the other members and at a higher level, he or she tends to play a more prominent role, over and above the role of presiding over the EMB’s meetings. He or she may have additional powers in relation to matters such as chairing various EMB internal subcommittees, actively supporting the secretariat in policy implementation and monitoring, and liaising with stakeholders. In Lithuania, for example, the EMB chair has specified powers to hire and fire staff, to keep and direct the use of the EMB seal, and also to represent the EMB in state institutions, in court, and in international organisations. In Liberia, the Chair of the National Elections Commission is also by law the official spokesperson for the Commission, though there are secretariat staff carrying out the day-to-day work of maintaining contacts with the media.

In many countries, all EMB members are appointed on the same terms, and the chair (and in some cases the vice-chair and secretary) is elected by his/her peers after the first meeting. In this context, the main responsibility of the chair is to preside over the meetings of the commission and/or its subcommittees if necessary.

There are no specific advantages or disadvantages associated with specifically appointing a person as EMB chair as a first among equals or having members of the EMB select their chair from among themselves. The appropriate practice depends on the context in which the EMB structure was originally designed and continues to function.

The case for a ‘first among equals’ EMB chair is stronger where the EMB is still nascent and requires some nurturing, and the position is full-time. This may also apply where the Chair is a full-time position and other members are part time. Where the EMB is a part-time body, it may be more appropriate for the chair to be elected by his or her peers and for him or her to have the same conditions of service as all other EMB members.

 

 

 

EMB Members: Respected Experts or Watchdogs on Each Other?

In countries where either Independent or Mixed Model EMBs exist, electoral legislation specifies the framework for the membership of the EMB. There is a myriad of different legal provisions that govern these critical issues, some of which are more conducive to EMB independence and others less so. A basic difference is in the distinction between a multiparty-based EMB and an expert-based EMB. Some countries have combined elements of both of these and have mixed EMBs.

 

Multiparty-based EMBs

Multiparty EMBs comprise a mixture of political party nominees as EMB members. The legal framework may entitle all political parties contesting an election to be represented on the EMB, or representation may be restricted by some threshold – for example, to those represented in the legislature or with more than a specified proportion of members in the legislature. In Venezuela in the mid 1990s, the larger parties each had their own representative, while smaller parties of the left and right were represented collectively.

Political party-based appointment often implies that EMB members are serving on the EMB as political party representatives or agents and, as well as impartially managing electoral processes, serve to ensure that their nominating political parties’ interests are protected. While each individual member is seen from outside as partisan, each is also ensuring that the others do not take partisan advantage – so the EMB can nonetheless credibly be perceived as an impartial body. Political party-based members often hold office for a fixed term and cannot be dismissed except for cause, such as a breach of their duties, or upon their withdrawal by their nominating authority. Allowing parties to replace their representatives at their own discretion is potentially very disruptive of the work of the EMB.

In some countries, however, political party nominees to the EMB are eminent persons who are required to maintain high standards of impartiality and professionalism, and thus they do not serve as political party representatives on the EMB, although in some cases it has not been easy for even these eminent political party nominees to be completely impartial.

Many countries, especially those that experienced difficult transitions from authoritarian rule to multiparty democracy, have chosen multiparty-based or partisan EMBs. In such societies, public servants are likely to have been largely discredited as electoral policy makers due to a history of being agents of the authoritarian former ruling party or military regime. Additionally, the fight against authoritarianism may have polarized society to the extent that it is difficult to find public figures widely accepted as ‘independent’ to serve on the EMB for a transitional election. Many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe adopted multiparty-based EMBs during their transitions.

Many electoral analysts believe that having political party representatives on the EMB engenders consensus among actors in the electoral contest and contributes to enhanced transparency, all of which lead to improved confidence in the electoral process. Voters may feel more encouraged to participate in elections if their political party leaders are playing an active role in the electoral process, specifically through representation on the EMB.

Multiparty EMBs may assist in promoting trust and confidence in electoral processes in the initial stages of democratic transitions. Depoliticization of EMBs may be more appropriate as confidence in the electoral process grows.

On the other hand, a political party-based EMB can put at risk or cripple decision-making, especially in situations where their critical interests are at stake. The presence of politicians on the EMB may undermine confidentiality in matters such as the security of balloting materials. Multiparty-based EMBs also tend to generate dissatisfaction, especially among minority parties which might be excluded from sitting on the EMB either because they are not represented in the legislature or because they did not participate in the negotiation leading to the initial appointments of EMB members.

 

Expert-based EMBs

Expert-based or non-partisan EMBs are those which the legal framework requires to be made up of individuals appointed on the basis of their professional standing. In some cases, members of an expert-based EMB may be nominated by political parties or civil society, but this does not imply that such nominees will be directed by their nominating political parties or act in a partisan manner.

Qualifications to be a member of an expert-based EMB may include

• impartiality,
• minimum age,
• professional qualifications, and
• electoral knowledge.
  
  

Expert-based EMB members are often eminent public figures renowned for political neutrality with expertise in fields such as law, public administration, political science, or the media. As of 2006, expert-based EMBs can be found in countries such as Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Poland, South Africa, and Thailand. The law in many of these countries provides that EMB members must not have been active in party politics in the recent past, and must not be a political party member whilst a member of the EMB.

Brazil is an example of a judicial EMB: elections there are the responsibility of national and state electoral tribunals, which are considered a specialized segment of the judicial branch, comprising judges of various categories, along with a small number of expert lawyers; below the tribunals, regular judges are detailed for a short time to oversee electoral preparations and operations in each electoral ‘zone’ (district) in the country.

In Canada, the Chief Electoral Officer is not allowed to vote in any federal election or referendum.

 

EMBs with Both Expert and Multiparty Membership

Some electoral legal frameworks specify that EMB members should be partly drawn from independent technocrats - such as judges, academics, civil society representatives and career public servants - and partly from appointments by political parties. This may combine advantages from both models, producing even-handed bodies that have both political party buy-in and transparency in their operations.

This ‘combined’ model can be implemented in various ways. In Croatia, a standing EMB formed from five members of the legal profession is augmented for election periods by three members of each of the majority and opposition blocs in the legislature, all with equal voting rights. Thus, only if opposing political tendencies agree can the independent members be outvoted. In Hungary, the chair and four members of the National EMB are elected by the legislature, and the political parties participating in the elections delegate one member each. The elected and delegated members have equal rights. Decisions of the EMB are made by simple majority, and decisions may be appealed to a court. In Mexico, the EMB is a permanent body comprising eight expert members plus a representative of each political group in the legislature and of each national political party. However, in the Mexican case, the legislators and party representatives are non-voting members.

Similarly to multiparty EMBs, ‘combined’ EMBs can find decision-making difficult. For example, in the 1999, Indonesian elections the ‘combined’ EMB was unable to validate the election results because members representing some very minor political parties refused to sign off on the validation unless their parties were allocated seats to which they were not entitled by their votes. This has been the rationale in some cases for making the party representatives non-voting members of their respective EMBs.

For a comparative table on advantages and disadvantages of multiparty, expert and ‘combined’ EMBs, see “Advantages and Disadvantages of Multiparty, Expert, and Combined EMBs” on the right hand side bar.

 

Advantages and Disadvantages of Multiparty, Expert, and Combined EMBs

 

 

 

Full-time or Part-time EMB Members?

Whether it is more appropriate for EMB membership to be a full- time or part-time position will depend on the electoral and administrative circumstances. In a permanent EMB, workloads may be high throughout the electoral cycle, and demand that EMB members be full time and thus readily available for speedy consultation and decisions. Full-time EMB members may be a good option in a situation of recurring activities, such as regular partial or by-elections, voter education, continuous voter registration, or continuing electoral law reforms. In a temporary EMB, the election-period workload may be such that full-time members are preferable. Full-time EMB membership may also be appropriate where there are doubts about the impartiality and skill levels of the EMB’s secretariat.

Some electoral legal frameworks require that EMB appointments be full-time. Other countries appoint full-time EMB members even though it is not a legal requirement. In 2006, all members of the South African EMB but one (a sitting judge) hold full-time office, although this is not a legal requirement.

On the other hand, in countries where election dates are fixed and the EMB has limited responsibility between elections, it may be advisable to have part-time EMB members. This arrangement applies in countries such as Botswana, Cambodia, Croatia, Jamaica, Japan, and Namibia. In some countries, members of the EMB are part-time while the chair and deputy are full-time. Alternatively, members could serve part time in non-electoral periods and full time during electoral periods.

The benefit of having full-time EMB members must always be weighed against the cost of their services, when it may be years before the next election. There is also the risk of a potential conflict between senior members of the secretariat and full-time EMB members, especially when the former begin to interpret the full-time presence of the EMB members as interfering in implementation of policy.

 

How Many EMB Members?

The electoral legal framework will generally specify the number of members of the EMB. It is not possible to specify an exact number for multiparty EMBs whose membership is determined by a criterion such as party representation in the legislature, as this number may vary over time.

The number of members of an EMB varies considerably worldwide, and need not be related to the size of the country. As of 2006, in the small country of Lesotho, the EMB has three members, whilst Nigeria, a much bigger country, has a 13-member EMB. However, countries like Canada, despite its sizeable land mass, and India, with about 600 million voters, have one-member and three-member EMBs, respectively. Having a larger number of members of the EMB may provide for broader representation, whereas a smaller number can facilitate discussion and decision-making.

EMBs which include political party nominees tend to have higher numbers of members, so as to accommodate a credible range of political interests, while expert-based EMBs tend to have fewer members. Having an uneven number of members of the EMB ensures that simple majority vote decisions can be made without having to resort to measures such as giving the EMB chair a casting vote.

In some cases, electoral law allows for the appointment of alternate or deputy members to EMBs. Under certain circumstances, a deputy member can then automatically take the place and exercise the powers of a member.

 

Term of Office of Members of Permanent EMBs

In many permanent EMBs, EMB members have a specified term of office. Some EMBs’ terms of office are defined in relation to the legislature’s term of office. In the case of EMBs with an unspecified term of office, members remain in office once appointed until they reach retirement age, unless they resign or are removed. Usually, the chair remains in office until he or she reaches retirement age.

The advantage of limiting the term of office is that it promotes constant generation of new ideas through new appointments. However, on the flipside, such a practice may undermine institutional experience, especially if EMB members’ terms coincide with a single electoral cycle. Many electoral laws which specify limited terms of office for EMB members allow for extension of the term by mutual consent between the appointee and the appointing authority. Some countries limits EMB members to two terms of office, while others do not put a limit to EMB members’ terms of office. The terms of EMB members can also be staggered. For example, a seven-member EMB could have one seat come up for (re-)appointment each year.

Staggering EMB members’ terms of office greatly assists retention of institutional experience and provides for smooth leadership succession. If appointments to the membership of the EMB are not staggered, the new EMB members should be appointed several months the last election to allow the former EMB members to have completed and reported on their election evaluation, and long enough before the next election for the new EMB members to master their responsibilities before the election period commences.

 

Recruitment and Appointment of EMB Members

The process for appointing members of any EMB is generally defined in electoral law, and the recruitment and selection methods may also be defined in the electoral legal framework. Appointment may be by the head of state, a judicial body, the executive, or in some cases by political parties, and may be consultative or unilateral. Recruitment and selection may be from closed nominations or from open advertising, may include some form of public or private test of merit and integrity, and may be from a pool of nominees or only the exact number of nominees required. Recruitment processes may be able to be more open for expert-based EMBs than for EMBs whose membership is wholly or partially nominated by political parties.

 

Recruitment through Open Advertisement

In some countries, members of an expert-based EMB are recruited through open advertisement, and interested candidates may apply directly to be considered for appointment; in a few cases, they may also be nominated by members of the public, or by civil society organisations or specified professional bodies such as the Bar Association. Applications are received and screened (through public interviews) by an independent body (for example, a judicial selection committee or a committee of the legislature). In Botswana, all applications are received by the EMB secretariat and are forwarded to an all-party conference which nominates 15 candidates to the judicial service commission. The latter appoints five members from the all-party conference nominees in addition to the EMB chair (who must be a judge of the Supreme Court) and his or her deputy (who must be a legal professional).

While open advertising and screening mechanisms can provide a broad range of applicants for EMB member positions and promote competency in selections of members, it does not necessarily guarantee that the most appropriate candidates are chosen. Where the mechanism for screening and appointing EMB members is dominated by one political grouping, competent candidates not in favour with this grouping may have lesser chances of selection.

Some advantages and disadvantages of open advertising for members of EMBs:

 

Nomination of Candidates for EMB Membership by the Head of State and Confirmation by or in Consultation with the Legislature

In some countries, the process of appointing expert-based EMB members is initiated by the head of state, who nominates candidates to the legislature for confirmation. Examples include Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Ukraine, and Yemen. Involving the legislature, including opposition parties, in the confirmation process can help to provide some degree of multi-partisan support for the appointments. For example, in Indonesia, the president determines a pool of nominees equal to twice the number of vacancies and notifies the legislature, which then conducts a written and public oral examination ‘fit and proper test’ of each nominee, before voting to rank the nominees, and sending the appropriate number of highest-ranked nominees to the president to be appointed. In some Commonwealth countries, including Fiji, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago, the head of state appoints EMB members on the advice of the prime minister and following consultation with the leader of the opposition. In Papua New Guinea, there is an Electoral Commission Appointments Committee made up of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Appointments, and the Chair of the Public Service Commission.

The division of EMB appointment powers between the executive and legislature provides for checks and balances in appointment procedures and enhances the appointment process. If one branch of the government (especially the executive) has the sole right to appoint EMB members, the danger is that such appointees, even if they are men and women of integrity, may be perceived by the public, and especially the opposition parties, as pawns of the appointing authority.

Even if the power to appoint the EMB members is divided between the executive and the legislature, this arrangement will be fettered if the two branches are dominated by the same party, or if the executive effectively controls the legislature. In this case, the requirement of a two-third legislative majority to approve EMB appointments could be a useful remedy, because it may guarantee veto power to minority parties: this is the case in Mexico, Nigeria, Uruguay, and Yemen.

 

Unilateral Appointments of EMB Members by One Branch of Government

Where EMB members are appointed unilaterally, for example by the head of state, no other consent is required, and there may be no consultation with or advice received from any other institutions, such as the legislature, political parties, or civil society, before making EMB appointments. If the head of state does have such consultations or take advice – and in many occasions this does take place – it is informal and not binding. In countries such as India, Malaysia, Senegal, and Zambia, the head of state unilaterally appoints members of the EMB. The unilateral appointment of EMB members, especially by the executive, has been criticized by many analysts, who argue that it could encourage the head of state to appoint EMB members who are government and ruling party sympathizers rather than impartial arbiters in the electoral process.

In other countries, such as Costa Rica, the Supreme Court of Justice unilaterally appoints members of the EMB. Their appointment is made by two-thirds of the members of the court.

 

Involvement of Other Actors in EMB Appointment

An alternative that is used to limit executive influence over EMB appointments is to involve judicial and non-state actors in either the nomination or the vetting of candidates. This can be done by a judicial body, by civil society organisations, academia, or by professional bodies such as the Bar Association.

 

Qualifications for Appointment

Whether the personal qualifications required for appointment to an EMB are detailed in electoral law generally depends on whether the EMB is expert-based or multiparty-based. For multiparty EMBs, it is more usual that political parties use their own criteria for appointing their representatives to the EMB, such as

• seniority in the political party hierarchy,
• political party membership,
• or professional qualification.
  
  

There are some multiparty EMBs for which the law defines criteria for members' qualifications, such as

• not being a party activist or
• not having held political office recently.
  
  

In Burkina Faso and Mozambique, for example, members of the multiparty EMB are by law expected to be professionally qualified and to carry out their work with integrity, independence, and impartiality. This means that political parties are obliged to nominate candidates who meet the qualifications of non-partisanship and independence. Such nominees are in many cases eminent members of the community rather than members of the political parties which nominated them.

In the case of expert-based EMBs, the electoral law may define an extensive set of personal qualifications for EMB members.Alternatively, the law may rely on its definition of the EMB’s expected behaviour and functions to define the qualities of EMB members to be appointed.

It is usual to expect EMB members to meet the criteria of professional competence and political neutrality. In some countries, professional qualifications include legal training and experience, especially for the chair, who in many cases must be a judge or a judge or former judge or somebody qualified for senior judicial appointment. In some cases, EMB members must have a law degree or university-level law education, while in others, members of the EMB must have at least a university degree. Other formal requirements for EMB membership would generally include citizenship, and often include age.

The manner in which EMB members are nominated for appointment may influence the type of person chosen, which may discriminate in favour of or against certain sectors of society. For example, in Indonesia in 2001, it appears that the initial nominations for potential members of the new EMB were sought solely from distinguished academics: thus the bulk of the persons nominated for consideration as members of the EMB were also academics. Apparently open processes may hide a more controlled environment of appointment to EMBs. For example, in 1999, the law on the EMB in Azerbaijan required that half the EMB members be appointed by the legislature and half by the president. With the president’s party totally controlling the legislature, this resulted in a nominally non-partisan but in reality government-influenced EMB.




While some electoral laws specify that EMB members must follow a certain occupation (e.g. all judges and/or eminent legal practitioners), few specify any appropriate mix of experience or skills. Where qualifications are required, these are generally legal. In the corporate world, a company with activities as large and broad as an EMB’s would be unlikely to have a narrowly focused board.

In some countries, the electoral law identifies persons who may not be appointed as members of the EMB. For many Independent or Mixed Model EMBs, this includes incompatibilities of position – for example members may not be a member/recent member of a political party, an elected representative of the people, or concurrently hold a government position. Other barriers to EMB membership, such as health qualifications, may allow hidden discrimination.

For a comparative table on “Qualifications Stated in Electoral Law for Appointment to Four Recently Reformed ‘Expert’-Based EMBs”, see bar on the right hand side.

 

Conditions of Service and Security of Tenure for EMB Members

In those countries where EMB members hold full-time office, their conditions of service, especially salaries and benefits, are determined either by law or by decisions taken by the head of state/government in consultation with other offices, such as the legislature, a Public Service ministry (or commission or similar body), or the treasury. Members of the EMB may be appointed under the same conditions of service as senior judicial officers, or other senior public officials.

In those countries where members of the EMB serve in a part-time capacity, it is usual for them to receive a sitting allowance when they attend EMB meetings, as happens in Botswana. Some countries (e.g. Namibia) augment this with a monthly retainer allowance. Such allowances are determined by the government in line with its own policies and regulations.

In many countries, EMB members’ remuneration is charged directly to the consolidated fund. This arrangement assures members’ benefits and salaries during their term of office and assists them to maintain full independence in their work.

EMB members’ security of tenure and immunity from any unwarranted harassment – such as salary cuts, reductions in conditions of service, or malicious prosecution - and removal from office by either the executive or any other authority enables members of the EMB to carry out their work impartially, professionally, without fear and favour, and resisting political pressures. EMB members may be less confident to take decisions which are unpopular with the executive or the legislature if they know that they may be removed from office, or their salaries and conditions reduced, without due process of law.

In many countries, the tenure protection for EMB members in the electoral law is the same as that for senior judicial officers: they can only be removed from office for a cause, such as misconduct, or mental and physical incapacity. Protection from arbitrary reductions in salary and conditions of service may also be guaranteed by law. In some other cases, the President may remove a member for a cause.

Protecting the tenure of party representatives on multiparty based EMBs can be a complex issue. If parties are responsible for appointment and removal of their representatives, they may also be free to replace their EMB representatives when they wish. Alternatively, the law could state that EMB members, whether nominated and appointed by political parties or otherwise, are independent from their appointing authority; in this case, any interference by the appointing authority in their work could be prohibited and punishable by law.

 

Oath/pledge-taking or Affirmation

In some countries, EMB members take a formal oath or a pledge of allegiance, loyalty, and integrity before taking office. The oath or pledge may be administered by a senior official or judicial officer. The oath/pledge-taking binds the EMB members to uphold the Constitution and the electoral laws of the country. The text of the oath or pledge may be simple, or more detailed. It may also include or refer to the code of conduct or any law governing conflict of interest for EMB members.

 

EMB Decision-Making Processes

Methods of making EMB decisions vary according to the Model of EMB, a country’s decision-making culture, and the requirements of electoral law.

In Governmental Model EMBs, where EMBs rarely have ‘members’ and administration may be directed from the executive branch of government, the EMB’s role may be as much one of proposing as determining action. Powers to determine policy and administrative issues may be delegated to the chief of the EMB secretariat by the government institution within which it is located.

For Independent EMBs and the independent component of Mixed Model EMBs, electoral law may specify some decision-making issues, such as election of the chair, decision making powers of the EMB chair and/or EMB members meeting in plenary, requirements for majority or super majority votes, role of the chair in voting, and use of casting votes.

While some key decision-making issues may be covered by the electoral law, it is usual for the detail of the EMB’s decision-making processes to be defined in standing orders or administrative procedures determined by the members of the EMB. Such documents may define a range of issues, including EMB member authorities, such as:

• the role of the chair;
• responsibilities for decision making and abilities to delegate these;
• methods of calling EMB meetings;
• frequency of meetings;
• responsibility for meeting agendas, processes of decision-making – proposals, rules of discussion, and types of voting and/or requirements for consensus;
• attendance at meetings and quorums; rights and roles of secretariat staff at meetings;
• invitations to outsiders to attend EMB meetings;
• taking, authenticating, and issuing meeting minutes; method of issuing EMB policies and directions;
• methods of suspending or altering the standing orders; and
• responsibilities for media conferences.
  
  

In many instances, a quorum is formed by 50 per cent of the members, and decisions are taken by simple majority of the EMB members present. However, in some cases, EMB decisions must be taken by consensus; or members present during a meeting may not be allowed to abstain from voting; or a member with a dissenting opinion on a matter may not be able to prevent the execution of the majority decision.

 

Meetings of EMB Members

The electoral law, or internal EMB regulations, may require decisions on particular matters – such as issuing of subsidiary regulations, validation of election results, staff appointments, or decisions affecting stakeholders’ electoral rights – to be agreed in a plenary session of EMB members. Regular EMB member meetings also assist in developing agreed policy directions, reviewing EMB performance, and providing guidance on policies to EMB secretariat staff.

Whilst full-time EMB members may be available daily to provide direction to EMB secretariat staff, part-time members of EMBs are more likely to merely meet occasionally to deliberate on policies and activities which shape the EMB’s operations. Outside election periods, full-time membership EMBs may meet every week. Part-time membership EMBs usually meet less frequently, often monthly. During peak electoral event periods, more frequent meetings are usual: full-time EMBs may meet as often as daily. It is common for EMB member meeting minutes to be signed by both the chair and the secretary, and in some cases (especially of multiparty EMBs) by all members of the EMB, as a way of authenticating them.

 

Closed or Open EMB Meetings

EMB meetings that are open to the public may promote greater trust in the EMB. Where meetings are open to the public by law, it is important that the EMB publicises the dates of its meetings. Decisions taken during each meeting still need to be publicised. It is also important that the EMB cooperates with the police to ensure the maintenance of security and protocol during EMB sessions. In some cases, the law provides for EMB meetings to be open to members of the public, and/or members of the public may record or film EMB sessions provided such activities do not disrupt the proceedings.

On the other hand, EMB meetings may be closed to any person who is not a member, unless he or she attends by special invitation. Closed EMB meetings may allow more open discussion, especially on sensitive matters, and members do not have to fear public reprisal for personal views on any matter brought before the EMB. However, closed meetings reduce the transparency of EMB decision-making and can lead to public suspicions about the influences on the EMB. Any closed EMB meetings need to be followed closely by a public announcement or media conference on their deliberation and results. Posting minutes and summaries of EMB meetings on public notice boards and EMB websites can keep the public informed about the EMB’s decisions and activities.

 

EMB Member Committees

For EMBs with a relatively large number of members, it can be advantageous for the EMB to form committees to oversee or manage some of its activities. In some countries, the formation of such committees, responsible to the full membership of the EMB, has allowed greater specialization and concentration by EMB members on key policy tasks. They may be an advantageous means of rationalising oversight workloads during peak electoral activity periods. In a few cases, such committees have powers to co-opt non-EMB members, such as professionals from outside the EMB, or EMB secretariat staff.

Where EMB members are involved in day-to-day leadership and management of the EMB’s activities, as was the case in Indonesia in 2004, allocating specific direction and oversight tasks in this manner clarifies responsibilities and provides greater surety to secretariat staff.

 

EMB Members Relationships With The EMB Secretariat

In Independent and Mixed Model EMBs, the relationship between the members of the EMB and the secretariat is critical. Appropriate roles for EMB members can vary widely. EMBs made up of part-time members are more likely to adopt a more hands-off approach of providing broad policy review and oversight, whilst those with full time membership may be more directly involved. Members of Mixed Model EMBs may be less likely to be involved in detailed administration issues, and more involved in overall integrity and quality control. Especially in elections marking transitions to multiparty democracy, members of Independent Model EMBs using a public service secretariat, and members of Mixed Model EMBs, may find it prudent to assume a publicly visible operational management role to enhance the public credibility of the electoral process.

Matters that can promote an effective working relationship between EMB members and secretariat include a clear delineation of powers and tasks between members and the secretariat, clear hierarchical authority between the members and the secretariat, and competent appointments leading to mutual respect between members and secretariat. For a trusting relationship between EMB members and the secretariat, it is important, where public servants make up an Independent Model EMB’s secretariat, that they report directly and only to the EMB, not also to an outside department of government. In Mixed Model EMBs and Governmental Model EMBs, a single departmental reporting responsibility for electoral issues handled by secretariat staff is highly preferable for the same reasons.

Attendance by the head of the secretariat or his/her nominee at all EMB plenary meetings, as an invited speaker or guest (as in Indonesia), a non-voting EMB member (as in Jamaica), or an EMB members with full rights (as in Australia), reinforces the links between EMB members and secretariat and ensures that all meetings have the benefit of advice on the practical operations of the EMB.

 

Internal Regulations

An EMB will generally need to issue and maintain a series of regulations governing the internal functioning of its operations. These may cover administrative, financial, and technical issues, such as staff safety and security, authorizations to speak to the media, meeting procedures and standing orders, internal committees’ membership, logistics controls, purchasing, asset controls, financial disbursements, and records management. These regulations may have more impact if required to be agreed and formally issued by the members of the EMB (or chief of the secretariat in a Governmental Model EMB).

EMBs could delegate powers to make less critical internal rules to specified members of the secretariat. Distribution of these rules to all EMB members and staff (in regional/local as well as central offices) will promote adherence. Clear and enforceable sanctions for breaches of these regulations are necessary. Enforcement procedures need also to be fully and openly defined, and follow accepted principles of justice. For Governmental Model EMBs, and other EMBs using public service staff, the appropriate public service regulations may apply automatically; modification for EMB use might also be possible

 

Summary: EMB Composition and Roles

• Independent and Mixed Model EMBs are guided by a ‘board’ of EMB members. With very few exceptions, Governmental Model EMBs do not have EMB members, only secretariat staff.
• There is no optimal number of members of an EMB or superiority of full-time or part-time EMB membership. The size of the country and its population, economic and geo-political issues, the EMB’s powers and functions, the strength of the EMB’s secretariat, and whether the EMB follows the Independent or the Mixed Model may determine the size and work schedule of the EMB membership.
• EMB members need to have sufficient status to entitle them to respect from their counterparts in other sectors of society, and constitutional or legal guarantees of their conditions of service and security of tenure sufficient to enable them to act without fear or favour.
• Independent and Mixed Model EMBs may have a membership that is multiparty – nominated by political parties qualified to do so, or expert - politically non-aligned members appointed on the basis of their professional skills, or combined – a mixture of political and professional appointees. Each type of membership may be suitable for a country, depending on its political environment and stage of democratic development.
• Fixed and secure terms of office for EMB members allows for institutional confidence and renewal. Staggering EMB members’ terms of office minimises disruptions and assists in retaining an EMB’s institutional memory.
• A quality EMB membership selection process can be achieved by open advertising for candidates and ranking all applicants according to a transparently applied ‘fit and proper’ test. The most widely accepted procedure for EMB appointment is for one branch of government to nominate and another to confirm. This process could start with the executive or judiciary and end with the legislature or vice versa.
• Electoral law would usually specify qualifications to be an EMB member, which would generally include citizenship, good repute, ability to act impartially, and professional qualifications or knowledge. They may include other factors such as age, health, holding or not holding specified positions (particularly in relation to political party membership or leadership), and residence.
• EMB members need to develop decision-making and management mechanisms suitable for the type of EMB and the country’s management culture. They need to adopt standing orders that ensure transparent EMB meeting and decision-making processes, and internal regulations for the good administration of the EMB. It may be useful for the EMB membership to form subcommittees dealing with various aspects of electoral administration.
• A good working relationship between an EMB’s members and its secretariat is critical for the effective functioning of the EMB.

 

Planning and Implementing EMB Activities

The internal functioning and the organisation of an EMB will depend on its structure, its powers and its responsibilities. Some EMBs may undertake all of the essential elements (core functions) of elections, while others might only be responsible for some of them. No matter which of the essential elements the EMB is responsible for, how many EMBs a country may have, or if the administration of elections is decentralised or not - the management of elections is concerned with the same internal structuring and organisational issues.

To function, an EMB needs to establish a team of staff, a plan for the conduct of elections, and procedures that will ensure that the electoral process is successfully run within budget, in compliance with the law, and in a timely manner.

Sub-sections of this chapter:  

• The EMB Secretariat
• Developing an EMB organisational structure
• The Election Calendar – A Planning Assistant
• EMB Internal Rule Making
• Strategic Planning
• Operational Planning
• EMB Budget
• Staffing of EMBs
• Procurement by the Election Management Body (EMB)
• Communications and Public Relations
• Records Management
• Report Writing

 

The EMB Secretariat

The organisational structure of an EMB comprises two key tiers: the policy-making level and the implementation level.

The secretariat often refers to the structure below the policy-making EMB member level, and encompasses the officials in the EMB who are responsible for policy implementation. The secretariat staff may work either part time or full time. These officials are responsible for executing EMB policies and activities, including planning and organising elections. In Governmental Model EMBs, the secretariat almost always is the EMB, and may also assist in making policy under executive branch of government direction. In Independent Model EMBs, the EMB secretariat is the structure below the policy-making EMB member level. In Mixed Model EMBs, a secretariat may service the administrative needs of the policy-making and oversight functions undertaken by the independent component of the EMB, while the governmental component of the EMB is the secretariat for electoral implementation.



Secretariats in Governmental and Mixed Model EMBs may be temporary, or part-time, assuming other duties in periods without electoral activity. In Independent Model EMBs, the secretariat is generally headed by a full-time administrator, with a title such as EMB Chief Executive Officer, Director of Elections, Secretary-General, or Chief Electoral Officer, or the EMB Secretary. In Australia, the person holding this position is called the Electoral Commissioner, and is also a member of the three-person EMB. In some smaller Independent EMBs, there may however not be a full-time secretariat except during election periods, and its secretariat head may have other duties than duties related to elections.

The two tiers are independent in the Independent Model EMB and part of the executive for the Governmental Model EMB. For the Mixed Model EMB, the top tier (policy making level) is Independent from the executive, while the lower implementation level is part of the executive, and usually lies under the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Justice.

 

The EMB Secretariat and the Public Service

The procedure for appointing the EMB secretariat varies. In countries which use the Governmental or Mixed Model, elections are implemented by the executive through a ministry or local authorities. The secretariat staff of the EMB are normally public servants, appointed by the executive through the same rules and regulations which apply to all public service appointments, and subject to public service policies on rotation, training, and dismissal. There is commonly no mention in the electoral law of these issues.

Such public servants may be engaged in election administration full time. On the other hand, they may have other duties during electoral off-seasons and only be engaged in electoral work during elections. They are then deployed or seconded to the electoral office to assist with various tasks, such as boundary delimitation, voter registration, voter education, political party and candidate registration, voting, and vote counting.

For Independent Model EMBs, in some countries the secretariat staff working for the EMB are directly appointed by the EMB under staffing structures and conditions determined by the EMB, while in other countries they are public servants and their salaries and conditions of service are linked to the public service. Even where secretariat staff are public servants, they may hold statutory appointments under electoral law.

The extent to which the EMB enjoys powers to hire and fire its public servant staff can be an indication of the extent to which the EMB is independent of the government. In countries where the chief electoral officer is the EMB’s chief executive, he or she may be appointed by the president. A recent external review of the 2004 Botswana general elections recommended that the power to appoint the EMB’s chief executive should be vested in the EMB rather than the president.

In some countries, the staff of the EMB are all public servants. All EMB appointments can, for example, be linked to public service salaries and conditions of service. The EMB may then determine the conditions of service for temporary election staff, such as polling station staff. In some cases, the remuneration of polling staff may have to be approved by the Treasury. In Canada, the EMB’s returning officers (managers) at the electoral district level are appointed by the government and not by the EMB. This practice has been regarded as a weak link in electoral administration, especially in Canada (see case study).

Critical issues to consider when determining whether to use public servants as EMB secretariat staff are those of political neutrality and job fit or skill levels. Public servants may be publicly regarded as associated with or easily influenced by the government, on whom they depend for their appointment, promotions, and salaries, thus affecting the credibility of the EMB. Strong Independent or Mixed Model EMBs can overcome this impression.

In many countries, public servants may also not be highly trained or, due to infrequent work on electoral matters or to public service rotation policies, not technically skilled in electoral tasks. Blending skills available within the public service with outside appointment and consultants can assist in raising skill levels. In a number of countries, including Indonesia, the EMB has successfully employed consultants and contractors for voter information and information technology (IT) tasks, who have transferred skills to the EMB’s public service staff.

 

Possible Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Public Servants as EMB Secretariat Staff

 

 

Structuring the Secretariat

No matter what the model of EMB used, budgetary restrictions provide an overall constraint on the number and types of positions that an EMB can afford to fund. EMBs following the Independent Model who have powers to hire and fire their staff may be best placed to determine their own structure. Even in such cases, the law or government regulation may have already determined key elements of the organisational structure, such as senior executive positions and required functional divisions.

All EMBs that rely on public service staffing for their secretariat may face constraints on their flexibility to determine their organisational structure. General laws and practices for the public service may require approval for all organisational structures from a central supervisory body, or set rigid standards for how departments, sections, subsections, and other work units must be structured. General laws and practices may also place restrictions on the use of non-public service contractors or experts. Governmental Model and Mixed Model EMBs, all or most of whose staff work within public service departments, may have even greater constraints, as their staff may have to fit not only the structure of a temporary electoral organisation structure but also the continuing work structure for their department or authority’s other tasks.

"Developing" is a key term for EMB organisational structures. Devising an initial structure is the first step, but maintaining an organisational structure that continues to meet the evolving legal framework, the rapid advances in electoral, information and communications technology, and the expectations of stakeholders, is a real challenge. Flexibility to meet these demands is more difficult when the organisational structure is partially or wholly defined by law or regulations of bodies other than the EMB, or where the EMB’s structure and staffing are subject to general public service rules. While constant organisational change is unsettling, inclusion of structural reviews in evaluations after major electoral events, and the EMB having powers to make changes or additions to organisational structures, can enhance the effectiveness of electoral management. Independent Model EMBs which have control of their own staffing may be better placed to have structural flexibility.

 

Developing an EMB organisational structure

EMBs will have different levels of flexibility to determine their own organisational structure. EMBs following the Independent Model who have powers to hire and fire their staff may be best placed to determine their own structure. Notwithstanding, there may be restrictions on the EMB flexibility, no matter which EMB model is in place:

• The electoral law may have already determined key elements of the organisational structure – such as senior executives and required functional divisions.
• Budgetary restrictions will almost certainly impose an overall constraint on the number and types of positions that an EMB can afford to fund.

‘Developing’ is a key term for organisational structures for EMBs. Planning an initial structure is the first step, but maintaining an organisational structure that continues to meet the evolving legal framework, advances in electoral, information and communications technology, and expectations of stakeholders, is the real challenge.

Flexibility to change structures to meet these demands is more difficult when the organisational structure is partially or wholly defined by law or regulations of bodies other than the EMB, or where the organisation and its staff are subject to general civil service rules. Independent Model EMBs which have control of their own staffing may be better placed to take advantage of structural flexibility.

Decentralised EMBs need to determine the accountability structure for regional offices. Do they report direct to the members of the EMB, or to the chief of the national secretariat, which is the more usual route? The situation becomes more complex if the legal framework defines a structure where there are both appointed members of regional EMBs and EMB secretariats at regional and lower levels. This has been the case in Indonesia, where the appointed regional EMB members report hierarchically to the EMB members at the next higher geographic level EMB, and the secretariat at the regional level reports to the head of the EMB secretariat at the next higher level. Such complex and divided reporting arrangements may confuse staff as to who ultimately directs them.

 

Alternative Functional Divisions

Any structure should have regard to the complete election cycle and all the separate and distinct functions undertaken prior to, during, and after the election event.

An EMB responsible for a small number of electoral tasks may only be structured into two main divisions:

1. electoral operations, covering subdivisions such as voter registration, boundary delimitation, organisation of voting and vote counting, party and candidate registration, electoral training and development, research, information services and publications, and legal affairs; and
2. corporate services, covering subdivisions such as financial management, human resources management, knowledge management, and IT infrastructure management.

An EMB with a greater amount of functions and responsibilities may be better suited by additional and more specialised divisions; such EMBs could include functional divisions such as:

• Registration Division – responsible for registration of voters, parties and candidates or alternatively for only voters or only parties and candidates.
• Human Resources Division - responsible for the recruitment, staff orientation and development, training, and capacity building of election staff, job descriptions, terms of reference, gender mainstreaming, etc.
• Finance and Accounts Division - responsible for the production of timely budget estimates, management of funds, accounting, auditing, and making payments to suppliers and staff, and reporting on the use of funds.
• Legal Services Division - responsible for codes of conduct, dispute resolution, litigation, petitions, applications etc. May in some cases be responsible for law reform and for drafting new election laws and procedures and interpreting the law for the national body to determine its position on legal challenges and complaints.
• Civic and Voter Education Division - this division could handle all parts of civic and voter education and have responsibility for content, methodology, production, and distribution of education materials and for managing training courses for stakeholders such as political parties and candidates, legislatures, media, the donor community, civil society, election observers, and others.
• Media Centre - to handle relations with domestic and international journalists, which could be parallel to voter education under a broader public information division. In some cases, public information also publishes a newsletter and oversees a library or research office. Some election bodies now also have international relations offices to handle observer matters, requests for external assistance, and general relations with counterpart organisations in other countries.
• Information Technology Division - responsible for planning and developing computerised information systems for the national election body when such technology is to be used and for its accuracy. It is important that this division is up-to-date with the latest technological advancements and that staff is qualified and experienced. Computerised voter registration systems, computerised voting and counting systems, electronic transmission of results, and in remote areas, high-frequency radio transmission of results should all be on the agenda for this division.

Under simpler models, some functions that do not fit easily into either of the divisions – such as stakeholder relations, international relations, and support for the EMB members – may be attached directly to the head of the secretariat’s office. It is preferable that audit and evaluation functions report directly to the Chair or members of the EMB in Independent and Mixed Models, and to the EMB’s chief executive officer in Governmental Models.

However, none of these models necessarily fit specific electoral environments. There are a large variety of structures deemed appropriate by EMBs. Judgement on an appropriate structure has to be made by each EMB, in relation to its environment, functions, priorities, and strategy.

 

Organisational Structure Charts

Determining the internal working relationships of the EMB entails the creation of an organisational structure chart (organigram) that provides for effective, integrated planning, service delivery, and management control.

The EMB may carry out this exercise itself if it has in-house expertise. Alternatively, the EMB could hire an expert consultant or organisation or another EMB to assist with the development of its organisational structure. It is important that an EMB or its agents consult broadly on the development of the EMB organisational chart so as to promote stakeholder involvement in the EMB’s operations. Stakeholder involvement can ensure that the EMB considers external service delivery expectations, rather than merely internal management needs, when developing or reviewing the organisational structure.

The number of staff positions to be created, their levels of seniority, and their management relationships will be determined by what is required to fulfil the EMB’s mandate effectively. Ideally, the structure will wholly reflect the EMB objectives and functions, rather than being tailored to the staff skills available, though this approach may be more difficult in EMBs reliant wholly on more inflexible frameworks of public service staffing.

The timing of EMB functions may be as important as the functions themselves in developing the organisational chart. There are basic administrative, review and evaluation, and electoral event planning and preparation tasks that require a base level of permanent staff. The EMB also needs to consider other tasks which may require ongoing implementation, such as voter registration, political party registration and oversight of funding, and voter education. Even if there are relatively few continuous tasks, the EMB may benefit from maintaining a strong and broadly-based permanent management team across all functions, so that peaks of activity can be effectively handled.

Creating too many positions on the EMB organisational chart is likely to prompt public criticism, especially during the period between elections when it is difficult for the public to visualise what, if anything, EMB staff are doing. Equally, maintaining too lean a structure may increase efficiency during periods of low activity but may undermine progress and continuity. Before implementing a ‘lean’ staffing plan, the potential availability of additional staff for peak workload periods and the in-house capacity to train new staff have to be carefully assessed. In this respect, Governmental and Mixed Model EMBs that have the ability to draw on additional public service resources to handle peak workloads may be better placed to operate continuously at peak efficiency.

The quantity and quality of EMB staff appointments should match the outcomes and outputs required by the EMB's strategic plan.

EMB structures have to be sufficiently robust to deal with real world conditions that may be disorganised or conflictual. Despite the multiplicity of possible organisational structures for an EMB, there are some general concepts worth considering when developing the secretariat’s structure:

• flatter organisational structures (fewer management levels) can deliver services faster, often more effectively, and reduce inefficient empire building;
• structures are most effective when clearly linked to the EMB’s strategic plan;
• outward-looking structures focused on service delivery to stakeholders are better than inward-looking ones focused on management or support functions;
• structures need to facilitate both vertical and horizontal communication within the EMB;
• clear work output expectations and accountability for services should be attached to each organisational unit;
• structures should promote support of operational areas by corporate service (for example finance and personnel) areas;
• an independent internal audit function, bypassing the secretariat structure and reporting directly to the head of the secretariat or EMB members, can assist in assuring integrity and probity.

 

The Election Calendar – A Planning Assistant

Before determining the organisational structure and deciding on staff numbers, the potential peak workload periods of the electoral cycle need to be identified. For this purpose, the EMB will need to prepare an electoral calendar. The primary purpose of an electoral calendar is to assist the EMB in keeping its planning and preparation on schedule in order to meet its statutory and administrative deadlines.

An electoral calendar is also especially useful in ensuring timely procurement of registration and polling supplies and materials.

Thorough review of the electoral calendar after each election or other electoral event will assist in identifying inappropriate time allocations for tasks. This review can be a useful tool for identifying where changes to organisational structure or resource allocations, or the legislative or regulatory frameworks, would improve election operations.

The calendar is also useful to convey information to the public, political parties, and the media about the dates for the beginning and completion of key activities. This will enhance transparency and create a positive public relations image for the EMB. Including all administrative deadlines in an electoral calendar for public distribution may, however, be unnecessary and confusing to those only needing to identify the key statutory dates. An EMB may decide to keep an internal administrative calendar and a cut down version of the calendar for distribution to the media and the public. If requested, and in the absence of security reasons, there is no reason why the EMB could not allow stakeholders, such as political parties, candidates, election staff, NGOs ,and participating donor agencies, access to copies of the detailed administrative calendar.

Countries with centralised election management systems may, if resources are available, be able to computerise their planning and develop comprehensive election calendars with clear milestones, timeframes, responsibilities, and interdependencies of activities. The calendar then becomes a sophisticated electoral operations plan. This type of calendar can be shared among staff for as the basis for managing their progress and completion of tasks, and with stakeholders for informationallocations, or the legislative or regulatory frameworks, would improve election operations.

 

EMB Internal Rule Making

As any other organisation that employs staff, deals with finance, interfaces with the public, and has access to public funds, an EMB will generally need to issue a series of regulations governing the internal functioning of its operations. The standards required of an EMB are at least as high as, if not higher than, those of other public bodies. Clear rules and regulations should be developed including adherence to guidelines such as those suggested by International IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). These should be reviewed and reissued as needs arise.

Internal regulations may cover a number of administrative, financial, and technical issues, such as:

• staff safety and security;
• behaviour and conduct of staff and members;
• authorisations to speak to the media, meeting procedures;
• internal committees’ membership, logistics controls;
• purchasing;
• asset controls;
• financial disbursements;
• breaching procedures and consequences;
• procedure for hearing from persons, whether personally or through representation; and
• secure storage and effective management of records.

Distribution of these rules and regulations to all EMB members and staff at all levels, and the implementation of systems for regular communication within the staff, on this and other issues, will promote adherence. For Governmental Model EMBs, and other EMBs using civil service staff, the appropriate civil service regulations may be applicable, or could be modified for EMB use.

 

Codes of Conduct for EMB Members and Staff

It is beneficial for EMBs to establish rules governing the behaviour and conduct of EMB members and all staff. These need to be consistent with, and could be complementary to, any behavioural requirements in the constitution or any law. Such rules are commonly issued as a code of conduct.

It is good practice to require all EMB members, staff, and contracted personnel to sign a document indicating their acceptance of and adherence to the EMB’s code of conduct as a condition of their appointment. To be effective, the code needs to be backed by appropriate and enforceable sanctions for breaches, and a fair process for determining allegations of breaches. In some countries, allegations of breaches of the code are dealt with internally under the EMB’s own, or general public service or employee, disciplinary provisions. In others, an independent tribunal may be set up to deal with allegations of code breaches against EMB members.

Basic issues to be included in a code of conduct are:

• commitment to maintaining the integrity of all electoral processes;
• support for the principle of political non-partisanship;
• avoidance of conflicts of interest;
• provision of quality service to voters and other stakeholders; and
• adherence to regulations and management directions

One code may be applicable to all members and staff of the EMB, or there may be codes of differing lengths and detail for various levels of staff, according to responsibilities. It may be more appropriate to have a simpler code for lower level or temporary staff with limited responsibilities. For example, for polling station officials, a simple statement committing them to obey all relevant laws, and maintain impartiality and ballot secrecy, may be sufficient.

Detailed codes of conduct for EMB members and more senior staff may also include one or more of the following:

• transparent and accountable actions based on law;
• professional behaviour in all actions;
• accuracy in all work.

Even in cases where members of an EMB are political party nominees, or representatives of government, a code embodying the above principles is still applicable. No matter what EMB model or composition is in place, all EMB members and staff are expected to uphold the integrity of electoral processes and to refrain from acting in any manner that is in conflict with their role as impartial electoral referees.

Specific regulations for non-partisanship of members and employees could look like the following:

• Act in a strictly neutral and unbiased manner in every matter concerning a political party, candidate, voter, or member of the press or media.
• Do nothing that could indicate, or be seen as indicating, partisan support for a candidate, political party, political actor, or political tendency.
• Behave, at all times, in an irreproachable manner, exercise sound judgement, and observe the highest levels of personal discretion.
• Disclose any relationship that could lead to a conflict of interest with duties as election administrators.
• Accept no gifts or favours from a political party, organisation, or person involved in the election process.
• Reject any improper influences and, except as provided by law or custom, refrain from accepting directions relating to the performance of appointed tasks from those not authorized it give such directions.
• Do not participate in any unauthorised activity, including any private activity, that could lead to an actual or perceived conflict of interest with their duties as election administrators.
• Do not express a view on any subject that is likely to be a political issue in the election.
• Do not communicate with any voter on a matter of partisan significance.
• Do not wear, carry, or display any obviously partisan party symbols or colours.

These principles will require amendment to reflect the partisan nature of some EMBs. Nevertheless, an EMB with a partisan composition should seek to abide by the underlying principles in order to be impartial in its actions and develop and sustain its credibility.

 

Strategic Planning

Developing a strategic plan is the basic step in focusing the efforts of the EMB on achieving a set of agreed objectives based on its legally defined responsibilities. The strategic plan is the management tool that is the EMB’s interface with its external environment - particularly its stakeholders, a tool from which fundamental decisions on EMB activity flow: operational planning and prioritising, resource allocation, service standards. The strategic plan is the basis for the fundamental decisions on EMB activity: for its operational planning and prioritising, its resource allocation, its service standards, and for providing the EMB with a blueprint for service, organisational strengthening, integration, and improvement. It is an instrument that helps the EMB to operate at a high level of performance and to achieve good customer satisfaction, and it is a helpful tool for the EMB to understand its changing environment.

The strategic plan is a public document that stands as a record of what the EMB stands for, what it does and why, and what it intends to achieve. As well as being a road map that guides and motivates the EMB for a defined period of years, it serves an important role as a marker against which the EMB’s performance can be measured by its stakeholders.

The strategic plan can assist the EMB to achieve high levels of performance and good customer satisfaction, and if effective, it can promote a vision of the EMB as an open, democratic, and accountable institution. To do so, it must be consistent with the EMB’s mandate and implemented within the framework of the constitution and the electoral law. It takes account of all known factors which could affect the EMB’s performance, such as:

• the regulatory environment;
• technology;
• likelihood of conflict;
• stakeholder participation or voter apathy; and
• EMB-government relations.

It would be unusual for an EMB’s strategic plan to cover more than one national election cycle as post-electoral event reviews may result in significant changes to the electoral administration environment. A strategic plan is not a document set in concrete: it is a practical strategic guide for the EMB, and must obviously change if significant changes in the external or internal environment require a revised strategy. An EMB without a strategic plan is like a pilot without a compass.

Strategic plan development may be facilitated by the EMB’s undertaking of an analysis of its strengths; weaknesses; opportunities and threats (SWOT). Identifying the contextual elements on which the intended outcomes of the strategic plan are based, is necessary to allow valid judgments of achievements. The assumed context could include specific levels of stakeholders’ participation, adequate infrastructure to support the strategic plan, or qualified and experienced staff being recruited and retained. Each country is likely to have some country-specific context, such as the EMB’s efforts to deal with the effects of HIV/AIDS on its employees.

An EMB without a strategic plan is like a pilot without a compass.

It is important that the EMB consults with its stakeholders in the development, monitoring, and review of its strategic plan. This promotes stakeholders’ awareness and appreciation of the EMB’s challenges and strengths, and may boost their confidence in the electoral process in general. It also promotes the EMB’s awareness of the expectations and priorities of its stakeholders.

 

Operational Planning

Each electoral process, be it voter registration, voter education, or voting and counting, is a series of operations carried out against a timetable and in a manner which complies with the electoral law and regulations.

Operational planning is setting out clearly the implementation of the strategic plan against specific objectives. The key issue is to specify each EMB task, its timeframe, and the manager of the unit responsible for completing it.

Operational plans can range from fairly simple timetables identifying key events in the electoral process to complex plans giving a specific time frame to each activity. Like the strategic plan, operational planning is meant to be an aid to the electoral process and not a task in itself. There is no need to have a complex plan if a simple one will ensure that everyone concerned knows the tasks and time scale.

An operational plan could be an action plan for the EMB or a diary of activities for the electoral managers, according to their area of responsibility. Such a diary could indicate what activity has to be undertaken, a time scale for each activity, and a cross-reference from the duty or activity to the appropriate section in the electoral law and to other electoral managers. This type of operational plan, if prepared from the electoral law and regulations, ensures that no activity identified in the law is "missed" by the electoral manager.

For management considerations, it is recommended that all election activities be included in any detailed operational planning. This includes those that are not necessarily delegated to the EMB but the responsibility of a Supervisory Commission, a Boundary Commission, or other electoral body.

Operational planning should take into account lessons from previous elections. A complete review of the electoral process at the end of the electoral task will show whether the operational plan worked well. It will establish what went well and what went wrong, why some things went badly, what could have been done differently, are there any cost savings to be made, and are there any processes that can be made simpler and more effective. Learning from these issues can save a lot of time and money when planning the next electoral event.

The operational plan needs also to provide clear guidance as to what happens in an emergency. Major catastrophes are not easy to foresee, but problems such as a fire in a polling site (or worse, in the EMB’s data centre) or during vote counting, or a disruption of the poll by protestors need to be considered so that a clear procedure can be outlined in the instructional material given to the staff.

Any electoral process, if completed successfully, will rely on the competence and commitment of a core of electoral staff. Ensuring that the core managers and staff have confidence in and ownership of the operational plan will help in delivering it. Gathering the key staff together in the run up to the electoral process to brief them on the overall logistics and the planning of the electoral process and allowing them to ask questions and comment will also improve planning. Involving staff at an early stage and setting out their work load and choices will give them a feeling of ownership and responsibility for the election administration.

 

Operational Concept

The concept of operations is used to guide an EMB in developing and implementing its detailed operation plans - it provides the framework for operational planning under the strategic plan. It needs to acknowledge any constraints on the EMB’s planning, and be realistic in its assumptions with respect to issues such as security and stability, and other unforeseen circumstances that could affect electoral management and the preparation and conduct of elections. The operational concept should also take account of the establishment or otherwise of a proper legal framework, and the nature and scope of the electoral processes.

The concept of operations should emphasise the importance of the need for full participation of stakeholders, particularly voters. For the purposes of detailed planning and effective administration, the operational concept may divide an electoral process into several phases, for example, the establishment of the legal and administrative framework; the preparation for voter registration; the conduct of voter registration; preparations for polling and counting; candidate registration; the political campaign; the polling; the counting and announcement of results; and post-election activities. Each operational activity needs to be targeted at the outcomes stated in the strategic plan.

Operational planning is most effective when those implementing the activities are involved in their planning. Operational plans may set yearly or longer-term operational targets and be broken down into half-yearly, quarterly, monthly, and weekly segments, taking into account resource availability and legal and operational deadlines for effective electoral service delivery. Operational plans for each EMB activity need to be split into divisional workloads, and may be harmonised through a committee of senior secretariat staff, possibly with EMB member involvement. EMB membership’s formal approval of operational plans emphasises their significance. Divisional plans need to be broken down to work unit and individual staffer level, to reinforce the importance of each EMB staffer in meeting EMB objectives and performance targets, and to provide a monitoring mechanism for staff and work unit performance.
 

 

EMB Budget

In terms of the way the electoral activity is conducted, the electoral law may indicate the authority responsible for the EMB budget and the processes to be followed to deal with financing of electoral procedures. In Independent Model EMBs, the procedure for formulating the budget is localised within the EMB itself, whereas in countries where there is either a Governmental or Mixed Model EMB, the ministry that is responsible for implementing elections is generally responsible for formulating the electoral budget.

Electoral costs can be met from a variety of levels, and budget responsibility can rest on local, regional, or national level, depending on the electoral process and its legal framework.

A typical budget could cover costs of:

• permanent staff
• temporary staff including poll workers
• advertising, public and voter information, and public relations
• printing and copying (including provision of ballot papers)
• computers and automation
• provision of polling sites, polling site equipment, ballots, and other supplies
• absentee balloting
• transportation of staff and equipment
• offices and storage
• training
• communications
  
  

No matter what model of EMB is used, budgetary restrictions will constrain the number and types of positions that an EMB can afford to fund. The EMB should carefully design its budget so that it covers the required activities and the necessary number of staff to perform its duties in accordance with the law, in a professional, cost-effective, and timely manner.

Fore more information on budgeting and financing of EMBs, see files and sub-files of Financial Management of EMBs.

 

Staffing of EMBs

Election management is a very complex activity and requires a very large number of staff. A strong Human Resources Division or a Personnel Office will play a key role in the success of the electoral process. A high quality advance planning with clear definition on what categories of staff are needed and how they will be selected is crucial. Before staff can be appointed, a clear description of what the job entails and what sort of person will fill it needs to be prepared. Such preparation normally entails putting together some form of overall structure of staff and responsibilities. Any structure should have regard to the separate and distinct functions undertaken prior to, during, and after the election. An EMB structure could include specific divisions for human resources, information technology, operations, finance, legal services, public information, etc.

Good employment practices should be adopted to the greatest possible extent. Pay scales, conditions of service, ordering of office equipment, office administration, petty cash, and so on, although perhaps considered minor issues, all need to be in place to contribute to the successful organisation of the election process.

 

Procurement by the Election Management Body (EMB)

An important part of the EMB’s planning is assessing the needs for procurement of election materials, and doing so in a timely and cost-effective manner. The time required for procurement can vary widely depending on factors such as the source of supplies and mode of shipment, but it is generally longer than most people imagine.

EMB procurement policies differ widely from country to country. Governmental and Mixed Model EMBs are often bound by government procurement guidelines and practices. Independent Model EMBs may be bound by governmental procurement requirements (such as those targeted at enhancing probity and effectiveness in procurement), or they may be able to determine some or all of their procurement policies and procedures. A few governmental and mixed model EMBs may in general have to follow government procurement procedures, but may have special dispensations for urgent purchases.

Some EMBs have to use a generic government or public-sector purchasing agency for all procurement. In some circumstances, as in EU member countries, the complexity of purchasing rules means it is more effective for the EMB to do this than to attempt to take on this task internally. In other countries where the EMB must use a government-wide purchasing agency, the EMB may obtain post-purchase approval of expenses or the exemption of some purchases from purchasing agency rules. However, this practice is generally regarded as incompatible with the principles of good governance and efficiency.

Using government–wide purchasing agencies may not be effective for EMB procurement, as many government bureaucracies are not able to work to the very short and strict time lines that generally confront EMBs for acquiring election goods and services. As a result, EMBs in some countries may be able to set up their own internal purchasing boards to manage their procurement independently. If an EMB has its own purchasing board, its control over procurement decisions and timing is increased, but accountability for all procurement now rests with the EMB.

Any public or government criticism about the probity or suitability of EMB procurement decisions can very quickly reflect on the overall credibility of the EMB. EMBs need to ensure that their purchasing processes are:

• fully transparent;
• conducted to the highest standards of probity;
• show no favouritism;
• genuinely competitive;
• objective; and
• free from any taint of corruption.
  
  

Before assigning control of procurement to an EMB, there needs to be certainty that the EMB has sufficient resources, skills, and control systems in place, including an enforceable code of conduct and conflict of interest provisions.

Robust checks and review procedures are required for major procurement decisions, as are control measures that are rigorous enough to withstand the pressures of any fast-tracked purchasing required due to late operational decisions or delayed release of funding. The EMB may find that its procurement procedures can be streamlined with no loss of integrity if it sets up pre-qualification procedures which identify earlier in the electoral cycle those suppliers which meet the EMB’s qualifications for supplying specific goods or services, and who are invited to tender for these before an electoral event. It is good practice to require bidders for contracts to accept the EMB Code of Conduct.

EMBs also need to ensure that their equipment purchases, especially in high technology areas, are driven by the needs of the EMB, and not those of suppliers to shift outmoded stock, field test new products, or sell expensive equipment that is over-specified for the task or which may not be maintainable in the absence of an expensive maintenance contract with the original supplier. Finding truly independent advice on IT systems can be very difficult, and EMB members and staff may not have the technical knowledge to analyse seemingly appropriate vendor proposals. EMBs have to be clear in their operational objectives about the outcomes that are expected of IT and other equipment or systems purchases, and rigorously and independently test vendor proposals far in advance of the next electoral event to ensure that they can meet these.

 

Communications and Public Relations

An important component of the public relations strategy of the EMB is direct communication with the public and with EMB stakeholders. In the interest of public confidence and transparency, all EMB stakeholders and all participants in the process should have access to the same level of information. Public relations activities may concentrate on both dispensing information for which there is the greatest demand and interest, as well as ensuring that there is open availability of the more detailed information which the special interest groups, such as observer groups and NGOs, may want. All information which is available should, however, be on hand for anyone who wants it or who asks. An active public relations campaign is a good means to help the EMB in its important role of keeping the stakeholders and the general public aware of its activities.

Through open communication and dialogue, the EMB can foster awareness of its activities in its stakeholders and build their loyalty. This could be done by regular stakeholder consultations and information sharing of its publications, such as

• annual reports,
• election reports,
• financial reports, and
• newsletters, and
• by regularly organising information meetings or seminars where stakeholders are invited.
  
  

An EMB could also foster public access to key publications and documents, such as

• performance reports and audited financial statements,
• business or strategic plans,
• laws and codes, either free of charge or on cost-recovery basis.
  
  

EMBs increasingly use the Internet to ensure wide availability of these documents.

All these activities will play an important role in informing people of the EMB’s activity, but it is also a means for the EMB to minimize the effect of potential complaints. Complainants may sometimes approach the media or public bodies for assistance, and when the complaint is reported in the media or referred by outside the EMB, the situation will be more complex to solve and EMB reputation may be at risk.

To ensure consistency in the messages conveyed, there should be a spokesperson responsible for answering queries from the public or mass media. This person must be in the full picture regarding the EMB‘s activities and familiar with the EMB’s policies, rules, and regulations. A public relations training course could be a helpful tool for such a spokesperson.

 

The Media

If the EMB does not commit itself to promoting transparent, sound relations between itself and the media, it increases the possibility of media publication of negative stories on EMB activities that may be based on misinformation, which can undermine the EMB’s credibility. The media will write about the election whether the EMB likes it or not. It is therefore in everyone's interest for the material that appears in the media about the EMB to be as accurate as possible.

The media, both print and electronic, both public and private, should be an ally of the EMB in informing the public about its mandate and operations. To take advantage of the opportunities the media provide, the EMB will benefit from a media relations strategy that promotes regular positive contact with the media. This strategy will also assist the EMB to counter any negative publicity in the media about its activities.

Regular EMB contact with the media through media conferences and media releases will build EMB relationships with the media. Media conferences could be at least weekly during election periods and when the need arises at other times. Usually media conferences are held more often for the progressive announcement of results.

When the EMB informs the media, it informs the public - and a constant flow of information enables the electorate to exercise their democratic rights, as well as retaining their confidence in the whole election process.

There are some common elements in implementing a good public relations strategy for any EMB, which would include:

• identifying the relevant media and their coverage;
• identifying who are the key people in the various media who can ensure accurate and prominent reporting of EMB activities;
• being proactive and transparent in releasing information;
• ensuring that the information given to the media is clear and easily understandable;
• developing a timetable for providing information to give a steady, accurate flow of information on the EMB’s activities;
• creating an EMB spokesperson for the media;
• setting up a Communications Centre within the EMB to deal with public relations issues, such as media conferences and releases, media tours of electoral activities, a media room at the EMB, and monitoring media coverage of EMB activities.

 

Records Management

Archiving of EMB materials is important to protect the institutional history and memory of the EMB, and to ensure that reference materials are available when required. Archiving policies need to include requirements for document security, for the structure and locations of current hard copy and electronic file records (including electronic file backup policies), for the preservation, on or off site, of historic records, and for the timing and manner of disposal of unneeded records. Clear archiving, disposal, and/or destruction plans for all EMB equipment and materials are necessary, and especially important to ensure that electoral materials that could be used in future legal proceedings or for research to improve electoral processes are appropriately preserved. Environmentally sound methods of disposing of unwanted assets – for example, the packaging for used registration kits in Cambodia in 1998 – are a good practice.

 

Report Writing

An EMB responsible for national elections would normally issue an overall report after those elections. An informative and comprehensive report covers

• every step from the election program,
• the details of the political parties and constituencies,
• voter turnout and
• a mass of statistical information about all aspects of the elections.

An election report can give extensive statistical information and describe the processes followed in some detail including the electoral system, how votes are counted, how results are assembled nationally, voter education/information activity by the commission, party funding information, the results of litigation arising from the elections, and the costs of the overall process.

Reports of this nature given on a national basis demonstrate to the public at large precisely what is happening in terms of the electoral process, how much it cost, what problems occurred, and what improvements are proposed. Reports are a valuable and cost effective a way to foster awareness among stakeholders of the EMB’s activities and to build their loyalty through a sustained effort of promoting open communication and dialogue.

The national EMBs are in a far better position to prepare this type of report than are local commissions or electoral officials because the information on overall activity is more relevant if given at a national level, although equally relevant at local level if local taxpayers are meeting the costs.

Reports are not just prepared at the end of the electoral process. The report of Uganda’s Interim Electoral Commission from 1996 sets out clearly the background to the electoral process, what duties and powers the Electoral Commission has and who its members and key staff are. This document would be of less interest to the average citizen but would be extremely useful to any participant in the electoral process whether a candidate, party member, or electoral official. Information of this type is always of assistance in demonstrating the transparency and integrity of the electoral process, and its publication is particularly important where public concerns are expressed or there is limited knowledge about the electoral process responsibilities.

Different ways of producing the information should be considered - the Australian Electoral Commission also produce their overall electoral statistics on CD-ROM - this is useful where a report containing very large quantities of information is prepared and where potential users have the necessary equipment. The Internet is an increasingly effective means of disseminating key information about an electoral process to the many widely dispersed audiences who are interested in the process.

 

Summary: Planning and Implementing EMB Activities

• EMBs may have more effective control over electoral activities if they are empowered to directly hire and fire, and set conditions of service, for the EMB secretariats that implement EMB policies. However, in many cases, EMB secretariats are drawn from public service staff and subject, to a greater or lesser degree, to common public service rules that may limit the EMB’s human resource flexibility and professionalisation.
• Each EMB needs to develop an organisational structure that facilitates cost-effective achievement of its strategic objectives through designation of the necessary numbers of skilled staff at appropriate locations and levels of seniority, that are subject to effective lines of accountability.
• An EMB’s strategic plan is the basis for all EMB activities, defining for a fixed period the EMB’s vision, purpose, values, target outcomes, result outputs, and performance indicators. Stakeholder involvement in development, monitoring, and review of EMB strategic plans focuses planning on service, and can boost confidence in the EMB.
• The quantity and quality of EMB staff appointments in the organisational structure chart should match the outcomes and outputs required by the EMB’s strategic plan.
• The EMB also needs operational workplans, based on the strategic plan, which detail individual work processes and their integration, deadlines, and responsibilities for work. These are usefully developed into a detailed electoral calendar, a simplified version of which is an important information and transparency–enhancing tool for public distribution.
• An enforceable code of conduct, which all members and staff of an EMB are required to sign, assists the EMB to maintain electoral integrity, ethics, impartiality, service, and professional standards.
• In order to protect the EMB’s institutional memory and to ensure that electoral materials that could be used in future legal proceedings or for research to improve electoral processes are appropriately preserved, the EMBe should be responsible for safekeeping and appropriate archiving of any records and EMB materials.

 

EMB Staffing and Development of Professional Electoral Management

• Professional EMB members and staff need appropriate skills and most importantly a commitment to the principles of electoral management, including fairness, impartiality, independence, transparency, accessibility, and professionalism.
• EMBs’ use of pubic service staff in secretariats can provide benefits of public sector experience, but can create challenges for EMB professionalization, especially in Governmental Model EMBs, where electoral work may not be the staff’s vocation. EMBs that can hire their own staff and are not subject to public service rules may be able to offer incentives to attract higher quality staff. The existence of attractive career paths in EMBs will assist in the professionalization and retention of staff.
• EMB staff requirements are cyclical, with very high peaks that cannot justify maintenance of all of those staff permanently. Each EMB needs to devise appropriate strategies to promote effective use of temporary staff, which may include timely recruitment processes, availability of incentives and training opportunities, and regular contact mechanisms.
• Equitable recruitment and employment practices – including open merit selection processes, gender balance, and a fair and safe working environment - fulfil an EMB’s internal responsibility as an institution that promotes equity in public life.
• Investment in EMB staff training and development is critical for improving overall EMB effectiveness. This could be through internal courses, professional associations, academic qualifications, mentoring and skills transfer by consultants and senior mangers, or through external electoral management courses such as the BRIDGE course.
• Operational training, especially for temporary staff, has been found to be most effective if it concentrates on specific technical processes, and includes simulations, backed by good quality materials such as manuals and checklists, instructions, appropriate audio-visual aids, and rigorous training evaluation.
• EMBs typically need to provide operational training quickly for large numbers of electoral event staff. Mobile team training requires a relatively long training timetable, and simultaneous training a relatively large number of trainers. Cascade training is commonly used, though it requires strict timing and quality controls to ensure that accurate and complete information reaches the lower levels of the cascade in a timely manner.
• EMBs may have to overcome negative influences on their professionalization, such as conflict environments, flawed legal frameworks, a temporary EMB institution, and insufficient or late release of funds

 

Staffing of EMBs

Election management is a very complex activity and requires a very large number of staff. Significant advance planning, with clear definition of what categories of staff are needed, what each specific job entails, what sort of person will fill it, and how they will be selected, is crucial. Any structure should have regard to the separate and distinct functions undertaken prior to, during, and after the election.

Each division will seek differing skills, such as:

 

• lawyers and experienced executives for the legal division;
• trainers and teachers for the training and civic and voter education divisions;
• accountants for the finance division;
• and computer professionals for the information technology division.
  

 

Criteria such as terms of qualifications, suitability for work, age, and possibly lack of connection with parties or candidates, are commonly considered in planning the recruitment process. In some cases, many of the posts involved are already specifically identified in laws and regulations – e.g., Returning Officer, Counting Officer, and Polling Officer/Poll Worker —,as are the duties attached to these posts.

 

 

Use of Public Service Staff for EMB Secretariats

Many EMBs rely on public service staffing for their secretariats. This may be required in Governmental Model EMBs and in other models where this is government policy. Independent Model EMBs which have their own employment rules may find it difficult to offer their staff good career prospects, due to the small number and specialised nature of many of the secretariat positions, and thus may find it more effective to rely on public service staff. Such reliance on the public service does not by itself inhibit the development of professionalism. Allowing the EMB to set its own rules for its secretariat staff who are public servants is beneficial. These rules could prohibit transfers from the EMB at specified periods, and could also provide conditions of service appropriate to the high pressure environment of electoral events.

In any case, EMBs will at some point have to deal with mobility of any public service staff assigned to the EMB. Staff who have gained electoral experience move on to other government positions, leaving a skill and experience gap. For those public service staff in Governmental and Mixed Model EMBs who remain available for electoral tasks, it is a long time between elections doing work of possibly a completely different nature. Regular development measures such as refresher courses, and accessible archiving of electoral materials, can assist in maintaining electoral skill levels.

 

Permanent and Temporary Staff

No EMB can justify or afford to maintain permanently the number of staff needed for all polling stations (which in a country such as Indonesia require over 4 million staff). Efficiency considerations may also preclude the permanent maintenance of secretariats or subsidiary EMBs at regional and local levels, or the full permanent staffing of functions that are only activated during an election period. For Governmental and Mixed Model EMBs, much of the management structure for major electoral events may be on temporary appointments or seconded from other areas of the public service. Temporary EMB secretariat staff are often not recruited long enough before elections, nor do they stay long enough after elections, to be trained thoroughly for their work.

Each EMB needs to devise appropriate strategies to promote effective use of temporary staff. These strategies could include timely recruitment processes; measures to ensure availability of experienced temporary staff for each electoral event, such as payment of availability retainers; and measures to maintain contact with temporary staff between electoral events such as databases of contact information, newsletters, reunion meetings, or refresher courses. Such measures can be particularly appropriate for EMBs in countries where there is no fixed interval for elections.

This type of approach is not possible, however, for an EMB such as that in Mexico, where temporary polling officials for each election are chosen through a lottery system. Significant lead time, and a very well funded recruitment and training effort, are then essential.

 

Conditions of Employment: EMB-Specific or Public Service Staff

Staff of Governmental and Mixed Model EMBs, and of Independent Model EMBs which use public servants as staff, are usually employed under conditions broadly equivalent to those of public servants of similar rank and seniority. Special allowances for electoral work, particularly to compensate for the long hours involved during election periods, may also be available.

In Independent Model EMBs responsible for their own staffing, the salaries and conditions of senior secretariat staff are often pegged to those of senior public servants. In some countries, EMB staff are employed on contract with conditions equivalent to the staff of the legislature, while in others, the public service regulations allow the EMB flexibility in its employment practices.

Where government policies aim to reduce staffing levels of public agencies, EMBs have often resorted to the use of external individual or corporate contractors, especially for technical development and support tasks, often at higher basic costs than public service base rates, but without EMB obligations for costs such as pensions and allowances. This may cause disquiet among EMB staff, fearing for the permanency of their own positions and aware that their base rate of pay is inferior. It may also affect the sustainability of the EMB’s operations.

 

Staff Pensions

Many EMBs link their staff pension to that of the public service, and it is natural to do so in EMBs where secretariat staff are public servants. It is cost-effective and convenient for these EMBs to maintain the pension link to the public service, and it may provide more secure or higher retirement benefits for EMB staff.

However, this practice can raise questions, especially for Independent and Mixed Model EMBs, about how ‘independent’ of the government the EMB is. In some countries, the EMB’s pension is linked by law to the public service pension without compromising its independence, while in others, EMB staff pension benefits are for staff of the legislature. Some EMBs have their own pension scheme.

 

Procedures for Recruitment of EMB Staff

EMBs use various secretariat staff recruiting methods. Governmental Model and other EMBs that rely on public service staff may not be free to implement their own recruiting practices. In countries such as Indonesia, they may have to take whatever secretariat staff are allocated to them.

Good practice is to hold an open selection process, advertising widely for candidates and specifying clearly the skills, qualifications, and personal attributes required for each position to be filled. This is possible even where EMB staff are public servants. It is more difficult where Governmental EMB secretariats have part-time or fixed-period electoral tasks, and electoral skills may not be prominent in the profile required of staff.

As organisations that must be an example of equitable action, EMBs need to implement recruitment and staffing policies that are conducive to gender balance in EMB staff, and that promote employment of women to achieve this. Women need to be afforded equal opportunities as men for employment, training, promotion, and benefits for all EMB permanent and temporary positions. This may require the EMB to introduce both gender-sensitive employment practices and training to ensure that all staff are aware of and committed to achieving the benefits of these. Some customary traditions, such as requirements in some societies for separate polling stations for women and men, may affect the details of implementing gender balance.

The implementation of gender balance in an established EMB permanent secretariat may take time and involve careful consideration of policies for filling vacancies. While this constraint does not apply when a new EMB secretariat is being established, the issue of gender balance may be lost in the hurry to find suitable people in recruiting for all levels of a complete EMB secretariat at one time.

Some countries use political parties to assist in identifying suitable EMB secretariat staff. In the USA, it is common for party nominees to participate in election administration, especially at local or ‘county’ level.

One of the biggest recruitment tasks faced in a country is that of recruiting short-term electoral staff, particularly polling station staff. In Hungary, local governments recruit polling station staff. Some EMBs request government ministries to second staff to be approved and appointed by the EMB for short-term contracts. In rural South Africa, traditional authorities are used to identify unemployed youth, who are interviewed by the EMB to assess their suitability for appointment as election officials at local polling stations.

In Mexico, the electoral law requires the EMB to hold a two-stage lottery of all eligible citizens to make an initial selection of temporary staff for polling stations. Those selected are trained, after which a final selection is made, allocating staff to specific roles at polling stations according to their education level. In a few countries, election work is compulsory. If a person is summoned to work as polling station staff, he or she cannot refuse without facing a penalty. Other avenues for recruiting temporary EMB staff for polling station work may be corporations and voluntary organisations.

Screening of candidates for permanent or temporary EMB staff appointment is a necessary component of the recruitment and appointment process and enhances transparency of the process. This screening aims to ensure that staff recruited have the specified qualifications, are of good character, and are not likely to be politically active or otherwise unsuitable. The screening process is best kept simple, quick, and under the control of the EMB, rather than of political parties or other organisations.

Nevertheless, parties can be involved in the process. In some countries, the list of candidates for regional election coordinators and returning officers is circulated to stakeholders, such as political parties, for their endorsement. In Namibia, parties have the right to veto the appointment of any person who holds a party political office and whose impartiality is questionable.

 

Appointment of EMB Secretariat Staff

The procedure for appointing members of the secretariat varies from country to country. Secretariats in EMBs which follow the Governmental Model are usually staffed by civil servants, either as permanent electoral employees or on secondment for specific election tasks, appointed under and subject to the conditions of service of laws governing civil service appointments.

In some countries with Independent Model EMBs, the secretariat staff working for the EMB are directly appointed and paid for by the EMB, while in other countries, EMB personnel are civil servants and their salaries and conditions of service are linked to the civil service. Even where secretariat staff are civil servants, they may hold statutory appointments under electoral law. The extent to which the EMB enjoys powers to hire and fire its own staff can be an indication of the extent to which the EMB is independent of the government. EMBs which have the power to hire and fire their own staff include India, Mexico, South Africa, and Uruguay.

The arrangement for EMB staff to remain civil servants and to be linked to the civil service machinery has been regarded by some electoral analysts as a back door through which the executive may control the electoral process.

For example, in Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Tanzania and Yemen, the Chief Electoral Officer, who is the EMB’s Chief Executive, is appointed by the President. A recent external review of the 2004 Botswana general elections recommended that the power to appoint the EMB’s Chief Executive should be vested in the EMB rather than the President. In Georgia, the staff of the EMB are all civil servants. In Canada and Kenya, the EMB’s returning officers (managers) at the electoral district level are appointed by the Government and not by the EMB. This practice has been regarded as a weak link in electoral administration, especially in Canada.

Except for the Director of Elections, who is the EMB’s Chief Executive, the whole of the secretariat of the Namibian Electoral Commission (ECN) consists of civil servants. The government approves the creation of EMB positions, and all EMB appointments are linked to civil service salaries and conditions of service. The EMB determines the conditions of service for election staff (the temporary staff that perform duty during elections, such as poling station staff), but the applicable rates must first be approved by the Treasury.

Some possible advantages of using civil servants as EMB secretariat staff

 

• Where the civil service has a tradition of neutrality, they provide loyal service.
• Knowledge of public administration may reduce EMB training needs.
• May have networks within civil service that assist in electoral activities – for example, procurement of equipment and materials, or use of state facilities.
• Have a clear career path, even if not in the EMB.
• Job security may promote continuity of staffing.

 

Some possible disadvantages of using civil servants as EMB secretariat staff

 

• May not be regarded as neutral or impartial, thus reducing credibility of electoral process.
• May lack specific electoral skills
• May not be accustomed to the time critical nature of electoral tasks.
• May transfer/be transferred out of the EMB with little notice, resulting in critical skill loss.
• Pay scales may be insufficient to motivate performance or loyalty.
• May be working second jobs due to low pay, thus affecting commitment at critical times.

 

Critical issues to consider when determining whether to use civil servants as EMB secretariat staff are those of political neutrality and job fit or skill levels. Civil servants may be publicly regarded as associated with or easily influenced by the government, on whom they depend for their appointment, promotions, and salaries, thus affecting the credibility of the EMB. Strong Independent or Mixed Model EMBs can mitigate this impression.

In many countries, civil servants may also not be highly trained or, due to only occasional work on electoral issues or to government civil service rotation policies, not technically skilled in electoral tasks. This requires that the EMB have a strong training unit or bring in external consultants as necessary to complement the skills available to the EMB. In Indonesia, the EMB has successfully employed consultants and contractors for voter information and information technology tasks, who have transferred skills to the EMB’s civil service staff.

 

Procedures for the Appointment for EMB Secretariat Staff

The overriding consideration in making appointments of EMB secretariat staff is a fair selection procedure that results in the selection of the most suitable candidates. The EMB may often delegate the power of appointment to the head of the secretariat or to one of its members, who then may delegate appointments of lower ranking officials to other secretariat staff. In a few instances, the power of appointment is vested solely in the head of the secretariat, as in Botswana. Often, the appointment of temporary staff for voter registration and polling station work is done by election committees, returning officers, or their equivalents, at electoral district or local level.

It is good practice for EMB staff to be required to sign the EMB’s code of conduct as a condition of appointment. It is also good practice to inform the public about senior appointments to the EMB and its secretariat, by placing this information on the EMB website, in newspapers, and in other media. To speed the integration of new staff into the EMB, it is important that the EMB develop a comprehensive orientation programme that is compulsory for all new staff within the first weeks of their appointment.

In Mexico, the EMB has full hiring and firing powers over its secretariat staff. The law requires that all management, supervisory, and technical officials of the EMB be members of the Professional Electoral Service, which is essentially a specialized civil service devoted entirely to electoral work. Citizens may have provisional access to the Professional Electoral Service by way of taking training courses, winning a contest for membership, or passing an examination. Full membership can only be obtained after passing required annual performance evaluations, undertaking further training, and having been involved in the management of an election. Initial recruits in 1992 were obtained through responses to a national media campaign.

 

Staff Appointment Formalities

The formalities, in accordance with good practice, that would be completed upon appointment would include an instrument of appointment setting out the terms and conditions of the appointment, the job description attached to the position, and a copy of the oath of office and/or code of conduct signed on appointment.

Other important information that would accompany the appointment instrument includes to whom the staff member reports and whom he/she should consult for assistance, if necessary. Information may also be given at this time concerning security and identification documents. The appointment instrument may require that the prospective appointee forward a letter of acceptance within a stipulated period. It is good practice, and may be legally required, to inform the prospective appointee of circumstances under which he/she may be dismissed from the position.

It is also common practice among EMBs to inform the public about senior appointments to the EMB, such as a newly-appointed head of secretariat or senior managers, by placing this information on the EMB website, newspapers, and other media. Information about such appointments may include a photograph, academic qualifications, and professional background and achievements.

 

What Is a Professional Electoral Administrator?

Compliance with the legislative framework, including electoral regulations, procedures, and manuals, is a prerequisite for the achievement of professionalism by an EMB. The term ‘professional electoral administrator’ implies a person with a range of skills beyond those associated with technical or management qualifications in a specific field.

In addition to these, a professional electoral administrator needs also:

a) an understanding of strategies for strengthening democratic development;

b) a commitment to the principles that are the foundation of electoral good practice; and

c) a strong commitment to high-quality electoral service to all stakeholders.

Specialist professional credentials and relevant management and technical experience assist EMB members and staff in becoming professional electoral administrators. As well as these skills, professional electoral administrators are committed to the principles of electoral good practice, which include:

a) Integrity, meaning the ability to act in a non-partisan and independent manner by not acting to benefit political interests and/or corruption, and by ensuring that breaches of the electoral law, rules and codes of conduct are followed;

b) Impartiality, meaning the ability to be fair and to afford stakeholders equitable and honest treatment or a ‘level playing field’ and the ability to treat all stakeholders in an even-handed, non-partisan manner;

c) Independence, meaning the ability to carry out the work without influence from or being under the control of an external force, such as the government or the ruling party;

d) Transparency, referring to the ability to be open and truthful in all dealings, except where openness will undermine the secret ballot or security;

e) Efficiency, meaning that funds for elections are used wisely, that procurement of election materials and development of programmes are made in a sustainable and cost-effective manner, and that EMB services are delivered efficiently;

f) Service mindedness, meaning that all stakeholders, and in particular voters, should enjoy high-quality services;

g) Accessibility, meaning available to stakeholders to provide timely information and access to EMB records; and

h) Professionalism, meaning the ability to be fair, effective, efficient, accurate, responsible, morally correct, and service-oriented.

No matter how great their commitment to their work, the bulk of members appointed to EMBs are not experienced in the full range of responsibilities associated with leading and managing electoral processes. Professional development for EMB members is as essential for attaining and maintaining high-quality EMB performance as is development of EMB secretariat staff.

An EMB’s capacity to perform all its electoral functions and responsibilities effectively depends very much on the capacities and performance of its secretariat staff. The capacities of EMB secretariat staff can be enhanced by implementing appropriate recruitment strategies and vigorous training and development programmes. Most of the issues faced will be similar for Independent, Governmental, and Mixed Models of EMBs, though they may manifest themselves in different ways.

Public concerns about the professionalism of an EMB can lead to calls for institutional reform. However, EMBs with a strong set of values can deliver elections whose results are accepted by stakeholders even though they are still in the process of developing professional staff, as, for example, in Yemen.

 

Staff Training and Development

One of the pillars of professionalism in electoral administration is proper training and development of core permanent staff (if any), temporary management staff appointed for specific electoral events, and the large numbers of field staff that may be temporarily engaged for large-scale events such as elections, referendums, or census-style voter registration.

The principles of good electoral practice, such as impartiality, transparency, voting secrecy, equality of access, accountability, and efficiency form the basis of all EMB staff training. Staff training and development is a continuing activity. Changes in electoral procedures and technology, and the time that elapses between elections, means even the most experienced staff cannot rely entirely on experience to ‘know’ their current tasks.

Because staff training and development is not immediately tangible like ballot boxes or voter education materials are, there can be difficulties in persuading governments to approve EMB budgets that contain sufficient funds for this task. Staff training and development management also needs to occupy a sufficiently senior position in the EMB’s organisational structure to ensure it has a strong input into organisational priorities, including internal budget determination.

 

EMB Organisational and Staff Development for Permanent Staff

Organisational and staff development (OSD) for the EMB’s staff addresses their long-term capacity-building and skills requirements, and also takes into account staff career development. OSD aims to unify the EMB’s strategic objectives and the skills required to attain these with the career and personal development goals of its staff. An active OSD element will contribute to the sustainability of the EMB.

It is important that the EMB develop both short-term and long-term strategies to address its OSD requirements. OSD requires a substantial, and preferably separate, dedicated budget, so the EMB will need to prioritise its training and development needs. For example, the Russian EMB has decided that training of core staff is its priority, not training of polling station staff.

OSD is based on a needs assessment, which the EMB may conduct itself or bring in outside contractors or management consultants to conduct. This needs assessment identifies all EMB tasks, compares the skill levels of staff with these tasks, and identifies the gaps – from which specific organisational and individual staff training needs, and the appropriate training methodologies, can be determined. OSD programs aim to train each EMB staff member to do his or her tasks with maximum efficiency and professionalism.

Depending on the needs analysis, areas which OSD could cover include.

a) generic skills development, such as:

 

• written and verbal communication;
• creativity innovation and enterprise;
• team building;
• critical and strategic thinking, and problem solving;
• self management;
• dispute resolution skills;
• project management;
• using technology;
• leadership, management, coaching, and supervisory skills;
  
  

b) technical skills relevant to the specific EMB division.

Staff development may take a number of basic forms, such as customized short-term informal training in the form of staff meetings and reviews, retreats and seminars, mentoring of staff by senior EMB or another organisation’s officials, and long-term formal training in the form of courses or academic development programmes. Continuous horizontal and vertical communication within the EMB not only contributes to development objectives, but greatly assists in maintaining organisational focus and improving staff performance.

 

Identifying Training Requirements

Before initiating any training programme, the electoral manager needs to identify what training is required. This involves both looking at the processes to be carried out and the people who will be undertaking them. The electoral manager should ensure that each staff member has the training and support they need to perform the tasks allocated. A proper training program will be best identified through staff performance and review interviews.

Training programmes for permanent staff need to reflect the career development potential of those staff and meet their training needs, which may vary in substance and content depending on the tasks of the EMB. Generally, a higher and continuing level of training is required for permanent staff, one that should be implemented progressively as the personnel become more involved in the overall electoral process and in the complex activity areas. No staff manager at a senior level will ever get to the point where they know everything there is to know about the process – elections are highly complex, and learning is a life-long activity.

The situation with temporary staff is usually simpler. Temporary personnel are likely to undertake a specific electoral task, such as vote counting or working at a polling site, so training can be targeted to this task, and the timing of the training can be fixed so as to ensure staff are prepared for the electoral period. The performance appraisal process should identify the overall training needs including the specialist electoral areas and the non-specialist ones. It should then prioritise these and establish a programme to meet the personnel and the identified skill shortages.

It is just as important to develop targeted training programs for senior staff as it is for new staff members. If possible, training should include political parties, candidates, and other stakeholders, since it will make training both more cost-effective and more transparent. In many countries, the EMB will provide training for candidates and prepare manuals for them. It is in everyone’s interests that candidates too know what is and is not permitted and what responsibilities fall on them.

Consistency

Training programmes also need to be prepared to cover changes in legislation or working practices and the introduction of new technology or processes. Electoral processes are governed by law, and the application of the law must be consistent. This idea alone is sufficient reason for a major training programme. To achieve a sustainable, non-partisan, and transparent electoral process, it is essential that personnel understand and learn how to apply the rules governing elections, including the electoral code of conduct. A significant part of training must be devoted to these important matters. To obtain maximum consistency, EMB generally have a permanent Training Officer. The need for consistency of decisions is a thread which should run through and be an integral part of the programme.

Not all electoral decisions are clear cut, however. An issue that frequently causes controversy is the validity of ballot papers and whether they should be declared invalid or not. The decision is difficult enough with proper training; without it, the electoral manager may find that two members of the staff faced with the same markings on a ballot paper have made different decisions at different counting centres. A good training programme could be designed to avoid this type of problems. Training for consistency is one way of doing so.

 

Internal Training of EMB Staff

One of the key features of election management is that it requires a very large numbers of staff. A Human Resources Division or a Personnel Office will play a key role in the success of the electoral process. A high quality advance planning with clear definition on what categories of staff is needed and how they will be selected is crucial. Before staff can be appointed, a clear description of what the job entails and what sort of person will fill it needs to be prepared. Such preparation normally entails putting together some form of overall structure of staff and responsibilities. Any structure should have regard to the separate and distinct functions undertaken prior to, during and after the election.

An EMB structure could include specific divisions for human resource, information and technology, finance, legal services public information etc. Each division will seek differing skills, such as:

 

• lawyers and experienced executives for the legal division;
• trainers and teachers for the civic and voter education division;
• accountants for the finance division;
• and computer professionals for the information technology division.

 

Criteria such as terms of qualifications, suitability for work, age, and possibly lack of connection with parties or candidates, are common thing considered in the recruitment process. Many of the posts involved are specifically identified in laws and regulations. Commonly posts such as Returning Officer, Counting Officer and Polling Officer/Poll Worker are sometimes described in legislation, as are the duties attach to these posts.

Good employment practices should be adopted, although it is recognised that this may not always be possible. Pay scales, conditions of service, ordering of office equipment, office administration, petty cash, and so on, although perhaps considered minor issues, all need to be put in place to contribute to the successful organisation of the election administration process.

 

Written Materials

Written training materials, such as instruction sheets, manuals, or handouts, can take many forms and can be shaped to meet specific training needs. In general, written training materials should be short and easy to understand. To make the training as simple as possible, printed training material could illustrate the polling process by using illustrative features, such as diagrams, pictures, and step-by-step animation of the process. Clear examples and “What if” questions will help deal with difficult situations.

Another helpful tool is a “Problem solving” or “Quick Reference” manual, a manual that lists a series of potential problems which poll workers may encounter and which can be easily opened to the proper page when necessary. Manuals or handouts could also be used to highlight what is new since the last election and what has changed. Experienced staff will tend to skim over instructions assuming that they already know the system and therefore are able to carry out the required tasks. Highlighting new requirements and changed requirements in a manual or a handout can avoid many mistakes from being made.

Handouts are also useful to bring forward selected key topics that might be especially important in the case. Written training materials have always been and still are very common for EMB staff training. In some countries, however, training is complemented with instruction by electronic means.

Instructions

Instructions in the form of easy-to-read sheets or checklists have long been used in some countries to complement cascade training of some tiers of electoral staff, for example, polling station security officials, polling station staff, and counting staff. Such instructions can be made available in electronic format where facilities for this exist.

Training Manuals

Most EMBs rely on training manuals to impart skills to election officials. Manuals that are accurate, well written, and easy to interpret and apply are an indispensable training aid. It is effective to develop separate components of a manual to cover categories of staff with different duties, and to include in the manuals simple check lists of their essential tasks and a set of questions that trainees need to answer to verify their knowledge. Hard-copy manuals can be supplemented by soft copies from which additional materials can be printed. Sufficient copies of manuals can be printed to allow election officials to take them home after training, either for further reading or for reference while they are working. In Hungary, electronic training facilities are used, including an electronic manual and test on its contents.

EMBs can also consider producing manuals on electoral processes for their various stakeholders, such as political parties and candidates, party agents, the media, and election observers. The better understanding stakeholders have of the electoral processes, the easier a competent EMB’s work is likely to be.

 

Practical Exercises

A popular and very effective method of training includes different types of simulations. These practical, ‘close to reality’ exercises tend to give participants good hands-on knowledge and will lift the level of confidence of staff. Simulation of electoral processes, such as the conduct of voter registration, polling and counting processes, and similar hands-on and interactive training experiences are generally regarded as the most effective method of training temporary EMB staff and are worthy of being included in every training session. A role play where for example a polling station is set up and a number of people present simulate the process shows in a practical way how the process works. Those present will have had the opportunity to watch, listen, and ask questions about the process they are to carry out.

Elections rely to a greater or lesser degree on automation, and the period between elections can be quite lengthy - sometimes 5 years or more for particular types of elections. If there have been significant changes in staff, running a simulated or test election (on a reduced scale compared to the overall process) is both a useful training exercise and a way of identifying any faults or shortcomings in process. Where permanent staff are organising elections every few months, this may not be necessary – but where a combination of new staff and a considerable time between elections occurs a test process will save a great deal of time and worry for when the main event comes round.

The use of videos and graphics to illustrate and reinforce training texts and messages, and to make presentations to smaller groups, is growing in popularity with trainers. These materials are useful to support, rather than be the basis of, electoral training. Video materials can be most effective when developed as short, focused segments that can be used to illustrate specific work activities and to guide simulations. Before developing training sessions relying on video content, an EMB needs to be sure that appropriate video facilities are available and affordable at all training locations.

 

Oral/visual Training

General briefings on an informal basis can be used as training opportunities, especially where there are very large numbers of people to be trained. If briefings are combined with the distribution of the poll workers manuals or similar documentation for vote counters or registration workers, a relatively short session can be used to run through the processes outlined in the manual and to answer questions. Where possible, it is recommended that manuals and other relevant documents are distributed in advance of the briefing to give the staff time to absorb the material and to prepare possible questions.

More detailed briefings can serve as training for key electoral staff, and hopefully such a briefing will highlight problems and questions that need to be addressed. Briefings for poll workers or count staff will be considerably livened up if some video and graphic material is used.

The regular meetings for headquarter staff should also be seen as training opportunities. Staff meetings should be held periodically and should address and highlight problems and solutions of the day-to-day work at the EMB. EMB members should, above meetings, have the opportunity to attend topic oriented or problem-solving seminars. These seminars can be directed to commissioners only or to EMB commissioners, election advisers, experts, stakeholders, etc. and can be more or less informal.

One disadvantage of internal training is that the staff often is very familiar with the person undertaking the training, and it is rarely seen as an "event".

 

External Training of EMB Staff

External training is training provided from outside the electoral manager's office or staff using external consultants, specialists, or organisations. There are many different types of external training, including:

 

• information exchange with other national or international electoral managers;
• secondment of staff into or out of the electoral manager's office;
• using consultants or external electoral staff to undertake training (e.g. lectures or seminars) either on- or off-site;
• sending staff to external training courses;
• training through membership in external organisations or associations;
• organising meetings of groups of other electoral managers faced with the same issues.

 

Internal training is essential, but an external training process can add interest, give a greater breadth of experience and working practices, and give better opportunities for discussion with other people facing the same problems.

 

Information Exchange

There is no point in having six managers all worrying about the same issues. Very few electoral problems are unique. Exchange of good practices is an excellent and inexpensive way of external training. Electoral managers can meet at the global, regional, or national level to discuss electoral issues, to learn from one another, and to prepare common solutions to anticipated problems. A network or an association which acts as an exchange of information and good practice group could be established by electoral managers from different parts of the globe.

The network can publish newsletters in order to exchange and distribute information at a low cost. Regional meetings can be a venue for specific training activities involving external sources. This type of meeting works very well in the run up to major electoral events; the only cost involved is travel. For example, where new automation systems are being introduced, the global network of electoral managers can arrange meetings with specialist suppliers, and where there are particularly difficult legal issues legal advisers can be invited to present their views.

 

Training Courses and Events

Regional and international training courses and events may engage election officials and experts from all around the world and will offer the opportunity to get together with colleagues facing the same or similar problems. External training courses where staff and members from different EMBs get together will facilitate exposure to new ideas and the exchange of good practices and current developments in election administration. Traditionally there are exchanges of good practice and detailed presentations on a variety of electoral problems and issues which are relevant to all participating countries. Regional and international seminars and workshops for electoral managers are also good training and should be encouraged by the EMB.

 

Education and Development Courses for EMB Staff

There is a strong case for EMB staff being seen to be professional by gaining graduate or postgraduate qualifications in electoral management and governance. More institutions of higher learning are offering courses on aspects of governance and electoral administration. Pioneers in this include the American University (USA), the University of Queensland (Australia), and the University of Paris (France).

International electoral assistance agencies have also developed relatively short professional development courses for electoral administrators, such as the BEAT (Basic Election Administration Training) course developed by IFES, which has been implemented in Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

The most comprehensive professional development course available for electoral administrators is the Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) course, jointly developed by International IDEA, the UN Electoral Assistance Division, and the Australian Electoral Commission. BRIDGE courses are presented by accredited BRIDGE facilitators. BRIDGE is made up of stand-alone modules, so any course can be tailored to an EMB’s specific professional development needs. All BRIDGE modules are available in English, with some or most of the modules also available in Arabic, French, Portuguese, and Russian.

In the UK, the Association of Election Administrators (AEA) conducts regular training and education for election administrators. EMBs (local authorities) in the UK usually require that candidates for election-related positions have the relevant AEA qualifications. The South African EMB has been developing a formal training and education curriculum for election practitioners and an accreditation mechanism for qualified election managers. The Bangladeshi EMB has set up the National Training Institute in Dhaka, which conducts intensive training for electoral staff at all levels, both face-to-face and electronically. There are strict entrance, accreditation, and continuing professional development requirements to be a member of the Professional Electoral Service of the EMB in Mexico.

 

External Election Advisers, Consultants and Trainers

Where there are specific training needs requiring specialist skills or experience, the use of consultants or external electoral staff is worthwhile. International advisers and consultants can be concentrated to train staff on a particular area, such as computer skills or on a particular part of the process. International advisers and consultants are also useful for the training of the EMB trainers.

An advantage of external consultants is that they may have an external and sometimes more objective view of an issue. They do not need to "defend" the process and may be able to identify weaknesses which are not apparent to internal staff. Consultants also have the advantage that they are able to specialise in a narrow field of activity, whereas most permanent electoral staff have to cover a wide topic and skill area. For example, specialist lawyers can be engaged to give training on legal issues or on how to prepare for legal processes, public relations consultants can give good training on public relations skills, and automation specialists on automated processes. External trainers’ wide experiences in given cases may not only help solving specific problems, but may help to raise training programmes to international standards.

A disadvantage is that external consultants may not be familiar with the values and objectives of the electoral organisation, but this situation can be overcome with adequate briefings. Unfortunately, this type of training is costly.

 

Using International Experience

Various regional electoral associations facilitate the exchange of information as well as the secondment and training of electoral administrators. At the international level, through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, many EMBs have been able to send their staff to observe electoral management in other countries, or on secondment to other EMBs for training and exposure to different ways of electoral organisation. This is a quick and relatively inexpensive way of gaining new ideas and exposure to good practices in electoral administration.

EMB projects using advisors and consultants with experience in other countries need to be structured to provide skills transfer and capacity-building through mentoring of the EMB’s staff. These advisors and consultants have the potential to help EMBs solve difficult specific problems, to advise the EMB members and staff on how to ensure its operations accord with international standards, and to build the EMB’s own internal problem-solving capacities. They may be specialists in particular electoral and technical fields or skilled electoral managers.

 

Mentoring

Providing formal or informal one-on-one mentoring opportunities for selected staff can contribute greatly to individual staff skills and personal development, especially if the conditions and goals of the mentoring program are clearly established. Mentor programmes can also assist the EMB to achieve some of its equity goals – for example increasing the number of women or other targeted social or ethnic groups holding more senior management or technical positions. In addition to internal mentoring programs, it may be possible to arrange short-term secondments of EMB staff to work with a mentor in another public-sector agency or private sector organisation.

 

Secondment of Staff

It is very easy to arrange for staff to visit another local or national management body, and many EMBs have been able to send key staff on secondments for a couple of weeks or so to EMBs in other countries. This is an effective way to expose EMB staff to different ways of election organisation, to exchange ideas, and to see how problems are solved in other countries or jurisdictions.

Secondments and exchange visits like this are increasingly taking place on an international basis. Good ideas are rapidly being transferred around the world. Exchange visits benefit both sides - the person visiting another electoral manager's office will bring new ideas and different approaches and thus the office being visited will have the benefit of a different perspective. Exchange visits will also benefit the increasing international interest in forming links with communities in different countries.

 

Handbooks and Specialist Publications

Specialist publications or handbooks, such as the ones from International IDEA, can provide detailed guidance on most parts of the electoral process, on electoral management, and on electoral law and good practice. These publications are an excellent way for the electoral manager to keep up to date at minimum cost and without having to undertake a lot of research and travel. Internet resources such as the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network and others are other easy and inexpensive sources of information. The newsletters of various EMBs such as Elections Canada and the Election Commission of India also provide a variety of useful information.

 

Factors Which May Inhibit EMB Professionalism

There are numerous problems which the EMB may have to overcome to achieve an acceptable level of professionalism. Some may be within the EMB itself, such as attitudinal or resource prioritization issues. Others may be the product of factors in the EMB’s external environment.

Political Climate

The political climate within which elections take place largely determines the electoral credibility and legitimacy. In environments of political fear, intimidation, and violence, in societies with no respect for rule of law, or where governments have no transparency or accountability, it is difficult to manage credible elections. Nevertheless, a professionally oriented EMB can still work hard under such circumstances to demonstrate a commitment to ethical principles and by so doing contribute to efforts to build confidence in the electoral process. Examples of EMBs which delivered acceptable results under the most trying circumstances include the EMBs of Afghanistan (2004), Iraq (January 2005), Mozambique (1994), Nicaragua (1990), and South Africa (1994).

Legal Framework

A sound electoral legal framework is essential for the successful planning and conduct of electoral events and also for the professionalization of the EMB. Where the legal framework falls short of the acceptable norms, the EMB may encounter difficulties in delivering electoral events that are acceptable to all stakeholders, and may thus appear to be unprofessional.

In order to avoid political disruptions and other uncertainties that may undermine the electoral process, it is preferable that changes to the legal framework be finalised long before the date of an electoral event. This allows the EMB sufficient time to educate the public about the changes, make the necessary modifications to its procedures, and train its staff. It also allows the parties and candidates time to adjust their plans if necessary.

The experience of many EMBs, however, particularly in emerging democracies, is that last-minute changes to the legal framework are common.

Temporary EMBs

Temporary EMBs, such as those in some parts of Eastern Europe, may suffer from interruptions which undermine their professional development. A full-time EMB tends to have time and resources to train its staff in between elections; a temporary EMB may only have 90 days in office, which makes long-term training and capacity-building practically impossible. The heavy reliance of a temporary EMB on temporarily seconded public servants may also undermine EMB professionalism, especially because the office from which they are seconded may not be able to release the same staff to the EMB for every electoral event.

Amount and Timing of EMB Funding

Lack of adequate or timely funding can also undermine EMB professional development programmes. Some EMBs, especially in fledgling democracies, struggle to get enough funds for electoral events. When funds are eventually made available, it may be too late to conduct meaningful training of staff, especially temporary electoral staff. Funding may also have conditions that inappropriately limit the EMB’s choice of types of staff training or development.

 

Summary: EMB Staffing and Development of Professional Electoral Management

• Professional EMB members and staff need appropriate skills and most importantly a commitment to the principles of electoral management, including fairness, impartiality, independence, transparency, accessibility, and professionalism.
• EMBs’ use of pubic service staff in secretariats can provide benefits of public sector experience, but can create challenges for EMB professionalization, especially in Governmental Model EMBs, where electoral work may not be the staff’s vocation. EMBs that can hire their own staff and are not subject to public service rules may be able to offer incentives to attract higher quality staff. The existence of attractive career paths in EMBs will assist in the professionalization and retention of staff.
• EMB staff requirements are cyclical, with very high peaks that cannot justify maintenance of all of those staff permanently. Each EMB needs to devise appropriate strategies to promote effective use of temporary staff, which may include timely recruitment processes, availability of incentives and training opportunities, and regular contact mechanisms.
• Equitable recruitment and employment practices – including open merit selection processes, gender balance, and a fair and safe working environment - fulfil an EMB’s internal responsibility as an institution that promotes equity in public life.
• Investment in EMB staff training and development is critical for improving overall EMB effectiveness. This could be through internal courses, professional associations, academic qualifications, mentoring and skills transfer by consultants and senior mangers, or through external electoral management courses such as the BRIDGE course.
• Operational training, especially for temporary staff, has been found to be most effective if it concentrates on specific technical processes, and includes simulations, backed by good quality materials such as manuals and checklists, instructions, appropriate audio-visual aids, and rigorous training evaluation.
• EMBs typically need to provide operational training quickly for large numbers of electoral event staff. Mobile team training requires a relatively long training timetable, and simultaneous training a relatively large number of trainers. Cascade training is commonly used, though it requires strict timing and quality controls to ensure that accurate and complete information reaches the lower levels of the cascade in a timely manner.
• EMBs may have to overcome negative influences on their professionalization, such as conflict environments, flawed legal frameworks, a temporary EMB institution, and insufficient or late release of funds

 

Financial Management of EMBs

A key responsibility of the EMB is dealing with the financing and cost aspects of electoral processes. Costs affect every part of the EMB’s work. Proper budgets need to be prepared and the authority responsible for meeting the costs advised of the likely outcome. The electoral law will lay down to a substantial degree the processes to be followed in terms of the way the electoral activity is conducted. The EMB, of course, should still ensure that all work is carried out in the most cost effective manner in accordance with the law. Elections, voter registration, and the other aspects of elections are a worldwide activity. There is plenty of scope for comparing cost and seeking out the most effective use of resources. To look critically at each stage of the electoral process and assess the EMB spending could be a very effective cost saving method. Can any of the EMB activities be outsourced - for example, the delivery of equipment to polling sites or the input of data into an automated system - in ways that would save money in the long term? An EMB is responsible to ensure the tasks are carried out on a cost effective and professional manner - not necessarily carry out every task from its own resources.

 

Common EMB Financing Issues

Elections are complex and costly events and have to compete with vital national services such as transportation, health, and education which may yield greater immediate political returns. Inadequate or untimely funding of electoral processes may be because governments are not able to appropriate sufficient funds or to ensure the timely disbursements of approved funds.

EMB funding needs are dependent on electoral cycles (see the picture, click to enlarge) and will vary hugely between election and non-election years. Other significant factors include the nature of the EMB, the electoral procedures in place, and the frequency of elections. EMBs have been regularly accused of procuring expensive goods and services, such as high-technology equipment, which is not put to effective use. Some EMBs have also been accused of printing more ballot materials and recruiting more election staff than necessary. The independence of some models of EMBs from the executive branch of government may lead to perceptions that they are not subject to the controls on spending applied to government agencies.

EMBs such as those in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, and Liberia have relied on international donors for substantial amounts of budgetary support, as well as technical assistance. Apart from the sustainability issues raised, the conflicting conditions which different donor agencies impose on the EMBs, added to the requirements from their own government, may make it difficult for EMBs to account properly and within a reasonable time for the totality of funding they receive.

EMBs have had to deal with whether and how to fund new technologies, particularly for voter registration, voting, and vote-counting. The increased emphasis on access issues – such as the provision of mobile polling stations, absentee voting facilities in-country or in other countries, facilities for voters with disabilities, and providing electoral information effective in increasingly multilingual societies – has also had financing implications. In many established democracies, government policies of slimming down public sectors have led to less certainty of funding for EMBs, particularly for staff costs.

 

What Electoral Costs Need to be Financed?

Electoral finance refers to the electoral budget or the costs that a country incurs as a result of the various activities undertaken by the EMB and other agencies to organize and conduct an electoral process. Some electoral costs may be easily identifiable EMB costs; others may be difficult to quantify, contained within general services budgets of other government agencies. Electoral cost comparisons between countries have proven difficult, largely due to the different items that are able to be identified and quantified as electoral costs in different electoral environments, using different models of EMB. The UNDP- and IFES-sponsored Cost of Registration and Elections (CORE) Project divides electoral costs into three categories:

• core costs (or direct costs): are those costs routinely associated with implementing an electoral process in a stable electoral environment;
• diffuse costs (or indirect costs): are those costs for electoral-related services that cannot be disentangled from the general budgets of agencies that assist with the implementation of an electoral process; and
• integrity costs: are those costs, over and above the core costs, that are necessary to provide safety, integrity, political neutrality, and a level playing field for an electoral process.

See table on “Attributes of Electoral Core, Diffuse and Integrity Costs” for further information and examples of these costs.

Integrity costs are often largely sponsored outside the EMB and mainly by the donor community; recent examples are the sophisticated internationally funded electoral register data processing and voter list production activities in the transitional elections of Afghanistan and Iraq. Such additional costs may not be included in analyses of EMB budgets, though they relate to functions within the EMB’s mandate. According to the CORE Project, core costs are proportionally highest in stable democracies, as progress towards democratic consolidation tends to lead to a decrease in integrity costs and an increase in core costs. The increase in the core costs results from demands to foster increased participation through more widely accessible electoral operations, and the use of high technology to expedite voter registration, voting, and the transmission of election results.

The CORE Project further shows that diffuse costs tend to be higher in stable democracies, especially in Western Europe, where electoral processes are more likely to be implemented by Governmental or Mixed Model EMBs which may use several government agencies to implement electoral services. Where, for example, a national civil registration agency is responsible for providing electoral register data, as in Hungary and Norway, it incurs electoral-related costs which may be difficult to separate from overall civil registration costs. Even where governments have a policy of ‘cost recovery’ for governmental agency electoral services, the true cost may not be charged.

Independent Model EMBs are more likely to have sole responsibility for electoral functions, and thus have a higher level of readily identifiable direct costs, and a lower level of diffuse costs than Governmental or Mixed Model EMBs. A higher level of readily identifiable costs may give a false impression of higher actual costs.

 

Attributes and Examples of Electoral Core, Diffuse and Integrity Costs

 

 

Who Finances EMBs and How?

Some EMBs receive funds and donations in kind from large corporations, the business community, and philanthropists. For example, the South African and Namibian EMBs collaborate with the local business community to set up and manage their election results centres, while the Botswana EMB cooperates with the corporate sector to conduct voter information campaigns. EMBs need to be careful that the manner of raising funds from the corporate sector does not affect perceptions of EMB financial probity, impartiality, or credibility.

Some EMBs, such as in Australia, raise some funds through the administration of elections on behalf of bodies such as professional associations or trade unions. Others, as in Hungary and Zambia, charge a fee to recover the costs of printing copies of the voters register which are distributed to political parties and other stakeholders, and in some cases charge for other publications.

 

Method of Disbursing State Funding

Funding for many Independent Model EMBs, for example in Costa Rica, Ghana, and Namibia, is a separate line item in the national budget, released directly to the EMB by the Treasury. For others, the EMB budget is released through a government ministry, for example, the Ministry of Home Affairs in South Africa and the Ministry of Laws in India.

Budgets for Governmental Model EMBs are usually a part of the budget of the government ministry responsible for implementing electoral processes, as in Denmark and Singapore. A Mixed Model EMB’s budget may be channelled through a line ministry, such as the Ministry of the Interior in Spain. In Senegal, the monitoring component of the EMB is funded directly from the legislature, while electoral implementation by the Directorate of Elections in the Ministry of the Interior is funded through that ministry.

 

Approval of EMB Budget Proposals

It is common for EMBs to submit their budget proposals to Treasury for preliminary approval, although some submit their budget proposals directly to the legislature or a committee of the legislature (such as the UK Electoral Commission). In some countries, such as Costa Rica, the legislature has no power to alter or reject any part of the EMB’s proposed budget. In others, as in Nigeria and the Seychelles, specified parts of the EMB’s proposed budget dealing with EMB members’ salaries and allowances cannot be altered by the executive or its agencies.

In Canada, the EMB’s budget has two parts, the recurrent budget, which covers costs such as permanent staff and related material support, and the elections budget, which covers additional expenses directly related to an election or referendum. The recurrent budget may be altered by the government, while the elections budget may not. The EMB provides an annual estimate of its elections budget to the government, but is allowed to spend more than this estimate. Following the election, the EMB accounts for these expenditures to a committee of the legislature.

 

Integrated or Distributed Electoral Budgets

An electoral budget may be a single integrated item in the national budget, or may consist of many components which are spread across the budgets of various government agencies. National, regional, and local governments’ budgets may each provide funds to the EMB. In the unitary state of Indonesia, the national budget totally funds the EMB to conduct presidential elections and national and regional legislative elections. However, regional and local authorities provide most of the funding for elections for provincial governors and local mayors. Such arrangements are more common in federal states. Funding for the EMB in Bosnia and Herzegovina is provided by all four levels of government: their respective shares vary according to the type of elections held. In India and Mexico, the national government funds the EMB to conduct national elections, but regional governments contribute funds when their elections coincide with national ones. In the UK, the budget for elections is funded by local authorities, with some costs being reimbursed by central government according to fixed scales.

 

Donor Funding

Some countries emerging from conflict have relied on donor assistance, through the UN or other agencies, to fund the whole or a significant part of their electoral budget. Examples include Cambodia (1993), Mozambique (1994), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), East Timor (2000), Sierra Leone (2002), Afghanistan (2004), and Iraq and Liberia (2005). In post-conflict elections, donor assistance can be essential, especially if breakdown of the institutions of the state has destroyed their ability to collect revenue.Donor assistance from, for example, the UN, the European Commission, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has made a significant contribution to funding electoral processes in many other countries. There is a growing pattern of regional donor assistance: for example, South Africa and other Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries offer electoral support to EMBs of other SADC member countries; the Organisation of American States (OAS) has provided regional assistance in countries such as Haiti.

In emerging democracies such as Albania, Indonesia, Lesotho, and Palestine, assistance may be necessary to implement electoral processes that meet international standards. Assistance may also be necessary to enable fledgling opposition parties to contest elections in a comparatively competitive manner. In countries wishing to upgrade electoral services, such as Papua New Guinea, general institutional capacities and awareness may not yet have developed sufficiently to deal with the ‘intangibles’ in electoral costs – such as training and education. Even in relatively consolidated democracies, ‘flagship’ projects in fields such as data processing and communications may require donor assistance. Some emerging democracies are relying heavily on foreign donor assistance to fund their core election budget.

Donors’ funding availability will be affected by their own funding cycles, which may be difficult to coordinate with the timing of EMB needs. Donor assistance is usually channelled either directly to the EMB or through a government ministry. Direct channelling to the EMB has the advantage that it facilitates easier disbursement and has a direct line of accountability. In Cambodia and Yemen, the EMB has a special account in the National Treasury established for electoral management funding from all sources. Different accounting requirements from multiple donors may complicate the EMBs financial reporting mechanisms. On the other hand, exposure to different donors’ accounting requirements can encourage EMBs to review and improve their own financial accountability systems.

Control of donor funds can be a contentious issue. Channelling donor funds through government ministries may lead to delays or diversions in the disbursement of funds due to government bureaucracy or corruption, but host countries may insist on this to ensure that their, rather then the donors’, funding priorities are followed. Steering committee mechanisms, involving representatives of all donors, the EMB, and possibly the government, can be an effective solution, and prevent duplication of funding. Formal or informal use of an agency such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to coordinate all donor funding for the EMB can also be effective. In Indonesia in 2004, a significant proportion of multiple donors’ electoral assistance funds were disbursed through a UNDP Trust Fund under priorities established by the EMB.

EMBs need to be careful that donor assistance meets the EMB’s priorities, and is not driven by the interests of donor-provided consultants or equipment providers from the donor country. Technical assistance provided by donors needs to include components for training and skills transfer to EMB counterpart staff, so that the EMB can assume full ownership of future electoral processes. Donors may prefer to directly contract suppliers of products or services for the EMB, which can raise public questions about foreign interference. Donors may require that systems, equipment, and other tangible items they provide be purchased from their home country suppliers. Experience shows externally driven equipment solutions, such as for voter registration in East Timor in 2000, may be inappropriate for the environment.

Some Key Advantages and Disadvantages of International Donor Funding for Electoral Processes

 

 

Other Sources of EMB Funding

Some EMBs receive funds and donations in kind from large corporations, the business community, and philanthropists. For example, the South African and Namibian EMBs collaborate with the local business community to set up and manage their election results centres, while the Botswana EMB cooperates with the corporate sector to conduct voter information campaigns. EMBs need to be careful that the manner of raising funds from the corporate sector does not affect perceptions of EMB financial probity, impartiality, or credibility.

Some EMBs, such as in Australia, raise some funds through the administration of elections on behalf of bodies such as professional associations or trade unions. Others, as in Hungary and Zambia, charge a fee to recover the costs of printing copies of the voters register which are distributed to political parties and other stakeholders, and in some cases charge for other publications.

 

Budget Formulation Methods for EMBs

There are two main approaches to the formulation of an EMB budget: baseline (or incremental) and zero base (or zero-based) budgeting:

• baseline budgeting - takes as its basis the last funding period’s funding allocation and adjusts that for the next period. It is a budgeting tool suited to relatively static environments, rather then the dynamic electoral environment. For example, using baseline budgeting methods, it may be difficult to estimate what funds a permanent EMB might really need in a year following an election year.
• zero base budgeting - recognises that circumstances change from funding period to funding period and treats each funding period as a clean slate, and estimates funds required to achieve the strategic plan’s outcomes for that period. Past funding levels are not the relevant factor: instead, budgets are linked to the strategic plan by separately estimating and justifying the funds required to achieve each of the outcomes for the funding period defined in the EMB’s strategic and operational plans.
  
  

The decision on which budgeting system an EMB uses may be taken at governmental level if the EMB operates under government rules and regulations, or by the EMB itself if its legal framework allows it to determine its own rules and procedures for financial administration. An EMB’s approach to budgeting often tends to reflect that of the public sector in its country, especially if it is a Governmental or Supervisory EMB bound by general civil service financial rules.

Many EMBs still use baseline budgeting to prepare their election budget. There are a number of factors that make this approach less effective or even inappropriate for EMBs:

• as an EMB’s tasks may vary greatly from one year to another, depending on the electoral cycle, the resources needed for one funding period’s tasks tend not to be adequately predicted by the preceding funding period;
• attempting to estimate budgets for a current year election based on those for an election three, four, or even five years earlier runs risks of not adequately considering the effects of environmental, technological, or inflationary changes that occur over longer periods;
• the changing nature of electoral processes creates new tasks and new costs which may not be able to be estimated on the basis of past needs;
• there are likely to be substantial cost variations from year to year due to the increasing use of new technology for EMB tasks such as voter registration, information communication and management systems, voting, and the transmission of election results. As increasing use of technology changes EMBs’ working methods, costs in some areas may rise and in others may fall.
  
  

If the EMB uses a baseline budgeting approach, it will find it more difficult to meet the increasing demands for good governance, accountability, and sustainability. EMBs need to justify what will be achieved by the use of the funds requested, and why the level of funding requested is necessary.

Zero base budgeting encourages a ‘programme’ or ‘performance’ approach to budgets, whereby EMB activities are separately costed, and budgets are linked to specific output targets and outcomes, as is done by the Australian EMB. Thus, instead of having EMB-wide, generic budget categories of ‘staffing’, ‘forms printing’, ‘transport’, ‘security’, ‘regional office costs’ and the like, which makes it difficult to determine the cost of any EMB service or product, relevant costs are budgeted and attributed to a specific programme or project – such as ballot paper printing and distribution, staff training, or information programmes for political parties.

Zero base budgeting greatly improves the accountability of the EMB for its use of public and other funds, and assists the EMB to focus on providing cost-effective service delivery. It requires that all divisions within the EMB have individual work plans tailored to the EMB’s strategic goals, which identify the required outcomes, contain performance objectives based on measurable output targets, and specify verifiable indicators that these targets are being achieved. Each work plan aims to achieve a particular objective which contributes to the EMB’s overall strategic goals, and has a specific budget structure. Linking the budget to the strategic plan in this way makes it easier to determine how effectively funds have been expended to reach each objective, and to determine where and to what extent funding requests may be cut, or need to be increased.

 

The Process for Budget Formulation and Approval

Construction of a zero base budget starts with each EMB division preparing a budget proposal for its workplans. This budget proposal states the division’s funding and other resource needs, how its activities meet the output objectives of the strategic plan, and performance indicators. Once activities have been agreed upon at division level, these divisional budgets are reviewed, often by a committee of senior divisional managers chaired by the head of the secretariat or the chief accounting officer of the EMB, to ensure that proposed divisional budgets are realistic and fit a common understanding and prioritization of the EMB’s strategic objectives. The head of the EMB’s secretariat then amalgamates and finalizes the overall EMB budget estimate, which in some EMBs then has to be approved by the members (or Chair) of the EMB. In Governmental Model EMBs, this whole process may be undertaken by the Ministry within which the EMB is located.

The next step is generally for the head of the secretariat or chair of the EMB to forward the budget to the relevant ministry. In countries where this ministry is required to approve the EMB budget proposal, a formal budget hearing may be scheduled. The South African EMB submits its budget to the legislature via the Department of Home Affairs, but the latter does not have the power to alter the EMB budget. However, the Department of Finance may reduce the EMB budget proposal - as happened in 1999, resulting in the resignation of the EMB chair in protest. EMBs whose budget proposals may not be altered by either the executive or the legislature include Cost Rica and Ghana. It is common practice for the Ministry of Finance to incorporate the EMB’s budget into the national budget for tabling before the legislature for approval. It may be presented by a member of the legislature, often a minister of the department which represents the EMB.

 

Availability of Budget Funds

The practice in many countries is for the Treasury to release the funds to the EMB in a lump sum after legislative approval has been secured. This applies where the EMB has autonomy over its finances, and often its own banking account, as in The Gambia and Macedonia. For Governmental Model and Mixed Model EMBs, funds for electoral processes may be released through the treasury or to the host ministry, and disbursed through that ministry’s or the treasury’s bank accounts. In some cases, EMB funds are kept and managed by the Ministry of Finance, with the EMB making requisitions for the Ministry to pay its creditors and staff, mainly by cheque. EMBs in this category include Botswana and Namibia.

In Russia, the CEC may obtain a loan from the private sector if there are delays in receiving state budget funding. The Georgian EMB has a procedure to ensure timely disbursement of funds by the Government: it can bring a claim before the Supreme Court if funds are not disbursed in a timely manner. Charging the EMB’s budget directly to the consolidated fund occurs in countries such as Barbados. There may be significant legal and administrative barriers to be dealt with before such an approach can be implemented in other countries.

EMBs are more likely to use cheques and bank transfers for significant payments, though cash transactions are still used extensively for payment of temporary staff and in general in post conflict environments where the banking system has broken down, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Cambodia, salaries are paid in cash while other transactions are made through bank transfer or by cheque. Other EMBs, such as in Australia, limit cash transactions to small petty cash amounts under strict controls.

 

Control of EMB Funding

Emerging democracies often fail to fund major election processes in an adequate and timely manner. Where the EMB’s expenditure processes and cash flow are controlled by a government ministry and subject to government rules and procedures, there may be delays in critical disbursements of funds. For Governmental Model EMBs and for the implementation arm of Mixed Model EMBs, this may be the ministry that houses the EMB. For other EMBs without financial autonomy, it may be the Ministry of Finance.

Delayed disbursement of funds can create major problems in electoral administration. Late disbursement of funds to the EMB can mean that vital decisions are delayed, or that insufficient time is left for the EMB to use high probity tender processes or organize the supply of acceptable quality goods for electoral purposes. Late payment to suppliers can cause disruptions to supply in the time-critical election environment. Late payments to staff, as has happened in Cameroon, can also threaten electoral processes. It may be to the advantage of both the EMB and the government to conclude a memorandum of understanding governing the funding disbursement arrangements.

Having a Ministry control EMB payments may raise EMB credibility-threatening perceptions that the EMB’s activities are being controlled by the government. Even where an EMB is constitutionally independent of the government, linking it to the government financial payments system can limit its autonomy.

Giving EMBs control of their own payments procedures and systems enhances their credibility as being independent of the government, and may lead to faster payment processes. It also places an additional workload and a significantly higher burden of control on the EMB to ensure that all payments are made correctly, on time, and to the highest standards of probity. Before assigning control of payments to an EMB, there needs to be certainty that the EMB has sufficient resources, skills, and control systems in place to be able to manage its own payments. Robust accountability systems - internally through internal audit, and externally through external audit and reporting to stakeholders such as a committee of the legislature – are essential.

 

EMB Financial Control Measures

There are four standard levels of control on EMB financial management: purchase and expenditure approvals processes, internal monitoring, internal review, and external review or evaluation. These controls are necessary to ensure that errors are corrected and corrupt or illegal practices are prevented.

The basic level of control is in the EMB’s procedures for approvals for purchasing and for authorizing expenditure. Approvals of expenditure up to defined financial limits may often be effectively delegated to secretariat staff with appropriate seniority (e.g., Chief of Operations). The important factor is some diffusion of control, for example by requiring transaction approvals from each of

• the operational area which requests the financial commitment, and
• the finance control area which checks that the commitment is in line with EMB strategic directions and financial policies, and
• the finance disbursement area which authorizes payment for the transaction.
  
  

Internal monitoring is applied by the EMB staff who are responsible for managing the EMB’s financial resources at all levels. This includes the heads of division who are responsible for monitoring and reviewing staff performance, and managing their divisional budgets. Overall financial monitoring is the responsibility of the division, usually the finance division, which is responsible for managing EMB expenses and financial transactions through accounting records such as general ledgers, journals, and suspense accounts. This division would usually also control the entire budget and produce regular financial reports including cash projections. Some EMBs have a special members' subcommittee on financial matters, which advises the secretariat on financial issues and may also have the mandate to approve the proposed EMB budget and appoint the EMB’s external auditors. For example, some of these tasks are undertaken by the Finance, Planning, and Logistics Committee of the Kenyan EMB, which includes both EMB members and secretariat staff.

The EMB may also have an internal auditor, a member of the secretariat whose objective is to ensure financial regularity and the alignment of the EMB budget and staff performance with the strategic direction of the EMB. To maintain the independence of internal audit, it usually reports directly to a member of the EMB or the head of the secretariat, rather than through a division of the secretariat. While a primary function of internal audit is to provide assurance to the EMB of the accuracy and integrity of its financial management, it can also play a wide internal development and evaluation role within the EMB. It can advise on the audit requirements of systems, especially those based on new technology, and can lead change advocacy through undertaking internal evaluations of the EMB’s operational processes.

The financial control process also includes external audit. External audits are usually required at least annually and often after significant electoral events. Audits of electoral processes in Governmental Model EMBs and the implementation component of Mixed Model EMBs may not be separate audits, but part of the external audit of the host department. External audits may be done by a government audit agency (if this exists) or by a private contractor, which examines the EMB’s financial transactions for the relevant period and reports to the government on whether they were free of irregularities, and also identifies areas of financial management where improvement is required.

The final stage of financial control includes public submission, often to the legislature, as in Guyana and Nigeria, of the EMB’s election or annual reports and audited financial statements. Accountability mechanisms for EMBs are discussed in detail in Performance and Financial Accountability.

 

Asset Management

EMB assets are public property, so the EMB has a responsibility to protect their value, through controlling all assets – equipment, materials, and other assets such as software - after purchase. Responsibilities for asset management need to be clearly identified in the EMB’s structure and staff job descriptions. Donors may also wish to ensure that an EMB has the capacity to take over the management of assets they provide.

Basic controls on an EMB’s assets include placing an EMB identification number on each asset, maintaining comprehensive and up-to-date asset registers, ensuring there are audit trails for transfers of assets, implementing regular stocktakes of assets, and investigating and enforcing appropriate sanctions over any discrepancies found. Stocktakes need to be conducted at least annually. Asset registers need to record all relevant data, including asset name, serial and ID numbers, purchase date and cost, current location and location history, depreciation data, current value, current condition, last stocktake date, and disposal information.

When purchasing assets, EMBs need to have a clear concept of their life cycle. Timing of asset purchases is critical for ensuring both efficient use of funds and availability of assets for electoral events, and needs to consider issues such as production lead times, storage costs, and distribution facilities. For example, in Canada, the EMB ensures that it always has sufficient special paper stocks on hand to print ballot papers for one national election, as in Canada elections may be called at any time.

 

Principles for EMB Financial Management

The requirements for key EMB financial processes, such as budgeting, procurement, expenditure authorizations, financial reporting, and auditing, may be contained in law, accounting and financial reporting codes, or EMB or government regulations. A clear legal framework for the management of EMB finances ensures certainty, regularity, and consistency and fosters good governance within the EMB. As well as the legal framework, there are fundamental principles which are the basis of good practice EMB financial policies and procedures.

Transparency

Financial transparency raises stakeholder and public awareness of the EMB’s structures and programmes, financial policies, and challenges and can foster stakeholders’ confidence in the EMB’s capacities. Financial transparency promotes good governance and serves as a strong deterrent to corruption and fraud within the EMB. When there are allegations of bad or dishonest practices, the EMB can better protect its credibility by rigorously exposing, rather than seeking to hide, such practices, including ensuring whistle-blowers are protected.

Transparency in the preparation, justification, and approval of an electoral budget builds public confidence in the EMB’s management. Rigorous public scrutiny and accountability through the legislature provide the EMB with the opportunity to show publicly its commitment to financial integrity. It is good practice for the EMB to be transparent in its procurement practices, especially where fast-track methods have to be used to meet electoral deadlines.

Prompt public disclosure of the results of audits of the EMB’s financial accounts and of reports on the awarding of procurement contracts guards against financial irregularity and corruption or patronage in contracting. The most fundamental way the EMB can promote financial transparency is by publishing its annual performance reports, including audited financial statements, and submitting these reports to the legislature and other stakeholders, including political parties and the general public.

Efficiency and effectiveness

As a guardian of public funds, the EMB has an obligation to expend these responsibly and to be efficient and effective in the management of its financial, human, and material resources. An outcome-based approach to the EMB’s budgets, regular monitoring of staff performance, and regular auditing of financial records assist in promoting efficiency and effectiveness in the use of an EMB’s funds. This can contribute to enhanced public confidence in the EMB’s management of electoral processes.

Integrity

The commitment of all EMB members and staff to integrity in their conduct underlies the organisational integrity of the EMB. Integrity in financial management covers not only monetary transactions, but includes issues such as respect for intellectual property. Development of integrated financial management systems with clear audit trails enables breaches of financial integrity standards to be discovered and reported. Strong codes of conduct and policies on conflicts of interest promote integrity. A strict regime of sanctions for breaches if integrity requirements, and fearlessness in using them, will enhance public confidence in the EMB.

 

Audit and Evaluation

Audit and program evaluation are widely used analytical tools to assist EMBs to improve their accountability. The boundaries between auditing and program evaluation are blurred. Both provide independent, objective analyses of how the EMB uses its resources and assist EMB management to improve service delivery. An audit will generally concentrate on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the EMB’s performance in relation to the objectives of its activities, as stated in its strategic plan or other legal and operational framework documents, while a program evaluation will systematically analyze how well a program, such as an election, is working. It will generally start from the basis of questioning whether the objectives determined by the EMB, or its framework, meet the needs of the EMB’s stakeholders.

 

Summary: Financial Management of EMBs

• New technologies and demands for high integrity and widely accessible elections are placing new demands on election funding, and reliance on donor funding in some emerging democracies. EMB funding needs vary significantly between years, requiring accurate budget estimations based on resource needs for planned strategic outcomes.
• The UNDP- and IFES-sponsored Cost of Registration and Elections (CORE) Project divides electoral costs into three categories:
  • Core (or direct) costs - ‘normal’ directly attributable electoral costs;
  • Diffuse (or indirect) costs – support costs hidden in budgets of organisations other than the EMB; and
  • Integrity costs – additional costs required to secure integrity of fragile electoral processes.
• Election costs are measured with different levels of comprehensiveness and under different circumstances in various countries, making cost-effectiveness comparisons difficult.
• State budget funding for elections may be from a single source or multiple sources and for a single institution or proposed by the EMB, they must in most cases be approved by the legislature, and disbursed to the EMB through a government ministry, though this may affect perceptions of the EMB’s ability to act independently and in a timely manner.
• Especially in emerging democracies, a large proportion of electoral funding may come from donor agencies. While donor assistance can have a positive impact on election technical standards and integrity, it needs to be carefully targeted at the EMB’s priorities, coordinated between donors and the receiving country, promote sustainability rather than donor dependence, and subject to controls appropriate to allow the EMB to make effective use of the funds.
• EMBs variously use baseline budgeting (based on historic funds allocations) or zero base budgeting (based on future activity required to meet strategic objectives) for electoral budgets. Zero based budgeting may initially require more skill and effort, but more effectively allocates resources, and more accountably ties EMB activities and performance to the EMB’s strategic plan outcomes.
• Having an EMB control its own expenditure processes and cash flows enhances its credibility and may assist in the timely disbursement of electoral funds. However, EMBs must then have sufficiently rigorous controls on expenditure and payments to prevent error and fraud.
• In some complex purchasing environments, it may be preferable for the EMB to use a public sector-wide procurement agency. In most cases, however, the EMB can better meet the tight deadlines for electoral procurement by managing its purchasing independently, subject to the EMB having sufficient resources, skills, and internal controls to ensure integrity and value for money in procurement. Necessary controls include enforceable conflict of interest polices and codes of conduct, and measures to ensure purchases are not vendor driven.
• EMBs need to institute graduated levels of financial controls, such as diffused approvals of procurement and disbursements, work unit and EMB-wide internal financial monitoring, and regular internal and external financial audits.
• EMBs hold public assets and are accountable for their use, safekeeping, and appropriate archiving or disposal at the end of their useful life. Professional asset management systems – including regularly checked asset registers - are necessary.
• EMBs' financial management needs to follow the principles of transparency, efficiency, effectiveness, integrity, and sustainability.

 

EMB Stakeholder Relationships

An EMB neither operates in a vacuum nor is it an island unto itself. There is a myriad of stakeholders, constituents, or ‘publics’ whose legitimate concerns and interests the EMB should strive to accommodate and keep on board when deciding policies and practices. Unless the EMB works hard to create and sustain sound relations with those stakeholders, misunderstandings and suspicions will arise, and this will ultimately generate lack of public confidence and trust in the electoral process in general and in the EMB in particular.

Although stakeholder management is critical to the success of the EMB, this subject is rarely taught, learned, or understood in EMB circles.

Like in the business world where companies are required to invest in customer satisfaction in order to attract more customers and thereby enhance their profitability, the EMB should, as they say in business parlance, ‘know its audience’ so that its services and goods are tailored and responsive to the requirements of its customers (stakeholders). This helps to develop customer confidence in the EMB and also generates support and goodwill towards EMB policies and practices which in turn enhances the EMB credibility.

Put differently, there is a correlation between stakeholder support and loyalty and the EMB credibility: the lesser the stakeholders’ support and loyalty towards the EMB, the lesser the EMB’s credibility. For example, an EMB may organise an election which, technically speaking, may be clean and flawless, but if stakeholders are not involved and kept in the loop about the process, their suspicion and distrust may lead to a rejection of the election outcome. Against this background, it is important that the EMB foster transparency and a participative approach which involves stakeholders in the way it administers the whole electoral process.

 

Who are the Stakeholders and What Is Their Role In the Electoral Process?

The term ‘stakeholder’ refers to those individuals and groups who depend on the organisation to fulfil their own goals and on whom, in turn, the organisation depends on for legitimacy. (University of Auckland, 2005). Such individuals and groups may have a multitude of interests, expectations, and demands as to what a particular organisation must provide to society. In short, stakeholders are those who affect and are affected by the actions of an organisation.

In the context of the EMB, stakeholders are those individuals and groups that have an interest or stake in the EMB operations. The word ‘stake’ here means a risk or a benefit which arises from the EMB actions. For example, because of the stake (loosing or winning) which political parties have in an election, they will insist that the EMB manage the polls in an impartial manner. Since political parties possess a stake in EMB activities, such as the way it runs elections, they are EMB stakeholders. Primary EMB stakeholders are those who directly affect or are directly affected by the EMB’s activities, policies, and practices. The following can be considered to be an EMB’s core stakeholders:

• political parties and candidates;
• EMB staff;
• government ministries;
• legislatures;
• electoral dispute resolution bodies;
• domestic and international election observers;
• media;
• voters and prospective voters;
• civil society; and
• the donor community and electoral assistance agencies
  
  

Secondary stakeholders of the EMB are those who, although part of the environment in which the EMB operates, are more loosely connected with the EMB, such as EMB suppliers, the public at large, and international networks.

 

Political Parties and Candidates as EMB Stakeholders

Political parties are key stakeholders whose concerns and interests the EMB needs to take on board when designing and implementing its policies and activities. Unless the EMB enjoys a good relationship with political parties, its policies and programs may attract opposition and criticism that could make it difficult for the EMB to enjoy widespread stakeholder support. Where political party nominees are appointed as full members of an EMB, such as in Georgia, or as non-voting members, such as in Mexico, there is a permanent structure for EMB dialogue with political parties.

It is in the interests of an EMB both to maintain an open-door policy to political parties and candidates and to treat all political parties and candidates equally – no matter whether in power or not, or in the legislature or not - with respect, impartiality, and fairness. Political parties and candidates are much more likely to have confidence in an EMB that treats them in this manner, and that seriously considers their opinion and suggestions. Regular meetings with political parties – at least one per month and perhaps more frequently during an election period – can provide a framework for this mutual communication.

A common expression in Southern Africa is that an EMB should not ‘comrade’ the ruling party and ‘puppet’ the opposition. The principle of fairness and equality means that the EMB should not give ‘the best’ to the ruling party and the ‘leftovers’ to the minority parties: for example, giving the ruling parties original copies of the voters register and the opposition parties photocopies; or delivering materials to the ruling parties while requiring opposition parties to find out about and collect the materials themselves. The EMB’s self interest, as well as its principles, is relevant: today’s opposition may well be tomorrow’s ruling party.

When the EMB consults political parties on any significant issue, it is important that all political parties believe that they are being treated equally, and offered the same opportunities and information by the EMB. All political parties need to be similarly consulted. Meetings to which not all political parties are invited can induce in those not present fears that favourable deals may have been struck between the EMB and a particular political party or parties. Minutes of the EMBs meetings with political parties need to be circulated to all political parties – whether present or not - at the same time and through the same method. It is also preferable that an EMB meet all the political parties at the same time to discuss EMB decisions or policies, not separately.

As well as regular EMB/political party meetings, the EMB may be able to improve its relationships with political parties by very carefully including their representatives in EMB sponsored events. Examples of potential joint activities are familiarisation visits to voter registration facilities, participation in voter education workshops, media interviews - including appeals for citizens to register and vote, or the EMB sponsoring public debates between candidates. Such public relations may assist cooperation between the EMB and political parties and candidates, and enhance stakeholder ownership of the key election projects.

While the EMB can improve cooperation with political parties and candidates by including them in EMB sponsored events, the EMB should be extremely careful to extend exactly equal opportunity for participation to all political parties and candidates, or it will be justifiably accused of favouring particular political interests. This will have a negative impact on the EMB’s stakeholder relationships.

It is important that political parties be involved in consultations about setting the EMB's strategic objectives and in evaluations of its performance. As a key EMB customer, political parties’ and candidates’ opinions on the EMB’s focus, priorities, and service provided are a useful ingredient in improving electoral management. During election periods, regular consultation with political parties and candidates can promote agreement on the EMB’s timetables, processes, and outputs. After each election, it is useful for the EMB to include political parties in general consultations with stakeholders on how to improve the electoral framework, to consider in any proposals the EMB may make for electoral reform. For example, the Botswana EMB always convenes post-election evaluation workshops which are attended by political parties and civil society.

Executives from major political parties can bring a different perspective to these consultations than their representatives in the legislature. Non-parliamentary parties, including newly registered parties and those which failed to win seats in the previous election, need also to be included in these consultations. In managing this consultative process, the EMB needs to be very careful that it is not, and is not seen to be, under the influence of any political party or groups of parties.

 

The EMB’s Staff

An organisation’s greatest asset is its human resources: the EMB’s permanent and temporary staff, and those hired on contract. Unless the EMB safeguards the interests of its staff and responds to their concerns, the EMB may well fail to deliver successful elections. A staff that is not loyal to the EMB and its principles may frustrate the EMB’s plans and programs. They may be corrupted either by suppliers who want to win a tender or by politicians who want to win an election. Unhappy staff may strike even during elections and thus derail the electoral process. It is in this context that the EMB staff are key stakeholders who can make or break the EMB’s operations and reputation.

The EMB cannot assume that its staff will be loyal and automatically share and work hard towards implementing the EMB’s values: it needs to support and generate this loyalty and professionalism. There are many organisational values and policies that could be implemented by an EMB to assist this, including the following:

• treating employees with honesty, fairness, and respect and outlawing any form of discrimination against particular employees or groups of employees;
• fostering a culture of cooperation, teamwork, and trust among staff, with a safe work environment for all;
• designing staff conditions of service and salaries which are commensurate with those in other sectors, including the private sector;
• training and developing staff to enable them to enhance and diversify their skills so as to enable them to qualify for promotion especially within the EMB;
• encouraging staff to become professional electoral administrators and to align their interests with those of the EMB;
• involving staff in the organisation and planning of their work;
• developing formal and informal arrangements by which the EMB’s management seeks and seriously considers staff views on the EMB’s activities;
• maintaining information flows within the EMB, including organising regular meetings to brief staff on external and internal developments which may affect their work and future;
• familiarising staff with staff rules and regulations and the EMB’s vision and mission, through orientation upon appointment and regular follow-up sessions;
• organising social activities, such as sports days, family outings, and year-end parties, in order to engender teamwork and esprit de corps among the staff;
• acknowledging and rewarding unique achievements by staff, such as long service and outstanding performance.
  
  

The EMB needs to make a determined effort to support its staff, instil in them values of professional electoral administration, and respond responsibly to staff needs.

As a socially responsible organisation, the EMB needs to ensure that its policies and practices actively promote the health, safety, and general welfare of its workers, and provide equality of accessibility to its entire staff. Particularly during election periods, when there is intense pressure to complete tasks to deadlines and welfare safeguards may appear of lesser importance, EMB policies and practices need to guard against unreasonably long working hours, unsafe modes of transport, poorly ventilated and weather unprotected venues for polling and counting of votes, and leaving staff in venues where there is no access to clean water and lavatories.

Ensuring equal opportunities for appointment, performance, and promotion for people from all societal groups strengthens the EMB’s relationships both with staff stakeholders and with the wider community. This may include seeking balance in employment opportunities for people from various ethnic groups, or catering for any special needs of employees with disabilities. EMB polices can ensure that gender opportunities are equal, for example through flexible working hours, child care arrangements, mentoring, and staff promotion policies.

Through implementing polices and providing facilities that promote equal opportunities for all EMB staff, the EMB not only maintains a good relationship with a key stakeholder group, but can promote conditions that allow all its workforce to perform to its full potential.

Governmental Model EMBs, and those other EMBs which use civil servants as their staff, may be bound by civil service regulations and polices that may restrict the EMB’s ability to deal in the most appropriate manner with its staff stakeholders. In such EMBs, the relationship with its staff may be more dependent on the EMB management’s attitudes to staff - to values such as fairness, non-discrimination, free and honest information flow or staff consultation mechanisms – than on their ability to provide material benefits.

 

Executive Branch of Government

There are many reasons for an EMB to promote sound relations with the executive branch of government. The Treasury or Ministry of Finance is often responsible for the EMB’s budget. Governmental Model EMBs need to work within the confines of a line ministry and may need to maintain close relationships with local authorities implementing electoral processes.

In many cases, the EMB, relies on government ministries (and regional EMBs similarly rely on local authorities) for transport and other electoral logistical support, such as premises for polling stations, and on staff seconded from various government agencies to serve as election officials. Approvals from government purchasing agencies or import licensing agencies may be required for essential procurement. EMBs may be subject to audit by the state audit authority, and may also be required to respond to inquiries from the ombudsperson or the anti-corruption agency. The EMB relies on the police force for security and, in some countries, may rely on the armed forces for security and some transport services during electoral events.

Cooperation and coordination will be enhanced if the EMB strives to keep all relevant government ministries and agencies informed about its activities and to consult with them on a regular basis about the services and support it may require from them. It can be useful for there to be a permanent working group or liaison committee involving the EMB and the government agencies on which the EMB relies for provision of resources for electoral events. For Independent Model EMBs, a ministry, such as the Interior Ministry or Ministry of Justice, may be the EMB’s ‘liaison’ ministry for representations to the Cabinet or the legislature, as in Canada.

It is essential that the EMB maintain good liaison with the Treasury, Ministry of Finance, or whichever department is responsible for vetting the EMB’s budget requests and releasing EMB funding. Unless this department is familiar with the EMB’s programs, their importance to democratic governance, and the time-critical nature of the EMB’s funding requirements, it may not recognise the importance of funding some EMB activities – such as voter education – or the need to make funds available to the EMB well before the date of an electoral event. Formal arrangements between the EMB and this ministry on how and when the EMB’s funds are to be released may be necessary, and their negotiation can be easier if relationships between this department and the EMB have been well-maintained. An important factor in this relationship is that the Treasury or Ministry of Finance has confidence in the budgeting, accounting, financial control, and reporting systems implemented in the EMB.

Arrangements for the EMB chair or members to make courtesy calls on government leaders, including the head of state, in order to create awareness about the EMB’s programs and the challenges it may face, such as financial or logistical constraints, will raise the EMB’s profile with its government stakeholders. Where the head of state must assent to legislation before it is promulgated, it is important that the EMB make him or her aware of any urgency in finalising electoral law amendments. The EMB may also find it useful to involve the head of state or senior ministers in high-profile public EMB events funded by the government, such as the launch of major voter education programs or the announcement of purchases of equipment.

 

The Legislature – An EMB Stakeholder

The legislature is the body which would usually be responsible for making laws, including electoral laws, and it may also approve the government budget and scrutinize all public accounts, including those of the EMB. In many countries, the EMB is required by law or convention to submit election reports and also annual reports to the legislature.

Maintaining a good relationship with the legislature enables the EMB to put forward its budget proposals and reports knowing that they will be dealt with by a body that has some understanding of its activities.

In Australia, for example, there is a special committee of parliament that deals with all issues that affect the EMB, while in Namibia, the speaker of parliament handles all matters relating to the EMB, including the tabling of its budget. In both cases, it is important that the EMB have regular consultations with the relevant offices or committees to brief them on issues of mutual interest and also to provide them with copies of relevant EMB documents.

In some countries, such as Costa Rica and Uruguay, the EMB has the power to propose amendments to the electoral law. In countries such as Canada and Palestine, the EMB may make recommendations for amend¬ments to electoral laws, while in others, this is done by a line ministry or a government office. EMBs may play a particularly important role in the development of the electoral legal framework in emerging democracies. It is advisable for the EMB to liaise with the legislature to sensitize it about electoral reform needs and the importance of amendments to electoral laws being passed long enough before an electoral event to allow the EMB to make appropriate prepara¬tions. There are numerous examples of delays in law-making, as in Malawi in 1997, arising from lack of understanding or cooperation between the legislature and the EMB or between the legislature and the head of state, which affected electoral performance.

 

Electoral Dispute Resolution Bodies

The EMB may have to deal with electoral dispute resolution bodies that may have powers to deal with issues such as challenges to EMB decisions, disputes between the EMB and other stakeholders such as political parties, legality of content of EMB regulations, or challenges to the election results announced by the EMB. These bodies may be judicial, quasi judicial, or less formal conciliation bodies. Their decisions can greatly affect the activities and public perceptions of the EMB.

General openness with these bodies – including ensuring that they are well informed on all EMB activities and decisions through regular meetings, receive all EMB publications, and are invited to inspect EMB operations – can assist in maintaining a good relationship. This needs to be done in a manner that does not, and does not appear to, impinge on the independence of decision-making of either the EMB or the dispute resolution body.

Of critical importance is that the EMB be professional and cooperative in any investigations of electoral disputes by these bodies. It will be difficult to maintain a good relationship if the EMB is obstructive of a dispute resolution body’s access to relevant electoral materials or sites, if it lobbies to limit the powers of such bodies, or if its presentation of evidence on disputes is not professional.

 

The Judicial System

Many components of the judicial system may interact with EMB activities. EMBs may need the cooperation of police and prosecuting authorities in investigating alleged electoral offences, and need to appear before the criminal justice or administrative court systems for any resulting court action. The EMB, or its members or staff, may be subject to judicial investigation or civil litigation, and EMB administrative policies and practices may be subject to challenges in tribunals.

General openness with these bodies – including ensuring that they are well informed on all EMB activities and decisions through regular meetings, receive all EMB publications, and are invited to inspect EMB operations – can assist in maintaining a good relationship. This needs to be done in a manner that does not, and does not appear to, impinge on the independence of decision-making of either the EMB or the judicial system. Of critical importance is that the EMB is professional, accessible, and cooperative in any investigations or dealings with the wider judicial system.

 

Election Monitors and Observers

Both election monitors (who have power to intervene and rectify any shortcoming in the electoral process, such as the UN in Namibia in 1989) and election observers (who do not have powers to intervene and must only report what they have seen, for example domestic organisations’ observer missions and international observers from organisations such as the EU, AU, OAS, and OSCE) are critical players in the electoral process. Their primary role is to assess the quality of the electoral process and to determine whether elections have been free and fair (or meet some other agreed measure of acceptability) or not. The role of election monitors and observers is more critical in a highly polarised society where there is a need for an independent voice to generate consensus among political players on the rule of electoral game including the acceptance of election results.

It is important that the EMB create and sustain a good relationship with monitors and observers, based on a sustainable and well-developed strategy. This could include the development of observer briefing packs or manuals which could cover issues such as the observers’ code of conduct, extracts from the electoral laws on registration, voting, ballot counts, etc. The briefing pack could also include lists of polling stations, counting stations, EMB contact addresses including those of local electoral managers, all political parties and observer organisations, information on emergency services, such as police and hospitals, and also general information about the country.

The EMB could organise observer pre-election briefings (some weeks before voting day) especially for long term domestic observers and international observers who are already in the country. A further round of observer briefings could be arranged some days before voting day, whenever most domestic and short term international observers are ready for deployment. Such briefings could cover issues about

• the EMB’s state of readiness for elections,
• the legal framework for the election,
• its logistics plan for voting,
• counting and announcement of results;
• issues of security;
• the EMB relationships with political parties, media, government, and civil society; and
• the rules governing observer activities and behaviour.

Monitors and observers that are well-informed about the electoral process in general and the EMB operations in particular are less likely to make incorrect conclusions about the performance of the EMB and the quality of the elections as a whole.

It is increasingly becoming a common practice for EMBs to invite political parties and civil society to attend observer briefings so that these stakeholders can brief observers about their impressions of the EMB’s preparedness for elections. The EMB needs to carefully consider the advantages of doing this against potential disadvantages. Some disgruntled politicians or other electoral participants may use this forum for electioneering purposes and to attack the EMB, even when such attacks are unwarranted.

 

The Media – An EMB Stakeholder

The media, both print and electronic, both public and private, is a key ally of the EMB in informing the public about its mandate and operations and also in informing and educating voters about democracy and elections. Many people read newspapers, watch television and listen to the radio on a daily basis. And those who do this tend to inform others about what they have read, seen, or heard. To take advantage of the opportunities the media provides, the EMB needs a media relations strategy that promotes regular positive contact with the media and ensures that the media has access to accurate electoral information – including on EMB activities. This strategy will also assist the EMB to counter any negative publicity in the media about its activities.

There are some common elements in implementing a media relations strategy for any EMB, which would include:

• identifying the relevant media and their coverage;
• identifying who are the key people in the various media who can ensure accurate and prominent reporting of EMB activities;
• being proactive and transparent in releasing information to the media;
• ensuring that the information given to the media is clear and easily understandable;
• developing a timetable for providing information so that the media have a steady, accurate flow of information on the EMB’s activities;
• creating one EMB spokesperson for the media and one point of administrative contact within the EMB for the media;
• setting up a Media Centre within the EMB to deal with media issues such as media conferences and releases, media tours of electoral activities, a media room at the EMB, and monitoring media coverage of EMB activities.

Regular EMB contact with the media through media conferences and media releases will build EMB relationships with the media. Media conferences could be at least weekly during election periods and when the need arises at other times. It is advisable that the EMB establish a full-time unit within its structure to assume responsibility for media relations and to appoint a person, preferably somebody with a solid media background and who is well respected in media circles, to serve as the EMB spokesperson.

Apart from sharing news information with the media, the EMB can actively seek to use the media for voter education and information purposes. For example, the voter education unit of the EMB can engage the media to publicize information on issues such as election dates and venues for voter registration. Sometimes, the EMB might be asked to pay for the placement of this information because it is considered as advertisement, while in other cases, it could be disseminated free of charge as a public service. If the EMB does not commit itself to promoting transparent, sound relations between itself and the media, it increases the possibility of media publication of negative stories on EMB activities that may be based on misinformation and can undermine the EMB’s credibility. The media will write about the election, whether the EMB likes it or not. It is therefore in everyone's interest that the material that appears in the media about the EMB be as accurate as possible.

When the EMB informs the media, it informs the public - and a constant flow of information enables the electorate to exercise their democratic rights, as well as retaining their confidence in the whole election process. An EMB can undertake the following activities to promote sound relations with the media, and which also enable the media to fulfil its watchdog role in relation to democracy and electoral issues:

• facilitating training programs for journalists;
• issuing press releases on various electoral issues;
• organising press conferences;
• preparing an information handbook on the elections;
• identifying suitable radio programs for disseminating campaign messages
• monitoring and managing campaign programs to ensure equal treatment of all parties and compliance with the electoral code of conduct;
• identifying suitable radio programs to carry voter education messages;
• establishing and managing press offices for disseminating information to the public; and
• managing the broadcasting of the poll results.

 

The Electorate As an EMB Stakeholder

The EMB primarily exists to render services to the electorate, and its actions need to show it cares for this major stakeholder. Given the many and wide-ranging tasks the EMB performs on behalf of voters, the EMB needs to keep the electorate informed about its activities and programmes, and seek its views on EMB processes and performance. It is wrong to assume that, since political parties, civil society, and the government are the institutions which by and large represent the electorate, the EMB need only deal with these institutions and can ignore individual voters.

Means of maintaining contact with the electorate could include:

• publicising call centres, mail addresses, or email addresses where the electorate can pose questions to the EMB or make comments about the EMBs operations;
• advertising for public comment or submissions on EMB plans or performance;
• interactive radio or television programming where EMB members or senior staff face questions from voters; and
• regular information meetings where the EMB consults the electorate on issues of electoral reform and the EMB’s performance

Many of these channels can be developed at a local level, with data from the electorate being synthesised and discussed with other major stakeholders, such as political parties and the government, at a national level. Concrete recommendations on electoral reform and improving EMB performance could be formulated from these voter inputs for submission to policy and law-making authorities.

Apart from these direct channels, the EMB can use the media to inform and educate the electorate about elections, and also rely on its own publicity activities – such as print and audiovisual information products, and a regularly updated website - to keep voters in touch with its activities. The existence of professional units within the EMB to deal with media relations and voter information will assist in these efforts. Other means which the EMB can use to maintain sound voter relations include public inquiry desks at all its offices which members of the public can use to obtain information and lodge complaints. The EMB could also set up suggestions or assessment boxes at various strategic places – such as shopping areas or transport hubs - where members of the public can deposit their opinions on the EMB’s performance.

It is important that the EMB respond quickly and accurately to all questions and comments received from the public. A delayed response, or no response, gives the EMB a public image of an inefficient organisation not interested in service to the electorate.

 

Civil Society Organisations as EMB Stakeholders

Regular consultation with civil society organisations can assist in maintaining good EMB relationships with a wide range of specific interest groups with a stake in the EMB’s activities. These may be organisations focusing on democratic development and electoral reform, governance, combating corruption, women’s empowerment, religious or ethnic tolerance, reforming legal systems, rights for people with disabilities, civic education, public sector reform, or human rights. Regular consultation with these stakeholders, as is practiced in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, and South Africa, will allow their specific needs to be channelled directly to the EMB and the EMB’s programs in their support to be discussed and publicised. EMBs may also build positive relationships with civil society organisations by using them as partners to implement electoral activities, for example in training temporary electoral staff, or in implementing voter education programs.

It is helpful to the EMB to involve these interest groups in its policy formulation discussions. This could be done through mechanisms such as including representatives of a range of civil society organisations on working groups reviewing the electoral legal framework, or through inviting representatives to address or provide submissions to EMB policy committees.

 

Donor Community – A Key Stakeholder

The key role played by donor agencies in democracy building and electoral assistance around the world makes donor agencies an indispensable partner of many EMBs, especially for those EMBs that rely heavily on donor funding for their elections. The relationship between the EMB and the donor community may differ from country to country, depending on whether the funds are negotiated by and released directly to the EMB or through a government department. There may be a direct bilateral electoral assistance agreement with a donor, or multiple donors’ assistance may be channelled through arrangements such as a UN Trust Fund (as in Indonesia in 2004 and in Liberia the same year) or a UN Basket Fund (as in Haiti and Yemen). In all cases, the EMB needs to ensure that all donor requirements, including budgets, project implementation reports and financial reports, and any requests for access to inspect the EMB’s activities, are met with maximum efficiency and timeliness.

In cases where the EMB negotiates and receives the money directly from a donor agency, and where a direct bilateral relationship between the two partners exists, it is particularly important that the EMB maintain a sound relationship with the donor. The EMB could arrange site visits by the donor to update them on project progress. Donors may require, and certainly appreciate, that the EMB acknowledge donor assistance in its various public relations events, including publications (such as annual reports, training manuals, and posters) and electronic productions (such as radio and television programs).

Regular contact between the EMB and all donor agencies in the country sensitises potential donors to the EMB’s present and future funding needs and allows the EMB to familiarise itself with the various donor funding priorities and requirements. One way to achieve donor involvement in EMB activities is to organise roundtables where donor representatives and other interested parties, such as civil society, government, and political parties, are invited to discuss strategies for inter-sectoral cooperation in the areas of democracy and electoral assistance. Donor roundtables can be used as a mechanism for the EMB to report on its progress in electoral administration and use of donor funding.

The EMB can also consider soliciting assistance from the local public and private sector to sponsor various EMB activities such as voter education, election result centres, etc. In South Africa, for example, some municipal authorities expressed keen interest in sponsoring voter registration campaigns. It may be possible to arrange full sponsorship or reduced rates from the local business community for EMB needs such as vehicles, bill board sites, telephone services, and other supplies, as in Namibia. In making any such arrangements, the EMB needs to be careful that it does not appear to be under the influence of or receiving favours from any politically well connected corporate groups.

 

Secondary EMB Stakeholders

Secondary stakeholders of the EMB are those who, although part of the environment in which the EMB operates, are more loosely connected with the EMB, such as:

EMB suppliers

While, on the one hand, the EMB is a service provider to the various customers who are its primary stakeholders, it is itself a customer to many other service providers. Just as the EMB’s actions affect its primary stakeholders, the actions of the EMB’s service providers also affect the EMB. The EMB needs to ensure that suppliers’ actions do not adversely affect its performance or image.

The EMB relies on many suppliers, such as those who supply products such as technology equipment, vehicles, election materials, and services such as consulting, cleaning, security, and transportation. Unless the EMB maintains good working relations with these suppliers, its activities may be adversely affected by suppliers who either do not keep deadlines or who supply sub-standard products and services.

The following are steps which an EMB can take to maintain good relations with its suppliers:

• ensuring transparency, professionalism, and efficiency in the invitations for expressions of interest to supply goods and services;
• sharing information with suppliers and prospective suppliers on the EMB’s values, such as strict adherence to integrity, dignity, professionalism, and efficiency. This information may foster suppliers’ trust and goodwill in tendering for EMB goods and services;
• arrange suppliers’ information forums to discuss EMB-suppliers’ concerns and to formulate mutually workable solutions to such concerns; and
• paying suppliers within the deadlines contractually agreed.

In some countries, standard terms of supply are receipt of payment within 30 days after products or services have been satisfactorily delivered, while in others the period is shorter. Late payments by the EMB, especially for large contracts, can adversely affect a supplier’s financial position. This can lead not only to bad publicity for the EMB, but may make suppliers less willing to participate in future tenders or contracts to the EMB, or make them raise prices, in order to cover expected costs of late payment.

The public at large

The EMB’s various constituents include the general public. As an organisation promoting democratic values and improved governance, the EMB has responsibilities to be a good corporate citizen.

In its external and internal working relationships, the EMB has a responsibility to be a good-practice model of the values that it represents: such as democratic decision-making processes; respect for rule of law; non-intimidatory practices; honesty and incorruptibility; transparency; accessibility for all societal groups, including those marginalised through disability, illiteracy, remoteness, and similar disadvantages; and promotion of gender balance.

An EMB can seek to develop programmes of social responsibility through ploughing back into the community the skills, knowledge, and other resources at its disposal. It could sponsor media campaigns promoting issues such as women’s empowerment and civic education, and against violence, fraud, and manipulation. As a socially responsible organisation, the EMB could share its technology with other public institutions, and donate funds or second its staff to assist in other public social projects such as population census, campaigns on violence against women and children, immunisation campaigns, and HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns.

Good corporate citizenship also demands that the EMB design policies and practices which are environmentally friendly and do not cause pollution and other environmental hazards. It also means that the EMB strives to promote actions and policies which do not present health hazards to the general public: for example, using poorly ventilated or weather unprotected venues as voter registration venues or polling stations, or using venues which lack access to clean water and lavatories. The EMB needs also have the safety of the public in mind when determining polling station sites and, where lives are likely to be threatened by violent incidents, the EMB needs to be ready to discontinue polling in order to protect lives and property.

Regional and international networks

Over and above its local stakeholders, the EMB has other stakeholders who do not form part of its immediate environment but which have a bearing on its policies and programmes. EMBs’ linkages with the international community have become more emphasised over the last few years following intensified international cooperation in the area of democracy and electoral assistance. The creation of regional and international electoral networks over the last few years has opened up opportunities for EMBs to meet regularly at conferences and workshops and to undertake study visits and other joint projects. Regional electoral networks which regularly bring EMBs together include the AAEA, ACEEEO, PIANZEA, and SADC ECF [spell all out]. Such contacts and networking expose EMBs to innovations and good electoral practices, present opportunities for partnerships in sharing knowledge and materials and in the processes of peer review and evaluation, and have triggered electoral reforms in many countries.

Other regional groupings such as OAS, Council of Europe, AU, ECOWAS, SADC, and OSCE also set standards and norms for democratic elections which member countries are encouraged to adopt. A good example is the SADC Heads of State Principles on Democratic Elections of August 2004, which were used by election observers as the yardstick to judge the 2005 Zimbabwean elections. In seeking to comply with the spirit of these new norms, the Zimbabwean government set up an ‘independent’ EMB; introduced one-day polling and translucent ballot boxes; and counted the votes at the polling stations.

International treaties and conventions also have an influence on EMB operations. For example, the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights provides for the EMB to ensure that elections are conducted in a manner that reflects the will of the people and guarantees the legitimacy of elected governments to rule in the name of the citizenry. The 1952 Covenant on Political Rights of Women also compels the EMB to guarantee that women are entitled to vote and be voted for and also to eradicate all forms of discrimination against women.

Such international and regional instruments have in the recent past served as the basic yardstick for assessing the quality of elections and have been widely used by election observers. Therefore, an EMB that seeks to maintain a good reputation needs to align its practices and policies with internationally recognised principles, and be aware of global trends in electoral management.

International and regional instruments are a basic yardstick for assessing the quality of elections and have been widely used by election observers. The Global Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct for International Electoral Observation, adopted by the United Nations and by global and regional organisations in October 2005, is an example. An EMB that seeks to maintain a good reputation needs to align its practices and policies with internationally and regionally recognized principles, and be aware of global trends in electoral management.

 

Managing Relationships With Stakeholders

It is important that the EMB first and foremost identify and profile its stakeholders and determine their stake in the electoral process. How much attention needs to be paid to any stakeholder will depend on the level of interest a stakeholder has in the electoral process, combined with the level of influence or power the stakeholder can exert on the EMB. The combined power, influence, and interest of a stakeholder can be referred to as the stakeholder value to the EMB’s policies and practices.

An EMB’s strategy for dealing with each individual stakeholder will also be guided by the attitude of each stakeholder towards the EMB.

For example, if a stakeholder is supportive of the EMB’s policies and practices, the EMB may find it useful to involve it in many of its activities as possible, though this would not be appropriate where stakeholder involvement could damage an EMB’s independence of action. If a stakeholder is marginal, and has little influence on EMB policies, the EMB needs to monitor it and keep it informed of the EMB’s activities, but may not need to invest too much effort to involve it. Where the EMB identifies a wholly unsupportive stakeholder, it will need to analyse that stakeholder’s potential intentions and reactions to EMB activities and develop an appropriate defence strategy.

Once the EMB has identified and profiled each stakeholder, it should design and develop an appropriate strategy for promoting sound relations with each stakeholder group, based on the level of the stakeholder value. The degree to which a particular stakeholder’s loyalty and support - or lack of it - will affect the EMB operations will affect the nature and magnitude of the EMB’s effort to win and maintain this stakeholder’s loyalty and support.

For example, political parties in general are high interest/high power stakeholders in elections. If a significant political party rejects an election’s result due to its distrust in the way the election was conducted by the EMB, the EMB may come under attack – let alone the potential ensuing disruption of society. Thus, the relationship with political parties is an important one for the EMB to take very seriously, and invest considerable effort to win their trust and support. On the other hand, the EMB may not need to be so focused on its relationships with low interest/low power stakeholders with a peripheral interest in its activities. Unemployed youth are a stakeholder group as they could potentially be employed by the EMB as temporary staff, and may accuse the EMB of lack of social awareness if the EMB draws its additional staff from the ranks of the already employed, such as civil servants. However the lesser influence of the unemployed, and the time-limited nature of the EMB’s potential interaction with them, means that the EMB need not invest the same continuous effort into its relationship with them, as with higher interest/higher influence stakeholders.

 

Principles of Stakeholder Management

The following are principles, called ‘Clarkson Principles’, which are used in the corporate world for stakeholder management. They have been cited here with some slight modifications to fit the EMB’s context. Good relationship between the EMB and its stakeholders can be maintained through the EMB:

• acknowledging and actively monitoring the concerns of all legitimate stakeholders, and taking their interests appropriately into account in decision-making and operations;
• listening to and openly communicating with stakeholders about their respective concerns and contributions, and about the risks that they assume because of their involvement with the EMB;
• adopting processes and modes of behaviour that are sensitive to the concerns and capabilities of each stakeholder constituency;
• recognising the interdependence of efforts and rewards among stakeholders, and attempting to achieve a far distribution of the benefits and burdens of EMB activities among them, taking into account their respective risks and vulnerabilities;
• working cooperatively with other entities, both public and private, to ensure that risks and harms arising from the EMB’s activities are minimized and, where they cannot be avoided, appropriately compensated
• avoiding activities that might jeopardize inalienable human rights (such as the right to vote) or give rise to risks which, if clearly understood, would be patently unacceptable to relevant stakeholders
• acknowledging the potential conflict in EMB members and staff between a) their own role as EMB stakeholders, and b) their legal and moral responsibilities for the interests of all stakeholders, and addressing such conflicts through open communication, appropriate reporting, incentive systems and, where necessary, third-party review.

 

How To Deal With Difficult Stakeholders

Not all stakeholders will be well disposed to the EMB. Some may be difficult for reasons that are legitimate, such as the EMB’s failure to treat them with fairness, respect, and impartiality. Others may simply be difficult for reasons such as personality clashes, past misunderstandings, or seeking political advantage. It is common for some candidates and political parties to threaten to boycott or withdraw from elections citing EMB incompetence or partisanship, or to blame the EMB whenever they have lost an election. This may occur because the EMB has not fulfilled its mandate to be fair and impartial, because of actions by bodies beyond the control of the EMB, or because of lack of public support for these political parties or candidates.

The EMB may need to decide whether it is wise to deal directly or indirectly with a difficult stakeholder, or whether to be on the offensive or defensive in dealing with this stakeholder. If a small political party with little following announces that it is boycotting an election, the EMB may decide to restate its position publicly and monitor the situation. If a large and influential party decides to boycott an election, the EMB may need to seek mediation by a third party. There may be advantage in approaching the courts for a binding determination if the differences between the EMB and a stakeholder relate to the interpretation of the law.

Liaison structures, such as working groups with civil society or suppliers, committees of the legislature, or political party liaison committees, may be useful in reducing or resolving differences between the EMB and its stakeholders. When a large majority in the liaison group supports the EMB’s views, the dissenting views of a difficult stakeholder may be muted or stifled. On the other hand, when a large majority in the liaison group supports the ‘difficult’ stakeholder, the EMB can recognize that it is not dealing with a ‘difficult’ stakeholder but with common perceptions of its performance.

Where differences between the EMB and a difficult stakeholder are nearly irreconcilable, the EMB can resort to a strategy of defending itself against attack. Media releases and appearances by the EMB’s spokesperson on news and other programmes, and other publicity opportunities such as the EMB’s web site, can be used to clarify the EMB’s position, so that the public understands the EMB’s side of the story. The EMB may seek to publicize areas of agreement, rather than emphasizing areas of difference, to demonstrate that the EMB can work with a difficult stakeholder.

By ensuring that it is irreproachable in all its conduct by maintaining a high level of transparency, impartiality, dignity, integrity, professionalism, service, and efficiency in all its dealings with stakeholders, the EMB can construct a good defence against detractors.

 

Summary: EMB Stakeholder Relationships

• An EMB's stakeholders are those groups who affect or are affected by the EMBs actions, and to which it is accountable. Primary stakeholders include institutions such as legislatures, political parties, the executive branch of government, the EMB’s staff, voters, the media, civil society, various components of judicial systems, election observers, and donors. Secondary, more loosely affiliated, stakeholders include suppliers and the general public.
• An EMB needs to treat all stakeholders fairly, and maintain regular two-way communication and consultation with them. Methods may include meetings to consult or discuss policy, provision of media briefings, inclusion of stakeholders in EMB activities and training, and wide distribution of EMB reports.
• EMB-initiated communication and consultation with stakeholders may be on issues such as strategic plans, election timetables and processes, electoral reforms, and voter education needs. Transparency, professionalism, and reliability in an EMB’s regular communications with stakeholders promote confidence in the EMB and the electoral process.
• An EMB culture needs to be responsibly sensitive to stakeholder needs and expectations. Relationships with stakeholders require active management by the EMB, to promote goodwill and EMB credibility. The attention which an EMB pays to a particular stakeholder will vary with its importance and power.
• Despite an EMB's best efforts, it may have to deal with difficult stakeholders. EMBs need to decide whether to deal directly with these – such as through liaison committees with a wide membership of stakeholders -- or indirectly -- using other institutions such as courts for arguments over legislative interpretations.
• An EMB may need to take defensive action to protect its reputation, using the media and other publicity opportunities to explain its side of any difference with stakeholders. An EMB’s best defence is a high standard of professionalism, integrity, and service in all its conduct.

 

Assessing EMB Performance

Like all public and corporate bodies whose policies and practices affect the public, the EMB is required to periodically account to its various stakeholders on its performance, including the way it uses public funds. Accountability means that the EMB is responsible for its activities, and must periodically provide evidence to its stakeholders and the public that its activities are effective and meet its prescribed legal, ethical, service, and financial standards. The principle of accountability requires that the EMB provide comprehensive public information on its policies, their intended outcomes, its performance, and the resources it has used and intends to use, including public and other funds.

EMBs are accountable for the development of policy decisions to give effect to their mandate, and for how they implement those decisions. They are accountable for electoral administration and how that administration functions, and they are accountable for their compliance with all relevant laws and regulations. Most importantly, they are accountable for delivering good-quality electoral services to voters and other stakeholders.

Accountability has a number of positive effects on the structure and operations of the EMB. It aids the transparency of the EMB in its performance, funding, and expenditures. Sometimes the lack of proper accountability mechanisms leads to accusation of poor operational transparency. Accountability positively influences the general public perception about the EMB’s independence, good governance, and non-partisanship and assists the EMB to gain the confidence of the public and important stakeholders, particularly political parties and government ministries.

To meet internal and external accountability requirements, an EMB needs mechanisms that can assess its activities, and assure itself and its stakeholders of the quality, effectiveness and probity of its operational and financial management. These mechanisms include:

• audits;
• internal quality controls;
• evaluations;
• post-election reviews;
• peer reviews; and
• external oversight.

 

Principles and Best Practices for EMB Accountability

Issues of transparency and integrity are especially important for the general accountability of an EMB.

Transparency is a critical precondition in the EMB’s effort to be publicly accountable. Transparency on the part of the EMB contributes to increased public trust and confidence in the EMB’s operations, and may protect it against unfounded allegations or misrepresentations made for electioneering or other purposes. Apart from financial transparency, the EMB should maintain an open policy towards its stakeholders, reinforced by regular stakeholder consultations and information sharing. An EMB may foster public access to key publications and documents, such as performance reports and audited financial statements, business or strategic plans, laws and codes, either free of charge or on a cost-recovery basis. For example, the EMBs of Ghana, Palestine, and South Africa regularly consult political parties and other stakeholders on relevant issues. EMBs such as Georgia’s prepare reports after every major electoral event, which are disseminated widely to all stakeholders.

It is important for the EMB to be seen to have integrity in the way it exercises public accountability. An EMB’s information quality control mechanisms and internal cultures need to be sufficient to ensure that it is honest, reliable, and accurate in its public information and accountability. The EMB needs to ensure that it has sufficient integrity controls on information it publicly releases under its accountability responsibilities. An EMB may knowingly or unknowingly disseminate incorrect or unreliable information. It may happen unknowingly due to inadequate internal quality control mechanisms, or due to ignoring these mechanisms under pressure to provide fast responses to external demands for information. It may do so knowingly, in an attempt to buy time or save face when the EMB is confronted with allegations of malpractice or poor administration. Providing inaccurate or unreliable information diminishes the credibility of and public trust in the EMB. How fully can the public trust the EMB’s election results, if it has been found to have provided unreliable information on other critical issues?

 

Stakeholder Accountability

Stakeholder accountability can be seen as an umbrella under which the EMB has both informal and formal accountability to the public in general and to specific stakeholders in particular.

EMB accountability primarily has three forms:

1. consultation and communication (informal accountability) through regular contact with primary stakeholders, transparent working methods, regular reporting procedures;
2. performance accountability (formal) through the submission of activity reports on an annual basis, or after every major electoral event, and performance audits and evaluations, to the legislature or the government, and other stakeholders; and
3. financial accountability (formal), which entails the submission of financial statements and audits to, among others, the legislature or the government, to explain how the funds allocated to the EMB have been used.
   
   

Regular consultation with its stakeholders promotes awareness about the EMB’s operations, and allows stakeholders to directly advise the EMB of their assessments of its performance and suggest potential improvements. These consultations could be regular or event-driven, mandatory or voluntary, structured or informal.

Formal and ‘informal’ accountability are both necessary, complementary measures. In tandem, they ensure that an EMB can be accountable to its stakeholders for legal compliance, financial probity, operational integrity, and effective customer-focused activity.

One relatively low-cost, general way in which the EMB can foster awareness among its stakeholders of its activities and build their loyalty is through a sustained effort of promoting open communication such as annual reports, election reports, financial reports, and newsletters with all stakeholders, and regularly organising dialogues. This could be by sharing its publications information

 

Performance and Financial Accountability

An EMB has different levels of accountability; performance-and financial accountability, which both have two sides: internal and external accountability.

Performance accountability

On the performance side, an EMB is responsible for the development of policy decisions to give effect to its mandate, and to ensure the implementation of those decisions. It is accountable for:

• electoral administration and how that administration functions;
• its compliance with all relevant laws and regulations; and
• delivering good-quality electoral service to voters and other stakeholders.
  
  

Financial accountability

Like performance accountability, financial accountability may be provided for in the electoral legal framework or in general legal requirements for public sector entities. Many EMBs treat the statutory requirement as the minimum and offer more regular financial reporting than is formally required.

An EMB has a responsibility to use the financial and other resources it receives effectively, to achieve its strategic objectives. It is accountable for:

1. efficient use of its resources that achieves value for money;
2. compliance with all relevant laws and regulations; and
3. using ethical financial practices.
   
   

There are two complementary aspects to financial accountability:

• internal accountability – the EMB’s internal procedures that promote control over its financial resources; and
• external accountability – the commissioning of external auditors to examine and report on the EMB’s financial activities and statements.
  
  

Like performance accountability, financial accountability has two components: internal and external financial accountability.

 

Internal Performance Accountability

Performance accountability has a two-pronged approach. The first is internal accountability which refers to the mechanisms by which:

1. the EMB’s lower structures account to higher structures for their performance; and
2. EMB managers monitor and assess institutional performance, and take corrective action in relation to activities that do not meet the required output targets, service levels, and performance standards.
   
   

The key responsibility of managers and supervisors is to ensure that EMB staff performance is of high standard and meets the work plans and standards that are anchored in the EMB’s strategic goals.

EMBs may also use the internal audit function (see Internal Quality Controls) to foster internal accountability. Past practices of internal auditors have often been to narrowly monitor institutional compliance with rules and policies, especially in the areas of finance and administration. Internal audit functions are increasingly being used as a performance enhancement tool, assisting senior management to identify means of improving the EMB’s operational effectiveness.

Performance-based accountability also requires senior EMB secretariat staff to submit regular institutional performance reports and updates to the EMB members for review, and for consideration of recommended policy initiatives. EMBs may also consider following corporate board practice in regularly reviewing the performance of the head of the secretariat.

 

External Performance Accountability

The second level of performance accountability is external accountability, for example requirements that the EMB report to the legislature or executive branch of government. External performance accountability assists transparency in EMB operations, and hence confidence in electoral processes, by requiring the EMB to report regularly and publicly on its activities.

The nature of this accountability mechanism is a product of a country’s legal and administrative tradition, and the model of EMB. Some countries provide for EMBs to prepare reports (both performance and audited financial reports) on an annual basis, while some have limited accountability requirements. EMBs in countries such as Cambodia, Ghana, Georgia, Lesotho, Namibia, and Russia submit their reports directly to the legislature. Countries which submit reports to the president include Fiji and Zambia. In the case of Zambia, the president is required to table the EMB’s report to the legislature within seven days after receipt of the report from the EMB.

• In Senegal, both the election monitoring component and the election management component of the Mixed Model EMB have limited accountability requirements: the monitoring component reports on each election process to the president, while the management component reports to the Ministry of the Interior.
• Some countries provide for EMBs to prepare performance and audited financial reports on an annual basis, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia.
• The South African EMB is subject to a rigorous series of accountability mechanisms. Electoral law requires the EMB to submit activity reports (including audited financial statements) to the legislature, both on an annual basis and following major electoral events. The EMB is also required to prepare publicly available readiness reports on forthcoming electoral events. The president may also request the EMB to submit written reports to him/her on specific electoral matters.
• In the USA, local authority EMBs are accountable to their communities, state officials, and the courts.
• In countries such as Costa Rica, Nigeria, Uruguay, and Yemen, EMBs have no formal performance accountability requirements. In Costa Rica and Nigeria, there are legislative committees on electoral matters which could serve as an oversight mechanism on the EMB’s activities. Uruguay’s EMB is financially accountable through external audit of its financial statements, but is not otherwise accountable.
• In Palestine, while there is no legal requirement for the EMB to account to any branch of government, the EMB has published reports after major electoral events which are simultaneously circulated to the executive branch of government, the legislature, political parties, and the general public.
  
  

It is a common practice for EMB performance reports to be both descriptive and analytical, highlighting challenges to the EMB’s operations, including funding issues and improvements to the electoral legal framework that would enhance the EMB’s effectiveness. Since these reports go to the legislature and may influence government decision-making, it is important that the EMB make an effort to ensure that its annual or post-election reports are as comprehensive and clear as possible, to capture the attention and interest of lawmakers, especially on issues of funding and improving the electoral framework.

EMB reports may also be proactively circulated to other stake¬holders, such as political parties, government ministries, donors, civil society organisations, universities and educational institutes, the business community, and interested members of the public. Reports can be made widely accessible through cost effective methods such as low-cost printing/copying or publication by CD-ROM or on the EMB’s web site.

An EMB also may also consider despatching copies of its annual reports and related publications to regional and international organisations with interests in electoral assistance, such as the United Nations, OSCE, African Union, OAS, etc. Such information may help to promote international awareness about the EMB’s country, including the challenges it faces and the assistance it may require in the area of elections and democracy.

The EMB may also promote public performance accountability by regularly consulting its stakeholders, especially political parties. These consultations not only promote awareness about the EMB’s operations, but also allow stakeholders to directly advise the EMB of their assessments of its performance in general or on specific issues, and suggest potential improvements. Genuine and open dialogues can contribute to confidence among stakeholders in the electoral process and specifically their trust in the EMB’s independence, transparency, and ability to take advice. These consultations could be regular or event-driven, formal or informal.

In South Africa, the law makes it mandatory for the EMB to set up political party liaison committees at all levels of government, from national to local level. Arrangements such as those in Mexico, where electoral law provides that political parties and legislative blocs have non-voting membership of the EMB, serve a similar purpose. Several other countries have consultative structures even though they are not legally required.

 

Internal Financial Accountability

Internal accountability – the EMB’s internal procedures that promote control over its financial resources - may include measures such as:

1. creating an EMB subcommittee to oversee EMB finances (which could include outside experts as well as EMB members);
2. formal reporting structures within the EMB’s secretariat and to the EMB’s members (or for Governmental Model EMB, to the host government department);
3. the use of programme-based and performance budgeting to ensure that all expenditure is in line with the EMB’s operational and strategic objectives; and
4. regular internal audits to monitor and review the EMB’s financial management procedures and their implementation.
   
   

In the absence of strong internal financial accountability controls which clearly demonstrate that the EMB is capable of controlling the probity and effectiveness of its financial management, there is more likely to be pressure for more rigorous external financial accountability controls. This may have negative effects on the EMB’s financial autonomy and its capacity for independent action. It is in every EMB’s interest to have strong internal financial accountability controls. These assure the financial integrity of the EMB and safeguard the EMB from pressure for more intrusive external controls that may limit the EMB’s independence.

 

External Financial Accountability

Mechanisms of external financial accountability consist primarily of the external audit of an EMB’s financial activities and statements. Additional external audits may be undertaken on specific financial systems (such as salary payments), or following allegations of corrupt or irregular practices within the EMB. In the latter case, state anti-corruption bodies may also be involved in the external audit.

Many EMBs’ external financial auditing is undertaken by a government audit agency, such as the State Audit Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Auditor-General in Canada. In Romania and Turkey, external audit of the EMB is by an Audit Court responsible to the legislature. In Portugal, the EMB may be audited by the Ministry of Finance and by the Audit Court. In countries such as Lesotho and Zambia, external auditing of EMB finances is undertaken by private auditing companies, while in Russia, the external audit is performed by the Federal Assembly through its Accounting Chamber.

Audit reports are usually published for public consumption. Once published, the EMB normally incorporates the financial statements within its annual or other reports for submission to the legislature and other stakeholders. In Cameroon, the audited financial reports are tabled in the legislature, while the performance audit is submitted to the president. In Senegal, the independent component of the EMB produces a narrative and financial report of each electoral process which is submitted to the president who makes it public, while governmental component, the elections division of the Interior Ministry, accounts for its activities through its minister.

Review of an EMB’s financial accounts by a committee of the legislature, often titled a Public Accounts Committee, can provide a public demonstration of the EMBs financial integrity. The framework of such reviews needs to ensure that the EMB is questioned fairly, rather than for political advantage. If auditors have identified poor financial management practices, members or senior executives of the EMB may be summoned to explain the circumstances and describe the remedial action that has been taken.

In countries such as Costa Rica, Nigeria, Palestine, and Yemen, the legal framework for financial accountability mechanisms is not clear. Although EMBs in these countries commission auditing of their financial operations, there is no requirement for them to submit reports to any oversight body. However, in Palestine, the EMB tends to circulate its annual reports and financial statements to stakeholders, such as the government, the legislature, and the political parties.

The proposed budgets and audited accounts of the EMB in many countries are subject to review by a committee of the legislature, often titled a Public Accounts Committee or similar. When auditors have identified poor financial management practices, such as inappropriate systems for budgeting, lax controls on payments or procurement, over-expenditure, or misappropriations, this committee of the legislature may summon the chief executive of the EMB to answer questions. This practice prevails in many countries around the world and applies across virtually all institutions which rely on public funding for their operations.

 

Auditing EMBs

An audit critically examines and assesses the EMB’s activities, strictly within the parameters of the EMB’s stated strategic objectives. Regular auditing is an essential means of ensuring that an EMB is accountable for its operations. Concepts of auditing publicly funded organisations now have a focus beyond the purely financial, looking also at the appropriateness and effectiveness of these organisations’ strategies, operational methodologies, and performance in delivering services to the public.

Just as an EMB has performance and financial accountabilities, so too can an audit of an EMB fall into the basic categories of:

1. performance audit – focusing on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of its activities – or
2. financial audit – focusing on examining the EMB’s accounting records against accounting standards, to assess the efficiency and probity of the EMB in handling its funds.
   
   

An audit may neatly fall into one or other of the above categories or be some combination of both. It may be broadly based – examining overall EMB performance or transactions – or be limited to a particular activity, or a system operated by the EMB. Audit reports are usually made public.

No matter what the type of audit, it is usually conducted in accordance with professional auditing standards. Audit reports would either certify this or explain why such standards could not be applied, and justify the standards or methodology used. The audit investigation and report may identify good and bad practices found; assess operational or financial management controls; identify non-compliance with the law or policies, and breaches of financial probity or integrity in operations; note improvements made since earlier audits; and assess the appropriateness of methods and systems used or the levels of service provided in achieving the EMBs objectives.

A professional audit report is always objective, factual, accurate, complete, and fair, and emphasizes the EMB’s positive accomplishments as well as identifying any failings. It is good practice for auditors to discuss their draft findings and recommendations with the EMB, for the EMB to be given sufficient time to respond to these, and for the EMB’s responses to be carefully considered before the audit report is finalised and publicly issued.

 

Performance Audits

Performance audits are an objective, independent, and systematic examination of an EMB’s activities and management systems to assess how effectively, efficiently, and economically it has used its resources. They may be conducted internally by the EMB, or as an external review of the EMB. They may cover the whole range of an EMB’s activities or focus on a particular function or programme. Performance audits identify strengths and weaknesses in an EMB’s activities, and recommend any appropriate corrective actions. A performance audit is an important mechanism for improving electoral management, instituting good practice, improving public accountability, and reinforcing institutional integrity.

 

Methodology and Scope of a Performance Audit

Performance audits involve both internal examination – that is, a review of the EMB’s policies and records relevant to the audit, and interviews with relevant EMB members; and external examination – interviews with the EMB’s stakeholders and review of media and other reports on EMB activities so as to obtain the external perception of the EMB’s performance. These audits would commonly undertake both cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, and use performance indicators – those included by the EMB in its strategic plan, where these are appropriate - and the service level standards either defined by the EMB or expected by its stakeholders, to assess the EMB’s performance against its strategic objectives.

Components of a performance audit would usually include:

1. interviewing the principal stakeholders, such as political parties, voters, members of the legislature, civil society organisations, media organisations, relevant government ministries and agencies, and suppliers. This may include joint consultation with stakeholders at workshops or seminars;
2. interviewing EMB members, secretariat staff, and, where relevant, temporary staff or contractors engaged for the activities being reviewed;
3. examining the EMB’s strategic plan, management structure, relevant policies, operational plans, and task assignments, and the implementation of these planned activities; and
4. reviewing relevant constitutional instruments, laws, regulations, court or tribunal decisions, codes of conduct, and the EMBs computer and other systems, reports, procedures, manuals, guidelines, and relevant records.

 

Election Performance Audits: Potential Criteria and Specific Issues

The specific criteria for and issues covered by a performance audit will be governed by the activity or activities to be audited. For example, a performance audit of an EMB’s overall conduct of an election could use the following design criteria and address the following issues:

 

Performance Audit Outputs

A performance audit’s output could be expected to include information in relation to the activities or processes being audited and recommendations targeted at assisting the EMB and its oversight bodies to improve the EMB’s services to stakeholders:

Possible Performance Audit Findings and Recommendations :

 

Performance audits can have a wide range of impacts, both on the EMB and the perceptions of the EMB by its stakeholders. These impacts can include savings in use of resources, higher efficiency, strengthened management policies and practices, improved service quality, and a better understanding of accountability.

 

Financial Audits

The EMB’s internal financial audit is its final internal checking mechanism to promote financial probity and integrity. An external financial audit of the EMB reviews the EMB’s accounts to provide an independent opinion of their completeness, compliance, integrity, and accuracy. Most EMBs are required to prepare and submit annual audited accounts, which are linked to achievements and activities based on the annual plan of work. The report may reflect the level of financial contributions by the state and by external sources, where appropriate, and the expenditure of these funds.

Electoral events generate many financial transactions through acquisition of election supplies, materials, and equipment and the employment of large numbers of additional staff. Many EMBs have a relatively large dispersed staff, including thousands of temporary workers, and procure millions of dollars-worth of electoral equipment, services, and materials, often in a very short time. This is an environment where corruption and misappropriation of funds may occur if adequate safeguards are not in place.

Financial audits aim to provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements of an audited EMB represent fairly the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles and financial reporting standards. Such audits seek to establish whether all financial transactions have followed the financial compliance criteria, based either on the EMB’s own rules and regulations or on more general public-sector financial accountability laws or rules. They also assess and provide an opinion on whether the EMB’s internal control structure for finance and safeguarding assets is suitably designed and implemented to ensure accuracy and integrity in financial management records and to prevent fraud.

Financial audit may cover some or all of the following areas:

a) financial statements and information (such as revenue and expenses, cash receipts and disbursements, and the inventory of assets);

b) budget requests and variations between estimated and actual financial performance;

c) compliance with laws and regulations, especially on procurement, accounting, reporting on contracts and grants, and anti-corruption measures; and

d) internal controls on funds, assets, and financial reporting

 

Internal Quality Controls

Internal quality assurance programs are the starting point for assuring the EMB and its stakeholders that EMB activities meet service, effectiveness, and appropriateness standards. Components of a quality assurance program may include:

1. stakeholder consultation on new systems and methods;
2. implementation of formally reviewed, benchmarked, design and development processes;
3. rigorous pre-implementation testing;
4. comprehensive training programs;
5. ensuring professional staff are qualified to be members of the appropriate professional associations;
6. formal-post implementation monitoring programs; and
7. robust fault reporting and rectification processes. EMBs may wish to follow the relevant International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) guidelines and standards.

 

Programme Evaluation by EMBs

Programme evaluation is another widely used tool to help EMBs improve their accountability. The boundaries between performance auditing and programme evaluation are blurred. Both provide independent, objective analyses of how the EMB may better uses its resources. A performance audit will generally concentrate on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the EMB’s performance in relation to the objectives of its activities as stated in its strategic plan or other legal and operational framework documents. A programme evaluation will generally start from the basis of questioning whether the electoral framework, and consequent strategic objectives that the EMB has determined, meet the needs of the EMB’s stakeholders.

Key questions for a programme evaluation of an EMB’s activities include:

1. Does the framework for the EMBs activities, and the EMBs objectives, meet the needs and objectives of the EMB’s stakeholders?
2. Are the services the EMB provides necessary?
3. Could the EMB’s services be provided more effectively?
4. What are the long- and short-term impacts of the services being provided?
   
   

Programme evaluations are wholly outcome-focused, feeding back into the EMB’s strategic planning cycle. They concentrate on how the EMB serves its stakeholders, including whether the needs assessments on which an EMB’s strategies and activities are based are still valid. As they are stakeholder-focused, they concentrate on obtaining the expectations of stakeholders of the EMB and their views on the appropriateness and performance of its current activities. In an environment of changing societal attitudes and political and legal frameworks, and technological advances, these evaluations assist the EMB to identify areas of activity that no longer effectively meet its stakeholders’ needs. A programme evaluation may review whether specific EMB services are still needed, or whether other institutions are better placed to use all or some of the public funds available for specific electoral services, for example voter education, than the EMB.

 

Post-election Reviews

Post-election reviews are a tool being used increasingly by EMBs to assess the adequacy or otherwise of the legal and management structures for elections, and of their performance in delivering acceptable elections. These reviews are complementary to the financial and performance audits. Countries which provide for the submission of performance reports after every major electoral event include Botswana and Georgia. The Botswana EMB engaged a team of electoral experts to conduct a review of its performance during the country’s 2004 general elections. This review produced several key recommendations with far-reaching implications, including requirements for constitutional and legal amendment.

A post-election review report analyses what worked well, what did not, and why. It may cover every aspect of the electoral system, processes, and management structures and capabilities, and is better if based on the analysts’ direct experiences of the electoral event, not just examination of records. Polling and vote-counting activities, voters’ attitudes, and the response of stakeholders to EMB actions can be matters for detailed examination in a post-election review. A post-electoral event review could also address how the EMB’s funding processes help or hinder EMB sustainability. The review report can examine the strengths and weaknesses of the EMB and the electoral framework, and make suitable remedial recommendations. Results of the review need to feed in to electoral reform discussions and EMB procedural development throughout the electoral cycle.

The twin approach of needs assessment studies prior to a general election and a post-election review of EMB performance during an election period can assist in identifying the level of sustainability of free and fair elections that can be achieved over the longer term.

 

EMB’s Post-Election Review Cycle Checklist: Responsibility and Action

 

 

Peer Reviews

Peer reviews can bring the knowledge of experienced electoral practitioners to both internal and external review (audit and evaluation) mechanisms. Using EMB field staff from one geographic area to assist with financial or performance audits, or post-election evaluations in another geographic area of the EMB, as was practiced by the Australian EMB in the early 1990s, can be extremely beneficial. EMB offices being audited may be more likely to take note of recommendations from peers who have had to solve similar management problems, and both reviewer and reviewee can broaden their knowledge through the exchange of ideas. Similar benefits arise from using appropriately senior experienced electoral professionals, from the same or another country, on EMB external review teams.

 

External Oversight Issues

External oversight of an EMB is part of its external accountability, and may be implemented through mechanisms such as external audits or evaluations, reviews of EMB activities by an ad hoc or other specially appointed body, or reviews by a committee of the legislature, such as an electoral affairs or public accounts committee.

If an entity undertaking external oversight of an EMB is not fully independent, it may be subject to interference that improperly inhibits its oversight scope and/or methodology. There may be attempts to change or influence the contents of oversight reports. Constraints on oversight bodies may include restrictions on terms of reference, on time allowed for investigations, on access to information, or on access to sufficient funds and other resources to carry out the task. For example, the Indonesian election monitoring body, Panwas, both monitors the conduct of the election and is the body of first instance for most election disputes. While it is expected that Panwas act independently, it is appointed and funded by the EMB. Conflict in 2004 between Panwas and the EMB over Panwas’ challenges to EMB decisions led the EMB to remove any role for Panwas in challenges or disputes involving the EMB.

Oversight bodies need rights to examine documents and computer files, to verify services and property acquired with public funds, and to interview EMB members, staff, and other persons. These rights can be guaranteed if they are included in the legal framework. If not, the EMB can enhance its credibility by allowing free and unimpeded access. In many cases, official oversight agencies are given the authority to obtain court–enforceable subpoenas to compel the EMB and other organisations to produce specific documentation, with sanctions for non-compliance. Where an oversight agency is given investigative powers, it usually is able to administer and take affidavits under oath.

To be effective, oversight must be subject to rigorous quality control so that it is professional, impartial, and accurate.

 

Accountability for the Use of Technology-based Systems

The increasing use of computer-based systems for electoral operations and management creates some additional challenges for EMB accountability. Apart from the issue of sustainability, public confidence in their accuracy and reliability needs to be assured.

Lack of any tangible transaction evidence in many computer systems, the lack of transparency and the incomprehensibility of computer programming to the bulk of the population, and the risks of interference with data that are widely publicized through media reports of computer worms, viruses, and hackers can affect the credibility of EMBs relying on computer systems for vital tasks such as voter registration, voting, and vote-counting, unless they are openly accountable for their use.

There is still intense debate about the reliability and security of computer-based systems for voting and counting of votes. Some of this debate in the USA entails the propriety of politically-aligned supplier behaviour beyond technical performance issues. Media reports of alleged integrity problems with mechanical and electronic voting machines in the USA, including with Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) ‘touch screen’ vote-recording machines (as in the state of Maryland in 2004) has increased pressure on EMBs to be open and accountable in their use of technology. These concerns led the 2005 report of the Baker-Carter Commission on Federal Electoral Reform to deal at length with concerns about electronic voting.

Measures that EMBs need to take to ensure integrity in computer-based systems include:

1. rigorous pre-implementation testing of computer systems and public release of the results of the tests;
2. use of open-source operating systems and applications, to promote transparency in the computer systems used;
3. making test versions of code for computer systems available for public comment, where open source code systems are used. For example, the Electoral Commission of the Australian Capital Territory posted proposed code for its computer-based vote recording and counting system on its web site, and invited comment from computer professionals;
4. holding of an audit-authenticated copy of the authorized code for each computer system in an independently controlled off-site location, and regular audited comparison of this with the code being used in the EMB, to detect and remove any unauthorized changes, as has been recommended in the US;
5. regular audit of computer systems, with particular attention paid to their security features;
6. ensuring that computer-based systems each leave a paper-based audit trail that can be used to verify the system’s results, as has been recommended in the US; and
7. ensuring backup systems are available in the event of computer system failure.

 

Summary: Assessing EMB Performance

• Accountability to its stakeholders aids EMB transparency and good governance, and positively influences the general public perception about the EMB’s professionalism and impartiality.
• ‘Informal’ accountability through regular communication with stakeholders, and formal performance and financial accountability mechanisms are all necessary, complementary measures, ensuring that an EMB is accountable for legal compliance, financial probity, operational integrity, and effective customer-focused activity.
• Performance accountability is both internal and external. Internal measures include management monitoring and use of internal audit to examine performance issues. External measures can include external reviews and requirements for reporting to stakeholders such as the legislature. Wide distribution of EMB reports can make a broad range of stakeholders aware of the EMB’s challenges and achievements.
• An EMB is similarly internally and externally financially accountable. Internal measures include financial reporting and control mechanisms, and regular internal audits. External measures include external audits and regular provision of audited financial statements to stakeholders such as legislatures and donors, and review by an appropriate body.
• Use of technology based systems, especially for voting and counting of votes, places additional accountability requirements on EMBs, as these systems may not be transparent to or easily understood by stakeholders. Maintenance of high levels of quality and integrity assurance, including transaction evidence, is necessary.
• In order to assure stakeholders of the effectiveness and probity of its performance, an EMB may use a variety of measures including pre-implementation and real time quality assurance controls, and later audit, evaluation, and external oversight mechanisms. Use of peer review processes can give added credibility to audit and evaluation findings and recommendations.
• Performance and financial audits can identify good practices being used by an EMB, deter and detect fraud, corruption, and malpractice, and identify how an EMB can improve its methods of complying with financial requirements, and improve its operational performanceand institutional integrity in order to meet the objectives of its strategic plan.
• Performance audits assess the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of an EMB’s activities, and can have a significant impact on improving an EMB’s service quality, cost-effective use of resources, and strengthening of electoral management. The impact of financial audits can be to improve internal financial controls, and promote compliance with relevant rules and efficient use of financial resources.
• As well as audits, an EMB may undertake programme evaluations of specified parts or all of its activities. Programme evaluations examine not just how well the EMB has done what it intended to do, but whether the EMB’s strategic objectives are appropriate for its environment and meet the needs of its stakeholders. They assess how an EMB’s activities could be improved to better meet these needs in an economical, efficient, and effective manner. They are an effective way of assisting EMBs to meet the challenges of a changing external environment.
• Well-planned post election reviews are particularly useful to EMBs. Recommendations from these reviews can feed into internal EMB policy and procedural reform, and EMB advocacy for electoral framework reform, throughout the electoral cycle.
• Independent external oversight of an EMB may be through external audit or evaluation, by a standing committee of the legislature, or by specially appointed ad hoc body. To be effective, it needs access to all relevant materials and personnel, a strongly independent, impartial, and professional culture, and rigorous quality controls.

 

The Sustainability of EMBs

Despite the axiom that 'you can't put a price on democracy', making democratic elections more sustainable is a principle to be embraced by all EMBs. The need for cost reductions in elections results from the rising costs of election goods and services - including the use of new technologies, dwindling public sector budgets, the increasing frequency of elections for different levels of political institutions, and also the tough competition among poorer countries to access international donor funding. The euphoria surrounding a successful, well-funded transitional election needs to be tempered by the reality that similar levels of funding may not be available for future elections.

 

What is sustainability?

In the context of elections, sustainability refers to electoral policies and practices which are cost effective, realistic, and meet the needs of all stakeholders in the electoral processes, both now and in the future. Sustainability aims to minimize reliance on external inputs and resources. EMB sustainability is not only defined in financial terms; it includes the value of the social and political returns on its activities. For example, a post-conflict poor country may use expensive voting systems and procedures which, in economic terms, may not be sustainable, but in political terms may be essential in the short term to build trust among stakeholders and lasting peace and stability in the country. There are several elements to EMB sustainability:

1. An EMB has institutional sustainability if its structures and processes enable it to fulfil its mandate and responsibilities in the longer term – that is, over a series of elections. This type of sustainability refers to the adequacy of the electoral framework – the constitution, electoral law and regulations, and administrative and other policies – to enable the EMB to carry out its work in an effective and efficient manner.
2. An EMB has financial and economic sustainability if the nature and level of its funding and expenditure is adequate to fulfil its institutional mandate and responsibility.
3. An EMB has human resource sustainability if it is able to engage sufficient, appropriately skilled local staff to manage and implement its systems and procedures.
4. Other forms of EMB sustainability include socio-political and environmental factors, for example, the extent to which EMB policies and practices promote social equality and political inclusion, minimise conflict, and promote environmental sustainability.
   

 

Why is EMB sustainability important?

Gearing EMB policies and practices to promote sustainability helps the EMB enhance stakeholder confidence in the electoral process and in the EMB. For example, governments and donors want to see that the funds they appropriate to the EMB are used effectively, and that there is increasing capacity development within the EMB to reduce reliance on external interventions and inputs, especially donor support. Other stakeholders such as political parties and the general public also want to see sustainability of EMB policies and practices as a way to increase electoral integrity and political participation.

The challenge of sustainability is more pronounced among EMBs in emerging democracies, which often rely heavily on donor aid. Economic and political hardships may prevent these countries from being able to fund wholly their own elections. In transitional elections, high integrity costs relating to confidence-building processes such as peace-keeping, voter education and information, and election observation and monitoring, may be financially unsustainable, and are often funded through donor aid.

A high level of international assistance for second and third elections in emerging democracies may not result in greater efficiency or effectiveness, even though many of the threats to the initial democratic transition may have receded. As the international political agenda moves on, reduced donor interest may mean that such funding is not even available.

Another immediate challenge has been the transfer of authority from international EMBs to fully local (national) EMBs, as in Cambodia and East Timor, and how best to ensure institutional sustainability of newly founded EMBs, as in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Iraq.

 

Needs assessment

The EMB’s sustainability can be addressed through a thorough needs assessment, by which a country informs itself of its current election management capabilities and the resources, financial, technological, and human resources necessary to organize and conduct free and fair elections. An assessment may be undertaken by the EMB itself, but may gain credibility if conducted by a private audit firm or an independent NGO. Donors also usually undertake needs assessments in planning assistance programmes.

A needs assessment can be used to identify EMB sustainability at three levels: system, organisational, and individual. It is normally based on an expert analysis of the electoral environment, and identifies and considers strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.

A system level needs assessment covers the broader issues of the legal and institutional environments in which elections take place, in order to determine the extent to which they help or hinder EMB sustainability. It includes a review of all parts of the legal and policy framework relevant to elections, and the EMBs functions and stakeholder relationships derived from these. The primary legal instruments to be reviewed are the constitution, laws dealing directly with electoral processes, and their subsidiary regulations and administrative policies. The assessment may need to cover parts of the legal framework that are indirectly relevant, such as public sector employment laws or polices, or government procurement rules and practices. It may also address the EMB’s linkages and relationship with other bodies, such as the host ministry of a Governmental Model EMB, government ministries which render financial and logistical support to the EMB, and local and international associations and bodies which serve as EMB networks of support and resource sharing.

At the organisational level, a needs assessment looks at the EMB’s strategies and management culture, and considers its processes of planning, policy-making and implementation; management structure; division of roles and responsibilities; communication and cooperation; and standards for financial reporting and staff performance. It helps the EMB calculate the amount of resources required to organize the conduct of any specific electoral event. The EMB can then work out what portion of the amount needed can be met from the national budget and how much, if any, would be needed from other sources. The assessment may also examine the nature and level of technical assistance required.

At the individual level, a needs assessment covers issues such as staff competence, available opportunities for staff development, and staff loyalty to the EMB’s objectives and mission.

Where there is a record of credible needs assessment reports over a period, a comprehensive picture of the ability of the EMB’s capacity begins to emerge, and it can be more accurately evaluated in terms of sustainability.

 

Electoral sustainability and donor support

Donor support may improve the quality of an election, and in some cases may even be necessary for it occur. However, for many EMBs, donor support has implications for the sustainable delivery of free and fair elections – see the case studies of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fiji, Lesotho, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Yemen.

While donor support may include budgetary contributions and technical assistance, including advanced technologies, some donors avoid supporting EMBs’ recurrent budgets, that is, core personnel costs and rental of buildings and furniture, as well as other non-technical items, such as motor vehicles and fuel. Donor assistance sometimes is accompanied by a tied aid concept whereby the recipient EMB is required to purchase goods and services from nationals of the donor concerned. Often the costs of purchasing from external vendors may be considerably higher, inflating overall electoral costs. New technologies may have significant long-term cost implications for the EMB, for example for maintenance or payment of regular licencing fees for software. Introducing donor-driven technological solutions may create political demands for progressively greater dependence on externally provided technology, as experienced with voter registration in Haiti.

In some post-conflict situations such as those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Liberia, donors contribute almost the entire cost of the transitional elections. In such cases, subsequent elections are unable to achieve the same level of funding and will offer a lower level of election services, which may lead to dissatisfaction with those subsequent elections. This raises obvious issues of creating transitional structures that the local authorities can ‘buy into’ subsequently, and building the necessary expertise to generate the financial resources to conduct future elections. In other post-conflict situations, outside support may be vital, but it may not be politically or economically desirable for outside authorities to assume ownership of organizing and conducting the transitional elections: Afghanistan and Iraq may fall into this category. Failed states and failed EMBs may also require considerable outside assistance from various donors; sometimes the UN plays a coordinating role, as in Liberia in 2004–2005.

The CORE study from 2005 notes that Cambodia, which in 1993 relied on donor assistance for up to 80 per cent of its election budget, has reduced its donor dependence to less than 50 per cent during the 2003 elections. Although it is desirable to transfer skills to local election officials during the transitional election period, in practice this goal has seldom been satisfactorily achieved, so capacity-building is likely to be a continuing need in post-transitional elections. In post-conflict environments, the initial external assistance is vital to restore democracy and stability, but unless considerable donor assistance continues in the medium term, to continue to develop EMB capabilities, both the electoral process and democracy itself may experience reverses.

New technologies can help to improve the quality of electoral processes, especially where large amounts of data have to be processed quickly, as in delimitation of electoral districts, electoral registration, the voting and vote-counting process, and the general computerization of the administrative machinery. An increasing number of EMBs are entering the field of electronic voting and counting of votes. Even some self-sustaining EMBs, for example in Costa Rica, find it necessary to rely on outside assistance to fund the introduction of new technology (see the case study). Opinions are divided on the question of the sustainability of funding voting computerization, Internet and telecommunication services, and other electoral technology such as scanners and biometrics for voter registration. Aspects to be considered by EMBs and donors include:

1. the comparative financial, social, and political costs/benefits of using donor assistance for funding new technology as against using it for other electoral assistance programmes;
2. the life of the technology: will the equipment require similarly expensive replacement at the next electoral event or will it be useful in years and elections to come;
3. capacities for local maintenance of the technology. If there is no technical or financial capacity to maintain the internationally provided hardware or software, or skills transferred to allow local operation once the international advisers have gone, internationally provided technology can be a very expensive single-use solution;
4. the potential for making the technology available for use by other government or societal organisations after the electoral event; or even loaning it to other countries for their elections; and
5. training for temporary electoral staff using internationally provided technology that can be transferred to their post-electoral work environments.
   

 

Practices favouring sustainability

Cost-effectiveness – providing an effective service for the lowest possible cost – is the major yardstick for sustainability, rather than purely lowest cost. Savings cannot compromise the basic requirements of legitimate elections. A particular measure to reduce electoral costs may work well in one country but not in another because of differing legal, political, and socio-economic circumstances. Although the practice of having a single-member EMB is a useful cost-saving measure, in India it was rebuffed by the Supreme Court as not conducive to fair decision making, thus paving the way for the appointment of a three-member EMB in 1995. It is not therefore possible to prescribe commonly applicable sustainability solutions, only general principles.

EMB core budgets may be reduced by rationalising structures, for example the number of EMB members or secretariat positions. The EMBs in Cambodia and South Africa undertook rationalization exercises during 1999 and 2002, respectively. The maintenance of only a small core of permanent staff, backed by well-trained temporary field staff, can reduce costs, while maintaining efficiency. For smaller EMBs, that of Fiji shows that core election staff can be kept to a minimum and remain functional. However, the loss of experienced staff can have a very negative effect on the EMB’s performance. Finding a successful balance is not easy.

Significant budgetary savings can be achieved in Governmental Model EMBs or other model EMBs where public servants or volunteers can be co-opted to serve with the EMB during an election period. While assisting financial sustainability, this type of staffing profile can also have a negative effect on the performance of and public trust in the EMB, and thus the political sustainability of the electoral process. EMB membership and staffing structures and costs are a significant issue in developing a viable strategy to sustain the delivery of free and fair elections. There are management tools, such as task profiling, that the EMB can use to determine the minimum staff numbers it needs to perform its functions. The EMB would then be required to justify the employment of additional staff on efficiency or effectiveness grounds.Significant cost savings can be achieved by holding elections for all levels of representation on the one day. However the marked political effects of having either simultaneous or staggered elections means that political sustainability arguments may outweigh financial ones.

 

Staffing for Sustainability

Staffing can be a significant proportion of an EMB’s costs, but also represent the EMB’s greatest asset. EMB core budgets may be reduced by rationalising structures, for example the number of EMB members or secretariat positions. The EMBs in Cambodia and South Africa undertook rationalization exercises during 1999 and 2002, respectively. The maintenance of only a small core of permanent staff, backed by well-trained temporary field staff, can reduce costs, while maintaining efficiency. For smaller EMBs, that of Fiji shows that core election staff can be kept to a minimum and remain functional. There are management tools, such as task profiling, that the EMB can use to determine the minimum staff numbers it needs to perform its functions. The EMB would then be required to justify the employment of additional staff on efficiency or effectiveness grounds. Use of temporary, rather than permanent, EMBs, can also assist financial sustainability.

However, the political and operational sustainability of using personnel measures to promote financial sustainability must be carefully considered. For example, significant budgetary savings can be achieved in Governmental Model EMBs, or other model EMBs where public servants or volunteers can be co-opted to serve with the EMB (as in India) during an election period. While assisting financial sustainability, this type of staffing profile can also have a negative effect on the performance of and public trust in the EMB, and thus the political sustainability of the electoral process. Finding a successful balance may not be easy.

Inability to retain sufficient experienced staff can have a negative effect on the EMB’s sustainability. Experienced staff, including temporary polling station staff, hold the institutional memory of the EMB – the knowledge of what has and has not worked, the experience to pass on to new staff and to other stakeholders. Staff retention requires active planning by the EMB, using measures such as reward schemes, professional training, and development programs and opportunities for promotion. Staff succession planning, including mentoring of more junior staff, exit debriefings for departing staff, and systematic, combined with accessible archiving of electoral records, will assist the EMB operate sustainably when key staff leave.

 

Electoral Materials

Sound materials design, procurement, and management policies are based on rigorous needs analysis and thus contribute to the sustainability of an EMB’s operations. Before procuring materials, EMBs need to determine the most suitable options, after investigating issues including:

1. need – considering what benefit the desired materials add to electoral processes;
2. local or international sourcing – considering issues such as cost, control, production lead time, quality, certainty of delivery, maintenance, and substitutability;
3. quality – considering issues such as cost, conditions under which being used, ability to support integrity standards, and requirements for durability;
4. single or multiple use – considering issues such as storage and production costs, environmental impacts including disposal and recycling methods, and opportunities for use by other organisations;
5. complexity – considering issues such as knowledge levels of users, training requirements, and maintenance capacities;
6. quantity – considering issues such as unit costs, production lead time, storage requirements, and needs for reserves;
7. distribution - considering issues such as costs and distribution time/scheduling;
8. storage and archiving requirements – considering issues such as cost, accessibility, centralised or decentralised warehousing, asset protection measures, and deterioration rate; and
9. disposal – considering issues such as environmental impacts, end-life value, and security requirements.
   
   

EMBs have community responsibilities to consider - not just the economic sustainability of materials purchases, but the environmental and social impacts also. Life cycle analysis, which considers the ‘cradle-to-grave’ economic, environmental, and social costs and impacts of products, can assist the EMB to choose suitable electoral materials. This analysis assesses all material use impacts, not only those related to materials production, but also to issues such as re-use opportunities, impacts of storage and distribution over the materials’ whole life, and costs of environmentally sound disposal or opportunities for recycling.

Rigorous determination of whether types of materials are really needed, and maintaining tight control of the quantities produced, can assist financial sustainability. Countries such as Cambodia have cut costs significantly by not printing special voter ID cards. Tight audit controls on the printing of ballot papers and other accountable forms will also help to reduce costs.

Existing low-cost materials options may not be fully utilised in new and emerging democracies due to lack of public confidence in the EMB’s ability to ensure security and prevent fraud if they were used. For example, EMBs may have to print ballot papers abroad because opposition political parties object to the government printer or local private printers doing this work. On the other hand, Indonesian law requires local printing of ballot papers, the EMBs of Australia, Canada, and South Africa use low-cost materials for ballot boxes and voting booths, and Nicaragua uses locally produced ballot boxes, without adverse affects on ballot security. Use of such low-cost materials depends on the EMB implementing sound security management controls.

Many EMBs are reducing election costs by sharing resources such as ballot boxes, cameras, and voting booths. For example, the Ghana EMB lent ballot materials to other EMBs in its region during 2003 and 2004. The South African EMB has provided professional services and shared computer equipment with other EMBs on the African continent. Resource sharing can also take place between the EMB and other government agencies, such as ministries and municipal authorities, in areas such as transport, logistics, statistical data, and related professional services.

Experience in the 1990s in countries such as Cambodia and Indonesia has shown that post-election preservation of electoral materials and equipment (such as motor vehicles, mobile phones, computers, and ballot boxes) may be neglected, resulting in misappropriation or damage. Considerable losses to EMBs are incurred in this way, and the EMB may lose credibility with funders. Effective continuous asset management procedures can prevent this.

 

Structural and Technological Implications of Sustainability

Electoral Systems

Each type of electoral system raises different political, social, and financial sustainability issues. The type of electoral system used will have a critical impact on boundary delimitation and voter registration processes, voter education and information requirements, ballot paper design and production, the number of polling days, and the need for by-elections. These issues are examined in detail in the ES topic area. For example, systems based on small electoral districts, requiring specific boundary delimitation processes, separate ballot papers for each district, high precision in voter registration and electoral fraud prevention, and an EMB administrative structure that is capable of dealing with each electoral district as a distinctive unit, may be more costly. On the other hand, large multi-member electoral districts may involve complex and expensive vote-counting systems, may be unwieldy for an EMB to manage accurately and transparently, and may attract higher transport and other logistics costs. Proponents of each type of electoral system advance social and political sustainability arguments in their favour which need to be examined carefully against specific country conditions.

Electoral Boundary Delimitation

The frequency and form of electoral boundary delimitation processes may be reviewed to improve sustainability. Using the EMB to conduct boundary delimitation can eliminate the costs of a separate boundary delimitation body; on the other hand, if the government maintains a mapping office for other purposes, it may not be necessary for the EMB to duplicate that capability. Simple electronic mapping and population databases for determining electoral district boundaries, and streamlined review processes and periods, can be used to reduce costs. The adoption of multi-member electoral districts based on existing administrative boundaries can drastically reduce or even eliminate boundary delimitation costs. However boundary delimitation is a politically sensitive issue, and needs also to be implemented in a politically sustainable manner.

Voter Registration

The cost of compiling and maintaining the voters register can be significantly affected by the system used and its components. The method of data collection can have significant effects on both costs and accuracy – and hence political sustainability – of the voters register. For example, whether data is specifically collected for voter registration or extracted from an existing database; whether by continuous registration, or by a national census-style exercise before an election; whether passive (the EMB contacting voters) or active (voters having to contact the EMB); whether special voter ID cards are issued, or not; and what opportunities are provided for electors to challenge alleged inaccuracies on the voters register. The use of technology in voter registration - such as in recording elector identity data such as thumb prints and photographs, the use of bar coded documents, database matching to update registration records, or in the production of voters registers - will also have significant cost implications.

Maintaining accurate voter registers is a costly task. Each EMB needs to determine which voter registration checks are necessary, and which, given levels of public trust and polling fraud controls, may be redundant and can be eliminated, thus saving costs. Comparison of data on the voters register with information from other government agencies can assist in maintaining the voters register cost-effectively, although it may raise concerns over data privacy. If the electoral register can be derived from a reliable and politically acceptable national civil registration database, as in Senegal and Sweden, or if births and deaths records are computerised and accessible to the EMB, costs can be cut significantly. Continuous voter registration may, in the long run, be another measure to cut down costs.

The Polling Process

The preparation for and conduct of polling at a general election or referendum in any country is a significant national event, requiring a considerable budget to be implemented effectively. Careful assessment of how many polling stations, staff, and associated materials are necessary for each election can help reduce costs. If security, integrity, and effective service levels can be assured, polling stations in higher population density areas could be amalgamated, providing significant cost savings. Improved allocations of duties to staff, polling station layouts, and staff training may allow a decrease in the ratio of polling station staff to voters without reducing service levels. Countries which conduct polling over two days may also consider whether sufficient hours on a single day would cut costs. Any proposed reductions in voting days or hours need to be considered against patterns of working hours, so as not to exclude any class of electors from voting.

Improving voter access and extending common facilities to voters, such as postal voting (as in Australia and Spain), external voting, and the provision of special services for voting in prisons, ships, and hospitals, has obliged EMBs to offer relatively higher-cost services to electors. These activities, particularly if they involve large-scale absentee voting for refugees or others as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and Iraq, may be a burden on the financial sustainability of electoral processes. Increases in election costs need, however, to be weighed against the EMB’s social responsibilities, and the additional political legitimacy gained through enabling these voters to use their franchise.

Training EMB staff can be expensive, and is often a cost that governments or EMBs see as a relatively painless cut when reviewing election budgets. Inadequate training is, however, likely to result in greater financial and political costs through poor staff performance - perhaps affecting the credibility of the electoral process - and have a long-term effect on the reputation and sustainability of the EMB.

 

Automated Voting and Counting Processes

There are a number of automated devices that are marketed as a means of improving voting methods and reducing costs, especially staffing costs. It is claimed that some of the machines offer a high degree of reliability and resistance to electoral malpractice. Many are now capable of providing audit trail facilities. These include electronic voting machines (EVMs) which have been used in countries such as Australia, Belgium, Brazil, the United States, and Venezuela over the last few years, and recently for the first time in the whole of India. Although no reliable cost-effectiveness analysis exists on the use of new technology for voting and the count, there is evidence that technology such as EVMs may reduce election costs over time, especially costs associated with the printing and storage of ballot papers and also the vote count. The use of optical mark reading (OMR) devices to count votes can also provide accuracy and time-effectiveness in the electoral process while still ensuring the existence of a paper ballot that can be physically examined if necessary in the course of post-election disputes.

It is important to weigh the use of new electoral technology against the level of public trust and confidence in the electoral process, to involve stakeholders in pilot testing new electronic systems, and to obtain major stakeholders’ agreement to the introduction of new technology. Due to the potential lack of transparency of electronic voting and counting, the use of EVMs may generate distrust among detractors who can argue that such technology can easily lend itself to manipulation. This is not surprising, given the security deficiencies, and omissions and errors in recording votes regularly reported in the use of DRE (direct-recording electronic, or touch screen) machines and other EVMs in the USA.

The accuracy and integrity of these machines is only as good as that of the companies and persons designing, programming, testing, and maintaining them. There are ways of introducing EVMs that can provide integrity, cost, and time benefits to the election process – provided that clear controls and accountability measures, such as regular audits and back-up systems, (see Accountability for the Use of Technology-based Systems), have been implemented.

It is not wise for a poor country to go high-tech while failing to feed and develop its own people. The use of electoral high technology such as digitized voter registration cards, computerised electoral registers, and electronic voting and counting should be weighed against other pressing national priorities such as health and education. Electoral technology may be more sustainable where it can be used for other continuing functions. Its introduction also needs to be considered not just against the immediate costs and alternative uses of funds, but future costs and human skills required for their maintenance. Assessing sustainability needs to consider the longer-term consequences.

The counting process is a prime target in many countries for automation and cost reduction, and many automated machines both record votes and tally them. Unless paper audit trails are recorded for each vote, transparency may be lacking in these automated counts. The counting process is considered to be a vulnerable part of an election, and always needs to be conducted in a transparent manner by well trained staff.

The requirement for openness at all stages of the counting and tabulation of votes may also limit the cost-saving measures that can be introduced into manual vote-counts. Stakeholders in the general election in Guyana in 1997 and the Union elections in Zanzibar (Tanzania) in 1995 and 2000 complained that events which took place during the tallying phase of the count adversely affected the election results and underlined the importance of transparency in the entire counting process. Both cases involved changes made by unknown persons to some of the count results subsequent to figures being issued from polling stations. Opposition parties in both instances believed that the interference did affect the outcome of the elections.

 

Summary: The Sustainability of EMBs

• There is continuous pressure on EMBs to increase their capacities and performance to promote effectiveness and efficiency.
• Sustainability refers to electoral policies and practices which are cost effective, realistic, and meet the needs of all stakeholders in the electoral processes, both now and in the future. It is a greater challenge in new and emerging democracies.
• EMBs need to aim for financial and economic, institutional, socio-political, and environmental sustainability in their activities, to enhance stakeholder confidence in the electoral process and to ensure their own survival.
• System, organisational, and individual needs assessments can assist an EMB to identify sustainability issues.
• Especially in new and emerging democracies, donor support levels and commitment have a large impact on EMB sustainability. Donor support may have positive and negative affects. It may improve the quality of a specific election, but its influences and any dependency by the EMB on it may negatively affect the EMB’s sustainability.
• Donors have a responsibility to ensure that their support assists EMB sustainability, such as through coordination on EMB needs and support for skills transfer.
• New technologies are seductive to EMBs and often attractive to donors, but EMBs need to make objective decisions on their long-term usefulness and impacts on EMB sustainability. The extent to which new technologies are used by an EMB should be determined by the level of the country’s resource endowment and the benefits to be derived through their use.
• Aiming for sustainability has impacts on choices of electoral systems, and on frameworks and procedures for costly, complex, and integrity-demanding electoral processes such as boundary delimitation, voter registration, voting, and vote counting and tabulation. EMBs need to carefully consider the necessary levels of integrity required and technology used for these processes, and their effects on financial and socio-political sustainability.
• Human resources and their knowledge and experience are an EMB’s greatest asset. Investment in developing and retaining these, and in ensuring that institutional memory survives losses of experienced staff, is an essential ingredient in EMB sustainability.
• Effective materials design, procurement, and management policies, based on rigorous needs and cost-effectiveness analyses, and tools such as life cycle.

 

Cooperation through EMB Networks

Globalization has brought rapid and dynamic changes to organisational management, including election administration, and such changes are influencing EMBs to move away from the hierarchical structures and routines of the past.

Electoral networks are important for supporting electoral managers around the world to cope with the rapidity of change in the environments in which elections take place.

The concept of entities or bodies connected to or interested in election machinery working together to improve electoral standards has been developing along three parallel lines: national, regional, and international. Today more than ever before, an increasing number of election managers work together through well-established networks to enhance their capacity to effectively manage elections in their respective countries. Gone are the days when election managers were operating in isolation from each other and without any external support to improve their knowledge and skills.

The next set of files will discuss issues of EMB networking by first defining what election networks are and why they matter, and then identifying various networks which exist around the world: national, regional, and global. The files will also distinguish between networks of election management bodies versus the networks of organisations which support democratic elections, which are known as election support networks and which comprise non-governmental organisations.

 

What Are Electoral Networks and Why Do they Matter?

The term electoral network refers to a system of collaboration among electoral practitioners to find solutions to common problems and to build innovations through sustained sharing of ideas and experiences. Electoral networks are important for supporting electoral managers around the world to cope with the rapidity of change in the environments in which elections take place.

Electoral networks may exist at national level to serve the interests of individual electoral practitioners, at the regional level to promote the interests of various EMBs which exist in a particular region, and at the global level to promote cooperation among EMB networks.

Electoral networks foster capacity development among electoral managers through information and experience sharing, which is a useful input for EMB sustainability. Such networks also serve as useful forums where electoral practitioners address concerns which affect their vocation, such as EMB independence, EMB funding, and the use of technology in elections, to mention but a few thorny issues that can be analysed through collegial sharing of ideas.

 

National Electoral Networks

In the UK, there is a professional network, the Association of Election Administrators (AEA), to which all senior electoral administrators (returning officers) belong. The AEA conducts regular training and education for electoral administrators, acts to safeguard their interests, and serves as a network of resources and expertise for its members. It offers professional qualification courses, which are mandatory for appointment to electoral related positions in UK local authorities (EMBs).

In the United States, the National Association of State Election Directors and the National Association of Secretaries of State serve as useful forums for electoral managers to exchange views and improve their capacities and performance. The International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers (IACREOT) holds regular electoral professional development courses for its members, and annual trade shows for electoral related equipment and supplies. The National Association of Clerks and County Recorders (NACRC), the Election Center, and the National Association of Counties also organize events for local election officials.

In Australia, the Electoral Council of Australia, a consultative forum comprising the national and state electoral commissioners and chief electoral Officers, meets regularly. Its main objectives are to ensure the quality of the electoral registers for all elections in Australia and to improve Australian electoral administration in general. The Association of Bosnian Election Officials (AEOBIH) consists of electoral officials from the three entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and holds conferences, seminars, and other consultations to promote democratic, open, and transparent elections.

 

Regional EMB Networks

During the 1980s and 1990s, cooperation between EMBs at the regional level intensified, and a number of regional associations were established to facilitate and sustain cooperation. The objectives of the early regional electoral associations which were formed in the 1980s were, however, so general as to be little more than a framework pointing to desirable goals with little specific commitment.

The Association of Electoral Institutions of Central America and the Caribbean (known as the Tikal Protocol), established in Guatemala in 1985, was a representative body of electoral organisations designed to achieve cooperation, exchange information, and facilitate consultation. Its recommendations were not binding on its member organisations. The Association of South American Electoral Organisations (the Quito Protocol) was formed in 1989 along similar lines.

The Inter-American Union of Electoral Organisations (UNIORE) was established in 1991 to promote cooperation between the electoral organisations and associations created under the Tikal and Quito protocols. It extended the potential scope of cooperation to provide support and assistance, as far as practicable, to member organisations which requested them.

Although the elements of information exchange, cooperation, and consultation still featured prominently in objectives of associations formed in the 1990’s, there was greater focus on broad common goals, such as the promotion of free and fair elections, independent and impartial election organisations, and transparent electoral procedures. Specific common regional goals were emphasised, such as cooperation in the improvement of electoral laws and practices, promotion of participation by citizens, political contestants, and non-partisan NGOs in electoral processes, and establishment of resource centres for research and information. These associations also placed a high level of importance on the development of professional electoral officials with high integrity, a strong sense of public service, knowledge, and experience of electoral processes, and a commitment to democratic elections.

The associations which typify these new dimensions include:

 

• the Association of Central and Eastern European Electoral Officials (ACEEEO), established in 1991;
• the Association of African Election Authorities (AAEA), established in 1997;
• the Association of Asian Election Authorities (AAEA), established in 1997; and
• the Association of Caribbean Electoral Organisations (ACEO), established in 1998.
  

 

Other regional networks which came into being around the same time include the Latin America-based Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL); the Pacific Islands, Australia, New Zealand Electoral Administrators Network (PIANZEA); and the Southern African Development Community Electoral Commissions’ Forum (SADC ECF).

Although the mandates of these networks differ in detail, they all aim to promote the free flow of information among election practitioners and to provide electoral assistance to their member EMBs. For example, the objectives of ACEEEO are the:

 

1. promotion of open and transparent elections through an exchange of experience and information related to election law and procedure, technology, administrative practice, and voter education;
2. promotion of the training and further education of election officials and international observers;
3. promotion of the principle of independent and impartial election authorities and administrators;
4. development of professional election officials of high integrity, with a strong sense of public service, knowledge of electoral practices, and commitment to democratic elections;
5. promotion of the principle of participation in electoral processes by citizens, political contestants, and non-partisan civil organisations; and
6. development of resources for election-related information and research.

 

The potential benefits of regional cooperation through associations of electoral organisations are considerable. New EMBs can draw on support and experience from more established electoral authorities, can accelerate their capacity-building potential by exchange of personnel, and may even be able to borrow electoral materials at relatively short notice. The development of common standards with respect to free and fair elections and the quality of electoral services may have a positive effect on losers accepting election results.

The development of EMB networks is constrained in practice by two issues affecting individual EMBs: lack of resources to participate in the association’s activities and fear of compromising perceptions of their independence. Some EMBs shy away from active participation because they fear that dependence on the government for resources for travel, research, or other programme activities might compromise their independence. Resource constraints also restrict the activities of the associations themselves, which have to depend mainly on outside funding.

 

Global Electoral Networks

The development of regional associations of electoral organisations and the increasing internationalization of elections through advocacy for international standards for democratic elections led to the establishment of a global forum for discussion of EMB collaboration.

The development of regional associations of electoral organisations in the 1980s and 1990s and the increasing internationalisation of elections through advocacy for international standards for democratic elections precipitated the need to set up a global forum for discussion of EMB collaboration. The Conference of the Global Electoral Organisation (GEO) Network, which was first convened in Ottawa in April 1999, is a worldwide meeting of regional associations of election officers. GEO conferences have the following objectives:

a) to provide an opportunity for associations of election officials to link with each other in a global professional network;

b) to offer organisational and programmatic models for collaboration and cooperative ventures among members and between associations, or with the supporters of electoral governance projects;

c) to serve as a forum in which to identify areas of need in electoral governance, and programmes which can be developed to respond to those needs; and

d) to identify a common agenda for all election management bodies around the world.

A global network of electoral organisations was a natural progression from regional electoral associations. The pillars on which regional electoral associations are built such as exchange of information, consultation, cooperation, technical assistance on bilateral and regional levels, will apply, albeit on a wider scale. A global network that is based on regional electoral associations is well placed to draw upon the strengths of those associations and be equipped to address emerging or potential global challenges in electoral administration.

The practical operations of the global network may best revolve around the promotion of knowledge and experience gained in the development of electoral procedures, joint research on matters relating to important election processes and issues, and promotion of international discussions on electoral issues with a view to furthering democratic values and governance. A global network is well placed to encourage and facilitate the publication of electoral materials by the various regional associations and to promote the exchange of expertise and the secondment of specialists in technical fields.

Various electoral issues could be treated with advantage at the global level and set the stage for adaptation at the regional or national levels. These issues could include:

1. improved cost-effectiveness in election organisation;
2. principles and good practices in election management;
3. new election technologies, their effectiveness and affordability;
4. legislative regimes for elections and referendums; and
5. model regimes for resolution of electoral disputes.
   

 

Electoral Support Networks

Apart from EMB networks, several networks exist around the world which are generally known as election support networks, and which include civil society organisations, such as churches, media organisations, human rights organisations, women’s organisations, and other community-based organisations. Election support networks have emerged to provide coordination and support services to non-state actors working in the arena of supporting democracy and electoral processes. Some domestic networks may consist of tens or even hundreds of individual organisations based regionally or nationally. The key electoral-related activities undertaken by electoral support networks include election observation and monitoring, civic and voter education, and electoral reform.

A good example of a national election support network is the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), which is a coalition of NGOs operating in the field of good governance, democracy, and elections. A similar network had earlier been formed in Kenya, where the National Election Monitoring Unit, a network of various local professional and commercial bodies, came together to press for electoral reform and then organised thousands of monitors to monitor the first multiparty elections of 1992.

The post-military regime transitional elections of 1998-99 in Nigeria spawned a number of civil society organisations, which formed various networks to further their participation in electoral reform and election observation. There were regional networks aimed at furthering the cause of women’s participation in the elections as candidates and as voters. Other networks were primarily interested in constitutional and legal reforms relating to elections; while other networks were interested in civic and voter education. These networks, the largest of which was the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), did a creditable job assisting with civic education and monitoring the election preparations and polling. The TMG (and many other domestic networks) survived the election and post-election period, and was active in preparations for the 2003 elections, during which time the TMG network grew to more than 100 NGOs.

At the SADC regional level, there is the SADC Electoral Support Network, which comprises civil society organisations in the region which are working in the democracy and electoral fields.

The Bangkok-based Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), formed in 1997, has 21 member organisations from 11 countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. ANFREL undertakes election observation activities as well as research, advocacy, information dissemination, and training activities on issues related to elections, democratisation, and good governance. It has observed elections in 15 Asian countries. The general goals of NGO networks are to involve the member organisations in pre-election activities, as well as implementing voting day programs.

It is often recognised that the required degree of specialisation resides in individual organisations and not necessarily in the network itself. The network itself usually takes on the more generalised tasks such as training assistance, standardization of procedures, and technical support to member organisations. Many NGO networks devote significant time and resources to supporting the national EMB programs of training and voter education. Many specialise in election monitoring or observation; and there are some NGO networks that contribute to the resolution of election disputes.

The contribution of domestic networks involved in election improvement has been considerable in new and emerging democratic States. The development of domestic networks of this type is often encouraged and provided with resources by international donors, who see them as an instrument of positive influence on the acceptability or otherwise of the election results, and an easier managed target for assistance than multiple individual organisations. Networks and their member organisations may be required to be accredited by the national EMB to operate in particular election activities and to conform to the goals and standards set by the EMB. There have been cases where individual member organisations of networks are refused accreditation for election observation on the grounds that they have a political agenda. There was at least one reported case in Nigeria in 1998-99 elections of an individual member organisation of a prominent network behaving in a partisan manner during election observation.

A trend is emerging in some regions whereby faith-based NGOs are joining secular NGOs in networks to participate in civic and voter education, as well as election observation. One such network is the Peoples Voter Education Network (JPPR) in Indonesia. JPPR is an Indonesia–wide coalition, primarily comprising Islamic mass-based organisations but also including Christian mass-based organisations and religious and secular NGOs. For the 2004 legislative and presidential elections in Indonesia, JPPR undertook voter education and election observation activities, fielding over 100,000 observers for the July presidential election.

 

Summary: Cooperation through EMB Networks

• Electoral networks promote information exchange and improvement in electoral processes, providing opportunities for EMBs to share experiences and good practices.
• National associations of electoral administrators, such as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UK, and the USA, can play a significant role in professional development, information exchange, and as a lobby group for electoral reforms.
• Regional EMB networks provide opportunities to EMBs to assist each other through drawing on the experience of longer established EMBs, personnel exchanges, pooling of research and information, and equipment sharing.
• Global electoral networks, such as the GEO Network, offer collaborative opportunities for EMBs to share knowledge and improve electoral governance.
• Community-based electoral support networks can assist EMBs with additional resources for activities such as training and voter education and information, and in transmitting information

 

Reforming Electoral Processes

Since the mid-1980s, there have been substantial structural and procedural changes in the way elections are conducted around the world, such as the growing numbers of independent and permanent electoral administration bodies, and the increasing use of new technologies to deliver electoral services. Electoral reform has often been part of a package of general democratization initiatives. However, many countries in which there had been general satisfaction with a long-standing framework and style of electoral administration have also seen substantial reforms.

Examples of this are:

 

• the introduction of an independent EMB and of significantly wider access to voting in Australia in 1984;
• the introduction of a new independent body with electoral functions, and a radically different electoral system, in New Zealand in 1993; and
• recent changes in Sweden to create more independent electoral administration.

 

The internationalization of electoral frameworks and administration continues to place countries under pressure to introduce electoral reform measures. The relatively recent development of generally acknowledged standards for ’free and fair’ elections and of global and regional standards for electoral administration have created yardsticks by which each country’s electoral processes and administration can be assessed.

Reforms to electoral processes may be triggered by failure to deliver acceptable elections or by conflict resulting from disputed elections. Where countries are dependent on international donor contributions, these may be linked to implementation of electoral reforms, such as in Liberia. Financial constraints requiring electoral resources to be used more sustainably and effectively have had a significant bearing on administrative electoral reforms.

The increasingly widespread and expert independent and political party observation of elections has produced many well-documented assessments of electoral performance and recommended reforms, as in Nigeria‘s post-2003 elections. Civil society and the media have become more aware of electoral rights and standards. International observation of and technical assistance to elections in emerging democracies can also have an effect in the mature democracies.

 

What Is Electoral Reform?

‘Electoral reform’ is a broad term that covers, among other things, improving the responsiveness of electoral processes to public desires and expectations. However, not all electoral change is electoral reform. Electoral change can only be referred to as reform if its primary goal is to improve electoral processes, for example through fostering enhanced impartiality, inclusiveness, transparency, integrity, or accuracy. Random and/or frequent electoral change, while it may be reformist, can also be confusing to voters, and thus defeat its purpose. Frequent change may also negatively affect the sustainability of an EMB’s operations.

Electoral reform often only catches the public eye when it involves changes to representational arrangements, such as electoral systems, but it is a much broader concept than this. There are three distinct areas of electoral reform, in each of which an EMB and its stakeholders may play different roles:

1. legal — involving the amendment of the constitution, the electoral law, or related regulations and rules to enhance the integrity, relevance, and adequacy of the legal framework within which the EMB delivers its services. This may include institutional reform of the EMB itself;
2. administrative — the introduction within the EMB of new strategies, structures, policies, procedures, and technical innovations that enable it to implement its legal responsibilities and deliver its services more efficiently, effectively, and sustainably. These could include: policies and practices on issues such as procurement, financial integrity, or employment (such as gender balance in the recruitment of EMB staff); making informed voting accessible to groups such as women, remote residents, and the physically impaired; or introducing new technology for services such as voting, voter registration, or electoral logistics; or
3. political – changes which take place in the political environment within which the EMB operates, such as giving it more autonomy or creating a more effective and transparent framework for its funding and accountability.

 

Change may be brought about by different means and originate from different sources. Many electoral reforms have been introduced by governments or by EMBs, sometimes triggered by voter apathy, as in the case of the UK, or as the result of internal investigations. The prevailing international environment, which emphasizes democratic representation, aided and abetted by local civil society bodies and other stakeholders, has emboldened many EMBs to press their governments for electoral reform.

 

Failing EMBs

Many EMBs fail to discharge their mandate in line with accepted regional or international standards. There are no comprehensive data on the reasons for EMB failure. Studies of individual EMBs have noted a number of internal causes, including:

1. lack of stakeholder confidence in the EMB;
2. government and/or political influence on EMB decisions;
3. a partisan approach by the EMB or its members;
4. a lack of EMB professionalism; and
5. EMB incompetence or financial impropriety.

In other cases, the reasons for an EMB’s failure are outside its control, for example, having to implement an electoral system that produces results that are not acceptable to major stakeholders, as in Lesotho in the 1990s. There may be deficiencies in the legal framework. In Liberia and Zimbabwe in the late 1990s/early 2000s, the failure of elections to meet acceptable standards was part of a failure of these countries’ political systems.

Except where the entire political system is failing, electoral reform – of the EMB itself and/or of the broader electoral framework – may be able to save future electoral processes from failure. Notable examples of this in the 1990s are those of Mexico and South Africa.

 

The EMB’s Role in Electoral Reforms

While the EMB has a key role to play in all electoral reform, it may not be in a position to implement reform without the support of its key stakeholders – particularly the government, the legislature, and political parties. This is a significant reason for EMBs maintaining a strong relationship with their stakeholders.

An EMB can only implement legal reform within the framework agreed by the government and legislature. However, the EMB may have a key research, review, and advocacy role in promoting electoral legal reform, which can be guided by the standards detailed in "International IDEA’s publication International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for reviewing the legal framework of elections" (see right hand bar). Electoral legal reform can be assisted by establishing an appropriate permanent body of the legislature to monitor electoral activities and recommend electoral reforms to the government. Effective legal electoral reform depends on a multi-partisan approach within the legislature that subordinates political advantage to electoral ethical principles and good practice.

The EMB has more control over the implementation of administrative reforms, and can implement them more effectively if it formally adopts a continuous review and reform process within its management policies. However, legal and administrative reforms often need to be synchronized to optimize their effectiveness. In India, for example, while the EMB has modernized its election procedures extensively, reform of the election machinery has not kept pace.

Unless an EMB maintains a process for review of its administrative strategies, policies, procedures and practices, its effectiveness will diminish, as it will have no mechanism to deal with change in its legal, stakeholder, technological, financial and social environments.

Political and legal reform issues in relation to electoral processes are often strongly associated. As with legal reform, the EMB does not control political reform, though it again can play a research and advocacy role, and cultivate support among key stakeholders. Unless an EMB maintains a process for review of its administrative strategies, policies, procedures, and practices, its effectiveness will diminish, as it has no mechanism to deal with change in its legal, stakeholder, technological, financial, and social environments.

 

Key steps for an EMB to consider in proposing and implementing electoral reforms include:

1. assigning responsibilities to specific members/staff for the development, advocacy and implementation of electoral reforms;
2. implementing effective processes, including post-electoral audits and evaluations, for review of the electoral framework and the implementation of electoral processes;
3. consulting with stakeholders to ascertain their views on required reforms and to enlist their support for the EMB’s reform program;
4. making submissions to the government and the legislature on desired electoral reforms;
5. publicising, through media and use of stakeholder networks, the desired electoral reforms;
6. developing an electoral reform implementation strategy;
7. evaluating effects of electoral reforms.

 

The Scope of Electoral Reform

A significant area for electoral reform is the nature and structure of the institutions engaged in electoral management or in delivering electoral services. These reforms may enhance the independence of the EMB – for example the creation of independent model EMBs in countries such as Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, and South Africa. Electoral responsibilities may be reassigned amongst existing and/or new bodies to promote better service delivery – as in New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK. In some cases, such as in Sweden, the suggestions for reform of electoral management were initiated by the EMB itself. In others, as in New Zealand and the UK, the reforms of electoral management were initiated by the government. Pressure from local civil society or international groups may also instigate reform of electoral management arrangements, as in Georgia and Liberia.

Reforms to electoral processes may have a broad effect on an EMB’s strategies, policies, and procedures – such as the introduction of a new electoral system. They may target key electoral issues such as electoral participation and representation, delimitation of electoral districts, voter registration, registration and oversight of political parties, and improving electoral integrity. They may target specific technical or technological aspects of the electoral process, such as introducing new procurement or employment processes, voter registration systems, or voting and vote-counting methods or systems. They may involve social policies, such as reducing a gender imbalance in representation, improving access to electoral processes for marginalized sectors of society, or improving the representativeness of the EMB’s own staff.

Electoral system reform, such as in Fiji, Indonesia, Lesotho, Liberia and New Zealand, is one of the most far-reaching reforms in election administration. It is often the result of a functional need, for example, of perceptions of an ‘unfairness’ in representation, or of government ineffectiveness or lack of responsiveness. In 2003, in Indonesia, the electoral system was changed from closed list proportional representation (PR) in very large electoral districts to open list PR in small electoral districts, in order to address perceived deficiencies in the links between voters and representatives, while maintaining the consensus nature of Indonesian governance. Electoral system reform places a substantial information responsibility on the EMB, and may require it to implement new methods of electoral district boundary delimitation, voting, and vote counting.

EMBs can play a significant role in reform of electoral district boundary delimitation: as advocates of more transparent and equitable boundary delimitation processes; in providing expert opinions on boundary delimitation issues; and in ensuring that they exercise any responsibilities for boundary delimitation impartially, equitably, and with integrity. Some electoral reforms have introduced multi-member districts, as this type of system, usually based on PR, can make electoral boundaries less of an influence on determining election results. Other reforms have required boundary delimitations based on ‘one person, one vote, one value’. Some reforms have attempted to make boundary delimitation processes more transparent and objective, such as by removing any role for the legislature in delimitation; having an independent body in charge of delimitation; and requiring open hearings and independent review of proposed boundaries.

The process of registering electors has attracted many efforts at modernization in both emerging and established democracies. Electoral registration determines the ability of eligible voters to participate in an election, and thus is a key ingredient in the fairness of an election. As it generally occurs well before Election Day, and often outside the direct scrutiny of observers (especially where electoral registers are derived from civil or population registers), the internal integrity of voter registration systems needs to be very high. Reforms have targeted increasing the efficiency as well as the integrity of voter registration processes.

Many EMBs have implemented systems to improve the inclusiveness, fairness, accuracy, and transparency of voter registration, such as providing for continuously updated voter registration, special registration provisions for transient voters, and safeguards against wrongful rejection of or removal from registration. EMBs and other agencies responsible for maintaining data from which voters registers are derived are improving the integrity of voter registers through better methods of checking the identity of qualified persons, and reducing data processing times, often using modern technological solutions. EMBs need to ensure that technological solutions for voter registration enjoy the trust of the citizens and are sustainable, especially in emerging democracies where EMBs may have uncertain levels of future financial support.

There have been significant reforms in the role played by EMBs in monitoring and regulating the activities of political parties. Some are the consequences of legal reforms targeted at providing a more level playing field for political competition – such as the administration of state funding of political parties and candidates’ election campaigns, and the qualifications for registration of parties and candidates to contest elections. Others have been targeted at improving oversight of campaign contributions and expenditure, and the internal democracy of political parties – such as oversight of candidate selection processes. Reforms to promote a level playing field for elections have also given some EMBs responsibilities to administer or monitor arrangements that require the media to allocate campaign advertising opportunities equitably.

A growing number of EMBs are introducing new voting methods. Brazil and India have introduced electronic voting machines (EVMs) with a view to replacing manual voting. Many of the issues that need to be considered in reforming electoral processes by introducing electronic voting are dealt with in the files on EMB Stakeholder Relationships and The Sustainability of EMBs.

There have significant efforts to make electoral participation more accessible. Access to voter registration has sometimes been opened to those out of country, of no fixed abode, or in prison. Access to polling has been widened for many people, through the introduction of in-person absentee or postal voting, including for voters out of country, and through providing special voting and voter information facilities for refugees, internally displaced persons, the disabled, the aged, and those in remote areas, in prison, or in hospital. EMBs have had to respond to all these reforms by introducing procedures and systems that enable the additional access while maintaining high integrity in the voter registration, voting, and counting processes.

Reform of electoral access has attempted in some countries to provide equity in access for specific societal groups and for women. EMBs can promote equitable access by insisting on it in their own staffing, for example by requiring gender balance in temporary staffing for polling stations, and using internal professional development programmes to ensure that women advance into EMB management positions.

 

Managing Electoral Change

Electoral change management requirements will depend on the extent of the reform and the specific electoral processes involved. Changes to the model of the EMB - for example from a Governmental Model to an Independent Model – require particularly careful planning to ensure a smooth transition and retention of skills and institutional memory. It is crucial that changes to electoral structures and frameworks are agreed sufficiently before electoral events to allow preparation of new materials and effective implementation of training.

Especially where the process of change applies to the nature, or structure and staff of an EMB, it is essential to appoint a skilled manager and communicator to oversee and implement the changes. Changing organisational structures and individual roles within structures will inevitably create tension. Transparency, honesty, serious consultation, communication, and adequate forewarning are essential in managing personnel through electoral change. Timing is also critical. An EMB’s staff have skills and knowledge that may be difficult to replace, especially close to an election date. The involvement of members of the EMB in change management demonstrates the EMB’s commitment to reforms.

The implementation of reforms relating to election technical processes may require the help of experts who specialize in particular technical areas. In implementing technical reforms, the EMB needs to be careful that the new procedural and system specifications are correct and have been correctly implemented. Thorough development review processes and pre-implementation testing are essential. The change management process also needs to include measurable indicators to evaluate the implementation of the electoral reforms, and clear responsibilities for reporting on indicators and for acting to improve performance if any indicator is not achieved.

 

Summary: Reforming Electoral Processes

• Electoral reforms are changes targeted at improving implementation of the guiding principles of electoral administration. See Guiding Principles.
• Electoral reforms may be directed at the electoral legal framework - including the institution of the EMB, the administrative and technical processes of electoral management, and the political context for electoral activities.
• No aspect of electoral frameworks, systems, institutions, planning, management, or operations is immune from reform or modernization. EMBs need to have a clear strategy for developing or responding to, and implementing electoral reforms.
• EMBs have vital roles as advocates for electoral reforms in general, as implementers of institutional reforms, and as initiators and implementers of administrative, including technical, reforms.
• Electoral reform needs to be carefully managed to ensure that it fulfils its purpose without confusing electors and with minimal disruption to electoral administration.

 

Afghanistan: An Electoral Management Body Evolves

Although elections were held in the Kingdom of Afghanistan in the 1960s, in 1977 after
the 1973 coup d’ état, and during the Soviet occupation after 1979, they were never of an
internationally recognized standard. Traditional means of choosing tribal or clan Shura leaders persisted.

One scholar noted that Afghans regarded the idea of a choice by secret ballot as somewhat ‘sneaky’, and preferred the ‘honest’ expression of choice by a show of hands. During the Soviet period the universal franchise, to include women, was adopted, but was culturally
controversial.

During the 25-year period of fierce war, victory through the bullet rather than the ballot decided who would govern. Following the defeat of the Taliban in late 2001, the anti-Taliban Afghan factions assembled in Bonn to agree on future stability and democratic government. The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 recognized Afghanistan’s sovereignty, despite the serious ‘failed state’ condition of the country and the unfinished war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, as well as the fact that powerful armed factions (warlords) were in control of many areas outside Kabul.

The Bonn Agreement mandated the UN to take the first formal step towards democracy –
the registration of voters for elections in mid-2004. The UN commenced this task in February
2003. It was a structurally ‘messy’ arrangement. Formally the sovereign Afghan authorities were responsible for the election. In fact there was no existing Afghan institution that could manage the elections, and in particular no EMB. Nor was there a legal framework to make a credible election possible.

The Evolution of the EMB

The evolution of an Afghan EMB is a complex process which has gone through five phases over the past three years.

• The first body charged with the functions of an EMB was a purely UN body created in
early 2003 – the Electoral Component of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) (the UN Component).
• In mid-2003 an Interim Joint Electoral Management Body (the JEMB) was created, with
both Afghan and international members. It had no operational capacity and depended
upon the support of various UN and other international organizations. Its responsibility
was to supervise the UN Component.
• In early 2004 the UN Component was transformed into an advisory service to an Afghanled
Secretariat responsible to the JEMB. That organization completed the preparations
for and conducted the 2004 presidential election.
• In early 2005 the JEMB’s Afghan commissioners were entirely replaced by a new set of
Afghan nationals, and some of its international members were also replaced. The JEMB
remained an interim body. Its Afghan Secretariat was replaced by an Electoral Component
appointed by UNAMA and internationally managed. This organization managed the
2005 parliamentary elections.
• Finally, in late 2005 the JEMB was replaced by the Independent Election Commission
(IEC), which retained some of the JEMB’s Afghan members. It has an Afghan Secretariat.
Provision is made for international advisers to serve both the IEC and the Secretariat.

The Legal Framework

The evolving EMB in Afghanistan is still a work in progress. The Bonn Agreement prescribed a UN role, endorsed by the UN Security Council, but the agreement is domestic and political. It is not an international or legally binding agreement. Neither the 2004 presidential election nor the 2005 parliamentary election was a UN peacekeeping election conducted under UN rules and regulations. The sole legal authority is the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA) – first the interim, and now the elected president and his Cabinet.

A decree of 26 July 2003 created the Interim Afghan Electoral Commission (IAEC) and
the JEMB. Until then, the absence of any Afghan body to work with the UN had implied that
the initial Voter Registration Work Plan and Budget could only be designed as an entirely UN
operation, based on UN standards and pay scales.

The resulting 130 million US dollar (USD) draft budget (June 2003) disturbed the TISA, donors (who would bear most of this cost) and the UN, and stirred them to action. The IAEC was urgently created, notionally to employ and support the Afghan registration staff at Afghan rates of pay. This would save the donors over 30 million USD. Despite the resulting economies, a second budget/work plan, launched in August for an October 2003 start, failed for lack of funding, and a scaled-down start was only possible in December 2003. This was based on the November 2003 Decree on Registration of Voters for the 2004 Elections.

At the end of December 2003 the new constitution of Afghanistan was promulgated, with
various electorally significant provisions. To bring the fiction of Afghan election management closer to reality, and to emphasize national capacity building as an integral part of the process, the decree of 18 February 2004 on The Elements of Convening Elections during the Transitional Period introduced a new institutional and management structure. The Electoral Component and officers of UNAMA became the ‘technical advisers’ to the newly appointed Afghan director of the JEMB Secretariat and his national managers at central and provincial levels.

On 27 May 2004 the Afghan Cabinet finally issued a decree establishing the Election Law.
The presidential election was held on 9 October 2004. On 21 January 2005, the entire IAEC was replaced by a presidential decree appointing new commissioners. An amended Election Law was adopted in May 2005.

Together with the decree on The Basics of Holding Elections during the Transitional Period, it made significant changes. Notably, it restored greater UN control for the 2005 parliamentary elections, with the restoration of a UNAMA chief electoral officer (CEO), reporting directly to the JEMB. It abolished the post of the Afghan director of the JEMB Secretariat. Under the May 2005 Election Law, the transitional period ended 30 days after the parliamentary elections, which took place on 9 October 2005. With these elections the JEMB completed its work and handed over to the eight-member IEC and its Secretariat. Members of the new IEC have security of tenure and a fixed term of office of three years.

Institutional and Operational Issues

The JEMB headed the management system for both the 2004 presidential and the 2005
parliamentary elections, supervising the Secretariat. For the presidential election, the Secretariat was headed by its Afghan director. For the parliamentary election, the Secretariat was run by the CEO, appointed by the Special Representative of the (UN) Secretary-General (SRSG).

The operational structure established for the 2004 presidential election remained as complex
during the 2005 parliamentary elections. The JEMB’s practical tasks, relating to Afghan
staff recruitment and pay, the development of electoral infrastructure and the procurement
and support of transport, relied for both elections on the United Nations Office for Project
Services (UNOPS). Neither the JEMB nor its Secretariat had either the independent capacity
or ministerial support for such tasks. Until December 2004, a United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) Project Office provided financial mobilization/accounting and personnel
management for the JEMB, the Secretariat, and the UNAMA Electoral Component.

Although the JEMB asserted its independence, it also paid considerable attention to the
views of both the government and the SRSG’s office. The international members, appointed
by the SRSG, were on occasions given explicit instructions by the SRSG’s office. The principle
of independence was thus not entrenched or uniformly respected during the presidential
election. Before the 2004 presidential election, the JEMB Secretariat and the UN Component
responded to the security situation by taking the initiative and setting up a Security Unit. This
was an unusual initiative for an election administration, but provided essential close liaison
with the Coalition, the Afghan security forces and the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) units.

For the presidential election, a separate structure was established to undertake the out-of-country registration and voting for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Once the JEMB
decided (very late) to provide this service, it was delegated to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the only body with experience relevant to conducting this massive task.

Powers and Functions

The JEMB had a standard range of EMB powers and functions: to prepare and conduct the
voter registration, the nomination and screening of candidates (a politically delicate task),
the polling and the counting, and the announcement of the results. The Ministry of Interior
(MOI), not the JEMB, was responsible for the delimitation of electoral districts, but the JEMB
allocated parliamentary seats to provinces on the basis of the MOI’s information and managed the awarding of seats to candidates, including the reserved seats for women.

A separate Media Commission, reporting to the JEMB, was established in both election
laws to ensure fair access to the public mass media, and this has worked reasonably effectively. In response to comments on the 2004 presidential election, the 2005 Election Law provided for a separate, election-related Complaints Commission.

Financing

As indicated, both the presidential and the parliamentary elections were almost entirely funded by the voluntary contributions of international donors. Since UNAMA was not a peacekeeping mission, there was virtually no UN funding provided, despite the official role of the UN in the operation and its considerable UN content. A UN, UNDP and JEMB Post Election Strategy Group has recommended that the IEC should be state-funded but should manage its budget independently. The legislation which established the new (post-Bonn) IEC has not provided for the mechanism by which future elections will be financed. However, policy statements have been made suggesting that it will be state-funded.

Given that some well-paid staff are still in place from the internationally-funded Bonn process, they are likely to demand better than normal government pay, and sustainability may become a problem. In 2006, international NGOs such as the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Asia Foundation appeared to be ready to continue their support for international advisers to the IEC, but such commitments could clearly not be indefinite.

Professionalism

Special efforts were made during 2003/2004 to provide training for the IAEC members and
enable them to observe their peers in operation. Following the appointment after February
2004 of the Afghan director of the JEMB Secretariat, Afghan managers at national and
provincial level were appointed as counterparts to the UN Electoral Component’s international
staff already in place.

This sought to introduce them to specific electoral tasks, and expose them to a range of international standards of professional practice. The return to an essentially UN management system for the parliamentary election in 2005 ended this practice. Consequently, a fresh capacity-building programme would be required to create a professional Afghan electoral
body. Afghan officers given electoral responsibilities generally displayed sound understanding
and a commitment to professionalism.

Relations with Other Institutions

The transitional process was marked by the electoral administration’s massive interaction
with and dependence on other organizations, international and national. Many of the former,
including the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), the IFES, the NDI and the International Republican Institute (IRI) of the USA, as well as the US-funded Asia Foundation, played significant roles in supporting the process. Donors’ diplomatic representatives, aware of their ‘investment’ (real or promised) were, unusually, regular visitors and enquirers at the JEMB Secretariat.

Sustainability

Afghans involved in the process, including the government, showed a serious commitment to
the ideal of the independence of the EMB. The interim nature of the IAEC may be viewed
either as having somewhat undermined this or as having provided a serious training and testing ground and a base of demand for the new Independent Electoral Commission. The regional example of the Indian Election Commission provides an important and admired model. Funding is likely to be the key issue for sustainability, especially as the current election system implies considerable electoral costs.

Electoral Reform

The JEMB, with its Secretariat of national and international staff, played an important role in
preparing and drafting the Election Law and related decrees. This role has been formally given to the new IEC by the 2005 Election Law. If the IEC is to play a structured role in this field with the legislature in the future, these provisions may need to be further institutionalized.

 

Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Success Story for the Independent Model

The signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP, or Dayton Accords) in
Paris on 14 December 1995 put an end to four years of civil war in the territory of the former
Federal Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The GFAP recognizes Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH) as a sovereign parliamentary state made up of two entities, the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. Annex III of the GFAP mandated the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to organize and conduct the
1996 general elections and establish an independent Provisional Election Commission (PEC).

The PEC was established as an autonomous body including seven national commissioners, but the final decision-making powers rested entirely in the hands of the head of the OSCE Mission to BiH in his capacity as chair of the PEC. The PEC, authorized by the GFAP to operate on the basis of provisional ‘rules and regulations’, administered the first six elections that took place in the country up to 2000.

The Legislative Framework

The Election Law adopted by the Parliament on 23 August 2001 finally brought the electoral
legislation of BiH under the country’s own domestic law. However, the unique and transitional
legal framework of BiH is still regulated by a supranational structure which has at its peak the
GFAP, of which the BiH constitution is an integral part (annex IV of the GFAP).

Under this structure, the ultimate authority remains with the international community, and in particular with the high representative, the international figure appointed to monitor, coordinate and facilitate the implementation of the civilian aspects of the GFAP. The adoption of the Election Law of BiH concluded a long and troubled four-year process overseen by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the OSCE. Remarkably, it was the first crucial piece of legislation adopted by the BiH Parliament through its normal procedures and not imposed by the high representative. It provided for the establishment of an independent central EMB, and in November 2001 the first Election Commission (EC) was appointed.

The Election Law provides for all the necessary elements for democratic elections, although
the electoral system it establishes is highly complex. Five very different systems of representation are used for the five institutional and administrative levels of the country (this includes Brcko where a special regime, under the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is in place) and specific quotas are introduced to ensure appropriate representation of all ethnic groups in all state and entity institutions.

Institutional Structure

The EC is composed of seven members, with two representatives for each of the three constituent peoples (Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) and one representative of the ‘Others’. The members of the EC are appointed by the Parliament for a five-year mandate, renewable for a second term, and the chair rotates among its members every 15 months. The EC is serviced by a Secretariat, headed by a secretary general who is the chief executive officer. It comprises six divisions, and has a total of around 40 permanent staff.

After the appointment of the EC, the OSCE transferred its most experienced national staff to the Secretariat of the EC. From the beginning of 2003, all EC staff came under the national payroll. The Election Law also established an Election Complaints and Appeals Council (ECAC), which has powers to adjudicate on disputes over violations of campaign rules and campaign financing irregularities. It consists of five members – one representative of each of the three constituent ethnic groups and the ‘Others’, and one member of the EC. The EC reviews all ECAC decisions and the EC Secretariat supports its work.

At the level of the two entities that make up the Bosnian state, two election commissions
have recently been established. In addition, within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
each canton administration appoints its own election commission. However, the role of these
intermediary commissions remains rather marginal and is essentially a monitoring one. Finally, the municipal election commissions (MECs) have the functions of organizing
electoral activities, including voter registration, within their respective municipalities.

Powers and Functions

The EC is vested with the power to issue regulations on all aspects of the electoral process, to maintain and update the central electoral register, to register parties and candidates, and to implement all levels of elections from the national to the municipal. More importantly, the EC has the power to coordinate, oversee and regulate the activities of all other election commissions provided for in the complex political and institutional set-up of BiH. The EC has proved so far to be a truly independent body, and has gained ‘on the ground’ a higher authority than originally envisaged.

The EC is also empowered to audit political party finances well beyond the election campaign
periods, and has been given vast powers to investigate public officials, sanction them and remove them from their elected or appointed positions when a conflict of interest is proved.

Financing

The EC is financed by the national, entity, cantonal and municipal budgets. Their respective
shares vary according to the type of election to be held. There are no clear provisions on how the disbursement mechanisms should function, and this has been a source of continuous
disagreement and friction. To date, full funding for the EC has come only after strong pressure from the international supervisors of BiH. Given the recent history of international support for elections, there is still a lack of appreciation, especially at the municipal level, that elections have now become a completely internal matter that must be funded by the domestic authorities.

Accountability

The EC is accountable to the Parliament of BiH, to which it submits an annual report of its activities. Its tendering, procurement and disbursement procedures have been established
in compliance with the national legislation. The State Audit Commission audits the EC’s
expenditure regularly.

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers

A successful OSCE programme for the relocation of its national electoral staff to the EC ensured the rapid and effective transfer of knowledge that allowed the smooth running of the 2002 elections. However, the lack of appropriate transitional employment policies and rules caused the departure of many experienced staff in 2005.

The recruitment and training procedures set out for the EC by the BiH Agency for Civil Service have proved so far to be too cumbersome and obsolete, and do not guarantee the conservation of the necessary levels of professionalism.

At the municipal level, some serious problems remain in ensuring that MEC members are
properly qualified and sufficiently independent.

Relations with the Media

The EC enjoys very good relations with the media. Its sessions are always open to the media and observers, and are regularly followed by press releases. The Commission Regulatory Agency (CRA), the body that regulates the behaviour of the media in the country, has jurisdiction over all violations of the election law by the media, but the EC has the power to issue regulations on media coverage of political actors during the election period. The two agencies hold regular and transparent coordination meetings.

Relations with Other Institutions and Agencies

The creation of an independent and sustainable EC was a lengthy and complicated operation
engineered by the international supervisors of BiH. The perception of the EC being an
‘international’ creation, together with its need to become operational immediately to run its
first elections less than a year after it was set up, generated some initial criticism and boycotting in minor ways by other state agencies and ministerial offices. The EC faced the challenge with great energy and enthusiasm, and managed quickly to garner the respect of all stakeholders, especially the political parties.

Electoral Reform Management

The EC does not have the power to amend the Election Law, but it can recommend and draft
amendments for parliamentary review and promote the setting up of ad hoc working groups
on electoral reform with the government. While certain political actors still remain opposed to
many of the complex formulae used to translate votes into seats, and are advocating changes, none of them has so far been able to propose new systems of representation that could be accepted by all the forces present in the Parliament and give equal protection to the interests of all the ethnic groups.

Sustainability

The first great achievement of the EC was to bring down the costs of elections to very affordable figures which are in line with those of other democracies of similar dimensions. However, a serious lack of appreciation remained on the part of many of the country’s institutions regarding the challenges connected with the organization of elections in general, and in particular of the extraordinary complexity of the tasks the EC faces. This is reflected in a persisting reluctance to meet the EC’s funding and procurement needs in a timely fashion.

The EC has already firmly established itself as a central asset in the BiH system, and is
viewed as an example of how a central and multi-ethnic institution could impartially serve the
different groups and interests present in the country. However, it is still a very young institution requiring international support to preserve its independence and impartiality.

The major sustainability problem facing the EC is the hiring and retaining of experienced
and qualified personnel. Many of the procedures put in place by the EC rely in practice on
sophisticated IT solutions. While this was a necessary move to rationalize operations and
reduce costs, they require a very high level of specific technical expertise that is not found in
any other sector of the BiH public administration. To guarantee the recruitment and retention
of highly qualified and neutral IT professionals, the EC needs to be able to choose more freely the professional profiles that best meet its IT requirements and adopt competitive salary scales. Otherwise, the long-desired absorption of the EC within the BiH institutional framework might cause the lowering of the very professional standards that made the EC an example to be followed.

The second important issue of concern is the relationship between the EC and the MECs. The professionalization and depoliticization of most MECs has not been achieved. This might be remedied if the MECs were brought clearly under the EC chain of command, with the possibility for the EC to dismiss incompetent and biased MEC members. Under this framework, the other intermediate election commissions would continue to play a supervisory and guarantee role.

 

Cambodia: Tensions Around the National Election Committee

Under the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, in May 1993 the United Nations, through the UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), organized and administered Cambodia’s first
free and fair multiparty, democratic elections. They were marred by high levels of political
intimidation that saw some hundreds of election-related killings. The Cambodian People’s
Party (CPP), which had ruled Cambodia since Viet Nam overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime
in 1979, initially rejected the election results, but a coalition government was formed of the
CPP and the royalist Funcinpec (United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and
Cooperative Cambodia).

An aborted attempt at secession by senior CPP members followed, after which King Sihanouk brokered a deal and the two parties agreed to share the management of the government on an equal basis.

The constitution promulgated on 24 September 1993 stipulated that elections to the National Assembly would be held every five years. In July 1997 the CPP/Funcinpec coalition fell apart amid armed confrontation between their respective military units. Partly as a result of international pressure, the CPP began preparations for National Assembly elections, which took place in July 1998 – the first multiparty elections to be conducted by Cambodians in over three decades.

In January 1998 the National Election Committee (NEC) was established, based in the Ministry of the Interior. Eleven members were appointed to the NEC: a chair, a vice-chair and two other members who were to be independent, one representative from each political party represented in the National Assembly, two officials from the Ministry of the Interior, and one representative of local NGOs. Much jockeying took place as parties sought to ensure the choice of their sympathizers to fill the independent and NGO positions.

In May 1998 the Constitutional Council was established. In addition to establishing the constitutionality of laws, it was also the final arbiter for election complaints and appeals. The 1998 elections were seen as a technical and logistical success, although Funcinpec and the Sam Rainsy Party (established following a split within Funcinpec) rejected the results because the formula eventually used to calculate the distribution of seats in the National Assembly was not expressed in a clear legal form and had been changed in the middle of the election process in a manner which subsequently appeared to favour the CPP. The CPP won a clear majority of seats.

Street demonstrations against the election results followed in September 1998, and after three months a coalition government was again formed. The coalition then governed for the full five-year term.

In February 2002, multiparty elections were conducted for the first time ever for 1,621
commune councils – the lowest administrative unit in the country. The 2003 National Assembly elections were followed by political deadlock as the CPP did not win the two-thirds majority required to govern outright, and Funcinpec and the Sam Rainsy Party again refused to recognize the results. Eventually, after 11 months, another CPP/ Funcinpec coalition government was formed.

The Legislative Framework

The Election Law and the Political Parties Law were initially drafted and adopted by the
National Assembly between October and December 1997, in the absence of the Funcinpec and Sam Rainsy Party leaders. In May 1998 important amendments were made to the law to enable the counting of votes to take place at commune level, as opposed to counting at the polling stations, in order to protect information on how individual villages voted.

Following the February 2002 commune elections, on 21 August 2002 the government enacted the Law on Amendments to the National Assembly Election Law, thus introducing several changes to the management of elections, including:

• the introduction of a permanent voter registration process, to be conducted each year
between October and December, at commune offices, by commune clerks;
• the change in the composition of the NEC from the 11-member body created for the 1998
elections to a smaller, apolitical committee of five members; it assumed its responsibilities
on 30 October 2002;
• new procedures for the appointment of members to the provincial election committees
(PECs) and commune election committees (CECs);
• the introduction of equitable access to the state media for political parties during the
campaign period; and
• the inclusion in the law of the seat allocation formula for the proportional representation
(PR) system by province/constituency.

The law also included a transitional provision whereby from 2008 vote-counting would be
done at the polling station (counting for the 2003 National Assembly elections would still be
conducted at the CEC level).

 

Institutional Structure

The NEC has a permanent committee of five persons – one chair, one vice-chair and three
permanent members. The members are selected by the Ministry of the Interior, on the basis of strict neutrality, and the nominations are approved by the Council of Ministers and ratified by the National Assembly. The permanent committee is supported by a General Secretariat, which has five departments: operations, administration, finance, training and public information, and legal services.

During and in the lead-up to election periods the NEC employs up to 460 staff, of whom 167 work on information technology (IT) tasks. For the 2003 elections the NEC had 24 PECs, 1,621 CECs, and 12,826 polling station committees (PSCs), all staffed on a temporary basis. The total number of staff peaked at 73,539 during the polling and counting phase for the National Assembly elections.

Powers and Functions

The NEC is responsible for planning, organizing and managing elections. Key duties include:

• publishing the election timetable;
• appointing members to the PECs, CECs and PSCs;
• establishing the areas covered by individual polling stations and their boundaries;
• receiving and deciding on the registration of political parties and the nominations of the
candidates of political parties to stand for the National Assembly;
• monitoring and facilitating the organization of the electoral campaign;
• organizing and managing the voting and the vote-counting, and determining and
announcing the results;
• auditing the income and expenditure of candidates and political parties during election
campaigns;
• taking measures to ensure equal access to the public media; and
• deciding on all complaints and appeals relating to the election, except complaints which
fall under the jurisdiction of the courts.

The power to determine the number and allocation of seats by province/municipality in the
National Assembly rests with a special committee of the Council of Ministers, which is convened in the third year of every legislative term. The committee is composed of a representative from each political party currently represented in the National Assembly; two representatives of the Ministry of the Interior; and the director of the National Institute of Statistics.

After the number of seats to be allocated has been determined, the special committee may recommend allocating them to any province(s), taking account of geographical, social and economic considerations.

 

Financing and Sustainability

The NEC is funded by the Cambodian government, foreign donors, international organizations, charitable individuals and NGOs. Except for foreign funding, all other election funds are deposited under a special account in the National Treasury called the Trust Fund Account for Elections. Donor funding has been a significant source of support over the years but has decreased with each successive election while the government’s contribution has increased. The total expenditure of the UNTAC mission which was responsible for the preparation and implementation of the 1993 elections in Cambodia was around 2 billion US dollars (USD).

Later figures are not directly comparable with this, but the cost of the 1998 national elections
was around 24 million USD, that of the 2002 commune elections around 15 million USD, and
that of the 2003 national elections around 12 million USD – of which only around 6 million
USD was provided by external donors. Major progress has been made towards an electoral
process that is financially sustainable.

The reduction in costs from 2002 to 2003 was, however, partly the result of a decision to
change voter registration from an independent exercise implemented directly by the electoral
authorities for each election to a process undertaken by the commune authorities involving a
permanent electoral register. While this decision advanced the cause of sustainability, it was not without a downside. A perception remains that commune clerks may be linked to the governing party rather than being independent administrators, and some questions were therefore raised about the integrity of the electoral register.

Accountability

By law the National Assembly delegates to the NEC the power to organize and manage elections as an independent and impartial body, with full rights to apply its own competence in order to ensure the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections. Financial management is carried out according to the procedures and modalities of the Ministry of Economy and Finance and in particular according to donor guidelines.

Relations with Political Parties

Compared to the 1998 elections, the NEC is now better organized, more accessible and more
transparent, and its duties and procedures are more clearly specified in the law and existing
regulations. It has been more responsive to the needs and concerns of all the political parties
through regular meetings at all levels.

Criticisms, however, remain because the NEC has torely on the commune council clerks (under the Ministry of the Interior) for voter registration. The NEC must now consult with the Ministry of the Interior on the delegation of power appropriate to the capacity and resources of commune councils and clerks for the continuous voter registration process. This also entails training, capacity building, the provision of facilities, supplies and materials, and budgetary assistance. However, final responsibility for preparing the electoral registers rests with the NEC. The final arbiter for the complaints and appeals process is the Constitutional Council.

Relations with the Media

According to the election law, all the media, including the state-run press, television and radio, are to make their services available to the NEC at no cost for the purposes of publicizing electoral work and voter education. In practice, many of the private- and public-sector media are controlled by the CPP and continue to give the CPP overwhelming coverage.

The NEC has a media office and a web site, and has instituted regular information exchanges
and coordination on the electoral process, at all levels, with the media, political parties and
candidates.

Relations with Other Institutions and Agencies

Since 1998 three key NGOs – the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (COFFEL), the Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) and the Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (NICFEC) – have led civil society advocacy on the legal and institutional framework for elections in Cambodia through extensive public consultation exercises, a joint advocacy programme and regular meetings with the NEC during 2004.

Another NGO, the Cambodian Development Resource Institute (CDRI), initiated a four-year series of monthly meetings in 1999, known as the Committee for the Prevention of Conflict in Cambodian Elections (COPCEL). These meetings brought together key political stakeholders and parties, and the NEC, to discuss potential issues of conflict in the commune and National Assembly elections.

The International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI),
along with the Asia Foundation, have all played key support roles aimed primarily at improving voters’ access to information and political platforms. In 2003 the NEC cooperated with the NDI to draft a code of conduct/ethics that was signed by the leaders of 18 political parties.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has played a lead role in coordinating
donor electoral assistance, as has the European Union. Both organizations have also directly
helped the NEC by providing technical experts.

Electoral Reform Management

One consequence of the 11-month deadlock following the 2003 National Assembly election
was a debate about electoral reform. The Sam Rainsy Party and Funcinpec both wanted to
reinstate political party members to the NEC, as opposed to neutral candidates. Both also
wanted to ensure the presence of representatives of political parties at all levels of electoral
management on the basis that only this would ensure impartial delivery of future electoral
management. However, after the CPP/Funcinpec government was formed in July 2004, no
further action was taken.

Since 1993, elections have become familiar in Cambodia. Two National Assembly elections
in 1998 and 2003 and one round of local elections in 2002 have been recognized as logistically and technically competent. Electoral costs continue to fall as technical competence develops. However, after each election, including the UNTAC-sponsored elections in 1993, the losing parties have rejected the results. This has led to attempted secession (in 1993), to violence and a three-month deadlock (in 1998), and to an 11-month deadlock before a government was formed (in 2003/2004). Problems related to these three elections include ongoing, although fewer, instances of political violence, unequal access to the media for opposition parties, and a perceived CPP bias concerning access to voter information. The key issue for future elections, noting the asymmetry between the parties and the dominance of the CPP, is how to ensure that party and state are separate in the administration of future elections.

Future challenges revolve around the Cambodian political community developing a consensual acceptance of the NEC and the electoral process, as well as the institutionalization of the NEC as an impartial, technically competent administrator of elections. This means providing an open space for debate and an exchange of views on all electoral issues, and particularly the ongoing management of the new continuous voter registration process involving the NEC, the commune councils and Ministry of the Interior staff. The imbalance between the political parties and the clear dominance of the administrative structures by the CPP will also have to be managed in future when vote-counting will take place at the polling station and not at the commune level.

 

Canada: Stability, Independence and Public Trust

The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, known as Elections Canada, is the national EMB
responsible for the management of national elections, by-elections and referendums. Provincial and territorial electoral matters are managed separately by the EMBs in each of their respective jurisdictions.

The Legislative Framework

Elections in Canada go back to the 1800s, but it was the Dominion Elections Act of 1920
which paved the way to true electoral democracy in Canada. This act consolidated Parliament’s control of federal franchises and established the position of Chief Electoral Officer (CEO). Over the years, subsequent electoral legislation has taken the form of amendments to this act (now called the Canada Elections Act), and has included:

• the elimination of disqualifications based on race in 1948;
• the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 in 1970;
• the introduction of campaign finance legislation in the 1970s;
• ensuring access for people with disabilities in 1992;
• the introduction of the special ballot in 1993 to permit voting by any eligible Canadian
in or outside Canada who cannot vote in person on election day;
• the elimination of door-to-door enumeration, to be replaced by a continuous National
List of Electors;
• the introduction of longer and staggered voting hours in 1996; and
• the strengthening and expansion, in 2003, of political financing regulations, including
extending disclosure and registration requirements for political entities; introducing new
limits on political contributions from individuals to candidates and political entities; and
banning contributions from unions and corporations to political parties and leadership
contestants.

The amended act also provides for payment of a quarterly allowance to registered political
parties based on the percentage of votes obtained in the previous general election. The Income Tax Act was also changed to increase the maximum tax credit for a political contribution, and to allow district associations of political parties, as well as political parties and candidates, to issue tax receipts.

The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, an integral part of the New Canadian
Constitution, provides that ‘Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of
the members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for
membership therein’. The advent of these rights provided the basis of successful court challenges to the provisions of the Canada Elections Act, which had prohibited voting by judges, prisoners and persons with mental disabilities.

The Canada Elections Act itself is quite detailed in its provisions concerning electoral
operations and the powers of the CEO. There are no detailed regulations as part of the
legislation. The CEO is, however, given reasonable discretion to manage the operations and to issue related materials, directives and instructions, and may adapt many of the provisions of the act to meet unforeseen circumstances during an electoral event.

Institutional Structure

Despite the massive geographical size of Canada, Elections Canada is a totally centralized body with the head office and its distribution centre located in Ottawa, the capital. The field structure at present comprises 308 constituencies, or electoral districts, each one under the responsibility of a political appointee – a returning officer. Returning officers are appointed from all walks of life by the government in power.

The CEO is not consulted in the selection process, nor can he discipline or fire returning officers, but only make recommendations to the government on their retention or removal. The returning officers’ responsibilities equate to those of a very senior operational and technical manager, but the selection process does not usually take this into account. The result is that, despite intensive training, returning officers range in competence
from the outstanding to the inadequate. This represents the weakest link in Elections Canada’s institutional structure.

The CEO, under the provisions of the act, is appointed on a full-time basis by a resolution
of the House of Commons (the lower house) – traditionally by a unanimous vote – until age
65, regardless of length of service. The CEO can only be removed for due cause, following
a majority vote in both the upper and the lower houses of Parliament. The CEO’s salary is
guaranteed at the level of a judge of the Federal Court and the CEO is prohibited from voting
federally. These provisions ensure the complete non-partisanship and independence of action of the CEO in the management of federal elections in Canada. There have only been five CEOs between 1920 and 2006.

Powers and Functions

Elections Canada is responsible for the conduct of all federal elections, by-elections and
referendums. Under the act, Elections Canada is responsible for:

• ensuring that all voters have access to the electoral system;
• informing citizens about the electoral system;
• maintaining the National Register of Electors;
• enforcing the Canada Elections Act;
• training electoral officers;Case Study: Canada
• producing electoral district maps;
• registering political parties, district associations, and third parties that engage in election
advertising;
• administering allowances paid to registered political parties;
• monitoring and enforcing election spending rules for candidates, political parties and
third parties;
• publishing financial information on the above plus district associations, nomination
contestants and leadership contestants;
• supporting the independent commissions responsible for adjusting the boundaries of
federal electoral districts following each decennial census; and
• reporting to Parliament on the administration of elections and referendums.

In addition, Elections Canada provides technical advice and guidance to the independent
electoral district boundary commissions which consider each province and territory once every decade on average. Following the completion of the boundary commission reports, the CEO, using a constitutional formula, announces the number of House of Commons seats allocated to each province and territory.

A Commissioner of Canada Elections is appointed by the CEO to ensure compliance with
and enforcement of the provisions of the Canada Elections Act, to investigate and to apply
sanctions. This includes instituting prosecutions for infractions where applicable, including
infractions involving political parties and candidates.

The CEO also appoints a broadcasting arbitrator to allocate paid and free time to registered
political parties on the electronic broadcasting networks. Elections Canada has no international mandate, but does participate in a limited number of international activities including election monitoring and the provision of technical assistance. It also receives visiting delegations.

Financing

Elections Canada’s financing is subdivided into two categories – government funding and
statutory funding.

Government funding

Each year, Elections Canada, like any government department, is required to prepare a budget covering only the costs of its 300+ permanent staff members and related material support costs. These estimates can be modified by the government.

Statutory funding

In addition, when putting forward its budget, Elections Canada provides an estimate of the funds that it expects to spend over the next fiscal year for all its activities directly related to election preparation and management, including boundary redistribution, the remuneration of the CEO, applications of technology and the employment of part-time staff. This estimate cannot be altered by the government as, by law, Elections Canada has direct access to the Consolidated Revenue Fund (the Treasury) for these ‘statutory funds’. There are no external donors involved with the financing of Canadian electoral events.

Accountability

Elections Canada is fully accountable for both its statutory and its non-statutory expenditures, as well as being subject to audit by the Auditor General of Canada. The CEO reports to Parliament and appears before a parliamentary committee several times a year. Although no prior approval is required for the spending of statutory funds, Elections Canada must account afterwards to Parliament for all its expenditure.

The Professionalism of Election Officers

The headquarters staff of Elections Canada are for the most part either public service managers or administrators recruited by competition from other government departments and agencies or private industry, or developed from within through on-the-job training. At the other end of the spectrum are the returning officers – one for each of the 308 electoral districts where their offices are located, who are selected by the government party.

Elections Canada provides returning officers with intensive professional training courses on the complete spectrum of electoral management of their constituencies, including their responsibilities for the application of technology. Returning officers, in turn, are charged with the training of all electoral officers and the administration of electoral events in their districts.

Relations with the Media

Other than the role played by the broadcasting arbitrator, Elections Canada does not have
responsibility for monitoring or other regulation of the press or other electronic media. There
are two exceptions: political campaign broadcasting from outside Canada, which is prohibited; and some restrictions on the publication of public opinion polls and on the dissemination of results on polling day.

Elections Canada is the enforcement agency for breaches of these: the Commissioner of Canada Elections investigates and prosecutes all infractions, and any person guilty of an illegal act (such as broadcasting from outside Canada) or corruption will lose the right to stand for election or to sit in the House of Commons, as well as to hold any office in the nomination of the Crown. For public information during an electoral event, Elections Canada contracts with an advertising agency, through competitive bidding, to conduct national advertising campaigns during election periods in order to educate voters and encourage turnout.

Relations with Other Institutions and Agencies

As an agency of Parliament, Elections Canada does not come under any government ministry
or minister, but reports to Parliament through the speaker of the House of Commons. For
ease of communication with the government, a minister, usually the leader of the House, is
designated as the person responsible to communicate with Elections Canada.

After each election, the CEO must provide a report to Parliament. The CEO submits the
report to, and accounts for the expenditures and activities before, an all-party committee of the House of Commons on an ongoing basis. Although there are no legally required meetings between Elections Canada and civil society, regular meetings are held with representatives of all registered political parties to discuss Elections Canada’s plans and programmes, and items of party concern.

The Canada Elections Act defines the persons who are permitted to be present at the polls.
Until the act was amended in 2000 no one apart from the responsible officials was allowed
– not even observers – and the CEO did not have the power to permit others to be present. The amendment gave the CEO the power to permit observers to be present at polling stations.

Electoral Reform Management

Only Parliament can make electoral reforms which require amendments to legislation. Within
this restriction, the CEO has both the power and the access to the required financial resources to explore and to modify any or all of his election-related activities which fall under the provisions of the Canada Elections Act. The CEO also frequently makes recommendations to Parliament related to changes in electoral legislation, and at times advises and assists the legal drafters charged with electoral reform amendments.

Elections Canada, being solidly established, well funded, and actively involved in exploring
and acquiring related new technology and other resources, has no sustainability challenges.
Canadians generally have a high level of trust and confidence in the Canadian electoral
process and in Elections Canada itself – a factor which contributes to Canada’s stable political
environment.

The strengths of Elections Canada include its independence from government
in almost every aspect of its activities, including financial independence, and the freedom to
investigate infractions and act rapidly to resolve problems. The three constraints which could
hamper its effectiveness are the government’s control over the budget related to Elections
Canada’s permanent staff; the issues inherent in the structure of the EMB, with a single
CEO, who has an open-ended term of office to age 65, with virtually ‘absolute power’; and
the government’s patronage appointments to the key positions of returning officers. However, in mid-2006 the government proposed to change the legislation to permit the appointment of returning officers by the CEO through a competition process.

 

Costa Rica: A Powerful Constitutional Body

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, TSE) of Costa Rica was
established as an independent agency in 1946. Before then, election administration was
the responsibility of the internal affairs secretary, who was part of the executive branch of
government, and the elections were called by the Congress.

The TSE was incorporated into the new constitution of 1949 as a constitutional agency with
full powers to administer elections. Since then it has become the most prestigious institution
in the country. The TSE is regulated by articles 99–104 of the constitution, the Organic Law of the TSE (Law no. 3504) and the Electoral Act (Law no. 1536).

Institutional Structure

The TSE consists of three regular judges and six substitute judges, all of whom must be at least 35 years old and have at least ten years of professional legal practice as judges or otherwise. These judges are known as electoral judges. Their appointment is made by two-thirds of the members of the Supreme Court of Justice. They are subject to the same immunities and responsibilities as the judges of the Supreme Court.

The appointment of an electoral judge is for a period of six years but can be renewed. In
practice, most of the judges remain in office until they retire. A member of the TSE may only
be removed from office by two-thirds of the members of the Supreme Court of Justice on the
grounds of misconduct.

Powers and Functions

The TSE has power to organize, implement and supervise all elections, including presidential,
legislative and local elections. Its main powers and functions are to:

• organize, implement and supervise all elections at both national and local level;
• register political parties in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and the
Electoral Act;Case Study: Costa Rica
• monitor the organization and operation of the political parties, including their finances;
• arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare, maintain
and revise the electoral registers;
• monitor political campaigns and establish rules and regulations which govern the political
parties and the political elections; and
• determine the electoral district boundaries.

The constitution provides that the TSE is responsible for the authentic interpretation of both
the constitutional and legislative norms regarding electoral matters. This means that the
constitution gives the TSE constitutional powers as well as legislative powers.

No appeal exists against the decisions and resolutions of the TSE. This is a remarkable and
important attribute, because no one can contest the results of an election in court. During the election campaign period, which lasts three months, the TSE assumes direct control of the Civil Guard (part of the domestic security forces). In this way elections are fully guaranteed to be free and without interference from the political authorities.

The Congress cannot enact any law regarding electoral matters later than six months before
polling day or earlier than six months after polling day. The TSE must be consulted in advance on every proposal for legislation regarding electoral matters; if this is not complied with, the resulting law is null and void. For the Legislative Assembly to enact legislation which is contrary to the opinion of the TSE, a majority of two-thirds of its members is required.

Financing

Constitutional provisions ensure the permanent financing of the work of the TSE, as well as
of the cost of elections. According to article 177 of the constitution, and in order to make the
universal suffrage effective, the Legislative Assembly cannot reject or change the funds included in the TSE’s annually proposed budgets.

This constitutional provision guarantees the TSE sufficient funds to carry out its functions without any financial burdens. Costa Rica sustains its electoral process through local resources. It is, however, seeking assistance from international agencies, both governmental and non-governmental, in order to introduce electronic voting in future elections.

Accountability

The legislative scheme for elections in Costa Rica does not expressly place accountability
requirements on the TSE. Oversight mechanisms do exist in the Legislative Assembly in the
form of committees on electoral matters, but these mechanisms are not adequate to ensure
effective reporting and accountability to the Legislative Assembly. There have therefore been
proposals that the TSE should be required to submit to the Legislative Assembly a report both
annually and after each election, and a management and financial audit report after each
election.

The TSE does not have to go through public tender for the acquisition of goods and services.
The level of transparency of its financial and budgetary processes, procurement procedures
and procedures for awarding contracts has come under critical scrutiny. Many scholars have
proposed that the operations of the tender process should be reviewed to assure transparency.

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers

The TSE, having been established in 1946, has an important record of democratic experience
of organizing multiparty elections. It has recruited and trained its electoral staff to the level
required to manage elections in accordance with modern practices. There is therefore a
continuous monitoring of tasks, scheduling and quality control, all of which receive attention
during the conduct of electoral processes. Along with the regular personnel, the TSE engages temporary election staff who are chosen from among civil society groups to carry out some of the tasks of election administration. They supervise the conduct of the electoral campaign, and on election day they provide assistance to the members of the polling station committees.

However, all members of polling station committees are appointed directly by the political
parties. The role of the TSE is limited to officially endorsing such appointments. The method used for the training of temporary staff ensures a consistently high standard.

Great emphasis is placed on dry runs of election procedures, highlighting aspects such as the
determination of valid votes, the counting and tabulating of the votes, and the filling out of
the relevant forms. Experience has shown that protection of the secrecy of the vote should be further emphasized in future training of presiding officers.

Career development and training for the core staff of the TSE exist both at headquarters and in the regional offices. Many years ago the TSE established a process of staff assessment which is linked to a programme of professional upgrading and career development, with a view to developing a cadre of election administration professionals. This comprehensive and coordinated training strategy has been designed to raise standards and to ensure that all staff have a clear understanding of their responsibilities.

Relations with the Media

The TSE has a framework within which to monitor the media during an election campaign.
According to the Electoral Act, the TSE ensures that all the electronic and print mass media
fully observe the relevant regulations during the campaign. Where offences appear to have been committed, the TSE has the obligation to file actions before the criminal courts.

In general, the media comply with the law and operate in a non-discriminatory way,
although some have made allegations of bias in favour of the incumbent party. When a petition alleging such bias is filed, the TSE must initiate a full investigation to determine if it has legal grounds.

The existence of a modern Media Centre at the headquarters of the TSE has improved
reporting of election results, which has increased the confidence in the electoral process both of the political parties and of citizens.

Relations with Other Institutions and Agencies

The relationship between the TSE and the executive branch has always been one of mutual
respect. According to the constitution, the TSE may issue the necessary orders to police officers to ensure the neutrality of the electoral process. In practice, authority over the police is passed over to the TSE during election campaigns.

The TSE’s relationship with the legislature, although normally good, was not able to
generate sufficient influence to lead to a number of reforms that the TSE proposed to the 2002 Electoral Bill being enacted.

Political parties generally have full confidence in the independence and impartiality of the
TSE, mainly due to the TSE’s ability to deliver elections on schedule and to remain neutral and transparent throughout the electoral process. Civil society groups’ views about the quality of the working relationships they enjoy with the TSE are positive. Their contacts with the TSE have always been open and based on mutual trust. The TSE has been receptive to accommodating international observers as well as observers’ support personnel during the last four or five elections.

Electoral Reform Management

Following widespread criticisms of the electoral legislation after the last two elections, the
TSE initiated a series of workshops and seminars to discuss necessary electoral reforms with
stakeholders. It then prepared some of the recommended reforms and drafted a bill which was submitted to the Congress for its approval. The reforms are wide-ranging and include some fundamental constitutional changes regarding the electoral system; legislative reforms to the organization and operation of political parties; and other reforms to amend the Electoral Act, which was approved back in l952.

The electoral history of Costa Rica has shown the huge impact that the independent EMB has
had on the democratic well-being of the state. Since 1949 the country has held 13 consecutive elections in which the two major political parties have alternated in power. This fact has strengthened the country’s democracy and reinforced a popular feeling that the electoral institutions work to guarantee free elections.

The major constraint is the lack of new electoral legislation to make elections less expensive
and to encourage the formation of modern political parties. During the last three elections
almost every single actor in the electoral process has emphasized the need to make elections more cost-effective. Proposals for the introduction of e-voting are seen as an effective response to the transport costs associated with the use of traditional voting materials.

 

Fiji: A New System Under Pressure

Fiji became an independent nation in 1970, with a governor general as head of state, a bicameral Parliament and an electoral system weighted in favour of indigenous Fijians. From that date, Fiji enjoyed some 17 years of political and constitutional stability. However, following two military coups in 1987, Fiji has experienced major constitutional and political turbulence, with the political balance of power between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians being central to the events leading to the two coups and the development of two alternative constitutions – the first in 1990, under which Fiji was declared a republic, severing its ties to the British monarchy, and the current constitution providing for the Republic of the Fiji Islands, which was passed by the Parliament in 1997.

General elections were held in 1999 based on the provisions of the 1997 constitution, which
saw a change from a First Past The Post (FPTP) voting system to the preferential Alternative
Vote (AV) system, resulting in the election of a coalition led by Fiji’s first non-indigenous prime minister.

In May 2000, a further coup was staged, and was followed by a period of constitutional and political uncertainty that culminated in a successful court challenge in 2001. The court determined the interim administration to be illegal and the 1997 constitution to be the supreme law of Fiji. Further national elections were held in August–September 2001.

The Legislative Framework

The legal framework for elections in Fiji comprises the 1997 constitution, the Electoral Act of
1998 (with subsequent amendments) and the Electoral (Counting Procedures) Regulations of
1999. The 1997 constitution provides for a Parliament comprising an executive president and
two houses. The upper House, the Senate, is made up of 32 appointed members.

The House of Representatives has 71 members elected for a five-year term in single-member constituencies. Of the 71 seats, 25 are open seats, where the candidates and voters are from any ethnic group, and 46 are communal, that is, reserved on a racial basis: the candidates and voters in a communal seat belong to just one ethnic group. There are 23 communal seats for indigenous Fijians, 19 for Indo-Fijians, one for Rotumans and three for ‘general’ electors (other races).

Registration and voting are compulsory, with the voting age set at 21. The constitution provides for an independent Constituency Boundaries Commission (CBC), an Electoral Commission and a supervisor of elections.

Institutional Structure

The Electoral Commission is made up of a chair and four other members. The president appoints the chair, who must be, or be qualified to be, a judge. The other four members are appointed by the president on the advice of the prime minister following consultation with the leader of the opposition. The independence of the commission is guaranteed by the constitution, according to which the Electoral Commission is not subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person.

The Constituency Boundaries Commission consists of a chair and two other members. The
chair is appointed by the president and must be, or be qualified to be, a judge. The other two
members are appointed by the president, one on the nomination of the prime minister and the other on the nomination of the leader of the opposition.

The supervisor of elections, who is appointed by the Constitutional Offices Commission, is charged with the day-to-day management of electoral matters, subject to the direction of the
Electoral Commission. He/she must be qualified to practise as a barrister and solicitor in Fiji.
The supervisor is appointed for a period of five years (with a possibility for reappointment) and can only be removed for due cause as set out in the constitution.

Powers and Functions

The CBC is mandated to determine the boundaries of constituencies for both the communal
and the open seats in the House of Representatives subject to meeting, as far as practicable, a series of criteria set down in the constitution.

The Electoral Act of 1998, along with the relevant regulations, sets out the specific powers of the Electoral Commission and the supervisor of elections, and prescribes details for the administration of elections. This includes the preparation and maintenance of the electoral
registers; the conduct of elections (including postal voting and vote-counting); the handling of
electoral offences; and the resolution of disputes by a Court of Disputed Returns.

The Electoral Commission has general responsibility for the registration of voters and the
conduct of elections, and is empowered to make regulations in relation to a range of electoral
matters including the registration of voters, the registration of political parties and candidates, and the penalties for violations of its regulations.

The supervisor of elections administers the registration of voters (there were 468,630
at the 2001 election) and conducts the elections for the House of Representatives and such
other elections as are prescribed by the Parliament, subject to the direction of the Electoral
Commission. He/she is required to take all reasonable steps to encourage all qualified persons to register on the appropriate electoral register; to publish the electoral registers at least once each year; to maintain a register of postal voters; to conduct elections in accordance with the law; and to appoint the registration and returning officers.

Financing

Estimates of expenditure are prepared by the supervisor of elections on an annual basis and
submitted through the Electoral Commission to the Parliament for appropriation. While
no difficulties have been encountered in the flow of funds from the Parliament to enable the
Electoral Commission and the supervisor of elections to carry out their responsibilities, there is a heavy reliance on international donors to fund national elections.

Accountability

The Electoral Commission is required to make an annual report to the president concerning its operations and must submit a copy to both houses of Parliament. The Electoral Commission and the CBC are required, along with other statutory bodies funded by parliamentary appropriation, to account to the Parliament, while the supervisor of elections is subject only to the direction of the Electoral Commission.

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers

The office of the supervisor of elections is staffed by five permanent officers who, during the
2001 general elections, were augmented by some 14,000 temporary election staff, drawn almost entirely from the public service. While the performance and impartiality of the officials have been generally praised by electoral observers, the complexity of the AV system has led to calls for better training for electoral officials and other stakeholders such as party agents. Electoral officials are required to adhere to a code of conduct.

Relations with the Media and Other Institutions and Agencies

The media (radio, television and the print media) are not censored and were regarded by
international observers at the 2001 elections to have been robust but balanced in their
coverage and analysis of the political campaign.

As the media play a major role in informing the population on electoral matters, the supervisor of elections and the Electoral Commission maintain an open relationship with the media. There are some 30 political parties registered with the office of the supervisor of elections and, while some parties have found themselves at odds with the office, generally reasonable working relations have been established. Relations with civil society organizations, international donor agencies and observer groups have been positive and productive, providing a platform for analysis and potential reform of the electoral processes.

Electoral Reform Management

Following the 2001 elections, international observer groups and the Fiji Citizens’ Constitutional Forum identified a range of issues arising from the conduct of the elections and made recommendations on the reforms needed. The supervisor of elections has indicated that the Electoral Commission and his office will consider the recommendations with a view to
improving the electoral system and the way it is administered. To the extent that suggested
improvements need legislative changes, submissions may be put by the Electoral Commission to the Parliament for its consideration.

Undoubtedly the Electoral Commission, the Constituency Boundaries Commission and the
supervisor of elections will continue to play their role in the administration of the electoral
system of Fiji. The limited size of these bodies, the constitutional security they enjoy and the
continued access to international funding and technical assistance point to their sustainability,
albeit with a need for additional staff and professional training.

The office of the supervisor of elections faces significant challenges in order to become established as a credible and impartial administrator of the electoral system in Fiji. The Cabinet approved a restructuring of the office with a major increase of staffing levels prior to the 2006 election.

 

Republic of Georgia: A Commission in Tranistion

Georgia, the first Soviet republic to secede from the USSR, held its first presidential election in May 1991 and endured instability due to violent secessionist conflicts until 1995. Between 1995 and 2001, the Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG), headed by President Eduard Shevardnadze, held a majority in the Parliament. By mid-2001 the CUG had begun to break apart. By 2002 no clear majority existed, and the Parliament’s ability to pass timely legislative initiatives suffered.

After 1991, the state and the registered political parties, using various formulas, determined
the membership of the Central Election Commission (CEC). In 2003, due to flaws in previous
elections and distrust of past commissions, interlocutors expressed concern that unless the
CEC changed questions over the fairness of the upcoming parliamentary elections could cause instability and violence.

Consequently, in August 2003, the Parliament passed transitional provisions for the Unified Election Code (UEC) which reallocated CEC member appointments and required that the chair be nominated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and appointed by the president of Georgia.

Many observer groups felt that the November 2003 parliamentary election fell short of international standards. Flaws in the electoral registers disenfranchised many voters, and
differences between the parallel vote tabulation and the official results led to allegations of
fraud. Public protests, known as the Rose Revolution, lasted two weeks and culminated in the
resignation of President Shevardnadze. Following the revolution, the Parliament amended the
UEC on 29 November 2003 to authorize the president to appoint the CEC chair unilaterally.

The Legislative Framework

The 1995 constitution establishes the election systems used for presidential and parliamentary elections, sets the minimum age for candidacy, and specifies how political parties and candidates can register to stand for election. It also guarantees freedom of association and the right to create political parties.

The 2001 UEC establishes the composition and formation of the different levels of election
administration, contains detailed provisions for the election of the president, the Parliament
and the local self-governance bodies, and requires that the preparation and conduct of elections be transparent and that domestic and international observers must be accommodated. The UEC establishes the CEC as the supreme election body in Georgia and authorizes it to pass decrees and ordinances that become secondary legislation. The CEC is independent, within the limits of its authority, from other government agencies.

Institutional Structure

Election administration in Georgia is a centralized system composed of three tiers: the CEC;
district election commissions (DECs), one for each electoral district; and precinct election
commissions (PECs) whose number in each electoral district varies according to district size.
The CEC and DECs are permanent bodies while the PECs only perform their duties during
an election period.

The CEC is composed of seven members – the chair and six others. Their term of office is six years. No later than 60 days before the expiration of their term, the president issues an order to hold a competition for the positions. From a shortlist of candidates vetted by presidential staff, the president chooses one name for chair and two names for each of the six other seats on the CEC, and these names are presented to the Parliament for a roll-call vote on each position. Each DEC is composed of five members. Their terms of office are also six years. No later than 60 days before the expiration of their term, the CEC issues a decree on holding a competition for the positions in each of the 75 electoral districts.

After the deadline for DEC candidacy has passed, the CEC selects the members of DECs by voting on each candidate individually. One of the qualifications for CEC and DEC candidates is that the candidates must be fluent in the Georgian language. This has the effect of excluding significant numbers of Armenians and Azerbaijanis who grew up in regions where there are no schools with Georgian as the language of instruction.

Each PEC is composed of a maximum of nine members. Three are elected by its DEC. The
remaining members are appointed by the three political parties who won the most votes in the last parliamentary elections, each appointing two members. CEC members and the chairs of the DECs are paid salaries for their entire term of office.

Other members of the DECs and all PEC members are paid for their duties when performed.
Employees of the CEC are civil servants. Since the Rose Revolution, the CEC has worked hard to increase the skills and professionalism of election officials by creating new organizational structures, setting standards and adopting assessment methods, training and testing. The administrative structure has been developed to enable the CEC to do this. The CEC is able to enter into bilateral agreements with donors to enhance technological development, staff training and civic education.

Powers and Functions

The CEC undertakes the conduct of elections and referendums, and guarantees the uniform
application of the electoral legislation. It determines and monitors the rules for participation
in electoral events and the use of governmental and non-governmental mass media during
elections. It defines electoral district boundaries, allocates funds to DECs and PECs, and
determines the content, design and production of all election material.

The CEC has extensive powers relating to the registration of political parties, party alliances
and candidates, and is responsible for compiling the electoral registers and the processing and announcement of election results.

Financing

The CEC submits its budget for annual expenditures to the Parliament. Once approved, this
forms part of the state annual budget. The CEC submits its expenses and spending plan for
an electoral event to the Ministry of Finance 55 days before polling day, and the ministry is
responsible for transferring funds to the CEC within ten days. If the funds are not transferred, the CEC can file a claim before the Supreme Court. For the November 2003 election, the government was slow in releasing the funds, but this situation improved during the April 2004 election.

Accountability

The CEC is accountable to the Parliament. Within 60 days after the end of an election it
must submit a report outlining alleged electoral offences, offending public officials, cases
referred to the prosecutor-general, complaints filed by the CEC in the courts, and related court judgements. A temporary parliamentary commission is given the authority to review the activities of the CEC and its subordinate commissions. Any electoral offences are dealt with in the general court, while criminal activities are referred to the prosecutor-general.

Relations with the Media and Other Institutions and Agencies

For elections, the UEC stipulates that state television and radio must provide two hours daily
of free air time for election campaigning, and political advertising for at least 15 days prior
to an election. The time must be allocated equally among election parties and/or candidates.
No broadcaster is permitted to allocate more than 15 per cent of its air time to political
campaigning. Newspapers can also allocate free space. Any party or candidate that uses the
free advertising must report to the CEC the equivalent cost of paid time/space. The CEC
requires each broadcaster to submit a weekly chart of time allocated for political advertising
and tariffs.

During the most recent elections the CEC held frequent media briefings to inform the
public about the campaign, upcoming events and important deadlines. As a result, the CEC has developed and maintained a good working relationship with the media. The CEC has good relations with civil society/NGOs, international observer groups and donor agencies. However, there is a lack of separation between the CEC, political party functionaries and the government administration – particularly at the regional and district levels, where some governors and local officials try to influence the decisions of the DECs.

Electoral Reform Management

The CEC has the authority to approve regulations by decree, but can only make recommendations to the Parliament regarding amendments to the UEC. The CEC may seek to continue its structural review, develop its corporate services and expand its policy and planning operations. To continue the strides forward taken by the CEC since the Rose Revolution, the Parliament could bring into force a number of general provisions of the Unified Election Code that are not yet operative.

The CEC’s ability to develop as an independent agency with public confidence in its
integrity may be limited by the political process of shortlisting candidates and the political
composition of the PECs.

 

India: The Embodiment of EMB Independence

The Election Commission of India (ECI) is widely regarded as a model of an independent
EMB. It may be even more appropriate to describe it as a ‘fiercely independent’ EMB. In 1948–9, the founding fathers of the Indian constitution, while debating the position of the election commission in the Constituent Assembly, ensured that the body responsible for conducting elections in independent India should be a distinct one, separate from the government of the day, and that it should have ample financial and administrative autonomy to conduct its affairs.

A combination of the well thought-out, broadly worded provisions contained in article 324 of the Indian constitution, a supportive judiciary, active media and Indian public opinion, coupled with the stature and independent attitude of some of the individuals who have headed the election commission, has resulted in the independence and reputation that the ECI enjoys today.

The Legislative Framework Governing Elections and the EMBs

In addition to the fundamental constitutional provisions, there are two important basic statutes that provide the legal framework for elections. They are known as the Representation of the People Acts, the first passed in 1950 and the second in 1951. The first provides for the basic requisites for elections, such as the allocation of seats for the legislatures at national and state level, the delimitation of electoral boundaries, and the preparation of the electoral registers.

The second lays down detailed provisions for the actual conduct of elections. It includes the
qualifications for standing as a candidate for different public offices, the rules for registration of political parties, and the procedure for dealing with electoral disputes.

Once the election machinery is set in motion, the electoral process is subject to the administrative supervision of the ECI, and no court of law can stop the process. Only after an
election is concluded can an election petition be presented to the High Court. The ECI itself
enquires into any allegations of procedural irregularity or violations of the electoral law. This
procedure has ensured that the electoral process can be completed on schedule, without getting bogged down in judicial hearings.

To supplement the various provisions of these two statutes, detailed procedures are contained in the Registration of Electors Rules 1960 and the Conduct of Elections Rules 1961, including the instructions and forms to be used on polling and counting days.

The ECI, after consultations with all the political parties, has published a model code of conduct. This code has no legal basis and derives its legitimacy from the consensus of the
political parties. It is an attempt to bring about a level playing field where the governing party is prevented from misusing the state machinery to the disadvantage of opposition parties. The ECI has done an excellent job of enforcing its provisions and reining in the governing parties during election periods. At times it has used this code to postpone elections in certain disputed electoral districts in the face of gross violations of the code of conduct.

Institutional Structure

India is a federal polity of 28 states and five union territories. At national level, the Union
Parliament has two houses, the lower or popular house, the Lok Sabha, and the upper house,
the Rajya Sabha. In addition, each of the states has at least one elected house, the Legislative Assembly, and some of the larger states also have a second house, the Legislative Council.

The Indian constitution entrusts the responsibility to conduct elections for all these legislative
bodies, at both federal and state level, to the national election commission. In 1992, through the 73rd amendment to the constitution, a third tier of governance was introduced – district-level bodies (panchayats), which are India’s institutions of local selfgovernment.

Elections to panchayats are entrusted to the state election commissions, which are
separate entities.

Initially, there was a single chief election commissioner. However, the size, complexity and
responsibility of the task led to the introduction briefly in 1989 and then from 1993 onwards
of a three-member ECI. The president appoints the chief election commissioner and election
commissioners. They have a term of office of six years, or up to the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. They enjoy the same status and receive the same salary and other benefits as judges of the Supreme Court of India. The chief election commissioner can be removed from office only through impeachment by Parliament. Impeachment can take place on two grounds only – proven misbehaviour or incapacity – and requires an elaborate procedure which is also prescribed for the removal of judges of the Supreme Court and the high courts.

Other election commissioners cannot be removed from office except on the recommendation of the chief election commissioner. The ECI exercises total control over the entire election machinery, even though the members of the electoral machinery are not its employees. India has the tradition of a neutral civil service.

The key officials at state level are the state chief electoral officers, who are selected by the ECI from a shortlist of federal civil servants posted to the state drawn up by the state government. State chief electoral officers may not be dismissed without the approval of the ECI at national level.

However, the main electoral activity takes place in the 500-odd districts, with an average
of 1.3 million registered voters in each district. The office of district magistrate (also known
as district collector or deputy commissioner in some parts of India) – an office created by the
British – plays the pivotal role for the ECI. As district election officer, the district magistrate
performs key electoral duties as the team leader of all district and sub-district level officials.
All these officials are legally deemed to be on secondment to the ECI and come under the
supervision, discipline and control of the ECI for the duration of an election.

In addition to about 5 million polling staff for about 700,000 polling stations, the ECI
demands and gets from the government the services of senior officials who have worked earlier as district election and returning officers to act as electoral observers on its behalf.

The ECI thus has immediate access to a large number of impartial and experienced observers without having either to employ them permanently or to pay them. The observers are provided for in the Representation of the People Act of 1951 by an amendment inserted in 1989. By law they are to be officers of the government (federal or state) and they are vested with the power to stop the count if they are of the opinion that some malpractice has taken place. However, they have to report this to the ECI immediately and then follow the directions given.

In practice, the ECI has also empowered them to intervene in several matters, especially the deployment of police forces on voting day, locating polling stations in areas inhabited by weaker and poorer sections of the people, and deciding on re-polls in cases of violence, alleged rigging and so on. Over time the institution of observers has developed into a formidable tool in the hands of the ECI to regulate elections in the field, acting as the eyes and ears of the commission and proving to be another important institution in ensuring the independence of the election machinery in India.

Powers and Functions

The ECI performs routine functions, such as voter registration, deploying and training election officials, printing ballot papers, conducting the actual voting, counting the ballot papers, and declaring the election results. In addition, it allocates free time on the state-owned electronic media to the different national and state parties during the campaign period.

The ECI is not responsible for the delimitation of electoral boundaries: the constitution provides for a separate Delimitation Commission, headed by a sitting or retired judge of the
Supreme Court. One of the election commissioners is nominated to be a member of this body.

However, because the ECI has the institutional memory and provides secretarial support, it
plays an important role in the delimitation process. The ECI is the watchdog of election expenditure. It appoints financial observers through whom it very closely monitors the expenditure of the candidates during the election campaign period. This has successfully reduced illegal expenditure at election time in India. The ECI has the power to order a re-poll at polling stations where irregularities have been observed – or indeed in a whole electoral district – if the situation so demands. It may also adjourn any poll for a few days.

Provisions to regulate political parties were originally absent from the electoral law and were introduced only in 1989, giving the ECI the responsibility for registering political parties. Initially, the procedure for registering a political party was quite liberal. Any association or
group of persons seeking to form a political party had to apply in a prescribed form giving
certain information. This simplified procedure prompted many people to register parties which then existed only in the records of the ECI. To curb this tendency and to facilitate the formation of serious parties, the regulations were tightened, to require that at least 100 members of a proposed party have to give details of their voter registration and swear individual affidavits that they are not members of any other party. The ECI has also prescribed a fee of 10,000 rupees (INR) for registering a new party.

Financing

It is a mark of the ECI’s independence that it has not faced any major funding problems. With a staff of about 300 officials at the federal level, it is funded by the government budget
through the Consolidated Fund. This pays for staff, technical operations and various office
expenses, including the cost of acquiring electronic voting machines (EVMs). However, the greater part of the expense is borne by the state governments – for example, for staff at the
state headquarters and in the districts, the printing and transport of ballot papers, preparing
and printing the electoral registers, procuring material for the conduct of elections, training,
the salaries of election officials and of security forces deployed for elections, and the expenses of central election supervisors.

The cost of time on the state-owned media is borne by the government as the parties are given this time free. The broad powers given to the ECI by the constitution have been liberally and boldly interpreted to make the government pay for any necessary expenses.
The ECI’s accounts are subject to audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General and its
report is tabled in the Parliament. This ensures the financial accountability of the ECI, and has worked smoothly.

Electoral Reforms

Although no formal procedure exists for proposing electoral (and consequent legislative)
reforms, the ECI does have some role in this regard. It has put forward a number of proposals for electoral reform which are sent to the Law and Legislative Affairs Ministry and to the prime minister directly. Many times, to bring pressure on the government and encourage public debate, such proposals are also simultaneously discussed in the media.

Calling a meeting of all political parties to create consensus is another effective method used by the ECI. The model code of conduct was adopted through this mechanism. Some important reforms have recently been instigated through the mechanism of public interest litigation, through which an NGO or public-spirited person raises issues before the Supreme Court or the high courts.

 

Modernization of the Electoral Procedures

The Election Commission, after initial hesitancy, has actively and successfully promoted the
application of information technology to elections as a way of handling the mammoth scale of
elections in India. Each registered voter is issued with a photographic ID card to enable him/her to vote freely, and at the same time to prevent fraudulent and multiple voting. Copies of the electoral registers are made available to the political parties on CD-ROM for checking and for use on election day.

Through the use of computers at over 400 vote-counting centres, the results of the count are processed instantly and made available. Another technological innovation has been the use of EVMs at all polling stations. Although initially reluctant because of political parties’ apprehensions about possible tampering and suspicion among voters resulting from widespread illiteracy, the ECI has actively promoted the use of EVMs. Their use at all polling stations in 2004 meant that the results were available within hours of the count starting.

 

Iraq: International Institution Design

Historical Background

The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) was created by Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) Order no. 92 of 31 May 2004 and empowered to be ‘the exclusive electoral
authority throughout Iraq during the Transitional Period’. The IECI was set up as an ‘independent and autonomous, non-partisan, neutral and professional government office’
mandated to ‘organize, oversee, conduct, and implement all elections set forth in’ the Law of
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (Transitional Administrative
Law, TAL). These included:

• elections to a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), the Kurdistan National Assembly
(KNA), and governorate councils, held on 30 January 2005;
• a referendum on a draft constitution (to be drafted by the TNA), held on 15 October
2005; and
• general elections under the new constitution on 15 December 2005.

The Legal Framework

CPA orders formed the basis of the electoral legal framework, including the system of
representation, the rules governing political parties, and the creation of an independent electoral authority. These orders were the result of inclusive discussions between the major Iraqi political factions, moderated by the United Nations and approved by the Interim Governing Council and the CPA. The major components of the legal framework were:

• the TAL, which described the elections required in the transition process and established
fundamental rights, including the definition of the citizenship and political rights (e.g.
freedom of speech and peaceful assembly) that are essential to the electoral process;
• CPA Order no. 92, which established the IECI and a panel of judges to hear appeals
against IECI decisions;
• CPA Order no. 96 of 15 June 2004, including a transitional electoral law specifying the
system of representation and voter eligibility for the TNA elections;
• an act of the interim government specifying the system of representation for the governorate
council elections and an amendment to the KNA electoral law adopted by the former
KNA, bringing that law into substantive agreement with the rest of the legal framework,
especially on issues of system of representation, candidate eligibility and voter eligibility;
• CPA Order no. 97 of 15 June 2004, including a transitional political party law; and
• 17 regulations adopted by the IECI covering issues ranging from electoral offences to
election observation to polling and counting.

Bearing in mind that CPA Order no. 96 applied only to the 30 January 2005 TNA election, this
legal framework was expanded by the TNA in order to provide guidance for the referendum and general election. The TNA adopted a law on the ‘referendum process’, which included the form of the referendum question, eligibility criteria, and an interpretation of the TAL’s requirements for the passage of the constitution.

This interpretation proved to be controversial as it would have made defeat of the constitution very difficult, and it was outside the bounds of a normal legal reading of the TAL, and it was eventually changed by a TNA decision. An electoral law was adopted on 12 September 2005 for the 15 December 2005 general elections.

The law established a system of representation, voter eligibility criteria, eligibility requirements for candidates, and restrictions on the election campaign for the new legislative body, the Council of Representatives.

Although CPA Order no. 92 was still in effect, leaving the IECI with all necessary authorities to conduct the general election, the new electoral law did specifically reaffirm the IECI’s role. This gave the IECI the ‘right to issue regulations and instructions necessary for the implementation of this law’.

The Structure of the IECI

The IECI has two major components. The Board of Commissioners heads the IECI, and the
Electoral Administration implements the election operation under the board’s authority. In
addition, a Transitional Electoral Panel of three judges has been set up to hear appeals against IECI decisions.

The Board of Commissioners has seven voting members and a non-voting chief electoral
officer (CEO). All current members were selected after a process of public nomination followed by vetting and interviews conducted by the United Nations. Almost 1,900 Iraqis were nominated for positions on the board in April and May 2004 despite severe domestic unrest at the time.

Nominations were received from residents of all of Iraq’s 18 governorates, and 111 women were nominated. In addition, an international electoral expert appointed by the United Nations serves as a non-voting member of the board. A secretariat and an audit unit report directly to the Board of Commissioners.

The Electoral Administration is managed by the CEO and has a national headquarters and
several levels of electoral offices. The national headquarters has divisions for administration,
finance, public outreach, capacity building and operations. There are electoral offices in the
Kurdistan region, in each of the 18 governorates (with two in Baghdad), and in 542 districts.
Each district electoral office is responsible for an average of ten polling centres with up to 3,000 voters each.

Due to the security situation prevailing in Iraq, not all governorate and district offices have been open or staffed at all times, requiring the IECI to direct staff and resources flexibly to ensure that the voter is served as well as possible. Staff of the Electoral Administration were appointed through a competitive application process, with members of the Board of Commissioners participating in the appointment of senior officers such as division directors and governorate electoral officers. IECI staff are to be professional and non-partisan, but in the transitional period their precise status as professional civil servants is unclear.

Given the demanding electoral calendar, formal professional development opportunities for
IECI staff have been limited. ‘On-the-job’ learning has been augmented by training and study
trips as appropriate. The Transitional Electoral Panel was set up by CPA Order no. 92. It is made up of three judges appointed by the Higher Juridical Council to hear appeals against the IECI’s decisions. Its jurisdiction is limited to final decisions of the Board of Commissioners, which can only be overturned if the panel finds them to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, in excess of jurisdiction, or rendered in bad faith’. In addition, the panel must act according to strict timelines in order to allow the electoral process to continue on schedule. There is no appeal against its decisions to any other body.

Powers and Functions

The electoral legal framework gives the IECI very broad authorities – something that is
unusual for settled or even transitional democracies, but less unusual for countries in conflict
or emerging from conflict. According to CPA Order no. 92, ‘the Commission is empowered to
take all necessary measures consistent with [the fundamental rights guaranteed by] the TAL
to oversee and administer genuine and credible elections throughout Iraq’. This order lists the following specific functions:

• to determine, establish, develop, certify, subdivide and maintain the electoral register;
• to help build social support for and confidence in the electoral process throughout Iraq;
• to regulate and conduct the registration and certification of political parties;
• to regulate and conduct the registration and certification of candidates for office;
• to accredit election observers and other officers engaged in monitoring and/or observing
elections in Iraq;
• to manage the work of polling and vote tabulation;
• to adjudicate in electoral grievances and disputes; and
• to certify election results.

IECI regulations issued in each of these areas address questions which, under other circumstances, might be settled by legislation rather than regulation. While the IECI is not accountable to any other organ of state, it has usually interpreted its authorities as narrowly as possible, seeking legislative guidance from the various interim and transitional authorities as appropriate.

Because the systems of representation used for the 30 January 2005 elections did not require the delimitation of electoral districts (or constituencies) or the apportionment of seats, these responsibilities were not assigned to the IECI or any other body. All the 30 January 2005 elections used a system of proportional representation (PR) in a single national electoral district, so that for the TNA all of Iraq was the electoral district; for the KNA all of Kurdistan was the electoral district; and for each governorate council the whole area of the governorate was the electoral district.

The 15 December 2005 elections to the Council of Representatives used a system of PR within electoral districts. The electoral law defined the electoral districts as the existing governorates, so that no delimitation was required. The IECI was, however, empowered
to apportion seats between the electoral districts using a (legally specified) population database and the Quota and Least Remainder system of proportional division.

The IECI did not have regulatory authority over the media but did coordinate with the Iraqi
National Communications and Media Commission on campaign-related media regulation.
Similarly, although the IECI was empowered to issue financial disclosure regulations, it did not do so for the 2005 elections.

Financing

Given its broad authorities, and in order to ensure the IECI’s effective independence, CPA
Order no. 92 assigned the IECI extensive control of its finances, establishing that:

The Iraqi government shall ensure that the Commission receives all of the resources necessary for administering elections throughout the Transitional Period. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission may seek to enlist the international community for appropriate assistance in this regard, including the direct provision of additional funds or resources. All Commission resources shall be solely managed and obligated by the Commission. The CEO shall be responsible for the accounting of these resources.

Although technical issues related to Iraqi government finances and payments were occasionally problematic, the IECI received all the support it requested from the interim government, as well as generous support from international donors, prior to the 30 January 2005 elections; it anticipated the same support for the remainder of the transitional electoral cycle. The IECI established an internal audit unit reporting directly to the Board of Commissioners in order to discharge its financial duties in the most transparent possible manner.

In addition to funds, the IECI received important material assistance from the Iraqi government and the international community. This included data from the Ministry of Trade
used in creating a provisional electoral register; warehouse and other facilities from the ministries of trade and education, and others; security support from the Iraqi security forces and the UN mandated Multi-National Force; and international technical assistance.

The Future of the IECI

The administration of future elections in Iraq is now the responsibility of the National
Assembly elected in December 2005. The IECI, does, however, seem to have built support for the concept of independent electoral administration. A public opinion survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in February and March 2005 found that 72 per cent of Iraqis believed the 30 January 2005 elections to be fair or very fair, and the responses to specific questions about aspects of the IECI’s performance were similarly favourable.

Discussions within the TNA on constitutional and legislative matters included the possibility
of establishing a permanent and independent electoral management body to succeed the IECI. Any new institution would require a more extensive legislative framework, along with more professional and institutional development for the EMB and its staff.

 

Japan: Mixed Model Electoral Management for a Mixed Parallel Electoral System

The constitution of Japan adopts representative democracy and guarantees universal suffrage, equality of vote, and the secret ballot. It also includes the basic principles of the election system in the chapter on Rights and Duties of the People, which apply both to elections for members of the National Diet and to elections for members of local assemblies and heads of local authorities.

Universal suffrage in elections for public office is guaranteed to all Japanese nationals
20 years of age and older. Since 1945 there has therefore been no discrimination on suffrage
according to gender, race, social status, property, or the amount of tax paid. Requirements as to the amount of tax paid to the National Treasury, which existed in the former election law under the Meiji constitution, were completely abolished in 1925, and in 1945 after World War II, women were finally given the right to vote.

The Public Offices Election Law actualizes the principles contained in the constitution relating to elections for national and local public offices. Previously, there was no unified legislation on elections. Each election, national or local, was held under individual pieces of legislation (the Lower House Election Law, the Upper House Election Law and the provisions concerning the election of local authorities in the Local Autonomy Law). In 1950, all these acts were consolidated into the Public Offices Election Law.

Institutional Structure

The types, responsibilities and composition of the EMBs are as follows. The responsibilities of the Central Election Management Council relate to the election of the members to the House of Representatives under the proportional representation (PR) element of Japan’s Mixed Parallel electoral system, and of the members of the House of Councillors under the PR element of the electoral system.

The Central Election Management Council is an independent body, composed of five members appointed by the prime minister based on nominations by the Diet. The term of office is three years.

Prefecture electoral management committees have responsibilities related to the election of
the members of the House of Representatives from the single-member electoral districts, the
members of the House of Councillors from electoral districts, the governors of prefectures,
and the members of prefecture assemblies. Prefecture election management committees are
composed of four members selected by prefecture assemblies. The term of office is four years.

Municipal (city, town and village) electoral management committees have responsibilities
related to the election of the heads of municipalities and the members of municipal assemblies. They have four members selected by municipal assemblies. The term of office is four years. Every prefecture and municipality establishes such an election management committee which is one of the administrative committees of the authority, parallel to other local authority committees such as those for education, public safety, local labour relations and agriculture.

In addition, electoral management committees are set up in the special wards of the Tokyo
metropolitan government and in the administrative wards of 12 designated cities. These committees are wholly responsible for the management of their respective functions. Local government in Japan is based on the presidential system, where governors, mayors and
councillors are directly elected, and functions on the principle of the separation of powers
and internal checks and balances to ensure democratic local administration. An ordinary
local authority thus consists of an executive branch and a legislature. The legislature (the
elected council) of the prefecture or municipality determines budgets, enacts local legislation
and makes decisions on its policies. The executive branch implements the policies decided
by the legislature. It includes governors, mayors and their executive committees.

To prevent the over-concentration of power in one place, the executive branch also includes a number of administrative committees which are independent of the governor or mayor, for instance, the board of education, or public safety committee, and election committees. Local authorities are empowered to manage their own financial affairs, and sources of revenue are guaranteed in a number of ways. Their major revenue sources are local taxes, a local allocation tax, government grants, and local loans. Article 7 of the Local Allocation Tax Law
requires local authority estimates (income and expenditure) to be determined by the Cabinet, submitted to the Diet and subsequently published. This allows for verification that the local authority revenues will be sufficient to provide a given level of service and meet legal obligations.

If revenue is insufficient, the central government may consider amendments to the local tax
system, increase the local allocation tax, or take other action. The arrangement also helps local authorities match their economic and fiscal policies with those of central government and acts as a guideline for fiscal management.

A system of resident registration has also been set up to identify accurately the residents
within a local authority’s jurisdiction. The register contains consolidated records of all residents within the community, forming a database for voter registration and other matters involving residence. It also makes notification procedures easy for the purposes of national health insurance, taxation, compulsory education, and so on.

Sources of Technical Advice and Recommendations

There are a number of sources for technical advice and recommendations relating to elections.

The Central Election Management Council provides the prefectures, cities, towns and villages with technical advice and recommendations and with directions for the legal and appropriate management of the election of members of the House of Representatives and the
House of Councillors based on the PR system.

The minister of public management, home affairs, posts and telecommunications is
empowered under the Local Autonomy Law to provide the prefecture, city, town and village
electoral management committees with technical advice and recommendations as well as
directions for the legal and appropriate management of the election of members of the House of Representatives on the single-member electoral district system, as well as elections to the House of Councillors. The prefecture electoral management committees also provide the municipal electoral management committees with technical advice and recommendations.

Efficiency and Costs in Vote Counting

A characteristic of election officials in Japan is their orientation to professionalism and a drive
towards constantly increasing efficiency, especially regarding the vote counting.

There are two main reasons for the electoral commissions’ efforts in reducing the time for
vote counting. The first originated from the extension of the opening hours of polling stations,
from 6 pm to 8 pm. Because salaries are higher in the evenings than during the daytime,
costs increased when the opening hours of the polling stations were prolonged and electoral
commissions have been keen to speed up the counting process.

The second reason is media pressure: the press has demanded timely information disclosure
and sought accurate results from the electoral authorities on the day of polling. This has even
led to competition among electoral commissions to reduce the time for vote counting. Some
electoral commissions have chosen to make public their estimated time for vote counting in each municipality, demonstrating the element of competition. Other electoral commissions have chosen to introduce electronic voting machines, but because of the perceived complexity, cost, and security issues regarding e-voting, the machines have not yet become popular.

In a further approach to cost reduction, a number of electoral commissions, such as that in Yokohama city, have instead decided to conduct the vote count on the day after polling, but delay their declaration of results by doing so.

 

Kenya: Compromised Independence of the EMB

In 1963 the constitution of the newly independent Kenya created an autonomous electoral
commission with a clear mandate to register voters, conduct elections, and delimit parliamentary electoral districts, among other electoral matters. This was the furthest the government went towards institutionalizing the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK).

Until 1991 the process for parliamentary and local authority elections came under the control of the supervisor of elections, an officer in the attorney general’s chambers. However, notwithstanding the ECK’s responsibility under the constitution for different electoral matters, between 1963 and 1991 it only carried out one function – the review and establishment of electoral district boundaries.

The constitution was amended in 1991 to introduce a multiparty system, and to change the structure and responsibilities of the ECK. Eleven commissioners were appointed by the president. This number was raised to 12 in 1993. The ECK was given exclusive powers to
manage the conduct of national and local elections, including full responsibility for voter
registration, candidate nominations and voter education.

Although the reforms introduced entailed significant change in the ECK’s role, opposition
political parties complained about its composition: all its members were presidential appointees. Following the establishment of the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) in 1997, opposition parties received representation in the ECK through the addition of ten more commissioners. The IPPG also reviewed and brought in some laws which made the ECK more independent. Under the constitution, the ECK should not accept the direction of or instructions from any person or authority, but it has so far had many difficulties realizing this independence in practice.

The Legislative Framework

The ECK is governed by the constitution and the November 1997 National Assembly and
Presidential Elections Act. The Constitution Amendment Act, no. 17 of 1990, re-establishes
the ECK and provides for its tenure and functions. It also guarantees its independent status,
although an exception, made through a constitutional amendment in 1997, empowers
Parliament to make laws to regulate the effective conduct of the ECK’s operations. Among the major issues covered by the act are the registration of voters, nominations and campaigns, and questions relating to the appointment of ECK staff, including a Code of Conduct for staff.

In addition, the act empowers the ECK to make regulations governing the electoral process. An Electoral Code of Conduct was introduced in 1997. The ECK’s constitutional mandate is further supported by the 1998 Election Offences Act, designed to prevent election offences and illegal practices during elections. This act (section 8) enables the ECK to impose penalties and sanctions on parties, candidates and their supporters who violate the 1997 Electoral Code of Conduct.

Institutional Structure

At the end of 2005, the ECK had 22 commissioners, including the chair and vice-chair, who are appointed by the president for a term of five years. The commissioners are eligible for
reappointment and enjoy security of tenure through special safeguards and procedures. They
can only be removed from office by a tribunal appointed by the president. During elections
the ECK appoints temporary election staff to assist in the administration of elections. These
include returning officers, deputy officers, presiding officers, registration officers and election
clerks.

For administration purposes the ECK is supported by a Secretariat and by district election
coordinators (DECs) at the district level. The DECs, who are appointed by the president,
head the district offices and their main responsibilities include safeguarding the ECK’s assets,
equipment and other property; authorizing expenditure and accounting for the ECK’s funds;
and serving as supplies officers in the districts. The Secretariat is headed by a secretary general assisted by a deputy administrative secretary and by the various department heads.

Powers and Functions

The powers and functions of the ECK include boundary delimitation, voter registration, and
the running of local and national elections. The law further mandates the ECK to register
political party candidates for parliamentary and local elections and to determine the eligibility
of candidates. The ECK is also responsible for voter education.

Financing

The ECK is funded by the government. It submits its budget to Parliament for approval through the Ministry of Finance. It has no control over its disbursements and relies on the DECs to manage its finances at the district level. According to the ECK, such financial arrangements are unsatisfactory and inefficient, and undermine its independence, given that DECs are appointed by the president.

In addition, the funding allocated is usually inadequate, and the ECK is treated as a government department, which forces it to rely heavily on donor funding. The ECK’s work has also been hampered by delays in funding and irregular remittances. This has severely hindered the planning process, and in some cases disenfranchised some communities as the ECK was unable to reach them and facilitate their participation due to the lack of appropriate funding.

Professionalism

The ECK’s professionalism has been criticized in the past. Between 1991 and 1997 in particular, its image was tainted and it suffered from a reputation for incompetence and unfairness. An improvement was seen during the 2002 elections, and many observers noted the improved professionalism and credibility of the chairman and commissioners compared with the previous elections.

However, many observers also noted that the ECK lacked the experienced and skilled professionals and needed to adopt a proper human resources development programme. A
transparent recruitment and deployment programme was also recommended. At the end of
2005, the commission’s staff did not have proper terms and conditions of employment. Late
appointments and renewals of employment were also problematic.

Relations with the Media and Other Institutions

The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) is mandated by the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Act to provide equal coverage to all political parties. The act also empowers the
ECK in consultation with the KBC to allocate free air time to registered political parties during
an election campaign. The ECK is not, however, mandated to intervene over or rule on the content of news broadcasts that may be of a partisan nature. The ECK’s relations with the
media improved significantly during the 2002 elections. For the first time the ECK set up a
media centre with the purpose of disseminating information on the electoral processes to the
media.

The ECK has taken measures to improve its relationship with the political parties, the
police and civil society organizations, especially religious groups. Peace committees set up in
all electoral districts have not only greatly improved the ECK’s relations with key electoral
stakeholders but also enhanced its capacity to enforce the Electoral Code of Conduct. As a
result several candidates have been summoned and fined for violations of the electoral law. Peace committees have also served as conflict management bodies and enhanced both communication and conflict management between the ECK and its electoral partners.

Accountability

The ECK is required to observe all financial regulations and accounting procedures in the
management of its funds and the disbursement of funds. It is also subject to the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) for all accounting queries.

Electoral Reform Management

The ECK is empowered by the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act (section 34)
to make regulations relating to the electoral process. Prior to the 2002 elections the ECK made new regulations to enhance the credibility of the electoral process, which were approved by the National Assembly in October 2002. The major changes included an amendment to allow for continuous registration of electors and the counting of ballot papers at the polling stations.

The ECK is also playing an important role in ongoing reforms such as the Constitutional Review. As and when it is enacted, the proposed new constitution is likely to further enhance
the credibility of the electoral process, as it includes a strengthened ECK. Over the years the ECK’s ability to manage elections efficiently and its credibility and impartiality have been the subject of never-ending scepticism. Its major obstacle is overcoming this image and winning trust as a commission with the ability and professionalism to conduct credible elections. In order to achieve this, two issues now stand out – control over the recruitment and supervision of its entire election staff, and control over the funding of electoral administration. The ECK itself recommends that its funds should come directly from the Consolidated Fund.

 

Lesotho: Building a Reputation

Lesotho achieved independence in 1966. In the post-independence election of 1970, the
Basutoland Congress Party won the election, but the ruling party, the Basotho National Party
(BNP), annulled the election and declared a state of emergency. The military took over the
administration of the country in 1986 and ruled until 1993, when multiparty democracy
returned to Lesotho. The 1993 elections were transitional, marking the end of the military regime and the beginning of the restoration of the democratic system of government.

The second multiparty democratic elections were held in 1998, after the country had experienced a short period of upheaval and a serious threat to its young democracy. The constitution was amended in 2001 to introduce the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system. The number of seats in the National Assembly increased from 80 to 120, 80 to be elected in single-member electoral districts and 40 to be elected in accordance with the principle of proportional representation (PR).

Prior to the 1993 election, civil servants ran elections under the supervision of a government
ministry. The provisions of the constitution and the National Assembly Electoral Act of 1992
established the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of Lesotho. Section 66 of the amended constitution establishes the composition, functions and independent status of the IEC, and the funding of its expenses.

The institutional framework of the EMB in Lesotho revolves around the IEC. It is a centralized, three-member institution with a normal staff complement of about 237. During
election periods an additional 27,276 temporary election staff are employed throughout the
country.

Powers and Functions

The constitution gives the IEC broad responsibility for all activities relating to the organization
and conduct of regular free and fair elections in the country. It organizes, conducts and
supervises elections to the National Assembly and local authorities, as well as referendums.
The IEC is empowered to continuously review legislation and other matters relating to elections and referendums and to make appropriate recommendations with respect to them.

It has the responsibility for carrying out tasks related to the organization and conduct of elections, such as voter education, research into electoral matters, and the delimitation of electoral district boundaries. The IEC has a mechanism to conduct its own tendering for contracts and has been vested by government with powers to enter into arrangements with international donors.

Funding and Accountability

The government meets the funding of the IEC, whose expenses, along with all other election
expenses, are charged directly to the Consolidated Fund. The budget is prepared by the IEC
and submitted, through the Ministry of Finance, to Parliament for approval. However, despite
the sound constitutional framework for meeting election expenses, in practice only the budget for the electoral event itself receives prompt endorsement by the Ministry of Finance; the budget for the IEC’s recurrent expenditure is often processed slowly.

The Act took account of the need for a high level of accountability with respect both to
general electoral activities and to the financial affairs of the EMB. The IEC is required within
a stipulated period after the end of each financial year to submit to Parliament, through the
minister responsible for law and constitutional affairs, both an annual report on its functions,
activities and affairs, and an audited statement of its revenue and expenditure for that year.

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers

The professionalism of the electoral officers of the IEC has been under continuous review, and a determined effort has been made to upgrade the existing level. The background and culture of the majority of IEC staff is that of the civil service in Lesotho. The IEC is required to consult with the Public Service Commission when employing staff and may request the minister responsible for the public service to make any officer available to it. A continuing process of reform in the management and staff structure will enable any excess staff to be identified and lead to greater productivity of a better-trained staff complement.

Relations with Political Parties

The IEC has had an uneasy relationship with the opposition parties since the 1993 elections,
largely due to the lack of proportionality between the number of votes received by the different parties and the number of seats won. The opposition parties did not accept the election results, and confidence in the electoral system was eroded. When the 1998 elections again produced results that were largely favourable to the ruling party, open conflict erupted.

This led to the creation of a transitional government and the establishment of an Interim Political Authority, which brought all the political parties together to work closely on electoral reform with the IEC, which was reconstituted.

Prior to the 2002 elections, with the assistance of the Interim Political Authority, the IEC played a leading role in the reform of the constitution and the National Assembly Election Act to enable the MMP electoral system to be established in 2001 and to implement other important changes to the delimitation of electoral district boundaries and the registration of voters. Those reforms contributed significantly to the delivery of improved quality of election
services in 2002.

Relations with the Media and Other Institutions and Agencies

The IEC’s relationship with the media has been good. The government-owned media have
cooperated with the IEC in the latter’s monitoring role to ensure that news coverage extends to the campaigns of all political parties. The IEC is responsible for determining the allocation of air time for each political party.

The relationship between civil society organizations, donor agencies and observers, and the
IEC has remained good since the IEC was formed. Although the relationship with government has been good, it has not enabled the IEC to operate confidently as an independent EMB.

Many members of the public and some legislators did not regard the IEC as an independent body, largely because of the apparent civil service status of the staff and the problems with funding disbursements from time to time. The IEC has one of the most comprehensive and up-to-date legislative electoral schemes in the Commonwealth. The two major obstacles it faces are the lack of full control over the recruitment and supervision of election staff, and the need to put into full effect and operation the constitutional provision that all election expenses are charged to the Consolidated Fund.

 

Mozambique: A Need for Depoliticization

Mozambique, a former Portuguese colony, achieved independence in 1975. The liberation
struggle in Mozambique was led by the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertaçâo
de Moçambique, Frelimo), which seized power in the post-colonial period and instituted a
socialist one-party state with a planned economy.

In 1976 an external rebel army known as the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana, Renamo) began a military offensive against the Frelimo government. The ensuing 16-year civil war devastated the country. In 1992, after protracted negotiations, peace was declared and the General Peace Agreement was signed. Central to the peace accord was the agreement to hold multiparty elections by 1993.

Following the declaration of peace, Renamo transformed itself into a political party and
several other political parties were also established. In 1994, with stability in the country
maintained by a massive United Nations peacekeeping presence and one year behind schedule, Mozambique held its first multiparty presidential and general elections. Between 1994 and 2005, four elections took place – two local government elections, in 1998 and 2003, and two presidential and general elections, in 1999 and 2004.

The Legislative Framework of Election Administration

The legal framework governing elections in Mozambique is provided by (a) the 2004
constitution (as approved by the Parliament on 16 November 2004) which lays down the basis for the electoral system and the structure for managing elections, and (b) the various electoral laws which cover the general provisions and principles for the conduct and management of elections, which include Law no. 18/2002 on voter registration for elections and referendums, Law no. 19/2002 on local government elections, Law no. 20/2002 on the establishment of the independent National Election Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições, CNE), and Law no. 7/2004 on presidential and parliamentary elections.

The constitution provides for a presidential system headed by a directly elected president,
and a national Parliament consisting of 250 deputies elected by proportional representation
(PR). The constitution further states that the elections are to be managed by the National
Election Commission. The constitution also makes provision for a Constitutional Council,
consisting of six members appointed by the Parliament and a chair appointed by the president of the republic. The role of the Constitutional Council during the electoral process is to decide on the eligibility of presidential candidates, make final decisions on electoral disputes and appeals, and validate the results of all national and local government elections.

Institutional Structure

Mozambique has a two-tier election management structure, with the CNE serving as a supervisory body consisting mainly of political party representatives, and a subordinate
Technical Secretariat for Administration of Elections (Secretariado Técnico da Administração
Eleitoral, STAE) responsible for the implementation of elections and made up of professional
election administrators.

The CNE, which has operated on a permanent basis only since 2003, consists of 19 members, including a chairperson and two vice-chairpersons. The chair is elected by the CNE on the basis of a nomination made by agreement among civil society organizations, and appointed by the president of the republic. The other members are appointed by the political parties with seats in the National Assembly in proportion to the number of seats they hold. In addition, the government appoints one member of Parliament who has the right to participate in open sessions and meetings, but may not vote. The term of office of CNE members is five years.

The CNE is assisted by provincial and district electoral commissions which operate as subsidiary bodies. Unlike the CNE, these are temporary commissions that are set up only
for the duration of each electoral process. The provincial electoral commissions are set up
in each of the ten provinces and in the capital, Maputo. They have nine members who are
appointed in the same way as the members of CNE, including one chair and two vice-chairs.

The district electoral commissions are identical to the provincial commissions in both number
and composition. The CNE’s implementing arm is the permanent technical body, the STAE. It is an administrative body that works under the supervision of the CNE, and is responsible for all activities related to the electoral process. The STAE is established at national, provincial and district levels. However, only the national and provincial STAEs are permanent institutions: the district-level STAEs are established only during election periods.

The STAE is headed by a director general who is selected in a competitive process by the CNE and appointed by the Council of Ministers. During an election period, two deputy directors are appointed by the political parties represented in Parliament – in effect one representing the ruling party, Frelimo, and one representing the opposition, Renamo. This is duplicated at provincial and district levels. The STAE director general and the national deputy directors are non-voting permanent members of the CNE. During election periods, in addition to the two deputy directors, the political parties with seats in the Parliament, in proportion to their parliamentary representation, appoint nine representatives to the various departments of the national STAE, five representatives to each provincial STAE, and three representatives to each district STAE.

Powers and Functions

The two election management bodies have distinct powers and functions in the electoral
process. Although Law no. 20/2002 stipulates that the CNE is responsible for the management and supervision of electoral events, referendums and national registration, in practice it acts as a supervisory body, with the STAE functioning as its subordinate implementing arm.

The CNE has three main roles – an ethical role, a legal role and a technical role.

Its ethical function is to guarantee free, just and transparent elections and referendums. However, despite this mandate, in practice it is a highly politicized body whose political party appointees represent the interests of their own parties.

The CNE’s legal function focuses on its role in the arbitration of electoral violations,
complaints and appeals. In addition it has the power to issue procedural and administrative
regulations regarding observers, the media and the distribution of state funding to political
parties.

Its technical tasks during election periods include the supervision of voter registration and
civic education, the approval of codes of conduct, guaranteeing the security of the vote, the
provision of financial aid to political parties, and the tallying of election results at the provincial and national levels.

The STAE is responsible for implementing all tasks concerning the organization of elections
and referendums. This includes conducting civic education; implementing voter registration;
recruiting and training voter registration, polling and counting staff; and conducting the
polling and counting.

Financing

The administration of elections is funded by the government. This includes the joint activities
of the CNE and the STAE, in two separate budgets: one covers the running expenses for
sustaining the permanent bureaucracy of the two institutions, and the second covers costs
incurred during elections. Mozambique is heavily reliant on international donor funds to cover election-related expenses, and generally more than 60 per cent of the elections’ budget is funded by donor contributions.

Accountability

The EMBs have two separate accountability procedures, one for the activities and costs related to maintaining the permanent bureaucracy of the two electoral institutions, and the second for activities and costs incurred during elections.

Each year the CNE and the STAE are required to submit an annual plan and budget for
their administrative costs to the government (through the Ministry of Finance) for approval.
The disbursement of these funds is done on a quarterly basis, and must be preceded by a full
and approved accounting of expenditure for the previous quarter, which is submitted to the
Ministry of Finance.

The election budget is prepared by the CNE and the STAE and submitted (by the CNE) to
the government (through the Ministry of Finance) for approval. At the end of each election the CNE and the STAE are required to submit a report on their activities and an audited statement of their revenue and expenditure to the government through the Ministry of Finance. Because of the high level of donor funding for elections, this report is also sent to the donors.

Relations with the Political Parties, the Media and Other Institutions

Relations with political parties differ greatly. The ruling party, Frelimo, because of its dominance within the election structure, generally has good relations with the EMBs. In contrast the opposition, Renamo, views both the CNE and the STAE with suspicion as being biased towards the ruling party, despite its having representation on the CNE and the STAE and the provision for political parties to monitor all aspects of the electoral process within the STAE.

The political parties which do not have representation within the electoral administration structure are inclined to feel that their interests are subordinated to those of the two dominant parties. The CNE’s relationship with the media has been fairly good, especially with the publicly owned radio, Radio Mozambique – the only medium that covers the whole country, and the principal source of information in rural areas.

Both national and international observers are authorized to monitor the electoral process,
and the CNE issues the regulations regarding observation and observer accreditations. While
the relationship between the CNE and observers is generally good, some believe that the CNE retains a certain reluctance to fully embrace the principle of transparency in all aspects of the electoral process.

Electoral Reform Management

It should be noted that Mozambique has reviewed its electoral laws either wholly or in part prior to each election held since 1994. However, the election administration has little or no input to the process, which is managed entirely by an ad hoc parliamentary committee consisting of representatives of the ruling party and the opposition.

Sustainability

The most significant threat to the sustainability of electoral management in Mozambique is the enormous cost of the electoral administration structure. With electoral commissions constituted at national, provincial and district levels, the number of commissioners in the country is over 1,600 for general elections. The political party appointees within the STAE also add a layer of additional political party supervision, which carries substantial extra expense.

Opportunities and Constraints

The major constraint on the functioning of an independent and impartial electoral administration in Mozambique is the politicization of the electoral administration. The political party representation in the election commissions and the political appointees within the STAE are intended to increase the opposition’s trust in the electoral process but, as political representation is based on shares of parliamentary seats, the ruling party, Frelimo, still dominates by virtue of its majority in the Parliament.

While party-based EMB membership can have the advantage that each party polices the actions of all the others, the Mozambique experience shows its limitations when one party retains a majority over a substantial period of time. The political party representation within the electoral commissions at all levels has meant in practice that commissioners are often more inclined to act in the interest of their party than as impartial upholders of the electoral law. The impact of this politicization on the electoral process has been to sacrifice the principle of impartiality in favour of short-term political goals.

In addition, as the CNE is only composed of members of political parties that have representation in the national Parliament, the two main parties dominate the decision-making process to the detriment of emerging parties.

The CNE has only been a permanent body since 2003, and inherited a legacy of lack of
technical competence and professionalism which was perhaps inevitable given its previous
temporary nature. A similar problem still exists with the commissions at provincial and district level. Training for electoral commissioners has been identified as an important factor in future improvement of the effective and efficient administration of elections.

 

Nigeria: A Need for Modernization

Nigeria achieved independence from British colonial rule in October 1960. The first post-independence national election was held in 1964 and the resulting government lasted until January 1966. Between 1966 and 1998 there were seven military regimes and two democratic administrations.

There were a series of electoral commissions after independence. The National Electoral
Commission was replaced in the early 1990s by the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria,
which was in turn replaced in 1998 by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). INEC was charged with the task of planning and conducting national democratic elections.

The 1999 constitution and the Electoral Act of 2002 govern the legislative framework which
applies to elections. The constitution has provisions dealing with the establishment of INEC
and with electoral tribunals, as well as with the delimitation of electoral district boundaries and the registration of political parties.

Institutional Structure

Nigeria has a federal system of government with different tiers of jurisdiction involving several levels of elections – presidential elections; elections at federal level for the Senate and the House of Representatives; at state level, the elections of governors and state legislatures; and local government elections. INEC is responsible for all elections except local government elections. It consists of the chair, who is the chief electoral commissioner, and 12 other members. The chair and members of INEC are appointed by the president, who must consult the Council of State, and the appointments are subject to confirmation of the Senate.

Powers and Functions

The principal powers and functions of INEC are to organize, conduct and supervise all elections at the federal and state levels, and to register political parties in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and the Electoral Act. INEC is also responsible for the delimitation of electoral district boundaries.

Financing

There are two practical issues relating to the funding of INEC – the approval of election
expenditure and the disbursement of the approved funds on a timely basis. The salaries and
allowances of commissioners are charged directly on the Consolidated Revenue Reserves, but election expenses are not. INEC therefore has to join the queue at the Ministry of Finance and Treasury. The disbursement of funds to INEC has not been timely and this has contributed to the lack of confidence in the electoral system in Nigeria. The delay of almost two years in the voter registration exercise in 2000 was blamed largely on the lack of funds.

Accountability

The legislative scheme for elections in Nigeria does not expressly place accountability requirements on INEC, but oversight mechanisms do exist in the National Assembly in the
form of committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives on electoral matters. These mechanisms have not proved adequate, however, to ensure effective reporting by INEC and full accountability.

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers

INEC, having been established only in 1998, inherited a patchy record of democratic experience of organizing multiparty elections from its forerunner electoral management bodies. Moreover, it has not recruited and trained its electoral staff to the level required to manage electoral organization along modern lines; it has relied instead mainly on the continued use of civil servants who follow civil service practices, work ethics and culture. Approximately 500,000 temporary election staff are needed for each election. There are approximately 2,000 staff at headquarters and over 6,000 permanent staff in the states.

Relations with Political Parties, the Media, and Other Institutions and Agencies

The relationship between INEC and the opposition political parties has been poor. Perhaps the most significant reason for this is a lack of transparency on the part of INEC. This has been aggravated by the weakness of the public relations programme and a failure to meet important deadlines, such as those set for the registration of voters and completion of the electoral register, as a result of untimely disbursement of funds to INEC by the government.

INEC has a framework within which to regulate media behaviour during an election campaign. The Electoral Act states that INEC may determine rules and regulations for election campaigns with respect to a candidate and his party (section 29), but also lays down several rules which the electronic and print media are required to observe, failing which they incur stiff penalties.

The relationship between INEC and stakeholder institutions and agencies has been mixed.
Its relationship with the governing political party, the government and the executive branch has been described at times as too close and as compromising INEC’s independence. Its relationship with the legislature, although normally good, was not enough to generate sufficient influence to gain support for the reforms that INEC proposed to the 2002 Electoral Bill, before it became law. Civil society groups have mixed views about the quality of their working relationship with the EMB.

Electoral Reform Management

Following widespread criticisms of the manner in which the 2003 elections were managed
and organized, INEC took the initiative in convening a series of workshops and seminars to
discuss with stakeholders necessary electoral reforms. As early as July 2003, INEC also invited the Commonwealth Secretariat, IFES and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division to undertake a review of the country’s electoral arrangements and make recommendations regarding electoral reform.

Nigeria has the potential to sustain its electoral process through its own resources, although
currently it obtains considerable assistance from bilateral donors and international agencies,
both governmental and non-governmental. There is a need to make elections more costeffective – a point that was emphasized by the president of Nigeria at an election seminar at the headquarters of INEC in December 2003. There is a need for modernization in many aspects of electoral organization and management in Nigeria, at the headquarters of INEC and at the principal offices in the states.

The 2003 elections were the first successful elections in Nigeria in that one civilian administration succeeded another. The major constraint on building a sound basis for the proper organization of multiparty elections is the lack of modern election management practices. Lack of professionalism among the electoral staff is another constraint. Finally, failure to approve budgets and disburse funds in a timely fashion remains a major obstacle to good electoral management.

 

Senegal: Independence Strengthened in a Mixed Model of Electoral Management

Senegal has held regular elections since its independence in 1960. From 1960 to 1998 all
elections were organized and supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. Although a multiparty
system has existed since 1974, there was no change of power at an election until the year 2000.

Most elections were disputed, and contestation reached a dangerous point in 1988. Amid
pressure, the government, together with the opposition, drafted a new Electoral Act, which
was adopted by Parliament in 1992. However, this act was more of a political than a legal and technical instrument. It did not clearly define the decision-making mechanisms and provided for consensual decision making in terms of election disputes. It was therefore difficult to apply its provisions, as they were open to different interpretations by different groups.

Ultimately, despite the view of most political actors that the act was good for the country, it failed to resolve election-related tension and disputes. In 1996, opposition parties started asking for an independent electoral commission to be established.

In 1998, under pressure from the opposition, President Abdou Diof introduced changes to
the election management structure by creating two separate bodies, the General Directorate of Elections (Direction Générale des Elections, DGE) and the National Elections Observatory
(Observatoire National des Elections, ONEL). ONEL was an independent temporary body only
put in place at the beginning of each election year. It had nine members who are chosen for their high moral integrity, nominated by the president after consultation with different professional associations such as human rights groups, lawyers’ associations, the media associations and the universities. This was, according to one of the opposition leaders, the first time in 40 years when the entire political class was able to participate in elections with equal chances.

The Socialist Party of Senegal (Parti socialiste du Sénégal, PSS), which ruled Senegal for
over 40 years, lost the 2000 elections when President Abdou Diof lost to Abdoulaye Wade of
the Senegalese Democratic Party (Parti démocratique Sénégalais, PDS). For these elections,
President Diof appointed a former army chief to head ONEL. This choice was motivated by the fact that the military and the police do not vote, and as a measure to limit opposition criticism.

Notwithstanding ONEL’s independence, citizens raised concerns about the closeness of these
institutions to government and the political parties, and civil society groups called for the
establishment of a single independent body to run elections. Discussion and negotiation between the various stakeholders resulted in a report to the president from a commission headed by a university professor proposing the replacement of ONEL by a new body, the Autonomous National Election Commission (Commission Electorale Nationale Autonome, CENA), made up of civil servants, academics and people from civil society organizations.

The National Assembly in May 2005 unanimously enacted a law creating the CENA. Its powers were considerably wider than those of ONEL, as the new body assumed direct responsibility for control and supervision of the registration and electoral processes. However, the choice of its 12 members, required to be independent and of high morals, and
sworn in by the Constitutional Council in July 2005, was contentious. In particular, the newly
appointed chair of the CENA, a retired judge, was challenged on the grounds of the political
activism of a family member. The opposition parties submitted a challenge in the Constitutional Council, which was subsequently rejected.

By December 2005, the CENA was able to establish bodies at departmental level, the autonomous departmental electoral commissions (Commissions électorales départementales
autonomes, CEDA). In 2006, it launched a new process of registration for both population and electoral purposes which involved the issuing of biometric cards to some 3 million Senegalese citizens. However, arguments about the resourcing of the CENA had already surfaced.

Legislative Framework and Institutional Structure

The constitution and the 1992 Electoral Act provide the legislative framework for elections in
Senegal. They lay down how elections should be organized and who should organize them,
from the delimitation of electoral district boundaries and the registration of voters to the actual running and supervision of elections. The Electoral Code of 2005 defines the powers and functions of the CENA.

The DGE is a permanent structure. It is a department within the Ministry of the Interior
and is answerable to the minister. It operates as an ordinary government department.
The DGE is charged with the organization of national and local elections and of referendums.
This includes among other functions:

• management of the process of voter registration;
• the organization and distribution of electors’ cards;
• the printing of ballot papers;
• the tabulation of votes;
• support to the security services on electoral matters;
• the design, maintenance, use and archiving of electoral documents;
• training of electoral officials, judicial personnel and elected members;
• support to judicial institutions in carrying out electoral functions;
• civic education;
• use of IT to meet electoral needs; and
• the drafting and implementation of budgets for voter registration and the conduct of
elections.

The DGE has two major directorates, one dealing with the management of operations for voter registration and for electoral events, the other with training and civic education.

Power, Functions, Funding and Accountability

The Ministry of the Interior through the DGE is responsible for the organization and
administration of all elections, and remains answerable to the minister of the interior. The role of the CENA is to control and supervise all electoral operations. It ensures that all stakeholders, including the government and the political parties, abide by the rules and regulations governing elections. Both the CENA and the DGE are state-funded. The DGE’s budget comes from the Ministry of the Interior, while that of the CENA is voted for by the Parliament.

 

Spain: Mixed Model Electoral Management Becomes Well Established

The first democratic elections in Spain after the Franco dictatorship were held in 1977, under the Royal Decree Law (RD Law) on Electoral Norms of 18 March 1977, to elect the parliamentary chambers that drew up the Spanish constitution of 1978.

Article 23(1) of the 1978 constitution recognizes the right to political participation. Articles
66 onwards establish the constitutional conditions for electing the members of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate, deciding the basic issues including the number of members, eligibility criteria, and conflicts of interest, or incompatibilities between the position of an elected member of Congress or the Senate and other work or positions.

The constitution also requires that there be an organic law to regulate the entire electoral process, including the electoral administration, which is entrusted with overseeing all the aspects mentioned above. The Organic Law on the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) was approved in 1985, drawing on the RD Law of 1977, and has continued in force to this day, with major amendments introduced in 1994, 1995, 1999 and 2003. During this period, and under the supervision of the central, regional, provincial and zonal electoral boards (juntas electorales), six elections have been held under completely normal conditions (in 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2004) in which Spain has consolidated its democratic system and the channels of political participation.

Institutional Structure

Spain has a decentralized system of autonomous governments based on a territorial distribution of power, that is, there are three levels of elections – national elections (to the Congress and Senate), elections in the autonomous regions (to the legislatures of the 17 comunidades autónomas) and local elections. At all levels the Organic Law provides that elections and referendums will be conducted under the full supervision of the electoral boards – the Central Electoral Board (Junta Electoral Central, JEC), with the support of the regional, provincial or zonal electoral boards in the respective elections. All are independent bodies.

Under this arrangement, the JEC and the lower-level electoral boards are broadly responsible for the establishment of policy on the administration of elections within the framework of the electoral law and for oversight of the implementation of electoral administration and logistics by the polling station committees and civil servants who are assigned these tasks.
This supervision of electoral processes by the electoral boards is reinforced by an arbitration
procedure which must be used before complaints and appeals on electoral issues can be brought before the judicial system.

The JEC, with its quasi-judicial composition (see below), is a permanent body, while all the
other boards operate on a temporary basis during election periods only. EMBs at the various levels are organized in a hierarchical manner. The JEC is the policymaking organ. Its decisions are binding for all other boards.

The JEC has 13 members. Eight are members of the Supreme Court, while the other five
are professors of law, political science or sociology, chosen on the basis of proposals made jointly by the parties represented in the Parliament. In addition, the secretary general of the Congress and the director of the Electoral Census Office of the National Institute of Statistics (the body in charge of drawing up the electoral registers) are non-voting members of the JEC. The composition of the lower-level electoral boards follows the same structure, although
each has only five members, and the levels of judicial or professional qualification required of their members are not so high. None of the members of the electoral boards may be removed from office except when found to have committed a crime or an electoral infraction that is verified by the electoral board immediately superior to it in the hierarchy.

Powers and Functions

The electoral boards do not come under any other public agencies or branches of government. They are autonomous, neutral and independent entities within the organizational structure under the JEC which operate in their functional areas of responsibility.

Their duty, as defined in article 8 of the Organic Law, is to guarantee the transparency
and objectivity of the electoral process, and that elections are equal and their conduct legal. To do this, their work is supported by the polling station committees (mesas electorales), made up of citizens chosen by lottery, who conduct the polling and counting of votes and ensure that the process is conducted properly on election day. The Ministry of the Interior, together with local governments and the Electoral Census Office, provides the necessary logistical support throughout the process, working at all times under the direct oversight and direction of the JEC and the other boards.

The work of the boards consists of processing, sanctioning and resolving election-related
matters. The appeals procedure culminates with the JEC as the last resort, although there may be an optional final remedy to appeal to the regular courts or the Constitutional Court in cases brought to uphold the constitutional rights of citizens.

The main functions of the JEC include:

• directing the activity of the Electoral Census Office, the organ entrusted with drawing
up the electoral registers and organizing postal voting (in coordination with the postal
service);
• giving instructions (which are binding) to the lower-level electoral boards on any electionrelated
matter;
• ruling on any requests for opinions forwarded to it by the electoral boards, overturning
those that contradict the interpretation of the JEC, and thus unifying the criteria by
which the electoral laws, regulations and norms are interpreted. Its rulings are binding;
• coordinating, in conjunction with the central government or the regional administration
(comunidades autónomas), the formal and practical organization of the elections, including
deciding the voting schedules, the design, production and distribution of electoral
protocols and ballot papers, the design and distribution of ballot boxes, the issuing of
accreditations, and the organization of the count;
• resolving complaints, claims and appeals pursued in relation to election matters;
• ensuring that the campaign accounts and expenditure of all candidates and parties during
the electoral campaign period comply with the relevant laws and regulations; and
• declaring the election results and formally accrediting the elected authorities and
representatives in each election.

Each of the lower-level electoral boards performs these functions within its own area of
authority.

Financing and Accountability

The JEC is the only permanent EMB. For its material and human resources it is entirely
dependent on the Congress of Deputies, and is financed out of its budget. The lower-level
electoral boards operate only during the electoral period, and their financing corresponds to
their temporary nature. Their expenditures are financed from the general budget of the state
through the executive branch, which ensures that their members are compensated for their
work and that operational expenditures are covered. There are no specific provisions in the legislation for the scrutiny of expenditures, since the staff of the electoral boards are normally members of the civil service who are temporarily assigned to election functions, and the administrative services that are in charge of organizing the electoral process meet the costs out of their own budgets and administer the expenditures.

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers

The members of the electoral boards are dedicated exclusively to their electoral functions during election periods, but do not receive special remuneration for their work on the electoral boards except for daily allowances.

They continue to receive their usual salaries from their original places of work.
The polling station committees are responsible for the conduct of the voting and vote
counting. The members of these committees are not professionals either. They are chosen by lot in the municipalities from among all registered electors over 18 years of age and under 65 years of age who are literate. The chairperson of each committee (mesa) is required to have completed secondary school. By law, this election work is a civic duty, with little financial compensation.

Failure to perform this duty can result in administrative and criminal sanctions. This system
has worked so far with few problems, which reflects the healthy level of public civic engagement in Spain.

Relations with Political Parties, the Media and Other Institutions

The electoral boards’ objectivity and impartiality of action have led to good relationships with
both the government and the opposition parties. The professionalism shown by the members of the electoral boards throughout the years has made them respected instruments of the electoral machinery rather than a source of partisan disputes. To facilitate relations with the political parties, at the outset of the election period each party nominates a general representative to the JEC and a representative to each of the lower-level electoral boards, who serve as the only interlocutors between the party and the EMB.

Relations with the public administration, especially with the Ministry of the Interior and
the Ministry of Justice, as well as with the autonomous and local administrations, are effective
and flexible, as are relations with the Electoral Census Office. Such relations enable the JEC to maintain a solid institutional memory of elections in the country.

While a major part of the role of the electoral boards lies in arbitration and quasi-judicial
functions, they also have a coordination role for the allocation of free broadcasting time in the public media and the supervision of the media’s coverage of the electoral campaign. Beyond this, the relationship of the electoral boards with the media is limited to providing information on issues of general interest, such as the nomination of candidates or the official proclamation of the results. They maintain a distance from election campaign coverage, which improves the public perception of them as independent functional and administrative bodies.

Electoral Reform Management

In the 20 years that the Organic Law on the General Electoral Regime has been in force, the
performance of the electoral boards has been generally accepted as very satisfactory. While there is permanent discussion of the possible reform of the organic law on issues such as the party list system (Spain uses the List PR system), the proportionality of the systems for allocating seats, or the financing of elections, at no time has the work of the EMBs been called into question by those involved in the elections. The Mixed Model of electoral management established in 1977, combined with the quasi-judicial composition of the electoral boards and complemented by a state administration which is accepted as effective and impartial, seems likely to endure.

 

Sweden: Governmental in Form, Independent in Practice: A Decentralized Election Management System

The Institutional Structure of Electoral Management

The Swedish EMB is best described as a decentralized institution divided into three levels that are separate from each other – central, regional and local. The structure of electoral administration corresponds to the structure of institutions of governance in Sweden in general.

The local authority (the kommun) is the local EMB, responsible for recruiting and training
polling station officials, for setting up and equipping polling stations and for the first count of
votes which takes place in the polling stations. The regional EMB, the County Administrative
Board (Länsstyrelsen), is responsible for the second and final count of votes from the whole
region, which takes place at counting centres, and the declaration of the results of elections
to the county councils and municipal assemblies. The central EMB, the Election Authority
(Valmyndigheten), has a range of responsibilities, including the (voluntary) registration of
political parties’ names and the names of the parties’ official candidates, voter education,
the production and design of ballot papers, and deciding the number of parliamentary seats
allocated to each electoral district. The central EMB declares the results of elections for the
national Parliament (the Riskdag) and the European Parliament.

The tasks carried out by the local or regional EMBs are not directed by the central EMB,
but are laid down in the laws and documents that establish them as electoral authorities – the
Elections Act and its associated regulations. The central EMB is not fully institutionally independent from the executive branch of government: it is expected to report to, and in some cases consult with, the Ministry of Justice.

The public administration in Sweden is structured so that all statutory authorities fall within
the area of work of a government ministry, even though they may not be subject to direct
supervision. The major channel of the relationship with the ministry lies in the submission
of the annual report, which in turns forms the basis of financial review by the State Auditors
(Riksrevisionen). The central EMB has full responsibility for implementation of the Elections
Act, but does not establish government policy.

The local EMB is accountable to the management and board of the municipality, which
is an elected body. Local and regional EMBs that have received additional funding from the
central EMB for tasks relating to voting at ‘special institutions’ (such as hospitals and prisons)
have to report on this specifically to the central EMB. The administrative director of the central EMB, the Election Authority, is appointed by the government. The central EMB is a small organization with not more than 13 full-time employees. Consultants are used mainly for work on technical and Web communication issues. The central EMB works under the supervision of the Board of the Election Authority, a five-member body which provides the EMB with advice but is not involved in day-to-day practicalities.

There are 21 regional EMBs (one within each of the 21 county administrative boards) and 290 local EMBs (one within each of the 290 local municipalities). An eight-member board, the Election Review Board, is appointed by the Parliament immediately after an election. Electoral disputes are managed by this board, and there is no appeal against its decisions.

The indigenous people of Sweden, the Sami, elect members to their own regional parliament.
These elections are managed by one of the regional EMBs, together with the central EMB and
the staff of the Sami authority, as specified in the law governing the Sami Parliament.

Historical Background

During the first half of the 20th century, elections were administered by local and regional
authorities under the supervision of the Ministry for Internal Affairs. Very few staff worked
with electoral administration, and most of them also had other responsibilities. The civil
register, which still provides the basis of the electoral register, was produced by the Board
for Civil Registration and Tax Collection (Centrala Folkbokföring och Uppbördsnämnden).
When the National Tax Agency (Skatteverket) was set up and took over responsibility for the
civil register in 1971, it was practical to centralize electoral management at the same time.

This was reinforced by a change in the electoral system, creating a single national district for
the allocation of some of the parliamentary seats, and therefore making it difficult for regional authorities to perform the allocation of seats for the national Parliament.

After almost 30 years as a small office incorporated within the National Tax Agency, at
the end of the 1990s the staff of the Electoral Office initiated discussions aiming at changing
the electoral management structure. Three main reasons for the proposed change were cited.

First, the Electoral Office was working under the rules of the National Tax Agency, and was
not able to work with the freedom, speed and versatility that its work demanded.

Second, with the development and increased use of new and Web-based technology, the Electoral Office identified the need to establish its own lines of communication.

Third, it was argued that the issues involved in managing elections are of such a different and particular character that they should be managed by a separate body.

The electoral management system of Sweden was changed by the Swedish Parliament in
January 2001, following a long process of deliberation, consultation and formal consideration
by relevant bodies. The new central EMB was in place and fully functional by July 2001, and
the first election to take place under the new EMB structure was the parliamentary election of
2002. In short, the structure of electoral management has moved from being a decentralized
system in the early 20th century, to a centralized system as part of a larger authority, to being an effectively independent body while still falling under the remit of a government ministry.

The Election Authority believes that the changes since 2001 have made its work much
easier, and that the regional and local EMBs have become more visible. However, there were
initial disadvantages associated with the change, as services and expertise that were available within the National Tax Agency were lost when the separate central EMB was established. The new EMB has been forced to invest in building up and recruiting its own expertise and capacity in relation to public procurement and computer technology.

The Legislative Framework

There are no provisions for EMBs in the constitution. They are, however, mentioned in the
Elections Act (Vallag 1997:157, chapter 1, sections 15, 16 and 17), which specifies that there
shall be a central EMB, regional EMBs and local EMBs. It does not specify whether these bodies should be independent, or affiliated to any other authority or institution. It simply provides that the government decides which body should form the central EMB. The Parliament, by the decision of 2001 to establish a separate central EMB, has already done so. (Since the inception of the Election Authority, powers relating to the establishment of new authorities have changed. It is today the power of the government to establish new authorities.)

The constitution outlines general principles of equal and universal suffrage, of periodic
elections, electoral districts, the Election Review Board and the electoral system. The Elections Act specifies the tasks of:

• the local, regional and central EMBs;
• the polling station staff; and
• the Election Review Board.

It also specifies in detail the division of tasks between the EMBs, and defines provisions relating to:

• electoral districts and boundary delimitation;
• procedures regarding the registration of political parties and candidates;
• the production and design of ballot papers;
• procedures for voting, including advance voting, absentee voting or voting from special
institutions (such as prisons or hospitals);
• vote counting and the allocation of seats;
• the identification of replacement candidates or elected members in the event of resignations or deaths;
• how to appeal against election results;
• voting rights; and
• special rules applicable for elections to the European Parliament (Sweden has incorporated
those rules and regulations laid down for elections to the European Parliament in European
Union legal instruments into its Elections Act).

Financing

The central EMB requests its annual budget from the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice then receives these funds from the Ministry of Finance, in accordance with a parliamentary decision on the budget proposal by the government. The central EMB has normally received the amount it requested.

The regional EMB receives its funding from two sources: its own general budget as the County Administrative Board, which covers permanent costs such as staff and premises, and
the budget of the central EMB, which covers the additional costs that relate to elections. On
average, the regional EMB receives about 0.30 euros (EUR) from the central EMB for each
registered voter in its region, depending on the type of election. This funding from the central
EMB is only given to the regional EMBs during an election year.

The funding of the local EMBs is separate from that of the other two levels, as municipalities
receive funding from the government for their whole area of work, which includes the work of the local EMB. The Municipal Assembly determines the overall municipal budget annually.
Expenditures for general elections and referendums are included in that budget. The one
exception is the cost involved in voting that takes place at ‘special institutions’; funding for
this is requested from the budget of the central EMB. Some local municipalities have disliked
having to cover the cost of elections other than those for representatives for the local electoral districts – for example, national referendums or elections to the European Parliament – since their budgets are ‘local’ and not supposed to cover ‘national’ events.

However, as of 2006 the municipalities have greatly increased responsibilities for advance voting for all types of general elections and national referendums, which will add to the election costs they are responsible for covering. The cost of meeting high technical standards is reflected in EMB budgets. The local and regional EMBs form part of existing administrations, the central EMB is established with the status of a separate authority, and adequate resources appear to be assured.

 

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers

There are no official education programmes or courses in electoral administration in Sweden.
The training provided to staff members is designed internally. The central EMB has taken part
in general training in issues relating to public procurement, as it manages the production of
high-cost material such as ballot papers, advertisements and public information on elections.
The central EMB has conducted in-depth training for the staff of the regional EMBs since the
1970s and for the staff of the Sami Parliament during recent years.

The staff of the Election Authority can be divided into three main groups – technical staff, subject experts and support staff. While institutional memory was maintained when nearly all the staff associated with elections transferred to the new central EMB in 2001, the central EMB faces problems common to small institutions, such as dealing with the near simultaneous
retirement of several key personnel or keeping up with constant developments in new technology.

Although all vacancies must be publicly advertised, in practice the staff of the central EMB are mainly recruited from election officials at the regional or local level. As local EMBs are
responsible for recruiting officials for the polling stations, they undertake major recruitment and training processes before each election. The recruitment process varies between municipalities: some recruit mainly from political parties, trying to ensure political balance, some seek officials from outside the political process, and some use a combination of both.

At regional level, between one and three members of staff are responsible for managing
elections, and have other tasks within the county administrative boards during other times.
As the regional EMBs are responsible for the final counting of votes, they recruit additional
temporary staff for this purpose.

Relations with Other Institutions and Agencies

Relations and cooperation with other institutions are key to the work of the central EMB.
Since the National Tax Agency is responsible for both civil and electoral registration, these two institutions cooperate continuously. The central statistical office (Statistics Sweden, Statistiska Centralbyrån) supplies survey data for electoral purposes, while the Election Authority provides the election results data to Statistics Sweden for publication.

The authority responsible for issues relating to real estate assists in the work of boundary delimitation. Sweden’s diplomatic missions abroad are also partners in the electoral process, as external voting is part of their function. The Ministry of Justice remains an important partner of the central EMB, and desk officers of both institutions have close and regular contact.

 

Electoral Reform Management

The political environment in Sweden is comparatively stable. Election results and the work
done by the EMBs are not often criticized or disputed, and EMB recommendations are usually
treated with respect.

The central EMB is, however, able to suggest changes and improvement to electoral legislation or practices through the Ministry of Justice, and regularly does so. There have been cases when the central EMB has been the catalyst for change, while at other times it simply acts as a participant, or makes suggestions to the Ministry of Justice, on issues that need consideration. If a decision involves controversy, committees, politicians and officials from the EMB and the government seek to reach agreement through consultation, not through voting.

 

The United Kingdom: Electoral Modernization

Elections in the United Kingdom (UK) have historically been managed through the Governmental Model, by returning officers appointed by local authorities. Although a UK-wide
Electoral Commission was established in 2000, it has not taken on responsibility for the management of elections. Although this commission therefore does not fall within the definition of an EMB (at least for elections), its role as an electoral ‘watchdog’ has provided much-needed impetus to reform and modernization of the electoral legislation and arrangements within the UK.

The commission’s responsibilities include:

• registering political parties;
• monitoring and publishing significant donations to parties;
• regulating spending by parties on election campaigns;
• writing reports on the conduct of elections and referendums;
• reviewing electoral law and procedures;
• advising the government on changes;
• advising those involved on the conduct of elections and referendums;
• promoting public awareness of electoral systems; and
• reviewing electoral boundaries.

In addition, the commission appoints the chief counting officer for UK-wide and regional
referendums – which means that, for referendums, it acts as an EMB under the Independent
Model.

To a great extent, elections in the UK are run with little modification to legislation introduced
during the 19th century, including the creation of an electoral register, the introduction of
the secret ballot and the introduction of limits on election expenditure. Indeed, the Electoral
Commission itself has commented that a voter at the beginning of the 21st century would
not have a significantly different experience from that of a voter at the beginning of the 20th
century.

However, there are indications that things are beginning to change. Recent pilots of
new voting methods are indicative of attempts to ensure that the voting system is accessible to the needs of modern voters.

The Legislative Framework

The Electoral Commission was established under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA). The act outlines the structure of the commission and empowers it to undertake its key statutory functions. It also empowers the commission to prescribe regulations (secondary legislation) in relation to areas in which it has direct responsibilities, such as the information which political parties and other organizations are required to submit to it when applying for registration or reporting.

Institutional Structure

The Electoral Commission has five commissioners and four deputy commissioners. The
commission chair serves full-time, other commissioners part-time. The commissioners are
responsible for taking strategic decisions about the direction of the commission. In operational terms, the commission is managed by a chief executive, supported by a team of senior managers and over 100 staff. The vast majority of staff are based in the commission’s London office, with smaller offices also located in Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh.

Powers and Functions

The commission has a number of key functions. These are:

• to regulate the financing of political parties;
• to promote awareness of democratic and electoral systems;
• to report on UK elections and electoral pilot schemes;
• to review electoral laws;
• to provide advice and assistance to electoral administrators; and
• to appoint a chief counting officer to manage regional and UK-wide referendums (this role
automatically falls to the commission’s chairman unless he appoints another individual).

In addition, the commission is progressively taking over the responsibility for the delimitation
of electoral boundaries, a process which started in 2002 when it assumed responsibility for the review of local government boundaries in England.

The commission undertakes its responsibility to promote awareness of democratic and
electoral systems in a number of ways. It carries out general research into people’s views of and level of knowledge about democratic and electoral systems, and conducts specific research into levels of engagement among specific sections of society. This research is used to inform a series of campaigns encouraging people to register to vote and to vote at elections and referendums.

The commission has an outreach programme that aims to promote awareness of and interest in democratic and electoral systems among young people aged 16–24, targeting principally young people outside formal education. In addition, the commission has established a partnership grant fund to support organizations with innovative schemes to raise awareness.

Financing

The commission is funded directly by Parliament and planned an annual budget of about 35
million euros (EUR) for the year 2005/2006. It is required to submit to the Speaker’s Committee (a committee of nine MPs chaired by the speaker of the House of Commons) an annual budget which the committee may modify, before the final request for funding is put to the House of Commons for approval.

Funds are released to the commission from the Treasury on a monthly basis in accordance with the commission’s monthly cash forecasting. The commission is subject to the same accounting controls as other public departments and bodies and is audited by the National Audit Office.

Accountability

The commission is directly accountable to Parliament and not to the government. It submits
a draft corporate plan each year to the Speaker’s Committee. The commission’s annual report must also be approved for publication by the Speaker’s Committee. Most of the commission’s work is intended for a general public audience, but in relation to some specific statutory functions the commission is responsible for submitting reports to the relevant secretary of state; for example, reviews of electoral law are submitted to the secretary of state at the Department for Constitutional Affairs.

Professionalization

Many commission staff are former election practitioners and members of the Association of
Election Administrators (AEA), the professional body for electoral staff. In addition, staff have
relevant professional expertise; for example, many of the staff regulating party financing have accounting or auditing backgrounds. The commission has a generous training budget for the professional development of its staff.

Relations with the Media and Other Institutions and Agencies

Although the commission’s Communications Directorate deals with press inquiries and works
with the media, the commission has no power to regulate the media during the campaign or
in any other period. Requirements on access to the broadcast media by political parties are
laid down in the broadcasting legislation.

However, broadcasters are required to seek and have regard to the commission’s views when framing rules for party broadcasts. The PPERA establishes a Parliamentary Parties Panel consisting of representatives of those parties with two or more members of Parliament, and the commission is required to consider any representations made by this panel; there is therefore ongoing contact between the commission and political parties. Since the commission must be consulted on changes to electoral law, commission staff also work closely with officials in relevant government departments.

The commission has worked on a number of joint projects with NGOs with an interest in
electoral and democratic systems and participation. Finally, although it is a relatively young
organization, the commission has started to building up links with other EMBs and related
international organizations.

Electoral Reform Management

The commission has no power to draft electoral law, but the government is under a statutory
obligation to consult it on proposed changes to certain aspects of electoral law. Typically,
commission officials work closely with government officials in the early stages of drafting
legislation, and the commission submits a formal response once the draft legislation is
completed.

The commission is required by law to keep a number of issues under review, including
matters relating to elections, referendums, the registration and financing of political parties, and political advertising. Legislative recommendations arising from the commission’s reviews will only be enacted if they are adopted by Parliament, a process which will rarely happen without the support of the government.

A number of recommendations made by the commission have led to government draft legislation for electoral change. However, there is no requirement for the government to support or progress the commission’s proposals, and a major recommendation to change the system of voter registration, from a household to an individual basis, was rejected by the government.

Although relatively new, the Electoral Commission is increasingly well established within
the democratic system in the UK. However, its work is subject to the constraint that its annual budget must be approved by the Speaker’s Committee. It is possible that the committee may in future refuse to authorize part of a budget proposal, in which case the work plan of the commission would be limited by the level of funding that it actually receives.

There are clear constraints that limit the commission’s ability to effect change, notably
the fact that it is unable to enact its own recommendations. However, the creation of the
commission has undoubtedly provided a catalyst for driving forward an agenda of electoral
modernization within the UK. In addition, the commission has also provided a much-needed
source of advice and assistance to electoral administrators, parties and members of the public. This highlights the capacity of the commission to strengthen the democratic process in the UK, as the commission’s web site shows.

 

The United States: Decentralized to the Point of Being Dysfunctional

Although the United States is the oldest constitutional republic in the world, and one in which elections have been held since the English first settled in the early 17th century, it does not have a national organization for conducting elections. Indeed, the first law to govern the administration of elections was passed by the US Congress in 2002, more than 200 years after the approval of the US constitution. The administration of elections is more decentralized in the United States than in any other country in the world. Thirteen thousand separate entities at the local level are mainly responsible for the conduct of elections. The 50 states are theoretically responsible for the supervision of the elections, but few have more authority than the localities. The federal level of government is the least involved in elections.

Historical Background

The US constitution of 1787 established an Electoral College to serve as an intermediary
between the voters and the final choice for president and vice-president. That was a progressive innovation for the 18th century but is an anachronism in the 21st.

The constitution says very little about the administration of elections except to suggest
that the states have responsibility for determining the procedures for choosing electors for the Electoral College. Over time, the individual states devolved responsibility for the administration of elections to the local level because most elections were for local offices, and national elections occurred at the same time. Counties and municipalities have registered voters, designed the ballot papers, purchased the voting machines and trained polling officials. Few states had a budget to help the local election authorities, and thus they had little power over the conduct of elections.

The only election conducted at national level in the USA is that run by the Electoral College, in which the electors designated by the candidates and chosen by the voters of each state then choose the president. Although Americans vote for four national offices (president,
vice-president, senator and member of Congress), these and all other elections are technically the responsibility of the states. In reality, however, they are conducted by 13,000 counties and municipalities, and the election authorities at that level are selected and replaced in many different ways. Most officials are appointed by mayors, who are themselves elected at the local level; others are appointed by political party officials; some are civil servants. This explains the wide range of administrative and technical procedures.

Until the end of the 19th century, the principal means of voting was a ballot paper given by
the political parties to individual voters. This procedure lent itself to vote-buying, and in the
1880s states gradually adopted the ‘Australian’ secret ballot, which identified all the candidates on a single page, giving voters the opportunity to select the one they supported in privacy.

Although some reforms of the campaign finance system were implemented during the
Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20th century, elections and politics remained heavily
influenced by money. State laws regulate campaign finance at the state and local elections, but at the federal level the first major reform came in the form of the Campaign Finance Act of 1974 after the Watergate scandal.

In the presidential election of 2000, the losing candidate, Albert Gore, won the popular vote
but lost in the state of Florida by 537 votes, which meant that he lost the election. A dispute over the recount was ultimately decided by a single vote in the Supreme Court. Many private and public organizations sought to learn from that experience, and as a result, Congress passed its first federal law on election administration, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).

The Legislative Framework

The statutory requirements for most elections are defined by laws passed by each of the 50
states. HAVA is the only national law addressing the issue of electoral administration (except
for civil rights laws and procedures to ensure that African-Americans and other minorities are
not disenfranchised). That law sets national standards and requirements for voting, but makes most of them conditional on whether the states decide to accept funding from the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), established by the same law. By the distribution of funds and the requirement that states develop and publish plans for meeting the national standards and establishing state-wide computer-based registration lists, the new law aims to help the states retrieve authority over the conduct of elections and to exercise it in a way that will permit some uniformity at the national level. The states were mandated to be in full compliance with the law by 1 January 2006, but there were many laggards.

It is clear that the law did not provide for sufficient uniformity or give the EAC sufficient strength to ensure that all states would assure the voting rights of citizens. A Commission on Federal Election Reform, chaired by Jimmy Carter and James A. Baker, and organized by the American University’s Center for Democracy and Election Management, offered 87 recommendations to address the remaining problems in its report, published on 19 September 2005.

Institutional Structure

The EAC was established in Title II of HAVA (Public Law no. 107-252). It is composed of four
members, two nominated by Republicans in Congress and two by Democrats. (The Federal
Election Commission (FEC) is similarly constituted, but its responsibilities relate only to the
supervision of the campaign finance laws.)

The EAC is not an electoral management body but primarily a mechanism for transferring
funds from the federal to the state governments to invest in new voting equipment and statewide registration lists. The institutional structures responsible for administering elections
275 remain at the state and local level. In most states, the secretary of state is technically responsible for the conduct of elections, but the county and city election boards are the EMBs; they actually conduct the elections. Secretaries of state are elected and tend to be individuals who aspire to higher political office. State and local officials are usually appointed by political party officials, although some are civil servants or are appointed by local elected officials.

The Powers and Functions of the EAC, Secretaries of State and Local Officials

The purpose of the EAC is to serve as an information clearing house, to oversee the testing,
certification, de-certification and re-certification of voting system hardware and software, and
to provide election assistance and publish voluntary guidance. Any EAC action requires the
approval of three members, but its regulatory powers are sharply limited. It cannot, for example, ‘issue any rule, promulgate any regulation, or take another action’ imposing a requirement on any state or locality.

Thirteen thousand individual counties and municipalities continue to manage virtually every stage of the electoral process. Over time, as HAVA is implemented, it is hoped that the federal government will have more power to impose uniform rules throughout all 50 states, but currently the law is not strong enough to give it that power.

Funding and Accountability

Until HAVA was passed, the federal government did not spend any money on elections, and the states spent very little. Virtually all funding was at the local level.

With the passage of HAVA, the federal government transferred nearly 3 billion US dollars
(USD) between 2003 and 2005 to the states to purchase new machines and implement statewide plans, including for computer-based, state-wide registration lists. Unfortunately, the EAC, which transferred the funding for machines to the states, is a weak institution, receiving for example less than 2 million USD to manage its office in its first year of operation, 2004.

The EAC (like the FEC) is accountable to the Congress, the executive branch and the courts. The local authorities are accountable to their communities and, secondarily, to the state officials and the courts.

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers

For much of US history, election officials’ posts were viewed as patronage jobs to be handed
out by the party in power. To a great extent, this has not changed. At the local level, there
are great difficulties hiring temporary workers, and as a result most are quite old and have
great difficulty working through a long and stressful day. For the presidential election in 2000,
approximately 100 million people voted in 200,000 polling districts. This required 1.4 million
election workers, most with little training, supervised by 20,000 election administrators. Wide
variations in electoral professionalism are thus inevitable.

The Strengths and Weaknesses of the US Electoral Administration

Both the strength and the weakness of the US electoral administration system stem from its
decentralized nature. It allows for great autonomy but no uniformity. Most Americans have
focused on the result rather than the process, but close elections compel a re-focus on the
process. Over time, if it is to respond to the many complaints, the federal government will need to insist on a much higher degree of uniformity of rules, and the states will need to retrieve authority from the local areas, starting with the registration list and the voter identification cards.

 

Uruguay: The Electoral Court - A Fourth Branch of Government?

The Oriental Republic of Uruguay gained independence in 1825 and, with influences from the
Swiss republican model, a unique combination of quasi-presidentialism and a multiparty system was formed at the beginning of the 20th century. With the exception of a military interregnum from 1973 to 1984, Uruguay has held multiparty elections for more than a century.

The Electoral Law of 1924 marks the beginning of an autonomous and independent electoral
management body. After almost a century in the hands of the executive power, elections
and other election-related issues were finally brought together under the jurisdiction of the
independent and permanent Electoral Court (Corte Electoral) which, as the new leading body
of the electoral system, was made responsible for the conduct of elections. In 1934 the existence and powers of the Electoral Court were enshrined in the constitution.

Institutional Structure

The Electoral Court consists of nine members elected by both houses of Parliament. Five are
politically impartial members, nominated on the basis of their professional skills, and elected by a majority vote of two-thirds; and four are representatives of the leading political parties, elected by proportional vote by the members of the respective parties in the legislature.

According to the constitution of 1952, the candidate with the highest number of votes among the five impartial members is chosen as president of the Electoral Court. Subordinated to the centralized Electoral Court are 19 permanent electoral boards (juntas electorales) – one in each of the 19 departments of the country, a National Electoral Office (Oficina National Electoral), which acts as the court’s secretariat, and 19 regional electoral offices, one for each department. The lower-level bodies are elected by popular vote, and thus the political party structure in Parliament is represented throughout all levels of the election administration.

The electoral boards are responsible for the conduct of elections at departmental level. They
oversee the scrutiny at polling station level, keep and organize the departmental electoral archive, ensure that electoral laws and procedures are respected, and declare the results of elections at local and departmental level. The electoral boards report directly to the Electoral Court.

The main task of the electoral offices is to facilitate the work of the Electoral Court and the electoral boards. The National Electoral Office in Montevideo mainly handles the court’s administrative matters, such as personnel, accounting and finances. It is also responsible for
the National Electoral Archive and for general electoral services. The National Electoral Office
functions as a technical division, heads the 19 departmental electoral offices, and reports directly to the Electoral Court.

Powers and Functions

Article 278 of the 1934 constitution assigns the Electoral Court the competences to:

• exercise overall responsibility for electoral acts and procedures;
• provide administrative, consultative and financial leadership for the electoral organs;
and
• decide appeals and complaints, and undertake the functions of a supreme electoral court
of justice.

The court’s electoral competence thus includes a range of functions. It is not only the manager of elections, responsible for, among other things, voter registration and the issuing of voting cards to eligible voters; it is also the highest court on all election-related matters, and thus it also hears and reviews electoral disputes and complaints. With the affirmative vote of six of its nine members, of which at least three must be neutral members, the Electoral Court has the authority to formally investigate the outcome of all elections and referendums, to reject election results and declare them null and void, and to carry out a new scrutiny of the results of a ballot.

Moreover, the court has the authority to issue administrative, jurisdictional and regulatory
acts, and none of the acts it issues can or may be revised by any branch of government. This
is an exclusive competence that no other independent organ of the state has: as Dr Carlos
A. Urruty Navatta, the president of the Electoral Court, has said, ‘The Court . . . has all the
qualities needed to shape a branch of the government because it is created by the constitution, its competence is established in the constitution and its decisions are irrevocable’.

Other responsibilities of the Electoral Court are the conduct and oversight of the political
parties’ internal elections and university elections, the registration of voters, candidates and
political parties, the maintenance of a permanent and updated electoral register, the issuing
of voter cards and the announcement of the official results. The court does little in providing
direct voter education and information, but on the other hand it does provide free electoral
materials and offers the assistance of electoral officials for school education and mock elections held for educational purposes.

Financing

The activities of the Electoral Court are financed through the state budget; the budget is prepared by the court itself and submitted to the executive branch for comment. Parliament
decides by majority whether to approve the budget as proposed by the Electoral Court or
to incorporate the observations and changes suggested by the executive branch. The funds
appropriated are not allocated to specific budget lines and the court is free to decide how best to spend its funds.

Accountability

There are no specific accountability requirements on the Electoral Court. As an organ with
qualities similar to those of a branch of government, the court is not required to report on its
activities to anyone. In practice, it is accountable to public opinion, partly expressed through
the four political party representatives among its members. The EMB does, however, have
financial accountability through external audit, and every year its accounts are submitted to the Tribunal of National Accounting.

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers and Staff

The permanent staff of the electoral administration adds up to 1,003 officials, of whom 668
work at the central level and the remaining 335 work at the departmental level. On polling
day itself the number of electoral officials is increased considerably in order to staff the polling stations. All government employees are required by law to offer their services to the electoral administration during elections and referendums. At the beginning of an election year the Electoral Court estimates the number of extra personnel required for polling day. If by any chance the number of civil servants is not sufficient, the polling stations may designate other citizens to help in the electoral process. Courses and instruction are offered to all new officials.

Electoral officers are generally well skilled. However, the court usually strives to enhance the
technical skills of its staff by ensuring that promotion of officers is done strictly on the basis
of their professional capacities. For each election the court designs and implements special
training courses for its staff at all levels.

Relations with the Media and Other Institutions and Agencies

The Electoral Court has extensive relations with other institutions and agencies. Its principal
relations are with the political parties, with whom it liaises regularly, and with Parliament and
the executive branch concerning financing, electoral legislation, and the security, transport
and other logistical aspects of elections. Its relations with the media are fluid: the media have taken upon themselves the role of the principal source of information to the public on election matters. The Electoral Court does not have extensive relations with international institutions and agencies and receives no help from international actors.

The Electoral Court is well established within the democratic system of Uruguay and has been so since its establishment as an independent body in 1924. Because of its independence, professionalism and inclusiveness of political parties it is perceived among Uruguayan citizens as a widely-respected government institution. Even during the military interregnum in the 1970s, when most of the political institutions were occupied by the military, the court was left untouched and its decisions were respected. A classic example is the referendum for constitutional reform on the autocratic rule of the military that was organized by the court in 1980, when the court announced that the people had voted against continued military rule, and the military fully respected the outcome and withdrew from Parliament.

This was the turning point for Uruguay and the end of the military regime. There is no doubt that the Electoral Court has been a stabilizing and legitimizing democratic institution which has been of great importance for Uruguay’s return to democracy.

Nevertheless, like many other institutions of government, the Electoral Court suffers from a
lack of technological means and assistance, and may need to modernize and computerize great parts of its administration in order to become more cost-effective. Manual registration of voters and issuing of voter cards has been manageable because of the small size of the population, but from the point of view of cost-effectiveness it is precarious.

 

Yemen: An Emerging Independent EMB

The Republic of Yemen emerged as a result of the unification, on 22 May 1990, of the Arab
Republic of Yemen in the north and the Socialist Republic of Yemen in the south.

After the new constitution was approved in a referendum held in May 1991, parliamentary elections were held in 1993, 1997 and 2003. The first presidential election took place on 23 September 1999. In addition, a referendum on a number of constitutional amendments and the first local elections were held simultaneously on 28 February 2001. In August 1992 the first Supreme Elections Commission (SEC) of 17 members was appointed by the Presidency Council of the Republic.

A seven-member SEC replaced it in July 1993, and a fresh SEC, with a new board of seven members, was appointed by the president in November 1997, based on a list proposed by
Parliament. This same system was used for the appointment, in December 2001, of the current permanent Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCER).

The Legislative Framework

The constitution provides details of the main conditions for voting or standing for election. The electoral legal framework is mainly based on the Election Law, no. 13 of November 2001. It replaces Law no. 27 of 1996 which, in turn, replaced the first election law of the unified country, of 1992. The new law deals extensively with the establishment, responsibilities and operations of the SCER, as well as its independence and its financial and administrative autonomy. Bylaws based on drafts proposed by the SCER, and a number of secondary legislative instruments approved by the SCER itself, complete the legal framework.

Institutional Structure

As the exclusive electoral authority, the SCER exercises full responsibility for the conduct of all elections. Its board includes a chairman and a deputy elected by the commission. Commissioners are appointed by the president of the republic from a list of 15 candidates proposed by a twothirds majority of Parliament, for a six-year term. A secretary general, who is the chief electoral officer (CEO), is also appointed by the president from a list of three candidates proposed by the SCER. The commission appoints supervisory committees for the 20 governorates, main committees for the 301 parliamentary constituencies, and basic committees for the 326 local electoral districts. Ad hoc committees are formed to manage voter registration, voting and vote-counting. The electoral administration is headed by the CEO and comprises the National Elections Office and a branch office for each governorate.

The Powers and Responsibilities of the SCER

The SCER is in charge of organizing, administering and supervising all elections. Its
responsibilities include:

• issuing regulations and procedures for the organization and conduct of elections, including
regulations on access to the media;
• determining parliamentary constituency boundaries and dividing them into polling
centres, based on principles of demographic equity and other geographic and social
considerations;
• organizing and conducting all electoral operations, including nomination, voting,
counting and the announcement of results;
• calling by-elections whenever and wherever required, as well as fully or partially annulling
election results as the case may require;
• registering political parties and independent candidates’ logos; and
• proposing amendments to the electoral law, and issuing secondary electoral legislation.

Financing

The SCER prepares its own annual budget, which is included in the government budget as one item. It is fully responsible for the management of its funds, through independent accounts. It also prepares specific budgets for each election, which are fully funded through governmental resources. The timely disbursement and flow of sufficient funds for electoral operations have generally been a distinctive aspect of elections in Yemen. Nevertheless, increased commitments and donors’ support are still needed to acquire and apply new technology in elections, and to implement capacity-building and public awareness programmes.

Accountability

The law does not establish specific accountability requirements for the SCER. Its selection and appointment mechanism means that the SCER reports to both the executive and the legislative branches. Despite the incipient control that is occasionally exercised by relevant committees of the Parliament, specific regulations would be necessary to introduce mechanisms of systematic oversight by the Parliament.

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers

Although Yemen’s electoral history is only short, the SCER benefits from the accumulated and relatively good experience of a reduced core staff team that manages key components of the electoral process at the central level. However, the larger group of electoral officials at both the central and other levels still lacks consolidated skills: this could be the next area of attention for future efforts to strengthen professional capacity.

At the decentralized levels, the SCER has not yet succeeded in building a core team of permanent and skilled staff. For the implementation of field electoral operations the SCER relies on temporary staff, usually teachers, who are civil servants. With donor support, human resources development and capacity-building programmes are constantly on the SCER agenda.

Relations with Political Parties, Other Institutions and Stakeholders, and the Media

For the 2003 parliamentary elections the SCER made efforts to make its work, and the electoral process in general, more transparent. Consultations were held with stakeholders to develop and apply a Political Parties’ Code of Conduct. However, opposition parties continued to criticize lack of communication by the SCER and the too-close relationship with the governing party, which compromises its independence.

Despite constant demands, meetings of the SCER are not public. Representatives of stakeholders are, however, occasionally invited to attend special meetings, usually to discuss
designated matters.

The SCER has managed to build a promising relationship with NGOs through the implementation of coordinated or joint public awareness initiatives, but this has not yet changed the mixed feelings of NGOs about the quality of such relations. Good relations with
the executive branch and the legislature are increasingly being complemented by enhanced
cooperation with donors who support the democratic process in Yemen.

The state media are put under the control of the SCER during elections, as part of its
regulatory responsibilities regarding the use of the media during the electoral campaign. The
privately-owned media in Yemen are weak and confined to the print media (which are also
required to observe the relevant SCER rules). The SCER’s ability to effectively guarantee free and equal access to the media to all stakeholders needs to be further strengthened. Measures are needed to moderate the traditional tendency to release information slowly, selectively and late.

Electoral Reform Management

The SCER has become a key actor in initiating and managing electoral reform. A new longterm UN-led Electoral Support Project, with input by other international agencies and donors, envisages specific assistance to the SCER to review the electoral arrangements and to handle the necessary electoral reform. The introduction of an inclusive, consultative approach is a key element of this support project.

The financial sustainability of the electoral process and of the SCER as a permanent body
can be guaranteed through local resources. Nevertheless, elections need to be gradually made more cost-effective, mainly through more stable decentralized structures that help rationalize expenditure. The support of donors is needed, mainly for capacity building and the application of new technologies. Alongside the decentralization and modernization process, periodic assessments would enable continuing confirmation of the sustainability of the process.

Yemen is progressing towards the consolidation of responsive institutions and democratic
practice. The SCER can play an important role in stabilizing the sometimes convulsive political environment in the country. Its main strength lies in its demonstrated capacity to deliver credible elections the results of which are accepted by stakeholders. Its main constraints are the weak professional skills of its middle management staff, its incomplete decentralized structure, and the need for electoral reform to enhance the electoral arrangements and practice. Bold efforts by donors to strengthen and consolidate the capabilities of the SCER, and a more genuine interest on the part of Yemeni officials to benefit from donor support, are positive signs that such constraints will be remedied.

 

Vanuatu: Limitations to the Independence of the EMB

Background

The independent Republic of Vanuatu has a Westminster-style constitution and a 52-member
unicameral Parliament elected by the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) election system.
In parallel to Parliament there is an elected 22-member Malvatumauri National Council of
Chiefs, which has a solely advisory role in areas relating to Melanesian indigenous values,
custom and tradition. This body has no women members, despite the existence of women
chiefs in many communities.

The independent Electoral Commission is responsible for the conduct of parliamentary,
provincial and municipal elections and has a supervisory role for elections to the Malvatumauri.

The six provinces and two municipalities of the country are delimited into six single-member
and 11 multi-member electoral districts, containing altogether over 309 polling stations. There are severe disparities between the electoral districts in terms of size of population, resources and geographical features. Out of a total population of 205,754 as of July 2005, 133,497 people were registered electors.

The rate of re-election of incumbent members of Parliament is high. Some members have retained their seats since the first-ever general election in 1979, held in preparation for independence in 1980. Four women have been elected to Parliament, including two elected in
2004.

Historically, the first elections for the Port Vila and Luganville municipal councils were
held in August 1975, followed by elections in November 1975 for the Representative Assembly, which replaced the earlier Condominium Advisory Council. Universal suffrage was achieved on 29 November 1979: article 4(2) of the constitution gives the franchise to all citizens reaching the age of 18. A voter can stand for election at the age of 25. The general election of 7 July 2004 was the seventh conducted by the Electoral Commission, which was established by the constitution at independence on 30 July 1980.

There are two types of voting, the ordinary and the proxy vote. Proxy votes can be obtained
upon application up to 72 hours before polling day. Each voter can be the proxy for two electors who are unable to cast an ordinary vote.

Institutional Framework, Powers and Functions

The 1980 constitution, signed on 5 October 1979, and the 1982 Representation of the People
Act (CAP 146) as amended provide for all matters relating to democracy, its institutions and
elections. Article 20 of the constitution specifies the powers and functions of the Electoral
Commission to oversee the conduct of voter registration and elections to Parliament, the
Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs, and provincial and municipal councils; to announce
election results; to promote public awareness and the provision and development of information for the citizen and voter education; to provide policy advice to the Minister of Internal Affairs, the government, the Parliament, and other departments and agencies; and to conduct research into electoral issues. The Electoral Commission has powers to override the decisions of the principal electoral officer (PEO) or dismiss a voter’s appeal on his registration; to declare candidates endorsed for elections; to declare a candidate elected unopposed; to declare a vote null and void at the official count; to declare recounts for contested results and appeals; to declare candidates duly elected as members of Parliament; and to make appropriate orders for the conduct of voter registration and elections.

The Electoral Commission has a chair and two other members who are appointed by the president for a term of five years on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). All members were men until 1998 when a woman was appointed and another serves on the current commission. Members receive sitting allowances appropriated by Parliament under the Electoral Office Budget.

The Electoral Commission is assisted by a secretariat, called the Electoral Office, headed by
the PEO. According to article 19 of the constitution, the PEO and all other electoral officers
are public servants. Their duties and responsibilities are set out in the constitution and the
Representation of the People Act. Staff capacity has always comprised a PEO, a compiler, an
assistant compiler and an office assistant. Although these positions are permanent the former
PEO occupied it on a temporary basis for six years (1997–2003). The current PEO and office
assistant are permanent staff, while the compiler and his assistant are on acting appointments since 1 January 1999.

Under article 4(3) of the constitution, political parties are free to form and contest elections.
Registration is not mandatory and there is no legal provision for the registration of political
parties, although the PEO maintains a register. Some political parties choose to register under the Charitable Organizations (Incorporation) Act, and in the 2004 general election only five out of 17 political parties were registered. Eligible candidates for parliamentary, provincial, municipal and Malvatumauri elections are considered and endorsed by the commission through a legal instrument.

For voter registration, the PEO appoints provincial and municipal executive officers as
registration officers (ROs), who through their administrative structures appoint area council
secretaries (ACS). The ACS appoint their assistants to undertake registration. The ROs and
their assistants claim hourly allowances which are paid by the Electoral Office. In this way,
the Electoral Commission and the PEO are able to effectively oversee the conduct of annual
registration and elections from a distance. Voter registration takes six months to complete
before the electoral register for each polling district is established by the PEO on 1 July of
each year, as specified by section 20(2) of CAP 146.

Eligibility to vote and registration are not automatic. Each voter is required to produce two witnesses to confirm their eligibility in the polling district of their residence to the ROs. The provisional electoral list is established about mid-May and dispatched to the provincial, municipality and area council headquarters for public inspection at the request of voters for a period of not more than 14 days, which must end on 15 June each year (CAP 146, section 16(2)(c)). Electors have an opportunity to inspect the provisional register, petition the PEO for wrongful omission, and/or appeal against the decision to the Electoral Commission. Registration and voting are voluntary.

Under the constitution, the Electoral Commission is independent. It is not easy for any
government to direct its work or abolish it as it does with other government departments.
The commissioners work independently of the government. Despite its statutory independence, however, significant limitations exist, caused by issues of access to budget funds and the recruitment and termination of the appointment of electoral officers. The government may take the opportunity to try to compromise the neutrality of the Electoral Commission through ministerial pressure, or directly inhibit its operations, for example through the budget process.

The overlapping and multiple lines of authority for reporting also impact on the good intentions of the Electoral Commission and the PEO in ensuring effective electoral management (see the section on accountability below).

Financing

The Commission and its Electoral Office are financed through an annual appropriation from
Parliament. Budget submission requirements and procedures are covered under the Vanuatu
Government Financial Regulation Act. While this budget is substantial in an election year, it
is never adequate to cover all election costs. As the Vanuatu Elections Observer group put it
in their 2002 report, the Electoral Commission was significantly under-resourced and lacked
sufficient funding to undertake a national public education campaign informing citizens of
their basic democratic rights and freedoms.

There is also a tradition of donor funding of certain aspects of the election process. For the 2002 general elections the European Union funded the printing of ballot papers to the sum of 10 million vatu (VUV) as the initial election budget of 40 million VUV was reduced by the Ministerial Budget Committee (MBC) to 30 million but only 25 million VUV was appropriated by Parliament. In 1998 the Electoral Commission entered into a partnership with the Wan Smol Bag Theatre in producing and performing the Election Play throughout Vanuatu in villages and schools, with funding from the British Government. The play and the radio slots were developed after consultation with the PEO and in collaboration with the Electoral Office.

Accountability

In terms of financial accountability, the PEO is accountable, as required by the Vanuatu Government Financial Regulation Act, to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministerial Budget Committee and the Parliament. As a public servant the PEO is also accountable to the Public Services Commission (PSC). There are thus overlapping and multiple lines for reporting.

The PEO reports to the Electoral Commission, the PSC, and the minister and director-general
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These arrangements have had a negative impact on longterm capacity-building and institution-strengthening initiatives because they create confusion and conditions that are conducive to conflict, duplication of effort and political interference.

The Professionalism of Electoral Officers

Electoral officers are qualified public servants in their own right prior to becoming electoral
officers. Professionalism is acquired on the job. Electoral officers gain in competence and improve their performance as a result of gaining knowledge and understanding of the constitution and the electoral legislation and by actually performing their registration and polling duties.

Recruitment and Training of Polling Officers

Returning officers for each province and municipality are appointed by the PEO, and they in
turn appoint polling officers for polling stations in each electoral district. Polling officers are
recruited on a voluntary basis following open appeals to interested citizens on the national
radio and newspapers, and are confirmed after attending half-day training sessions on the
voting procedures and rules conducted by the Electoral Office. The polling team comprises the presiding officer and two polling clerks.

The use of teachers and community leaders as polling officers helps in promoting public interest in the election process. However, polling officers tend to be recruited along political party lines depending on which party dominates the province or the municipal council, and there have been allegations of lack of independence, transparency and accountability. The Electoral Office is currently developing a more independent and transparent recruitment system.

Relationship with the Media

There is almost no formal recognition of the role of the media as a forum that can contribute
positively to effective electoral administration, voter education and credible elections. The
radio is the main medium for communication and the dissemination of election information.
Weekly and daily newspapers and television are restricted to the urban centres of Port Vila
and Luganville where the percentage of the educated and literate in the population is high.

However, over 80 per cent of the population live in rural areas, and indigenous mechanisms
for transmitting important election and campaign information have proved more reliable than
state facilities, which have often failed.

Politicians and candidates have equal opportunities to use the media. However, those who
can afford to publish and to pay for screen and air time have greater access and use it to their advantage. There has been no research to verify allegations of partisan reporting or unbalanced reporting in news coverage.

On polling day, only those with accreditation from the PEO may enter polling stations. The
media – like the international and domestic observers – were able to observe the official count for the first time ever in the general election of 2 May 2002.

Relations with Other Institutions and Agencies

The Electoral Commission has cordial relationships with other state, corporate and civil society organizations (CSOs). However, engaging other institutions in electoral development initiatives has not been easy, even with those that have general responsibility for certain services; for example, the Ministry of Education has not been able to develop appropriate curricula for school children and young adults in secondary schools. This may be due to a lack of understanding on the ministry’s part that it has a joint responsibility, together with the Electoral Commission and other stakeholders, to promote civic education.

Some positive relationships have, however, been established over the years. For example, in
the absence of ongoing voter education programmes, political parties, CSOs, candidates and
voters have taken on the responsibility of educating their members and families, and the EMB has cooperated with other stakeholders in such initiatives.

In 1998, the Ombudsman’s Office issued official statements on freedom of movement, choice, speech and association, supporting human rights and democracy, in connection with
concerns raised by community leaders and political parties and candidates in some communities on restrictions imposed on campaigning. Transparency International (TI) Vanuatu and the Electoral Commission cooperated with international and domestic observers during the 2002 elections. Since 2003, through European Union funding, TI Vanuatu has been collaborating with government departments and CSOs in developing citizen awareness curricula and materials.

In 2004 the Vanuatu Education Policy Advocacy Coalition (VEPAC, a loose coalition of NGOs, CSOs and individuals who seek to bring about changes to education policies to meet the education needs of all members of society) initiated and staged an Education Forum where parties and candidates presented their education polices to voters and the public in Port Vila.

The Sustainability of the EMB

Minimal effort has been put into ensuring the sustainability of the EMB. Political will is difficult
to secure and budgets for long-term development and reform, although realistic, have not been approved. The political culture in place lends itself to criticism of politicians as being only readily available to negotiate a supplementary budget for elections if the result will promote their own careers.

Capacity building in terms of setting institutional priorities, training, mentoring and feedback is adversely affected by consistently inadequate annual budgets and lack of trained and
available human resources. A restructured permanent Electoral Commission would be needed, with the powers and the human and financial resources to undertake reforms to strengthen and improve electoral administration.

Electoral Reform Management

No major reforms have occurred over the past 25 years, although the Electoral Commission has endorsed several proposals for reforms aiming to serve the voters and introduce impartiality, transparency, accuracy and professionalism into electoral administration. Political will on the part of both government and Parliament is lacking.

In particular, it has been difficult for government to secure the funding required for a computerized voter registration system – a European Community (EC) initiative of 1990 to
improve the voter registration system and the maintenance of the electoral register. The project has been on the Electoral Office’s annual budget submission since 1997 and every year so far it has been deferred.

Vanuatu has a history of inflated electoral registers since the 1970s, when they were compiled under the Condominium administration for two municipal council elections, for the Representative Assembly elections in 1975, and in preparation for the 1979 general elections. They remained heavily inflated at independence in 1980 and were updated in 1983.
In preparation for the 1987 elections they were totally redone in 1985 and 1986, and they were updated each year until the 1991 elections. In 1992 new registrations were undertaken for the purposes of computerizing the electoral registers. The registration system was grossly abused in the colonial period and has been so since 1991 – and even more so now in this era of the splintering of political parties and factions – to ensure that certain parties and leaders retain their seats in Parliament.

Three days after the 7 July 2004 elections, the ballot boxes and papers for two constituencies
(Tanna and Other Southern Islands) were seized, even though under police escort, at the air
terminal on Tanna and burned by frustrated voters and supporters of two losing candidates.
The episode was associated with the anomalies of multiple registration of voters and abuse of
the proxy vote.

A computerized system might ensure concise and accurate electoral registers, with each
voter registered only once. It could also tackle the problem of abuse of the proxy vote, and the government would save on the cost of printing the ballot papers associated with the SNTV
system. Another reason advanced for computerizing the electoral registers was to increase the turnout on polling day in the urban constituencies of Port Vila and Luganville. The government endorsed a system that would have been similar to the computerized government payroll, but funds were diverted elsewhere. Since then, while the Ministerial Budget Committee has claimed that the new system is important and is appropriate for Vanuatu, it has deferred parliamentary consideration each year. Many issues of the credibility of elections thus remained outstanding in 2006.

Zimbabwe: A New Era in Election Management

Historical Background

After independence in 1980, the new government of Zimbabwe introduced a new electoral
system (First Past the Post) and established an electoral management structure, which included the Delimitation Commission (DC), responsible for the delimitation of electoral districts, and the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC), charged with supervising the conduct of elections. Elections would be managed by the Registrar-General of Elections (RG), who was responsible for registering voters, compiling the electoral registers, conducting the voting and the vote-counting, and the announcement of the results, with the logistical support of the Election Directorate, a committee made up of representatives of several government ministries. The RG’s department fell under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

This structure was criticized because of its perceived partisanship. The two commissions
– the DC and the ESC – were appointed by the president, who, although he was required
to consult the chief justice and the Judicial Services Commission (JSC), was not compelled
to abide by their recommendations. The RG and Election Directorate are both part of the
executive, and included officials who had a vested interest in the outcome of the elections.
In late 2004, bowing to internal and external pressure, new legislation was adopted that
introduced the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), the Registrar-General of Voters and
the Electoral Court. Constitutional Amendment no. 17 finally abolished the ESC in 2005.

The Legislative Framework

The legal framework for elections in Zimbabwe consists of the 1979 constitution, as amended
in 2005, and the Electoral Commission Act (chapter 2:12) and the Electoral Act, both promulgated in 2004. The legislation provides for the conditions under which elections are
to be held as well as the electoral system to be used. The Electoral Commission Act provides
for the operation of the ZEC, while the Electoral Act provides for the conduct of the electoral
process, including the operations of the Registrar General of Voters.

Institutional Structure, Powers and Functions

Three bodies are charged with managing election-related activities in Zimbabwe:

1. The Delimitation Commission is appointed by the president. The chairperson is the chief justice or another judge of the High Court or Supreme Court recommended by the chief justice. In addition to the chairperson, three other members are appointed on the recommendation of the chief justice. The DC is responsible for the establishment of electoral district boundaries at least once every five years. The president may also request a revision of the boundaries before the end of a five-year period.
2. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. In addition to a chairperson who must be qualified
   to be a judge of the High Court or Supreme Court, and is appointed by the president
   in consultation with the JSC, six other commissioners, of whom at least three must be
   women, are appointed from a list of nine nominees submitted by the Parliamentary
   Committee on Standing Rules and Orders.
   
   The ZEC is responsible for:
   • preparing for, conducting and supervising all parliamentary and presidential elections
   and national referendums;
   • directing and supervising the registration of voters, and the compilation and storage of
   the electoral register;
   • designing, printing and distributing ballot papers and other election material, and
   establishing and operating polling stations;
   • conducting voter education and voter information campaigns; and
   • accrediting election observers.
   
3. The Registrar-General of Voters. The RG is responsible for registering voters and for
   compiling and maintaining the electoral register. The structure is completed by the Electoral Court, which consists of judges and former judges. It is appointed by the JSC and has the same status as the High Court. It is responsible for adjudication of election-related disputes.
   
   

Funding

Historically, elections in Zimbabwe have been adequately funded, through the executive
branch. This has, however, now changed, as the amended section 61 of the constitution states that the ZEC will be funded from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The ZEC may also receive funding from foreign sources to conduct voter education in conjunction with non-governmental organizations.

In the March 2005 parliamentary elections, as well as in the September 2005 elections for the Senate, there was an evident shortage of election material and election staff. Nevertheless, it is important to note the achievements of the ZEC in increasing the number of
polling stations and purchasing the translucent ballot boxes that were used in March 2005.

Accountability

According to subsection 5 of section 61 of the constitution, the ZEC shall not be subject to
the direction or control of any person or authority in the exercise of its duties and functions,
or in the organization of its staff procedures and processes. This is a welcome change from the previous arrangements when the law did not explicitly grant the former ESC this autonomy. The lines of accountability have also become clearer as the RG reports to the ZEC in all matters related to voter registration and the electoral register. The involvement of Parliament in the appointment process introduces an element of transparency which was lacking in the past, and compensates to some extent for the fact that final appointment is still done by the president.

Professionalism

From the technical and administrative points of view, voting and counting have always
been conducted efficiently, and Zimbabwean election officials have been applauded for their
knowledge of their duties. However, successful legal challenges have exposed flaws in the
electoral register which can only be attributed to administrative inefficiency or deliberate fraud. Following the March 2005 elections the ZEC was criticized for announcing differing results at different times, without being able to provide a clear explanation.

Relations with the Media

In the past, a good relationship existed between the EMBs and the state-controlled public
media, while relations with the private media were poor. During the March 2005 elections,
for the first time in a long time, the EMBs’ election-related advertising and voter education
material were placed in both the public and the private media. This is prompting a new era of
cooperation between the EMBs and the private media.

Relations with Other Institutions

Relations between the EMBs and with non-state actors, including NGOs and opposition
political parties, have in the past been strained at best and hostile at worst. However, there was a discernible thaw in relations in the run-up to the March and September 2005 elections. The ZEC displayed openness to discussing issues and cooperating with key electoral stakeholders. It should be noted, however, that problems remained, such as the failure to allow political parties access to the electoral register, which has been a perennial sore point in the EMBs’ stakeholder relationships.

Sustainability

Election processes have always been well funded in Zimbabwe. The key challenge has been
institutional funding. For many years, members of the former ESC complained of inadequate
funding for administrative and staffing costs. According to section 61 of the constitution, the
ZEC should receive sufficient funds from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to enable it to carry
out its functions properly. This and the streamlining of the electoral management system lay
down good grounds for the future sustainability of the current arrangement. It should, however, be noted that voter registration and delimitation of boundaries still take place outside the ZEC – a situation that may need to be reviewed from the point of view of cost-effectiveness.

Electoral Reform Management

The management of the electoral reform process in Zimbabwe used to be poor. At one point
the reforms actually added to the multiplicity of EMBs which had necessitated the reforms
in the first place. For the March 2005 elections, the ZEC was expected to be accountable for
some processes which had already taken place before it was appointed, such as the key stages of voter registration and boundary delimitation.

The latest round of reforms, and particularly Constitutional Amendment no. 17 of 2005, mean that the ZEC has became a constitutional body funded by a separate budget, which will improve its stature and efficiency. There is still room for further reforms, possibly giving the ZEC the responsibility for the demarcation of electoral district boundaries as well as bringing voter registration and the management of the electoral register under the commission’s full control.

Local authority elections and regular by-elections will both be opportunities to put the new
electoral management system to the test before crucial presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008 and 2010, respectively. These elections will allow the ZEC to assess its own preparedness for the logistical and administrative requirements of national elections as well as giving the different EMBs time to rationalize their relationships.

More significantly, however, these elections will be useful in assessing the impartiality and
independence of the EMBs. In the past, criticism of the EMBs stemmed from the fact that they
were appointed by the president and from their lack of financial autonomy. The new reforms
have changed this situation, with a process of appointment that now involves Parliament, and
the provision of institutional funding. It will remain a constant challenge for the ZEC to protect itself from actual and perceived political manipulation, particularly in the highly polarized political environment in Zimbabwe.

 

Contributors to Electoral Management

The Electoral Management topic area of the ACE Encyclopaedia has been completely re-written since it was first launched. Lead writers for this topic area are Sara Staino and Joram Rukambe, and leading organisation responsible for this the completion of this topic is International IDEA.

Main authors are:

Alan Wall has over 20 years of electoral administration and democracy advisory experience. From 1984 to 1994 he held various senior management positions with the Australian Electoral Commission. He has since managed IFES projects in Azerbaijan in 1999 and in Indonesia between 2000 to 2004, been a senior electoral official for the United Nations in Eastern Slavonia in 1996 and Nigeria in 1998, and was an advisor to the South African government for the local government elections of 1995. During 2005 and 2006 he has directed Democracy International’s local government election support programs in Indonesia. Alan was one of the initial lead writers for the ACE Project.

Sara Staino serves as the lead writer for the Electoral Management topic area of the ACE Encyclopaedia. She is a member of the ACE Project Management Team and the Project Manager for the IDEA ACE Course Correction Team, responsible for the completion and quality control of the four topic areas under IDEA responsibility- Electoral Management, Parties and Candidates, Media and Elections and Electoral Systems. Sara has been a consultant for the Electoral Processes Team of International IDEA since the beginning of 2004, and is the co-author of the International IDEA Handbook on Electoral Management Design. Sara also works part time as a university lecturer in International Relations, as an Election Observer for the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), and acts as a deputy-chairman of a polling station commission at elections in Sweden. Sara is a graduate of political science of the University of Örebro in Sweden.

Carl W. Dundas is a former Director of Elections in Jamaica (1979-80) and a former Special Adviser (Legal) in the Commonwealth Secretariat, with responsibility for technical assistance in elections matters (1990-2001). Mr Dundas has been an election consultant since 2001, specialising in modernisation of electoral management bodies (EMBs), election legislative schemes and delimitation of electoral districts. He has been the Election Consultant for the European Commission in Liberia (2004 July -October 2005). Carl is a Barrister-at-Law (Gray's Inn) and holds a Master of Laws (LL.M) Degree, London University.

Joram Rukambe is currently Africa Programme Manager for International IDEA, based in Pretoria, South Africa. He served as Senior Programme Officer in the Electoral Processes Team of IDEA for two years before joining the Africa Programme. Joram was Director of Elections and Chief Executive of the Electoral Commission of Namibia from 1998 to 2003. He has served as an election observer, consultant and technical adviser in Africa and has published on elections management especially in South Africa. He holds a Master of Arts degree in Media and Cultural Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, and undergraduate degrees in Public Administration and Development Studies from the University of Fort Hare, South Africa.

Andrew Ellis is currently the head of the Electoral Processes Team at International IDEA in Stockholm. He has wide experience as a technical adviser on electoral and institutional matters in democratic transitions. He acted as senior adviser for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Indonesia from 1999 to 2003, working with members of the Indonesian legislature on constitutional amendment and reform of electoral and political laws, and with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and political commentators. His other recent assignments include acting as chief technical adviser to the Palestinian Election Commission under the European Commission’s support for all aspects of the preparation of the first Palestinian elections in 1996, and design and planning for the Commission’s electoral assistance programme in Cambodia for the 1998 elections. Andrew is the co-author of the New International IDEA Handbook on Electoral System Design.

Ayman Ayoub specializes in programmes of electoral assistance, legal and judicial reform. A Spanish lawyer of Syrian origin, Ayoub's work for the last 12 years has primarily focussed on the provision of specialised assistance services for democratisation processes in transitional and post conflict countries, including the Middle East, West Africa, East Europe and South East Asia for the European Commission, the United Nations and other organisations.

The lead writers would like to express special thanks to:

Linda Ederberg worked as an ACE Research Assistant at International IDEA during 2005 and 2006 and was responsible for uploading, reviewing and editing the Electoral Management topic area files. Linda has finished her studies in political science, psychology, German literature and linguistics at University of Heidelberg, Germany and NUI Galway, Ireland, and graduated as M.A in July 2005. During the studies, she had a part-time employment as student employee in a research project at the political science department and as assistant teacher (tutor) to lectures in international relations and European politics.

Ray Kennedy was contracted by International IDEA to assess the quality and edit the Electoral Management topic area. Ray is a senior election consultant and has worked on many UN assissted elections. He was a Director of Information Resources at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Prior to joining the Foundation in 1990, he was Coordinator of the Center of Brazilian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced Studies (SAIS) from 1983-1989.

Marie Hohwu-Christensen was an intern at International IDEA the fall of 2005. She contributed to this topic by uploading Electoral Management files to the ACE database.

 

Electoral Management Glossary

Absentee voting – A mechanism by which voters are enabled to cast a vote which does not
involve their attendance at a polling station on the day or days fixed for voting.

Amalgamation of results – The incorporation of the votes into a unified result. Also known
as tabulation.

Announcement of results – See Declaration of results.

Arbitrary dismissal – Removal from an official or staff position without due cause and due
procedure.

Audit trail – A sequence of verifiable records that are maintained to track activities, for
example, movement and numbers of electoral materials, tabulation of electoral results, changes to computerized records, maintenance of financial records and determination of policies.

Baseline budget – A budget formulation method in which the funding allocation by the
financing authority for the previous funding period is taken and adjusted to give the estimate
for the next period. Also called incremental budget.

Boundary delimitation – The process for determining the way in which constituency or
electoral area boundaries are drawn; it deals with the division of a country into electoral districts and the allocation of electors to electoral districts and polling sites. Sometimes called districting or boundary demarcation.

Budget (electoral) – A document containing an itemized summary of proposed electoral
incomes and expenditures in relation to specified activities by a specified organization or part of an organization, for a defined future period.

By-election – An election to fill a vacant seat in an elected assembly held at any time other than at a general election.

Calendar (electoral) – A document containing a sequence of tasks and the dates and deadlines for their performance during the planning, implementation and completion of an electoral event.

Campaign (electoral) – Political activity, including meetings, rallies, speeches, parades,
broadcasts, debates and other media events designed to inform the electorate of or gather
support for the platform of a particular candidate or political party in an election or to promote a choice available to voters in a direct democracy instrument.

Candidate – A person who is nominated to contest an election either as a political party
representative or independent of any political party’s support.

Candidate nomination – The process by which political parties/organizations and/or
individual candidates submit their intention to compete in an election, often subject to meeting qualification criteria set out in the law.

Cascade training – A method of training in which a core central group of trainers are trained in both electoral technical matters and training techniques, who in turn train others ‘face to face’ at a lower level. The second level trains the third level and so on, until all targeted staff are trained.

Centralized EMB – An organizational structure for an EMB, most often found in countries
with unitary constitutions, in which the powers to conduct and implement all aspects of
electoral processes at all levels are vested in the national-level EMB.

Certification of results – The formal endorsement and confirmation of election results
Chair – The head of an independent EMB under the Independent or Mixed Model of electoral
management. Formal titles may include chief electoral commissioner or EMB President.

Chief electoral commissioner – See Chair.

Chief electoral officer – A title that may be used for the head of an EMB secretariat. Other
titles that may be used include chief executive officer, director of elections, secretary-general and EMB Secretary. Where the EMB is independent, the chief electoral officer can in some cases also be a member of the EMB.

Citizens’ initiative – A direct democracy instrument that allows a certain number of citizens to initiate a vote of the electorate on a proposal outlined by those citizens. The proposal may for example amend the constitution, or adopt, repeal or amend an existing law.

Civic education – An information and/or educational programme which is designed to increase the comprehension and knowledge of citizens’ rights and responsibilities.

Civil registry – A centrally held master database containing information generated by the
administrative infrastructure of a country involving the mandatory collection of information
from many sources and containing information such as the name, gender, nationality, age,
marital status and address of all citizens. Electoral registers and other documents may be drawn from it when required.

Civil servant – An employee of a central or local government ministry or department,
sometimes subject to a single common set of employment procedures, terms and conditions laid down by government.

Claims (electoral) – Complaints presented by different electoral actors to dispute resolution procedures in the course of the electoral process regarding decisions, actions, or lack of action by electoral administrators or other participants in the electoral process. See also electoral dispute resolution.

Closed list – A form of List Proportional Representation in which electors are restricted to voting only for a party or political grouping, and cannot express a preference for any candidate within the list presented by a party or grouping.

Code of conduct – A set of general rules of behaviour, for example for members and/or staff of an EMB, or for political parties, with respect to participation in an electoral process.

Combined EMB – An independent EMB under the Independent or Mixed Model of electoral
management some of whose members are non-partisan experts and some of whose members represent political parties or interests. See Expert-based EMB and Multiparty-based EMB.

Commissioner – A term used for a member of an electoral commission. Sometimes the term is limited to the EMB chair, and in rare cases the term is used inconsistently to refer to specific senior staff of the secretariat. See Member (of an EMB).

Consolidated electoral law – A single piece of legislation which gathers together all laws related to electoral processes in a country, some times referred to as the electoral code.

Consolidated fund – The reserved revenue funds of a country which the national Treasury
manages. Expenses that are charged directly to the Fund are not subject to change or ministerial delays.

Constituency – A synonym for electoral district used predominantly in some Anglophone
countries. See Electoral district.

Constitutional Council – A term for the supreme body concerned with constitutional and
other issues, which may be either part of the judicial branch or a separate body entrusted with adjudicating the constitutionality of laws and in some cases other tasks, including tasks related to electoral processes.

Core costs – Those costs routinely associated with implementing an electoral process in a stable electoral environment. They include the basic costs of voter registration, boundary delimitation, voting operations, the counting and transmission of results, and voter information. Sometimes called ‘ direct costs’.

Decentralized EMB – A model of electoral administration in which the powers to conduct and implement different electoral processes and/or different aspects of electoral processes have been delegated by the EMB at national level to sub-national EMBs or sub-national branches of the national EMB.

Declaration of results – Oral or written formal public communication of the result of an
electoral event. This may consist of the number of votes received by each candidate or political party contesting an election, and of the candidate(s) and/or party(ies) entitled to sit as/seat an elected member(s) under the provisions of the electoral law; or of the number of votes recorded for each of two or more options presented in the use of a direct democracy instrument.

Diffuse costs – Costs for electoral-related services that cannot be disentangled from the
general budgets of agencies that assist with the implementation of an electoral process. Sometimes referred to as indirect costs.

Direct costs – See Core costs.

Direct democracy instrument – An instrument which gives citizens the right to be directly
involved in the political decision-making process. It may take one of three forms: referendum; citizens’ initiative; or a recall vote.

Domestic observer – An individual or representative of an organization who is authorized
and accredited to observe and assess the performance of the election process in her/his own
country.

Donor – A country or intergovernmental or non-governmental organization which provides
support in the form of money, in kind contribution and/or technical assistance to the electoral
process in another country.

Electoral activity – A portion of an election task that can be assigned to one or more persons. In some election operational plans, the term ‘activity’ is equated to or used interchangeably with the term ‘task’.

Electoral administration – The measures necessary for conducting or implementing any
aspect of an electoral process.

Electoral administrator – A person who directs, manages and/or implements any of the
operations of an EMB on a day-to-day basis.

Electoral commission – A title often given to an independent EMB under the Independent
Model or to the component independent EMB under the Mixed Model of electoral management.

Electoral court – Court of justice or other body before which an electoral actor may dispute
the validity of an election, or challenge the conduct of candidates, political parties or the EMB.
See also electoral tribunal.

Electoral cycle – The full series of steps involved in the preparation, implementation and evaluation of an election or direct democracy instrument, viewed as one electoral event in a continuing series. In addition to the steps involved in a particular electoral process, it includes pre-electoral activities such as the review of relevant legal and procedural provisions and electoral registration, as well as post-electoral evaluation and/or audit, the maintenance of institutional memory, the process of consultation and the planning of the forthcoming electoral process.

Electoral dispute resolution – The process of hearing and adjudication of any complaint,
challenge, claim or contest relating to any stage of the electoral process.

Electoral district – One of the geographic areas into which a country or region may be divided for electoral purposes. See also constituency.

Electoral event – An election or direct democracy instrument.

Electoral law – One or more pieces of legislation governing all aspects of the process for electing the political institutions defined in a country’s constitution or institutional framework.

Electoral management – The process of execution of the activities, tasks and functions of
electoral administration.

Electoral management body (EMB) – An EMB is an organization or body which has been
founded for the sole purpose of, and is legally responsible for, managing some or all of the
essential (or core) elements for the conduct of elections, and of direct democracy instruments. These essential (or core) elements include determining who is eligible to vote, receiving and validating the nominations of electoral participants (for elections, political parties and/or candidates), conducting balloting, counting votes, and tabulation of votes.

Electoral network (international or regional) – A mechanism, which may be formal or
informal, through which EMBs in different countries enable themselves to share knowledge,
expertise and/or resources.

Electoral observation – A process under which observers are accredited to access an electoral process, and may assess and report on the compliance of the electoral process with relevant legal instruments and international and regional standards.

Electoral period – That central part of the electoral cycle containing a series of steps involved in the implementation of a particular electoral process, usually starting with the official announcement of polling day and ending with the announcement of final results

Electoral process – The series of steps involved in the preparation and carrying out of a specific election or direct democracy instrument. The electoral process usually includes the enactment of the electoral law, electoral registration, the nomination of candidates and/or political parties or the registration of proposals, the campaign, the voting, the counting and tabulation of votes, the resolution of electoral disputes and the announcement of results.

Electoral register – The list of persons registered as qualified to vote. In some countries known as the voters’ list or electoral roll.

Electoral regulations – Rules subsidiary to legislation made, often by the electoral management body or the ministry within which an EMB is located, under powers contained in the electoral law which govern aspects of the organization and administration of an election.

Electoral system – A set of rules and procedures which provides for the electorate to cast votes and which translates these votes into seats for parties and candidates in the legislature.

Electoral tribunal – A judicial or other institution whose specific competence is to hear
disputes on electoral matters. In Latin America, such a body is often also an EMB. See also
electoral court.

Electronic voting – Any method of voting using electronic means, including the use of
electronic machines, the Internet, telephones, mobile phones or digital television. Often referred to as e-voting.

EMB president – In some countries used as the official name of the EMB chair.

Evaluation – An independent assessment of the relevance of an organization’s strategic
objectives to its stakeholders’ needs, and the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which the organization and its legal framework have met those needs.

Expert-based EMB – An independent EMB under the Independent or Mixed Model of electoral management all of whose members are chosen and appointed because of their expertise, reputation or standing in the community. Also referred to as non-partisan EMB.

External accountability – The requirements and/or methods through which an EMB reports to external stakeholders or a constitutional authority.

External audit – Audit of an organization’s financial records or operational activities by an
independent person or body who/which is outside the structure of the organization being
audited.

External voting – A mechanism by which voters who are permanently or temporarily absent from a country are enabled to cast a vote, also called out-of-country voting.

Financial audit – An independent examination of an EMB´s accounting records to determine if they are maintained accurately and in accordance with accepted accounting standards and legal and regulatory requirements.

Financial regulations – Rules subsidiary to legislation often made by the electoral management body or the ministry responsible for public sector financial management, governing financial management issues.

Full-time EMB – An EMB all or most of whose members serve on a full-time basis during
their term of office.

General election – An election at which all those seats in an elected assembly at the national level which are subject to an election are filled simultaneously.

Government audit agency – A government body which conducts a process of external audit to examine the financial transactions and in some cases the operational activities of other public sector bodies.

Governmental Model of electoral management – An electoral management model where elections are organized and managed by the executive branch of government through a ministry, such as the Ministry of the Interior, and/or through local authorities.

Horizontal communication – The passage of information, communication or instructions
between different parts of an organization which are at the same level in its hierarchy.

Incremental budget – See baseline budget.

Independent candidate – A candidate for an elected position who is not nominated by a
political party.

Independent Model of electoral management – An electoral management model where
elections are organized and managed by an EMB which is institutionally independent and
autonomous from the executive branch of government, and which has and manages its own
budget.

Indirect costs – See Diffuse costs.

Institutional memory – The ability of an organization to retain understanding, expertise and physical records in order to be able to access and use these even after the passage of time or after a major or total change of personnel.

Integrity costs – Those costs, over and above the core costs, that are necessary to provide safety, integrity, political neutrality and a level playing field for an electoral process. They are particularly relevant for electoral events in post-conflict societies or emerging democracies.

Internal accountability – Mechanisms by which the lower-level structures within an
organization account to higher structures on their performance.

Internal audit – An audit conducted by or on behalf of an organization for internal control
purposes. Also used to describe the unit within an organization responsible for internal audits.

International observer – Representative of an international organization, association,
government or professional body, who is authorized and accredited to observe and assess the preparation for or conduct of an electoral process in a foreign country.

Jurisdiction – Refers to the competence and geographic scope of an organization’s directionmaking, decision-making and implementation powers.

Legal framework – The collection of legal structural elements defining or influencing
an electoral process, the major elements being constitutional provisions, electoral laws, other
legislation impacting on electoral processes, such as political party laws and laws structuring
legislative bodies, subsidiary electoral rules and regulations, and codes of conduct.

Liaison ministry – For an independent EMB under the Independent or Mixed Model of
electoral management, the government ministry through which the EMB can channel its views
and representations to the government, and vice versa.

List Proportional Representation – A system in which each participant party or grouping
presents a list of candidates for an electoral district, voters vote for a party, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote. Winning candidates are taken from the lists. Often referred to as ‘List PR’. Common variants include ‘closed list PR’, in which electors are restricted to voting only for a party or grouping, and ’open list PR’ where electors can express their preference for a party or grouping and for one, or sometimes more, candidates from that party or grouping.

Local authority – A body established as the legislative and/or executive arm of government at any sub-national level lower than a province, region or equivalent.

Lower-level EMB – An EMB formed at any sub-national level, for example a province, region, district or commune.

Member (of an EMB) – A person appointed or elected to serve on the body or committee
which directs the conduct of elections and the implementation of the powers and functions of
the EMB.

Mixed Model of electoral management – An electoral management model with a dual
structure which has a policy, monitoring or supervisory EMB that is independent of the
executive branch of government (like an EMB under the Independent Model or Mixed Model of electoral management) and an implementation EMB located within a department of state and/or local government (like an EMB under the Governmental Model of electoral management).

Multi-member district – An electoral district from which more than one representative is
elected to a legislature or elected body.

Multiparty-based EMB – An EMB all of whose members are nominated by political parties.

National Election Commission – A common title for an independent EMB under the
Independent or Mixed Model of electoral management, with competencies over the entire
territory of a country.

Needs assessment – A method to address institutional sustainability, by which an organization informs itself of its current management capabilities and the resources, financial, technological and human, necessary to organize and conduct its activities.

Nominating authority – A body which puts forward a candidate or candidates for election,
selection or appointment to another body or to a position.

Non-partisan member – An EMB member who has been appointed to the EMB other than as a representative of a political party.

Observer – A person accredited to witness and assess, but not intervene in, the proceedings of an electoral process. See domestic observer and international observer.

Open list – A form of List Proportional Representation in which voters can express a preference both for a party or grouping and for one, or sometimes more, candidates within the list presented by that party or grouping.

Operational plan – A plan that defines the responsibilities and time periods for all activities
that need to be undertaken to meet an organization’s strategic objectives.

Oversight body – A body charged with the task of ensuring that an electoral process is correctly conducted in line with the provisions of the legal framework.

Paper audit trail – An audit trail where records are kept in printed or written form and not
solely in an electronic form.

Part-time EMB – An EMB all or most of whose members serve on a part-time basis during
their term of office.

Party symbol – An identification figure or sign allotted to a candidate or a political party in
accordance with the electoral law.

Performance accountability – Methods by which an organization internally and externally
accounts for its progress towards achieving its strategic objectives and meeting its stakeholders’ needs.

Performance audit – Retrospective assessment of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of electoral procedures, operations and financing against an EMB’s strategic objectives within its legal and regulatory framework.

Performance evaluation – Objective assessment against expected benchmarks of the value added to an organization by an employee’s efforts.

Performance standard – A statement of benchmark criteria to be achieved, without specifying how they are to be achieved.

Permanent EMB – An EMB which has a continuous existence throughout the whole electoral
cycle and takes care of electoral matters both during and between electoral periods.

Political party based EMB – See Multiparty-based EMB.

Political party registration – Compiling of a list of political parties that meet defined legal or regulatory qualifications and may thus qualify for privileges such as proposing the nomination of candidates for election.

Polling district – An area in which all electors are allocated to vote at a single polling station.

Polling official – An member of staff who participates in the administration of a polling station on polling day. Polling officials may or may not be members of the staff of an EMB.

Polling station – A venue established for the purpose of polling and controlled by polling
Officials.

Postal voting – A mechanism for voting in which a voter completes his or her ballot paper and returns it by post to an official designated to conduct the election.

Post-electoral evaluation – A retroactive evaluation of the conduct of an electoral process, or specified parts of that process, that is completed after the electoral period.

Post-electoral period – One of three periods of the electoral cycle, during which audit and
evaluation takes place and during which legislation, regulations and administration are reformed and developed.

Post-transitional elections – Second and subsequent elections held in a country after an
initial election – following a period of, for example, dictatorship or civil war – that marked the
commencement (or re-commencement) of democratic competition in elections.

Pre-electoral period – One of three periods of the electoral cycle, during which planning and preparation for the conduct of elections take place, and during which legal and procedural provisions are reviewed.

Primary election – A public election through which a political party chooses its candidates for a forthcoming electoral process.

Proportional representation (PR) – An electoral system family based on the principle of the conscious translation of the overall votes of a party or grouping into a corresponding proportion of seats in an elected body. See List Proportional Representation.

Public servant – An employee of any organization whose core funding is provided by the
Treasury of a country.

Qualified majority – A majority requirement which demands that for a proposal to be passed, it must receive a proportion of the vote in excess of 50 per cent plus 1 – for example, 2/3 or 3/4.

Recall – A direct democracy instrument that allows a specified number of citizens to demand a vote of the electorate on whether an elected holder of public office should be removed from that office before the end of his/her term of office.

Referendum – A direct democracy instrument consisting of a vote of the electorate on an issue of public policy such as a constitutional amendment or a bill. The results of the vote may be either binding or consultative.

Regional EMB – An electoral management body at a sub-national level.

Registration of political parties and candidates – The act of accepting the applications to participate in an election of political parties and candidates that meet defined criteria.

Registration of voters – The act of entering the names of eligible electors and other relevant information in a register or list of electors.

Screening process – A process through which checks are made to verify that a candidate
for appointment as a member of an EMB or to the staff of an EMB meets the required
qualifications.

Secondary legislation – See Subsidiary regulations.

Secretariat – The structure below the policy-making EMB member level in the Independent
and Mixed Model of electoral management, which comprises the officials in the EMB who are
responsible for policy implementation. In the Governmental Model of electoral management, the secretariat is usually the sole component of the EMB, and may also have some policy-making functions.

Secretary-general – A term often used for the head of an EMB Secretariat, who may or may not be a member of the EMB.

Security of tenure – A legal measure to protect members and/or staff of an EMB from dismissal or adverse change to the terms and conditions of contract or employment without due cause and due process.

Selection process – The mechanism, procedures and conditions for appointment and/or
employment of members or secretariat staff of an EMB.

Simple majority – A majority requirement which demands that the prevailing candidate in an election (or the prevailing option in a direct democracy instrument) obtains the highest number of valid cast votes.

Single-member district – An electoral district from which only one member is elected to a
legislature or elected body.

Single-member EMB – An EMB where the powers and responsibilities for implementing the
mandate of the EMB are vested by the legal framework in a single person.

Special voting – Procedures and facilities for electors who are unable to implement the voting procedures or to access the polling station at which they are registered to vote.

Staggered membership – A system under which members of an EMB are not all appointed
at the same time and their terms of office do not end at the same time, usually used to ensure continuity in the work of an EMB.

Stakeholders – Those individuals, groups and bodies which have an interest or ‘stake’ in the operations of an organization and/or which affect or are directly affected by the activities,
policies and practices of the organization.

Standing orders – A set of rules adopted by an organization to regulate its internal structures and procedures.

State – In the context of a federal constitution, often refers to a sub-national unit of a country. In the context of supranational bodies or intergovernmental organizations, a member state refers to a country that has been accepted as a full member of that body or organization.

Strategic plan – A document used by an organization to state the organizational vision, mission, values, priorities and objectives from which its structure and budget are derived.

Subsidiary EMB – An EMB that is not the primary or principal entity responsible for the
organization of elections within a country, and that assists the primary EMB and implements
electoral tasks at local and regional levels.

Subsidiary regulations – Rules consistent with, and made under powers granted by, a law,
which provide details of the manner in which the law is to be implemented.

Supranational body – An organization created by a number of countries by treaty where power is held by independent appointed officials or by representatives elected by the legislatures or people of the member states.

Tabulation – The process of compiling the result of counting of votes cast in an electoral process. Also known as amalgamation of results.

Task profiling – Analysis of the resources required to implement a specified task to meet
specified parameters, such as time and quality.

Temporary EMB – An EMB which exists only for a specified limited period, often for the
electoral period.

Term of office – The period of time for which a member of an organization serves following
election or appointment.

Transitional EMB – An EMB which is set up temporarily to facilitate transitional elections. It
is normally set up under the auspices of the international community, such as the UN, and may consist of or include international experts as members.

Trust fund – A mechanism for aggregating individual donor contributions into a single pool of funds, held in trust and administered by an external organization (e.g., the UNDP) for use in support of an electoral process.

Vertical communication – The passage of information, communication or instructions
through an organization upwards and downwards through two or more hierarchical levels.

Voter – A person who casts a vote at an election or under a direct democracy instrument.

Voter education – A process by which people are made aware of the electoral process and the particulars and procedures for voter registration, voting, and other elements of the electoral process.

Voter information – A short-term programme focusing on specific electoral information, which aims to give relevant factual information about an electoral process to voters on a timely basis.

Voter registration card – A card issued to identify a person registered as an elector in accordance with the provisions of the electoral law.

Voters’ list – See Electoral register.

Zero base budget – A budget formulation method which treats each funding period for an
organization as a clean slate, and estimates the funds required to achieve the planned outcomes for that period. See also baseline budget.

 

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