Whether the personal qualifications required for appointment to an EMB are detailed in the electoral law generally depends on whether the EMB is expert based or multiparty based. For multiparty EMBs, political parties usually use their own criteria for appointing their representatives to the EMB, such as seniority in the party hierarchy, party membership or professional qualifications.
There are some multiparty EMBs for which the law defines criteria for members’ qualifications, such as not being a party activist or not having recently held political office. In Mozambique for example, members of the multiparty EMB are required by law to be professionally qualified and to carry out their work with integrity, independence and impartiality. This means that political parties are obliged to nominate candidates who meet the qualifications of non-partisanship and independence. Such nominees are in many cases eminent members of the community rather than members of the political parties that nominated them.
In the case of expert-based EMBs, the electoral law may define an extensive set of personal qualifications for EMB members, as it does in Indonesia. Alternatively, the law may rely on its definition of the EMB’s expected behaviour and functions to define the qualities of EMB members to be appointed, such as being known for their their moral integrity, intellectual honesty, neutrality and impartiality (Senegal).
It is typical to expect EMB members to meet the criteria of professional competence and political neutrality. In Mexico, the Philippines and Vanuatu, previous election candidates are not eligible, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mexico, Moldova, Nepal and South Africa, those with a high political profile are not considered.
In some countries, appointment is open only to those with legal training. All members of the EMB in Pakistan, Poland and Turkey must be a current or former senior judge, and the chair must hold such a position in Australia, Botswana, Portugal and Tanzania. In Lithuania, Mexico, Nepal, the Philippines, Russia and Ukraine, EMB members must have at least a university degree. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mauritius and the Philippines, a law degree and time practicing as a lawyer are required.
Other formal requirements for EMB membership generally include citizenship and often age. Requirements for gender and ethnic balance in EMB membership was discussed in Chapter 3. Citizenship requirements are common (for instance Liberia, Lithuania, the Philippines, Senegal and South Africa). However in Iraq, two of the nine members do not need to be citizens; in Tonga and Fiji, citizenship is not a requirement for the chair; and citizenship is not a requirement in New Zealand. A minimum age is mentioned but varies from 25 in Guinea to 30 in Mexico, 35 in Liberia and the Philippines, 40 in Pakistan and 45 in Nepal.
The manner in which EMB members are nominated for appointment may influence the type of person chosen, which may work in favour of or against certain sectors of society. For example, in Indonesia in 2001, it appears that the initial nominations for potential members of the new EMB were sought solely from distinguished academics; thus most nominees were also academics. Open processes can hide a more controlled environment of appointment to EMBs. For example, the 1999 EMB law in Azerbaijan required that half the EMB members be appointed by the legislature and half by the president. Since the president’s party controlled the legislature, this resulted in a nominally non-partisan but in reality government-influenced EMB.
While some electoral laws specify that EMB members must have a certain occupation, few specify any appropriate mix of experience or skills. Where qualifications are required, these are generally legal. In the corporate world, a company with activities as large and broad as an EMB’s would be unlikely to have a narrowly focused board.
