Elections
are an instrument through which the power balance in societies can be altered.
There are two key dynamics that determine whether this power change takes place
in a peaceful or in a violent manner. The first relates to the context in which
elections take place. In countries where large-scale violence is present due to
unresolved long-standing grievances and/or the activity of spoilers, it is
likely that violence will affect elections, as electoral stakeholders are
accustomed to using violent means in order to try to either hold onto or gain
power.
The second relates to the
quality of the electoral process itself. Electoral processes consist of many
building blocks. According to the electoral cycle approach, a well-known
paradigm among both practitioners and researchers, electoral processes consist
of three periods (pre-, election and post-election) with a total of eight
phases: establishment/review of the legal framework, planning and programming,
training and education, voter registration, the electoral campaign, voting
operations and election day, verification of results and post-election). Each
phase consists of micro-processes and activities that usually need to be
completed in order for the next phase to start (see figure 2: The Electoral Cycle). It is important to
highlight, however, that in some instances good quality electoral processes may
still yield results that are contested by the population; while, in other
instances, technically poor electoral processes may yield results that are
viewed as acceptable.
When elections are not designed and managed
sensitively, and if stakeholders do not perceive the process as occurring on a
level playing field, they can lead to violent epilogues. Particularly sensitive
issues include the legal and institutional framework, for example: electoral
management body composition or the rules defining the eligibility of voters,
candidates and parties; campaigning culture; procedures for the announcement of
results; effectiveness of and trust in electoral dispute resolution mechanisms;
and so on.
Drawing
on its research papers on this topic, International IDEA has classified and
described 26 internal and 10 external risk factors that can trigger or
contribute to triggering election-related violence. Internal factors (Alihodžić and Asplund 2018a) are
election-specific and do not exist outside of the electoral context. They
relate to risks surrounding electoral actors, events, practices and materials
across the electoral cycle. External factors (Alihodžić and Uribe
Burcher 2018) originate and exist outside the electoral context. They include
exogenous conditions that can negatively influence electoral processes.
Distinguishing process and structural factors has
several practical benefits. It illuminates the need for enhanced collaboration
between different communities of practice, such as election, governance,
conflict, peacebuilding and security specialists, in addressing
election-related violence. It also underlines the need for combining long- and
short-term approaches to addressing both process triggers and structural causes
of election-related violence.
Internal factors are clustered into the seven
phases[1] of the electoral cycle (reflected in
the seven sections below). The eighth phase of the electoral cycle,
post-election, is not included. Although there is a possibility that
post-electoral violence is linked to the elections themselves, the risk factors
underlying such violence may not be process-related. Rather, the incident
should be examined in the context of structural risk factors. External factors
are not tied to specific electoral phases. Each factor is described through:
a) an introduction that provides a general
definition and explanation of the context in which a given factor can trigger
or contribute to triggering election-related violence;
b) empirical cases illustrating particular
countries and electoral contexts in which the given factor was identified as
either a trigger in itself, or a factor that contributed to triggering
election-related violence. Interrelated factors point to the wider context in
which violence took place. This includes both internal and external factors.
References to the source documents are provided.
The list is not exhaustive. Also, the way in which
factors are named or described may not match local terminologies and specifics.
[1] The eighth phase of the
electoral cycle, namely the post-election phase, is not included. Although
there is a possibility that violence occurring after the implementation of
election results is linked to the elections this may not be the key trigger.
