Preventing Election-related Violence

Topic IndexRegistration of voters, political parties and election observers

The registration phase encompasses the processes of voter registration, registration of political parties and candidates, and accreditation of election observers. Registration may be controversial for a number of reasons. An inaccurate electoral register may misspell voters’ names, assign them to the wrong polling places, omit eligible electors and registrants or include non-eligible electors (for example, people who have died). Such problems will be likely to give rise to speculation as to whether those mistakes were intentional and part of electoral fraud. It is therefore important to have a registration process of a high standard which will ensure that only eligible electors are registered. Likewise, it is important to ensure that all eligible political parties and independent candidates have the opportunity to register and compete in elections. Furthermore, is important to allow interested organizations, including political parties, civil society and international non-governmental and governmental organizations, to be accredited to observe the voter registration, polling and counting processes.

Table 4. Registration of voters, political parties and election observers

A. Improved electoral management and justice

B. Improved electoral security

C. Improved infrastructure for peace

Ensure that the voter registration process is conveniently accessible to all eligible citizens including women and minority groups.
Ensure that electoral justice mechanisms have the capacity to effectively resolve complaints and disputes relating to voter registration.
Ensure transparency of and sufficient time for registration of political parties, party candidates and independent candidates.
Ensure timely and transparent accreditation of voter registration observers.

Establish and maintain close coordination between different SSAs and with an EMB during the voter registration period through a joint electoral operations centre.
Provide security to citizens and officials that participate in registration processes and safeguard registration materials and facilities.
Ensure that citizens face no security challenges while travelling to and accessing the voter registration facilities.
Provide a safe environment for those who wish to put up their nomination, especially for women candidates.

Observe voter registration processes and share findings with an EMB.
In collaboration with an EMB, build and provide capacity for dispute resolution relating to the voter registration period.
Promote multi-stakeholder collaboration through joint forums that create space for discussion and coordination of violence prevention during voter registration.

A. Improved electoral management and justice

Improved electoral management and justice during the registration phase aim to achieve a process that is technically as good as possible, safe, and trusted. The success of the registration processes will depend on the quality of the electoral laws, rules and regulations; the comprehensiveness of operational planning; and the quality of training and information campaigns. To be able to address emerging issues, an EMB must have a good situational awareness and operational agility to engage in resolving challenges that arise. This may include modification of operational plans relating to the establishment of voter registration centres and revision of the procedures and timelines relating to registration of voters, parties, candidates and observers. An EMB will benefit from credible election observation groups and therefore needs to be transparent in its work. The environment in which registration takes place should be safe and secure, while all related complaints are resolved effectively.

Ensure that the voter registration process is conveniently accessible to all eligible citizens including women and minority groups.

Voter registration may be passive or active, depending on whether eligible citizens are included in the electoral registers automatically, on the basis of the civil registry data, or are required to register by visiting designated voter registration locations. Passive voter registration requires an accurate and trusted citizen register. In many countries with a citizen register, this is not of sufficient quality to be used to extract an electoral register and voter registration needs to be organized in order to establish and maintain the electoral register. Most often, an EMB is mandated to organize these processes. Critical elements of voter registration relate to voters’ awareness, the procurement and dissemination of voter registration equipment and materials, administrative procedures, the professionalism of staff, trust and transparency.^{^[1]}Preparations need to start early on. Procedures for voter registration must be clear and concise, and voter registration staff must be professional and well trained. They must be impartial and transparent in their work. The EMB should be in contact with other electoral stakeholders during the over registration process - especially with political parties as they play a crucial role in endorsing the voter registration process. In addition, the voter registration process must be accessible to all men and women, in particular marginalized and vulnerable groups. In post-conflict or conflict-prone countries, voter registration should ensure that refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) are given an opportunity to register for voting. This may require special arrangements in terms of personal identity documentation needed for the voter registration, such as a refugee or ID card. Also, citizens of all geographical regions, regardless of their gender, ethnicity and race, must have equal access to the voter registration locations.

A new voter registration system increases the credibility of the 2008 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The 2007 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh were postponed due to a growing political crisis, demonstrations and violent incidents that had marked the pre-election period. Among other things, the EMB was criticized for lack of action to ensure the credibility of the electoral registers. These had last been updated in 2000, and it was estimated that they included
10 million ‘ghost voters’, which could lead to widespread fraud on polling day. Following the cancellation of the 2007 parliamentary elections, the newly appointed Bangladesh Electoral Commission (BEC) implemented a number of reforms, among them a new voter registration process. The BEC initiated a new voter register with photographs and other biometric data details. The registration centres were managed by the armed forces, mainly because they were the only institution in the country with the manpower and the technical and logistical expertise to complete the process on time. In addition, the army enjoyed public trust. Technical assistance was provided by the UNDP, while several civil society organizations engaged in a widespread voter and civic education programme. The accuracy of the electoral register was verified by an independent audit which affirmed that 99 per cent of the eligible electorate were on the register. The process was characterized as both careful and transparent and generated high levels of public trust in the upcoming elections and in the BEC. The level of election-related violence was also considerably lower in the run-up to the December 2008 elections compared to the levels of violence reported in the 2007 pre-election period. This was believed to be in part due to the electoral reforms.^{^[2]}

Ensure that electoral justice mechanisms have the capacity effectively to resolve complaints and disputes relating to voter registration

The way in which electoral processes are implemented may sometime open the process to legal challenges. Participation in the registration phase will be massive, involving citizens, political actors and observer groups, and the number of complaints can therefore be very high. Adequate dispute resolution capabilities should therefore be put in place to ensure that complaints are resolved efficiently and professionally. Dispute resolution mechanisms can take different forms. Administrative challenges, which are the most common type, are usually addressed and resolved by an EMB. Contested decisions can be revisited either by the EMB or by a higher-ranking organ, such as an electoral court, high court or even a constitutional court.^{^[3]} This system is widespread. Judicial challenges are addressed, as defined by law, to judicial bodies, which may be regular or administrative courts, a constitutional court or special electoral courts. Likewise, legislative challenges systems allow legislative bodies or other defined political assemblies to resolve electoral disputes.^{^[4]}

The Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq strengthens its capacity to adjudicate voter registration complaints ahead of the 2010 general election. The Iraqi general election in 2005 witnessed numerous cases of election-related violence.^{^[5]}During the run-up to the 2010 National Assembly elections, the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) undertook an update of the voter register. During the updating, the IHEC increased its institutional capacity to handle legal complaints. In Kirkuk in particular the IHEC established close cooperation with the Global Justice Project–Iraq (GJPI). Through this collaboration, three electoral dispute experts were brought on board to support the IHEC and the Kirkuk Governance Electoral Office (GEO) with the ‘adjudication of complaints concerning voter registration’. Practical work included the categorization of appeals, organizing responses to appellants and the compilation of an electronic archive of voter registration cases. This allowed the IHEC and the GEO to process disputes in a timely manner, ensuring a minimal backlog of undecided cases. Ultimately, this helped the IHEC to publish the final voter register without delays.^{^[6]}

Dispensing electoral justice—maintaining a credible voter register in South Africa. A voter register that is out of date or inaccurately compiled, or excludes eligible voters, has the potential to jeopardize the credibility and integrity of the entire electoral process. In South Africa voters are required to register to vote in the voting district in which they reside. An objection to the voter register may relate to a voter’s inclusion, exclusion or registration details. A common objection relates to a voter’s being registered in a district in which the objector believes he or she does not reside. Objections must be lodged with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which is required to investigate the objection and respond within 14 days. The investigation involves verifying the residential address of the voter. The Chief Electoral Officer of the IEC then needs to implement the decision of the Electoral Commission within three days. All eight general elections in South Africa, since the 1994 liberation elections, have been declared free and fair—underpinned by a credible voter register.^{^[7]}

Ensure transparency of and sufficient time for registration of political parties, party candidates and independent candidates

Legal requirements guiding the registration of political parties and candidates are usually included in the electoral legal framework. These may relate to geographical or gender representation, authenticating citizens’ support, minimum requirements with respect to founding documents, financial disclosure and so on. Sufficient time, fair requirements, clarity and transparency in the registration procedures, and the existence of electoral justice mechanisms to deal with complaints will ensure that the registration is a ‘level playing field’ in which rules are not designed and applied to favour or disfavour specific actors. Provisions may deny registration for individuals convicted of criminal offences and human rights abuses, or those linked to illegal armed groups.^{^[8]} Candidates with a record of stirring up electoral violence may also be disqualified through vetting procedures. However, EMBs must ensure that their mandate to disqualify candidates is not used for political reasons and, if such fears do exist, that they are properly addressed.

New political party and candidate registration rules are introduced to address election-related violence during the Bangladesh 2008 parliamentary elections. The 2007 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh were postponed due to a growing political crisis and violence that started during the pre-election period. To address cases of violence, the new Bangladesh Electoral Commission (BEC) introduced a new election law that required all political parties to register with the BEC. This had not been the case previously. To be allowed to register, all political parties were required to enhance their internal democratic procedures. Specific provisions included establishment of internal election committees, nomination of parliamentary candidates based on the recommendations of committees at grass-roots level and agreeing to fill at least one-third of all party committee seats with women by 2020. Party constitutions were also required to ban affiliated bodies such as student and labour groups. These groups had been involved in partisan violence in the past. The amendments also introduced new transparency requirements for candidate nominations to ensure that ‘clean’ candidates run for seats. Several parties opposed the reforms, but ultimately all the major parties were registered.^{^[9]}

Ensure timely and transparent accreditation of voter registration observers

Political parties and candidates, domestic civil society groups and international non-governmental and governmental organizations are interested in observing electoral processes, including voter registration. Their engagement in electoral processes may have multiple benefits for the process, including a decrease in manipulation and fraud, and increased credibility of elections. To ensure the professionalism of observers, an EMB should work together with observer organizations to organize joint training courses, thus ensuring that observers are well informed about relevant procedures, operational details, and the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in electoral processes. The guiding reference documents that can be used to strengthen the training of observers are: (a) the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations,^{^[10]} and (b) the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers.^{^[11]}

The Kenyan EMB, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, accredits long-term electoral observer missions ahead of the voter registration process. Following the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007-08, the Krieger Commission found that the poor performance of the Election Commission of Kenya (ECK) contributed to these problems, in part due to the lack of transparency which “leads to the publication of inaccurate and alarming documents on the subject.”[12] To address previous weaknesses, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) set up a new voter registration process, using biometric voter registration equipment. To enhance public confidence in the process, the IEBC invited electoral observation organizations to observe the voter registration processes. Among others, the European Union (EU), The Carter Center and the East African Community (EAC) accredited long-term observers (LTOs) to observe biometric voter registration.^{^[13]}Before the deployment of LTOs, accredited organizations conducted meetings with key electoral stakeholders, including the police, civil society organizations and the donor community. These pre-assessment meetings allowed the EAC to ‘prepare for the deployment of an election observation mission’ which included 30 LTOs and 25 short-term observers (STOs).^{^[14]}

B. Improved electoral security

During the registration period, a large number of voter registration centres have to be established. This increases the demand for a security presence and protection. The main electoral actors that need protection include male and especially female electoral officials, election observers, and political party nominees/candidates, as well as vulnerable and marginalized groups. In addition, security arrangements need to be put in place to safeguard electoral facilities and registration materials and equipment while being transported or stored. Security sector agencies may have to deal with ‘no-go zones’ where registration is not taking place because of lack of security.^{^[15]}

Establish and maintain close security coordination between different SSAs and with an EMB during the voter registration period through a joint electoral operations centre

Joint electoral operations centres (JEOCs) combine military-police-civilian communications and coordination centres.^{^[16]} The establishment of a JEOC may serve the purpose of enhanced collaboration between different security sector agencies that share electoral security mandates and an EMB during elections. These centres have been essential in the planning and implementation of electoral security strategies in post-conflict environments where security responsibilities are shared between national and international security stakeholders. Examples of international peacekeepers initiating the formation of JEOCs include Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo and Liberia. This practice may be applicable in a context where international peacekeepers are not present.

A Joint Registration Taskforce is set up during the voter registration phase ahead of the 2000 municipal elections in Kosovo. After the armed conflict in Kosovo, which saw approximately 12,000 deaths and over 200,000 refugees, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established to govern the province until its future status was determined. Ahead of the 2000 municipal elections, UNMIK and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) had the responsibility for administrating civil and voter registration.^{^[17]} To address registration challenges, UNMIK and the OSCE set up a Joint Registration Taskforce (JRT). With respect to security issues, the JRT involved the NATO-led international Kosovo Force and the international policing component of UNMIK. Additional security was carried out by the Kosovo Police Service which was at the time subordinated to the UNMIK Police.^{^[18]}

Provide security to citizens and officials that participate in registration processes and safeguard registration materials and facilities

Citizens need adequate security guarantees to engage in voter registration.^{^[19]} Not all voter registration centres may face security risks, and the deployment of SSAs should reflect risk levels. When risks are very high and security agencies lack sufficient resources to provide adequate security to all locations, SSAs may work closely with an EMB to organize mobile voter registration centres. These should allow the registration of citizens in high-risk areas while at the same time safeguarding them properly. However, such a decision may create logistical complexities and increase the exposure of election staff and security sector personnel during relocation. If such a decision is taken, it is crucial that the EMB carries out an information campaign stating clearly the dates and times when the mobile voter registration centre will be visiting particular locations. The integrity and transparency of the process must be maintained. It is also important to balance the presence and visibility of security sector agencies. Ideally, they should be visible to the extent sufficient to deter violence, but without scaring potential registrants off.^{^[20]}
Security sector agencies cooperate closely in providing security during voter registration ahead of the 2010 parliamentary election in Iraq. Elections in Iraq are organized in a complex security environment. Security for the voter registration centres (VRCs), governorate electoral offices (GEOs) and sensitive materials (including escorts for convoys transporting materials) was provided by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) throughout the voter registration phase. Ahead of registration, the ISF and field security officers categorized each VRC as a high-, moderate- or low-risk location and deployed protection based on the threat ratings. Protection to the VRCs was provided by the Iraqi police or army or a combination of the two. In terms of coordination, election security was maintained through an Elections High Security Committee composed of the Independent High Election Commission (IHEC), the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Office of the National Security Advisor, the Multi-National Force, and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). On the local level, IHEC field security personnel, located in each GEO and working with other security sector agencies (the Iraqi MoI and MoD liaison officers attached to each GEO), were tasked with planning and implementing security procedures for their GEO and VRCs.^{^[21]}

Ensure that citizens face no security challenges while travelling to and accessing the voter registration facilities

Some citizens, in particular women and marginalized groups, but also vulnerable groups such as ethnic and religious minorities, IDPs and others, may face increased security challenges in reaching voter registration centres. This may entail exposure to psychological intimidation and physical attack. Strategies for protecting these voters may include increased security on the main routes they use to access the voter registration facilities, or the organization of mobile centres that will bring the voter registration process closer to marginalized and vulnerable groups.

The armed forces and police establish checkpoints to increase security during the 2012 voter registration in the Philippines. Past elections in the Philippines have witnessed numerous incidents in which citizens and candidates were the victims of election-related violence perpetrated by armed groups. During voter registration in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in 2012, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) were tasked with ensuring the safe conduct of the voter registration process that was carried out by the Commission on Elections (Comelec). In coordination with Comelec, security checkpoints, manned by soldiers and police officers, were established to enforce a ban on private individuals carrying guns. This measure was deployed to ‘ensure a safe, peaceful conduct of a region-wide voters’ listing process’. The army also monitored 900 election hot spot areas and movements by partisan groups during the voter registration period in the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao Del Sur, Suli and Twai-Tawi.^{^[22]}

Provide a safe environment to those seeking nomination

Standing as a political party or independent candidate in elections may, in some countries and social contexts, entail exposure to potential psychological or physical violence perpetrated by political opponents or dominant or majority groups. This is particularly true where women stand as candidates in societies that are traditionally dominated by men or where religious dogmas are abused to suppress equality. Similar challenges may be faced by ethnic and religious minority group candidates or members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. Security sector agencies should gather intelligence and take concrete measures to identify problems and create a safe environment in which all citizens can safely put up their political nomination and participate in the electoral processes.

Security arrangements for candidates put in place ahead of the Philippine mid-term 2013 elections. In 2009, a group of 58 people, heading towards an election office to file a candidacy for the Deputy Mayor of the town of Buluan, were abducted and killed.[23] Ahead of the 2013 elections, the Philippines Commission on Elections (Comelec) issued a resolution that allowed political candidates running for senators’ positions to apply for security personnel or bodyguards. These may be ‘regular members of the national police or the armed forces, or the National Bureau of Investigation, and as augmentation, duly licensed/authorized protective agents of private detective agencies or accredited private security agencies, to provide security, for the duration of the election period’. Candidates for all other local elective positions may, upon application, be authorized to employ, avail themselves of and engage the services of no more than two duly licensed/authorized protective agents of private detective agencies or accredited private security agencies, to act as their security personnel or bodyguards within the duration of the election period.^{^[24]}

The Nigerian Police provide security during political party primaries ahead of the April 2011 general election. Election-related violence has accompanied previous elections in Nigeria. To avoid ‘those who lost out in the primaries ganging-up to cause chaos in the state’,^{^[25]} the Nigerian Police increased security during state and national political party primaries.^{^[26]}During the political party primaries ahead of the 2011 general election, a total of 17,000 security officers were deployed into regular, anti-riot and anti-bomb units. The security provided to venues and the delegates was coordinated by the Nigerian Police, the State Security Services and the National Security and Civil Defence Corps.^{^[27]}

C. Improved infrastructure for peace

Starting the registration phase will increase the need for extended collaboration among various state and non-state actors which, as part of the national peace architecture, work to support peaceful elections. In particular, collaboration with the EMB and SSAs will gain new impetus. Obtaining accreditation to monitor electoral processes may be a first step that CSOs should focus on. They also need to build communication routines that will allow them to share relevant information and analysis with the EMB and explore the potential to work with it in providing support to dispute resolution. This may include the establishment or promotion of multi-stakeholder collaborative forums where the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence during registration processes can be coordinated.

Observe voter registration processes and share findings with an EMB

It is well established that observation and monitoring of highly contested processes, such as elections, may have a violence-prevention effect. This is especially true when impartial and reputable stakeholders, domestic or international, do the observation. CSOs should therefore collaborate in ensuring that their observers are accredited to observe voter registration processes. If the observers’ presence is not sufficient to deter violence, they will be able to make a record of incidents that includes details about the perpetrators, victims and circumstances that triggered these incidents. In addition to observing incidents at the voter registration locations, CSOs should engage in the collection of data relating to electoral violence that occurs outside voter registration facilities, and may relate to intimidation, threats and physical violence directed against citizens, political actors, journalists, and so on. It may be particularly useful to disaggregate the data and show to what extent the perpetrators of violence target women registrants, candidates and journalists. The data collected should be shared with relevant stakeholders, including the EMB, law enforcement agencies and other organizations that have a mandate to prevent and mitigate electoral violence or an interest in doing so. In some instances, it may be productive to make these data publicly available through websites or the media.

Domestic CSO observers record incidents of violence and intimidation during the voter registration period ahead of the 2011 Nigerian presidential elections. The Nigerian elections held in 2003 and 2007 were marked by widespread election-related violence. Ahead of the national elections in 2011, Project 2011 Swift Count was initiated. It brought together a consortium of CSOs and religious groups, both Christian and Muslim, to promote peaceful, free and fair elections through independent citizen observation. The objective of the project was to provide all electoral stakeholders, including the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), with independent, non-partisan, comprehensive and detailed information on the conduct of the electoral process. For the voter registration exercise, approximately 1,000 volunteers were trained, accredited and deployed throughout all of Nigeria’s 36 states as well as the Federal Capital Territory. Among other things, observers were requested to record incidents of individuals attempting to disrupt the registration exercise as well as incidents of intimidation and violence. Furthermore, observers were required to make a note of security personnel present at the registration centre. Observers were requested to send their reports on a daily basis using their mobile phones to the National Information Centre where the data were reconciled. The observation and reporting also covered voting operations and vote counting. Throughout the process, Project Swift Count communicated its findings through public reports and statements which included recommendations with the INEC.^{^[28]}

In collaboration with an EMB, build and provide capacity for dispute resolution relating to the voter registration period

The implementation of voter registration on a large scale may be very challenging. For example, determining citizens’ eligibility to register for voting in a post-conflict environment where record books have been destroyed and people have been displaced on a massive scale may involve exceptional operational and political challenges. Furthermore, voter registration may involve complex procedures that are prone to technical glitches and human error. Voter lists ought to be maintained in a manner that prevents the unlawful or fraudulent registration or removal of persons. But, if crises still arise from the perception that the voter registration process is being manipulated in order to disenfranchise particular individuals or groups, it is important to address them in a timely and effective fashion. Where electoral justice institutions lack capacity to deal with electoral disputes effectively, or they enjoy little trust among political actors, it may be beneficial to promote the use of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in the management of disputes relating to voter registration. This is not to replace electoral justice institutions, but rather to open up additional channels that can produce outcomes that will be accepted. In some instances, mediation by reputable and knowledgeable individuals will resolve the matter instantly and avoid the sometimes long and complicated processes that will lead to an administrative or judicial ruling. Engagement of non-state actors in the mediation of electoral disputes should always be done with the consent of, and in collaboration with, the EMB and backed by relevant legislation.

Promote multi-stakeholder collaboration through joint forums that create space for discussion and coordination of violence prevention during voter registration

Improved coordination during the voter registration phase between non-state and state actors which work to support peaceful elections will help non-state and state actors to build an understanding about the efforts and strategies of individual organizations in this regard. This information will be useful in ensuring that different organizations cooperate in such a way that they reinforce each other, and that possible gaps are identified and addressed. If such collaborative forums have not already been established by an EMB or other state actors, or do not include non-state participants, non-state actors may take the initiative to establish and maintain such forums. In that case, they should involve the EMBs and SSAs in discussions.

[1] For an overview of voter registration procedures, see International IDEA, Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006), pp. 65–6, 265.

[2] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Elections in Bangladesh 2006–2009: Transforming Failure Into Success (Dhaka: UNDP, 2010), pp. 6–12, 42, 43, 79–80, 120, available at <http://www.undp.org.bd/info/pub/election%20in%20bangladesh.pdf>, accessed 23 October 2012.

[3] International IDEA, Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2010), p. 137.

[4] Ibid., pp. 138–41.

[5] International Crisis Group, ‘In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency’, 15 February 2006, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/In%20Their%20Own%20Words%20Reading%20the%20Iraqi%20Insurgency.pdf>, accessed 10 April 2013.

[6] Global Justice Project Iraq, ‘Voter Registration Disputes Resolution Kirkuk Adjudication Assistance Program’, 29 July 2009, available at <http://content.lib.utah.edu/utils/getfile/collection/qip/id/405/filename/image>, accessed 10 April 2013.

[7] Contribution from the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) by Mosotho Moepya, Chief Electoral Officer of the IEC, and Stuart Murphy, Manager, Delimitation and Voting of the IEC, 30 April 2013.

[8] See the debate about vetting candidates in ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, ‘Vetting Electoral Candidates’, 2010, available at <http://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/archive/questions/replies/827374909>.

[9] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Elections in Bangladesh 2006–2009, pp. 6, 9, 120.

[10] See <http://www.gndem.org/declaration-of-global-principles>.

[11] See <http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/observation_coc.cfm>.

[12] Kriegler and Waki Reports Summarized Version, Revised Edition 2009, pp 15, see http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_16094-1522-2-30.pdf, accessed 19 September 2018

[13] See <http://www.wiredkenya.com/jobs-in-kenya-independent-electoral-and-boundaries-commission-iebc-accreditation-of-long-term-election-observers/>.

[14] ‘EAC to Send Kenya General Election Observers’, Daily Nation, 21 November 2012, available at <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/EAC-to-send-Kenya-poll-observers-/-/1064/1625914/-/rj218vz/-/index.html>, accessed 9 April 2013.

[15] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming (New York: Democratic Governance Group/Bureau for Development Policy, 2009), p. 20.

[16] Fischer, Jeff, ‘Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention’ IFES White Paper, February 2002, p. 25, available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan019255.pdf>, accessed 3 June 2013.

[17] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘Registration Sites Open to the Media’, 3 May 2000, available at <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/52028>, accessed 25 April 2013.

[18] International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), ‘Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention’ (IFES, 2002), pp. 9, 25–8, available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan019255.pdf>, accessed 8 April 2013.

[19] USAID and Creative Associates International, Electoral Security Framework: Technical Guidance Handbook (Washington, DC: USAID, 2010), pp. 5–6, 26.

[20] Höglund, K. and Jarstad, A., Strategies to Prevent and Manage Electoral Violence: Considerations for Policy, Policy & Practice Brief, No. 1 (Umhlanga Rocks: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), June 2010), p. 4.

[21] Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq, ‘Security for Voter Registration Update’, fact sheet, available at <http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=38VoOXuib2o%3D&tabid=4312&language=en-US>, accessed 5 December 2012.

[22] ‘Advocacy for Clean, Free ARMM Voters’ Registration Launched’, Philippine Star, 3 July 2012, available at <http://www.philstar.com/breaking-news/2012/07/03/824046/advocacy-clean-free-armm-voters-registration-launched>, accessed 12 December 2012.

[23] See: <http://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Philippines/sub5_6b/entry-3856.html>, accessed 19 September 2018

[24] Commission on Elections (Comelec), Resolution No 9591-A, Section 6, 4 December 2012, available at <http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=Elections/2013natloc/res/res9561>, accessed 12 December 2012.

[25] ‘PDP Primaries: Security Beef-up in Bayelsa’, NBF News, 9 January 2011, available at <http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/43500/1/pdp-primaries-security-beef-up-in-bayelsa.htm>, accessed 17 April 2013.

[26] ‘PDP Primaries Held in Abuja Amid Tight Security’, African Examiner, 7 January 2011, available at <http://www.africanexaminer.com/pdp0107>, accessed 17 April 2013.

[27] ‘PDP Presidential Primaries: Security Operatives Take Over Abuja’, Nigerian Tribune, 10 January 2011, available at <http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/15905-pdp-presidential-primary-security-operatives-take-over-abuja-comb-eagle-square-hotels-motor-parks-anti-terrorism-police-to-monitor-primary-petitions-flood-party-secretariat-court-decides-jonathans-fate-today>, accessed 17 April 2013.

[28] Project 2011 Swift Count, ‘Interim Statement on the Voter Registration Exercise’, 1 February 2011, available at <http://www.ndi.org/files/PSC_Statement_020111.pdf>, accessed 13 December 2012.

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Preventing Election-related Violence