The official election results are announced by the leadership of
an EMB. To safeguard electoral integrity, the results must be managed
professionally and transparently. Also, at the time when the election results
are announced, there should be no cases that could influence the election
outcome still pending judicial resolution. In practice, unofficial
announcements often precede the official announcement. In addition to an EMB,
political parties and other observer groups may publish their preliminary results
and estimates. Such reporting can differ in accuracy and in some cases be based
on unverified facts, even rumours. Contradictory and sensationalistic
statements may deepen mistrust and feed the perception that elections are
rigged. If the margin of victory is narrow, complaints are not resolved
professionally, and the winner takes all power, losing parties may resort to
violence to prevent the results being implemented or secure a power-sharing
agreement. To prevent election-related violence, an EMB must ensure that the
management of election results is transparent and that complaints are resolved
effectively and professionally before the final results are announced. Security
sector agencies must ensure that they act on signs of impending electoral violence
and protect vulnerable individuals, groups and facilities. Other state and
non-state actors can work at the grassroots level and with the key political
actors to promote peace between different groups and peaceful implementation of
the election results, especially if it involves the transition of power.
|
Table 7. Election
results announcement
|
|
A.
Improved electoral management and justice
|
B.
Improved electoral security
|
C.
Improved infrastructure for peace
|
- Manage the election results in a
professional and transparent way to ensure that the credibility of the
results is protected.
- Ensure that complaints, in particular
those with the potential to affect the overall election results, are resolved
before the final results are announced.
- Collaborate with election observation
groups, including domestic and international election observation missions,
and the media in respect to publication of official and unofficial
preliminary and final results.
- Communicate preliminary results and
announce the final election results in a clear and concise way.
|
- Monitor indicators of impending
violence relating to the announcement of election results.
- Ensure that vulnerable individuals
and groups, such as women and minorities, are protected.
- Ensure that security sector
interventions are not used to suppress political liberties and the free
expression of opinion.
- Cooperate with other actors to ensure
a multi-layered approach in addressing risks related to the announcement of
election results.
|
- Build scenarios for engagement in
addressing tensions relating to the election results.
- Uphold peace forums that involve
diverse stakeholders at national and sub-national level throughout the period
of the announcement of the election results.
- Coordinate peace-building efforts
with security sector agencies.
|
A. Improved
electoral management and justice
Following voting day and the completion of the count, an EMB will
face pressures from politicians, the media, and the public to announce the
final election results as soon as possible. Before doing so, it must ensure
that the results are accurate. This may include obtaining original log forms
and consolidated reports from each polling station/region. Electoral complaints
that could influence the election outcome must also be resolved. Due to the
large number of polling stations and the geographical distance between central
office and remote regions, shipping the necessary documentation to the central
EMB office may take time. Also, the timelines for resolving electoral disputes
may be prolonged due to specific legal remedies. If the time between voting day
and the announcement of the results is longer than expected, or the
announcement is delayed, an EMB must be able to demonstrate that results and
complaints are being managed professionally and in a way that leaves no room
for malpractice. Transparency and openness to collaboration with other
stakeholders, such as political parties and CSOs, will help an EMB to promote
its integrity and credibility of election results.
- Manage the election results
in a professional and transparent way to ensure that the credibility of the
results is protected
An EMB must have a safe and secure means for the transmission of election
results. These may include electronic transmission and shipment of a hard copy.
An electronic transmission system should be established and tested in advance,
including alternative methods of data transmission. In addition to conveying
the election results to the central EMB, locally generated results should be
made available to all electoral monitors, including political party and other
domestic and international observers. It is good practice to ask observers to
co-sign result the forms and to issue them a copy of the forms. Sensitive
electoral materials, primarily ballot papers, must be kept safely to ensure
that they can be inspected and recounted when necessary.
Automating
elections reduces conflicts and tensions surrounding the 2010 elections in the
Philippines. Election-related violence in the Philippines, especially the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), is a common and deeply rooted
issue. During the 2007 national and local elections, due to manual procedures,
it took days and weeks for local-level results to be announced and months for
the national results to be announced. In 2010, the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) decided that the national and local elections would be automated
through the use of precinct count optical scanners (PCOSs). By the close of
voting, all ballot papers were scanned. The PCOSs tabulated the results and
transmitted them electronically to the higher canvassing bodies. Hard copies of
the results were also delivered to those concerned. As a result, local-level
results were compiled within just a few hours and within 72 hours the national
results were almost final. In Sulu province, there were fewer incidents of
election-related violence during the 2010 elections than in earlier elections
‘as a result of the significantly decreased human involvement in the counting
of votes and canvassing of election results, and the unprecedented speed with
which the results were arrived at’.[1]
Transparent
management of the election result helps the credibility of electoral processes
during the 2006 elections in Bolivia. In 2005, Bolivia experienced violent
protests in which the formation of an assembly to draft a new constitution
which would grant more autonomy to the Bolivian provinces was demanded.[2] The
election of a constituent assembly and a referendum on regional autonomy took
place in 2006. Although they were organized in a tense environment, the
Election Commission of Bolivia delivered an election that was regarded as
credible and genuine.[3] The
transmission of results was handled to the satisfaction of the European Union
(EU) Election Observation Mission (EOM). For example, the EU-EOM observed that
‘provisions of copies of the results forms from the polling stations to the
party agents helped the political organizations to monitor the process.
Furthermore, the EU-EOM final report explains that ‘electoral authorities
placed scanned copies of the result forms from all polling stations on the
internet, which further increased the credibility of the counting process. In
terms of the result announcement, the EU-EOM mentions the following: ‘The low
number of official complaints, together with the general efficiency of the
electoral authorities, made possible an exceptionally fast processing of the
results. While the legally established deadline for finalizing the counting of
the votes was July 27, the CNE was able to give the official proclamation of
the results already on July 12, more rapidly than ever before in the electoral
history of Bolivia.’[4]
- Ensure that complaints, in
particular those with the potential to affect the overall election results, are
resolved before the final results are announce
During the polling and
counting processes, electoral actors may submit a large number of complaints.
The bulk of complaints may relate to occurrences at the polling and counting
locations and include systemic problems, for example, inaccuracies in the
electoral registers or a lack of sufficient sensitive and non-sensitive
electoral materials; the performance or actions of polling and counting
officials, observers and voters (e.g. the management of polling and counting
processes and compliance with relevant procedures); and serious breaches of the
electoral rules and regulations that can impact electoral outcomes, such as
ballot stuffing and falsification of the election results. In addition,
electoral complaints may relate to incidents outside the polling and counting
locations, such as violation of a ‘no-campaigning period’, vote buying,
intimidation of electorates and other electoral stakeholders, and so on. An EMB
must work closely with the security, prosecution and judiciary agencies to
ensure that all complaints are processed in an effective and timely way. In
particular, an EMB must ensure that the complaint log forms from the polling
and counting locations are examined by the relevant instances. If malpractice
is suspected, an investigation should be initiated, and the perpetrators
sanctioned. Where evidence or indications exist that electoral manipulation has
affected the election results, a recount or a repeat of the polling can be
imposed to ensure that the credibility of the election results is
preserved.
Mexican electoral
authorities investigate allegations of fraud and perform a partial recount
before the official result announcement in 2006. In 2006, street protests broke
out for several months after one presidential candidate, who had lost by a
narrow margin, rejected the election results.[5] During
the 2012 general elections, the margin between the winning and the next
candidate was 6 per cent, and one losing presidential candidate rejected
the preliminary results published by the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE).
Moreover, a full recount was demanded. Allegations included vote buying,
through giving away supermarket food coupons; manipulating opinion polls; and
paying broadcasters to favour one candidate. The fraud allegations triggered
peaceful demonstrations in Mexico City.[6] Soon
after polling day, the IFE decided to recount the votes at more than half of
the country’s 143,000 polling stations. The Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPFJ),
after considering all legal challenges to the results, dismissed appeals
calling for an annulment of the vote, finding insufficient evidence of vote
buying.[7] The
official election results were declared by the TEPFJ and the IFE approximately
two months after polling day. Although the IFE had found some irregularities
during the recount, these were not significant to change the results. The IFE
regarded the recount as an ‘exercise in openness and transparency’.[8] ..
- Collaborate with election
observation groups, including domestic and international election observation
missions, and the media in respect to the publication of unofficial and
official preliminary and final results
Well-organized electoral observers, including political party and domestic
observers, will be able to cover most, rarely all, polling and counting
locations. Transparent voting and counting processes will allow observers to
get results from different counting locations and compile the overall results
in parallel with the election administrators. In some situations, observers may
publish unofficial results even before an EMB is in a position to do so.
However, these results may be prone to mistakes and misleading, sometimes
intentionally. For example, if these results are compiled wrongly or presented
only partially, or if they ignore electoral complaints, they may be misleading.
On the other hand, when observers manage the results accurately and
impartially, they may be an important reference point for an EMB. An EMB should
therefore collaborate closely with election observation groups and the media to
ensure that results can be cross-checked and that disputed results are verified
before being presented to the public. An EMB should discourage publication of incomplete
or disputed results that may raise unrealistic expectations and tensions and
lead to conflicts and violence. If such results are announced, an EMB should
react to make the public aware and inform it about the status of the official
results.
The Ugandan
election authority regulates publication of the final election results to
prevent misunderstandings and faulty reporting during the 2011 elections.
During the run-up to the 2011 general elections, which witnessed some
election-related violence,[9] one
presidential candidate issued a statement that he and his campaign team would
announce the results immediately after polling day in order to ‘forestall
rigging’.[10] In
2006, the same candidate had rejected the election results, calling for a
recount after losing to an incumbent candidate.[11] However,
the announcement of the results in 2011 was regulated by the Ugandan Electoral
Commission, which released a set of rules for media coverage. The code of
conduct was developed by the Commission with the help of the Independent Media
Council of Uganda and the UN High Commission on Human Rights. It emphasizes the
importance of free and fair media coverage and points out that only the
Electoral Commission has the right to announce the final results. This specific
provision aimed to prevent misunderstandings and faulty reporting. Accordingly,
the media are allowed to cover different polling stations and present the
result from the specific station but are not allowed to announce the final
results.[12] Prior
to the launching of the Code of Conduct, the African Centre for Media
Excellence (ACME) published guidelines for media coverage through a
participatory process to which the Ugandan Election Commission was a party.[13]
- Communicate preliminary
results and announce the final election results in a clear way
Following
the voting and counting processes, political actors, journalists and the
broader public will expect an announcement of election results in a short
period of time. However, publication of the preliminary and final results is a
sensitive process that, especially in conflict-prone societies, can generate
disputes and conflict. When providing preliminary results for general
elections, an EMB must ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, these draw
on a proper sample. For example, it should reflect the ratio between rural and
urban communities as well as the geographical, social and other diversities
that determine political alignments. The broader public, journalists and
political analysts should be able to understand these details. Use of the
geo-spatial tools for data presentation may be helpful. Preliminary results
should be published periodically and an EMB should avail itself of press
conferences to provide comments and explanations. If any serious complaints,
which could impact on the final results, are being considered, an EMB should
keep the public informed about this fact. When an EMB publishes the final
results, these should be presented in a clear and concise way. If the final
results include seat allocation, the background information on candidates’
electoral unit, the number of votes and the method for converting number of
votes into number of seats should be available and explained.
Transparent and well-organized result management by the Independent Electoral
Commission of South Africa (IEC) ensures clear communication of results to
electoral stakeholders and the public. Elections in South Africa are organized
in an environment characterized by some social tensions and conflicts. Conflict
sensitivity is an important aspect of electoral management. Ahead of the 2009
national and provincial elections, certain areas of KwaZulu-Natal province
experienced some election-related violence during the pre-election phase.[14] During
the phase of election results announcement, the IEC organized a display of the
results information on leader boards at the IEC national and provincial results
centres, as well as on the IEC’s website. In this respect, nine Result
Operation Centers (ROCs) were established throughout the country. The national
ROC in Pretoria was established to allow the IEC and other interested
stakeholders, including the media and political parties, to monitor the various
processes leading up to election day and the results announcements.[15] Furthermore,
on a regular basis, the ROCs used Global Information System (GIS) mapping
technology to display the results in a visually simplified manner which
rendered the results information discernible. The IEC also published several of
the maps through international and national broadcasting networks.[16] The
IEC is legally bound to declare the results within one week of an election. The
2009 results were published after three days and included information on the
allocation of seats to the political parties contesting the election. Within
seven days after election day, the IEC designated seats to the respective party
candidates, and published the names of the designated representatives.[17] All
objections relating to election results were dealt by the IEC before the final
results were announced. According to the Electoral Act, the IEC informs
objectors, and any other party involved, about its decisions relating to
objections. Objectors can appeal to the Electoral Court, but this does not
delay announcement of the final election results. In 2009, the IEC received 25
objections, most of which were rejected as not being objections contemplated in
terms of the Electoral Act.
B. Improved electoral
security
The
announcement of the final election results will reveal the electoral ‘winners
and losers’. In some situations, political competitors will have a good sense
of who is expected to win elections even before the final results are
announced. In other cases, the margin of victory may be narrow and it may be
hard to predict the winner before all ballot papers are processed and electoral
disputes are resolved. Due to the high political stakes and anxieties, the
period around the announcement of the election results may be prone to
conflicts and incidents. If rigging of the result is suspected—regardless of
whether these suspicions are grounded or not—losing parties, their supporters
and the broader citizenry can initiate demonstrations. It should be kept in
mind that candidates who have personal motives to obstruct verification and
implementation of the election results may manipulate citizens. Some incentives
to instigate violence may include a determination to remain in elected office,
secure a power sharing deal, force a repeat of the elections, undermine
electoral processes and institutions, and so on. During the period of the
announcement of the election results, security sector agencies must focus on
detecting signs of impending violence in order to prevent and mitigate violent
incidents before they escalate into a large-scale violence. In particular, SSAs
should focus on the protection of electoral actors, vulnerable groups and
electoral facilities. In doing so, they must maintain impartiality and refrain
from the excessive use of force. Close collaboration with other actors and
civil society groups will increase the chances of such situations being
peacefully resolved.
- Monitor indicators of
impending violence relating to announcement of election results
During
the period of election result verification, security sector agencies should
collect information that may give an early indication of impending violence.
Such information may include early and ungrounded announcements of electoral
victory; threats made by prominent political stakeholders against political
opponents and their supporters, electoral actors and vulnerable groups;
rejection of the results prior to or after the announcement; claims that the
elections have been rigged; verbal conflicts between political stakeholders;
cases of intimidation; and so on. The risks identified may be many, but good
intelligence will assist in planning scenarios for the prevention and
mitigation of election-related violence and in ensuring that SSAs deploy
rationally.
Security
is heightened before the Egyptian 2012 presidential election result
announcement. The 2012 Egyptian presidential election was the first such after
the 2011 revolution. There was a run-off between two candidates, both of whom
had declared victory before the results were officially announced by the
Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC). As a result, violent protests
from candidates’ supporters were feared. To respond to increased risks,
Egyptian security forces deployed 3,000 police and military officers to
safeguard key political and economic sites throughout the country before the
election results were officially announced by the SPEC. Enhanced security was
provided to all public institutions and the Suez Canal.[18]
- Ensure that vulnerable
individuals and groups, such as women and minorities, are protected
Experience
from different contexts when the announcement of election results has triggered
outbreaks of violence shows that election-related violence is often directed
against marginalized and vulnerable groups. Women and girls, men and boys are
sexually abused; ethnic and religious minorities are maltreated, killed and
expelled from their homes and their property and places of worship are
destroyed. In case of such concerns, SSAs should demonstrate determination to
protect vulnerable groups. Practical actions may include public statements in
this regard, swift investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators of
incidents, and the deployment of standing security capacities to guard
vulnerable communities.
- Ensure that security sector
interventions are not used to suppress political liberties and the free
expression of opinion
In
conflict-prone societies, security sector personnel will often receive
additional training to ensure that they deploy sensitively when protecting
electoral processes. However, in many cases, incumbent officials and elites
have used security sector agencies to suppress opposition and stop citizens
from protesting against perceived electoral manipulation. Very often, police
interventions against citizens have resulted in excessive use of force. If
disturbances do happen relating to the election results, the SSAs must remain professional
and politically impartial and act in accordance with the professional code of
conduct. The force should not be used to suppress political liberties and the
free expression of opinion. When this is a concern, senior officials must take
measures to reinforce understanding of these principles within all agencies. On
the other hand, security agencies must demonstrate resoluteness in prosecuting
those who provoke violent conflict and instigate violent incidents.
- Cooperate with other actors
to ensure a multi-layered approach in addressing risks related to the announcement
of election results
The
deployment of security sector agencies in resolving electoral disputes may help
in separating hostile communities and providing physical security to vulnerable
groups and facilities. However, this will not address the root causes of
conflict, nor will it help bridge different positions. The engagement of SSAs
will prevent violence escalation and create space for peace-building efforts.
Security sector agencies therefore need to maintain close collaboration with
other state and non-state actors and reputable individuals and groups that can
help in mediating conflicts and reaching peaceful settlements.
C. Improved
infrastructure for peace
It is well established that the announcement of election results, particularly
in conflict-prone societies where the election winner takes all power, or where
electoral processes lack credibility, may increase tensions and trigger violent
outbreaks. Different actors may have different incentives to resort to violent
means in order to derail the implementation of election results. If citizens’
groups and losing political parties fear that the election results have been
rigged, they may initiate protests. These protests may turn violent or attract
violent responses from the security sector agencies. Incumbent candidates who
lose an election may rig the election results and clamp down on their political
opponents using the state security agencies. The opposition parties may resort
to violent tactics in an attempt to secure favourable power-sharing deals.
There are many possible scenarios that may lead to outbreaks of violence during
the electoral phase in which election results are announced. Non-state and state
actors which form infrastructures for peace may be important and are sometimes
the only force that has the legitimacy and capacity to engage with different
actors and promote non-violent resolution of disputes surrounding election
results.
- Build scenarios for
engagement in addressing tensions relating to the election results
Non-state
and state actors that promote peace and the peaceful resolution of electoral
disputes may be well positioned to engage in deflating tensions and mediating
conflicts arising from disputed election results. Those familiar with electoral
processes and the dynamics of structural conflicts in a given country will be
able to make reasonably accurate predictions about the reactions of political
actors and citizens with respect to different electoral outcomes.
Methodological consistency in the assessment and analysis of multiple risks
will ensure that predictions are even more accurate. This analysis will help
create different scenarios for action. The aim is to ensure that relevant non-state
and state actors are prepared to engage in reducing tensions. Coordination will
ensure that the engagement is timely and comprehensive and that it reaches all
communities. Efforts should focus on protecting marginalized and vulnerable
groups, including women. Scenarios need to be periodically revised and modified
to reflect the most recent developments.
Scenario planning ahead of the Iraqi 2005 National Assembly elections. During
the run-up to the 2005 Iraqi National Assembly elections, incidents of
election-related violence were recorded throughout the country. These included
assassinations of political party candidates and campaign workers.[19] This
was the first election since the 2003 occupation by the US-led Multi-National
Force. In the context of preparations for the 2005 elections, the United States
Institute for Peace (USIP) organized three scenario planning workshops, two in
2004 and one in early 2005. Workshops, each involving approximately 20 Iraq
experts, were designed to explore alternative election outcomes using
multiple-scenario analysis. This included scenarios relating to the actions of
various groups and leaders based on the performance of an EMB; the final voter
turnout; or the election results. The participants identified risks in respect
to so-called ‘undesirable’ election outcomes, which might increase the
likelihood of election-related violence, and perceptions that the elections
were unfair. A working group was also tasked with recommending strategies and
actions ‘to ward off’ certain outcomes or ‘at least ameliorate their effects’.[20] The
experts concluded that ‘win–lose’ scenarios were less important than the Iraqi
people’s perception of the transparency, legitimacy and fairness of the
electoral process.
- Uphold peace forums that
involve diverse stakeholders at national and sub-national level throughout the
period of the announcement of the election results
The period surrounding the announcement of election results may see
polarization and increased mistrust between the main stakeholders, including
political actors, an EMB, security sector agencies, communities and so on. If
the margin of victory is expected to be narrow and tensions are on the rise,
civil society organizations and other non-state and state actors should engage
in the promotion of peace and trust building. Among other things, they can
organize discussion forums where all relevant stakeholders can express and
discuss their concerns and seek commonly accepted solutions. In addition, these
forums may serve as a joint platform for inviting supporters of all political
parties and the broader public to abstain from violence, regardless of the
electoral outcomes. Peace forums should be established at the national and
sub-national levels.
National
and sub-national peace efforts by civil society help mitigate the outbreak of
election-related violence following the Kenyan 2007 general election result
announcement. The election-related violence that broke out in Kenya in
2007–2008 was triggered by the announcement of the presidential election results
and aggravated when the president was sworn in later on the same day.[21] During
a two-month period, 1,500 Kenyans lost their lives, 3,000 women were raped,
businesses were ransacked and set on fire, and over 300,000 people were
internally displaced.[22] During
this time, a group of five influential Kenyans, calling themselves Concerned
Citizens for Peace (CCP), started to plead for dialogue and negotiations among
the political leadership. Through this initiative, working committees were
formed attracting a wide range of skilled and influential volunteers to
reflect, analyse, strategize and act to mitigate violence. This included the
launch of the Citizens’ Agenda for Peace which influenced the formal mediation
efforts, led by Kofi Annan, that helped in reaching a power-sharing agreement
between the opposing sides. The CCP also facilitated the international
mediation process by initiating the visit of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, briefing
eminent persons, and interacting with the Kofi Annan mediation through a CCP
High Level Dialogue Committee and Technical Committee. The CCP also worked with
the Internal Security Ministry to set up peacekeeping in the city of Nairobi at
a time when riots threatened to engulf the city. This also led to the creation
of the Nairobi Peace Forum and the establishment of District Peace Committees.[23]
- Coordinate peace-building
efforts with security sector agencies
Various
non-state and state organizations have mandates, knowledge and skills to
promote peaceful conflict resolution through conflict mediation, reconciliation
projects, facilitation of negotiations and so on. During the period in which
election results are announced, inter-communal tensions can be on the rise.
Organizations within the existing peace infrastructure at the grassroots level
may therefore be well positioned to engage in the prevention and mitigation of
election-related violence. In particular, these non-state and state actors
should collaborate closely with security sector agencies to ensure that their
efforts are coordinated. As SSAs focus on efforts to separate hostile
communities, provide security to vulnerable groups, and apprehend and prosecute
those who perpetrate violence, peace-building organizations can focus on
deflating tensions and addressing the root causes of conflicts.
A Women’s Situation Room is set up to provide early warning and response during
the Kenyan 2013 general elections. Due to the high level of violence directed
against women during the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–2008,[24] the
women’s movement of Kenya, with the support of UN Women and the UNDP, set up a
Women’s Situation Room (WSR) ahead of the 2013 general elections. The WSR was
mandated to monitor, verify, analyse and respond to incidents of
election-related violence. The WSR deployed 500 field observers. In addition, a
team of telephone operators was established to receive incident reports from
Kenyan citizens via a toll-free number. In total, the WSR received over 500
incident reports, many of which included the post-election period. Once
verified, the information was passed on to a group of local and international
‘eminent women’ who sought intervention from the decision makers within the
police, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) or political
parties. ‘Through its early warning and early response mechanism, the women’s
situation room managed to resolve all cases it received before they escalated
to bigger problems.’[25]
The media enhance collaboration with the police during the 2012 general
elections in Ghana. To promote responsible reporting before, during and after
the 2012 general elections, the Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association
(GIBA) developed a Code of Ethics handbook to be used by journalists. The GIBA
also provided 400 copies of the handbook to the Ghana Police Service in order
to help the police to understand ‘the ethical guidelines of private media
practitioners with regards to maintaining peace’. The aim was also to reinforce
the partnership between the GIBA and the Ghana Police Service. The police
committed themselves to disseminate the handbook among all commanders and
various departments to serve as a ‘guide in the discharge of their duties
during the elections’.[26]
[1] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, ‘PERV:
Preventing Election-related Violence’, 2011,
<http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/
6631~v~Preventing_Election_Related_Violence__Sulu_Mindanao_.pdf>, accessed 8
May 2018.
[2] BBC News, ‘Bolivian Protesters Reject
Offer’, 3 June 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4608111.stm>,
accessed on 17 September 2018
[3] European Union Election Observation
Mission to Bolivia, September 2006, pp. 2, 5, available at <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/BO/reports/bolivia-constituent-assembly-election-and>,
accessed 8 February 2013.
[4] Ibid., pp. 29–30.
[5] Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), ‘Mexico’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador: 2006 versus 2012 and
Beyond’, 5 September 2012, p. 2, available at <http://csis.org/files/publication/120905_Grayson_AMLO_HemFocus.pdf>,
accessed 11 February 2013.
[6] ‘Mexicans Protest against Peña Nieto’s
Election Win’, The Guardian, 8 July 2012, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/08/mexicans-protest-pena-nieto-election>,
accessed 11 February 2013.
[7] Congressional Research Service, ‘Mexico’s
2012 Elections’, 4 September 2012, pp. 2, 9, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42548.pdf>,
accessed 11 February 2013.
[8] BBC World, ‘Mexico Faces Partial Recount
in Presidential Election’, 5 July 2012, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-18717146>,
accessed 11 February 2013.
[9] BBC News, ‘Uganda Election: Amnesty
International Violence Concern’, 11 February 2011, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12428969>,
accessed 11 February 2013.
[10] Natabaalo, G., ‘Electoral Body Issues Rules for Media
During Elections’, African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), 12 May 2012,
<http://acme-ug.org/2011/02/09/electoral-
body-issues-rules-for-media-during-elections/>, accessed 8 May 2018
[11] BBC, ‘Ugandan Court Rejects Poll Protest’, 6 April
2006, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4882594.stm>,
accessed 11 February 2013.
[12] African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME),
‘Electoral Body Issues Rules’.
[13] African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME),
‘Guidelines for Media Coverage of Elections in Uganda’ (no date), available at
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[16] Ibid., p. 61.
[17] Ibid., p. 99.
[18] Ahramonline, ‘Heightened Security as Egypt Awaits
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[23] Citizens in Action, ‘Making Peace in the
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