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Democratic elections allow actors holding differing political views to compete for power peacefully. However, electoral contests can make deeply rooted conflicts more visible, increase tensions, and trigger violence. Striking a balance between positive and negative conflicts in elections is important to ensure that these processes are peaceful and that the results they yield are credible.

The ACE Preventing Election-related Violence topic area is devoted to assisting interested readers in broadening their understanding of the phenomena of election-related violence, key assessment concepts, and the prevention and mitigation options. The target audience includes electoral management bodies, security sector agencies, and other democracy and conflict practitioners who have the mandate or interest to contribute to credible and peaceful elections.

Overview

PART I of this ACE topic area will introduce the key theoretical perspectives. These will assist readers in understanding dynamics of electoral conflicts and perpetrators’ motives and consequences of election-related violence, including gender-based violence and violence against marginalized groups.

PART II presents frameworks for assessing and analysing factors that can trigger negative conflicts and election-related violence in specific contexts. While several approaches are highlighted, International IDEA’s concept - that distinguishes thirty-six (36) process (internal/endogenous) and context-related (external/exogenous) factors - is presented in detail.

Finally, PART III presents the framework for taking prevention and mitigation actions. Aligned with the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) concept, which acknowledges that sustainable peace needs a collaborative institutional framework between state and non-state actors, it distinguishes between three groups of organizations and their mandate or capacity to act in ensuring that elections are peaceful and credible. These are: electoral management and dispute resolution bodies, security sector agencies, and other state and non-state actors.

Preventing Election-related Violence

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Definitions

There is no single definition of election-related violence or a commonly accepted terminology on this topic. Philip Alston’s report (2010:4-6)[1a] points to the main approaches and definitions to electoral violence, which are mainly constructed around motives for influencing the election:

- Höglund (2009:417)[1] notes that: “electoral violence is separated from other forms of political violence by a combination of timing and motive. The time aspect relates to violence carried out during the election period. The objective of electoral violence is to influence the electoral process and in extension its outcome”.

- Laakso (2007: 227)[2] notes that: “electoral violence is an activity motivated by an attempt to affect the results of the elections – either by manipulating the electoral procedures and participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results”.

- Fischer (2002:4)[3] defines electoral conflict and violence as “Any harm or threat of harm to any person or property involved in the election process, or the process itself, during the election period”.

- Haid (2010:1)[4], according to who electoral violence is: “employed to affect electoral outcomes”.

- Sisk (UNDP, 2009:4)[5] who defines election-related violence more broadly as: “acts or threats or coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition”.

Additional definitions that deserve attention are proposed by Kehailia and Bardall:

- Kehailia (2014:31-39)[6] distinguishes eight categories, based on who the perpetrators are and why is violence occurring, namely: 1) Party-on-Party Electoral Violence; 2) Party-on-Voter Electoral Violence; 3) Party-on-State Electoral Violence; 4) Voter-on-Voter Electoral Violence; 5) Voter-on-State Electoral Violence; 6) State-on-Voter Electoral Violence; 7) State-on-Party Electoral Violence; and 8) State-on-State Electoral Violence.

- Bardal (2016)[7] provides the right-based definition and finds electoral violence a subtype of “political violence is a means of controlling and/or oppressing an individual or group’s right to participation in political processes and institutions through the use of emotional, social or economic force, coercion or pressure, as well as physical and sexual harm. It may take place in public or in private, including in the family, the general community, online and via media, or be perpetrated or condoned by the state.”

While acknowledging that “much election-related violence is indeed motivated by a desire to influence the conduct or outcome of an election in some way”, Alston (2010:5) also underlines that some electoral killings are not motivated by an intention to influence an election, in particular with killings in the context of riots or protests. While some protests may be intended to influence or change electoral outcomes, others are motivated by indignation, anger or disappointment with a result, and are not necessarily intended to change that result:

“This is even more so for killings in the context of protests. Killings between private citizens in the midst of protests may be better explained, for instance, by the complex dynamics of crowd behaviour or mob violence. More significantly, many killings during riots are committed by security forces while attempting to (legitimately or otherwise) pacify or end a protest. There are many types of such security force killings (e.g. intentional targeting of perceived enemies of a regime, identified by their presence at the protest, or the excessive).”

The United Nations understands electoral violence as a form of political violence, “which is often designed to influence an electoral outcome and therefore the distribution of political power”[8]. Electoral violence can include physical violence as well as coercion or intimidation. These manifestations of violence can occur during all the different phases of the electoral cycle; however, they also show that the political order has not managed to achieve a balance between competing political interests more generally.

 

Motives of electoral violence

The list of possible causes of electoral violence is long. At the most basic level, electoral violence is employed to either coercively maintain or achieve power, including to “to enforce patriarchal control of democratic institutions” (Bardall 2018).[1] Specific incentives that political actors (such as candidates and supporters, security sector agencies, protestors, organized crime groups and terrorists) may have to resort to violent tactics include (Alihodzic 2011):[2]

§  Seeking electoral advantages – is usually an incentive for those who compete in a high-stake elections. Such violent acts are directed against political competitors and their supporters and may include threats, coercion, intimidation, assassinations, etc.

§  Disrupting elections – is often an incentive for those who do not compete in elections. They may be excluded from the electoral processes (disenfranchised groups) or have particular interest in elections being spoiled or not taking place at all. Violent tactics may include terrorist acts targeting electoral actors, events and materials.

§  Preventing election manipulations – is an incentive of those who share perceptions that elections are manipulated or rigged. Electoral processes may be designed and implemented in a way which will favour one electoral contestant over another. Parties and individuals who feel that the process is manipulated to their disadvantage may take action to bring an end to such practices, even through violent means. In addition to opposition parties, protesters may include civil society organizations and other social groups and individuals who feel that they are pursuing their legitimate rights. Violent acts are often directed against government buildings and offices.

§   Violence as a response to initial violence is also a likely development in all the above scenarios. Even the most righteous protests may involve violent episodes as the victims of violence also respond with violence.

Violence against women is an important feature in all cases above, often motivated by desire to punish women for their participation in the electoral process as their participation threatens the dominance of a male power structure.[3] This issue deserves a special attention and is therefore elaborated in the consequent section.

[1] Gabrielle S. Bardall (2018), Violence, Politics and Gender, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, retrieved from https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/violence_politics_and_gender.pdf

[2]     Sead Alihodzic (2011) in ed. Iff A. Ballots or Bullets Potentials and Limitations of Elections in Conflict Contexts Swisspeace Annual Conference 2010, Swisspeace

 

[3]    UNDP, UNWOMEN (2017) Preventing Violence Against Women in Elections: A Programming Guide 

Violence against women in elections

Violence against women in elections (VAWE) refers to types of violence that exist in the exercise of political competition and governance in (at least nominally) democratic states and during democratization processes.[1] Violence against women in elections is a threat to the integrity of the electoral process – it can affect women’s participation as voters, candidates, election officials, activists, and political party leaders, and it undermines the free, fair, and inclusive democratic process (Bardall 2011, Huber and Kammerud 2016). VAWE is a violation of political and human rights and frequently also a criminal or civil code violation that harms voters, candidates, election officials, activists and security and political professionals worldwide, occurring both online and offline. 

Although it has some characteristics in common with the gendered dimensions of conflict and civil war as well as with domestic gender-based violence, it is different in its distinct political nature as well as in its material manifestations including its forms, perpetrators and common victims. Most importantly, it is distinct from wartime and/or domestic violence in terms of its impacts: VAWE is not only a manifestation of inequality but also, significantly, a mechanism that formally institutionalizes women’s subordinate position in society by coercively excluding them from state governance.[2]

Violence against women in elections is a global issue that varies in nature, intensity and form across different contexts. According to an IPU study [3], violence against women parliamentarians is a universal and systemic problem. The study, in which 55 women parliamentarians from 39 countries across five regions were surveyed, found that 81.8 per cent of them had experienced some form of psychological violence from members of the public and fellow parliamentarians; 44.4 per cent had received threats of death, rape, beatings or abduction during their parliamentary terms; 65 per cent had been subjected to sexist remarks, primarily by male colleagues in parliament and from opposing parties as well as their own.

In 2011, Carter Center observer teams in Egypt reported that in several areas of the country, women were threatened with divorce if they did not vote as their husbands ordered. In interviews conducted in 2010 by International Alert, women who had stood as candidates in Sierra Leone reported unequal access to political party support, verbal and physical violence, and threats to themselves, their supporters, and their husbands. In 2013, focus group participants in Bangladesh told IFES that verbal sexual harassment, as well as physical violence, is commonly directed at women in public at demonstrations and perpetrators have included police officers providing security. Online harassment is cited by many women as a serious threat; Kenyan focus group participants in 2015 noted that a female County Assembly candidate lost a race because of cyber-bullying in which she was depicted as a lesbian in doctored photos. In late 2009, months before elections, members of the paramilitary police under the ruling military junta in Guinea publicly raped scores of women inside the national soccer stadium as part of an attack on a pro-democracy demonstration that also killed at least 150.

The term “violence against women in elections” (VAWE) is an umbrella for several distinct but related issues. Violence against women in politics is understood as the supra-category encompassing violence that takes place outside the direct electoral process but within the context of peace-time politics. VAWE is, as the name suggests, restricted to violence directly connected to an electoral process.

IFES defines the broad umbrella of “violence against women in elections” (VAWE) as “any harm or threat of harm committed against women with the intent and/or impact of interfering with their free and equal participation in the electoral process during the electoral period. It includes harassment, intimidation, physical harm or coercion, threats, and financial pressures, and it may be committed in the home or other private spaces, or in public spaces. These acts may be directed at women in any of their roles as electoral stakeholders (e.g. voters, media, political actors, state actors, community leaders, or electoral officials).”[4]

Within this umbrella, there are two types of VAWE/P: gender-motivated political violence and gender-differentiated political violence.[5] These reflect distinct but equal components of gender-based violence against women as defined by the Council of Europe: “Violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately[.]”[6] These distinctions are vital because different types of violence call for different types of responses.

• “…Because she is a woman”: Gender-motivated political violence (GMPV) is harm that violates an individual’s or groups’ political rights on the basis of their gender identity. This distinct form of violence is motivated by a desire to repress, deter, control, or otherwise coerce the political rights of the victims because of the victim’s gender. Where GMPV specifically targets women in order to enforce patriarchal control of democratic institutions, it may be described as violence against women in politics.[7]
• “…That affects women disproportionately”: The second key concept is gender differentiation in the manifestations of politically motivated violence (gender-differentiated political violence, GDPV). Simply put, women experience political violence in different ways and frequencies than men do. The most notable differences are in the types of political violence that women experience more frequently than men (e.g., sexual, psychological, economic), the locations where political violence occurs (including in domestic and cyber spheres) and the perpetrators involved (including community, family, and intimate partners). [8]

Women are targeted with electoral violence while occupying a variety of stakeholder roles. In some cases, they are targeted because of their political actions or affiliations, and in others, they are targeted because they are women participating in politics. These examples involve many circumstances found in globally-accepted definitions of violence against women (VAW) or gender-based violence (GBV) against women, including verbal or physical sexual violence, violence by intimate partners and community leaders, gender-based discrimination against women in professional circles, and violence in private spaces.14 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank and others further underscore that GBV impacts women and girls more than other populations and that women with disabilities, as well as lesbian, bisexual and transgendered women suffer violence at even higher rates.

The experiences of these women also reflect circumstances commonly found in globally-accepted definitions and patterns of electoral violence, including public intimidation of opposition supporters and physical and psychological violence against voters.

UN Women and UNDP jointly developed a programming guide ‘Preventing Violence Against Women in Elections’ in 2017. The guide identifies the specific components of VAWE, including types, tactics, victims and perpetrators, and offers various options to prevent and mitigate them based on current good practices. The aim is to provide examples of existing practices and options for policy and programming responses for different electoral stakeholders and to support technical assistance providers to take measure against VAWE. In order to provide programming guidance, it introduces the VAWE Prevention and Matrix (See below Matrix 1) that identifies six main action points for preventing and eliminating VAWE based upon the phases of the electoral cycle and the role of various stakeholders—i) mapping and measuring VAWE, ii) integrating VAWE into election observation and violence monitoring, iii) legal and policy reform to prevent and respond to VAWE, iv) preventing and mitigating VAWE through electoral arrangements, v) working with political parties to prevent and reduce VAWE and vi) raising awareness and changing norms. Drawing good practices from all the regions, it offers diverse menu of programming options with concrete examples of activities for each action point that stakeholders could implement.

 

 Source: UN Women and UNDP. “Preventing Violence Against Women in Elections” A Programming Guide” 2017.[9]

IFES has developed a suite of tools to better understand and respond to the unique issues related to gender-based election violence, including research and data tools, legal strategies and digital initiatives. This includes the IFES “VAWE Legal” approach, which helps ensure justice and facilitate change of institutional and societal attitudes, beliefs and behaviors on VAWE through targeted legal analysis, aid and advocacy. IFES has developed several tools to monitor and report on VAWE including through field assessments, a methodology for monitoring the presence of VAWE online in social media, and tools to integrate VAWE reporting into general electoral monitoring programs. Recognizing the existence of an ecosystem of ICT-facilitated violence against women online, IFES engages multiple targeted tools to stop VAWE online in its tracks, including a VAWE Online sentiment analysis tool and partnerships with digital entrepreneurs. The Carter Center increasingly integrates VAWE reporting into their election observation activities and is developing methods of data collection and analysis about online VAWP in the context of elections. The National Democratic Institute has also developed a number of helpful tools to respond to VAWE. These include a toolkit for domestic observers, a public awareness campaign called #NotTheCost and strategies to prevent online violence.

In March 2018, an Expert Group Meeting (EGM) on Violence Against Women in Politics (VAWP) was organized in New York, co-organized by UN Women, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), and the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women (SRVAW), in collaboration with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). This meeting provided the space for a diverse, specialized and influential group of experts to identify institutional, advocacy, and legal means to enable women to fully realize their political rights, and end impunity for those who seek to stifle or suppress them in electoral processes but also other areas of political participation.[10]

[1] Bardall, G. “Violence, Politics and Gender”. Contentious Politics and Political Violence. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Feb. 2018.

[2] ibid

[3] http://archive.ipu.org/pdf/publications/issuesbrief-e.pdf

[4] IFES. “VAWIE: A Framework for Assessment, Monitoring, and Response” 2017. http://www.ifes.org/publications/violence-against-women-elections

[5] https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/handle/1866/18513

[6] Art. 3 d, Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence

[7] https://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/Issues/Women/SR/IFES.pdf&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1

[8][8] https://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/Issues/Women/SR/IFES.pdf&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1

[9] http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2017/preventingvaw-in-elections.pdf?la=en&vs=2640

[10] http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2018/egm-report-violence-against-women-in-politics-en.pdf?la=en&vs=4036.

Consequences of electoral violence

In broad terms, the consequences of election-related violence may include the following:

§       Undermined civil and political rights and human suffering - These range from the disfranchisement through deprivation of citizens’ or groups’ rights to vote and compete, to the psychological, physical and sexual violence that specific groups–particularly women– may suffer, with short and long-term consequences for the victims and for their families and communities. 

§       Diminished trust in democratic processes and institutions – Electoral violence reproduces repressive and non-democratic power structures  including patriarchal repression in the institutional space. It doesn’t only diminish trust in democratic processes, it undermines the quality of democracy both directly (repressing/killing voters, candidates, etc) and indirectly (limited inclusive participation) as well as through public perceptions of legitimacy.. In some contexts, elections have already become synonymous with trouble and danger. Such associations have devastating effects on trust in democratic processes and institutions.

Economic implications - Elections are the largest administrative undertakings in democratic societies, and consequently the costs associated with elections may represent a major financial burden. In some cases, governments are unable to finance elections and depend on international electoral assistance. In addition, electoral competition and election monitoring involve significant expenditures for political parties, and domestic and international monitoring groups. Election-related violence will not only squander those resources but will further cause destruction of local communities and infrastructure with numerous negative economic and developmental consequences, both direct and indirect. For example, the Association of Kenyan Manufacturers estimates that Kenyan economy suffered the loss of $3.7 billion as a consequence of the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007-08. In addition, 400,000 jobs were put at risk (Voice of America 2009). Before the outbreak of violence, Kenya was East Africa’s economic leader and the economies of other countries in the region relied heavily on its infrastructure. Kimani (2008, 3) describes how the entire region (including Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) suffered disruptions to imports and exports and increased prices of commodities. Relief organisations that provide aid to seven million refugees and displaced people in the region faced tremendous logistical and security challenges in fulfilling their mandates. In the long run, the crisis also affected investors’ confidence and reduced the gross domestic product of the region (Alihodzic, 2012:57).[1]

[1] Alihodžić, S. (2012). ‘Electoral Violence Early Warning and Infrastructures for Peace’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 7:3, 54-69, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2013.767592

 

 

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Electoral legislation is the collection of ‘legal structural elements defining or influencing an electoral process’. These can include:[1] 

• The constitution, which is the supreme legislative act in a country;
• National laws, which may take the form of one comprehensive electoral code, or be a set of laws covering different aspects of the electoral process;
• Provincial or state laws, which in federal countries may govern processes for provincial or state and local electoral events (as in Australia), or for national electoral events (as in the United States);
• Ordinances and regulations made by national or lower-level authorities;
• Regulations, proclamations and directives issued by an electoral management body (EMB), if it has powers to do so; 
• Customary laws and conventions which may be integrated into an electoral law, or EMB regulations or policies, dealing with issues such as separate voter registration and voting arrangements for women and men;
• Administrative policies introduced by an EMB or other bodies; and
• Codes of conduct (voluntary or otherwise), some of which may be unspoken and may have a direct or indirect impact on the electoral process, for example, for EMBs, election participants, observers, and election reporting by the media. 

The framework can also incorporate international standards derived from international agreements and frameworks. For example, articles 7 and 8 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) require that state parties take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of a country and to ensure that women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, have the opportunity to represent their governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international organizations. Additionally, article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in clauses 1 and 3 that ‘Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives’ and ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures’.

Regardless of the wider institutional framework in a given country, there will always be a body or bodies responsible for electoral management (International IDEA 2014:5). In emerging democracies legal frameworks often help promote electoral integrity by making EMBs responsible for managing the entire process (International IDEA 2014:75). However, some functions, such as boundary delimitation, voter registration, the registration and funding of political parties, electoral dispute resolution, the certification and announcement of election results, and voter education and information may also be contracted out by an EMB or supported by other institutions or civil society organizations (CSOs). If electoral functions are assigned to more than one institution, the legal and policy framework needs to be very clear on each institution’s functional responsibilities, and on the hierarchy of authority and coordination mechanisms between those institutions (International IDEA 2014:77-78).

[1]     Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006), chapter 2, p. 43, available athttps://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/electoral-management-design-international-idea-handbook-2006.

Inadequate electoral law

Electoral laws can exclude individuals and groups from electoral processes by denying them the right to vote or to compete in elections. They can also be designed to favor one party over another. Those who feel that they are being denied an opportunity to participate in the electoral process, or that they will be competing on an uneven playing field, may resort to violent means to communicate their message or to prevent elections from taking place at all. Similarly, a government or its supporters may also prevent certain groups from participating in elections through violent means.

 Empirical cases: 

§  Zimbabwe parliamentary and presidential elections 2008. The electoral law adopted in 2007 did not stipulate a deadline for the announcement of election results. In addition, the timeline for organizing a second round of elections proved somewhat shorter than ideally needed in the context. Legal inconsistencies led to delay in the announcement of election results, raising opposition concerns over the outcome. As tensions rose, there were media reports of government supporters allegedly intimidating people in areas that were seen as opposition strongholds.[1]

Interrelated factors: human rights violations (external); unequal media access and favouritism (internal); presence of non-state armed actors (external); poor socio-economic conditions (external); poor voter information campaign (internal)

§  Burundi presidential election 2015. The violence that surrounded the 2015 Burundi elections was rooted in controversy over the constitutionality of the 3^rd term as President given to Pierre Nkurunziza. His supporters argued that the two-term limit established by the 2005 constitution did not apply to Nkurunziza’s first mandate, since on that occasion he had not been elected by universal suffrage but by the national assembly. After the Constitutional Court endorsed this interpretation on 4 May 2015, large street demonstrations took place and a (failed) coup occurred on 13 May. Local and legislative elections were held on 29 June, and presidential elections on 15 July, despite a boycott by key opposition parties.[2] 

Interrelated factors: human rights violations (external); poor socio-economic conditions (external); unequal media access and favoritism (internal); Provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external) 

[1]     ‘Zimbabwe: Post Election Violence Increasing’, IRIN Africa, 10 April 2008: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=77705.

 

[2] Violent start to 'sham elections' in Burundi’, The Guardian, 29 June 2015: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/29/burundi-elections-violent-start-grenade-explosion.

 

An unfit electoral system

At the most basic level, an electoral system translates votes cast into seats won by political parties and candidates.[1]

Electoral systems can aggravate or moderate tensions and conflict in society. Some systems can work well to ensure gender-balanced[2] representation, representation of minority groups and the formation of coalition governments. Others will encourage the formation of strong single-party government. If an electoral system is not considered inclusive and fair and political parties believe they will not have a chance to win next time around, they may feel compelled to work outside the system, using non-democratic, confrontational and even violent tactics.[3]

A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)[4] study points to four variables of an electoral system that may trigger conflicts: (a) the formula for determining how votes are translated into seats; (b) district magnitude; (c) the votes-to-seat-ratio; and (d) boundary delimitation.

 

Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNDP Elections and Conflict Prevention Guide: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming (New York: UNDP, 2009)

Empirical cases: 

• Malaysia parliamentary election 2008. Political parties and civil society groups both called for electoral reform before general elections. Among other reforms they called for the abolition of the First Past The Post (FPTP) electoral system inherited from British colonial rule, whereby the party with a simple majority dominates parliament. It was argued that such a system is discriminatory, particularly with respect to women and indigenous people. Calls for electoral reforms led to a number of violent incidents.
  
  Interrelated factors: unequal media access and favouritism (internal); problematic voter registration (internal); lack of transparency of special and external voting (internal);[5] problematic registration of political parties and candidates (internal); problematic accreditation of domestic and international observers (internal).[6]
   
• Bangladesh general election 2014. The national political party landscape is dominated by two parties, the ruling Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The prevailing electoral system is viewed by some as having fuelled political polarization as well as tendencies towards the use of political violence.[7] The 29 January 2014 parliamentary elections were preceded by violence related to a number of political controversies.[8] In the event the opposition decided to boycott the elections.[9]
  
  Interrelated factors: human rights violations (external); poor socio-economic conditions (external); unequal media access and favoritism (internal); Provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal).

Inadequate electoral administrative rules

The electoral legal and regulatory framework includes numerous administrative rules such as ordinances and regulations made by national or lower-level authorities; regulations, proclamations and directives issued by an Election Management Body (EMB); customary laws, conventions and codes of conducts; and EMB regulations or policies dealing with various issues. These rules are important as they set a clear and detailed normative framework which can be clearly operationalized.

A lack of legislative and operational clarity may impact negatively on the credibility and transparency of the electoral processes and increase the risk of arbitrary manipulation, with the potential to lead to conflict and violence.

Empirical cases:

 •  Maldives local council elections 2011. Six instances of election-related violence were reported.[1] Observers reported that two supporters of the incumbent Maldives Democratic Party (MDP) were injured on the island of Kelaa and taken to hospital after clashing with the police. The incident was triggered by an Electoral Commission decision to let everyone queuing to vote cast their ballot, no matter how long it would take.[2]

Interrelated factors: environmental hazards (external); poor socio-economic conditions (external)[3]; problematic registration of political parties and candidates (internal); contested electoral law (internal); unequal media access and favouritism (internal).[4]

Poor performance of the electoral management bodies

An EMB is an organization or a body that is legally responsible for managing some or all of the elements essential to both the conduct of elections and direct democracy instruments. These core responsibilities include planning voting operations, determining who is eligible to vote, receiving and validating the nominations of electoral participants (for elections, political parties and/or candidates), conducting the balloting, counting the votes, and vote tabulation.[1] An EMB may be a stand-alone institution or a unit within a larger institution that has a broader mandate.

There are three broad electoral management models—independent, governmental and mixed. No matter which model is used, however, it is of the utmost importance that an EMB can ensure both the credibility of the electoral process and legitimacy of election results. This can be done if electoral management is constituted and operates under the following fundamental guiding principles: independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, professionalism and service-mindedness.[2]

If any of these constitutive principles are lacking, the EMB’s work may generate further concerns and chaos that can in turn lead to outbreaks of election-related violence. 

Empirical cases: 

• Nigeria parliamentary and presidential elections 2007. During the 2007 elections Nigeria experienced widespread violence resulting in the deaths of 200 people. According to a number of observers the election was marred by deficiencies in their official organization, along with allegations of vote rigging and other electoral malpractices. Immediately following announcement of the result protesters took to the streets and demonstrations were subdued, often violently.[3] 
  
  Interrelated factors: human rights violations (external);[4] problematic election day operations (internal); insufficiency, destruction and loss of sensitive and non-sensitive materials (internal); problematic ballot counting and result tallying (internal); unequal media access and favouritism (internal); rejection of the election results (internal); presence of non-state armed actors (external);[5] poor socio-economic conditions (external).[6]
• Albania parliamentary elections 2013. The Central Election Commission (CEC) is composed of 7 members: 1 chair, 3 incumbent party representatives and 3 from the opposition. In the election runup the CEC was paralyzed by the resignation of its 3 opposition-nominated members. Failure to find a solution impacted the CEC’s functioning along with the overall organization of elections. First, it gave the impression that the CEC was politically oriented. Second, regulations necessary to ensuring the transparency of elections were not adopted or implemented, which gave rise to a number of questionable practices during the runup. Third, and most importantly, because it did not reach the required five-member quorum, the CEC could neither legally consider complaints against results, adopt the results nor allocate the mandates.[7] This led to significant delays in the announcement of results, as a consequence of which both camps initially announced victory. This in turn fuelled tensions between supporters of both camps, including a shootout in which one opposition activist was killed.[8]

Interrelated factors: An inadequate system for the resolution of electoral disputes (internal), human right violations[9] (external), Problematic vote counting and tallying of the results (internal), Poor management of the election results (internal).

 

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[1]     International IDEA, Electoral Management Design, annex B, Glossary, p. 330.

[2]     International IDEA, Electoral Management Design, pp. 22–5.

[3]     International Crisis Group, ‘Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State?’, Africa Report no. 126 (30 May 2007), p. 6, available at < https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/126-nigeria-failed-elections-failing-state.pdf>, accessed 12 September 2018.

[4]     International Crisis Group, ‘Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State?’, Summary, pp. 4, 5, 7, 9.

[5]     International Crisis Group, ‘Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State?’, pp. 2, 3, 5, 6, 11.

[6]     International Crisis Group, ‘Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty’, Africa Report no. 113 (19 July 2006), p. 1, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/Nigeria%20Want%20in%20the%20Midst%20of%20Plenty.pdf>, accessed 2 November 2011.

[7] OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Final Report, Republic of Albania Parliamentary election, 23 June 2013, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106963?download=true

[8] Al-Jazzeera, Violence mars Albania's general election, 24 June 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/06/201362391518185222.html

[9] United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Albania 2013 Human Rights Report https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220457.pdf

Inadequate operational planning

The development of a strategic plan is the basic step in focusing the efforts of an EMB on achieving its legal responsibilities.[1] Operational planning will help in developing a clear blueprint for the steps that need to be taken towards achieving the organization of credible elections. The plan will include descriptions, timelines, geographical scope of preparation, activities, and the human and financial resources needed.

Poor implementation of electoral activities may result in mistakes and delays. If these problems are seen as deliberate tactics aimed at favouring particular political options or having the potential to influence electoral outcomes, they have the potential to trigger violence.

 

An inadequate system for the resolution of electoral disputes

Electoral dispute resolution (EDR) mechanisms provide a formalized structure for appeals through which electoral actions and/or procedures can be legally challenged. Disputes may arise at any point in time throughout the various stages of the electoral process.[1] If effective and trusted EDR mechanisms are not put in place from the initial stages of an electoral processes, those involved may decide to resort to violent means in their efforts to resolve disputed issues.

Empirical cases:

• Ethiopia parliamentary election 2005. The President of the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) also acted as the head of the Supreme Court, which had a mandate to rule on electoral disputes – a fact viewed as controversial by some parties. Electoral complaints were processed in a way that was alleged to impact on some parties’ electoral rights as well as generating exposure for alleged human rights violations. Overall, the complaints process was viewed by some as significantly problematic, including security force presence at hearings and alleged witness arrests.[2]
  
  Interrelated factors: Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external);[3] human rights violations (external); presence of non-state armed actors (external);[4] rejection of the election results (internal).[5]

 

Inadequate funding, financing and budgeting

Electoral costs can be divided into three categories:[1] 

• core costs (or direct costs)—routinely associated with implementing an electoral process in a stable electoral environment;
• diffuse costs (or indirect costs)—relating to electoral services that cannot be disentangled from the general budgets of agencies that assist with the implementation of an electoral process; and
• integrity costs—necessary to provide security, integrity, political neutrality and a level playing field for an electoral process.
  
  

Inadequate funding, financing and budgeting will not necessarily trigger violence directly. Inadequate resources may. however, force EMBs to make compromises that can impact on the integrity and security of electoral processes and thus open them up for disputes that can in turn fuel and trigger violent conflicts. For example, core cost deficiencies may affect an electoral process’s technical integrity; lack of diffuse funds will limit the engagement of supporting agencies, especially those with the task of providing security; and a lack of integrity funds at the disposal of an EMB may harm the legitimacy of the process.

“Economic violence is also recognized among forms of non-physical violence. This type of violence includes being denied funds that an individual is entitled to during their term of office or political campaign; being denied other resources an individual is entitled to in connection with their political office or campaign (offices, computers, staff, salary); harm or threats to harm a business, termination, or threat of termination of employment.”[2]

 

Inadequate electoral security arrangements

Electoral security entails the protection of stakeholders such as voters, candidates, poll workers, media, and observers; electoral information such as the results of the vote, registration data and campaign material; electoral facilities such as polling stations and counting centres; and electoral events such as campaign rallies against death, damage or disruption. From a broad perspective, three kinds of electoral security can be identified:

•  physical security concerns the protection of facilities and materials;
•  personal security concerns electoral stakeholders; and
•  information security concerns the protection of the physical ballot papers and ballot boxes, computers and communication systems.
  
  

Weaknesses in electoral security, especially in conflict-prone societies and those that experience high levels of violence, will expose electoral stakeholders, information, facilities and events to violence.[1]

Electoral security may entail engagement and collaboration between different security sector agencies (SSAs) such as the police force, intelligence agencies, armed forces, special prosecutors for electoral crimes and so on. Personal security for women in conflict-prone and post-conflict contexts deserves special attention as women (in particular candidates and poll workers) are often victims of election-related violence. This violence can manifest itself in many different ways ranging from intimidation to preventing women from standing as candidates or voting, to physical and sexual assault, and even murder.

Empirical cases: 

• Bangladesh parliamentary election 2008. During the electoral period a total of 110 incidents of election-related violence were recorded.[2] Law enforcement agencies were perceived by international observers as having played an insufficiently active role in preventing and limiting such incidents.
  
  

    Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); environmental hazards (external); unequal media access and favouritism (internal); human rights violations (external).[3]

• Kenya parliamentary and presidential elections 2007. Riots broke out across the country after the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced the results.[4] Authorities were perceived as being slow to act on intelligence regarding potential outbreaks of violence. Additionally, there were instances of the alleged disproportionate use of force against demonstrators.[5]
  
  

    Interrelated factors: gender-based discrimination and violence (external); presence of non-state armed actors (external); poor socio-economic conditions (external).[6]

 

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Lack of training for political parties and media

Elections are high-stake processes for political parties which compete for popular support and political power. During all phases of an electoral process, the media has an essential role to play in facilitating information sharing, profiling both women and men as candidates, and in discussions of electoral issues.

If politicians and journalists lack basic understanding of the technical aspects of electoral processes—including related procedures, decision-making and EDR mechanisms—their actions may raise tensions and lead to potential outbreaks of violence. The media have a responsibility to report rather than make news, and when this basic principle is ignored it can also further exacerbate tensions and even lead to violence.

Empirical cases:

•       Guyana parliamentary election 2001. Throughout the election period the media failed to investigate rumours spread by political party supporters on TV and radio talk shows. In one such broadcast it was suggested that people should invade the homes of party officials. Following election day many Guyanese suggested that such talk shows had provided a platform for hate speech as well as a raison d’être for mobs to form. It was also suggested that the talk shows had raised fear and tension during the election period itself.[1] Additionally, a talk-show host leading a crowd near the Election Commissioner’s house was arrested twice before election day.[2]

Interrelated factors: unequal media access and favouritism (internal); social and political exclusion (external);[3] problematic voter registration (internal).[4]

 

Lack of training of security sector agencies

The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, has argued that one of the most frequent types of electoral violence is that engaged in by state agents against demonstrators in election-related public gatherings or protests.[1] Apart from violent acts perpetrated by politically biased police, most of the abuses occur because police officers are not aware of their responsibilities within the electoral process or of the electoral legislation and other laws involved in the process, such as regulations concerning the right of assembly and public demonstrations. With regard to the policing of demonstrations, Alston has pointed out that, in many cases, violence occurs because ‘the police lack[ed] the appropriate use of force guidelines, training, experience and equipment to control the crowd lawfully and appropriately’.[2]

Empirical cases:

•  Nepal parliamentary election 2008. The police force deployed over 100,000 personnel[3] during the electoral period. External reports warned, however, of a lack of police training in coping with potential electoral violence.[4] Illustrating the point, during one pre-election protest the police fired on protesters, resulting in one death. Protesters also demonstrated against the death of communist candidate Rishi Prasad Sharma. [5]
  
  Interrelated factors: presence of non-state armed actors (external).[6]

 

A poor voter information campaign

A voter information campaign is an effort organized by the relevant EMB to provide the basic information enabling citizens to participate in elections as both candidates and voters. Such information often includes eligibility requirements and timelines, locations and procedures for registration and voting.

Voter information campaigns may be unclear, badly timed and fail to reach all citizens, especially marginalized groups such as women and the elderly (men and women) in rural areas. In most societies of the world, the unequal distribution of power between women and men disadvantages women’s access to information. As a consequence, voters may lack clarity about the eligibility criteria for voter registration, the identification documents required, designated voting location, voting procedure and so on. Poorly informed citizens may slow down or disrupt electoral processes, also unnecessarily overburdening EDR mechanisms.

Empirical cases:

• Presidential and parliamentary elections in Uganda in 2016. According to articles 61 and 52 of the Ugandan Constitution, the Electoral Commission and the Uganda Human Rights Commission are mandated to develop and implement voter and civic education programmes.[1] in the runup to the February 2016 general elections, however, a significant voter education campaign was not conducted.[2] Two months prior to election day. Reportedly many voters remained informed about the location of their polling station, the poll date and the election’s legal framework, issues such as the illegality of voter bribery and vote buying included. At the same time, 39% of Citizen Election Observers Network Uganda (CEON-U) observers reported an absence of voter education activities in their constituencies. The introduction of a Biometric Voter Verification System just 14 days before polling day further compounded voter uncertainty. Civil society organisations faced several challenges in their election-related efforts.[3] Due to limited resources their activities centred on urban areas, whereas rural regions were neglected. The authorized voter education handbook was released a few weeks prior to election day. As a result, voter education initiatives lacked clear guidelines. Limited voter education contributed to an atmosphere of fear along with misperceptions and myths concerning the elections. These in turn were viewed by some observers as having contributed to vote bribery, intimidation and hate speech.[4] Attendant hostilities between partisans of the rival political candidates eventually escalated into violence in the pre-election period.[5]
  
  Interrelated factors: Contested electoral law (internal); Provocative use of the media by political parties (internal); Human Rights violations (external).[6]

 

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Training and education efforts are conventionally focused on (a) training for electoral officials on technical aspects of the preparation and implementation of electoral processes; and (b) educational campaigns for registrants and voters about their rights, duties, electoral timelines, and registration and voting procedures, inter alia. 

Deficiencies in the training of electoral officials, along with potential misunderstandings of the electoral process among political actors, the media and the general public, may raise tensions and contribute to deepening conflict and potential outbreaks of violence. Further, they may result in inadequate protection for populations that are especially vulnerable or are commonly subject to less well understood forms of electoral violence, such as women and disabled persons.

One of the main pillars of professionalism in electoral administration is the proper training and development of: permanent EMB staff; temporary management staff appointed for specific electoral events; and the large number of field staff that may be temporarily engaged for large-scale events.[1]

Poorly trained electoral officials may lack the basic understanding and skills to conduct professional voter registration, voting and counting processes. Technical mistakes committed during voter registration may affect the accuracy of the electoral registers, thus damaging the integrity of voting processes at the polling stations, and thereby the election results.
 

Empirical cases:

Somaliland presidential elections in 2008. In 2007 the parliament of Somaliland decided to mandate the National Election Commission (NEC) to implement a sophisticated dual identification voter registration system, with fingerprints and paper identification cards. The process was, however, marred by flaws, many of which were attributed to poor training of the staff that conducted the registration process. These weaknesses were exploited by individual voters and clan leaders to their advantage, which in turn led to clashes over the system’s viability. Due to fears of renewed conflicts the NEC resigned.[2] “When presidential elections scheduled for April 2008 were repeatedly postponed due to a problematic voter registration process, insufficiencies in the National Election Commission (NEC), and intransigence among the political parties, the president’s term of office was repeatedly extended by the Upper House of Elders (the Guurti). “As political tensions spilled over into violent street protests in September 2009, Somaliland faced its most severe political challenge since the civil war of 1994-1996”.[3]

 Interrelated factors: Poor performance of electoral management body, inadequate funding, financing and budgeting, provocative and violent actions by political parties, conflicts related to changing power dynamics.

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[1] International IDEA, Electoral Management Design, p. 157.

[2] Forero, Owens, Pierce, Pitea, Ramey Rosenbaum, Tesfaye, Vu, and Yi, Project Advisor: Jeff Fischer: ‘Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013’: Somaliland, Côte D’Ivoire, and Kenya, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School February 2013

[3] Social Research and Development Institute (SORADI), 2010, ‘Somaliland, Facing the Challenges of Free and Fair Elections’, available at: < https://ke.boell.org/sites/default/files/somaliland_-_challenges_of_elections_1.pdf > accessed on 20 September 2018

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Electoral processes encompass three types of registration:

1. voter registration ‑ the process of verification of a citizen’s eligibility to vote;
2. the registration of political parties and candidates ‑ verification of the eligibility of political parties and candidates to stand for election; and
3. observers’ accreditation ‑ a procedure designed to grant different actors access to observe relevant electoral activities.

All three may have an impact on the credibility and integrity of electoral processes and as such represent potential factors contributing to election-related tensions and violence.

Problematic voter registration

Voter registration establishes the eligibility of individuals to cast their ballot on election day. As a general rule, eligibility to vote is a precondition for the registration of voters.

Voter registration is a technically complex and often sensitive process. Voters with multiple registrations, electoral registers which contain the names of deceased or non-existent people, rejected voter registration, inaccurate assignment of a voter to the proper polling station and other factors have the potential to influence electoral outcomes. As a consequence, all political actors competing in elections are likely to be highly concerned with the quality of voter registration. Manipulation of voter registration, or perceptions that this has occurred, may trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence. 

Empirical cases:

• Ghana presidential and legislative elections 2008. During the voter registration period there were major irregularities that resulted in violence^[1]. In northern Ghana, some supporters of the two main political parties, the incumbent New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), vandalized several voter registration centres. Furthermore, a journalist covering the process was attacked while reporting on under-age voter registration. (Domestic observers highlighted illegal registration of minors as an issue of significant concern.)^[2] 
  
  Interrelated factors: poor voter information campaign (internal); inadequate funding, financing and budgeting (internal); provocative use of media by political parties (internal).[3]

• Guinea parliamentary elections 2013. The run-up to parliamentary elections in Guinea in 2013 was marked by violence. Ahead of Election Day the opposition denounced manipulation of the voter roll by the president’s party.^[4] A South African company, hired to draw up the electoral roll, was accused of collusion with the National Electoral Commission (CENI), allegedly to inflate the electoral roll with supporters of the ruling party. Violent protests in which 51 people were killed broke out over this issue, and elections had to be postponed repeatedly due to the prevailing level of tension and mistrust.^[5] Three weeks after the polls official results awarded victory by a large majority to the incumbent parties. International observers, however, reported the elections as marred by irregularities. The opposition contested the result’s validity and refused to participate in a recount, citing mistrust in CENI and calling for the vote’s annulment.^[6] In the event the commission dismissed opposition complaints and validated the official results.^[7]
  Interrelated factors: Conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); Human right violations^[8] (external); Unequal media access and favoritism (internal); Provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); Rejection of the election results (internal).
  
  

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[1] IRIN Africa, ‘Ghana: Pre-election Violence and Irregularities Worry Watchdogs’, Humanitarian News and Analysis (7 August 2008), available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=79703>, accessed 2 September 2011.

[2]     IRIN Africa, ‘Ghana: Pre-election Violence and Irregularities Worry Watchdogs’, Humanitarian News and Analysis (7 August 2008), available at <http://www.eods.eu/library/FR%20GHANA%2002.2009_en.pdf>, accessed 12 April 2018.

[3]     European Union Election Observation Mission, ‘Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2008’, February 2009, pp. 12, 13, 14, 19, available at <http://www.eueomghana.org/EN/PDF/Final_report/EU_EOM_Final_Report_Ghana.pdf>, accessed 9 November 2011.

[4] BBC news, Q&A: Guinea parliamentary elections, September 20^th 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24179390

[5] Liesl Louw-Vaudran, “South African Firm, Waymark, Continues to Fuel Misgivings about Guinea’s Legislative Elections”, Guinea Oye, August 17, 2013, https://guineaoye.wordpress.com/2013/08/17/south-african-firm-waymark-continues-to-fuel-misgivings-about-guineas-legislative-elections/ ; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014 – Guinea, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/guinea

[6] The Guardian, Guinean opposition disputes election, October 29^th, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/guinea-elections-alpha-conde-diallo

[7] BBC News, Guinea's Supreme Court upholds election result, November 16^th, 2013 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24966937

[8] United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Djibouti 2013 Human Rights Report : https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220318.pdf

Problematic registration of political parties and candidates

Political parties usually require registration with the body in charge of conducting elections. Basic registration requirements may include providing information on party identity, programme documents, evidence of popular support, geographic coverage, financial viability and so on. Basic registration requirements for political party candidates may include proof of eligibility to vote in a given electoral district and additional information, such as financial statements.

Registration requirements can, however, be used as an instrument for excluding groups or individuals from electoral competition and participation in power sharing. Exclusion from electoral processes through the denial of registration can provide incentives to excluded groups to turn to violent means in pursuing their political interests. In many situations, psychological and physical violence is used to prevent candidates standing for elections.

Empirical cases: 

• Turkey parliamentary election 2011. In December 2009 the Constitutional Court decided to ban the Democratic Society Party (DTP), a pro-Kurdish party.[1] The Court alleged that the DTP were connected with the terrorist-affiliated Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The DTP’s supporters, mainly of Kurdish origin, perceived the banning of the DTP as a further step in the Turkish government’s repression of the country’s Kurdish minority. This led to demonstrations, mainly in the south-east, which is predominately inhabited by Kurds. There were reports of stone-throwing demonstrators clashing with riot police.[2]
  
  Interrelated factors: social and political exclusion (external);[3] presence of non-state armed actors (external);[4] gender-based discrimination and violence (external);[5] human rights violations (external).[6]
  
  

•  Russia parliamentary election 2011. The liberal Party of People’s Freedom (PARNAS) was refused party registration prior to the 2011 parliamentary elections. It was alleged that party members and supporters were intimidated with a view to making them either resign from their posts or to taking their names off the party list.[7]
  
  Interrelated factors: human rights violations (external); presence of non-state armed actors (external);[8] gender-based discrimination and violence (external).[9]

•  Philippines legislative and presidential election 2010. The election campaign was marred by violence. On one day alone a group of 57 people, including relatives of local politicians, lawyers and journalists, were abducted by armed men from a faction with alleged ties to the incumbent President, and later found dead.[10]
  
  Interrelated factors: presence of non-state armed actors (external);[11] human rights violations (external).[12] 

Problematic accreditation of domestic and international observers

Domestic and international observers often confer legitimacy of an election and constitute a safeguard against electoral fraud. It is very common that the public places a great deal of trust in their findings. 

Authoritarian regimes will, however, tend to limit international observers’ presence and deny registration to domestic observation groups. In the case of domestic observation, regimes may also resort to intimidation to influence their reporting. Problematic accreditation can be perceived as a part of preparations to rig the electoral results, which may in turn contribute to increased tensions, rejection of the electoral results and/or outbreaks of violence.[1] 

Empirical cases:

• Nicaragua municipal elections 2008. A number of international bodies were denied accreditation to monitor these elections. Furthermore, domestic observers were also denied access to polling stations. Following the announcement of the result, supporters and opponents of the Sandinista party accused each other of electoral fraud (during the balloting and counting processes). This ended in a violent clash resulting in six casualties and two fatalities. The government was criticized for not letting international observers monitor the balloting and counting processes. The party of incumbent President Daniel Ortega won the majority of the votes, however, rejecting criticisms and contending that observers were denied access due to the fact that they were allegedly financed by ‘outside powers’.[2]
  
  Interrelated factors: gender-based discrimination and violence (external).[3]

  

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Political parties use the electoral campaign period to promote their programmes and confront the views of other political actors. Campaigning allows citizens to get a better understanding of the different political options and decide who to vote for. During the campaign period, political parties use different strategies to reach voters and seek their support. They organize political rallies and parades and display promotional materials and media advertisements in order to increase their profile and visibility. Media appearances are particularly important as it is well established that media debates are important vehicles for winning popular support.

Nevertheless, unequal media access—especially as between women and men and between ruling and opposition political parties— provocative messages and appearances, and aggressive campaigning and actions can and does lead to outbreaks of election-related violence, including gender-based violence, and in many different contexts.

Unequal media access and favouritism

Political parties use different media during the electoral campaign period to send out their messages and appeal for popular support. Although the role and importance of web-based social media has dramatically increased in recent years, in most countries traditional media, such as radio, TV and print media are still the most widely used during the campaign period.

State-owned media favouritism towards incumbent candidates and parties—in terms of biased reporting, gender discrimination in coverage and reporting, coverage time, discrimination against opposition forces, unethical reporting and so on—is often a factor in raising tensions. Private media may adopt the same practices to champion their own favoured candidates. Such a scenario can increase tensions and fuel election-related violence directed against both political opponents and critical and/or investigative journalists. 

Empirical cases: 

• Cambodia parliamentary election 2008. Most media networks were perceived as biased towards the Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) during the elections. In addition, a journalist working for Moneaksekar Khmer, an opposition newspaper affiliated with the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), was killed roughly two weeks before election day. The journalist was well known for his critical articles on official corruption. The fact that no one was arrested for the murders was interpreted by observers as a warning signal to other journalists and opposition members.[1]
  
  Interrelated factors: problematic voter registration (internal); poor voter information campaign (internal);[2] problematic election day operations (internal); poor management of the final round of electoral appeals (internal); the presence of non-state armed actors (external); poor voter information campaign (internal); poor management of election results (internal).[3]

 

Provocative use of media by political parties

Media campaigning traditionally provides a unique space for different political options to confront the views of their opponents. In all contexts, including well-established and transitional democracies, political debates facilitated by the media are essential in informing voters of policy options and winning their support.

Although it is envisaged as a platform for issues-based presentation and confrontation of political arguments, media campaigning often turns into derogation and inflammatory speeches. In many societies, insults towards women in politics tend to focus on undermining their capacity as leaders in comparison to men, who are assumed to be born leaders. In order to mobilize support, political parties sometimes abuse campaign opportunities and access to the media to disseminate false statements, create imaginary threats and feelings of insecurity. As outlined in the International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ (IFES) Countering Hate Speech in Elections: Strategies for Electoral Management Bodies,[1] while hate speech during campaigning does not automatically result in electoral violence, it does increase the risk of it. Use of hate speech during elections, such as through ‘hate-spin’ – ‘a double-sided technique that combines hate speech (incitement through vilification) with manufactured offense-taking (the performance of righteous indignation)’[2] – can be a tool used to manufacture offense and result in voter intimidation, for example through the use of violence.

Empirical cases:

• Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) presidential and legislative elections 2006. During the electoral campaign period a number of incidents of hate speeches were reported.[3] Two rival political parties engaged in hate speech campaigns with ethnic dimensions. One party’s campaign had the slogan ‘100 percent Congolese’ – an allusion to the leader of the other party, the incumbent president, who is of foreign descent. In addition, the same party had its own television channel which broadcast images of atrocities allegedly committed by the incumbent president during the 1963–2008 civil war. Some media announcements also encouraged people to attack the head of the election commission. This rhetoric had severe consequences and triggered violence during a Kinshasa political party rally where six people were killed, several of them police officers. The political party of the incumbent president used this to its advantage by broadcasting images of the deceased police officers , with the apparent aim of bringing the other party into contempt.[4]
  
  Interrelated factors: presence of non-state armed actors (external); human rights violations (external);[5] problematic voter registration (internal); problematic ballot counting and result tallying (internal).[6]

Provocative party rallying

Political parties organize rallies during an election campaign in order to reinforce links between political leaderships, party activists and party supporters. Electoral rallies are also demonstrations of strength, unity and power.

In conflict-prone societies where political divides often correspond with social divides, election rallies may represent high-risk events. Irrespective of the organizer’s intentions, the use of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech can quickly inspire violent action. Additionally, actions taken to limit, obstruct or prevent competitors from holding political rallies may trigger violent reactions.

Empirical cases:

• Azerbaijan presidential election 2003. During the election campaign period international observers recorded cases of opposition candidates being denied venues for rallies. The local authorities in the capital, Baku, for example, refused a popular opposition party leader, Isa Gambar of the Musavat party, permission to hold a rally in a cinema. Hundreds of supporters gathered outside the cinema to demonstrate against this decision, de facto showing their support for the candidate. The police used violence to disperse the demonstrators.[1]
  
  Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); problematic accreditation of domestic observers (internal);[2] human rights violation (external).[3]

• Nepal parliamentary election 2008. In the Tarai region the Nepali Congress held mass meetings. These were interrupted by opposing political parties using threats of violence and bombings.[4]
  
  Interrelated factors: presence of non-state armed actors (external).[5]

Provocative and violent actions by political parties

Electoral processes are supposed to offer a level playing field on which the quality of parties’ electoral manifesto will determine their chances of success. In reality, election campaigning and party actions can go beyond political rhetoric. In some contexts, political actors resort to different forms of psychological and physical violence in order to try and ensure that their electoral success is secured prior to election day. Such actions mostly take place during the electoral campaign period. They involve aggressive party activists, recruited thugs or members of party militias who commit acts of harassment, intimidation, assaults, violence against women and girls, destruction of property, political assassinations and other unlawful acts. Actions are directed against political opponents, their supporters, journalists and others. These scenarios are particularly dangerous as a single provocative or violent action may trigger responses and thereby kick-start a vicious circle.

 

Empirical cases:

 

•       Guatemala presidential and legislative elections 2011. The run-up to the election was marked by violent acts committed by political parties and their supporters, with more than 20 election-related deaths reported.[1] In February 2011 a mayoral candidate for the National Union for Hope-Grand National Alliance (UNE-GANA) was assassinated in a restaurant. Another, similar murder involved an UNE-GANA mayoral candidate’s son, who was killed in February 2011. There were claims that a politician from the oppositional party Patriot Party (PP) was involved in plotting the murder.[2]

 

Interrelated factors: presence of non-state armed actors (external); presence of organized crime (external);[3] problematic voter registration (internal).[4]

 

·         Nepal Constituent Assembly Election, 2013. Elections for a new constituent assembly were initiated in Nepal after the May 2012 dissolution of the first assembly, which had failed to agree on a new constitution. A coalition of 33 parties opposed to the election engaged in a range of protest actions, including the destruction of voter registration material, burning copies of the election code of conduct, destruction of campaign material and obstruction of political campaigning-[5] The ad hoc coalition then initiated a transport strike during the week before the election, with the aim of blocking voters from travelling to their home villages to vote. Vehicles that did not respect the strike were allegedly attacked and set on fire with petrol bombs. The attacks injured many and killed one truck driver.[6] Violence culminated on Election Day, when a bomb explosion in a Kathmandu polling station was reported. A splinter group from the Nepal Communist Party (CPN), the CPN Revolutionary–Maoist, claimed responsibility for these explosions. Despite these events, voter turnout was high. [7]

 

Interrelated factors: Poor socio-economic conditions (external); Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external); Conflict related to changing power dynamics (external).

 

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In most cases voting operations include logistical preparations for election day, the conduct of special and regular voting, vote counting and tallying of the result. Critical aspects of voting operations include logistics and security related to the handling of electoral materials, the integrity and transparency of special and external (out-of-country) voting, real or perceived problems with the integrity of voting on election day, and the technical accuracy and credibility of counting and result tallying. If technical operations are executed poorly or in a way that can create perceptions that there has been manipulation and rigging of the result, the reactions can be violent.

Insufficiency, destruction and loss of sensitive and non-sensitive materials

EMBs are responsible for ensuring that election day is carried off without technical complications. One important precondition for successful voting is proper logistical arrangements. These include the timely and sufficient provision of sensitive and non-sensitive materials to all polling locations, and ensuring that these materials are protected at all times.

Failures or delays in supplying essential electoral materials, poor security and lack of transparency in the handling of them, before or after voting and counting, can have a negative impact on perceptions of the credibility and integrity of elections, and lead to the rejection of election results.[1] This can in turn trigger or contribute to election-related violence. In some cases, even procedurally well-conducted elections may lead to contested outcomes, particularly in countries with long-standing and deep-rooted grievances.

Empirical cases: 

• Nigeria presidential and parliamentary elections 2007. The lack of electoral materials was associated with an alleged attempt to manipulate the electoral process. Voting operations started late and finished early, mainly due to the shortage of electoral materials such as ballot papers and result sheets. Such shortfalls typically occurred in provinces where the ruling party faced a strong challenge. In some polling districts electoral materials were not delivered, and elections did not take place at all. Furthermore, the material was often alleged to have been poorly handled, not counted or not registered, thereby making it easier to manipulate the ballot papers and result sheets.
  
  Security was perceived as inadequate throughout the election: there were several cases of political party-affiliated individuals stuffing ballot boxes with pre-marked ballot papers - allegedly with no resistance from presiding electoral officials. On some occasions the police themselves were allegedly responsible for fraud. Widespread allegations of fraud contributed to outbreaks of violence, resulting in the deaths of 200 people.[2]
  
  Interrelated factors: social and political exclusions (external), provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal). 

• Burundi, communal elections, 2010. Because the May 2010 communal elections in Burundi preceded presidential and legislative elections, they were perceived as a test of the parties’ popularity. These elections were chiefly won by the ruling party. While election day was generally calm and transparent, the Coalition of Civil Society for Electoral Monitoring (COSOME) noted that some polling stations had not fully respected the electoral code. Alleged issues included missing ballot papers for certain parties in some polling stations, party propaganda in the waiting lines, cases of voter intimidation, and some polling stations where secrecy of voting was reported as not fully respected.[3] While these irregularities were not judged sufficient to affect the result of the election by international observers,[4] they nonetheless strengthened opposition claims of significant fraud. The non-publication of the procès-verbaux (minutes) by the Electoral Commission reinforced opposition’s claims in this regard. Another controversy emerged when the opposition claimed to have discovered a ballot box hidden, and full of ballots.[5] Following this a coalition of opposition parties decided to boycott the presidential and legislative elections. The protests that followed these events resulted in electoral violence, and the boycotted elections led in turn to victory for the ruling party.[6]

Interrelated factors: human rights violations (external); poor socio-economic conditions (external); Problematic election day operations (internal); Provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external); Poor management of election results (Internal); Poor management of the final round of electoral appeals (Internal).

Lack of transparency of special and external voting

Special and out-of-country voting are options put in place for those voters who cannot attend regular polling stations on election day. Such voters may be institutionalized or housebound, refugees, diplomatic or military personnel and diasporas. Arrangements are made to allow them to vote on a special day or series of days at special locations, or at mobile polling stations on election day. Votes can be cast in person or by post.[1]

Organizing voting for external populations is more complex than organizing in-country polling, and taking on this logistical and financial burden in a challenging environment, especially in the context of a post-conflict election, is rarely without risks. A large external population could change the outcome of an election in ways that may not be politically acceptable in-country.[2] Moreover, due to complexities associated with special and external voting, political actors or independent observers may not be in a position to verify independently special and external voting’s integrity. All these issues can be sources of dispute, especially in a closely contested election. 

Empirical cases: 

• Presidential elections in Romania in 2014. The legal electoral framework provides for only one way to vote from abroad: voting in person at a Romanian embassy. For the first round of the 2 November 2014 presidential election the Romanian Foreign Ministry distributed 600,000 ballots to its diplomatic missions. The number of eligible voters abroad, however, amounted to approximately 3 million people. The limited supply of ballot papers resulted in citizens visiting embassies to vote in vain. Inadequate organization of external voting was in violation of constitutional rights, and was viewed by some as an instance of election fraud that angered both expatriates deprived of their right to vote and the Romanian public. In Bucharest protests erupted in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the conclusion of the first round.[3]
  
  Interrelated factors: inadequate operational planning (internal); rejection of the election results (internal).[4]
  
  

Problematic election day operations

Election day operations are designed to facilitate the process of casting a ballot for all eligible voters. The level of participation and time constraints make election day operations very complex. In many countries, more than half of the population will vote on election day. This process is managed by a large number of male and female electoral management officials and staff and the security sector agencies’ personnel. Political parties, civil society groups and international organizations provide a presence in electoral facilities across the country to scrutinize and testify to the integrity of the voting process.

Problems and irregularities that take place on election day have effects that are difficult to repair afterwards. If the margin of victory is expected to be narrow, even the smallest irregularity or perception of irregularity may spark conflict and/or violent reactions. Due to the short time in which voting takes place, problems that emerge on election-day may be compounded during the days following the actual voting.

Empirical cases:

• Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia municipal elections 2000. International observers reported several irregularities during election day. In a number of cases, ballot boxes were destroyed, thereby preventing voters from casting their ballot. In the municipality of Debar, all 24 polling stations had to close due to violent incidents such as threats against election officials. In other municipalities voting had to be temporarily suspended in order to restore order.[1] 
  
  Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external);[2] social and political exclusions (external); the presence of organized crime (external); the presence of non-state armed actors (external).[3]

 

Problematic vote counting and tallying of the results

The vote counting and tallying of the results is particularly sensitive and vulnerable to misuse and manipulation. It usually takes place immediately after polling stations close. Vote counting and result tallying are very complex processes and thus prone to human error. In most cases, errors in vote counting and tabulation will disadvantage some parties more than others, and it may be hard to establish whether the error is a consequence of human error or a deliberate act. In cases where political actors, civil society and international observers are obstructed in their work, suspicions may build to the point where this has the potential to deepen conflicts and lead to violence.

Empirical cases:

• Mongolia parliamentary election 2008. The vote counting and reporting process was very lengthy, primarily due to high voter turnout and the large number of voters assigned to each voting station. The delay aroused people’s distrust and contributed to a perception of electoral fraud, thereby triggering violent protests that resulted in the destruction of the incumbent government’s party headquarters as well as 60 civilian and police casualties, among them five fatalities, during an ensuing period of state of emergency.[1]
  
  Interrelated factors: inadequate electoral administrative rules (internal); environmental hazards (external).[2]

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The body responsible for the conduct of elections is usually responsible for announcing the final election results. Preliminary results usually provide a good indicator of overall electoral outcomes as well as the distribution of political power for the next term of office. For an incumbent, admitting defeat and handing over political power to opponents may be difficult. Leaders who are disappointed with the initial figures may feel strongly motivated to use all available means, including violent ones, to challenge the election results and change them in their favor.

The overriding responsibility for a successful election lies with political leaders, as they are in a position: to commit to challenging election results through legal means only and with substantiating evidence; to accept final outcomes, as officially declared; to encourage their supporters to engage in proper, peaceful behavior; and to be gracious in defeat and magnanimous in victory, including through offering political space for the opposition. Where this responsibility is not assumed, however, inconsistencies, delays and lack of transparency among the bodies in charge of the management of electoral appeals and results may contribute to stakeholders’ resort to violent means.

Poor management of election results

EMBs are responsible for the compilation of election results from the field, reconciliation of results at the electoral district and central levels, announcement of the preliminary election results and announcement of the final election results.

The imperative is to minimize the time lapse between election day and announcement of the final election results. Any unnecessary or unexplained delay will feed suspicions concerning the integrity of results processing. Whether real or perceived, biased processing of election results will increase the likelihood of outbreaks of violence.

Empirical cases:

• Mozambique presidential and parliamentary elections 1999. International observers charged that the national Electoral Commission did not follow international standards relating to electoral transparency, or release official results in a timely manner.[1] When it did announce the results, they were viewed as fraudulent by the opposition Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). Approximately 100 people died during the violent protests that followed.[2]
  
  Interrelated factors: inadequate funding, financing and budgeting (internal); unequal media access and favouritism (internal); poor voter information campaign (internal).[3]

• Kenya parliamentary and presidential elections 2007. Much of the violence that occurred was due to irregularities after election day.[4] After analysing the results from 18 selected constituencies, an independent review commission found that there were indications that the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) had conducted a poor tallying process.[5] Allegations of malpractice and fraud following the result’s announcement contributed to triggering election-related violence that led to the deaths of more than 1,100 people killed by armed individuals or mobs. The security forces were also criticised for either failing to prevent these killings or, in some instances, for being directly responsible for them.[6]
  
  Interrelated factors: gender-based discrimination and violence (external); presence of non-state armed actors (external); poor socio-economic conditions (external).[7]
• Djibouti, parliamentary elections, 2013. February 2013 parliamentary election were the first where the opposition had participated since 2003. The election took place in a tense context marked by significant curtailment of opposition and media freedoms. Amid accusations of widespread fraud, the opposition refused to accept the declared results. A formal complaint was rejected on a legal technicality, and polling station results were not published. Large-scale protests followed, resulting in widespread detentions.[8] Opposition parliamentarians boycotted parliament for months, until an agreement was reached with the government in December 2014[9]. 2016 elections were subject to similar challenges and controversies.[10]
  

  
  Interrelated factors: Conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); Human right violations[11] (external); Unequal media access and favoritism (internal); Provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); Rejection of the election results (internal).

Poor management of the final round of electoral appeals

In most cases, the electoral dispute resolution instances include the EMBs, administrative bodies and judicial institutions. Their mandate and hierarchy may differ across different electoral systems.

Any appeal which is not dealt with, and adequately remedied, may create discontent and may also seriously contribute to the deepening or aggravation of existing conflicts. In an already tense situation, unresolved issues can become a trigger for conflict and an excuse for violence.

Empirical cases:

• Belarus presidential election 2010. Violent demonstrations erupted in Minsk following an official announcement that incumbent Aleksandr Lukashenko had won the presidential election with 79.6 per cent of the vote.[1] Under the existing legal framework, voters in Belarus cannot challenge election results in the Supreme Court.[2] The lack of dispute resolution instruments, and thus a legitimate outlet for complaints and grievances, contributed to triggering protests in Minsk, which resulted in several injuries and the arrest of 725 people .[3]
  
  Interrelated factors: problematic vote counting and result tallying (internal); unequal media access and favouritism (internal); human rights violations (external).[4]

Rejection of the election results

The rejection of electoral results is an extreme act that may stem from a real or perceived lack of integrity and credibility in the electoral process and its outcome. In very broad terms, rejection of the result by a particular party may result in self-exclusion from participation in a democratic institution or process. Very often such a decision may lead to protests with violent outcomes.

Empirical cases:

• Haiti presidential and legislative elections 2010/2011. Violence erupted after the results of the first round of voting were declared in December 2010. Jude Célestin, the candidate of the party of outgoing President René Préval, came second, thus qualifying for the next run-off. The supporters of presidential candidate Michel Martelly, who came third and thus did not qualify for the run-off, were outraged by the fact that he was only one percentage point behind Célestin.[1] Protests escalated and resulted in a large-scale campaign of destruction as well as the deaths of 13 people.[2] The Provisional Electoral Council re-examined the ballot papers and announced that Martelly had come second and thus qualified for the run-off.[3] 
  
  Interrelated factors: environmental hazards (external);[4] gender-based discrimination and violence (external).[5]

• Côte d’Ivoire presidential election 2010. After the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, rejected the election results violence erupted, resulting in the deaths of 3,000 people and the creation of over 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).[6] The competing presidential candidate, Alassane Ouattara, gained 54.1 per cent of votes.[7] Gbagbo refused to step down, however, which resulted in violent demonstrations, abductions of perceived political opponents from the opposition Rally of the Republicans (RDR), beatings and torture.[8]
  
  Interrelated factors: presence of non-state armed actors (external); human rights violations (external);[9] poor socio-economic conditions (external);[10] problematic ballot counting and result tallying (internal); problematic election day operations (internal).[11]

• Cambodia, General Election, 2013. After a proclamation of victory for the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the main opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) refused to accept the results and boycotted parliament, citing widespread electoral irregularities.[12] Concerns over alleged electoral rigging were also expressed by the EU, the UN and Human Rights Watch. The CNRP organized protests which both grew in scale over the following months and provoked a violent reaction from the government. An agreement was finally signed between the two parties on 22 July 2014.[13]
  
  Interrelated factors: Conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); alleged human right violations[14] (external); Violent actions by political parties (internal); problematic voter registration (internal); problematic registration of political parties and candidates (internal); management of the final round of electoral appeals (internal).
• Venezuela, presidential elections, 2013. Electoral violence erupted in Venezuela after the publication of presedential election results. Following a tense campaign the results gave Nicolás Maduro, Hugo Chavez’s heir, victory over his opponent, Henrique Capriles, by a margin of 1-6 per cent. While the opposition refused to accept these results amid accusations of fraud, the government accused the opposition of plotting a coup. Massive demonstrations and political turmoil followed the government’s refusal to initiate a recount.[15] While the government blamed Capriles’ supporters for the ensuing violence, Human Rights Watch expressed concerns over alleged wide-scale governmental human rights abuses.[16]
  
  Interrelated factors: Conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); Human right violations (external); Provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); Problematic Election Day operations (Internal); Poor management of the final round of electoral appeals (internal).

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Internal (endogenous or process) factors include 26 election-specific factors divided into seven electoral phases. These are exclusive to the electoral context and are defined in the Electoral Risk Management Tool (International IDEA): Internal Factors Guide (Alihodžić and Asplund 2018). The eighth phase of the electoral cycle, post-election, is not included. Although there is a possibility that violence occurring after the implementation of election results is linked to the elections, the risk factors underlying such violence may not be process-related. Instead, the incident should be examined in the context of structural risk factors.

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Factors related to exogenous conditions can either trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence. International IDEA’s guide (Alihodžić and Uribe Burcher 2018) points to ten such factors - although this list can also be expanded, and single factors further unpacked.

Poor socio-economic conditions

Poverty, inequality and high or increasing unemployment are important factors to consider when assessing the risks of election-related violence. Poverty is a complex concept that has been defined as ‘pronounced deprivation in well-being’, referring to a situation where, as a result of lack of income or consumption capacity, a person fails to attain the minimum level of well-being required to be able to function adequately in society.[1] There are many dimensions to poverty, but mostly they relate to a lack of access to food supplies, adequate education and health, among others. Closely linked to poverty are unemployment, which contributes to perpetuating its root causes, and inequality, which jeopardizes access to opportunities for disenfranchised population segments.^[2] There is strong evidence suggesting causal links between poverty, inequality and political violence, in particular election-related violence.^[3] Poverty increases tensions over less serious disputes, such as those concerning electoral procedures, which can lead to violent actions. Moreover, those who have little to lose are easily mobilized for violent action.^[4]

 Empirical cases:

• Kenya presidential and parliamentary elections 2007. Economic frustration and inequalities associated with land ownership, together with unkept promises of job opportunities for young people, have been identified as some of the most important contributors to outbreaks of violence during electoral processes in Kenya. The epitome was the 2007 elections, which ultimately resulted in over an alleged 1,500 people killed, 3,000 women raped and 300,000 internally displaced.^[5]

  
  Interrelated factors: social and political exclusion (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external);^[6] gender-based discrimination and violence (external);^[7] electoral security arrangements (internal);^[8] provocative use of the media by political parties (internal);^[9] management of election results (internal).^[10]
  
  

• Liberia presidential and legislative elections 2005. Unemployment has affected all Liberian electoral processes, in particular the 2005 elections. Although there was a considerable reduction in violence during the pre-electoral period,^[11] this did not result in a peaceful post-electoral phase, as political groups mobilized unemployed youth in sprees of violence.^[12] Incidents included intimidation, protests and traffic disruption in the capital, Monrovia, threats of violence against targeted political figures and journalists, and looting.^[13]

  
  Interrelated factors: social and political exclusion (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external);^[14] the presence of non-state armed actors (external); a poor voter information campaign (internal); unequal media access and favouritism (internal); poor performance of the electoral management bodies (internal).^[15]

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[1] Haughton, Jonathan and Khandker, Shahidur R., Handbook on Poverty and Inequality (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009), p. 1.

[2] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Social Policy and

Development Division, ‘Social Perspective on Development: Issues’, [n.d.], <https://

www.un.org/development/desa/socialperspectiveondevelopment/issues.html>, accessed

4 May 2018

[3] Krug, Etienne G. et al. (eds), World Report on Violence and Health (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002), p. 37, available at <http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/full_en.pdf>, accessed 12 July 2011.

[4] Laakso, Liisa, ‘Insights into Electoral Violence in Africa’, in Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann and Andreas Mehler (eds), Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet and Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), pp. 228–30.

[5] Roberts, Mara J., Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya (Charlottesville, Va.: New Dominion Philanthropy Metrics, 2009), available at <http://www.ndpmetrics.com/papers/Kenya_Conflict_2007.pdf>, accessed 30 June 2011; and Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA), The General Elections in Kenya 2007, Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est, no. 38 (Nairobi, 2008), pp. 2, 11, 172, 202, 227, 228, 369.

[6] International Crisis Group, ‘Kenya in Crisis’, Africa Report no. 137 (21 February 2008), p. 9, available at

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya-crisis>, accessed 2 May 2018

[7] Ibid.; and Roberts, Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya.

[8] Alston, Philip, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. Addendum: Election-related Violence and Killings’, UN document A/HRC/14/24/Add.7 (18 May 2010), p. 38, available at <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E002895AFBE42ABA492577370007FFE9-Full_Report.pdf>, accessed 1 September 2011

[9] Mbeke, Peter Oriare, ‘The Role of the Media in Conflict and Peace Building in Kenya: Draft Literature Review Report’, April 2009, p. 13, available at <http://www.internews.org/pubs/kenya/LiteratureReview_ReportingPeaceKenya_20090415.pdf>, accessed 21 October 2011.

[10] [Kriegler Commission], Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections Held in Kenya on 27 December 2007, pp. 35, 125, 129, available at

<http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/KE/reports/independent-review-commission-on-the-general>, accessed 4 May 2018

[11] International Observation Delegations, Observing Presidential and Legislative Elections in Liberia, Final Report on the International Observation Delegations, sponsored by the National Democratic Institute and Carter Center, October/November 2005, p. 1, available at <http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/FinalReportLiberia2005.pdf>, accessed 30 June 2011.

[12] Carnegie Mellon University, ‘Conference to Mitigate Violence in Liberia’s 2011 Electoral Contests: Resolution’, Monrovia, 2010, p. 2, available at <http://www.cmu.edu/cipi/news-events/pdfs/Liberia2010Conference_Resolution-SummaryOfProceedings.pdf>, accessed 30 June 2011.

[13] International Observation Delegations, Observing Presidential and Legislative Elections in Liberia, p. 26.

[14] Ibid., pp. 36, 38.

[15] Carnegie Mellon University, ‘Conference to Mitigate Violence’, p. 2.

Social and political exclusion

The social and political exclusion of minorities and marginalized groups creates the potential for conflict. A minority is a group of people sharing an ethnic, cultural, religious and/or linguistic identity that is distinct from that of the majority of the population. One of the main characteristics of minorities is that they are usually in a non-dominant position. The term minority may also refer to groups of the population that are marginalized by their political affiliation, their sexual orientation or even their physical capacities.^[1]

The exclusion of a minority or marginalized group from political processes often creates a context characterized by strong incentives for violence.^[2] In addition, the characteristics associated with these groups, be it ethnicity, religious beliefs, language, age, geographical location or sexual preferences, have often been used to further stigmatize and alienate them before, during and after elections.^[3] The mobilization of ethnic hatred by political elites is an all-too frequent example in this respect.^[4]

Empirical cases:

•  Zambia presidential and legislative elections 2006. Chinese workers have increased their presence in the Zambian economy in recent years as part of the development of the copper industry as well as other sectors, such as textiles, road construction and retail. Frustration within Zambia is on the rise as many consider that Chinese investment has not improved the quality of life. Such frustration was reflected in the highly charged debates during the 2006 election.^[5] As a consequence, post-electoral violence surged in Lusaka, targeting, among others, Chinese populations.^[6]
  Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external);^[7] provocative party rallying (internal);^[8] rejection of election results (internal).^[9]

•  Ghana presidential and legislative elections 2008. Ghana has a wide array of ethnic groups who have clashed on different occasions over political control of the country. Northern Ghana has long seen disputes between the Kusasis and Mamprusis, two groups that have enjoyed the support of different political parties.^[10] Conflicts between these parties have generated tensions that have in turn contributed to violence, in particular during the 2008 elections, when the pre-election period was affected by vandalism in registration centres, shootings, burning of houses and cars and attacks on journalists. In addition, three people were killed and many more injured.^[11]
  Interrelated factors: conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external);^[12] problematic voter registration (internal).^[13]

 

Conflict relating to changing power dynamics

The balance of power in a country can be affected by transitional political processes such as: implementation of peace agreements; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes; social or legal reforms benefiting or marginalizing groups of citizens; international trade agreements; and other factors.

Deficiencies in the institutional arrangements in place to address heightened tensions during transitional periods, especially within a post-conflict environment, are likely to produce election-related violence.^[1] The biggest risk is that such institutional deficiencies will increase the inherent tensions that any electoral competition generates.^[2] The timing of any major political process plays a significant role: for example, an early election in combination with a weak DDR process creates fertile ground for election-related violence.^[3]

Empirical cases:

• Burundi presidential, legislative and communal elections 2010. Since 1993 Burundi has suffered from a protracted civil war that has at different times shifted the balance of power between the two main ethnic groups (majority Hutus and minority Tutsis). The country has had to deal with the assassination of a succession of presidents, military coups, a change of the constitution and various attempts at power-sharing and peace agreements. In 2009, a new transition period and DDR process began that had a clear impact on the 2010 elections.^[4] By then the country was dealing with the early stages of a turbulent DDR process. In addition, state institutions lacked the experience and capacity to provide democratic channels to address related grievances. Major election-related incidents included a boycott by many political parties, grenade attacks, restrictions on participation, as well as allegations of physical abuse and torture.^[5]
  Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); social and political exclusion (external); the presence of non-state armed groups (external); grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external); provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); rejection of the election results (internal).^[6]
• Timor-Leste presidential and legislative elections 2007. Violence recorded during the 2007 elections was perpetrated by and against different political party supporters, mainly during the post-electoral period. There were 162 alleged incidents of this nature including two deaths, approximately 100 injuries and 7,000 families displaced.^[7]
  Inter-related factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external);^[8] the presence of non-state armed actors (external);^[9] provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); inadequate electoral security arrangements (internal).^[10]

Gender-based discrimination and violence

Gender-based violence is widely defined as the most extreme forms of gender-based discrimination, manifested as an act inflicting physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, including threats of such acts.^[1] When gender-based violence is perpetrated against both women and men, particularly in times of conflict and war, trauma and the public stigmatization of victims are key impediments to the reporting and prosecution of these crimes.^[2] Furthermore, when already weak state institutions suffering from rampant corruption, incompetence, lack of public trust and operational capacity are further paralysed by the outbreak of election-related strife and violence, their capacity to prevent and prosecute such crimes and protect the victims of gender-based violence is almost non-existent.

Gender-based violence, predominantly against women and girls, has been a feature of a great many recent political and ethnic conflicts. In some cases, elections have triggered outbreaks of violence in which women and girls were victimized. In other instances, violence against women has been a tool of political harassment and intimidation against female election candidates. In addition, female voters continue to be disproportionately affected by various forms of election-related violence or threats of violence, which has the effect of keeping them away from the polling stations more than male voters.^[3] Perpetrators of gender-based violence can be state and non-state actors including national armed forces, security and police bodies, rebel and militia groups, the family and the community.

Empirical cases:

• Kenya presidential elections 2007. Women have traditionally suffered from various forms of gender-based discrimination and violence in both the public and the private spheres.^[4] In the past decade, while women have increased their share in elected bodies of governance, education and labour force, gender-based stereotypes and harmful traditional practices still significantly inhibit women from gaining an equal footing with men in various spheres of political and public life.^[5]
  Reports of violence surrounding the 2007 elections indicated numerous cases of rape, sexual assault and mutilation across different regions of the country.^[6] These acts were reportedly perpetrated by the police, security forces and militarized gangs aligned with the two presidential contenders, as well as individuals working in IDP protection camps. Even neighbours, relatives and supposed friends were guilty of widespread acts of violence against women and girls of all ethnic origins, predominantly those from poor areas. While fewer cases of gender-based violence against men were reported, they included instances of circumcision and castration of male hostages belonging to rival groups.^[7] As various inquiry reports indicated, to date no proper or adequate investigation of these incidents has taken place.^[8]
  Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); social and political exclusion (external); the presence of non-state armed actors (external); human rights violations (internal); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external);^[9] inadequate electoral security arrangements (internal);^[10] provocative use of the media by political parties (internal);^[11] poor management of the election results (internal).^[12]
•  Guinea presidential elections 2009. Despite official efforts to improve the situation of women and, more broadly, promote equality between women and men in Guinea in the last few years, women continue to face widespread inequality and discrimination based on gender stereotypes that are deeply entrenched in all spheres of political, public and private life.
  
  Political unrest in late 2009 was motivated by the failure of self-proclaimed president Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, who seized power in a coup in late 2008, to hold the elections he had promised. Unrest featured some egregious cases of gender-based violence targeted against women. Opposition leaders and their supporters gathered at a rally in Conakry on 29 September 2009 and were violently attacked. Over 100 cases of rape and gender-based violence against women protesters were reported in this context.^[13]
  Inter-related factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external); human rights violations (external).^[14]

 

The presence of non-state armed actors

Non-state armed actors refers to individuals or groups who use violence to achieve their objectives but are not acting as part of the state’s regular forces or institutions.^[1] They include rebels or guerrilla fighters, militias or paramilitaries, armed clan chiefs, warlords, terrorists, mercenaries and private security companies as well as marauders.^[2] Problems related to non-state armed actors are especially acute when these have a direct presence in the country, although their location in neighbouring countries can also raise tensions.^[3] Such groups do not necessarily respect borders and can use neighbouring territory to seek shelter or mobilize material. If these groups have a political agenda, they can spread instability.

The presence or influence of non-state armed actors will increase risks of violence during elections.^[4] Irregular armed groups may destabilize the country by engaging in electoral manipulation.^[5] In particular, they can resort to intimidation of candidates and voters.^[6] The risk of violence is particularly high when Secruity Sector Agencies (SSAs) do not have the capacity to respond to evolving security challenges, or when parts of the security sector are in collusion with militias or paramilitary groups. Such cases are exacerbated when the state does not have complete control over its territory, or when porous borders allow the illegal transit of armed groups.^[7]

Empirical cases: 

• Colombian presidential and legislative elections 2010. Colombia has been immersed in a violent internal conflict for more than 50 years, with a broad array of non-state armed actors that range from, for example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) involved.[8] Both these groups have caused major distortions in the political process, often radically modifying historical electoral trends.^[9]
  Interrelated factors: the presence of organized crime (external);^[10] grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external); human rights violations (external);^[11] contested electoral law (internal); inadequate electoral security arrangements (internal); problematic election-day operations (internal).^[12]
• Afghanistan presidential and provincial council elections 2009. The recent history of Afghanistan is marked by political instability, with the Taliban still carrying out attacks against both the government and civilians.^[13] Electoral processes are one of their main targets. During the 2009 election, the Taliban were responsible for numerous threats and terrorist acts in the pre-election period, mainly targeting candidates and their staff. In addition, at least 10 electoral officials, candidates and campaign workers were abducted, and 31 people killed on election day.^[14]
  Interrelated factors: the presence of non-state armed actors (external);^[15] human rights violations (external); grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external);^[16] contested electoral law (internal); poor performance of the electoral management body (internal); an inadequate system for the resolution of electoral disputes (internal); inadequate electoral security arrangements (internal); problematic voter registration (internal); problematic ballot counting and tallying (internal).^[17]
•  Afghanistan, presidential election, 2014. The 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan was marked by widespread fraud, voter intimidation and violence perpetrated by political parties, war lords, local tribal and religious leaders and the Taliban. For ideological reasons, the Taliban were expected to attempt to orchestrate enough violence to derail the election. Other factors, however,  impacted on their efforts. Both foreign patrons and local strongmen lobbied for their attacks to be targeted  to favour particular candidates. This in turn resulted in significant internal fragmentation amongst the Taliban, and uneven violence during the first round of voting. More generalized violence was observed during the second round resulting in voter intimidation, whole villages prevented from voting, voter turnout irregularities, and the killing of many of the security forces personnel who were protecting the elections, EMB staff members and voters included.[18]
  
  Interrelated factors: Conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); Human right violations (external); Provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); the presence of organized crime (external).

The presence of organized crime

Organized crime is a term used to refer to structured groups that exist for the purpose of committing serious crimes and/or other offences for financial or other material gain.^[1] The most common activities of these organizations include trafficking of humans, migrants, drugs, firearms, environmental resources and counterfeit goods, as well as maritime piracy and cybercrime.^[2] Organized crime affects the state and, particularly, the security forces in a different way than other violent actors. These groups sometimes seek to ‘capture’ the state, meaning that they take control of the state’s institutions in order to achieve their economic objectives.^[3] They do this through corruption^[4] and extortion, among other things.^[5] Thus, when the state has been captured and loses the ability to deliver, these groups tend to hollow out both state institutions and overall political legitimacy.^[6]

Organized crime networks, while not necessarily having political aspirations, are interested in protecting their ‘territories’. This often translates into seeking to ensure that local bureaucracies, the security sector, judges and prosecutors as well as local politicians are all on their ‘side’. In such contexts organized crime plays a major role in affecting electoral processes,^[7] and can use violence as a tool to achieve or maintain its aspirations to territorial control.^[8]

Empirical cases:

• Guatemala presidential, legislative and local elections 2011. Guatemala has been trying to deal with the problem of organized crime for many years, and there have been repeated exposures of the alleged involvement of government officials in this regard.^[9] Organized crime is associated with the flow of drugs and weapons from/to Mexico and the United States. Levels of violence have increased even beyond those experienced during the country’s 36-year armed conflict.^[10] Among other things, elections represent an opportunity for organized crime to enhance their role by seeking to build relationships with elected officials.^[11] The violence that surrounded the 2007 elections^[12] was repeated in 2011. During the pre-election period, violence included the murder of candidates, their families, party activists and electoral staff.^[13]
  Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external);^[14] provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); inadequate electoral security arrangements (internal); an inadequate system for resolution of electoral disputes (internal).^[15]
• Guinea-Bissau presidential elections 2009. Organized crime networks, mainly drug traffickers seeking to use the country as a transit route, have brought a wave of violence and corruption, affecting all areas of governance.^[16] This situation spilled over into the 2009 elections held after the president had been killed.^[17] Despite a largely orderly pre-election period,^[18] a general sense of tension and insecurity surrounded the elections themselves. Incidents such as the killing of one candidate and political party members, as well as allegations of killings and arbitrary arrests of government officials, were recorded.^[19]
  Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); human rights violations (external);^[20] lack of training of security sector agencies (internal).^[21]

 

Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes

Genocide is an international crime committed through the murder of members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as well as through other actions that seriously affect the survival conditions of the group, with the intention of destroying it as a whole or in part.^[1] Crimes against humanity are more general and refer to those actions that are part of a widespread or systematic attack against individual civilians. These include murder, extermination, enslavement, imprisonment or other severe deprivations of physical liberty, torture, rape and enforced disappearance of persons, as well as forced displacement.^[2] War crimes, on the other hand, include grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international and non-international armed conflict, in particular those actions targeted against civilians.^[3]

Crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes affect societies in such a way that the electoral process can hardly escape their consequences. In the aftermath of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, the tensions between ethnic groups are usually still on the rise and the chances that elections will fuel further violence are high.^[4] Likewise, internal displacement creates an abnormal situation that has the potential to affect elections.^[5] The relocation of IDPs, as well as the repatriation of refugees often brings new conflicts and clashes in their host communities. IDPs and returnees are therefore often subject to intimidation and harassment at election time. In addition, if IDPs and refugees are able to return, old tensions often surface, with elections fueling old and new grievances.^[6]

Empirical cases:

•  Rwanda presidential elections 2010. Rwanda hosts various ethnic groups, with the Hutus (majority) and the Tutsis (minority) the largest. Over the last 50 years and even beyond, there have been sporadic, and sometimes serious, outbreaks of conflict between the two communities. During the 1994 genocide, approximately 800,000 people – mostly Tutsis but also moderate Hutu - were killed and numerous women raped as part of an organized attempt to exterminate the Tutsi minority.^[7] Post-genocide, Rwanda’s political life has remained profoundly marked by all the tensions that existed before it.^[8] This was reflected during the 2010 elections.^[9] During the pre-election period, the government was accused by some of tightening control over the media and opposition forces. There were also numerous threats to and attacks on opposition party members and journalists. and two candidates were arrested.^[10]
  Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); social and political exclusion (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external);^[11] provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); unequal media access and favouritism (internal).^[12]
• Sri Lanka presidential and legislative elections 2010. Sri Lanka suffered from a 26-year conflict between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), causing massive population displacement in the north of the country. The final stages of the war were the worst for IDPs and, even though many people have since returned, the conditions for IDPs remain a cause for concern.^[13] This further fueled an already volatile political situation,^[14] with obvious consequences for elections and their peaceful occurrence.^[15] In particular, during the pre-election period in 2010, there were numerous violent attacks against candidates, campaigners and political activists.^[16]
  Interrelated factors: social and political exclusion (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external);^[17] lack of training of security sector agencies (internal); unequal media access and favouritism (internal); provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal).^[18]

 

Human rights violations

Human rights are ‘rights inherent to all human beings’ that a state is obliged to protect and promote.^[1] A state violates human rights when it fails to take steps to promote and advance them. One way in which the state may fail in this regard is by not restraining itself in the use of force according to formal legal provisions. This may be reflected in, for example, the necessity to observe proportionality in the use of force in relation to the specific threat in question.^[2]

 

If there are human rights violations in a country and strong rule of law mechanisms and culture are lacking, the risks of both violence and further violations of human rights during the electoral period increase significantly.^[3] For example, during political rallies a lack of appropriate police guidelines and training with respect to crowd control and the use of force, in combination with a lack of sound and efficient accountability mechanisms, can lead to violence generated by the security services.^[4]

Empirical cases:

• Iran presidential elections 2009. The country’s human rights record has long the subject of international criticism. In this regard alleged violations include torture, degrading punishment. lack of due process and significant constraints on freedom of speech.^[5] The 2009 elections were highly contested, and numerous protests followed announcement of the results.^[6] Clashes between the security forces and protesters resulted in a number of citizens being killed, tortured and arrested.^[7]
  Interrelated factors: social and political exclusion (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); lack of training of security sector agencies (internal); an inadequate system for the resolution of electoral disputes (internal); rejection of the election results (internal).^[8] 
• Côte d’Ivoire presidential elections 2010. The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is marked by both human rights abuses and weak rule of law, in particular since 2002. These abuses have been characterized by excessive use of force by the security forces as well as harassment, extortion and intimidation of the population, with little or no implementation of accountability mechanisms.^[9] 
  
  Abuses were especially acute during the contested 2010 elections, when the incumbent president was defeated but refused to recognize the results. Incidents of violence were particularly grave during the election and post-election period. They included intimidation of voters and violent repression of demonstrations as well as the alleged murder of at least 300 people.^[10]
  Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); social and political exclusion (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external);^[11] the presence of non-state armed actors (external);^[12] contested electoral law (internal);^[13] rejection of the election results (internal).^[14]

Environmental hazards

Environmental hazards relate to a situation or state of affairs that poses a threat to the surrounding environment.^[1] Environmental hazards also encompass threats such as chemical, biological and natural hazards. For instance, a chemical spillage, HIV/AIDS epidemic or a sudden outbreak of cholera encompass either a chemical or a biological hazard.^[2] A natural hazard is related to phenomena such as atmospheric, hydrological, geological and wildfire-related incidents. Such severe and intense threats can disrupt social life drastically,^[3] causing loss of life, damage to or loss of properties, disruption of basic services, the collapse of infrastructure and in some cases even forced migration.^[4]

In particular, the multiple layers of disruptions that natural hazards can trigger, ranging from the collapse of infrastructure and communications to the total destruction of villages and cities, have an impact on the political life of a country.^[5] In some cases, these sets of disruptions are an invitation to violence.^[6] Elections in the aftermath of a natural disaster are often very complex as they face not only extraordinary logistical challenges but also a high risk of unrest and violence that can derail the electoral process.

Empirical cases:

• Haiti presidential and legislative elections 2010. Following an earthquake and cholera outbreak that devastated large parts of the country, Haiti’s political institutions and leadership suffered greatly, and the 2010 elections were no exception.^[7] The volatility of that period, in combination with the numerous flaws in the organization of events surrounding the electoral process, caused significant popular discontent, triggering violence during the post-electoral period.^[8]
  Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external);^[9] gender-based discrimination and violence (external);^[10] problematic election-day operations (internal); rejection of the election results (internal).^[11]
• Uganda presidential elections 2011. Constant exposure to natural hazards poses a major problem to the stability of Uganda. Landslides and floods caused numerous deaths and outbreaks of disease in 2010,^[12] and placed further stress on an already unstable political situation.^[13] Widespread frustration and demands for better service delivery contributed to the violence that surrounded the 2011 elections. Even though the overall situation remained under control, there were allegations of the use of force against opposition leaders and their supporters,^[14] attacks against an opposition politician and journalist, and turmoil in the north of the country.^[15]
  Interrelated factors: social and political exclusion (external); conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); human rights violations (external);^[16] contested electoral law (internal); lack of training of security sector agencies (internal); provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal).^[17]

 

Unethical media reporting

Ethics involves what is right, equitable, fair, just, dutiful and/or responsible. Ethical media practice is important because of its high level of public impact.^[1] In conflict-prone societies in particular, unethical media reporting can exacerbate conflict and trigger violence.^[2] Unethical media reporting may be the result of political control and abuse of media^[3] and/or irresponsible journalism that pursues sensationalism.^[4] Manifestations of unethical media reporting are particularly dangerous in the context of highly contested electoral processes in conflict-prone societies.^[5]

Empirical cases:

• Zimbabwe general elections 2008. Ex-President Robert Mugabe is widely viewed as having long used the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC) to disseminate propaganda,^[6] discredit the opposition and enhance the ruling party’s image.^[7] Since the 1980s, journalists expressing an independent voice have been harassed, arrested, detained or murdered.^[8] During the 2008 general election the ZBC, which dominates national radio and television, was criticized by civil society for using hate speech to intimidate the opposition and their supporters. In particular, during the course of the campaign it was criticized for allegedly promoting hate speech, notably in TV news and current affairs programmes.^[9]
  Interrelated factors: provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); the presence of non-state armed actors (external);^[10] contested electoral law (internal); rejection of the election results (internal).[11]
• Kenya general elections 2007. Following the liberalization of public media from 2002 onwards, certain media began to ‘operate freely and sometimes recklessly and irresponsibly’.^[12] During the 2007 general election, radio broadcasts using offensive language and hate speech are said to have contributed towards the buildup in tensions that led to the deaths of over 1,500 people.^[13] According to the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), which examined the role of the media during the 2007 elections, media houses took sides ahead of the election: it further found that many editors had become ‘compromised’ and some media houses ‘sensational’, unnecessarily alarming their audience and ‘inflaming their passions’.^[14] Many local radio stations (vernacular radio) were identified as having permitted the use of hate speech during public debates, talk shows or phone-in programmes hosted by irresponsible journalists, entertainers or disc jockeys.^[15]
  Interrelated factors: social and political exclusion (external); changing power dynamics (external);^[16] gender-based discrimination and violence (external);^[17] inadequate electoral security arrangements (internal);^[18] provocative use of the media by political parties (internal);^[19] poor management of election results (internal).^[20]

Independent Review Commission [Kriegler Commission], Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections Held in Kenya on 27 December 2007, 17 September 2008, <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/KE/reports/independent-review-commission-on-the-general>, accessed 4 May 2018 

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Elections are an instrument through which the power balance in societies can be altered. There are two key dynamics that determine whether this power change takes place in a peaceful or in a violent manner. The first relates to the context in which elections take place. In countries where large-scale violence is present due to unresolved long-standing grievances and/or the activity of spoilers, it is likely that violence will affect elections, as electoral stakeholders are accustomed to using violent means in order to try to either hold onto or gain power.

 

The second relates to the quality of the electoral process itself. Electoral processes consist of many building blocks. According to the electoral cycle approach, a well-known paradigm among both practitioners and researchers, electoral processes consist of three periods (pre-, election and post-election) with a total of eight phases: establishment/review of the legal framework, planning and programming, training and education, voter registration, the electoral campaign, voting operations and election day, verification of results and post-election). Each phase consists of micro-processes and activities that usually need to be completed in order for the next phase to start (see figure 2: The Electoral Cycle). It is important to highlight, however, that in some instances good quality electoral processes may still yield results that are contested by the population; while, in other instances, technically poor electoral processes may yield results that are viewed as acceptable.

 

 

When elections are not designed and managed sensitively, and if stakeholders do not perceive the process as occurring on a level playing field, they can lead to violent epilogues. Particularly sensitive issues include the legal and institutional framework, for example: electoral management body composition or the rules defining the eligibility of voters, candidates and parties; campaigning culture; procedures for the announcement of results; effectiveness of and trust in electoral dispute resolution mechanisms; and so on.

Drawing on its research papers on this topic, International IDEA has classified and described 26 internal and 10 external risk factors that can trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence. Internal factors (Alihodžić and Asplund 2018a) are election-specific and do not exist outside of the electoral context. They relate to risks surrounding electoral actors, events, practices and materials across the electoral cycle. External factors (Alihodžić and Uribe Burcher 2018) originate and exist outside the electoral context. They include exogenous conditions that can negatively influence electoral processes.

Distinguishing process and structural factors has several practical benefits. It illuminates the need for enhanced collaboration between different communities of practice, such as election, governance, conflict, peacebuilding and security specialists, in addressing election-related violence. It also underlines the need for combining long- and short-term approaches to addressing both process triggers and structural causes of election-related violence.

Internal factors are clustered into the seven phases[1] of the electoral cycle (reflected in the seven sections below). The eighth phase of the electoral cycle, post-election, is not included. Although there is a possibility that post-electoral violence is linked to the elections themselves, the risk factors underlying such violence may not be process-related. Rather, the incident should be examined in the context of structural risk factors. External factors are not tied to specific electoral phases. Each factor is described through:

a) an introduction that provides a general definition and explanation of the context in which a given factor can trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence;

b) empirical cases illustrating particular countries and electoral contexts in which the given factor was identified as either a trigger in itself, or a factor that contributed to triggering election-related violence. Interrelated factors point to the wider context in which violence took place. This includes both internal and external factors. References to the source documents are provided.

The list is not exhaustive. Also, the way in which factors are named or described may not match local terminologies and specifics.

 

[1]     The eighth phase of the electoral cycle, namely the post-election phase, is not included. Although there is a possibility that violence occurring after the implementation of election results is linked to the elections this may not be the key trigger.

 

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The nature of the actions undertaken to respond to signs of impending or existing violence will depend on the specificities of the country context, the organisational mandate and the capacity to engage. One might distinguish between actions implemented by non-state actors, such as national and international civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs, and those implemented by state organisations, such as EMBs and SSAs, that have an official mandate to act in order to ensure that elections are held peacefully. Different actors that undertake electoral violence prevention and mitigation activities in the same national and electoral context will undoubtedly benefit from collaboration.[1]

Prevention by non-state actors[2]

A number of domestic and international CSOs are implementing programmes that aim to address electoral conflicts during their initial stages. The main strategies are monitoring and reporting on electoral violence, organising community-based prevention and mitigation actions and supporting EMBs. Monitoring is a well-established conflict prevention methodology. For example, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), through its Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) project, builds the capacities of CSOs to document incidents of election-related violence, including details of victims and perpetrators. Systematic monitoring and documentation of incidents, many of which represent criminal offences, serve to minimise the sense of impunity among perpetrators. The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) promotes the strengthening of political party liaison committees and community-based prevention and mitigation capacities that are harmonised with traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.

Community-based prevention is organised so that information on election-related tensions is conveyed to trained community mediators, who are selected from among reputable individuals in respective areas to engage in conflict prevention and mitigation. A similar approach is promoted in Nepal by the Department of Peace Operations of the Peace Action, Training and Research Institute of Romania (PATRIR) through a multi-stakeholder strategic planning process that brings together community-development and peacebuilding organisations with local, national and international electoral organisations. These and other prominent non-state actors often implement capacity-building programmes designed to support the work of national EMBs and can also be involved in supporting local and national campaigns for violence-free elections.

Prevention by state actors[3]

EMBs are using early warning data to make better-informed and conflict-sensitive electoral decisions. As state actors, they are also well positioned to coordinate the efforts of other governmental agencies during elections, for instance in designing electoral security arrangements and prosecuting perpetrators of electoral crimes. Mexico’s IFE is well known for the quality of its electoral planning and security arrangements. IFE cooperates closely with major national agencies and institutions, including the army, navy, police, civil protection organisations and energy and water utilities through the ‘Group for Strategic Facilities Coordination’. The group coordinates operational planning and prevention/mitigation of conflicts in different areas, including electoral processes. The ‘Vulnerability Mapping Tool’ was designed by the Election Commission of India to address specific security challenges during elections through increased collaboration between EMB officials, SSAs and the judiciary.

Electoral prevention and mitigation efforts can take different forms and include different actors, even when implemented in a single electoral and national context. To conceptualise a practical framework in which electoral violence early warning can be utilised effectively, International IDEA has developed a three-layered approach for the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence.

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The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Alihodzic and Asplund 2013b) has conceptualised a three-layered approach for prevention and mitigation of election-related violence:

 

1. Improved electoral management and justice: specific electoral planning, implementation and dispute resolution strategies that can be used to avoid controversies, fraud and technical flaws, in order to minimise the potential for outbreaks of violence.
2. Improved electoral security: specific electoral security measures that can be undertaken by SSAs throughout the electoral cycle to protect electoral actors, events, facilities and materials from violence.
3. Improved infrastructure for peace: putting in place standing capacities for peacebuilding and prevention, from the community to the national level, which can employ strategies to address conflict drivers, and coordinate and mobilise state and non-state actors, CSOs, traditional and religious leaders, reputable individuals and other organisations and individuals with capacity to contribute to preventing and defusing election-related tensions.

 

The three-layered approach can be applied consistently throughout the eight different phases of the electoral cycle,[1] as follows.

 

Legal and institutional electoral framework

The electoral legal framework is composed of the constitutional provisions, legislation, rules, regulations and procedures that govern the electoral system design, the formation of electoral institutions and bodies, and the implementation of electoral activities. An inclusive, fair, concise and uncontested legal and institutional framework is an important foundation for successful and peaceful elections. In addition to electoral legislation and institutions, responsibilities, rules of engagement and coordination between the security sector agencies (SSAs) should also be detailed in the rules that govern their electoral engagement. Following the analysis and evaluation of the previous electoral cycle, an electoral management body (EMB) and SSAs should initiate legal and institutional reforms to address identified weaknesses, and where needed collaborate with other stakeholders. Other state and non-state actors may play an important role in the facilitation of public discussion and national consensus on the legislative and institutional framework.

Table 1. Legal and institutional electoral framework
A. Improved electoral management and justice	B. Improved electoral security	C. Improved infrastructure for peace
Advise political stakeholders about an appropriate electoral system that takes into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of different design options. Advise adoption of a legal framework which will allow for the establishment of credible EMBs. Establish trusted and efficient frameworks for electoral dispute resolution and introduce mechanisms to sanction perpetrators of electoral offences. Design legal provisions which facilitate credible processes for the registration of voters, political parties and candidates. Introduce regulations that define the roles and responsibilities of political parties in the electoral processes. Define collaborative mechanisms and information exchange with security sector and other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups.	Advise adoption of a legal framework that assigns clear electoral security responsibilities to different security sector and government agencies. Define rules of engagement for security sector agencies during elections. Define sanctions and enforcement mechanisms against perpetrators of electoral fraud and violence. Formalize collaborative mechanisms for coordination and information exchange with electoral management bodies, other relevant agencies and political parties.	Mobilize and involve non-state actors in discussions on the electoral framework in order to achieve citizens’ participation and national consensus. Promote understanding of the role of non-state actors in contributing to peaceful elections, and advocate for the integration of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms into the electoral legal framework. Involve the public into decision-making processes on electoral institutions

A. Improved electoral management and justice

Reform of the legal and institutional electoral framework should draw on the evaluation of previous electoral processes. Such evaluation is conducted in the post-election period to identify disputed, deficient or ambiguous legal provisions and acts which have had a negative impact on the conduct of the previous electoral processes. The reform, among other things, needs to take into consideration (a) the appropriateness of the electoral system; (b) the credibility of the EMBs; (c) the effectiveness of the electoral dispute resolution mechanisms; (d) the integrity of processes for the registration of voters, political parties and candidates; (e) the quality of the legislation that regulates the roles and responsibilities of political parties; (f) the existence of mechanisms for the replacement of elected representatives; (g) the existence of mechanisms for information exchange with security sector and other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups; and so on. Electoral management bodies are in a good position to initiate, advise on and influence these changes.

• Advise political stakeholders about an appropriate electoral system that takes into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of different design options
  
  The specific choices in the electoral system may affect participation, representation, the stability of government, the accountability of elected officials, the complexity of electoral processes, and political pluralism.^[1] In particular, provisions relating to the formula for translating votes into seats, district magnitude, the votes-to-seat ratio, and boundary delimitation require careful consideration. An EMB is well positioned to advise legislators about the practical implications of different electoral systems in a given national and electoral context. In conflict-prone societies, an analysis may focus on the potential of a specific electoral system design to exacerbate or mitigate social conflict and electoral violence, including how gender-based violence can affect the participation of women in electoral processes and their representation in elective positions. At the very basic level, the legal framework should ensure that elections are a level playing field for all electoral actors. 

Gender and minority quotas are introduced in Nepal to defuse tension in 2007. Political and social exclusion is one of the main roots of conflict in Nepal.^[2] Gender and minority representation was therefore an integral part of the electoral law reform preceding the 2007 Constituent Assembly of Nepal. The electoral system design introduced quotas for women, securing them 33 per cent of seats, as well as for marginalized and oppressed groups and indigenous tribes, based on their representation in the population.^[3]

• Advise adoption of a legal framework which will allow for the establishment of credible electoral management bodies
  
  Careful consideration needs to be given to what type of EMB will perform best in a given country context and what will contribute to its credibility. Three major organizational modalities exist: independent, governmental and mixed.^[4] The legal framework should establish the fundamental principles that will ensure the credibility of the EMBs. These principles include independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, professionalism and service-mindedness.^[5] An EMB should advise the legislator about legal reforms needed to improve an EMB’s capacity to organize credible elections. A balanced composition, for example, geographical, ethnic, gender, linguistic, religious and other, will increase the credibility of an EMB.

Reform of the Indonesian National Election Commission in 1999 builds trust in democratic processes. ‘To indicate a breakaway from an old election system which allowed manipulation with electoral processes and massive election fraud in the past’, a new electoral law was adopted in early 1999. This led to the establishment of an independent National Election Commission (NEC). To promote trust, the Commission was composed of representatives from each of the competing 48 political parties and five government-appointed officials. In 1999, the NEC delivered the first open and competitive election since 1955. During the elections, approximately 100 million Indonesians cast their ballot.^[6]

• Establish trusted and efficient electoral dispute resolution mechanisms and introduce mechanisms to sanction perpetrators of electoral offences 

The legal framework for electoral dispute resolution should ensure that electoral actions, procedures and decisions throughout the electoral cycle are in conformity with the law and based on the right to an effective remedy.^[7] Electoral dispute resolution mechanisms can take on four separate types of challenge: (a) administrative, (b) judicial, (c) legislative and (d) international. The type of challenge will typically dictate which institution will be responsible for hearing and resolving the dispute concerned. Administrative challenges, which are the most common type of challenge, are addressed and usually resolved by the EMBs. Contested EMB decisions can be revisited either by the same organ or by a higher-ranking organ such as a constitutional court.^[8] This system is widespread. Judicial challenges are addressed to judicial bodies, which may be regular or administrative courts, a constitutional court or special electoral courts as defined by law. Legislative challenges systems allow legislative bodies or other defined political assemblies to resolve electoral disputes.^[9] ‘The international means for bringing electoral challenges are those legal instruments provided for in international treaties and conventions (for example the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) after exhausting the domestic remedies provided.’^[10] Well-functioning electoral dispute resolution mechanisms have an inherent potential to prevent violence. The legal framework should therefore be simple, clear and consistent, making it easily understandable and ensuring complete and effective access to the system for resolving electoral disputes. Because the electoral process cannot be halted if a challenge is introduced, the timeliness of challenge submission and dispute resolution mechanisms is essential if the credibility of the electoral process is not to be affected.^[11]

Where individuals and groups feel they have impunity from prosecution they may be tempted to engage in electoral fraud or perpetrate acts of election-related violence to achieve political gains. When this is a risk, an EMB should get a mandate to investigate, prosecute and sanction perpetrators of electoral offences independently or in collaboration with other relevant agencies.

Improvement of the electoral dispute resolution system in Bhutan, 2008. After the 2008 parliamentary election, which saw some political violence,^[12] the EMB conducted a self-assessment of its electoral dispute resolution mechanisms. Based on the analysis of electoral complaints lodged during the 2008 elections, the Electoral Commission improved the rules and procedures for the submission of electoral challenges. It was noted that in some instances dealing with less severe complaints at the district level enhanced the effectiveness of electoral dispute resolution as disputes would be resolved faster and the central body could receive fewer complaints. Consequently, the electoral dispute resolution system became more effective and transparent.^[13]

The EMB sets up an Investigation and Prosecution Department in Kenya, 2012–2013. A sense of impunity among political and electoral officials is seen as an important factor that contributed to the violent outcomes of the 2007 Kenyan presidential elections. Ahead of the 2013 general election, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) started building its capacity to investigate and prosecute election offences by setting up an Investigation and Prosecution Department. Neither the preceding Election Commission of Kenya (2002–2008) nor the Interim Independent Election Commission (2008–2011) had this mandate. The November 2011 Election Act gave the IEBC the mechanisms to settle electoral disputes, prosecute any offences defined under the Election Act, and impose sanctions against electoral offenders.^[14]

• Design legal provisions which facilitate credible processes for the registration of voters, political parties and candidates

The legal framework for voter registration should establish legal clarity and be conflict-sensitive in order to generate preventive potential.^[15] Laws regulating voter registration must ensure that there are no disfranchised categories. It is of the greatest importance, especially in conflict-prone societies, that no ethnic, religious or other social group feels disenfranchised or marginalized through boundary delimitation or other legal provision that may impact on their right to register for voting. The procedural criteria for political parties and candidates’ registration should be clear, reasonable and transparent.^[16] At the same time, they should not offer a pretext for banning parties.^[17] This legislation should be designed in a way which will enhance political pluralism, encourage reconciliation processes, and enhance gender equality and respect for human rights.

Registration of displaced persons and refugees during elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996–1997. The international community intervened to end the violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) and mediate the peace agreement. The peace agreement stipulated that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) would be mandated to supervise implementation of the post-war elections. The Provisional Election Commission, working under the supervision of the OSCE, adopted rules and regulations which allowed displaced people and refugees to vote in their pre-war municipalities. This largely defused tensions among the displaced groups.^[18]

The Seychelles introduce a year-round voter registration and inspection of the electoral roll, 2015. The 2011 parliamentary elections in the Seychelles were boycotted by the main opposition party because the government had not met the demand to revise the electoral law. This situation created tensions. To address the lack of trust in the accuracy of the voter register, [19] the reform of the electoral law, which came into effect in May 2015, introduced a change in the process of voter registration. Under the amended law, voter registration is now active and conducted throughout the year, resuming only the day after the announcement of election results.[20] Apart from the introduction of the new temporal procedure, the legislation established the possibility for the inspection of the voter roll. The register is now accessible to the public in all district administration offices across the country as well as at the archives section at the National Library Building in the capital of Victoria. Moreover, each registered political party also receives a copy of the voter roll.

• Introduce regulations that define the roles and responsibilities of political parties in the electoral processes

The electoral legal framework should include provisions defining the roles and responsibilities of political parties in the electoral processes. In particular, the electoral legal framework should provide political parties with incentives to resolve political conflicts through institutional frameworks and in a democratic way.^[21] One widely-used mechanism for defusing the risk of an outbreak of election-related violence is political parties’ own codes of conduct (CoCs). These are defined as a set of rules of behaviour for political parties and their supporters relating to their participation in an election process.^[22] A distinction is drawn between those texts to which political parties subscribe voluntarily and those which are imposed either by law or by some other authority. CoCs may therefore be: (a) a part of the electoral law or a particular provision in the electoral law that prescribes the conduct of the parties; (b) agreed by political parties as an outcome of negotiations among themselves or as a result of negotiations moderated by a third party; (c) agreed by the parties, and then embodied in law; or (d) determined by a third party, such as an EMB. If codes of conduct are embedded in the legislative framework, they are more likely to be implemented and enforced. They can prevent and defuse tensions by prohibiting the use of hate speech and violent means during the campaign and by including commitments for parties losing the elections to have to accept the election results and work together to maintain peace in the post-election period, as well as other measures including those directed towards the prevention and elimination of gender-based violence. CoCs may further become powerful tools for building confidence, as well as creating and promoting relationships.^[23]

The process leading to the formulation of a CoC may be initiated, driven, and facilitated in cooperation with civil society representatives or negotiated in party liaison committees. However, there are a number of challenges in terms of implementation and enforcement of such codes, in particular when political parties use violence as a political instrument.^[24] Stakeholders’ public declarations and commitments to respect a CoC can reinforce implementation, particularly if they are made jointly. Institutionalized monitoring of the codes of conduct, as well as public and civil society pressure directed at parties which disregard them, may also facilitate implementation

An electoral legal framework is introduced to sanction parties and candidates linked with organized crime in Colombia, 2009. Organized crime has been largely responsible for election-related violence in Colombia for the last decade. This violence is linked to efforts by criminal actors to get hold of power over the local governments during local elections through their connections with the politicians.^[25] Since 2009, penalties have been introduced for those parties that support candidates with links to illegal armed groups or are facing charges for crimes against humanity and drug trafficking.^[26] Furthermore, political parties are not allowed to replace an elected member of parliament who has been convicted of crimes against humanity or links to illegal groups. The law concerning the filling of these vacant seats provides political parties with incentives to avoid nominating candidates with suspected links to illegal groups.^[27]

• Define collaborative mechanisms and information exchange with security sector and other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups

Cooperation with security sector agencies will help electoral management bodies to ensure that electoral security arrangements are put in place to protect electoral stakeholders, including election officials, facilities, events and materials. The establishment of collaborative mechanisms that facilitate information exchange and joint action will be beneficial to both electoral and security organizations. If collaboration structures and procedures are defined in the electoral legal framework, this will ensure that coordination is structured and not left to chance.

The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE)[28], established a formal mechanism for collaboration with security sector agencies ahead of the 2012 federal elections. As a result of the number of attacks on civil society by organized criminal organizations, which had caused uncertainty and fear ahead of the 2012 federal election, the IFE initiated formal cooperation with a number of Mexican agencies in order to protect the electoral process. These included the Federal Police, the Army, the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes (FEPADE), the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPFJ), the Navy, the intelligence agency (CISEN), local governments, communications (TELMEX), and infrastructure agencies (water and electricity). Through an inter-agency collaborative process, the IFE reached a formal political agreement with the security sector agencies (SSAs) and other organizations on how to respond to the threat of election-related violence during the election period. Practical aspects included agreement on the exchange of risk data and analysis between the IFE and its partners during and after the 2012 federal elections. The formal information-sharing mechanism between the IFE and the SSAs contributed towards a positive environment between partners, enhanced inter-agency coordination and increased election security during the elections.

B. Improved electoral security

Security sector agencies are mandated to provide safety to electoral actors, events, materials and information throughout the electoral cycle. In doing this, SSAs may follow regular rules of engagement. However, practice shows that, due to the specific dynamics of political and social mobilization and conflicts during elections, the SSAs may benefit from specific legal provisions referring to their electoral duties. These provisions can define the responsibilities of different SSAs, rules of engagement when securing electoral actors, events and facilities, enforcement of sanctions, and forms of collaboration between different SSAs and other relevant actors during elections. In some instances, SSAs benefit from an EMB being mandated to direct their work when they are engaged in electoral processes.

• Advise adoption of a legal framework that assigns clear electoral security responsibilities to different security sector and government agencies

The legal framework that regulates the electoral responsibilities of SSAs should establish a clear division of responsibilities and define the specific role of the various security sector agencies during elections. The responsibilities relating to public safety during elections—the safety of electoral materials during transport and storage, safeguarding of electoral facilities, intelligence gathering, the prosecution of electoral crimes, logistical support and so on—may be assigned to different ministries and institutions including the police, the army, intelligence agencies, the public prosecutor’s office and so on. Legal clarity will enhance preparedness and collaboration between the different agencies and the establishment of collaboration with electoral management bodies.

An EMB provides guidelines for the engagement of security sector agencies in India, 2011. The Constitution of India has vested in the Election Commission of India (ECI) the superintendence, direction and control of the entire process for the conduct of elections to Parliament and the legislature of every state and to the offices of President and Vice-President of India.^[29] The ECI mandate includes coordination of the police forces’ engagement in and around elections. The ECI’s Compendium of Instructions presents guidelines and directives to the Indian Central Police Force as well as the state police. The ‘maintenance of law and order and deployment of security forces and home guard’ section, among other things, describes the need for a ‘number of measures over and above the purview of normal law and order arrangements, for augmenting the measures taken for peaceful, free and fair poll’.^[30]

• Define rules of engagement for security sector agencies during elections

The conventional routines for engagement of law enforcement agencies, usually found in ‘rules of engagement’ (RoE) or ‘use of force’ (UoF) frameworks, guide the conduct, rights and obligations of security sector personnel in certain circumstances. In some contexts, these frameworks may need to be reviewed ahead of elections to ensure that the engagement of law enforcement agencies does not interfere with democratic processes and practices. In particular, it is important to ensure that security forces are not ‘baited into actions that may later be politicized’.^[31] Specific rules of engagement for electoral security, based on professional standards, may also be developed.^[32]

Revision of police rules in the context of preparations for general elections in Sierra Leone in 2012. The death of six persons in separate incidents, involving the use of live ammunition by the Sierra Leone Police, created concerns relating to the potential misuse of force ahead of and during the 2012 general elections. To ensure that such incidents do not create challenges for the management of elections, the Sierra Leone Police, with support from the United Nations, undertook a review of its Rules of Engagement in parallel with the development of a strategy on governance mechanisms in the force ahead of the general election in November 2012.^[33]

• Define sanctions and enforcement mechanisms against perpetrators of electoral fraud and violence

Researchers point to the increased importance of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms directed against perpetrators of electoral violence. Höglund and Jarstad (2010) argue that ‘more attention needs to be directed at measures which can support the implementation of the legal framework. Without sanctions against those breaking the electoral law, including violence makers, a culture of impunity is upheld’.^[34] The report of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security (2012) finds that ‘electoral violence is more likely in a context in which institutions like the courts, the criminal justice system, the security forces, and the media are corrupt or too weak to carry out their roles in the face of violence and intimidation. To ensure long-term electoral security, there is no substitute for ending the impunity that often surrounds electoral violence’.^[35] This, however, requires meeting the rule-of-law challenges, and the development of ‘institutions, processes, and networks that deter election-related violence and, should deterrence fail, hold perpetrators accountable’.^[36]

• Formalize collaborative mechanisms for coordination and information exchange with electoral management bodies, other relevant agencies and political parties

Enhanced information exchange and coordination between security sector agencies and other electoral actors is required during elections. Practice shows that these collaborative mechanisms require flexibility and the commitment of the organizations involved. Given the mandate of SSAs to provide electoral security, they represent a key interlocutor to different stakeholders, including electoral management bodies, political parties, and other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups. In particular, the responsibilities of SSAs to collaborate with an EMB and other state agencies should be formalized within the relevant legal framework or through intra-institutional collaboration agreements. Collaboration will improve information exchange and allow holistic analysis and coordination of prevention and mitigation efforts.

The police formalize coordination with political parties ahead of general elections in Liberia in 2011. Although the 2005 general elections were categorized as violence-free, orderly and well managed, a few incidents of violence were recorded during the campaign phase. This was despite the fact that political parties committed themselves to abstain from violence and intimidation by signing a code of conduct.^[37] Ahead of the 2011 general elections, the Liberian National Police (LNP) and 11 political parties signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which regulates the conduct of political rallies with the aim of ensuring a peaceful environment during elections. The MoU provisions specify that (a) each political party was expected to submit at least two focal persons to work with the LNP during rallies, marches and campaigns, and (b) all marches would be monitored by LNP officers in a peaceful manner.^[38]

Prior to the 2016 elections, the Georgian Central Election Commission (CEC) initiated several coordination mechanisms to improve communication around electoral security. The CEC set up a coordination body with the police to discuss security threats, share information, and collaborate on the development of procedures. They also developed an electoral security training module to help train poll workers, law enforcement officials, and security personnel. Following the trainings, poll workers met with their local security counterparts to ensure that they could deploy security effectively if needed. Election Day was relatively peaceful, and the CEC now has an established mechanism and communication strategy with their security counterparts.

 C. Improved infrastructure for peace

Improved infrastructure for peace (I4P) relates to putting in place standing capabilities for peace building and conflict prevention from the community to the national level. These strategies may include mobilization and coordination of state and non-state actors, including civil society organizations (CSOs), traditional and religious leaders, reputable individuals and other organizations and individuals that have the capacity to contribute in preventing and defusing social conflicts. The value of the infrastructures of peace in the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence in different national contexts is well documented.^[39] The initial electoral phase, in which legal and institutional frameworks for the organization and conduct of elections are discussed, provides an opportunity for early engagement of various state and non-state actors. On the one hand, they can engage in facilitation of a national consensus relating to electoral legal frameworks; on the other hand, they can promote and advocate for the acknowledgement of the role that civil society groups and traditional leaders may have in resolving electoral disputes.

• Mobilize and involve non-state actors in discussions on the electoral framework in order to achieve citizens’ participation and national consensus

The involvement of multiple stakeholders, who share a mandate and an interest in contributing to peaceful elections, in the discussion on the reform of the electoral legal framework may be crucial for avoiding legal controversies at later stages. When processes are not inclusive and trusted, non-state actors can take initiatives to convene cooperative forums aiming to bring together relevant stakeholders, including EMBs, political parties, security sector agencies, traditional or customary governance structures and civil society organizations. These forums may create an environment of ownership and trust and ensure the involvement of minority groups and balanced gender representation. They can work to secure the commitment of the organizations involved to adhere to, or implement, conclusions resulting from the discussions. If national actors are unwilling to agree on reforms, international specialists and/ or reputable individuals may be involved to mediate and help align processes to international standards and obligations. Notwithstanding, the primary responsibility remains with the various national stakeholders.

Civil society helps to resolve legal deadlocks ahead of the 2005 presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau. The 2005 presidential election was intended to mark the end of Guinea-Bissau’s history of trouble marked by civil war and political violence. In 2003, a Transitional Charter was adopted to allow the transitional government to govern the country until the new leadership was elected. Ahead of the 2005 presidential elections, the Citizens’ Goodwill Task Force (CGWTF), supported by the International Peace and Prosperity Project, engaged international legal experts in a review of the electoral laws regarding candidacy for public office contained within the Transitional Charter. After expert review, the CGWTF recommended that the Charter’s legal status should be recognized by the High Court in order to resolve issues relating to candidates’ eligibility to run for presidential office.^[40] The CGWTF also drafted an election code of conduct to promulgate an ‘issue-based and peaceful campaign’. It was endorsed by all but one of the presidential candidates. The code of conduct was distributed in French and Arabic and presented in rural areas by the country’s main religious and civil society leaders. International organizations and national leaders praised the CGWTF’s efforts as important in contributing to enhanced national debate on the electoral legal framework.^[41]

• Promote understanding of the role of non-state actors in contributing to peaceful elections, and advocate for the integration of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms into the electoral legal framework

The effect of the efforts of formal institutions, such as EMBs and SSAs, to prevent and mitigate election-related violence may be maximized if they are combined with existing peace building and conflict prevention initiatives. These may include national mediation panels, peace councils, traditional and religious leaders, and reputable institutions and individuals, including women’s organizations and activists that work to promote gender equality and participation. Formal recognition and integration of these actors in the electoral legal framework, as part of dispute mediation and resolution, may be an effective strategy to prevent and mitigate election-related violence.

The Electoral Law of South Africa recognizes the role of the local peace committees in mediation of electoral disputes. The transition from apartheid to a new democratic order from 1991 to 1994 was supported by a fairly well-developed peace architecture, with the local peace committees as the primary strategy to prevent violence. These committees were a product of the National Peace Accord signed on September 1991 by 27 South African stakeholders, including the government, the main political parties and the major liberation movements. The South African Electoral Law (103A, insertion to the 2003 amendment to the Electoral Act, no. 34, 2003) states that the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa can resolve any electoral dispute, complaint or infringement of the code of conduct through conciliation or mediation.^[42]

• Involve the public into decision-making processes on electoral institutions
  
  Mistrust in the integrity of an electoral process can stem from a lack of knowledge about the institutions and practices of the election administration. To avoid confusion and the spread of rumours, campaigns to inform voters about how the organization of election works can be launched. Apart from that, initiatives to involve the public in the process of the operationalization of the EMB and provide the opportunity of an exchange between the public and the election administrators can enhance transparency of and confidence in the electoral process.

The Civil Network OPORA and the local Council of Europe Office organize a public discussion with the candidates for members of the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Ukraine. The public trust in the CEC has been low and civil society activists raise doubts on the independence of the Commission[43]. These doubts put the credibility of the electoral process at risk. The CEC of Ukraine is appointed by the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukranian parliament, upon the submission of the President[44]. To increase the transparency of the decision-making process, OPORA and the Ukrainian Council of Europe office invited civil society, expert community, media and members of Ukrainian Parliament to meet the candidates for the CEC proposed by the President. The event gave the opportunity to inquire into the candidates perspectives on election administration issues and on reforms of the legal framework for elections in general and the CEC in particular.

 

Planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities

Once the electoral legal framework is finalized, planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities need to be instigated. This will include developing operational plans for the implementation of the different phases of the electoral cycle, such as voter information; registration of voters, political parties and candidates, and observers; political party campaigning; polling and counting; and results management. Operational plans will point to activities to be implemented, timelines, geographical scope, human resources and training needed, budget and so on. Weakness or controversy in one electoral phase can compromise the integrity of the subsequent phases or of the whole electoral process.

Existing tensions and conflicts may also spill over into electoral processes and affect electoral actors, events, materials and facilities. It is therefore important that electoral planning is timely, holistic and conflict-sensitive and that it considers both the process and the structural factors of conflict. A baseline risk analysis conducted during the planning phase will be an asset for conflict-sensitive planning. 

 

Table 2. Planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities
A. Improved electoral management and justice	B. Improved electoral security	C. Improved infrastructure for peace
Conduct an inter-agency exercise to foresee factors and scenarios which may represent risks for elections in different phases of the electoral cycle and across different geographical regions. Secure sufficient funds for electoral activities and allocate specific funding lines for conflict and violence prevention efforts. Ensure that the boundary delimitation process is conducted in timely fashion and that political stakeholders accept the outcomes. Ensure that the operational timelines for implementation of the election activities are realistic, feasible, and translated into the election calendar. Establish electoral dispute resolution bodies and mechanisms at an early stage in the process. Design sample electoral materials at an early stage and test their usability and accuracy. Establish data collection and analysis capacities to understand risk levels and make informed and conflict-sensitive decisions. Ensure that the introduction of information technology-based electoral solutions is timely and manageable. Ensure political preconditions for the implementation of technical activities.	Conduct a timely exercise to assess security risks relating to electoral processes within different electoral phases and across different geographical regions. Operationalize the electoral security strategy in respect to protection of electoral actors, events, facilities and materials during the different electoral phases. Ensure that joint security planning, that involves multiple security sector agencies and an EMB, is a collaborative exercise that takes place at the national and sub-national level. Develop a curriculum for training of security sector agencies on the specifics of security engagement during the electoral processes.	Map organizations and individuals with an agenda or capacity to promote peace and conflict resolution during elections at a national and sub-national level. Join or initiate discussion forums for participatory dialogues between EMBs, security sector agencies and non-state actors in the planning phase of electoral processes. Formalize coordination between state and non-state actors during elections and mobilize sufficient financial and human resources for joint action. Consult with traditional and religious leaders in order to understand their interest and potential to assist in mediating electoral conflict. Create a platform to enable information exchange on the electoral process and monitor the activities of electoral stakeholders throughout

 

 

 

A.        Improved electoral management and justice

 

Electoral planning is a process led by an electoral management body. Key considerations of electoral planning are the timing of electoral events and the resources, financial and human, needed for the implementation of specific activities. Specific considerations include, among others, the costs associated with different activities, the recruitment and training of election staff, the procurement of electoral materials, logistical organization, communication, security and so on. Timely, thorough and holistic planning processes will ensure broad consultations within an EMB, as well as with external actors. In conflict-prone societies, an EMB will benefit from conducting a risk assessment to identify potential process weaknesses and security threats, both internal and external to the electoral processes. An EMB should also establish an analytical capacity to record incidents and observe changing risks throughout the different electoral phases. In this case, the planning processes should, where feasible, include specific details on how these threats can be addressed.

 

• Conduct an inter-agency exercise to foresee factors and scenarios which may represent security risks for elections in different phases of the electoral cycle and across different geographical regions

 

Conflict-sensitive planning entails a thorough analysis of the security risks associated with electoral processes. A baseline risk analysis should be implemented as an inter-agency exercise that brings together election officials, security sector agencies, civil society organizations, academia and others. Such an exercise can look into the historical record of election-related violence and current trends at national, provincial and local levels. The aim is to identify internal and external factors that may increase risks and trigger election-related violence throughout the different phases of the electoral cycle. A baseline risk analysis should include gender and minority dimensions and also explore prevention and mitigation strategies. Due to the changing dynamics of electoral processes, a baseline analysis should be followed up by periodical exercises which will explore emerging risks.

 

A baseline electoral risk assessment is conducted ahead of the 2013 general elections in Kenya. Following the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–2008, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) of Kenya undertook a number of steps to strengthen its capacity to prevent and mitigate electoral violence ahead of and during the general elections in March 2013. The IEBC, supported by International IDEA, organized a workshop that brought together the IEBC staff, the Kenyan police and intelligence agencies, national human rights and reconciliation commissions, and academics. A two-day discussion was focused on mapping electoral risks in different counties ahead of the general elections. The risks associated with the different phases of the electoral cycle were also considered. In parallel, a national public opinion survey was conducted to measure citizens’ perceptions in this regard. These exercises made it possible to generate a baseline risk analysis which pointed to 14 risk factors which needed to be monitored and analysed throughout the different electoral phases.^[1]

 

The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE), conducts electoral planning in consultation with the major national agencies. Mexican elections are complex undertakings which, due to presence of organized crime groups, often face enhanced security challenges. During the planning phases, the INE maintains close consultation with the major national agencies and institutes, including the army, navy, police, civil protection organizations, energy and water agencies and others represented in the national Group for Strategic Facilities Coordination. The Group coordinates operational planning and prevention and mitigation of conflicts in different areas, including electoral processes.^[2] Through the inter-agency data exchange, the INE is able to identify areas where electoral processes face increased risks.^[3]

 

The timely and transparent publication of the election schedule by the Election Commission of Pakistan ahead of the 2013 elections allows it to obtain timely feedback from electoral stakeholders. Historically, elections in Pakistan have been marred by violence. After the President announced the 2013 general election date, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) immediately started preparing an election schedule.^[4] The schedule was soon completed and published on the ECP website.^[5] This allowed political parties to scrutinize the schedule and to present arguments with respect to the suggested changes in it. Following those appeals, the ECP modified the schedule,^[6]including deadlines for nomination procedures, as well as the timelines for submitting nomination appeals.^[7]

 

• Secure and allocate sufficient funds for electoral activities in the budget, including conflict and violence prevention efforts

 

Electoral management bodies (EMBs) need sufficient funds to safeguard the integrity of elections. This entails investment in a well-trained electoral staff, the production of high-quality electoral materials, the building up of internal information technology (IT) and communication capacities, strong public relations and outreach. In addition, an EMB should include specific budget lines for the collection of unbiased information that will help assessing the quality of electoral processes. In conflict-prone societies, it may be important to have resources that can be directed towards the prevention and mitigation of electoral violence. Of course, EMBs should be mindful to adopt strategies that are sustainable and cost effective.

 

The financial resources allocated to the Election Commission of India by the central and state governments include specific security and violence-prevention budgets. With over 700 million voters,^[8] India is the largest democracy in the world. The Election Commission of India (ECI) is funded by the government of India. A so-called Consolidated Fund pays for staff, technical operations, electronic voting machines and various office expenses. Federal state governments cover expenses relating to staff at the state headquarters and in the districts, the printing and transport of ballot papers, preparing and printing the electoral register, procuring material for the conduct of elections, training, the salaries of election officials and the expenses of central election supervisors. Each state also pays for security forces deployed for elections. During the 2009 parliamentary elections, prevention efforts, which for example included video monitoring of ‘dangerous’ individuals, were funded out of the general election budget.^[9] ‘The broad powers given to the ECI by the constitution have been liberally and boldly interpreted to make the government pay for any necessary expenses. The ECI’s accounts are subject to audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General and its report is tabled in the Parliament.’^[10]

 

• Ensure that boundary delimitation process is conducted in timely fashion and that political stakeholders accept the outcomes

 

The delimitation of electoral boundaries may be very complicated, especially under some electoral systems.^[11] Electoral districts are often aligned with a country’s administrative divisions, which may have some practical advantages when citizens know them well. However, there are some drawbacks. These boundaries may be artificial and of little significance to citizens. Furthermore, this may divide natural communities, such as racial, ethnic, religious, or spoken language communities.^[12] The decision to establish electoral districts must therefore be sensitive and well informed to avoid division of the traditional communities of interest. Fundamental principles for boundary delimitation include: (a) the impartiality of the boundary authority; (b) equality of voting strength; (c) the representativeness of cohesive communities defined by administrative boundaries, geographic features, and interest; (d) non-discrimination with respect to race, colour, gender, language, religion, or related status; and (e) transparency and accessibility to the public.^[13] The EMB should plan and conduct boundary delimitation in a cooperative manner in order to prevent the emergence of violence.^[14] In this regard, electoral dispute resolution mechanisms should be put in place to deal with complaints. The technical capacity of an EMB to implement boundary delimitation may require the use of the Global Information Systems (GIS) software.^[15]

 

Boundary delimitation improved through the use of the GIS ahead of the general elections in South Africa in 1999. Preparations ahead of South Africa’s 1999 general elections—the second post-apartheid elections to take place—included adjustments to the electoral district boundaries. The process started in 1997 with the Election Steering Committee working in cooperation with the Department of Land Affairs and Statistics in order to create a geo-spatial database for the entire country. After more than a year, the geographical dataset was delivered to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The Global Information System (GIS) software was used to delimit approximately 14,500 electoral districts. In parallel, local electoral officers from each municipality had been requested to convene party liaison committees consisting of local representatives from all political parties to examine the newly created maps depicting the voting districts. In total, the IEC received only six disputes, all of which were resolved within two weeks of the election. The IEC was honoured with the prestigious 2000 Computerworld Smithsonian Award in the Government and Non-profit Organizations category for ‘innovative applications of information technology that benefit society’. In making this award, special mention was made of the innovative use of GIS systems by the IEC.^[16]

 

• Ensure that the operational timelines for implementation of election activities are realistic, feasible, and translated into the election calendar

 

Even if the legal framework defines the timing of elections, rules may allow the EMB to choose the exact date of elections and consequently decide the timing of the different electoral phases. In the timing and sequencing of elections, the EMB needs to allow sufficient time for the implementation of all preparatory activities preceding election day. Unrealistic timelines may cause delays and thus affect the credibility of electoral processes and their outcomes. Planning of election timelines should consider external risks, particularly in areas that are prone to environmental hazards, as well as seasonal weather conditions. In some countries, the planting season may affect the participation of women due to their roles in food production. Poor weather conditions may affect the transport of election materials and citizens’ access to the electoral facilities. Time lost may be difficult or impossible to make up. Furthermore, an EMB when planning needs to consider whether a possible second round of elections is applicable. The second round of presidential elections may be particularly sensitive because of the high electoral stakes and frustration that may accumulate during the period leading up to the run-off. Once formulated, operational timelines should be included in an election calendar that needs to be periodically updated.

 

• Establish electoral dispute resolution bodies and mechanisms at an early stage in the process

 

Well-functioning electoral dispute resolution mechanisms have an inherent potential to prevent violence. The planning process should pay particular attention to the timeliness of dispute resolution and the capacity of the responsible bodies to deal with a potentially large number of complaints. Since the electoral process cannot be halted when a challenge is introduced, the establishment of adequate dispute resolution mechanisms which are trusted and effective is essential for ensuring the credibility of the electoral process.^[17]

 

Eleven actions for an improved electoral dispute resolution (EDR) system in Bhutan, 2008. After the 2008 parliamentary election, which witnessed some violence,^[18] the EMB undertook efforts to understand and address weaknesses relating to the election dispute resolution (EDR) mechanisms. The improvements included (a) the establishment of a two-level EDR body; (b) the introduction of clearer rules for complaint adjudication; (c) guidelines for the proper presentation of complaints;
(d) the establishment of investigation committees; (e) improved regulations governing the hearings; (f) better guidance for decision-making; (g) the enabling of summary decisions; (h) better provisions for final and binding decisions; (i) time limits for considering cases; (j) mandatory referral; and (k) the making of provision for complaints during non-election periods.^[19]

 

• Design sample electoral materials at an early stage and test their usability and accuracy

 

Electoral materials, including voter registration forms, provisional and final electoral registers, ballot papers and tabulation forms, need to be designed carefully to minimize the potential for mistakes, disputes and conflicts. These materials should be clear, concise and understandable for a broader population, including linguistic minorities and people with disabilities, and have security features, such as watermarks, security printing or other secure features as may be appropriate for the context in which these will be applied. Allowing sufficient time for the designing, testing and improvement of electoral materials may be beneficial in avoiding tensions generated by technical problems. Furthermore, there are many countries that do not have sufficient capacity to print or source some of these materials and therefore resort to sourcing same abroad. In these instances, communication with internal stakeholders is vital. The process of sampling electoral materials and the security measures to be taken by suppliers in the printing country become an important consideration for electoral stakeholders. Decisions and activities need to be taken well in advance, to compensate for the longer supply chain applicable in those circumstances.

 

• Establish data collection and analysis capacities to understand risk levels and make informed and conflict-sensitive decisions

 

Numerous factors can cause outbreaks of election-related violence. These may be process-specific (electoral) or context-specific (structural) factors. Risk assessment is a useful methodology in assessing relevant risk factors in a given national and electoral context. However, the risks associated with specific factors may change over time. Factors that are not initially categorized as risks may resurface during the later stages of electoral processes. It is therefore important to establish a standing capability within the EMB to analyse risk dynamics throughout the electoral cycle. This can be done through continuous data collection and analysis, with the aim of producing information that allows conflict-sensitive electoral decision-making. Furthermore, such analysis can be used to mobilize external agencies that may have mandates and capacities to address identified risks, such as security sector agencies and other state and non-state actors. At the same time, electoral management bodies will benefit from improved information and analysis generated and shared by external agencies and actors.

 

The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE)[20], develops a robust risk data analysis system ahead of elections. One year ahead of the 2009 legislative elections, Mexico was experiencing an increased number of attacks on civil society by organized criminal groups, causing uncertainty and fear. Due to increased security risks, the IFE put in place a general strategy to prevent attacks on citizens and political actors. Two mechanisms were put in place, namely a ‘political-electoral information system’ and a ‘scenario analysis programme’, to allow the IFE to assess risks relating to drug trafficking, murders, robbery, kidnapping, poverty and electoral complexity throughout the country. The ‘state risk index’ included data from a task force composed of local state governments and security sector, communication and infrastructure agencies. The system was designed to minimize the risks related to the electoral process and to protect the electorate going to the polls in 2009. The overall strategy contributed to informed decision-making in terms of preventative action.^[21]

 

In Burkina Faso, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)provided a training program on conflict prevention and mitigation strategies for communal-level election commissioners. The training program was based on IFES’ EVER methodology and customized to the Burkina Faso context, as well as to the operations of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and its communal administrative divisions. Following training, IFES provided support to the Independent Communal Electoral Commissions (CECI) and Independent District Electoral Commissions (CEIA) to establish an elections conflict monitoring cell, which identified sources of potential conflict, collected data through focal points, analyzed data gathered, implemented conflict prevention activities, and issued. The monitoring cell used information collected through focal points to draft reports on the nature and frequency of conflict incidents, tension levels, and threats. The reports were then delivered to the CENI to enhance its decision-making process ahead of the 2016 municipal elections, and its implementation of conflict prevention measures. The reports and data from the monitoring cell were also delivered to the National Committee for the Security of Elections.

 

• Ensure that the introduction of information technology-based solutions is timely and manageable

 

EMBs are increasingly relying on the application of sophisticated IT-based solutions in the implementation and management of delicate and complex electoral processes. Popular IT systems include biometric voter registration, electronic voting and electronic vote transmission. The use of IT may ensure that electoral processes are more expeditious and less prone to human mistakes, and thus contribute to increased trust in, and the credibility of, election results. On the negative side, late procurement and testing and breakdowns of these systems may cause serious problems to election administrators, resulting in loss of public confidence and damaged credibility of election results. To minimize the risks relating to the introduction of new technologies, an EMB should ensure that the testing and procurement of equipment happen during an initial stage of the electoral processes. It should be possible to compensate for delayed delivery and testing, or failure of these systems, through the deployment of alternative resources and procedures. Experience shows that introduction of ITs may work best if the development and implementation are incremental and are owned and trusted by all relevant national stakeholders. It is also important to highlight the complex relationship that exists between the choice and sophistication of the technology used in an election and the level of confidence in the electoral process. In some cases, the introduction of electoral technology might not be the best solution. Thus, the need to ensure that new technologies are considered on a case-by case basis in accordance with national needs and financial capacities, following a comprehensive and consultative feasibility study.

 

 

 

E-voting is introduced gradually by the Brazilian Superior Elections Tribunal. ‘Introduction of e-voting in Brazil was motivated by economic and fraud-prevention factors. A multi-year approach for the gradual introduction of e-voting was adopted and included the following steps: (1) Voter and civic information including usability and feasibility studies starting in 1986; (2) Capacity building within the EMB, and digitalization of the result aggregation; (3) Development of hard- and software, involving local technical expertise; (4) Testing of equipment in the Brazilian environment; (5) EMB’s final decision on the type of machine fitting the Brazilian context best; (6) Quality control and testing in various environments; (7) Authorization of e-voting in 1996 local and municipal elections; (8) Post-election review and subsequent quality overhaul; (9) Full e-voting roll-out in the 2002 general elections. A hacking competition was organized in 2009 to create additional confidence in the technology. Over the years citizens and stakeholders gained enough trust in the system for the paper trail that was initially included to be deemed redundant and scrapped after technical problems associated with the printers. While systems without paper trails are often disputed, the Brazilian case exemplifies what can be achieved with successful trust, capacity and consensus building over many years and several electoral cycles.’^[22]

 

In the lead up to the 2009 parliamentary elections, the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities participated in the Lebanese Election Violence Risk Assessment (LEVRA) project aimed to track the risk of election-related conflict in each electoral district in Lebanon. This contributed to the development of effective security planning (with other security agencies and stakeholders) to mitigate risks of election-related conflict during the campaign, polling and results phase of parliamentary elections. LEVRA used a methodology that analyzed data to indicate risk of political, confessional or electoral violence and assessed whether the data indicated a risk of violence in that district. In partnership with a local Geographic Information Systems (GIS) company, a tracking and mapping software was developed to record and data, incorporating GIS technology to map the risk assessments for each electoral district. Subsequently, incident maps were developed, and the information was used to design a security plan for the parliamentary elections. LEVRA also established a secure website that contained the risk assessment information, available for use by the Ministry and other stakeholders.

 

• Ensure political preconditions for the implementation of technical activities

 

Elections are often organized in national contexts where the political landscape is very complex. Political divisions within the legislative and executive institutions can increase the complexity of electoral processes and demand increased integrity and operational capacities of the organizations with electoral mandates. While it may be important to ensure that a political consensus is reached among the relevant political actors that give an EMB legitimacy, an EMB should have a good awareness of the politically delicate phases and activities in order to ensure that political consensus is maintained before and during the implementation of specific technical segments of elections. This may require political sensitivity and consensus-building skills among election administrators.

 

The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE), exercises political sensitivity when implementing technical processes. To implement its mandate in the complex political context of Mexico, the INE distinguishes between two aspects of electoral management. The first is the technical dimension. It entails management of resources and operational activities to ensure that election processes are implemented in a timely, credible and peaceful manner. The second dimension is political. The INE acknowledges that election administrators require a good sense of the political situation in order to better understand the possible political connotations of electoral activities. This allows it to make politically sensitive electoral decisions and take action ensuring that electoral processes do not raise political controversy. In fact, Mexican experiences confirm that there is an interplay between the technical and political dimensions of electoral processes. ‘Politics and technique change jointly: technique is the administrative body, and politics is what gives sense and feeds the spirit of the administration’.^[23]

 

B.         Improved electoral security

 

Planning of security precautions and responses needs to be undertaken on the basis of risk assessments of the general election environment and specific issues related to the geographic or political landscape. Security sector agencies are generally accustomed to strategic and operational security planning. In an election year, these plans must take into account the dynamics of electoral conflicts, such as increased political tensions and conflicts, and requirements to provide security for a large number of electoral actors, activities and facilities and a great deal of information. To support and reinforce the integrity of electoral processes, the SSAs’ electoral security planning must be timely and well informed about specific electoral needs. Specific consideration should include electoral risks, needs for the provision of physical protection (to actors, events, facilities and materials), financial and human resources, coordination with other actors and so on.

 

• Conduct a timely exercise to assess security risks relating to electoral processes within different electoral phases and across different geographical regions

 

Security sector agencies should mobilize organizational expertise to carry out a comprehensive electoral risk assessment early on in the electoral processes. This assessment must look into the historical and current electoral conflict dynamics in different geographical regions. To the greatest extent possible, consultations should involve all relevant stakeholders including EMBs, relevant ministries (for example, interior, defence, police, justice, health and transport), local governments, political parties and civil society organizations.^[24] Understanding of the political actors’ incentives to resort to the use of violence during electoral processes can inform the planning of appropriate security responses.^[25]

 

The Colombian Ministry of Defence maps risks relating to electoral security during local elections in 2011. In 2008, the government of Colombia estimated that illegal armed groups could, through intimidation and other violent means, potentially disrupt the 2011 local elections in as much as one-third of the country. As a response, the Ministry of Defense mapped out high-risk areas with a focus on electoral security. In total, 53 police regional centres were involved in mapping out risk areas by using the existing statistical data and targeted surveys. The exercise identified 58 municipalities where candidates might experience increased security risks. High-risk areas were provided with security protocols and protection schemes in order to guarantee a functional electoral process. Political actors travelling to areas where protection schemes were put in place were encouraged to inform the police before travelling. This allowed the authorities to ‘dispatch adequate protection measures’.^[26]

 

• Operationalize the electoral security strategy in respect to protection of electoral actors, events, facilities and materials during the different electoral phases

 

Operationalization of electoral security plans will help in translating broader electoral security concepts into practical action points. It will point to specific categories that need security protection, such as actors (election officials, political leaders), electoral events (political party rallies, for example), electoral facilities (such as voter registration centres and EMB offices and warehousing facilities where electoral materials are kept), and electoral materials (such as sensitive electoral materials). Furthermore, it will link specific security protection needs with specific phases of the electoral cycle and assign inter-agency responsibilities.

 

Operationalization of an electoral security strategy during the 2009 elections in India. The Election Commission of India (ECI) was in charge of putting in place an electoral security strategy for the protection of electoral actors, facilities and materials ahead of the 2009 parliamentary elections. The challenges included the provision of security arrangements for 828,000 polling stations. To compensate for a shortage of security personnel, since demand for them would be so great, the ECI requested that chief electoral officers in each state make a preliminary assessment of where to deploy extra security and where to take specific action to deter individuals who might perpetrate fraud or violence. “Vulnerability mapping” helped the chief electoral officers identify which polling places in their state would be most vulnerable. The chief electoral officers then had the power to call upon the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), a paramilitary police service operated by India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, to supplement state police during elections., The CRPF operated under the command of the Director General of the police, who took orders from the Chief Electoral Officer during the electoral period. This led to a decline in the number of election-related incidents and the ECI declared that the 2009 election was one of the most peaceful in the country’s history.^[27]

 

• Ensure that joint security planning, that involves multiple security sector agencies and an EMB, is a collaborative exercise that takes place at the national and sub-national level

 

Electoral security is most effective when adapted to the local security context.^[28] Implementation of the electoral security strategy may require the establishment of joint coordination bodies such as task forces or joint election operation centres.^[29] Such security forums will maintain and enhance coordination between agencies throughout the electoral cycle. Security planning may also take into account a wider range of actors including political parties, other ministries and civil society groups.^[30]

 

Coordination between the Interim Independent Electoral Commission and the Kenyan police strengthens security planning ahead of the 2010 referendum. Post-electoral violence in 2007–2008 claimed the lives of over 1,500 Kenyans and caused the internal displacement of more than 300,000 people.^[31] In the context of preparations for the 2010 constitutional referendum, the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) and the Kenyan police collaborated on the development of a comprehensive electoral security plan. This methodology included identification of the security personnel required to provide electoral security. Needs assessments were conducted nationwide by the respective officer commanding police divisions (OCPDs). This information was consolidated at the national level and collated through a comprehensive report that was shared with the Commission. The IIEC worked closely with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police on security operations ahead of the elections and consulted with the Office of the President, the Department of Registration of Persons and Immigration and, the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs in order to ‘effectively operationalize election activities’. To strengthen the capacity of the Kenyan police force to provide electoral security, uniformed personnel from the Kenyan Wildlife Services and the Prison Department were seconded, trained and then appointed as police officers immediately before and after election day.^[32]

 

• Develop a curriculum for training of security sector agencies on the specifics of security engagement during the electoral processes

 

Security sector agencies need training to understand the specific challenges relating to their engagement during electoral processes. Such training should include human rights and gender awareness.^[33] When developing the training, the SSAs should collaborate with the EMB. The training needs to take into account the levels of literacy and linguistic diversity of security sector officers and the length of the training. If the training is cascaded, the capacity of trainers to convey the training, while maintaining its standard, must be ensured.

 

UN agencies develop a training curriculum for the Sudanese police ahead of the 2010 general elections. The 2010 general election was regarded as an important milestone of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the armed conflict in Sudan.^[34] With assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Elections Assistance Basket Fund, the United Nations Police (UNPOL) and the United Nations Mission in Darfur developed a training curriculum on electoral security in order to train over 34,000 Sudanese police officers at different levels ahead of the 2010 general election. The curriculum provided a summary of the electoral law, the polling process, the role of the police, likely offences, and mock polling scenarios. The UNPOL also produced 27,000 pocket-sized copies of a as a quick reference guide outlining basic procedures and recommended police conduct during polling days. This training curriculum covered the development of a polling day deployment strategy to mitigate election ‘flashpoints’.^[35]

 

C.         Improved infrastructure for peace

 

In addition to EMBs and SSAs, which have clear mandates and responsibilities to ensure that elections are peaceful, a number of other state and non-state actors may have a specific interest in contributing to peaceful elections. These may include civil society organizations and other groups and individuals which represent the building blocks of a national infrastructure for peace. During the election planning phase, these actors should be proactive in identifying and reaching out to other organizations and individuals with a similar agenda and recognized potential to mediate and resolve disputes, such as traditional leaders. This may require the establishment of a joint collaborative forum which can ensure that efforts are coordinated and results are maximized. Specific actions may include the mapping of all existing organizations and actors that may contribute to peaceful elections, the promotion of collaborative platforms and forums, resource mobilization, operational planning, and the establishment of collaboration with EMBs and SSAs.

 

• Map organizations and individuals with an agenda or capacity to promote peace and conflict resolution during elections at a national and sub-national level

 

Effective mechanisms for conflict prevention and mitigation may take different forms in different societies. In consolidated democracies, judicial institutions usually enjoy the citizens’ trust and are able to mediate or resolve conflicts effectively. In some societies, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and authorities, such as religious or tribal leaders, complement the judiciary and constitute an essential conflict prevention and mitigation mechanism. In conflict-prone societies, additional efforts are often required to develop and enhance conflict-prevention and peace-building capacities through the establishment of peace and liaison councils and forums that involve civil society organizations, political parties, government agencies, reputable citizens, and organizations and individuals that work to promote gender equality and women’s participation. Understanding the full peace-building and conflict-prevention potential may require mapping of the existing infrastructure for peace.

 

• Join or initiate discussion forums for participatory dialogues between EMBs, security sector agencies and non-state actors in the planning phase of electoral processes

 

Participatory and democratic dialogue through multi-stakeholder forums and consultations between state and non-state actors should be established during the planning phase. If electoral management bodies and security sector agencies do not take the initiative to organize dialogue forums, or do not include non-state organizations, these may take proactive steps to convene such forums themselves. Existing forums, established to coordinate broader peace-building and conflict-prevention efforts outside the electoral context, may serve as platforms for discussion and coordination around actions the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence during the election period.

 

Non-state actors conduct nationwide consultations to support peaceful elections in Somaliland in 2012. Although recognized as credible, the 2010 elections in Somaliland witnessed some election-related violence in the form of intimidation and murder.^[36] Ahead of the November 2012 local government election, the Somaliland Non State Actors Forum (SNSAF) conducted a nationwide consultation process which created a platform for dialogue, bringing together all electoral stakeholders such as National Election Commission (NEC), the Committee for the Registration and Approval of Political Associations (RAC), political parties and associations, government officials, parliamentarians and civil society organizations which included traditional and religious leaders, women’s organizations and legal experts. The objective of the pre-election dialogue was to identify the main issues that might have a negative impact on the elections, and to generate appropriate strategies to ensure that elections were free, fair and peaceful. Some of the concerns identified during the dialogue included shortcomings in the electoral legal framework relating to ballot paper design, polling station arrangements, the demarcation of electoral districts and boundaries, inadequate voter education, the NEC’s general lack of capacity and finances, inappropriate election timing (no election date was decided at the time of the consultations) and security concerns.^[37]

 

• Formalize coordination between state and non-state actors during elections, and mobilize sufficient financial and human resources for joint action

 

Strengthening a society’s resilience to conflict and violence during elections may require enhanced coordination between, and joint action by, the major state and non-state actors that have a mandate to work for peaceful elections and an interest in doing so. These organizations should work together to develop operational plans for engagement throughout the different phases of the electoral cycle at the national and sub-national level. In conflict-prone societies, such plans should foresee the establishment of standing bodies for data collection and analysis, the creation of early warning alerts, and coordination of prevention and mitigation activities. Preventive and mitigation actions requires funds, however. In the long run, such mechanisms are inexpensive and cost-effective.^[38]

 

State and non-state actors establish a collaborative early warning and conflict prevention platform ahead of the 2010 referendum in Kenya. During the outbreak of election-related violence in Kenya in 2008, far fewer incidents were recorded in the Kenyan districts where a District Peace Committee (DPC) existed than in districts without such a committee. The results were so convincing that, after the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 was passed, the government decided to establish DPCs in all of Kenya’s districts. Prior to the 2010 constitutional referendum, the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management (NSC), the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), PeaceNet Kenya (an umbrella body for peace-building CSOs in Kenya), and UNDP Kenya established the Uwiano Platform for Peace. This Platform also involves other key government agencies such as the Provincial Administration, Kenya Police, Administration Police, the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) and the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) in ‘a unique multi-stakeholder conflict prevention, de-escalation and response strategy that emphasized preventive action, diplomacy and community dialogue’.^[39] The contribution of Uwianoto the peaceful referendum has been well documented. The key success factors included the strong national profile of the principal partners and their linkage to credible grass-roots networks, including the Provincial Administration, security agencies and district peace committees. Positive media input supportive donors and development partners and the UNDP’s invaluable role in mobilizing resources. The establishment and operationalization of the Emergency Response Fund (ERF), also referred to as the Rapid Response Fund, was one of the most notable achievements of Uwiano.

 

• Consult with traditional and religious leaders in order to understand their interest and potential to assist in mediating electoral conflict

 

Acknowledgement of the role of traditional and religious leaders in the peace infrastructure is an important measure for preventing electoral violence, particularly in remote areas. It is important to be aware that the authority of elected leaders has been often in competition with traditional leaders´ power.^[40] Engagement should be based on a constructive approach and respect for traditions.^[41] However, some traditions are not always inclusive and participatory, especially with regard to women’s participation. Traditional and religious leaders should not be perceived as biased if they are to have the legitimacy to resolve disputes.^[42] It is important to be aware of gender roles and context-specific practices and beliefs when working with religious leadership in any particular context.

 

Chiefs affirm support to democratic processes ahead of Sierra Leone’s 2007 elections. Following a decade-long conflict, Sierra Leone organized its first peacetime general elections in 2002. These elections did witness some incidents of election-related violence. In this respect, the potential of the paramount chiefs to contribute to the prevention and mitigation of election-relation violence ahead of and during the 2007 elections was explored. Ahead of the campaigning phase, the Fatima Institute and the UNDP organized several leadership consultation workshops around the country in an effort to clarify the role of the paramount chiefs in the electoral process, resulting in the Makeni Protocol whereby chiefs affirmed their commitment to promote the democratic and electoral process.^[43] In general, the 2007 election was regarded as free and fair; however, incidents of intimidation were still recorded during the campaign period and on election day.^[44]

 

• Create a platform to enable information exchange on the electoral process and monitor the activities of electoral stakeholders throughout

 

Election Watch initiatives are a means to increase the transparency of the electoral process. Through observation of the voting operations, information of the public about the activities in the different stages of the electoral cycle (such as voter registration, nomination of parties and candidates, or campaigning).[45] Moreover, election watch projects monitor the work of other electoral stakeholders, such as political parties, or review the reporting in the media.

  

The Namibian Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) launches an Election Watch ahead of general elections in November 2014 and regional and local elections in 2015.[46] The project uses different channels to publish election-related material: it operates a website that features background documents and explanations on elections, news from the Electoral Commission, political analysis, party lists, manifestos and speeches.[47] Further, it produces a regular Election Watch Bulletin[48] with information on electoral activities in an online and print version and also makes use of social media. This way, information is made accessible for civil society activists, journalists, students and the public in general. The objective of the project is to act as a platform for the exchange of the views of the citizens and civil society activists on the electoral process and a vehicle for voter education[49]. Another asset is that it can make a contribution to the peacefulness of the electoral process: Through such a comprehensive monitoring effort, potential problems that might threaten the effective organization of the vote and trigger conflicts can be detected. After all, the initiative also strives to promote Namibian, African and international electoral and democratic standards.

 

Training and information

Electoral training and information refer to the building of understanding, knowledge, skills and capacities of different electoral actors in relation to electoral processes. Voter information aims to disseminate relevant information about the electoral process to voters. As a general rule, training is provided to all who have specific tasks in respect to implementation, security, observation or reporting on electoral processes. Given the complexity and sensitivity of electoral processes, it is of great importance that all actors are acquainted with the procedures and have relevant, timely and accurate information, in particular about the registration and polling and counting processes. When elections are organized in conflict-prone societies, electoral training and information should also enhance the awareness and sensitivity of electoral officials, security sector agencies and civil society groups with respect to specific electoral risks and prevention and mitigation strategies. Training and information efforts should be maintained throughout the electoral cycle.

Table 3. Training and information
A. Improved electoral management and justice	B. Improved electoral security	C. Improved infrastructure for peace
Ensure that the training for election officials is of a high standard and timely. Provide electoral training at the national and sub-national level to political party representatives, the media, CSOs and electoral observers. Design and conduct a timely voter information campaign that is gender-sensitive and far-reaching in respect to diversity and citizens with special needs.	Conduct electoral training for security sector agencies to enhance and build understanding of the electoral process, the roles and rights of electoral actors, and electoral offences. Reinforce security sector agencies’ professional standards.	Ensure that all non-state actors which form an integral part of the national infrastructure for peace are familiarized with electoral processes, including timelines, procedures and operational details. Train the conflict mediation personnel at the level of local communities. Design and implement electoral training, information and education activities targeting high-risk areas.

 

 

 

A.      Improved electoral management and justice

Election officials should undertake continuous professional development programmes. During an election year, EMBs will engage a large number of temporary staff to conduct voter registration or to perform polling and/or counting duties. In some countries it is customary to engage public servants to act as polling station and counting officials. In others, temporary staff are recruited for this purpose. Newly recruited officials may not have prior experience or understanding about electoral processes and therefore require intensive training. New electoral rules and regulations will increase the training needs of experienced personnel. An EMB should also provide training to other stakeholders, such as political parties, the media and civil society organizations, who engage in observing or reporting about electoral processes. Furthermore, an EMB should ensure that all citizens are well informed about timelines and procedures through a far-reaching information campaign. These measures will help avoid technical problems that may harm the credibility of electoral processes, raise tensions and lead to violence.

• Ensure that the training for election officials is of high standard and timely
  
  Training of electoral officials entails training in procedures and standards of professional conduct.^[1] Adequate knowledge and skills reduce the likelihood of procedural mistakes being made. Training can be implemented at two levels. For permanent electoral officials, training should be a part of professional development. The most comprehensive professional development course is the Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) project.^[2] Training for the temporary staff should be implemented before they are assigned to do specific electoral work. Depending on their specific role, training topics may include registration of voters, political parties and independent candidates, and observers; external voting; polling and counting; electoral security; human rights, including gender-participation; conflict resolution; and so on. The training methodology for temporary staff may involve cascade training which can be multiplied at different levels so that it is more cost-effective, and it is possible to train a large number of staff members.^[3]
  The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), ensures high-quality training for randomly selected polling station officials. Mexican elections are highly contested, and the winning margins between presidential candidates were very narrow during the general elections in 2006 and 2012. Such outcomes have raised tensions and led to street protests in 2006.^[4] Large-scale recounts were undertaken by the IFE to ensure that the credibility of the election results was upheld in 2012. In this context, it is critical that election officials in charge of the polling and counting processes perform well and impartially. The IFE therefore puts much effort and resources into ensuring that polling station officers, who are drawn at random from the voter register, and without the intervention of any political party, are properly instructed and trained.^[5] The most important thing is to ensure the credibility of each of the polling stations.^[6] The training programme has a cascade scheme. The electoral supervisors (ESs) and the electoral assistant trainers (EATs) are selected, hired and trained at the district level. The ESs coordinate, support and verify the electoral training and assistance activities implemented by the EATs. The EATs inform selected citizens about their assignments and duties and train them in the polling and counting procedures. Furthermore, EATs are responsible for the proper installation and functioning of the polling stations. The ESs are hired for five months and the EATs for around two weeks.^[7]

• Provide electoral training at the national and sub-national level to political party representatives, the media, CSOs and electoral observers

Political parties have high stakes in electoral processes and are therefore greatly interested in following different electoral activities in order to verify their quality and integrity. Civil society organizations and other national and international actors may also be interested in observing different electoral activities. Furthermore, journalists are involved in providing media coverage of electoral processes. To avoid misunderstandings, tensions, unfounded complaints and sensationalist media reporting, an EMB should organize training for the key external stakeholders. This type of training can be tailored to address the needs of the specific stakeholder. Among other things, it can include topics about electoral rights and duties, technical procedures, dispute resolution mechanisms, gender equality and participation, diversity perspectives in electoral processes and so on.

The National Election Commission conducts extensive training for external actors ahead of the 2010 general elections in Sudan. Following the peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the People’s Liberation Movement in 2005, Sudan organized its first multiparty elections in 2010. Ahead of the elections, the National Election Commission (NEC), supported by the UNDP, organized an extensive training programme for political party representatives, female political candidates, state prosecutors, representatives from civil society organizations, journalists and electoral observers.^[8] About 140 political party agents attended a training workshop on their roles during polling. Specific topics included parallel vote tabulation, polling regulations and the importance of monitoring. Workshops for female political candidates were organized in five states in northern Sudan with a focus on campaigning, agenda setting, and intimidation and violence.^[9]

• Design and conduct a timely voter information campaign that is gender-sensitive and far-reaching in respect to diversity and citizens with special needs

Voter information is provided by electoral management bodies. The aim is to provide relevant information about electoral processes to citizens. This information primarily includes details on when, where and how to register and vote. Sometimes voter information may encompass elements of voter education and address issues relating to human rights, such as the rights to elect representatives freely, to gender equality, and to freedom from harassment and intimidation.^[10] It is also useful to inform voters on how to submit electoral complaints. In conducting an information campaign, an EMB may benefit from partnership with civil society groups. Information and educational activities should be designed to reach remote communities and overcome language, literacy and disability barriers.

A far-reaching voter information and education campaign is organized in Yemen prior to the 2006 elections. During the 2001 local council elections in Yemen, 67 people were killed and more than 100 wounded.^[11] Ahead of the 2006 elections, the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCER), with the support of the UNDP, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and other international assistance providers, implemented a national voter information and education campaign in order to increase citizens’ information, participation and confidence in the election. This included the use of radio and television and the production and dissemination of a range of printed materials, including booklets, posters, stickers, banners, fact sheets and taxi advertising. The information included electoral laws/rights, election logistics and the importance of participation among marginalized groups such as women, ethnic minorities, young people and persons with disabilities.^[12] The outreach activities were directed at communities living in rural areas who lacked access to traditional sources of voter education information such as radio or television. Twenty CSOs conducted face-to-face campaigning. The aim was to enable citizens to make informed decisions about the registration and election day processes and to provide them with accurate, culturally sensitive and timely information about these processes. This gave marginalized groups, especially in rural locations, an opportunity to obtain electoral information in a simple format and receive immediate answers to their questions.^[13]

An inclusive and collaborative voter education campaign was implemented in Myanmar for the 2015 elections. The 2015 elections in Myanmar represented a historic step in the country’s transition from five-decades of military dictatorship to a civilian-led government. While this democratic transition was simultaneously evolving with the country’s ongoing peace process, observers were concerned about possible tensions as 92 political parties vied for seats in the national and state/regional legislatures. The Union Election Commission (UEC) implemented a nationwide voter education campaign designed to include voters that were viewed as traditionally marginalized and worked collaboratively with civil society organizations to reach voters throughout the country. The campaign was based on conflict assessments and national survey data so as to accurately respond to how voters received information and what information voters needed prior to election day. The materials were developed to be culturally sensitive, reflecting Myanmar’s diverse population, and were translated into 16 different ethnic languages.

B.         Improved electoral security

Electoral training for the security sector personnel will contribute to their professionalism and sensitivity when engaging during elections. A curriculum that could be used to train police in electoral security practices may include the following topics: (a) the nature of the electoral legislation and an overview of the electoral process; (b) the role of the police in supporting the democratic process; (c) human rights issues in relation to the police’s role; (d) the police’s role in an election; (e) security objectives and strategy in relation to the election; (f) the standards of professional, neutral and non-intimidating conduct to be upheld by police forces during the election; (g) contact mechanisms and liaison details (on an as-needed basis) between the electoral commission and police forces; (h) details of specific offences against electoral laws; and (i) details of other laws such as those regarding public gatherings that will have an impact on police planning.^[14] In particular, training should focus on an enhanced understanding of the roles and responsibilities of electoral actors, electoral offences and professional standards.

• Conduct electoral training for security sector agencies to enhance and build understanding of the electoral process, the roles and rights of electoral actors, and electoral offences

In addition to having clarity about their roles and mandates during elections, security officers need to be aware of the roles and mandates of other stakeholders, including elected officials, political party candidates and election observers. Security personnel should be able to understand voters’ rights and electoral offences and be able to differentiate between sensitive and non-sensitive materials. Training should be intended for the leadership as well as national and local security personnel.^[15] Training will have the greatest impact when all relevant national institutions are involved in its planning and implementation and when it is organized well in advance of elections.^[16]

The Georgian Central Election Commission (CEC) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) formally coordinate the training of police on their roles during the electoral process for the October 2018 presidential election. For the third election in a row, the CEC and MIA signed a memorandum of understanding on electoral security outlining their coordination of communication and activities including training. This cooperation was brought about through encouragement from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) during its “Enabling a Peaceful Environment to Administer Credible Elections” (ePeace) training program which provides police and election management bodies with improved knowledge of the security challenges unique to elections and the skills to more effectively play their roles in the electoral process.[17] This training resulted in the first memorandum of understanding for the 2016 national parliamentary elections.

Large-scale electoral security training is implemented ahead of the Ghanaian general elections in 2012. Ghana experienced a peaceful transition of power after the 2008 general elections. However, the capacity of the police to respond to election-related violence remained a concern.^[18] Prior to the 2012 general elections, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) supported the national electoral security training programme that was implemented in all ten regions of the country using a train-the-trainer methodology. Approximately 16,000 security officers from the Ghanaian police, the fire service, and the prisons and immigration services were trained. The training was designed to acquaint the officers with the electoral laws, public order management and intelligence gathering in order to prevent election-related violence from occurring. The training in public order management was designed to assist in effective and professional handling of crowd-related violence and introduced international standards of policing to ensure peaceful and violence-free elections. The training included field and simulation exercises on problem solving related to election violence.^[19]

Security sector agencies, together with the Election Commission of Ghana, conduct an election security exercise ahead of the 2012 general elections. Some parts of Ghana experienced election-related violence during the 2012 general elections, including assaults, shootings and arson.^[20] A simulation exercise covering election day operations, including election security, was undertaken in the city of Ho shortly before the 2012 general elections. The Volta Regional Task Force, together with the Election Commission of Ghana and the National Commission for Civic Education, coordinated the exercise. It was focused on the escorting of election materials and simulations in which the police had to foil the ‘snatching of ballot boxes’ and detain suspects.^[21] Similar simulation exercises were conducted in other parts of the country to demonstrate the readiness of the security agencies ahead of election day.^[22]

• Reinforce security sector agencies’ professional standards

Training for security sector agencies should emphasize professional standards and values that sustain the democratic nature of electoral processes and SSAs’ own legitimacy. These include neutrality, transparency, consistency in the application of the law and non-intimidating behaviour, as well as cooperation with other electoral actors.^[23] In addition to training, police officers can be provided with a pocket book that contains all relevant instructions relating to professional standards when engaging in electoral processes.

The Ugandan police and Electoral Commission work together to produce professional guidelines for the conduct of election day. During its general elections in 2006, Uganda experienced incidents of election-related violence involving the police and the main opposition party following the rejection of the election results.^[24] Ahead of the 2011 general elections in Uganda, the police force, with the support of the Electoral Commission and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, provided pocket-sided ‘guidelines for law enforcement officials during the national elections’ to police officers.^[25] The document sets out the professional standards for security officials with an emphasis on political neutrality and discipline. References were made to the constitution and the electoral legal framework with an emphasis on the rule of law and human rights, as well as law enforcement standards. In addition, the document provided information on the responsibility of the Electoral Commission in managing the elections.

C.         Improved infrastructure for peace

The capacity of different non-state and state actors to engage effectively in the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence may be contingent on their understanding of the legal and operational aspects of electoral processes. These actors should therefore be acquainted with the election rules and regulations. This can be achieved through training initiatives implemented in collaboration with electoral management bodies at the national and sub-national level. Once familiarized with electoral processes, these organizations may be well positioned to engage in designing and implementing conflict-sensitive electoral training, and information and education programmes for communities that experience conflicts and for women and other marginalized groups.

• Ensure that all non-state actors which form an integral part of the national infrastructure for peace are familiarized with electoral processes, including timelines, procedures, and operational plans.

The national infrastructures for peace may include actors with extensive experience in conflict prevention and resolution, such as peace builders, mediators, reconciliation experts and similar organizations. However, conflict prevention practitioners may lack a good understanding of the operational and legal aspects of electoral processes and the specifics relating to electoral security. To apply their skills in electoral processes effectively and contribute in the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence, these agencies need capacity-building training in electoral issues. This training can be implemented with the support of an EMB and security sector agencies at the national and sub-national level.

The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy (EISA) trains conflict mediators on electoral processes in Kenya ahead of the 2013 General Elections[26]. The violence that flared up after the presidential elections in Kenya in 2007 provides the background to this effort to build the capacity of peacebuilding actors to mediate election-related conflicts. EISA conducts such trainings since the inception of its Election Conflict Management Panels in South Africa in 1999.[27] If needed, the training aims to improve conflict resolution and mitigation skills, on the one hand, addressing psychosocial dimensions of conflicts. On the other hand, the sessions inform participants about the legal framework and the procedures of elections in the respective country.

• Train the conflict mediation personnel at the level of local communities

Effective conflict prevention and resolution can take different forms in different societies. In some national contexts, conflict prevention and resolution at the local level may benefit from the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions that involve traditional leaders, such as traditional chiefs or reputable individuals. Religious institutions in particular may have an infrastructure that enables access to different communities. Cooperation with traditional leaders in the area of voter education may be very effective. Cultural sensitivity as well as respect and appreciation for their contribution are central to making such cooperation work. At the same time, if cultural and religious organizations practise exclusivity and intolerance, additional measures to promote dialogue and social cohesion will be needed.^[28]

Mediation training is organized in the context of Guinea’s 2010 presidential elections. In 2010, Guinea organized the first free presidential elections since independence in 1958. Ahead of the election, mediation training workshops were organized in different parts of the country.^[29] participants represented civil society organizations, women and youth groups, elders and religious leaders, political parties, the election commission and the security sector forces. The workshops allowed the participants to familiarize themselves with the electoral legislative framework, conflict analysis, the electoral cycle, and mediation techniques and methods. Lessons learned from Kenya, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo were presented by experts from International Alert, Swisspeace, and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA).^[30] Practical training methods such as role play were also used. Some reports suggest that the mediation training did help to de-escalate conflicts and stop them becoming violent in a number of cases around the country before, during and after election day.^[31]

Equipping society to demand peaceful elections in Bangladesh. While most Bangladeshi citizens desire more peaceful elections, violence is so prevalent that it has come to be accepted and tolerated as a natural part of politics. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) conducted the People Against Violence in Elections (PAVE) training and peace initiative for over 1,000 political and civil society leaders to build their capacity to engage in community-level peacebuilding around elections. PAVE equips these leaders – including political party advocates, elected representatives, women’s leaders, journalists and students – with the skills to understand election violence, engage in cross-party collaboration on conflict-related issues, and implement peacebuilding that creates public demand for peaceful and violence-free elections. Participants worked together to create a network of “Peace Ambassadors” (Shani Dut Gon) through which they conducted community-level advocacy both within their core communities and across political, demographic, religious, and other lines; implemented grassroots peacebuilding activities which created opportunities to build consensus; and fostered dialogue between civil society, political parties and law enforcement representatives, among other electoral stakeholders.^[32]

• Design and implement electoral training, information and education activities targeting high-risk areas

Civil society organizations are well positioned to work with EMBs and implement programmes relating to electoral training, information and education at the grass-roots level. The added value of such work may be particularly visible when it is done in regions that face increased inter/intra-communal tensions and gender-based violence and discrimination.

Civil society promotes civic education in conflict-prone areas of West and East Africa. The participants in the Tostan human rights-based education programme receive civic education to organize drama events for entire villages in order to disseminate messages on election procedures. Furthermore, Tostan participants organize radio broadcasts on a range of civic education issues with a conflict and violence prevention potential. This has been the case in various countries such as the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Somalia, where Tostan has been operating during election periods and beyond through its Community Empowerment Programme.^[33]

Registration of voters, political parties and election observers

The registration phase encompasses the processes of voter registration, registration of political parties and candidates, and accreditation of election observers. Registration may be controversial for a number of reasons. An inaccurate electoral register may misspell voters’ names, assign them to the wrong polling places, omit eligible electors and registrants or include non-eligible electors (for example, people who have died). Such problems will be likely to give rise to speculation as to whether those mistakes were intentional and part of electoral fraud. It is therefore important to have a registration process of a high standard which will ensure that only eligible electors are registered. Likewise, it is important to ensure that all eligible political parties and independent candidates have the opportunity to register and compete in elections. Furthermore, is important to allow interested organizations, including political parties, civil society and international non-governmental and governmental organizations, to be accredited to observe the voter registration, polling and counting processes.

Table 4. Registration of voters, political parties and election observers
A. Improved electoral management and justice	B. Improved electoral security	C. Improved infrastructure for peace
Ensure that the voter registration process is conveniently accessible to all eligible citizens including women and minority groups. Ensure that electoral justice mechanisms have the capacity to effectively resolve complaints and disputes relating to voter registration. Ensure transparency of and sufficient time for registration of political parties, party candidates and independent candidates. Ensure timely and transparent accreditation of voter registration observers.	Establish and maintain close coordination between different SSAs and with an EMB during the voter registration period through a joint electoral operations centre. Provide security to citizens and officials that participate in registration processes and safeguard registration materials and facilities. Ensure that citizens face no security challenges while travelling to and accessing the voter registration facilities. Provide a safe environment for those who wish to put up their nomination, especially for women candidates.	Observe voter registration processes and share findings with an EMB. In collaboration with an EMB, build and provide capacity for dispute resolution relating to the voter registration period. Promote multi-stakeholder collaboration through joint forums that create space for discussion and coordination of violence prevention during voter registration.

 

 A. Improved electoral management and justice

Improved electoral management and justice during the registration phase aim to achieve a process that is technically as good as possible, safe, and trusted. The success of the registration processes will depend on the quality of the electoral laws, rules and regulations; the comprehensiveness of operational planning; and the quality of training and information campaigns. To be able to address emerging issues, an EMB must have a good situational awareness and operational agility to engage in resolving challenges that arise. This may include modification of operational plans relating to the establishment of voter registration centres and revision of the procedures and timelines relating to registration of voters, parties, candidates and observers. An EMB will benefit from credible election observation groups and therefore needs to be transparent in its work. The environment in which registration takes place should be safe and secure, while all related complaints are resolved effectively.

• Ensure that the voter registration process is conveniently accessible to all eligible citizens including women and minority groups.

Voter registration may be passive or active, depending on whether eligible citizens are included in the electoral registers automatically, on the basis of the civil registry data, or are required to register by visiting designated voter registration locations. Passive voter registration requires an accurate and trusted citizen register. In many countries with a citizen register, this is not of sufficient quality to be used to extract an electoral register and voter registration needs to be organized in order to establish and maintain the electoral register. Most often, an EMB is mandated to organize these processes. Critical elements of voter registration relate to voters’ awareness, the procurement and dissemination of voter registration equipment and materials, administrative procedures, the professionalism of staff, trust and transparency.^[1] Preparations need to start early on. Procedures for voter registration must be clear and concise, and voter registration staff must be professional and well trained. They must be impartial and transparent in their work. The EMB should be in contact with other electoral stakeholders during the over registration process - especially with political parties as they play a crucial role in endorsing the voter registration process. In addition, the voter registration process must be accessible to all men and women, in particular marginalized and vulnerable groups. In post-conflict or conflict-prone countries, voter registration should ensure that refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) are given an opportunity to register for voting. This may require special arrangements in terms of personal identity documentation needed for the voter registration, such as a refugee or ID card. Also, citizens of all geographical regions, regardless of their gender, ethnicity and race, must have equal access to the voter registration locations.

A new voter registration system increases the credibility of the 2008 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The 2007 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh were postponed due to a growing political crisis, demonstrations and violent incidents that had marked the pre-election period. Among other things, the EMB was criticized for lack of action to ensure the credibility of the electoral registers. These had last been updated in 2000, and it was estimated that they included
10 million ‘ghost voters’, which could lead to widespread fraud on polling day. Following the cancellation of the 2007 parliamentary elections, the newly appointed Bangladesh Electoral Commission (BEC) implemented a number of reforms, among them a new voter registration process. The BEC initiated a new voter register with photographs and other biometric data details. The registration centres were managed by the armed forces, mainly because they were the only institution in the country with the manpower and the technical and logistical expertise to complete the process on time. In addition, the army enjoyed public trust. Technical assistance was provided by the UNDP, while several civil society organizations engaged in a widespread voter and civic education programme. The accuracy of the electoral register was verified by an independent audit which affirmed that 99 per cent of the eligible electorate were on the register. The process was characterized as both careful and transparent and generated high levels of public trust in the upcoming elections and in the BEC. The level of election-related violence was also considerably lower in the run-up to the December 2008 elections compared to the levels of violence reported in the 2007 pre-election period. This was believed to be in part due to the electoral reforms.^[2]

• Ensure that electoral justice mechanisms have the capacity effectively to resolve complaints and disputes relating to voter registration

The way in which electoral processes are implemented may sometime open the process to legal challenges. Participation in the registration phase will be massive, involving citizens, political actors and observer groups, and the number of complaints can therefore be very high. Adequate dispute resolution capabilities should therefore be put in place to ensure that complaints are resolved efficiently and professionally. Dispute resolution mechanisms can take different forms. Administrative challenges, which are the most common type, are usually addressed and resolved by an EMB. Contested decisions can be revisited either by the EMB or by a higher-ranking organ, such as an electoral court, high court or even a constitutional court.^[3] This system is widespread. Judicial challenges are addressed, as defined by law, to judicial bodies, which may be regular or administrative courts, a constitutional court or special electoral courts. Likewise, legislative challenges systems allow legislative bodies or other defined political assemblies to resolve electoral disputes.^[4]

The Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq strengthens its capacity to adjudicate voter registration complaints ahead of the 2010 general election. The Iraqi general election in 2005 witnessed numerous cases of election-related violence.^[5] During the run-up to the 2010 National Assembly elections, the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) undertook an update of the voter register. During the updating, the IHEC increased its institutional capacity to handle legal complaints. In Kirkuk in particular the IHEC established close cooperation with the Global Justice Project–Iraq (GJPI). Through this collaboration, three electoral dispute experts were brought on board to support the IHEC and the Kirkuk Governance Electoral Office (GEO) with the ‘adjudication of complaints concerning voter registration’. Practical work included the categorization of appeals, organizing responses to appellants and the compilation of an electronic archive of voter registration cases. This allowed the IHEC and the GEO to process disputes in a timely manner, ensuring a minimal backlog of undecided cases. Ultimately, this helped the IHEC to publish the final voter register without delays.^[6]

Dispensing electoral justice—maintaining a credible voter register in South Africa. A voter register that is out of date or inaccurately compiled, or excludes eligible voters, has the potential to jeopardize the credibility and integrity of the entire electoral process. In South Africa voters are required to register to vote in the voting district in which they reside. An objection to the voter register may relate to a voter’s inclusion, exclusion or registration details. A common objection relates to a voter’s being registered in a district in which the objector believes he or she does not reside. Objections must be lodged with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which is required to investigate the objection and respond within 14 days. The investigation involves verifying the residential address of the voter. The Chief Electoral Officer of the IEC then needs to implement the decision of the Electoral Commission within three days. All eight general elections in South Africa, since the 1994 liberation elections, have been declared free and fair—underpinned by a credible voter register.^[7]

• Ensure transparency of and sufficient time for registration of political parties, party candidates and independent candidates

Legal requirements guiding the registration of political parties and candidates are usually included in the electoral legal framework. These may relate to geographical or gender representation, authenticating citizens’ support, minimum requirements with respect to founding documents, financial disclosure and so on. Sufficient time, fair requirements, clarity and transparency in the registration procedures, and the existence of electoral justice mechanisms to deal with complaints will ensure that the registration is a ‘level playing field’ in which rules are not designed and applied to favour or disfavour specific actors. Provisions may deny registration for individuals convicted of criminal offences and human rights abuses, or those linked to illegal armed groups.^[8] Candidates with a record of stirring up electoral violence may also be disqualified through vetting procedures. However, EMBs must ensure that their mandate to disqualify candidates is not used for political reasons and, if such fears do exist, that they are properly addressed.

New political party and candidate registration rules are introduced to address election-related violence during the Bangladesh 2008 parliamentary elections. The 2007 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh were postponed due to a growing political crisis and violence that started during the pre-election period. To address cases of violence, the new Bangladesh Electoral Commission (BEC) introduced a new election law that required all political parties to register with the BEC. This had not been the case previously. To be allowed to register, all political parties were required to enhance their internal democratic procedures. Specific provisions included establishment of internal election committees, nomination of parliamentary candidates based on the recommendations of committees at grass-roots level and agreeing to fill at least one-third of all party committee seats with women by 2020. Party constitutions were also required to ban affiliated bodies such as student and labour groups. These groups had been involved in partisan violence in the past. The amendments also introduced new transparency requirements for candidate nominations to ensure that ‘clean’ candidates run for seats. Several parties opposed the reforms, but ultimately all the major parties were registered.^[9]

• Ensure timely and transparent accreditation of voter registration observers

Political parties and candidates, domestic civil society groups and international non-governmental and governmental organizations are interested in observing electoral processes, including voter registration. Their engagement in electoral processes may have multiple benefits for the process, including a decrease in manipulation and fraud, and increased credibility of elections. To ensure the professionalism of observers, an EMB should work together with observer organizations to organize joint training courses, thus ensuring that observers are well informed about relevant procedures, operational details, and the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in electoral processes. The guiding reference documents that can be used to strengthen the training of observers are: (a) the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations,^[10] and (b) the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers.^[11]

The Kenyan EMB, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, accredits long-term electoral observer missions ahead of the voter registration process. Following the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007-08, the Krieger Commission found that the poor performance of the Election Commission of Kenya (ECK) contributed to these problems, in part due to the lack of transparency which “leads to the publication of inaccurate and alarming documents on the subject.”[12] To address previous weaknesses, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) set up a new voter registration process, using biometric voter registration equipment. To enhance public confidence in the process, the IEBC invited electoral observation organizations to observe the voter registration processes. Among others, the European Union (EU), The Carter Center and the East African Community (EAC) accredited long-term observers (LTOs) to observe biometric voter registration.^[13] Before the deployment of LTOs, accredited organizations conducted meetings with key electoral stakeholders, including the police, civil society organizations and the donor community. These pre-assessment meetings allowed the EAC to ‘prepare for the deployment of an election observation mission’ which included 30 LTOs and 25 short-term observers (STOs).^[14]

B.         Improved electoral security

During the registration period, a large number of voter registration centres have to be established. This increases the demand for a security presence and protection. The main electoral actors that need protection include male and especially female electoral officials, election observers, and political party nominees/candidates, as well as vulnerable and marginalized groups. In addition, security arrangements need to be put in place to safeguard electoral facilities and registration materials and equipment while being transported or stored. Security sector agencies may have to deal with ‘no-go zones’ where registration is not taking place because of lack of security.^[15]

• Establish and maintain close security coordination between different SSAs and with an EMB during the voter registration period through a joint electoral operations centre 

Joint electoral operations centres (JEOCs) combine military-police-civilian communications and coordination centres.^[16] The establishment of a JEOC may serve the purpose of enhanced collaboration between different security sector agencies that share electoral security mandates and an EMB during elections. These centres have been essential in the planning and implementation of electoral security strategies in post-conflict environments where security responsibilities are shared between national and international security stakeholders. Examples of international peacekeepers initiating the formation of JEOCs include Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo and Liberia. This practice may be applicable in a context where international peacekeepers are not present. 

A Joint Registration Taskforce is set up during the voter registration phase ahead of the 2000 municipal elections in Kosovo. After the armed conflict in Kosovo, which saw approximately 12,000 deaths and over 200,000 refugees, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established to govern the province until its future status was determined. Ahead of the 2000 municipal elections, UNMIK and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) had the responsibility for administrating civil and voter registration.^[17] To address registration challenges, UNMIK and the OSCE set up a Joint Registration Taskforce (JRT). With respect to security issues, the JRT involved the NATO-led international Kosovo Force and the international policing component of UNMIK. Additional security was carried out by the Kosovo Police Service which was at the time subordinated to the UNMIK Police.^[18] 

• Provide security to citizens and officials that participate in registration processes and safeguard registration materials and facilities 

Citizens need adequate security guarantees to engage in voter registration.^[19] Not all voter registration centres may face security risks, and the deployment of SSAs should reflect risk levels. When risks are very high and security agencies lack sufficient resources to provide adequate security to all locations, SSAs may work closely with an EMB to organize mobile voter registration centres. These should allow the registration of citizens in high-risk areas while at the same time safeguarding them properly. However, such a decision may create logistical complexities and increase the exposure of election staff and security sector personnel during relocation. If such a decision is taken, it is crucial that the EMB carries out an information campaign stating clearly the dates and times when the mobile voter registration centre will be visiting particular locations. The integrity and transparency of the process must be maintained. It is also important to balance the presence and visibility of security sector agencies. Ideally, they should be visible to the extent sufficient to deter violence, but without scaring potential registrants off.^[20]
Security sector agencies cooperate closely in providing security during voter registration ahead of the 2010 parliamentary election in Iraq. Elections in Iraq are organized in a complex security environment. Security for the voter registration centres (VRCs), governorate electoral offices (GEOs) and sensitive materials (including escorts for convoys transporting materials) was provided by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) throughout the voter registration phase. Ahead of registration, the ISF and field security officers categorized each VRC as a high-, moderate- or low-risk location and deployed protection based on the threat ratings. Protection to the VRCs was provided by the Iraqi police or army or a combination of the two. In terms of coordination, election security was maintained through an Elections High Security Committee composed of the Independent High Election Commission (IHEC), the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Office of the National Security Advisor, the Multi-National Force, and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). On the local level, IHEC field security personnel, located in each GEO and working with other security sector agencies (the Iraqi MoI and MoD liaison officers attached to each GEO), were tasked with planning and implementing security procedures for their GEO and VRCs.^[21]

• Ensure that citizens face no security challenges while travelling to and accessing the voter registration facilities

Some citizens, in particular women and marginalized groups, but also vulnerable groups such as ethnic and religious minorities, IDPs and others, may face increased security challenges in reaching voter registration centres. This may entail exposure to psychological intimidation and physical attack. Strategies for protecting these voters may include increased security on the main routes they use to access the voter registration facilities, or the organization of mobile centres that will bring the voter registration process closer to marginalized and vulnerable groups.

The armed forces and police establish checkpoints to increase security during the 2012 voter registration in the Philippines. Past elections in the Philippines have witnessed numerous incidents in which citizens and candidates were the victims of election-related violence perpetrated by armed groups. During voter registration in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in 2012, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) were tasked with ensuring the safe conduct of the voter registration process that was carried out by the Commission on Elections (Comelec). In coordination with Comelec, security checkpoints, manned by soldiers and police officers, were established to enforce a ban on private individuals carrying guns. This measure was deployed to ‘ensure a safe, peaceful conduct of a region-wide voters’ listing process’. The army also monitored 900 election hot spot areas and movements by partisan groups during the voter registration period in the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao Del Sur, Suli and Twai-Tawi.^[22]

• Provide a safe environment to those seeking nomination

Standing as a political party or independent candidate in elections may, in some countries and social contexts, entail exposure to potential psychological or physical violence perpetrated by political opponents or dominant or majority groups. This is particularly true where women stand as candidates in societies that are traditionally dominated by men or where religious dogmas are abused to suppress equality. Similar challenges may be faced by ethnic and religious minority group candidates or members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. Security sector agencies should gather intelligence and take concrete measures to identify problems and create a safe environment in which all citizens can safely put up their political nomination and participate in the electoral processes.

Security arrangements for candidates put in place ahead of the Philippine mid-term 2013 elections. In 2009, a group of 58 people, heading towards an election office to file a candidacy for the Deputy Mayor of the town of Buluan, were abducted and killed.[23] Ahead of the 2013 elections, the Philippines Commission on Elections (Comelec) issued a resolution that allowed political candidates running for senators’ positions to apply for security personnel or bodyguards. These may be ‘regular members of the national police or the armed forces, or the National Bureau of Investigation, and as augmentation, duly licensed/authorized protective agents of private detective agencies or accredited private security agencies, to provide security, for the duration of the election period’. Candidates for all other local elective positions may, upon application, be authorized to employ, avail themselves of and engage the services of no more than two duly licensed/authorized protective agents of private detective agencies or accredited private security agencies, to act as their security personnel or bodyguards within the duration of the election period.^[24]

The Nigerian Police provide security during political party primaries ahead of the April 2011 general election. Election-related violence has accompanied previous elections in Nigeria. To avoid ‘those who lost out in the primaries ganging-up to cause chaos in the state’,^[25] the Nigerian Police increased security during state and national political party primaries.^[26] During the political party primaries ahead of the 2011 general election, a total of 17,000 security officers were deployed into regular, anti-riot and anti-bomb units. The security provided to venues and the delegates was coordinated by the Nigerian Police, the State Security Services and the National Security and Civil Defence Corps.^[27]

C.         Improved infrastructure for peace

Starting the registration phase will increase the need for extended collaboration among various state and non-state actors which, as part of the national peace architecture, work to support peaceful elections. In particular, collaboration with the EMB and SSAs will gain new impetus. Obtaining accreditation to monitor electoral processes may be a first step that CSOs should focus on. They also need to build communication routines that will allow them to share relevant information and analysis with the EMB and explore the potential to work with it in providing support to dispute resolution. This may include the establishment or promotion of multi-stakeholder collaborative forums where the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence during registration processes can be coordinated.

• Observe voter registration processes and share findings with an EMB

It is well established that observation and monitoring of highly contested processes, such as elections, may have a violence-prevention effect. This is especially true when impartial and reputable stakeholders, domestic or international, do the observation. CSOs should therefore collaborate in ensuring that their observers are accredited to observe voter registration processes. If the observers’ presence is not sufficient to deter violence, they will be able to make a record of incidents that includes details about the perpetrators, victims and circumstances that triggered these incidents. In addition to observing incidents at the voter registration locations, CSOs should engage in the collection of data relating to electoral violence that occurs outside voter registration facilities, and may relate to intimidation, threats and physical violence directed against citizens, political actors, journalists, and so on. It may be particularly useful to disaggregate the data and show to what extent the perpetrators of violence target women registrants, candidates and journalists. The data collected should be shared with relevant stakeholders, including the EMB, law enforcement agencies and other organizations that have a mandate to prevent and mitigate electoral violence or an interest in doing so. In some instances, it may be productive to make these data publicly available through websites or the media.

Domestic CSO observers record incidents of violence and intimidation during the voter registration period ahead of the 2011 Nigerian presidential elections. The Nigerian elections held in 2003 and 2007 were marked by widespread election-related violence. Ahead of the national elections in 2011, Project 2011 Swift Count was initiated. It brought together a consortium of CSOs and religious groups, both Christian and Muslim, to promote peaceful, free and fair elections through independent citizen observation. The objective of the project was to provide all electoral stakeholders, including the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), with independent, non-partisan, comprehensive and detailed information on the conduct of the electoral process. For the voter registration exercise, approximately 1,000 volunteers were trained, accredited and deployed throughout all of Nigeria’s 36 states as well as the Federal Capital Territory. Among other things, observers were requested to record incidents of individuals attempting to disrupt the registration exercise as well as incidents of intimidation and violence. Furthermore, observers were required to make a note of security personnel present at the registration centre. Observers were requested to send their reports on a daily basis using their mobile phones to the National Information Centre where the data were reconciled. The observation and reporting also covered voting operations and vote counting. Throughout the process, Project Swift Count communicated its findings through public reports and statements which included recommendations with the INEC.^[28]

• In collaboration with an EMB, build and provide capacity for dispute resolution relating to the voter registration period

The implementation of voter registration on a large scale may be very challenging. For example, determining citizens’ eligibility to register for voting in a post-conflict environment where record books have been destroyed and people have been displaced on a massive scale may involve exceptional operational and political challenges. Furthermore, voter registration may involve complex procedures that are prone to technical glitches and human error. Voter lists ought to be maintained in a manner that prevents the unlawful or fraudulent registration or removal of persons. But, if crises still arise from the perception that the voter registration process is being manipulated in order to disenfranchise particular individuals or groups, it is important to address them in a timely and effective fashion. Where electoral justice institutions lack capacity to deal with electoral disputes effectively, or they enjoy little trust among political actors, it may be beneficial to promote the use of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in the management of disputes relating to voter registration. This is not to replace electoral justice institutions, but rather to open up additional channels that can produce outcomes that will be accepted. In some instances, mediation by reputable and knowledgeable individuals will resolve the matter instantly and avoid the sometimes long and complicated processes that will lead to an administrative or judicial ruling. Engagement of non-state actors in the mediation of electoral disputes should always be done with the consent of, and in collaboration with, the EMB and backed by relevant legislation.

• Promote multi-stakeholder collaboration through joint forums that create space for discussion and coordination of violence prevention during voter registration

Improved coordination during the voter registration phase between non-state and state actors which work to support peaceful elections will help non-state and state actors to build an understanding about the efforts and strategies of individual organizations in this regard. This information will be useful in ensuring that different organizations cooperate in such a way that they reinforce each other, and that possible gaps are identified and addressed. If such collaborative forums have not already been established by an EMB or other state actors, or do not include non-state participants, non-state actors may take the initiative to establish and maintain such forums. In that case, they should involve the EMBs and SSAs in discussions.

Electoral campaigning

During the election campaign phase, political parties mobilize significant human and financial resources to communicate messages to citizens to win their support. The list of potential risks during the campaign period is wide-ranging and may include psychological and physical violence directed against candidates, party activists and supporters, and violence directed against women and other marginalized or vulnerable groups. In particular, the electoral campaign may be marked by aggressive and inflammatory rhetoric. The use of the media and political rallying are two main ways of campaigning. In conflict-prone societies, both methods are often used to convey messages that exacerbate conflicts. During the electoral campaign period, an EMB should introduce mechanisms to constrain hate speech and violent actions by political parties and their supporters. This may include investigating and sanctioning perpetrators. Security sector agencies should maintain a safe environment for political party and independent candidates, activists and citizens to organize and participate in the campaign activities. Other non-state and state actors should promote peaceful and democratic electoral campaigning as well as monitoring, recording and reporting about incidents.

Table 5. Electoral campaigning
A. Improved electoral management and justice	B. Improved electoral security	C. Improved infrastructure for peace
Collaborate with other agencies to ensure comprehensive monitoring of media (including social media) campaigning at the national and sub-national level. Establish mechanisms for the monitoring of political party campaign rallies in order to compile data on the use of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech. Ensure that those responsible for violations of the campaigning rules and the instigation or perpetration of electoral violence are sanctioned. Maintain close collaboration and information exchange with the security sector agencies throughout the campaign period at the national and sub-national level.	Maintain close cooperation and coordination with EMBs through a joint election operations centre. Provide physical security to prominent electoral actors which may face security threats during the campaign period. Provide physical security at electoral campaigning events. Enhance security arrangements to protect marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women and minorities, during the campaigning phase. Cooperate with electoral actors and the broader public to increase their security awareness and promote their constructive engagement in preventing and mitigating electoral violence.	Create forums to facilitate discussion and consensus relating to the implementation of the political party campaigning code of conduct and enforcement mechanisms. Promote peace activism at the national and sub-national levels to deflate tensions and conflicts arising from inflammatory campaigning. Establish structures and mechanisms for monitoring and reporting on provocative political party campaigning in the media and political party rallies. Share reports on violations of campaigning rules, in particular the use of inflammatory language and hate speech, with the EMBs, prosecutor’s office, security sector agencies and media.

 

 

A. Improved electoral management and justice 

Electoral management strategies to prevent election-related violence during the campaigning period will draw on legal provisions that define an EMB’s mandate in this respect. An EMB may have a specific mandate to investigate and sanction those who violate election campaign rules or perpetrate electoral violence during this period. Where an EMB does not have a specific mandate to investigate and sanction perpetrators, it should support the responsible agencies in implementing their mandate. In any case, an EMB will collaborate with other actors to put in place mechanisms that will ensure that incidents are observed and documented, and that perpetrators are held accountable.

• Collaborate with other agencies to ensure comprehensive monitoring of media campaigning at the national and sub-national level

 

Political actors use media extensively during the campaigning period. They strive to occupy media space through paid advertisements, party press releases, and giving interviews to the media. In addition, political parties increasingly use the Internet and social media to reach citizens and promote their political agenda. From the media side, journalists can be proactive in reporting on campaign events and in facilitating political debates. In conflict-prone societies, especially where political divisions follow ethnic and religious lines, political campaigning may be negative. Hate speech and intimidation are often directed against political opponents and their supporters. The electoral legislation usually includes provisions that prohibit such behaviour and define sanctions against perpetrators. It is therefore important to ensure systematic monitoring of campaigning through the media, both traditional and social, and the sanctioning of those who resort to unlawful campaigning. Media monitoring may be a complex task that exceeds the capacity of an EMB or other existing institutions. Where this is the case, an EMB should coordinate with different agencies to ensure full coverage of the media campaigning including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private businesses that specialize in media monitoring. This will provide the EMB or the agencies with the mandate to sanction, with the evidence for holding perpetrators accountable.

The establishment of an EMB Media Monitoring Unit in Guyana addresses violence related to irresponsible media reporting. In response to the election-related violence that occurred in Guyana’s 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections—instigated in part by the ‘conduct of irresponsible media which incited extremist elements to ethically motivated violence’—the Guyana Election Commission (GECOM) established an Independent Media Monitoring Unit (MMU). The unit was established following the signing of the self-regulatory Media Code of Conduct by the country’s main media houses. During the campaign phase, 17 people were recruited to the MMU to ‘analyze the political content of broadcast news and current affairs programs and of the main daily newspapers’. After initial support and training by the Commonwealth Secretariat, local professionals were in charge of the process. On a weekly basis, the MMU published ‘assessments of the balance and discouragement of violence achieved by each media house’. In contrast to previous elections, the 2006 general election in Guyana witnessed no violent incidents because of irresponsible media reporting.^[1]

• Establish mechanisms for the monitoring of political party campaign rallies in order to compile data on the use of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech

Political party rallies involve mass gatherings of the party leadership and supporters. They therefore represent high-risk events. On the one hand, violence can be directed against the participants at rallies. On the other hand, participants can resort to violence against other groups as a result of a mob mentality and the excitement that is generated during the actual event. An EMB should, independently or in collaboration with other state and non-state actors, establish mechanisms for monitoring political party rallies. This may entail the deployment of campaign monitors to attend political party rallies and report on incidents. Systematic monitoring may discourage inflammatory rhetoric. Audio and video recording of electoral events may further discourage negative campaigning, given that these records may be used as an evidence against the perpetrators.

The Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina prepares to sanction politicians for hate speech. Following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord, which ended the violent conflict that had raged from 1992 to 1995, ethnicity has played a major role in political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In an effort to win voters along ethnic lines, ethnic political parties have been inclined to use nationalistic rhetoric which is directed against other ethnic groups or minorities. Ahead of the 2008 local elections, the Central Election Commission (CEC) warned all political parties and candidates not to incite religious or ethnic hatred during the campaign period. Penalties for hate speech included USD 7,500 fines, the removal of candidates from the party list and the withdrawal of political certification by the CEC.^[2] This prompted the improved monitoring of political party campaigning and reporting of hate-speech incidents to the CEC.

• Ensure that those responsible for violations of the campaigning rules and the instigation or perpetration of electoral violence are sanctioned

Perpetrators of actions that may trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence, including hate speech and inflammatory rhetoric, should not feel that they have impunity from prosecution. If an EMB is mandated to sanction perpetrators, it needs to invest in efforts to deter unlawful campaigning and, if deterrence fails, to take resolute action to investigate and sanction perpetrators. When applying sanctions against political stakeholders, an EMB or other electoral justice institution must maintain the highest professional standards in order to avoid politicized decisions that can further increase tensions. In this respect, an EMB should work with other agencies, including the prosecutor’s office and relevant regulatory agencies.

The Election Commission of India finds a candidate guilty of violating the Code of Conduct during the 2009 general election campaign. This was also the case during the 2009 general elections, which saw incidents of both physical and psychological election-related violence.^[3] In early 2009, the Election Commission of India (ECI) found one high-profile candidate guilty of violating the code of conduct during the campaign period. The candidate allegedly used inflammatory rhetoric, causing ‘feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes on the ground of religion’ during two separate election rallies.^[4] The evidence was brought to the notice of the ECI by the District Election Officer.^[5] The ECI ordered all video footage of the candidate’s campaign to be submitted as evidence. Based on this evidence, the ECI advised the political party concerned to withdraw its support for the candidate, stating that ‘any sponsorship of his candidature by the party would be perceived as endorsing his unpardonable acts of inciting violence and creating feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes of citizens in India’.^[6] The ECI also initiated a criminal case against the candidate under Indian law by cooperating with the District Magistrate. The candidate was later arrested and taken into judicial custody awaiting trial.^[7]

• Maintain close collaboration and information exchange with the security sector agencies throughout the campaign period at the national and sub-national level

During the campaign period an EMB will collect wide-ranging information relating to political party campaigning, including tension-raising behaviour and incidents. This information will be useful to SSAs when planning and implementing security measures to protect electoral actors and events during the campaign period and after. It is important that election officials collaborate closely with the security personnel at the national and sub-national level to ensure that the information is shared in timely fashion. Election officials will benefit from security updates and specific information provided by the security sector agencies. This will help officials from both agencies to obtain a more holistic analysis and maximize the effectiveness of their actions.

The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission of Kenya shares information and risk alerts with the police during the 2013 general election campaign. Election-related violence was widespread throughout the 2007 general election in Kenya.^[8] Although the main outbreak of election-related violence took place after the actual 2007 elections, incidents of violence were also recorded before election day, including during the campaign phase.^[9] In the course of the preparations for the 2013 general elections, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) decided to enhance its capacity to understand and analyse electoral risks, and to take action to prevent and mitigate election-related violence throughout the electoral cycle. The IEBC partnered with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in using the Electoral Risk Management Tool. The use of the tool allowed the IEBC to collect electoral risk data and generate electoral risk alerts. These were used by IEBC officials to make informed and conflict-sensitive electoral decisions. Also, risk data and alerts were shared with external agencies, including the police^[10] and other electoral stakeholders, such as the Uwiano Platform for Peace.^[11]

 B. Improved electoral security

During the electoral campaign phase, security sector agencies will be responsible for providing and maintaining a safe environment for electoral officials, political party candidates, party activists, journalists, event monitors and citizens. This may include providing protection to individuals, events, and vulnerable groups and their settlements. In particular, SSAs should focus on the security of electoral campaigning events that will gather large numbers of participants, such as political party rallies. In this respect, SSAs will benefit from close cooperation with an EMB and other state and non-state actors.

• Maintain close cooperation and coordination with an EMB through a joint election operations centre

Following the process of registration of political parties and candidates, SSAs need to work closely with an EMB to obtain information on registered political subjects and candidates. Furthermore, EMBs will be able to provide information and updates relating to the electoral campaign processes. This information, in particular incidents of hate speech and inflammatory language, will be relevant in the deployment of security personnel during the electoral campaigning. The establishment of a Joint Electoral Operations Centre (JEOC) that provides a platform for close-to-real-time information exchange between different security sector agencies and an EMB may improve situation awareness and improve coordination of actions.

Joint security coordinating centres are established ahead of the 2010 elections in the Philippines’ Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Political and election-related violence in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is prevalent and deeply rooted.^[12] In late 2009, politicians and political party supporters, including large numbers of women, travelling to Commission on Elections (Comelec) offices were intercepted and abducted or killed by armed gangs.^[13] As a result, the Philippine National Police (PNP) and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), in close cooperation with Comelec, enhanced security arrangements in the run-up to the 2010 elections. Comelec deputized law enforcement agencies to perform security duties relating to the conduct of the elections.^[14] Regional police offices strengthened ‘their respective Joint Security Coordinating Centers (JSCC) with the AFP field commander to immediately address any untoward incidents during the campaign period’. Throughout Mindanao, the PNP and the AFP ‘mobilized 9,711 personnel, many of which were deployed to man the 828 mobile checkpoints established to enforce a total region-wide ban on firearms. Moreover, the PNP was also tasked with preventing private security companies from acting as armies for political stakeholders ahead of the elections, as well monitoring the actions of local volunteer security personnel. Round-the-clock close coordination with the officials of Comelec was also implemented.^[15] According to the PNP and AFP, the elections were generally peaceful and orderly, and ‘minor incidents were quickly addressed by the Joint Security Coordinating Centers (JSCC) positioned at various strategic places in the three regions’.^[16]

• Provide physical security to prominent electoral actors which may face security threats during the campaign period

Depending on the country context and the security risks associated with running for an elective seat, security sector agencies may need to provide physical protection to political leaders or high-profile political candidates, their offices or households. In societies where women are marginalized, their activism during the campaigning period may expose them to psychological or physical violence. Furthermore, similar security arrangements may need to be put in place for journalists, public opinion leaders and other individuals whose engagement or activism during the electoral campaign increases the likelihood of their being exposed to violence.

Security sector agencies protect presidential candidates during the 2012 presidential elections in Taiwan. Following assassination attempts on high-level politicians during the election periods of 2004 and 2010, security arrangements were stepped up ahead of the 2012 presidential elections. The National Security Bureau (NSB) provided security teams to all presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The NSB special protective task force provided candidates with a protective arrangement following the registration processes. The special task force provided security plans as well as security protocols which, for example, would require the campaign teams to provide lists of their staff and guests at events to the NSB during the campaigning. In total 135 members of the NSB security task force were included in three teams assigned to provide security for each of the three presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Each team was also supported by specially trained police officers and bullet-proof vehicles throughout the campaign period.^[17]

• Provide physical security at electoral campaigning events

Political campaign events and activities include political party rallies, town-hall meetings, media appearances, posting of campaign materials and so on. These events will bring political leaders, candidates, activists, supporters, citizens and journalists to public locations that may not have appropriate security arrangements in place. To provide security, SSAs need to have prior information on planned events. The responsibility for providing timely information about campaign events usually lies with the respective political subjects. In some contexts, the police may have a mandate to authorize or decline requests for the organization of campaign-related events due to security concerns. This may be an effective strategy to avoid conflicts arising from situations where political rallies are scheduled at the same time or at the same location by different political subjects. Political party rallies are mass gatherings and participants may be vulnerable to attacks or acts of terrorism. Securing these events may therefore require the deployment of substantive intelligence and security personnel. If participants are travelling from different locations to attend rallies, SSAs should secure the main routes of travel.

Police provide physical security during high-risk political party rallies in India. Election-related violence is a common issue in India,^[18] especially in areas where separatist movements wish to exploit the ‘visibility of the electoral campaigns to conduct paramilitary and criminal strikes against the government and its symbols’.^[19] Ahead of India’s 2009 general election the police intensified their security arrangements during campaigning in the ‘Maoist belt’ and the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Enhanced security arrangements were necessary as Maoists had increased their attacks in various states ahead of the polling process. The police therefore conducted random searches around the campaigning sites and increased their presence throughout the rallies themselves.^[20] Other security measures included helicopter transport to take candidates to and from the election rally sites and police roadblocks in the vicinity of election rally sites throughout the campaign period. Moreover, increased security was provided by the Border Security Force along the border with Pakistan.^[21] Enhanced security measures were put into place since the ‘model code of conduct for the guidance of political parties and candidates’, which was endorsed by all political parties in 2007, stipulates that all political parties or candidates must inform the local police of the venue and time for all political party rallies and routes to be used during a procession ‘well in time in order for the police to make necessary arrangements for controlling traffic and maintaining the peace’.^[22]

• Enhance security arrangements to protect marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women and minorities, during the campaigning phase

In an effort to galvanize their electoral base during the electoral campaign period, political actors may resort to threats and intimidation and use inflammatory rhetoric directed against other ethnic, religious or social groups. Hate speech and other inflammatory rhetoric may lead to physical violence. Intimidation and coercion are also recognized as a category of election-related violence that deserves sanctioning. When violence occurs, marginalized groups such as women suffer greatly. Minorities and other vulnerable groups can be targeted as well. If the electoral campaign period is marred by inflammatory rhetoric, SSAs should put in place standing capacities for the protection of marginalized and vulnerable communities. This may be particularly important in situations where political party rallies or other mass gatherings may turn hostile to minority communities based near the location of a rally.

Women candidates are given security protection during the Kenyan general elections in 2013. Approximately 20 female political party candidates were assaulted during the run-up to the 2007 general election in Kenya.^[23] Furthermore, women in general were exposed to high levels of violence during the post-election period, lasting until 2008, which resulted in over 1,300 deaths and approximately 3,000 cases of rape.^[24] Ahead of the 2013 general elections, security for female candidates was increased by the setting up of a specially trained security unit. The unit, consisting of officers from the National Youth Service, the Kenya Forest Service and the Kenya Wildlife Service, were first gazetted by the Inspector General of the Police and then deployed across the country to deal with election-related matters, including providing female candidates with security during the campaigns and guarding women candidates on election day.

• Cooperate with electoral actors and the broader public to increase their security awareness and promote their constructive engagement in preventing and mitigating electoral violence

The efficiency of the security sector agencies (SSAs) in maintaining safety during the election campaign phase may depend on their ability to forge constructive relationships with electoral actors and the broader public. SSAs should initiate discussions that will increase the security awareness of political stakeholders and the public, in particular vulnerable groups. The benefits can be twofold. On the one hand, such discussions will allow SSAs to communicate how individuals and groups can work with the police to increase public security. On the other hand, SSAs will get a better understanding of security concerns among different electoral actors and social groups. Electoral actors and the broader public will benefit from an enhanced understanding of the security risks and of how their actions and behaviour may exaggerate security threats or contribute to peaceful outcomes of tense situations.

The police cooperate with electoral actors to broaden general security awareness ahead of the 2012 general elections in Ghana. In 2012, Ghana experienced some election-related violence in certain parts of the country during the voter registration phase, including assaults, shootings and arson.^[25] As a result, the Ghana Police Service (GPS) cooperated with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and several other stakeholders to organize a public ‘peacemakers rally’. The event, held at the National Theatre in Accra, was attended by several hundred people. The GPS together with the Ghana Journalists Association made a public declaration of their commitment to peace ahead of the 2012 elections. The GPS address also aimed to broaden the public’s security awareness ahead of the campaign period. On this occasion, a senior police official assured Ghanaians that the police and other security agencies were ready to provide security to ensure peaceful elections. The public was informed about security arrangements put in place to protect political party rallies, electoral materials, facilities and voters, as well as to preserve the integrity of the elections. It also underlined that preserving peace is a shared responsibility and politicians were admonished to promote peace during the electoral campaign, avoid the use of hate speech or insults and to be aware that their utterances could spark tension or violence.^[26] Police announced plans to establish the National Election Security Taskforce and train 16,000 personnel from all the security agencies to provide security during the elections. Ghanaians were encouraged to contribute to peaceful political processes and to avoid comments, statements and insults that would incite others. They were also advised to abstain from violence even in the face of provocation, and to use legal channels instead of taking the law into their hands. Finally, voters were advised not to give their voter IDs to others, not to destroy ballot papers or supply ballot papers to any person or engage in other malpractices.^[27]

C. Improved infrastructure for peace

Non-state and state actors involved in peace activism can play an important role during the campaigning phase. Provocative campaigning may exacerbate tensions between different social groups and raise anxieties particularly among vulnerable groups. Organizations that constitute a countrywide infrastructure for peace may engage in activism which will constrain provocative campaigning and deflate interparty or inter-communal tensions during the campaign period.

• Create forums to facilitate discussion and consensus relating to the implementation of the political party campaigning code of conduct and enforcement mechanisms

The code of conduct for political party campaigning can be a key tool to promote peace during the campaigning phase. These provisions may already be included in the electoral law or a specific code of conduct that regulates the behaviour of political parties and during elections. However, where such provisions do not exist, or are not respected and enforced, these commitments need to be established and enforced. Reputable non-state and state actors may have a convening power to bring political parties together to discuss and agree the principles of peaceful electoral campaigning and the effective enforcement mechanisms.

A civil society organization promotes the adoption of and adherence to the campaigning code of conduct during the 2012 national elections in Ghana. Although the Political Party Code of Conduct (CoC) was first adopted in 2000, lack of an enforcement mechanism resulted in non-compliance and political parties’ misconduct throughout the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections. Ahead of the 2012 national elections, the Institute of Political Party Affairs (IEA) facilitated a series of interparty dialogue meetings to revise and strengthen the CoC enforcement mechanisms. The revision of the CoC was in part based on experience, such as the use of hate speech and unsavoury language during the voter registration period, and on the realization that preventative action needed to be taken to prevent or mitigate ‘irresponsible political conduct or activity’.^[28] The new CoC, adopted by all political parties, set out the guidelines for responsible campaigning, and covered a broad range of issues including abuse of incumbency, defacing of posters, biased media reporting and campaign violence. The IEA, with the approval of the political parties, established a National Enforcement Body (NEB) to monitor political parties’ adherence to the CoC ahead of the general elections. The NEB was composed of members representing the Electoral Commission, the National Commission for Civic Education, the Ghana Journalists Association, the security services and political parties, and chaired by the Ghana National Peace Council. The NEB is also tasked with educating the electorate and political party supporters on the provisions of the code.^[29] The establishment of one national and ten regional enforcement bodies was intended to increase the capacity to monitor campaigns, rallies and other political party activities throughout the country, investigate alleged incidents and impose sanctions on those in breach of the CoC. The NEB was also able to publish its investigation findings in newspapers and on the air waves, thereby naming and shaming party offenders.^[30] In the case of serious offences, security sector agencies and other state bodies were alerted for appropriate action to be taken.^[31]

• Promote peace activism at the national and sub-national levels to deflate tensions and conflicts arising from inflammatory campaigning

Civil society organizations, including women’s and youth groups, religious networks and interest groups, may play an important role in promoting peace during the campaigning period. They can engage in activism and involve political representatives, state officials and traditional leaders in addressing anxieties that emerge from provocative party campaigning. Peace campaigning strategies should clearly define the target audience (e.g. young people) and the communication mechanisms (e.g. the media, roadshows), messages and symbols used.^[32] Strategies implemented at the community level, such as the use of community-based radio stations, will have the potential to reach all citizens, including vulnerable groups, and to bridge language barriers.^[33] Peace campaigning should promote tolerant political debates and seek public commitments by politicians in support of peaceful elections.^[34]

The business community launches a peace campaign in Kenya ahead of the 2013 general elections. Due to the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–2008, the Kenyan economy suffered losses estimated at USD 3.7 billion. For that reason, the Kenyan business community, the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (Kepsa), launched a peace campaign ahead of the 2013 general elections. The initiative, supported by numerous civil society and faith-based organizations, aims to prevent violence during general elections in 2013. The peace initiative dubbed ‘My Kenya’ was launched with the beginning of the formal political party campaign period. My Kenya includes the use of media advertisement, road shows and concerts to remind Kenyans to reject violence before and after election day. Kenya’s corporate organizations provide most of the funding needed to implement campaign activities, which amounts to over USD 4.6 million.^[35]

• Establish mechanisms for monitoring and reporting on provocative political party campaigning in the media and political party rallies

To reach out to citizens, parties, mobilize candidates, members and supporters in an effort to occupy spaces through which political messages can be sent to voters. Electoral campaigning is mainly done (a) through the traditional media, including newspapers, radio and television; (b) through new media, including social networks and blogs; and (c) in person, through political party rallies. In conflict-prone societies, campaigning strategies may appeal to fears and emotions, or resort to intimidation. The media can also contribute to provocative campaigning by favouring particular political options and working against their competitors and supporters, which may include intimidation. Even if the use of inflammatory rhetoric is defined as an election offence in the electoral and media codes of conduct, gathering information and evidence relating to provocative campaigning and intimidation may be a challenge. In some cases, political parties will be watchful and report incidents involving their political opponents or media. However, in conflict-prone societies, it may be effective if a reputable non-state or state actor, without a stake in the electoral outcome, monitors and reports such incidents. These actors may include media regulatory agencies and civil society groups that specialize in media reporting or have the capacity to observe local media and political party rallies at national and sub-national level.

Civil society groups engage in media monitoring ahead of the 2010 elections in Sudan. The 2010 general elections were a milestone in implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the 22-year-long conflict there. During the period leading up to the 2010 general elections, the Sudan Media and Elections Consortium (SMEC), made up of six national and international organizations with experience in media support,^[36] monitored and reported on equal access to the media and the use of hate speech during the electoral campaign. The SMEC conducted both quantitative and qualitative media monitoring, providing detailed information on the allocation of air time given to political parties, media impartiality and incidents of hate speech by the various newspapers, radio and TV channels or political parties interviewed by the media. The SMEC’s final report, which covers media reporting from the campaign up until the post-electoral phase, also included recommendations on specific provisions for the media and other agencies to improve equality of access and to reduce incidents of hate speech in the future.^[37]

The Indonesian Election Oversight Body (Bawaslu), the General Elections Commission (KPU) and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology hold a roundtable on and coordinate a response to the spread of fake news and hate speech in preparation for June 2018 regional elections. Building on growing awareness of the link between misinformation and violence in Indonesia, such as deadly protests surrounding the candidacy of then-Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) for the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, a roundtable was held in January 2018 bringing together 28 actors from Bawaslu, KPU, Ministry of Home Affairs, Executive Office of the President and national civil society groups. [38] These representatives were interested in learning about ways to minimize the effects of hate speech and communal incitement. The conversations built on strategies outlined in the white paper “Countering Hate Speech in Elections: Strategies for Electoral Management Bodies”[39] from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and covered topics such as strengthening policy and regulatory frameworks, modelling good behaviour from all electoral actors, speaking out clearly against discrimination and hatred; and monitoring and collecting data on hate speech and resultant violence. This resulted in the January 31, 2018 signing of a memorandum of action between the Bawaslu, KPU and Ministry of Communications and Information Technology to curb fake news and hate speech including coordinating efforts to monitor hoax news and inter-communal incitement in official social media accounts registered by political parties and candidates.[40]

• Share reports on violations of campaigning rules, in particular use of inflammatory language and hate speech, with the EMBs, prosecutor’s office, security sector agencies and media

Collecting evidence on the use of inflammatory rhetoric during an electoral campaign is a complex task. However, it may be of little relevance if those who resort to such rhetoric are not sanctioned. Imposing sanctions on political parties and prosecuting political party candidates during election campaigns may be extremely difficult. If responsible agencies abuse their mandates, or if the prosecution is perceived as action directed against one party or candidate for the benefit of another political actor, it can escalate tensions and lead to deeper conflicts. When reports of unlawful campaigning are collected, they should be forwarded to the relevant body that has the mandate and integrity to investigate and prosecute electoral offences. These may include an EMB, general or special prosecutors, and security sector agencies. In cases where institutions, which are mandated to prosecute electoral offences, show a lack of commitment to sanctioning perpetrators, this information can be presented to the public and other stakeholders through the media, putting pressure on the perpetrators and responsible agencies.

A statutory agency is mandated to monitor and investigate hate speech in Kenya. Following the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–2008, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) was formed with the mandate to promote peaceful coexistence among all Kenyans. During the campaign period ahead of the 2013 general elections, the NCIC monitored political rallies, public forums and traditional media in relation to the use of hate speech and incitements. The 2008 National Cohesion and Integration Act gives the NCIC the power to ‘investigate complaints of ethnic or racial discrimination or any issue affecting ethnic and racial relations and make recommendations to relevant authorities, including the Director of Public Prosecution, on remedial measures. The NCIC has partnered with national telephone providers in order to prevent and mitigate text messages that include hate speech. It has also worked with the Cyber-Crime Unit at the Police Criminal Investigation Department to obtain telephone records of people suspected of sending hate messages from telephone providers. Furthermore, the NCIC monitored use of hate speech on social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as commentaries on news websites. This has been achieved through the employment of 40 staff members tasked with the monitoring of social networking sites. The monitoring also included Kenyans in the diaspora.^[41]

Voting operations

Activities in the voting operations phase include logistical preparations for election day, the ballot casting process, vote counting and tallying of the result. This is the period when the logistical and security arrangements are put to the crucial test. High-level mobilization of the electoral administration, domestic and international observers, and security sector agencies, as well as the massive participation of citizens, makes the management and coordination of voting operations processes a very complex undertaking. Given that the period of time in which voting operations are implemented is relatively short, the time available for intervention and for correcting deficiencies in the process is very limited. If problems are widespread, they may seriously threaten the integrity of the election results. No elections are perfectly organized and trouble-free. However, the extent of the problem and reactions to it may differ. It is therefore important that possible risks are identified in advance and that measures are put in place to ensure that elections are peaceful and that the integrity of election results is preserved. In this respect, EMBs, SSAs and other state and non-state actors must work closely together throughout this sensitive period.

Table 6. Voting operations
A. Improved electoral management and justice	B. Improved electoral security	C. Improved infrastructure for peace
Ensure that all electoral materials are produced in sufficient quantities and delivered in timely fashion and safely to the storage facilities and polling and counting centres. Ensure that polling and counting staff are professional, well trained and acquainted with the latest electoral rules, regulations and procedures. Maintain close collaboration with security sector agencies in relation to the provision of physical security to voting materials, polling and counting staff, and facilities. Ensure that the designated poling and counting locations provide a safe environment for election officials, observers and voters. Ensure that special voting operations start on time and that the process is transparent. Ensure that that all electoral stakeholders are familiar with complaint procedures and that electoral dispute resolution bodies process complaints relating to voting and counting processes in good time and effectively. Establish open communication channels with all electoral stakeholders including political parties, observer organizations and citizens. Ensure that ballot casting, counting and result tallying are implemented according to the rules and regulations, accurately and transparently.	Provide security to electoral actors, materials and locations before, during and after election day. Monitor and analyse developments that may impact on the security situation around election day. Maintain close cooperation and coordination with the EMBs and other agencies through the JEOC. Ensure that security sector interventions are in line with the rules of engagement, and that the use of force is kept to a minimum.	Implement voter information and education activities relating to voting day operations. Compile, share and publicize information relating to electoral risks and violent incidents during the voting operations phase. Observe the voting and counting processes. Initiate or sustain peace initiatives and dispute resolution networks during the voting operations phase.

 

 A.        Improved electoral management and justice

During the voting operations phase, an EMB must undertake all necessary steps to maintain political stakeholders’ trust in the voting processes and their outcomes. In many ways, this may depend on the EMB’s ability to understand how problems or weaknesses related to previous phases may affect voting operations. It is also important to assess the potential for technical problems and electoral fraud to occur. In respect to logistical and technical challenges, an EMB must ensure the timely production and distribution of electoral materials, the presence of well-trained and professional electoral personnel, and transparent and accurate voting, counting and result tallying methods. During this period, an EMB needs to maintain close cooperation with political stakeholders, observers, security sector agencies and citizens. All electoral actors should have the means to communicate concerns to electoral officials at different levels, so that these can be addressed in a timely manner. Also, all electoral actors should have access to effective electoral dispute resolution mechanisms.

•  Ensure that all electoral materials are produced in sufficient quantities and delivered in timely fashion and safely to the storage facilities and polling and counting centres

The production, storage and distribution of election materials may raise controversies. In particular, if sensitive materials, such as ballot papers, voter registers and tabulation sheets, are unaccounted for, this may raise suspicion of electoral manipulation. The production, transport and storage of electoral materials therefore need to be timely, transparent and safeguarded. Sensitive electoral materials may have different security features and serial numbers. However, these features should not compromise the secrecy of the voting. Sensitive materials need to be safeguarded at all times, during both transport and storage, and accessible only to authorized personnel. This needs to be coordinated with the security sector agencies. Observer groups should be able to observe the handling of the sensitive election materials throughout the voting operations phase.

The Nigerian Independent National Election Commission cooperates with other state agencies to ensure the safe storage and transport of electoral materials ahead of the 2012 local elections in Edo State. Election-related violence is a recurring issue during election periods throughout Nigeria.^[1] In 2012, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) cooperated with the Nigerian Central Bank (NCB) and security sector agencies in Edo State to ensure that all electoral materials, including anti-fraud customized ballot papers,^[2] were stored and transported safely ahead of the governorship elections. After the production of electoral materials, they were stored at the NCB. Two days before polling day, electoral materials were moved by armoured vans and with security escorts to Edo State and stored in the branch NCB offices for safe custody. Electoral materials were unloaded by INEC officials and security personnel and observed by accredited party agents and the media. At the time, the INEC offices and officials in Edo State were also provided with increased security by the police, the army and the Civil Defense Corps.^[3] The INEC logistical plans included measures to ensure that voting materials were delivered to the polling stations in a secure manner with the assistance of security personnel. However, due to the limited capacity of the security agencies, INEC’s insistence on delivering materials to polling locations only under the protection of security personnel led to some delay in voting procedures.^[4] The governor in Edo State had to publicly condemn the late start of the election.^[5] However, no major incidents of election-related violence were reported on polling day or during the announcement of the results.^[6]

• Ensure that polling and counting staff are professional, well trained and acquainted with the latest electoral rules, regulations and procedures
  
  During voting operations, a number of temporary staff will be engaged to perform polling and counting duties. Although an EMB may be able to engage staff with prior experience, training for polling and counting personnel needs to be organized. Because the actual voting and counting exercises take place over a very short time, an EMB’s ability to replace polling and counting staff who show lack of understanding of the relevant procedures, or of the integrity or skills to conduct electoral assignments, will be very limited. Following the training of polling station and counting staff, therefore, an EMB should consider testing the trained staff to verify their understanding of the relevant electoral procedures, rules and regulations. This exercise should be conducted in good time to allow for retraining and replacement of the staff.
  
  Large-scale training of poll workers ahead of the 2004 general elections in Indonesia. Indonesia holds the biggest single-day elections in the world. Ahead of the 1999 parliamentary elections, the first democratic elections in 45 years, 2.8 million poll workers were employed by the National Election Commission (KPU) to work at 300,000 polling stations spread across 17,000 islands. Although election day was mostly peaceful, it was described as ‘seriously flawed administratively’ because the poll worker training programme was ‘inconsistent at best, and/or non-existent throughout the country’.^[7] The fear of election-related violence between political parties emerged after violent conflicts involving political parties’ security personnel in 2003. Ahead of the April 2004 legislative election,^[8] 4 million polling staff members were employed to serve 150 million voters expected to vote at 585,000 polling stations. With the technical support of the UNDP, IFES and the Australian Election Commission, the KPU trained poll workers. Due to timing and budgetary constraints, as well as the large number of poll workers mobilized, training was divided into two components, namely (a) a cascade training-of-trainer system, reaching 15 per cent of the poll workers, and (b) publicly aired training videos and radio programmes, quick reference sheets, manuals and booklets designed to train 85 per cent of poll workers. Both the legislative and the presidential elections of 2004 were relatively free of major incidents and irregularities, although some procedural problems with the handling of ballot papers by polling station staff suggested that more training, especially for those managing polling stations, was needed for the future.^[9]
•  Maintain close collaboration with security sector agencies in relation to the provision of physical security to voting materials, polling and counting staff, and facilities
  
  To ensure that security sector agencies can engage in the protection of electoral staff and facilities at the right time and adequately, and prevent violence against actors participating in the voting processes, an EMB should liaise with, and provide relevant data to, SSAs at the earliest opportunity. For this purpose, electoral officials should work closely with security officers at the national and sub-national levels. It may be particularly useful for the chairpersons of polling stations and counting committees to meet with responsible security officers prior to election day in order to inspect the polling/counting locations together and discuss security arrangements. If concerns exist, these should be communicated to the relevant instances in both organizations, so that security arrangements can be strengthened in time.
  
  Formalized collaboration between EMBs, SSAs and the judiciary with respect to security arrangements on election day in India. In India historical social divides have often spilled over into the electoral processes through the use of intimidation and violence. To address these challenges, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has developed a Vulnerability Mapping Tool which formalizes collaboration between EMB officials, SSAs and the judiciary in taking action to analyse, deter and mitigate election-related violence. The Election Commission’s Compendium of Instructions (Instruction SI. No 1) provides the framework for mapping out hot-spot areas ahead of an election as well as the inter-agency coordination efforts needed to prevent intimidation of vulnerable voters.^[10] Ahead of election day, presiding officers are also provided with detailed instructions on security arrangements at polling stations in the form of a handbook provided by the ECI. These instructions include information on the responsibility of the Central Police Force, the Local State Police (LSP) and the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPF) in terms of protecting the polling station perimeter and regulating orderly entry into the polling station. The handbook also makes clear that polling should not start unless the CPF are present. It also points out that the CPF are responsible for (a) escorting the presiding officers and the electronic voting machines (EMVs) to the reception centre after the voting is completed and (b) guarding the ‘strong room’ where the EVMs are stored until the day of the count.^[11]
• Ensure that the designated polling and counting locations provide a safe environment for election officials, observers and voters
  
  When elections are organized in post-conflict or conflict-prone environments, the actual physical location of polling or counting centres may determine the likelihood of election-related violence occurring. It is therefore important to ensure that polling and counting locations provide a safe environment for electoral officials, observers and voters. Some practical considerations are: (a) whether the location is acceptable to all voters; (b) whether it can be associated with historical atrocities and related grievances; (c) whether access roads can be safeguarded; (d) whether it will serve antagonistic groups; (e) whether it is associated with incidents during previous elections; and (f) whether it has sufficient space, lighting and other capacities to facilitate voting and counting and so on. Conflict-sensitive decisions with regard to determining polling and counting locations will consider the potential triggers of conflict in a given geographical and social context.
  
  Security considerations in determining polling station locations in Mauritius. Among criteria for identifying suitable polling stations defined by the Electoral Commissioner’s Office in Mauritius are security conditions. Accordingly, the police are requested to deploy sufficient manpower in order to maintain ‘law and order of each voting station’. Security within the counting locations also includes the safeguarding of sealed ballot boxes ahead of election day as well as for the counting process.^[12]

 

• Ensure that special voting operations start on time and that the process is transparent
  
  Special voting is organized for voters who are unable to cast their ballots at regular polling stations. These categories may include refugees, IDPs, and diaspora voters, as well as voters who are housebound, hospitalized, jailed, or performing military, security, or election services on election day, or are temporarily absent from the country for diplomatic or other reasons. Out-of-country voting (OCV) may be particularly important in countries which have experienced displacements of population as a result of armed conflict. Inclusion of these categories of people in the democratic processes will ensure that they are not deprived of their voting rights. However, it is very difficult to ensure that OCV processes are transparent. In many cases, out-of-country voters will vote at special polling stations abroad, such as consular offices, and by post. In such cases, political parties may find that observation of these processes is too difficult. It may therefore be of great importance to organize OCV in cooperation with international organizations that can support the impartiality of the processes.
  
  Out-of-country voting during the run-up to the 2009 national and provincial elections in South Africa. Elections in South Africa are organized in a highly contested environment with some social tensions and conflicts. Conflict sensitivity is therefore an important aspect of electoral management. In 2009 the Constitutional Court ruled that South Africans living abroad would be entitled to cast their ballot during the 2009 national and provincial elections.^[13] In total, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of South Africa approved 18,855 of the 20,350 notifications for out-of-country voting (OCV). One week before election day, 9,857 voters cast their vote in 123 South African missions across the globe. The head of each mission was appointed special voting officer and the staff of the mission were tasked with administering voting procedures. Also, 2,457 votes were cast at foreign missions by government officials and their families. The ballot papers were then sent to the IEC national office in Pretoria before election day. The registration details of voters who had cast special votes (using a double envelope system) were checked against the electoral register to ensure that only eligible voters’ ballot papers were considered. This reconciliation process was undertaken in the presence of political party agents and election observers. Thereafter, the ballot paper was placed in the relevant ballot box to be counted, again in the presence of party agents and election observers.^[14]

 

• Ensure that all electoral stakeholders are familiar with complaint procedures and that electoral dispute resolution bodies process complaints relating to voting and counting processes in good time and effectively
  
  The voting operations period may see many electoral complaints filed by political actors. When the legal deadlines for the announcement of the preliminary and final election results are short, timely processing of electoral complaints may be difficult. Electoral justice mechanisms must therefore have sufficient capacity to process large numbers of complaints in a short period, while at the same time maintaining high professional standards and integrity. To ensure that election complaints (sometimes referred to as election petitions) are filed with the relevant electoral dispute resolution authority, EMBs should work with political actors to make them familiar with the complaint procedures.
  
  Electoral dispute and complaint management during the 2009 national and provincial elections in South Africa. The pre-election phase ahead of the 2009 elections in South Africa saw clashes between political parties in some provinces.^[15] The country has established an Electoral Court, which has the status of a Supreme Court. Its powers include, among others, the review of any decision of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) relating to an electoral matter as well as matters relating to the interpretation of any law or any other matter for which appeal is provided in law. In total, 867 formal complaints were lodged with the IEC, 200 of which came directly from political parties. None of these complaints were eventually referred to the Electoral Court. Using an Issue Tracker Application, the IEC was able to refer complaints to the relevant department for prompt resolution. The outcome was then communicated to the complainant.^[16] Nine formal complaints relating to voting and counting procedures were submitted to the IEC by three political parties before the election results were announced. After reviewing the individual complaints, the IEC notified the political parties that it did not find any major irregularities concerning the voting operations. No appeal process was initiated by the political parties to the Electoral Court.^[17] Also, through the Conflict Management Program, which deployed 107 trained mediators throughout the county, complaints were dealt with on election day relating to long queues or delays or insufficient ballot papers.^[18]

 

• Establish open communication channels with all electoral stakeholders including political parties, observer organizations and citizens

An EMB will face an increased workload during the voting period. This will include extensive decision-making, coordination of field activities, and resolving urgent logistical, technical or legislative challenges. However, it is important that the EMB remains available for cooperation and exchange with political stakeholders, observer groups and citizens during the voting operations phase. In this respect, an EMB should encourage frequent meetings of political party liaison committees, organize briefings for observers and journalists, and open voter hotlines to improve exchange with citizens. In particular, hotlines will enable it to provide voters with personal information while also learning about perceptions of, and satisfaction with, its own work.

The Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa establishes and maintains communication with political party liaison committees during the 2009 elections. Ahead of the 2009 national and provincial elections, incidents of election-related violence occurred during political party gatherings in KwaZulu-Natal province.^[19] The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) met formally with the National Party Liaison Committees (PLCs), which are a permanent consultative structure, 30 times between April 2008 and April 2009. During this time, the PLCs raised ‘matters of concern’ or made ‘recommendations on electoral processes’ to the IEC. The meetings also served as a forum in which the IEC could ‘inform and consult’ the PLCs on specific activities. In particular, the PLCs (in the national, provincial and local spheres of government) were consulted when the IEC was considering (a) changes to existing legislation; (b) the electoral timetable; (c) boundaries of electoral districts and the locations of polling stations; and (d) the recruitment of presiding officers, among other things. Through the PLCs, political parties were available for consultation with the IEC during the voting operations phase, as they were situated in the Results Operation Centre.^[20] Furthermore, the PLCs served as a valuable conflict-resolution mechanism between parties to resolve interparty disputes without going to court.^[21]

The Election Commission of India opens call centres for citizens’ complaints during the 2011 legislative assembly elections. Incidents of election-related violence are common and widespread in India, especially on election day.^[22] As a result, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has established a complaints mechanism for citizens. Ahead of election day, the state chief electoral officers are required to set up mechanisms to register complaints by voters. These may include websites and toll-free call centres supervised by election officials. Once the complaint is registered, action will be taken within a defined time frame. The complainants will be informed via SMS, through the website or by the call centre operators about action taken.^[23] Ahead of the 2011 legislative assembly election in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, the State Chief Electoral Officer opened a call centre in each district. Citizens were encouraged to report electoral malpractice such as the distribution of money, liquor or arms to voters.^[24]

• Ensure that ballot casting, counting and result tallying are implemented according to the rules and regulations, accurately and transparently
  
  Many aspects of polling, counting and result tallying can go wrong. Some very common problems include delayed distribution of materials; missing, insufficient or unaccounted-for materials; voters arriving who are not found in the electoral registers; prolonged voting time; disputes and conflicts involving voters and political party and civil society observers, as well as polling station committee staff; procedural confusion; counting mismatches; threats of violence and violent incidents inside or outside the polling stations; the destruction of sensitive voting materials; and so on. If there are problems with the voting and counting processes, an EMB will only have a narrow window of time to address problems, correct deficiencies or resolve disputes on the spot. Its success may depend on an EMB’s contingency planning, agility, mediation skills and credibility. Detailed records of events from the polling stations, including complaints from observers, will help in resolving voting and counting appeals more effectively. 
  
  B.         Improved electoral security
  
  During the voting operations phase, security sector agencies must take all necessary steps to ensure that elections are conducted in a peaceful environment in which all electoral actors feel safe, and where electoral materials and facilities are well protected. In practical terms, SSAs will need to ensure that sensitive electoral materials are safeguarded while in storage facilities, during transport, and during the actual voting and counting. Furthermore, SSAs will need to ensure that all electoral actors feel protected. Safety should not be limited to the immediate surroundings of polling centres but should include access roads and other public spaces. Due to the large number of polling and counting locations on election day, this may stretch the human and material capacities of security sector agencies. SSAs will therefore benefit from collaboration with an EMB and other state and non-state actors in terms of understanding where to focus their efforts and resources. While performing election security duties, police officers must maintain the highest professional standards and keep the use of force to a minimum.

 

• Provide security to electoral actors, materials and locations before, during and after election day
  
  In the period before, during and after elections, security sector agencies have the mandate and responsibility to provide security to electoral actors, materials and locations. Personal protection arrangements for political party candidates, electoral officials and journalists who face increased security threats should be extended throughout the voting operations phase. Other arrangements may include the provision of security to electoral officials and observers in high-risk areas. Security arrangements for voters should ensure that they feel safe to cast their ballots. Access roads to polling locations need to be safe. In the event of incidents and technical problems on election day, SSAs need to be able to maintain control of the situation and protect electoral officials, offices and vulnerable groups which may be targeted by perpetrators of electoral violence. From the moment the sensitive electoral materials are produced, SSAs need to ensure that these materials are safely stored and protected during the voting and counting.
  
  Protecting electoral actors and locations before and during the 2011 local elections in Colombia. In the run-up to the 2011 local elections, more than three dozen candidates were assassinated. This included 15 mayoral candidates and 26 people running for seats in town and city councils.^[25] Approximately one month ahead of election day, the police activated security protocols for 72 municipalities identified as high-risk. Candidates residing in these municipalities received exceptional protection by security sector agencies before and during election day.^[26] On election day itself, the military and the police mobilized 300,000 servicemen across the country as part of a government-led security initiative called Operation Democracy which aimed to ‘protect the right to elect and be elected’.^[27] This included the deployment of 165,000 officers at over 85,000 polling stations. Reserves were deployed across the country. ‘As part of these efforts, the Strategic Police Information Center (CIEP) was created to coordinate the police deployment, provide public information, and to ensure the safety of voters. The National Police Information System of Plan Democracy (SIPDE) has also been created to gather information and to provide protection for official websites which contain sensitive information.’^[28] In the city of Bogota, the police also invoked a 30-hour gun ban around election day. The high level of security was deemed appropriate in order to protect candidates and civilian voters from organized criminal groups and non-state armed actors such as FARC (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) who threatened to destabilize the electoral process.^[29]
  A mobile security arrangement is put in place to safeguard the 14-days-long polling process during the 2012 general election in Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinean elections are often marred by incidents. These include intimidation of voters and electoral officials by candidates and their supporters through the use of firearms, the hijacking of ballot papers and boxes, the stuffing of ballot boxes, and the destruction of private and public property. For these reasons, over 8,000 police, army and correctional officers and Australian defence personnel were enlisted to provide security for 4,700 polling stations, out of which 1,700 were only accessible by air. Due to complexities related to security and logistical challenges, elections in Papua New Guinea are conducted over a 14-day period. The process is coordinated by an inter-agency coordination body, chaired by the Chief Secretary to the government. The security arrangements put in place ensure that sufficient security capacities are deployed in the region where elections take place. Thus, half of 8,000 security personnel were deployed in the highlands provinces a few days before the election. When the polling was completed, they were transferred to the next province where polling was scheduled.^[30] 
• Monitor and analyse developments that may impact on the security situation around election day

A deterioration of the security situation during the voting operations phase, in particular with the approach of election day, represents a major challenge to security sector agencies. Security actors need to monitor events and adjust their contingency planning to reflect changing realities. In particular, they need to develop a good understanding of the areas where election-day problems, such as technical hiccups or perceptions of rigging, may trigger violent reactions. In addition to establishing a security presence to counter violence, they should share such information with an EMB to ensure that risks are managed through improved electoral management and justice.

Ghanaian security sector agencies watch for early warning signs ahead of 2008 elections Numerous incidents of election-related violence took place in northern Ghana ahead of the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections.^[31] Violent incidents included attacks on journalists during the voter registration period as well as shootings during political party gatherings.^[32] In response to these incidents, members of the security sector agencies, which included the police, the military, customs and immigration, established a ‘coordinated security strategy under the unified command of the Inspector General of Ghana’s police force’. Security personnel cooperated with ‘other electoral stakeholders to watch for early warning signs of violence and take steps to address potential flash points’.^[33] In total the Ghana Police Service identified 1,399 hot spots that could see unrest during the election. Areas varied from specific villages to entire districts.^[34] A National Elections Security Task Force (NESTF) was also established to provide operational capacity for swift action with respect to election-related threats and acts of violence.^[35] This was further operationalized through the deployment of regional security task forces responsible for election security^[36] and a dedicated polling station communications network.^[37] 

• Maintain close cooperation and coordination of responses with the EMBs and other agencies through the JEOC

During the voting operations phase, security sector agencies need to establish and maintain an operational centre where information from different security agencies, the electoral management body and other relevant organizations can be gathered and analysed and prevention or mitigation actions initiated. Whenever possible, strategies to address increased risks and incidents should include multi-layered approaches to conflict resolution, for example, peace building, negotiations, conflict mediation and so on. Joint Electoral Operations Centres provide a good working platform to operationalize and coordinate conflict prevention and mitigation during elections.

A coordinated security response provided by National Joint Operational Centres before, during and after the 2011 local elections in South Africa. The 2011 local government elections in South Africa were fiercely contested. Before election day, ‘protests threatened to disrupt elections in at least three of South Africa’s poorest provinces—North West, Limpopo and Northern Cape’.^[38] The National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS), led by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and represented by multiple government departments including the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), started preparing security arrangements six months ahead of the 2011 local elections. Approximately two months before election day NATJOINTS activated nine National Joint Operational Centres (NATJOCs) situated in nine South African provinces. NATJOCs were responsible for all coordination related to security actions and reactions in their respective provinces. Election security coordinated by NATJOCs on election day included safeguarding of the inner perimeters of the 20,864 polling stations. In certain areas, the outer perimeter was secured as well. NATJOCs also coordinated SAPS and IEC escorts of election materials to and from the polling stations as well as general crime prevention duties.^[39]

• Ensure that security sector interventions are in line with the rules of engagement, and that the use of force is kept to a minimum

In the event of election-related violence occurring during the voting period, security sector agencies must intervene to protect electoral actors, facilities and materials, and vulnerable groups. In some cases, violent incidents may be sponsored by political actors who seek political gains. In other instances, tensions and incidents may be the result of people’s anxieties relating to deficient electoral processes, manipulation by political stakeholders, or even responding to unfounded rumours. In any case, it is important that police act in line with the rules of engagement and refrain from the excessive use of force.

A police oversight mechanism established during the 2012 gubernatorial elections in Nigeria. Election-related violence is a recurring issue in Nigeria. The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) has on occasion been regarded as biased and non-responsive towards imminent threats.^[40] During the 2012 Edo State gubernatorial elections, the Police Service Commission (PSC)^[41]—which is a civilian oversight body—was tasked with monitoring the conduct of police officers during the elections. The monitoring mission was part of the PSC’s overall responsibility of holding the NPF accountable for its actions. Before the election, the PSC issued a document entitled Guidelines for the Conduct of Police Officers on Election Duty^[42] to the NPF. The guidelines highlight 11 key principles such as alertness; approachability; professionalism; maintenance of impartiality; fairness; use of force; awareness of electoral law; and so on. In total, 11 officers divided into three teams monitored the election in Edo State. The PSC also opened three telephone hotlines for citizens to lodge complaints. The police also cooperated with the CLEEN Foundation, a Nigerian-based NGO which deployed observers throughout Edo State to observe the conduct of security operatives on election duty.^[43] Overall, the PSC monitoring mission concluded that the NPF had conducted themselves very well and congratulated the police for their professional conduct. The PSC also praised the NPF for their rapid-response capability which had allowed for increased security in certain areas at short notice.^[44]

 

During the voting operations phase, non-state and state actors that share an interest in and a mandate to support the conduct of peaceful elections should focus their efforts on voter information, election observation and the exchange of risk data with other actors, including EMBs and SSAs. Due to the scope and dynamics of voting operations, these actors will need to build internal capacity to engage and coordinate efforts so as to maximize results. 

• Implement voter information and education activities relating to voting day operations
  
  Civil society organizations are well positioned to implement programmes tailored to reach out to the general population, but also to remote or isolated communities and marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women. In addition to the general set of skills required to implement training programmes, CSO activists should be acquainted with the electoral rules and regulations, and have specific information on the timing and locations of electoral events and electoral dispute resolution procedures. Voter education should focus on the rights and obligations of all citizens to participate in electoral processes. Specific education efforts should aim to generate interest among and create a safe environment for vulnerable and marginalized groups, such as women, to participate in electoral processes.
  
  A media campaign is designed to promote the participation of young people ahead of the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections in Tunisia. Due to the negative experiences with elections under the pre-revolution regime, there was suspicion and fear among the people of Tunisia during the run-up to the 2011 National Constituent Assembly election. To address these concerns, Radio Mosaique FM, one of Tunisia’s foremost radio stations, together with the UNDP, launched a voters’ educational game designed to promote youth participation. The game, called DemocraTweet, was initiated a few weeks ahead of election day. It covered broad election-related topics, from the institutional legal framework to election procedures. Radio Mosaique FM, which attracts a large number of website and Facebook visitors, decided to make particular use of social media. Young people were targeted in particular because they make up a large proportion of the Tunisian population, and because of their pivotal role during the 2010–11 ‘Jasmine Revolution’.^[45]
• Compile, share and publicize information relating to electoral risks and violent incidents during the voting operations phase

With the approach of election day, incidents of election-related intimidation and physical violence directed against electoral actors, journalists and citizens may increase. If such violence is directed against citizens in remote areas or against marginalized groups, such as women, incidents may never be reported to the authorities and even if they are reported, security sector agencies may, for political reasons, fail to prosecute perpetrators. Non-state actors may be well positioned to engage, through their networks, in systematic collection of data on incidents, perpetrators and victims. Such data should be shared with the security sector agencies for investigation and prosecution. Where SSAs fail to respond, these data can be publicized in the media to pressure responsible actors to take action. 

Civil society organization monitors and reports on election-related violence during the 2010 presidential election in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan elections in 1999 and 2005 saw cases of election-related violence. Ahead of the presidential election in 2010, violent attacks against candidates, campaigners and political activists were reported. In this context, the Centre for Monitoring Electoral Violence (CMEV)^[46] deployed several hundred electoral observers across the country. One of their main tasks was to record incidents of electoral violence. The organization started monitoring activities long before the elections, kept them up during voting operations, and continued thereafter. On election day alone, the CMEV deployed 3,790 monitors throughout the county, who worked in mobile teams or stationed at polling stations.^[47] On election day, it recorded 178 incidents, of which 94 were categorized as major and included intimidation and the use of firearms. The CMEV used a range of means to analyse and present information, including Google maps for mapping incidents of violence.^[48] This information was presented to the public and used to pressure the responsible agencies to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of election-related violence. 

Civil society organizations monitored and reported on election-related violence during the 20012 provincial elections for the governorship in Aceh, Indonesia. 

“To monitor and mitigate election-related violence, IFES has partnered with two local organizations to implement an Election Violence Education & Resolution (EVER) project. These organizations, Forum LSM Aceh and Aceh Institute, seek to mitigate election-related violence by monitoring and documenting incidents in 60 districts and 12 regencies for a six-week period (four weeks prior to Election Day and two weeks after). EVER partners issue reports and press briefings based on field monitoring results to stakeholders, including KIP Aceh, and they held an additional press conference last week, which reported about 77 verified incidents of election violence since monitoring efforts began in March.”[49] 

• Observe the voting and counting processes
  
  Election observation efforts, involving political parties, civil society groups and international actors, are always focused on voting and counting operations. Through observation, interested actors can witness the integrity of electoral processes and record incidents that, in their view, represent irregularities. The capacity of electoral observation missions to discourage manipulation of voting and counting is well established. Well-documented cases which identify the perpetrators of electoral violence and fraud will make it possible to prosecute and sanction offenders. The presence of independent observers will also discourage political party observers from intimidating voters.
  
  Domestic electoral observers report critical election day incidents during the 2012 general elections in Ghana. Several incidents of election-related violence were recorded in Ghana during the 2008 election and during the run-up to the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections.^[50] The Coalition for Domestic Electoral Observation (CODEO), the largest independent and non-partisan domestic observation coalition in Ghana, observed the 2012 general election. CODEO trained and deployed approximately 4,500 non-partisan observers, 3,000 of whom observed the voting, counting and collation process, while 1,500 observed the parallel vote tabulation (PVT). Information collected by the observers during polling day was collected and analysed by the CODEO secretariat ahead of public dissemination. CODEO published two reports during election day, a midday report and a close-of-the-polls report. The observers, constituency supervisors, and regional coordinators were also tasked with reporting critical incidents directly to a dedicated CODEO hotline. These incidents, which included violence, harassment and intimidation, voting procedure violations, suspension of voting, and the presence of unauthorized persons in polling stations, were then verified by a Critical Incident Team. In total, 79 critical incident reports were received during voting operations, of which 13 cases related to harassment and intimidation.^[51]
  An NGO observes the conduct of security operatives during the 2012 gubernatorial elections in Nigeria. Election-related violence is a recurring issue in Nigeria. The Nigerian Police Force has on occasion been regarded as biased and non-responsive towards imminent threats.^[52] During the 2012 Edo State gubernatorial elections, the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (or CLEEN Foundation) recruited, trained and deployed observers in all local government areas to observe the conduct of security officials on election duty. CLEEN also published a shortened version of the police’s Guidelines for the Conduct of Police Officers on Electoral Duty in state and national newspapers. The notice also included numbers of CLEEN-established call centres, where citizens could issue complaints and report incidents with respect to the conduct of security officials during election day. Shortly after the election, the centre issued a public statement which included specific observations and recommendations on election security for future elections.^[53]

• Initiate or sustain peace initiatives and dispute resolution networks during the voting operations phase

Non-state and state actors that promote peace and engage in mediation and conflict resolution around elections will usually build their capacities and commence peace initiatives during the earlier phases of the electoral cycle. These efforts need to be intensified, or otherwise established, and tailored to address risks and tensions surrounding the polling and counting processes. Specific peace campaigning activities can include the promotion of dialogue forums with the aim of bringing together political leaders and getting them to pledge non-violent resolution of electoral disputes. Furthermore, peace councils can be activated to mediate the resolution of electoral disputes relating to tensions and incidents before and after election day. In cooperation with EMBs and security sector agencies, CSO representatives and other state and non-state actors can be trained to engage in peaceful conflict resolution and dispute mediation around election day, thus complementing EMB and SSA efforts.

National and sub-national peace initiatives support organization of the peaceful 2010 constitutional referendum in Kenya. The Uwiano Platform for Peace was launched several months ahead of the 2010 constitutional referendum. The referendum was the first voting exercise since the 2007 general election, when post-election violence caused the deaths of more than 1,500 people and the displacement of more than 300,000.^[54] The strategic aim of Uwiano was to promote peace building, conflict management, and national cohesion and integration processes by developing a platform in which state and non-state organizations could work together at the national and sub-national levels. This was done through the identification of hot spots and the taking of timely action before, during, and after election day. On the grassroots level, District Peace Committees (DPCs), peace monitors and CSOs were tasked with communicating with the Joint Secretariat in Nairobi on issues of peace and conflict on a regular basis. This included SMS messages and early warning reports throughout the election period. Furthermore, DPCs were tasked with building partnerships with businesses and professionals at the local level as well as identifying rapid response teams and mediators to engage in confidence-building measures. In order to deploy for ‘local level negotiation and mediation processes, dialogue, communal cohesion activities, activities that counter propaganda and hate speech’ the DPCs were expected to request funds from the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) administrated by the Joint Secretariat. In general, between 600 and 1200 USD was disbursed per request within 48 hours. ‘ERF received over fifty applications for community visit projects, public meetings, community dialogues, mediation and reconciliation.’^[55]

Election results announcement

The official election results are announced by the leadership of an EMB. To safeguard electoral integrity, the results must be managed professionally and transparently. Also, at the time when the election results are announced, there should be no cases that could influence the election outcome still pending judicial resolution. In practice, unofficial announcements often precede the official announcement. In addition to an EMB, political parties and other observer groups may publish their preliminary results and estimates. Such reporting can differ in accuracy and in some cases be based on unverified facts, even rumours. Contradictory and sensationalistic statements may deepen mistrust and feed the perception that elections are rigged. If the margin of victory is narrow, complaints are not resolved professionally, and the winner takes all power, losing parties may resort to violence to prevent the results being implemented or secure a power-sharing agreement. To prevent election-related violence, an EMB must ensure that the management of election results is transparent and that complaints are resolved effectively and professionally before the final results are announced. Security sector agencies must ensure that they act on signs of impending electoral violence and protect vulnerable individuals, groups and facilities. Other state and non-state actors can work at the grassroots level and with the key political actors to promote peace between different groups and peaceful implementation of the election results, especially if it involves the transition of power. 

Table 7. Election results announcement
A. Improved electoral management and justice	B. Improved electoral security	C. Improved infrastructure for peace
Manage the election results in a professional and transparent way to ensure that the credibility of the results is protected. Ensure that complaints, in particular those with the potential to affect the overall election results, are resolved before the final results are announced. Collaborate with election observation groups, including domestic and international election observation missions, and the media in respect to publication of official and unofficial preliminary and final results. Communicate preliminary results and announce the final election results in a clear and concise way.	Monitor indicators of impending violence relating to the announcement of election results. Ensure that vulnerable individuals and groups, such as women and minorities, are protected. Ensure that security sector interventions are not used to suppress political liberties and the free expression of opinion. Cooperate with other actors to ensure a multi-layered approach in addressing risks related to the announcement of election results.	Build scenarios for engagement in addressing tensions relating to the election results. Uphold peace forums that involve diverse stakeholders at national and sub-national level throughout the period of the announcement of the election results. Coordinate peace-building efforts with security sector agencies.

 

 A.        Improved electoral management and justice

Following voting day and the completion of the count, an EMB will face pressures from politicians, the media, and the public to announce the final election results as soon as possible. Before doing so, it must ensure that the results are accurate. This may include obtaining original log forms and consolidated reports from each polling station/region. Electoral complaints that could influence the election outcome must also be resolved. Due to the large number of polling stations and the geographical distance between central office and remote regions, shipping the necessary documentation to the central EMB office may take time. Also, the timelines for resolving electoral disputes may be prolonged due to specific legal remedies. If the time between voting day and the announcement of the results is longer than expected, or the announcement is delayed, an EMB must be able to demonstrate that results and complaints are being managed professionally and in a way that leaves no room for malpractice. Transparency and openness to collaboration with other stakeholders, such as political parties and CSOs, will help an EMB to promote its integrity and credibility of election results.

• Manage the election results in a professional and transparent way to ensure that the credibility of the results is protected

An EMB must have a safe and secure means for the transmission of election results. These may include electronic transmission and shipment of a hard copy. An electronic transmission system should be established and tested in advance, including alternative methods of data transmission. In addition to conveying the election results to the central EMB, locally generated results should be made available to all electoral monitors, including political party and other domestic and international observers. It is good practice to ask observers to co-sign result the forms and to issue them a copy of the forms. Sensitive electoral materials, primarily ballot papers, must be kept safely to ensure that they can be inspected and recounted when necessary.

Automating elections reduces conflicts and tensions surrounding the 2010 elections in the Philippines. Election-related violence in the Philippines, especially the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), is a common and deeply rooted issue. During the 2007 national and local elections, due to manual procedures, it took days and weeks for local-level results to be announced and months for the national results to be announced. In 2010, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) decided that the national and local elections would be automated through the use of precinct count optical scanners (PCOSs). By the close of voting, all ballot papers were scanned. The PCOSs tabulated the results and transmitted them electronically to the higher canvassing bodies. Hard copies of the results were also delivered to those concerned. As a result, local-level results were compiled within just a few hours and within 72 hours the national results were almost final. In Sulu province, there were fewer incidents of election-related violence during the 2010 elections than in earlier elections ‘as a result of the significantly decreased human involvement in the counting of votes and canvassing of election results, and the unprecedented speed with which the results were arrived at’.^[1]

Transparent management of the election result helps the credibility of electoral processes during the 2006 elections in Bolivia. In 2005, Bolivia experienced violent protests in which the formation of an assembly to draft a new constitution which would grant more autonomy to the Bolivian provinces was demanded.^[2] The election of a constituent assembly and a referendum on regional autonomy took place in 2006. Although they were organized in a tense environment, the Election Commission of Bolivia delivered an election that was regarded as credible and genuine.^[3] The transmission of results was handled to the satisfaction of the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission (EOM). For example, the EU-EOM observed that ‘provisions of copies of the results forms from the polling stations to the party agents helped the political organizations to monitor the process. Furthermore, the EU-EOM final report explains that ‘electoral authorities placed scanned copies of the result forms from all polling stations on the internet, which further increased the credibility of the counting process. In terms of the result announcement, the EU-EOM mentions the following: ‘The low number of official complaints, together with the general efficiency of the electoral authorities, made possible an exceptionally fast processing of the results. While the legally established deadline for finalizing the counting of the votes was July 27, the CNE was able to give the official proclamation of the results already on July 12, more rapidly than ever before in the electoral history of Bolivia.’^[4]

• Ensure that complaints, in particular those with the potential to affect the overall election results, are resolved before the final results are announce 

During the polling and counting processes, electoral actors may submit a large number of complaints. The bulk of complaints may relate to occurrences at the polling and counting locations and include systemic problems, for example, inaccuracies in the electoral registers or a lack of sufficient sensitive and non-sensitive electoral materials; the performance or actions of polling and counting officials, observers and voters (e.g. the management of polling and counting processes and compliance with relevant procedures); and serious breaches of the electoral rules and regulations that can impact electoral outcomes, such as ballot stuffing and falsification of the election results. In addition, electoral complaints may relate to incidents outside the polling and counting locations, such as violation of a ‘no-campaigning period’, vote buying, intimidation of electorates and other electoral stakeholders, and so on. An EMB must work closely with the security, prosecution and judiciary agencies to ensure that all complaints are processed in an effective and timely way. In particular, an EMB must ensure that the complaint log forms from the polling and counting locations are examined by the relevant instances. If malpractice is suspected, an investigation should be initiated, and the perpetrators sanctioned. Where evidence or indications exist that electoral manipulation has affected the election results, a recount or a repeat of the polling can be imposed to ensure that the credibility of the election results is preserved. 

Mexican electoral authorities investigate allegations of fraud and perform a partial recount before the official result announcement in 2006. In 2006, street protests broke out for several months after one presidential candidate, who had lost by a narrow margin, rejected the election results.^[5] During the 2012 general elections, the margin between the winning and the next candidate was 6 per cent, and one losing presidential candidate rejected the preliminary results published by the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE). Moreover, a full recount was demanded. Allegations included vote buying, through giving away supermarket food coupons; manipulating opinion polls; and paying broadcasters to favour one candidate. The fraud allegations triggered peaceful demonstrations in Mexico City.^[6] Soon after polling day, the IFE decided to recount the votes at more than half of the country’s 143,000 polling stations. The Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPFJ), after considering all legal challenges to the results, dismissed appeals calling for an annulment of the vote, finding insufficient evidence of vote buying.^[7] The official election results were declared by the TEPFJ and the IFE approximately two months after polling day. Although the IFE had found some irregularities during the recount, these were not significant to change the results. The IFE regarded the recount as an ‘exercise in openness and transparency’.^[8] .. 

• Collaborate with election observation groups, including domestic and international election observation missions, and the media in respect to the publication of unofficial and official preliminary and final results

Well-organized electoral observers, including political party and domestic observers, will be able to cover most, rarely all, polling and counting locations. Transparent voting and counting processes will allow observers to get results from different counting locations and compile the overall results in parallel with the election administrators. In some situations, observers may publish unofficial results even before an EMB is in a position to do so. However, these results may be prone to mistakes and misleading, sometimes intentionally. For example, if these results are compiled wrongly or presented only partially, or if they ignore electoral complaints, they may be misleading. On the other hand, when observers manage the results accurately and impartially, they may be an important reference point for an EMB. An EMB should therefore collaborate closely with election observation groups and the media to ensure that results can be cross-checked and that disputed results are verified before being presented to the public. An EMB should discourage publication of incomplete or disputed results that may raise unrealistic expectations and tensions and lead to conflicts and violence. If such results are announced, an EMB should react to make the public aware and inform it about the status of the official results.

The Ugandan election authority regulates publication of the final election results to prevent misunderstandings and faulty reporting during the 2011 elections. During the run-up to the 2011 general elections, which witnessed some election-related violence,^[9] one presidential candidate issued a statement that he and his campaign team would announce the results immediately after polling day in order to ‘forestall rigging’.^[10] In 2006, the same candidate had rejected the election results, calling for a recount after losing to an incumbent candidate.^[11] However, the announcement of the results in 2011 was regulated by the Ugandan Electoral Commission, which released a set of rules for media coverage. The code of conduct was developed by the Commission with the help of the Independent Media Council of Uganda and the UN High Commission on Human Rights. It emphasizes the importance of free and fair media coverage and points out that only the Electoral Commission has the right to announce the final results. This specific provision aimed to prevent misunderstandings and faulty reporting. Accordingly, the media are allowed to cover different polling stations and present the result from the specific station but are not allowed to announce the final results.^[12] Prior to the launching of the Code of Conduct, the African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME) published guidelines for media coverage through a participatory process to which the Ugandan Election Commission was a party.^[13]

• Communicate preliminary results and announce the final election results in a clear way

Following the voting and counting processes, political actors, journalists and the broader public will expect an announcement of election results in a short period of time. However, publication of the preliminary and final results is a sensitive process that, especially in conflict-prone societies, can generate disputes and conflict. When providing preliminary results for general elections, an EMB must ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, these draw on a proper sample. For example, it should reflect the ratio between rural and urban communities as well as the geographical, social and other diversities that determine political alignments. The broader public, journalists and political analysts should be able to understand these details. Use of the geo-spatial tools for data presentation may be helpful. Preliminary results should be published periodically and an EMB should avail itself of press conferences to provide comments and explanations. If any serious complaints, which could impact on the final results, are being considered, an EMB should keep the public informed about this fact. When an EMB publishes the final results, these should be presented in a clear and concise way. If the final results include seat allocation, the background information on candidates’ electoral unit, the number of votes and the method for converting number of votes into number of seats should be available and explained.

Transparent and well-organized result management by the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) ensures clear communication of results to electoral stakeholders and the public. Elections in South Africa are organized in an environment characterized by some social tensions and conflicts. Conflict sensitivity is an important aspect of electoral management. Ahead of the 2009 national and provincial elections, certain areas of KwaZulu-Natal province experienced some election-related violence during the pre-election phase.^[14] During the phase of election results announcement, the IEC organized a display of the results information on leader boards at the IEC national and provincial results centres, as well as on the IEC’s website. In this respect, nine Result Operation Centers (ROCs) were established throughout the country. The national ROC in Pretoria was established to allow the IEC and other interested stakeholders, including the media and political parties, to monitor the various processes leading up to election day and the results announcements.^[15] Furthermore, on a regular basis, the ROCs used Global Information System (GIS) mapping technology to display the results in a visually simplified manner which rendered the results information discernible. The IEC also published several of the maps through international and national broadcasting networks.^[16] The IEC is legally bound to declare the results within one week of an election. The 2009 results were published after three days and included information on the allocation of seats to the political parties contesting the election. Within seven days after election day, the IEC designated seats to the respective party candidates, and published the names of the designated representatives.^[17] All objections relating to election results were dealt by the IEC before the final results were announced. According to the Electoral Act, the IEC informs objectors, and any other party involved, about its decisions relating to objections. Objectors can appeal to the Electoral Court, but this does not delay announcement of the final election results. In 2009, the IEC received 25 objections, most of which were rejected as not being objections contemplated in terms of the Electoral Act.

 

B.         Improved electoral security

The announcement of the final election results will reveal the electoral ‘winners and losers’. In some situations, political competitors will have a good sense of who is expected to win elections even before the final results are announced. In other cases, the margin of victory may be narrow and it may be hard to predict the winner before all ballot papers are processed and electoral disputes are resolved. Due to the high political stakes and anxieties, the period around the announcement of the election results may be prone to conflicts and incidents. If rigging of the result is suspected—regardless of whether these suspicions are grounded or not—losing parties, their supporters and the broader citizenry can initiate demonstrations. It should be kept in mind that candidates who have personal motives to obstruct verification and implementation of the election results may manipulate citizens. Some incentives to instigate violence may include a determination to remain in elected office, secure a power sharing deal, force a repeat of the elections, undermine electoral processes and institutions, and so on. During the period of the announcement of the election results, security sector agencies must focus on detecting signs of impending violence in order to prevent and mitigate violent incidents before they escalate into a large-scale violence. In particular, SSAs should focus on the protection of electoral actors, vulnerable groups and electoral facilities. In doing so, they must maintain impartiality and refrain from the excessive use of force. Close collaboration with other actors and civil society groups will increase the chances of such situations being peacefully resolved.

• Monitor indicators of impending violence relating to announcement of election results

During the period of election result verification, security sector agencies should collect information that may give an early indication of impending violence. Such information may include early and ungrounded announcements of electoral victory; threats made by prominent political stakeholders against political opponents and their supporters, electoral actors and vulnerable groups; rejection of the results prior to or after the announcement; claims that the elections have been rigged; verbal conflicts between political stakeholders; cases of intimidation; and so on. The risks identified may be many, but good intelligence will assist in planning scenarios for the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence and in ensuring that SSAs deploy rationally.

Security is heightened before the Egyptian 2012 presidential election result announcement. The 2012 Egyptian presidential election was the first such after the 2011 revolution. There was a run-off between two candidates, both of whom had declared victory before the results were officially announced by the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC). As a result, violent protests from candidates’ supporters were feared. To respond to increased risks, Egyptian security forces deployed 3,000 police and military officers to safeguard key political and economic sites throughout the country before the election results were officially announced by the SPEC. Enhanced security was provided to all public institutions and the Suez Canal.^[18]

• Ensure that vulnerable individuals and groups, such as women and minorities, are protected

Experience from different contexts when the announcement of election results has triggered outbreaks of violence shows that election-related violence is often directed against marginalized and vulnerable groups. Women and girls, men and boys are sexually abused; ethnic and religious minorities are maltreated, killed and expelled from their homes and their property and places of worship are destroyed. In case of such concerns, SSAs should demonstrate determination to protect vulnerable groups. Practical actions may include public statements in this regard, swift investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators of incidents, and the deployment of standing security capacities to guard vulnerable communities.

• Ensure that security sector interventions are not used to suppress political liberties and the free expression of opinion

In conflict-prone societies, security sector personnel will often receive additional training to ensure that they deploy sensitively when protecting electoral processes. However, in many cases, incumbent officials and elites have used security sector agencies to suppress opposition and stop citizens from protesting against perceived electoral manipulation. Very often, police interventions against citizens have resulted in excessive use of force. If disturbances do happen relating to the election results, the SSAs must remain professional and politically impartial and act in accordance with the professional code of conduct. The force should not be used to suppress political liberties and the free expression of opinion. When this is a concern, senior officials must take measures to reinforce understanding of these principles within all agencies. On the other hand, security agencies must demonstrate resoluteness in prosecuting those who provoke violent conflict and instigate violent incidents.

• Cooperate with other actors to ensure a multi-layered approach in addressing risks related to the announcement of election results

The deployment of security sector agencies in resolving electoral disputes may help in separating hostile communities and providing physical security to vulnerable groups and facilities. However, this will not address the root causes of conflict, nor will it help bridge different positions. The engagement of SSAs will prevent violence escalation and create space for peace-building efforts. Security sector agencies therefore need to maintain close collaboration with other state and non-state actors and reputable individuals and groups that can help in mediating conflicts and reaching peaceful settlements.

 

C.         Improved infrastructure for peace

It is well established that the announcement of election results, particularly in conflict-prone societies where the election winner takes all power, or where electoral processes lack credibility, may increase tensions and trigger violent outbreaks. Different actors may have different incentives to resort to violent means in order to derail the implementation of election results. If citizens’ groups and losing political parties fear that the election results have been rigged, they may initiate protests. These protests may turn violent or attract violent responses from the security sector agencies. Incumbent candidates who lose an election may rig the election results and clamp down on their political opponents using the state security agencies. The opposition parties may resort to violent tactics in an attempt to secure favourable power-sharing deals. There are many possible scenarios that may lead to outbreaks of violence during the electoral phase in which election results are announced. Non-state and state actors which form infrastructures for peace may be important and are sometimes the only force that has the legitimacy and capacity to engage with different actors and promote non-violent resolution of disputes surrounding election results.

• Build scenarios for engagement in addressing tensions relating to the election results

Non-state and state actors that promote peace and the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes may be well positioned to engage in deflating tensions and mediating conflicts arising from disputed election results. Those familiar with electoral processes and the dynamics of structural conflicts in a given country will be able to make reasonably accurate predictions about the reactions of political actors and citizens with respect to different electoral outcomes. Methodological consistency in the assessment and analysis of multiple risks will ensure that predictions are even more accurate. This analysis will help create different scenarios for action. The aim is to ensure that relevant non-state and state actors are prepared to engage in reducing tensions. Coordination will ensure that the engagement is timely and comprehensive and that it reaches all communities. Efforts should focus on protecting marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women. Scenarios need to be periodically revised and modified to reflect the most recent developments.

Scenario planning ahead of the Iraqi 2005 National Assembly elections. During the run-up to the 2005 Iraqi National Assembly elections, incidents of election-related violence were recorded throughout the country. These included assassinations of political party candidates and campaign workers.^[19] This was the first election since the 2003 occupation by the US-led Multi-National Force. In the context of preparations for the 2005 elections, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) organized three scenario planning workshops, two in 2004 and one in early 2005. Workshops, each involving approximately 20 Iraq experts, were designed to explore alternative election outcomes using multiple-scenario analysis. This included scenarios relating to the actions of various groups and leaders based on the performance of an EMB; the final voter turnout; or the election results. The participants identified risks in respect to so-called ‘undesirable’ election outcomes, which might increase the likelihood of election-related violence, and perceptions that the elections were unfair. A working group was also tasked with recommending strategies and actions ‘to ward off’ certain outcomes or ‘at least ameliorate their effects’.^[20] The experts concluded that ‘win–lose’ scenarios were less important than the Iraqi people’s perception of the transparency, legitimacy and fairness of the electoral process.

• Uphold peace forums that involve diverse stakeholders at national and sub-national level throughout the period of the announcement of the election results

The period surrounding the announcement of election results may see polarization and increased mistrust between the main stakeholders, including political actors, an EMB, security sector agencies, communities and so on. If the margin of victory is expected to be narrow and tensions are on the rise, civil society organizations and other non-state and state actors should engage in the promotion of peace and trust building. Among other things, they can organize discussion forums where all relevant stakeholders can express and discuss their concerns and seek commonly accepted solutions. In addition, these forums may serve as a joint platform for inviting supporters of all political parties and the broader public to abstain from violence, regardless of the electoral outcomes. Peace forums should be established at the national and sub-national levels.

National and sub-national peace efforts by civil society help mitigate the outbreak of election-related violence following the Kenyan 2007 general election result announcement. The election-related violence that broke out in Kenya in 2007–2008 was triggered by the announcement of the presidential election results and aggravated when the president was sworn in later on the same day.^[21] During a two-month period, 1,500 Kenyans lost their lives, 3,000 women were raped, businesses were ransacked and set on fire, and over 300,000 people were internally displaced.^[22] During this time, a group of five influential Kenyans, calling themselves Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), started to plead for dialogue and negotiations among the political leadership. Through this initiative, working committees were formed attracting a wide range of skilled and influential volunteers to reflect, analyse, strategize and act to mitigate violence. This included the launch of the Citizens’ Agenda for Peace which influenced the formal mediation efforts, led by Kofi Annan, that helped in reaching a power-sharing agreement between the opposing sides. The CCP also facilitated the international mediation process by initiating the visit of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, briefing eminent persons, and interacting with the Kofi Annan mediation through a CCP High Level Dialogue Committee and Technical Committee. The CCP also worked with the Internal Security Ministry to set up peacekeeping in the city of Nairobi at a time when riots threatened to engulf the city. This also led to the creation of the Nairobi Peace Forum and the establishment of District Peace Committees.^[23]

• Coordinate peace-building efforts with security sector agencies

Various non-state and state organizations have mandates, knowledge and skills to promote peaceful conflict resolution through conflict mediation, reconciliation projects, facilitation of negotiations and so on. During the period in which election results are announced, inter-communal tensions can be on the rise. Organizations within the existing peace infrastructure at the grassroots level may therefore be well positioned to engage in the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence. In particular, these non-state and state actors should collaborate closely with security sector agencies to ensure that their efforts are coordinated. As SSAs focus on efforts to separate hostile communities, provide security to vulnerable groups, and apprehend and prosecute those who perpetrate violence, peace-building organizations can focus on deflating tensions and addressing the root causes of conflicts.
A Women’s Situation Room is set up to provide early warning and response during the Kenyan 2013 general elections. Due to the high level of violence directed against women during the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–2008,^[24] the women’s movement of Kenya, with the support of UN Women and the UNDP, set up a Women’s Situation Room (WSR) ahead of the 2013 general elections. The WSR was mandated to monitor, verify, analyse and respond to incidents of election-related violence. The WSR deployed 500 field observers. In addition, a team of telephone operators was established to receive incident reports from Kenyan citizens via a toll-free number. In total, the WSR received over 500 incident reports, many of which included the post-election period. Once verified, the information was passed on to a group of local and international ‘eminent women’ who sought intervention from the decision makers within the police, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) or political parties. ‘Through its early warning and early response mechanism, the women’s situation room managed to resolve all cases it received before they escalated to bigger problems.’^[25] 
The media enhance collaboration with the police during the 2012 general elections in Ghana. To promote responsible reporting before, during and after the 2012 general elections, the Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association (GIBA) developed a Code of Ethics handbook to be used by journalists. The GIBA also provided 400 copies of the handbook to the Ghana Police Service in order to help the police to understand ‘the ethical guidelines of private media practitioners with regards to maintaining peace’. The aim was also to reinforce the partnership between the GIBA and the Ghana Police Service. The police committed themselves to disseminate the handbook among all commanders and various departments to serve as a ‘guide in the discharge of their duties during the elections’.^[26] 

 

[1]     Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, ‘PERV: Preventing Election-related Violence’, 2011, <http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/ 6631~v~Preventing_Election_Related_Violence__Sulu_Mindanao_.pdf>, accessed 8 May 2018.

[2]     BBC News, ‘Bolivian Protesters Reject Offer’, 3 June 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4608111.stm>, accessed on 17 September 2018

[3]     European Union Election Observation Mission to Bolivia, September 2006, pp. 2, 5, available at <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/BO/reports/bolivia-constituent-assembly-election-and>, accessed 8 February 2013.

[4]     Ibid., pp. 29–30.

[5]     Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), ‘Mexico’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador: 2006 versus 2012 and Beyond’, 5 September 2012, p. 2, available at <http://csis.org/files/publication/120905_Grayson_AMLO_HemFocus.pdf>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[6]     ‘Mexicans Protest against Peña Nieto’s Election Win’, The Guardian, 8 July 2012, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/08/mexicans-protest-pena-nieto-election>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[7]     Congressional Research Service, ‘Mexico’s 2012 Elections’, 4 September 2012, pp. 2, 9, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42548.pdf>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[8]     BBC World, ‘Mexico Faces Partial Recount in Presidential Election’, 5 July 2012, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-18717146>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[9]     BBC News, ‘Uganda Election: Amnesty International Violence Concern’, 11 February 2011, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12428969>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[10]   Natabaalo, G., ‘Electoral Body Issues Rules for Media During Elections’, African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), 12 May 2012, <http://acme-ug.org/2011/02/09/electoral- body-issues-rules-for-media-during-elections/>, accessed 8 May 2018

[11]   BBC, ‘Ugandan Court Rejects Poll Protest’, 6 April 2006, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4882594.stm>, accessed 11 February 2013.

[12]   African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), ‘Electoral Body Issues Rules’.

[13]   African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), ‘Guidelines for Media Coverage of Elections in Uganda’ (no date), available at <http://www.google.se/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facme-ug.org%2Findex.php%3Foption%3Dcom_docman%26task%3Ddoc_download%26gid%3D19%26Itemid%3D&ei=2AUaUbS_GuSC4ASX5oH4Cw&usg=AFQjCNHSg1MFKj0Dn8DaCpX8mFiZI1DZ7g&sig2=M4YLJxHTon8KI-QdOUGzuQ&bvm=bv.42261806,d.bGE>, accessed 12 February 2013.

[14]   Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) Election Observation Mission, ‘South Africa National and Provincial Elections, 22 April 2009’, 2010, pp. 24–5, available at <http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/sou2009eom.pdf>, accessed 6 February 2013.

[15]   Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), ‘National and Provincial Elections’, 22 April 2009, pp. 64–5, available at <http://www.elections.org.za/content/Dynamic.aspx?id=1344&name=Elections&LeftMenuId=100&BreadCrumbId=220>, accessed 6 February 2013.

[16]   Ibid., p. 61.

[17]   Ibid., p. 99.

[18]   Ahramonline, ‘Heightened Security as Egypt Awaits Election Results’, 20 June 2012, available at <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/45696/Egypt/Politics-/Heightened-security-as-Egypt-awaits-election-resul.aspx>, accessed 14 February 2013.

[19]   US Department of State, ‘U.S. Envoy to Iraq Condemns Pre-election Violence, Fraud’, 9 December 2005, <https://wfile.ait.org.tw/wf-archive/2005/051212/epf111.htm>, accessed 8 May 2018

[20]   Schwartz, A., ‘Iraq Election Scenarios: Anticipating Alternative Futures’, Special Report No. 142, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), July 2005, <https://www.usip.org/ publications/2005/07/iraq-election-scenarios-anticipating-alternative-futures>, accessed 13 February 2013

[21]   Citizens in Action, ‘Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis of Kenya – 2008’, January 2010, p. iv, available at <http://humanitarianismafrica.typepad.com/files/citizens-in-action-ccp.pdf>, accessed 13 February 2013.

[22]   Roberts, Mara J., Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya (Charlottesville, Va.: New Dominion Philanthropy Metrics, 2009), available at <http://www.ndpmetrics.com/papers/Kenya_Conflict_2007.pdf>, accessed 13 February 2013.

[23]   Citizens in Action, ‘Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis’, pp. iv–xi.

[24]   Roberts, Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya; and Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA), The General Elections in Kenya 2007, Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est, No. 38 (Nairobi), 2008.

[25]   ‘Women’s Situation Room: A Unique Type of Response Mechanism in Elections’, UN Kenya Newsletter, March 2013, available at <http://www.unicnairobi.org/newsletter/UNNewsletter_March2013.pdf>, accessed 8 April 2013.

 

[26]   ‘GIBA Gives 400 Copies of Code of Ethics Handbook to Police’, Ghana Business News, 16 October 2012, available at <http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2012/10/16/giba-gives-400-copies-of-code-of-ethics-handbook-to-police/>, accessed 7 January 2013.

The post-electoral phase

The electoral cycle approach underlines the cyclical nature of electoral processes. It reiterates that elections are not isolated events, but interlinked processes. Therefore, following the announcement of election results, electoral stakeholders should initiate evaluations of the past electoral cycle in order to identify areas that need improvement. This is also true for security sector agencies and organizations that form national infrastructures for peace.

The length of the post-election period may differ from country to country. In most cases, if national and local elections are organized together, elections usually take place every four to five years; if they are held separately, a country may have elections every two years. In any case, it is useful to engage in the post-electoral evaluation shortly after the final election results have been announced. Such an evaluation will benefit from stakeholders’ feedback, while memories are fresh, and provide sufficient time to address process weaknesses and structural causes of election-related tensions and violence before the next election. In addition, it will provide important reference points to inform the discussion in the first phase of the next electoral cycle, when the legal and institutional framework is revised.

Table 8. The post-electoral phase
A. Improved electoral management and justice	B. Improved electoral security	C. Improved infrastructure for peace
Evaluate the legal framework and identify areas that need to be reformed. Evaluate the institutional performance of electoral management and justice bodies and identify needs for institutional reform. Assess staff performance and identify needs for professional capacity building. Identify practices that will lead to improved collaboration with security sector agencies and other state and non-state actors	Evaluate the institutional performance of the security sector agencies and identify capacity-building needs. Maintain collaboration with electoral stakeholders towards the next round of elections.	Address structural factors of conflict: Poor socio-economic conditions; Social and political exclusion; Conflict relating to changing power dynamics; Gender-based discrimination and violence; The presence of non-state armed actors; The presence of organized crime; Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; Human rights violations; Environmental hazards; Unethical media reporting.

 

 A.        Improved electoral management and justice 

Electoral processes are complex and dynamic. Even the most successful elections will face challenges and experience problems. Following the announcement of the election results, an EMB should initiate an evaluation of the processes. The evaluation should focus on internal processes and achievements relating to the implementation of the overall institutional mandate, and include details, such as the performance of individual departments, sub-national offices and short-term personnel, communication challenges, finances and so on. Evaluation should identify both successes and unfulfilled objectives. This will help the promotion of good practices and identifying areas where legal and institutional reforms and human capacity building are needed. Furthermore, an EMB should assess how it managed its relationship with external stakeholders, such as the security sector agencies, political parties, civil society and international observer groups, media and the citizens, in order to identify needs and spaces for improvement. 

• Evaluate the legal framework and identify areas that need to be reformed 

The electoral legal framework may require periodic updating and improvement to ensure that it provides solid ground rules for the conduct of credible elections. The post-electoral period is a proper time for an EMB to reflect on this. On the one hand, memories are fresh. On the other, an EMB does not face immediate operational deadlines, so it has sufficient time to analyse and understand the practical effects of different laws, rules and regulations. In particular, an EMB can examine the extent to which implementation, or lack of implementation, of specific items of legislation or rules and regulations has generated tension or triggered violence. An EMB should document such cases and use them to initiate and inform legal reforms during the initial phase of the subsequent electoral cycle. 

The Honduras EMB, the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), conducts evaluation of the 2012 primary elections. Ahead of the 2012 primary elections in Honduras, the first since the presidential coup in 2009, several incidents of election-related violence directed against political party candidates were recorded.^[1] During the post-election period, the TSE, with the assistance of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), conducted an evaluation of the electoral process. Using the SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis, the TSE assessed its administrative performance as well as identifying opportunities and challenges ahead of the 2013 general elections. In general, the evaluation found the TSE’s current organizational structure to be ‘obtuse and outdated’. Some of the specific challenges and threats identified included ‘uncontrolled variables’ such as electoral legal and institutional reform, budgetary restrictions and political interference. The evaluation included recommendations that the TSE could implement to improve its overall performance.^[2] In addition, the evaluation was designed to provide input to the planning for the 2013 general elections. 

Post-election evaluation leads to amendments to the electoral law in South Africa. In South Africa it is standard practice for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to evaluate its performance following a general election. An evaluation session is also conducted with political parties represented on the National Political Party Liaison Committee. Ahead of the 2009 national and provincial elections in South Africa, the Constitutional Court ruled that the law on voting abroad was unconstitutional in limiting the franchise to registered South African citizens who were temporarily abroad. During the post-2009 election evaluation, the electoral law was aligned with the 2009 Constitutional Court ruling, allowing citizens to register and vote from abroad. Legislative amendments were shared with members of the National Party Liaison Committee in an effort to obtain the buy-in of political parties before the proposed changes were debated in the Parliament. Should parties remain dissatisfied, the legislation may be referred to the Constitutional Court for a final decision.^[3] 

• Evaluate the institutional performance of electoral management and justice bodies and identify needs for institutional reform 

There are three main organizational models of an EMB: (a) independent, (b) governmental and (c) mixed.^[4] Any of these models may be appropriate for a given country depending on several factors that include the particular circumstances and needs of the country at the time. The actual structure of each of three main models may vary further. Some key variables relate to organizational leadership, executive powers, the design of operational competences, the hierarchy of national and sub-national structures, electoral dispute resolution capacities and so on. Some of these may be detailed in the electoral legal framework and result from specific mandates. However, some decisions may be made internally. An EMB may face different challenges from one electoral cycle to another. It is therefore important to periodically assess and adjust the internal organizational structures to ensure that an EMB can deal with all challenges effectively. To address challenges relating to increased risks and incidents of election-related violence, an EMB should strengthen its capacity to understand and analyse internal and external risks and manage conflicts that threaten to develop into violence. The capacity to collaborate on and coordinate electoral security issues with external organizations should also be developed. The post-election phase will allow time for an EMB to assess and plan these important institutional reforms. 

An EMB cooperates closely with the police and judiciary to prosecute perpetrators of electoral offences following the 2011 general elections in Nigeria. The Nigerian elections in 1999, 2003 and 2007 were marked by widespread election-related violence.^[5] However, no evidence exists that a single person was prosecuted for an election offence during that time. Following the 2011 general elections, which also witnessed several incidents of election-related violence, the Independent National Election Commission (INEC), with the support of the Nigerian police and the judiciary, started arresting and prosecuting electoral offenders. The INEC also worked together with the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) to facilitate the prosecution at minimal cost.^[6] Although the INEC has prosecuted ‘more offenders than any other EMB in the history of Nigeria’, the INEC Chairman stated that the process was slow considering the number of cases still pending before various courts. He also suggested the establishment of a separate agency to handle election offences due to the INEC’s lack of capacity, in terms of funds and manpower, to manage elections and prosecute electoral offenders at the same time. 

• Assess staff performance and identify needs for professional capacity building 

Electoral management and dispute resolution bodies need continuous development of their professional competencies. This is particularly important for bodies which are not organized as permanent and independent structures, and organizations that face a high staff turnover. In addition, the adoption of new electoral management routines and systems, including IT solutions, will increase the need for capacity building. The post-election period will allow an EMB to focus on assessing the capacity-building needs and identifying training for relevant staff at all levels. National EMBs can benefit from international training programmes. For example, the BRIDGE training curriculum is the most prominent course offered by a number of electoral support providers to national EMBs. Some prominent EMBs, such as the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) of Mexico and the Election Commission of India (ECI), also have training centres through which they promote peer-to-peer training programmes, including specialized electoral security courses. However, it is important to ensure that the capacity building is not limited to the institutional leadership and that there are internal mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge. 

The Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa introduces a performance assessment system and training scheme following the 2006 municipal elections. Following the 2006 municipal elections, which saw widespread protests before election day,^[7] the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) established an internal performance assessment system. All members of staff were trained and assessed in terms of key result areas and key performance indicators. In general, the system allowed the IEC to ‘reward meritorious performance and to identify skills development needs’. From early 2006 until early 2007, 107 IEC staff members were provided with internal or external skills development and training in various areas which included project management, supply chain management, certificates in IT and Geographic Information Systems.^[8] 

• Identify practices that will lead to improved collaboration with security sector agencies and other state and non-state actors 

Throughout the electoral cycle, an EMB will engage with numerous stakeholders, including security sector agencies, political parties, civil society and international observer groups, the media and citizens. The nature of this engagement may vary from constructive collaboration and coordination to less successful engagements, even conflict situations. During the post-election period, an EMB should analyse how it engaged with other electoral stakeholders and identify successful and less successful practices. This evaluation can be conducted in collaboration with relevant organizations. Inter-agency discussions and workshops can be organized to help in identifying good practices that can be promoted and further strengthened, as well as areas where collaboration needs to be built. 

B.         Improved electoral security

The engagement of security sector agencies during elections, in particular in post-conflict or conflict-prone societies, requires increased collaboration between SSAs and electoral management bodies. Furthermore, interactions with political parties and the media on matters related to electoral security may be needed. The fulfilment of the SSAs’ mandates—to create a safe environment for the conduct of peaceful elections—may depend on their capacity to uphold their credibility in the eyes of these actors and general public. During the post-election period, security sector agencies should critically evaluate their engagement in order to identify internal and external challenges (and successes) that affect the fulfilment of their electoral mandates. These findings will inform the plans for capacity building geared towards the next electoral cycle. They will also point to areas where collaboration with relevant electoral stakeholders can be improved.

• Evaluate the institutional performance of security sector agencies and identify capacity-building needs 

During different phases of the electoral cycle, security sector agencies will engage in different ways. They may be focused on providing security to electoral officials, registrants and voters, prominent political party candidates and other vulnerable individuals and groups. They will also provide security to electoral events and safeguard electoral materials and facilities. In the course of implementation of their electoral security mandates, SSAs may face different internal and external challenges. Post-electoral evaluation will allow identification of the main challenges and successes. These may relate to the specific phases of the electoral cycle, specific geographic regions, or specific electoral stakeholders.

Assessment for enhanced electoral security in 2013 and 2016.[9] The Philippines have been plagued by a long history of electoral violence. Since the revolution in 1986, all elections have been overshadowed by conflicts resulting from rivalries between political clans, the proliferation of weapons and the lack of a robust party system. Although such complex risk factors cannot be easily overcome, the elections in 2010 showed that adequate measures can effectively reduce electoral violence. To counter electoral violence in the forthcoming electoral cycles in 2013 and 2016, USAID commissioned a study to analyze the phenomenon of election-related violence and the level of electoral security administration capacity in the Philippines in 2012. The analysis implemented the methodology of the ‘Electoral Security Framework’, “a toolkit to profile electoral conflict as well as to plan and program for preventing, managing or mediating these conflicts”. It entailed an assessment of the political context, the stakeholders, and the history of electoral violence. Building upon that, strategies and specific programmatic steps are devised taking into account planning considerations, such as the limits of local capacities or donor priorities and constraints. 

• Maintain collaboration with electoral stakeholders towards the next round of elections 

National and local government elections may be held in different years. In some contexts, elections for local, provincial and federal authorities may take place in different years. If by-elections and primary elections are hotly contested, security sector agencies may have additional electoral security responsibilities. It is therefore important that SSAs maintain collaboration with all relevant electoral stakeholders, even throughout the period when election-related activities are not taking place on the ground. The period following the announcement of election results may be used to hold bilateral and multilateral meetings between electoral stakeholders in order to discuss successes and challenges relating to collaboration and coordination during the different phases of the electoral cycle. 

C.         Improved infrastructure for peace

When elections are organized in societies that face high levels of violence, there is a likelihood that existing violence will spill over into electoral processes and affect electoral actors, events, materials and facilities. International IDEA has mapped ten structural factors, identified by different researchers, which have triggered or contributed to triggering election-related violence in different electoral contexts. These factors include:

• Poor socio-economic conditions;
• Social and political exclusion;
• Conflict relating to changing power dynamics;
• Gender-based discrimination and violence;
• The presence of non-state armed actors;
• The presence of organized crime;
• Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes;
• Human rights violations;
• Environmental hazards; and
• Unethical media reporting.

There is a broad academic and practitioners’ literature that elaborates strategies for addressing these structural factors of conflict. Strengthening of the state and non-state actors, which constitute national infrastructures for peace, to address structural causes of conflict is a long-term process that will ultimately contribute to the narrower efforts focused on the organization of peaceful elections. Specific action points relating to addressing the structural factors of social conflict remain outside of the scope of this Guide. The broader literature should be consulted in this respect.

[1]    ‘Will Honduras Have Free and Fair Elections?’, Aljazeera, 20 November 2012, available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestoryamericas/2012/11/2012112051713508222.html>, accessed 8 April 2013.

[2]     International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), ‘Honduras Evaluates Election Performance, Plans for General Elections in November’, 21 March 2013, available at <http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Articles/2013/Honduras-Evaluates-Election-Performance-Plans-for-General-Elections-in-November.aspx>, accessed 8 April 2013.

[3]     Contribution from the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) by Mosotho Moepya, Chief Electoral Officer of the IEC, and Stuart Murphy, Manager, Delimitation and Voting of the IEC, 30 April 2013.

[4]     International IDEA, Electoral Management during Transition: Challenges and Opportunities (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2012), p. 8.

[5]     International Crisis Group, Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis’, Africa Report No. 123, 28 March 2007, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-s-elections-avoiding- political-crisis>, accessed 8 May 2018

[6]    ‘INEC to Prosecute 1 m Voters’, Vanguard, 16 April 2012, available at <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/inec-to-prosecute-1-m-voters>, accessed 8 January 2013.

[7]     Think Africa Press, ‘The Impact of Service Delivery on South Africa’s Local Government Elections’, 8 April 2011

[8]     Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), Annual Report 2007, March 2007 p. 34, available at <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=93212>, accessed 18 April 2013.

[9] Creative Associates International/USAID (2012): Electoral Security Assessment Philippines. – Available at < HYPERLINK "http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2003/01/Creative-Philippines-Electoral-Security-Assessment-Final.pdf> accessed: 20.01.2017.

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‘Early warning analysis is a messy business and, inevitably, the results will be imperfect and understandably subject to questioning’ (Clarke 2005, 82)[1]. Matveeva (2006, 13)[2] suggests that early warning systems can be distinguished by whether they adhere mainly to a quantitative or a qualitative methodology. A study by Barton et al (2008, 2)[3] of 30 conflict prediction models points to a wide range of conflict early warning methodologies, from qualitative assessment to complex regression and systems dynamics analysis.

Early warning methods developed around elections analyse both qualitative and quantitative data. Decisions on which methodology to adopt might be influenced by the availability of early warning tools and the capacity of implementing organisation to utilise them effectively. Operational considerations include conceptualisation of observable indicators and sources, as well as data collection, analysis and presentation methods. This is also applicable to electoral violence early warning efforts.

[1] Clarke, J.N. 2005, ‘Early Warning Analysis for Humanitarian Preparedness and Conflict Prevention’. Civil Wars 7, no. 1: 71–97.

[2] Matveeva, A. 2006. ‘Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas – The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict’, Issue Paper 1. European Centre for Conflict Prevention/International Secretariat of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, The Hague.

[3] Barton, F., and K. von Hippel, with S. Squeira and M. Irvine. 2008. ‘Early Warning? A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems’. PCR Project Special Briefing, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.

Observable indicators and sources

Once relevant risk factors to electoral processes are identified (by using the framework elaborated in Part II), the decision about the observable indicators of the factors needs to be made. For example, for the factor ‘heated party campaign’, indicators might be observed quantitatively, for instance in the number of hate speeches, or in the quality of legislation that regulates political party campaigning. Data might exist in a rough format, such as official statistics and reports, or they might require collection. Sometimes analysis will require that different data are combined. The transformation of qualitative data into quantifiable categories will often improve handling and presentation of data.

Data collection, analysis and presentation

Nyheim (2009)^[1] argues that the future of early warning lies in adopting and capitalising on innovative information communication technologies for data collection, communication, visualisation and analysis. A comparative study of several IT based tools developed and used by different electoral stakeholders will help to illustrate common approaches in analysis and presentation of the electoral risk data.

Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) Mexico is generating electoral risk maps by assessing risks associated with different factors, including drug trafficking, homicides, robbery, kidnapping, poverty and electoral complexity. Risk levels are projected on a scale of low, mid or high risk. Relevant data are generated by INE or obtained through cooperation and exchange with other government agencies. The risk analysis, presented through colour-coded geographical maps, is used by INE and other agencies to ensure conflict-sensitive planning of electoral operations and related security arrangements. See figure below:              

 

La Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE) in Colombia is generating electoral risk maps by analysing the rough data sets, some of which are produced and made available by the government. MOE undertakes statistical tests to establish regions in which data deviates. Data sets might include voter turnout figures. Risk analysis, presented through colour-coded geographical maps, is used to inform the broader public, including academics and news agencies, and the government about electoral risks. The established quality of the analysis has influenced the government’s actions and parliamentary discussions. See figure below:       

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Centre for Monitoring Electoral Violence (CMEV) in Sri Lanka is generating online maps of election-related incidents collected by civil society networks. Factors observed include incidents relating to voter intimidation, campaigning irregularities, violation of electoral procedures, threats against electoral monitors and attacks on candidates. CMEV is presenting this data by placing the static markers on a Google Map. Markers point to a geographical location where incidents have taken place. Information is shared publicly, through media and websites, with the intention to stimulate government action. See below figure:     

 

USHAHIDI is an online platform available as a global public facility. The UCHAGUZI version is customised to gather information on election-related conflicts and violence. The platform uses Google Maps to present the data on election-related incidents collected through crowdsourcing. Data can be presented in the form of static markers, pointing to individual incidents, or through the aggregate numbers. The platform is used by a number of civil society organisations to inform public or organisations responsible for conducting elections. See figure below: 

International IDEA’s ‘Electoral Risk Management Tool’, which is being tested in several countries, is a desktop application that allows the user to create a country model and populate it with the relevant factors. Risks associated with the model factors can be presented in colour-coded maps, trend charts, static markers and aggregated figures shown on a map. The tool is designed to enhance the early warning and violence prevention capacity of organisations mandated to organise credible and peaceful elections, such as EMBs and security sector agencies (SSAs), as well as other interested organisations. The tool has been offered as a global public good since 2013. See below figure: 

 

Figure Example of a colour-coded map with static markers and cumulative factors, accompanied by a trend chart.

This comparative overview portrays the main IT-based methods for presenting electoral early warning analysis and highlights their advantages, disadvantages and synergies:

Geographical colour-coding is used to present risks associated with given factor(s) in different administrative or geographical regions. Data are presented on a map, and risk levels are coded in colour. This type of risk mapping is useful for communicating complex risk concepts in a simple and understandable way, but the disadvantage is that it allows only for a snapshot analysis. If the data are collected in successive rounds, geographical colour-coding cannot provide an insight into changing trends. This method is therefore particularly useful for illustrating risks associated with structural factors.

Trend charting is a widely used analytical methodology that is applied less often in the field of electoral violence early warning. Trend charts are useful in providing insight and communicating information about the dynamic factors whose risk properties may frequently change. The disadvantage is that it requires methodologically consistent and frequent data collection, which entails skills, time and resources. However, the combination of trend charting and geographical colour-coding methodologies offsets the deficiencies.

Geographical static markers are valuable analytical indicators for presenting the dichotomous variables on geographical maps. Markers pinpoint the location of an incident, enabling focused mitigation action and prevention of future incidents. The density of static markers in the region will be indicative of the risk levels and the level of action required. The disadvantage of this method is that it records events that have already happened. Furthermore, the presentation of a large number of static markers on small size maps may be messy.

Aggregated figures presented on geographical maps are used to point to the dimension of a factor, for example the aggregate number of incidents in a given region. This methodology may be used to aggregate, and numerically present, incidents recorded through static markers and thus improve and simplify their presentation.

 Early warning methodologies need ongoing improvement, with guidelines put in place for evaluating the effectiveness of different early warning measures. Infrastructure for peace (I4P, elaborated in Part III 1) adds the critical dimension needed for maximising efficiency of electoral violence early warning, prevention and mitigation. On the other hand, electoral violence early warning methodologies and tools can be designed with flexibility to fit different national and electoral contexts; to appeal to diverse pool of users; and to process different types of data close to real time. Such tools can be the cement which will strengthen these complex peacebuilding structures.

Contributors

The Elections and Conflict topic area was developed by Sead Alihodzic and Erik Asplund. Part I is original contribution, apart from section on gender based violence in elections that is contributed by IFES. Part II is largely based on International IDEA’s publications: The Guide on Factors of Election-related Violence Internal to Electoral Processes (2013) written by Sead Alihodžić and Erik Asplund, and The Guide on Factors of Election-related Violence External to Electoral Processes (2013) written by Sead Alihodžić and Catalina Uribe Burcher. Part III is largely based on The Guide on Action Points for the Prevention and Mitigation of Election-related Violence (2013) written by Sead Alihodžić and Erik Asplund, and Alihodžić S. (2013), Electoral Violence Early Warning and Infrastructures for Peace, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 7:3, 54-69.

Special thanks go to Virginia Beramendi, Oliver Joseph, Natasha Ikners, Mark Salter and Sofia Bingermark for their support in editing, and to Eva Johais and Alexander Raffoul for their research contributions. Thanks further extend to peer-reviewers from ACE partner organizations who provided insightful comments, in particular to Virginia Spinks and Avery Davis-Roberts from The Carter Centre, Aleida Ferreyra and Risa Arai from the UNDP, Gabrielle Bardall, Ryan Bennett and Vasu Mohan from IFES for reviewing and contributing to the final draft and, to IFES for contributing section on violence against women in elections (2.3), and to Sara Staino and Heather Szilagyi who both coordinated partners’ inputs.

Sead Alihodzic has over 20 years of professional experience working with elections, democratization, and peace building. In 2008, Sead joined the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) where, as Senior Programme Officer, he is in charge of the Elections and Conflict project work. In addition to afore mentioned publications, Sead authored several articles on the topics of elections, violence, early warning, risk management in elections, and democracy promotion, including: Risk Management in Elections (International IDEA Policy Paper No.14, 2016); The mechanics of democracy promotion tools: bridging the knowledge-to-practice gap (Development in Practice, 2016); Prevention and Mitigation of Election-related Violence – A Three Layered Approach (New Routes – A journal of peace research and action, 2012); ‘Elections, Violence and Peace’ (‘Ballots or Bullets: Potentials and Limitations of Elections in Conflict Contexts; Swisspeace Annual Conference 2010’). Sead holds a Master’s degree from the University of Essex

Erik Asplund is a Programme Officer with International IDEA’s Electoral Processes Programme. He joined the institute in 2009 working on Democracy Analysis and Assessment and the Electoral Risk Management Tool. His current work on institutional strengthening and professional development in elections focuses on: Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) project; the ACE project; electoral risk management; and electoral management design, with a focus on electoral training, education and research facilities. From 2015–16 he worked as the Coordinator of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. He has worked with electoral management bodies in Africa, Asia, the Arab World, Europe, North America and Latin America on various electoral capacity development projects. Before joining International IDEA, Asplund worked in the Gambia on democracy and human rights projects. He has also worked for several think tanks including Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). He holds a Master’s degree in international studies from Uppsala University, Sweden.