The electoral
legal framework is composed of the constitutional provisions, legislation,
rules, regulations and procedures that govern the electoral system design, the
formation of electoral institutions and bodies, and the implementation of
electoral activities. An inclusive, fair, concise and uncontested legal and
institutional framework is an important foundation for successful and peaceful
elections. In addition to electoral legislation and institutions,
responsibilities, rules of engagement and coordination between the security
sector agencies (SSAs) should also be detailed in the rules that govern their
electoral engagement. Following the analysis and evaluation of the previous
electoral cycle, an electoral management body (EMB) and SSAs should initiate
legal and institutional reforms to address identified weaknesses, and where
needed collaborate with other stakeholders. Other state and non-state actors
may play an important role in the facilitation of public discussion and
national consensus on the legislative and institutional framework.
|
Table 1. Legal
and institutional electoral framework
|
|
A. Improved electoral management and justice
|
B. Improved electoral security
|
C. Improved infrastructure for peace
|
- Advise political
stakeholders about an appropriate electoral system that takes into
consideration the advantages and disadvantages of different design options.
- Advise adoption
of a legal framework which will allow for the establishment of credible EMBs.
- Establish
trusted and efficient frameworks for electoral dispute resolution and
introduce mechanisms to sanction perpetrators of electoral offences.
- Design legal
provisions which facilitate credible processes for the registration of
voters, political parties and candidates.
- Introduce
regulations that define the roles and responsibilities of political parties
in the electoral processes.
- Define
collaborative mechanisms and information exchange with security sector and
other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups.
|
- Advise adoption of a legal framework that assigns
clear electoral security responsibilities to different security sector and
government agencies.
- Define rules of engagement for security sector
agencies during elections.
- Define sanctions and enforcement mechanisms against
perpetrators of electoral fraud and violence.
- Formalize collaborative mechanisms for coordination
and information exchange with electoral management bodies, other relevant
agencies and political parties.
|
- Mobilize and
involve non-state actors in discussions on the electoral framework in order
to achieve citizens’ participation and national consensus.
- Promote
understanding of the role of non-state actors in contributing to peaceful
elections, and advocate for the integration of alternative conflict
resolution mechanisms into the electoral legal framework.
- Involve the public into decision-making processes on
electoral institutions
|
A. Improved electoral management and
justice
Reform of the
legal and institutional electoral framework should draw on the evaluation of
previous electoral processes. Such evaluation is conducted in the post-election
period to identify disputed, deficient or ambiguous legal provisions and acts
which have had a negative impact on the conduct of the previous electoral
processes. The reform, among other things, needs to take into consideration
(a) the appropriateness of the electoral system; (b) the credibility
of the EMBs; (c) the effectiveness of the electoral dispute resolution
mechanisms; (d) the integrity of processes for the registration of voters,
political parties and candidates; (e) the quality of the legislation that
regulates the roles and responsibilities of political parties; (f) the
existence of mechanisms for the replacement of elected representatives;
(g) the existence of mechanisms for information exchange with security
sector and other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups; and so on. Electoral
management bodies are in a good position to initiate, advise on and influence
these changes.
- Advise political stakeholders about an appropriate
electoral system that takes into consideration the advantages and disadvantages
of different design options
The specific choices in the
electoral system may affect participation, representation, the stability of
government, the accountability of elected officials, the complexity of
electoral processes, and political pluralism.[1]
In particular, provisions relating to the formula for translating votes into
seats, district magnitude, the votes-to-seat ratio, and boundary delimitation
require careful consideration. An EMB is well positioned to advise legislators
about the practical implications of different electoral systems in a given national
and electoral context. In conflict-prone societies, an analysis may focus on
the potential of a specific electoral system design to exacerbate or mitigate
social conflict and electoral violence, including how gender-based violence can
affect the participation of women in electoral processes and their
representation in elective positions. At the very basic level, the legal
framework should ensure that elections are a level playing field for all
electoral actors.
Gender and minority quotas are introduced in
Nepal to defuse tension in 2007. Political and social exclusion is one of the
main roots of conflict in Nepal.[2]
Gender and minority representation was therefore an integral part of the
electoral law reform preceding the 2007 Constituent Assembly of Nepal. The
electoral system design introduced quotas for women, securing them 33 per cent
of seats, as well as for marginalized and oppressed groups and indigenous
tribes, based on their representation in the population.[3]
- Advise adoption of a legal framework which will allow
for the establishment of credible electoral management bodies
Careful consideration needs to
be given to what type of EMB will perform best in a given country context and
what will contribute to its credibility. Three major organizational modalities
exist: independent, governmental and mixed.[4]
The legal framework should establish the fundamental principles that will
ensure the credibility of the EMBs. These principles include independence,
impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, professionalism and
service-mindedness.[5]
An EMB should advise the legislator about legal reforms needed to improve an
EMB’s capacity to organize credible elections. A balanced composition, for
example, geographical, ethnic, gender, linguistic, religious and other, will
increase the credibility of an EMB.
Reform of the Indonesian National Election
Commission in 1999 builds trust in democratic processes. ‘To indicate a
breakaway from an old election system which allowed manipulation with electoral
processes and massive election fraud in the past’, a new electoral law was
adopted in early 1999. This led to the establishment of an independent National
Election Commission (NEC). To promote trust, the Commission was composed of
representatives from each of the competing 48 political parties and five
government-appointed officials. In 1999, the NEC delivered the first open and
competitive election since 1955. During the elections, approximately 100
million Indonesians cast their ballot.[6]
- Establish trusted and efficient electoral dispute
resolution mechanisms and introduce mechanisms to sanction perpetrators of
electoral offences
The legal framework for
electoral dispute resolution should ensure that electoral actions, procedures
and decisions throughout the electoral cycle are in conformity with the law and
based on the right to an effective remedy.[7]
Electoral dispute resolution mechanisms can take on four separate types of
challenge: (a) administrative, (b) judicial, (c) legislative and
(d) international. The type of challenge will typically dictate which
institution will be responsible for hearing and resolving the dispute
concerned. Administrative challenges, which are the most common type of
challenge, are addressed and usually resolved by the EMBs. Contested EMB decisions
can be revisited either by the same organ or by a higher-ranking organ such as
a constitutional court.[8]
This system is widespread. Judicial challenges are addressed to judicial
bodies, which may be regular or administrative courts, a constitutional court
or special electoral courts as defined by law. Legislative challenges
systems allow legislative bodies or other defined political assemblies to
resolve electoral disputes.[9]
‘The international means for bringing electoral challenges are those
legal instruments provided for in international treaties and conventions (for
example the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights) after exhausting the domestic remedies provided.’[10]
Well-functioning electoral dispute resolution mechanisms have an inherent
potential to prevent violence. The legal framework should therefore be simple,
clear and consistent, making it easily understandable and ensuring complete and
effective access to the system for resolving electoral disputes. Because the
electoral process cannot be halted if a challenge is introduced, the timeliness
of challenge submission and dispute resolution mechanisms is essential if the
credibility of the electoral process is not to be affected.[11]
Where individuals and groups
feel they have impunity from prosecution they may be tempted to engage in
electoral fraud or perpetrate acts of election-related violence to achieve
political gains. When this is a risk, an EMB should get a mandate to
investigate, prosecute and sanction perpetrators of electoral offences
independently or in collaboration with other relevant agencies.
Improvement of the electoral dispute resolution
system in Bhutan, 2008. After the 2008 parliamentary election, which saw some political violence,[12]
the EMB conducted a self-assessment of its electoral dispute resolution
mechanisms. Based on the analysis of electoral complaints lodged during the
2008 elections, the Electoral Commission improved the rules and procedures for
the submission of electoral challenges. It was noted that in some instances
dealing with less severe complaints at the district level enhanced the
effectiveness of electoral dispute resolution as disputes would be resolved
faster and the central body could receive fewer complaints. Consequently, the
electoral dispute resolution system became more effective and transparent.[13]
The EMB sets up an Investigation and Prosecution
Department in Kenya, 2012–2013. A sense of impunity among political and
electoral officials is seen as an important factor that contributed to the
violent outcomes of the 2007 Kenyan presidential elections. Ahead of the 2013
general election, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)
started building its capacity to investigate and prosecute election offences by
setting up an Investigation and Prosecution Department. Neither the preceding
Election Commission of Kenya (2002–2008) nor the Interim Independent Election
Commission (2008–2011) had this mandate. The November 2011 Election Act gave
the IEBC the mechanisms to settle electoral disputes, prosecute any offences
defined under the Election Act, and impose sanctions against electoral
offenders.[14]
- Design legal provisions which facilitate credible
processes for the registration of voters, political parties and candidates
The legal framework for voter
registration should establish legal clarity and be conflict-sensitive in order
to generate preventive potential.[15]
Laws regulating voter registration must ensure that there are no disfranchised
categories. It is of the greatest importance, especially in conflict-prone
societies, that no ethnic, religious or other social group feels
disenfranchised or marginalized through boundary delimitation or other legal
provision that may impact on their right to register for voting. The procedural
criteria for political parties and candidates’ registration should be clear,
reasonable and transparent.[16]
At the same time, they should not offer a pretext for banning parties.[17]
This legislation should be designed in a way which will enhance political
pluralism, encourage reconciliation processes, and enhance gender equality and
respect for human rights.
Registration of displaced persons and refugees
during elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996–1997. The international
community intervened to end the violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1992–1995) and mediate the peace agreement. The peace agreement stipulated
that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) would be
mandated to supervise implementation of the post-war elections. The Provisional
Election Commission, working under the supervision of the OSCE, adopted rules
and regulations which allowed displaced people and refugees to vote in their
pre-war municipalities. This largely defused tensions among the displaced
groups.[18]
The Seychelles introduce a year-round voter registration and
inspection of the electoral roll, 2015. The 2011 parliamentary elections in
the Seychelles were boycotted by the main opposition party because the
government had not met the demand to revise the electoral law. This situation
created tensions. To address the lack of trust in the accuracy of the voter
register, [19] the
reform of the electoral law, which came into effect in May 2015, introduced a
change in the process of voter registration. Under the amended law, voter
registration is now active and conducted throughout the year, resuming only the
day after the announcement of election results.[20]
Apart from the introduction of the new temporal procedure, the legislation
established the possibility for the inspection of the voter roll. The register is
now accessible to the public in all district administration offices across the
country as well as at the archives section at the National Library Building in
the capital of Victoria. Moreover, each registered political party also
receives a copy of the voter roll.
- Introduce regulations that define the roles and
responsibilities of political parties in the electoral processes
The electoral legal framework
should include provisions defining the roles and responsibilities of political
parties in the electoral processes. In particular, the electoral legal
framework should provide political parties with incentives to resolve political
conflicts through institutional frameworks and in a democratic way.[21]
One widely-used mechanism for defusing the risk of an outbreak of
election-related violence is political parties’ own codes of conduct (CoCs).
These are defined as a set of rules of behaviour for political parties and
their supporters relating to their participation in an election process.[22]
A distinction is drawn between those texts to which political parties
subscribe voluntarily and those which are imposed either by law or by some
other authority. CoCs may therefore be: (a) a part of the electoral law or
a particular provision in the electoral law that prescribes the conduct of the
parties; (b) agreed by political parties as an outcome of negotiations
among themselves or as a result of negotiations moderated by a third party;
(c) agreed by the parties, and then embodied in law; or
(d) determined by a third party, such as an EMB. If codes of conduct are
embedded in the legislative framework, they are more likely to be implemented
and enforced. They can prevent and defuse tensions by prohibiting the use of
hate speech and violent means during the campaign and by including commitments
for parties losing the elections to have to accept the election results and
work together to maintain peace in the post-election period, as well as other
measures including those directed towards the prevention and elimination of
gender-based violence. CoCs may further become powerful tools for building
confidence, as well as creating and promoting relationships.[23]
The process leading to the
formulation of a CoC may be initiated, driven, and facilitated in cooperation
with civil society representatives or negotiated in party liaison committees.
However, there are a number of challenges in terms of implementation and
enforcement of such codes, in particular when political parties use violence as
a political instrument.[24]
Stakeholders’ public declarations and commitments to respect a CoC can
reinforce implementation, particularly if they are made jointly.
Institutionalized monitoring of the codes of conduct, as well as public and
civil society pressure directed at parties which disregard them, may also
facilitate implementation
An electoral legal framework is introduced to
sanction parties and candidates linked with organized crime in Colombia, 2009. Organized crime
has been largely responsible for election-related violence in Colombia for the
last decade. This violence is linked to efforts by criminal actors to get hold
of power over the local governments during local elections through their
connections with the politicians.[25]
Since 2009, penalties have been introduced for those parties that support
candidates with links to illegal armed groups or are facing charges for crimes
against humanity and drug trafficking.[26]
Furthermore, political parties are not allowed to replace an elected member of
parliament who has been convicted of crimes against humanity or links to
illegal groups. The law concerning the filling of these vacant seats provides
political parties with incentives to avoid nominating candidates with suspected
links to illegal groups.[27]
- Define collaborative mechanisms and information
exchange with security sector and other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups
Cooperation with security
sector agencies will help electoral management bodies to ensure that electoral
security arrangements are put in place to protect electoral stakeholders,
including election officials, facilities, events and materials. The
establishment of collaborative mechanisms that facilitate information exchange
and joint action will be beneficial to both electoral and security
organizations. If collaboration structures and procedures are defined in the
electoral legal framework, this will ensure that coordination is structured and
not left to chance.
The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Federal Electoral
(IFE)[28],
established a formal mechanism for collaboration with security sector agencies
ahead of the 2012 federal elections. As a result of the number of attacks on civil
society by organized criminal organizations, which had caused uncertainty and
fear ahead of the 2012 federal election, the IFE initiated formal cooperation
with a number of Mexican agencies in order to protect the electoral process.
These included the Federal Police, the Army, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes (FEPADE), the Federal Electoral Tribunal
(TEPFJ), the Navy, the intelligence agency (CISEN), local governments,
communications (TELMEX), and infrastructure agencies (water and electricity).
Through an inter-agency collaborative process, the IFE reached a formal political
agreement with the security sector agencies (SSAs) and other organizations on
how to respond to the threat of election-related violence during the election
period. Practical aspects included agreement on the exchange of risk data and
analysis between the IFE and its partners during and after the 2012 federal
elections. The formal information-sharing mechanism between the IFE and the
SSAs contributed towards a positive environment between partners, enhanced
inter-agency coordination and increased election security during the elections.
B. Improved electoral security
Security sector
agencies are mandated to provide safety to electoral actors, events, materials
and information throughout the electoral cycle. In doing this, SSAs may follow
regular rules of engagement. However, practice shows that, due to the specific
dynamics of political and social mobilization and conflicts during elections,
the SSAs may benefit from specific legal provisions referring to their
electoral duties. These provisions can define the responsibilities of different
SSAs, rules of engagement when securing electoral actors, events and
facilities, enforcement of sanctions, and forms of collaboration between
different SSAs and other relevant actors during elections. In some instances,
SSAs benefit from an EMB being mandated to direct their work when they are
engaged in electoral processes.
- Advise adoption of a legal framework that assigns
clear electoral security responsibilities to different security sector and
government agencies
The legal framework that
regulates the electoral responsibilities of SSAs should establish a clear
division of responsibilities and define the specific role of the various
security sector agencies during elections. The responsibilities relating to
public safety during elections—the safety of electoral materials during
transport and storage, safeguarding of electoral facilities, intelligence
gathering, the prosecution of electoral crimes, logistical support and so
on—may be assigned to different ministries and institutions including the
police, the army, intelligence agencies, the public prosecutor’s office and so
on. Legal clarity will enhance preparedness and collaboration between the
different agencies and the establishment of collaboration with electoral management
bodies.
An EMB provides guidelines for the engagement of
security sector agencies in India, 2011. The Constitution of India has vested in the
Election Commission of India (ECI) the superintendence, direction and control
of the entire process for the conduct of elections to Parliament and the
legislature of every state and to the offices of President and Vice-President
of India.[29]
The ECI mandate includes coordination of the police forces’ engagement in and
around elections. The ECI’s Compendium of Instructions presents guidelines and
directives to the Indian Central Police Force as well as the state police. The
‘maintenance of law and order and deployment of security forces and home guard’
section, among other things, describes the need for a ‘number of measures over
and above the purview of normal law and order arrangements, for augmenting the
measures taken for peaceful, free and fair poll’.[30]
- Define rules of engagement for security sector
agencies during elections
The conventional routines for
engagement of law enforcement agencies, usually found in ‘rules of engagement’
(RoE) or ‘use of force’ (UoF) frameworks, guide the conduct, rights and
obligations of security sector personnel in certain circumstances. In some
contexts, these frameworks may need to be reviewed ahead of elections to ensure
that the engagement of law enforcement agencies does not interfere with
democratic processes and practices. In particular, it is important to ensure
that security forces are not ‘baited into actions that may later be
politicized’.[31]
Specific rules of engagement for electoral security, based on professional
standards, may also be developed.[32]
Revision of police rules in the context of
preparations for general elections in Sierra Leone in 2012. The death of six
persons in separate incidents, involving the use of live ammunition by the
Sierra Leone Police, created concerns relating to the potential misuse of force
ahead of and during the 2012 general elections. To ensure that such incidents
do not create challenges for the management of elections, the Sierra Leone
Police, with support from the United Nations, undertook a review of its Rules
of Engagement in parallel with the development of a strategy on governance
mechanisms in the force ahead of the general election in November 2012.[33]
- Define sanctions and enforcement mechanisms against
perpetrators of electoral fraud and violence
Researchers point to the
increased importance of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms directed against
perpetrators of electoral violence. Höglund and Jarstad (2010) argue that ‘more
attention needs to be directed at measures which can support the implementation
of the legal framework. Without sanctions against those breaking the electoral
law, including violence makers, a culture of impunity is upheld’.[34]
The report of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security (2012)
finds that ‘electoral violence is more likely in a context in which
institutions like the courts, the criminal justice system, the security forces,
and the media are corrupt or too weak to carry out their roles in the face of
violence and intimidation. To ensure long-term electoral security, there is no
substitute for ending the impunity that often surrounds electoral violence’.[35]
This, however, requires meeting the rule-of-law challenges, and the development
of ‘institutions, processes, and networks that deter election-related violence
and, should deterrence fail, hold perpetrators accountable’.[36]
- Formalize collaborative mechanisms for coordination
and information exchange with electoral management bodies, other relevant
agencies and political parties
Enhanced information exchange
and coordination between security sector agencies and other electoral actors is
required during elections. Practice shows that these collaborative mechanisms
require flexibility and the commitment of the organizations involved. Given the
mandate of SSAs to provide electoral security, they represent a key
interlocutor to different stakeholders, including electoral management bodies,
political parties, and other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups. In
particular, the responsibilities of SSAs to collaborate with an EMB and other
state agencies should be formalized within the relevant legal framework or
through intra-institutional collaboration agreements. Collaboration will
improve information exchange and allow holistic analysis and coordination of
prevention and mitigation efforts.
The police formalize coordination with political
parties ahead of general elections in Liberia in 2011. Although the
2005 general elections were categorized as violence-free, orderly and well
managed, a few incidents of violence were recorded during the campaign phase.
This was despite the fact that political parties committed themselves to
abstain from violence and intimidation by signing a code of conduct.[37]
Ahead of the 2011 general elections, the Liberian National Police (LNP) and 11
political parties signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which regulates
the conduct of political rallies with the aim of ensuring a peaceful
environment during elections. The MoU provisions specify that (a) each
political party was expected to submit at least two focal persons to work with
the LNP during rallies, marches and campaigns, and (b) all marches would
be monitored by LNP officers in a peaceful manner.[38]
Prior to the 2016 elections, the Georgian
Central Election Commission (CEC) initiated several coordination mechanisms to
improve communication around electoral security. The CEC set up a coordination body with the police to discuss security
threats, share information, and collaborate on the development of procedures.
They also developed an electoral security training module to help train poll
workers, law enforcement officials, and security personnel. Following the
trainings, poll workers met with their local security counterparts to ensure
that they could deploy security effectively if needed. Election Day was
relatively peaceful, and the CEC now has an established mechanism and
communication strategy with their security counterparts.
C. Improved
infrastructure for peace
Improved
infrastructure for peace (I4P) relates to putting in place standing
capabilities for peace building and conflict prevention from the community to
the national level. These strategies may include mobilization and coordination
of state and non-state actors, including civil society organizations (CSOs),
traditional and religious leaders, reputable individuals and other
organizations and individuals that have the capacity to contribute in
preventing and defusing social conflicts. The value of the infrastructures of
peace in the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence in
different national contexts is well documented.[39] The initial electoral phase, in which
legal and institutional frameworks for the organization and conduct of
elections are discussed, provides an opportunity for early engagement of
various state and non-state actors. On the one hand, they can engage in
facilitation of a national consensus relating to electoral legal frameworks; on
the other hand, they can promote and advocate for the acknowledgement of the
role that civil society groups and traditional leaders may have in resolving
electoral disputes.
- Mobilize
and involve non-state actors in discussions on the electoral framework in order
to achieve citizens’ participation and national consensus
The involvement of multiple
stakeholders, who share a mandate and an interest in contributing to peaceful
elections, in the discussion on the reform of the electoral legal framework may
be crucial for avoiding legal controversies at later stages. When processes are
not inclusive and trusted, non-state actors can take initiatives to convene
cooperative forums aiming to bring together relevant stakeholders, including
EMBs, political parties, security sector agencies, traditional or customary
governance structures and civil society organizations. These forums may create
an environment of ownership and trust and ensure the involvement of minority
groups and balanced gender representation. They can work to secure the
commitment of the organizations involved to adhere to, or implement,
conclusions resulting from the discussions. If national actors are unwilling to
agree on reforms, international specialists and/ or reputable individuals may
be involved to mediate and help align processes to international standards and
obligations. Notwithstanding, the primary responsibility remains with the
various national stakeholders.
Civil society helps to resolve legal deadlocks
ahead of the 2005 presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau. The 2005
presidential election was intended to mark the end of Guinea-Bissau’s history
of trouble marked by civil war and political violence. In 2003, a Transitional
Charter was adopted to allow the transitional government to govern the country
until the new leadership was elected. Ahead of the 2005 presidential elections,
the Citizens’ Goodwill Task Force (CGWTF), supported by the International Peace
and Prosperity Project, engaged international legal experts in a review of the electoral
laws regarding candidacy for public office contained within the Transitional
Charter. After expert review, the CGWTF recommended that the Charter’s legal
status should be recognized by the High Court in order to resolve issues
relating to candidates’ eligibility to run for presidential office.[40]
The CGWTF also drafted an election code of conduct to promulgate an
‘issue-based and peaceful campaign’. It was endorsed by all but one of the
presidential candidates. The code of conduct was distributed in French and
Arabic and presented in rural areas by the country’s main religious and civil
society leaders. International organizations and national leaders praised the
CGWTF’s efforts as important in contributing to enhanced national debate on the
electoral legal framework.[41]
- Promote
understanding of the role of non-state actors in contributing to peaceful
elections, and advocate for the integration of alternative conflict resolution
mechanisms into the electoral legal framework
The effect of the efforts of formal
institutions, such as EMBs and SSAs, to prevent and mitigate election-related
violence may be maximized if they are combined with existing peace building and
conflict prevention initiatives. These may include national mediation panels,
peace councils, traditional and religious leaders, and reputable institutions
and individuals, including women’s organizations and activists that work to
promote gender equality and participation. Formal recognition and integration
of these actors in the electoral legal framework, as part of dispute mediation
and resolution, may be an effective strategy to prevent and mitigate
election-related violence.
The Electoral Law of South Africa recognizes the
role of the local peace committees in mediation of electoral disputes. The transition
from apartheid to a new democratic order from 1991 to 1994 was supported by a
fairly well-developed peace architecture, with the local peace committees as
the primary strategy to prevent violence. These committees were a product of
the National Peace Accord signed on September 1991 by 27 South African
stakeholders, including the government, the main political parties and the
major liberation movements. The South African Electoral Law (103A, insertion to
the 2003 amendment to the Electoral Act, no. 34, 2003) states that the
Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa can resolve any electoral
dispute, complaint or infringement of the code of conduct through conciliation
or mediation.[42]
- Involve the public into
decision-making processes on electoral institutions
Mistrust in the integrity of an electoral process can stem from a lack of
knowledge about the institutions and practices of the election administration.
To avoid confusion and the spread of rumours, campaigns to inform voters about
how the organization of election works can be launched. Apart from that,
initiatives to involve the public in the process of the operationalization of
the EMB and provide the opportunity of an exchange between the public and the
election administrators can enhance transparency of and confidence in the
electoral process.
The Civil Network OPORA and the local Council of
Europe Office organize a public discussion with the candidates for members of
the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Ukraine. The public trust in the CEC has been low and civil society activists
raise doubts on the independence of the Commission[43].
These doubts put the credibility of the electoral process at risk. The CEC of
Ukraine is appointed by the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukranian parliament, upon the
submission of the President[44].
To increase the transparency of the decision-making process, OPORA and the
Ukrainian Council of Europe office invited civil society, expert community,
media and members of Ukrainian Parliament to meet the candidates for the CEC
proposed by the President. The event gave the opportunity to inquire into the
candidates perspectives on election administration issues and on reforms of the
legal framework for elections in general and the CEC in particular.
[19] Commonwealth (2011): Election
Observation Report, pp. 9-12. - Available at:
http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/SC/seychelles-final-report-presidential-election/at_download/file
[20] Elections Act as at 19 October
2015, Part. II, Art. 7 + 8. – Available at:
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/42539/106551/F1293552907/SEY42539%202015.pdf
[28] Following a Constitutional reform, the mandate of the
Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) was broadened and the name changed to
Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE)
[43] Poll: Citizens have low level of
confidence in CEC and Supreme Administrative Court, Kyiv Post (December 28,
2009) - https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/poll-citizens-have-low-level-of-confidence-in-cec-56034.html
; European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE): OPORA: Credibility of new
Central Election Commission in Ukraine at Risk - http://www.epde.org/en/newsreader/items/opora-credibility-of-new-central-election-commission-in-ukraine-at-risk.html
[44] The Law of Ukraine "On the
Central Election Commission", No. 1932-IV (1932-15), dated June 30, 2004,
promulgated July 9, 2004: http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/7148
