The electoral cycle approach underlines the cyclical nature of
electoral processes. It reiterates that elections are not isolated events, but
interlinked processes. Therefore, following the announcement of election
results, electoral stakeholders should initiate evaluations of the past
electoral cycle in order to identify areas that need improvement. This is also
true for security sector agencies and organizations that form national
infrastructures for peace.
The length of the post-election period may differ from country to
country. In most cases, if national and local elections are organized together,
elections usually take place every four to five years; if they are held
separately, a country may have elections every two years. In any case, it is
useful to engage in the post-electoral evaluation shortly after the final
election results have been announced. Such an evaluation will benefit from
stakeholders’ feedback, while memories are fresh, and provide sufficient time
to address process weaknesses and structural causes of election-related
tensions and violence before the next election. In addition, it will provide
important reference points to inform the discussion in the first phase of the
next electoral cycle, when the legal and institutional framework is revised.
|
Table 8. The
post-electoral phase
|
|
A.
Improved electoral management and justice
|
B.
Improved electoral security
|
C.
Improved infrastructure for peace
|
- Evaluate the legal framework and
identify areas that need to be reformed.
- Evaluate the institutional
performance of electoral management and justice bodies and identify needs for
institutional reform.
- Assess staff performance and identify
needs for professional capacity building.
- Identify practices that will lead to
improved collaboration with security sector agencies and other state and
non-state actors
|
- Evaluate the institutional
performance of the security sector agencies and identify capacity-building
needs.
- Maintain collaboration with electoral
stakeholders towards the next round of elections.
|
- Address structural factors of
conflict:
- Poor socio-economic conditions;
- Social and political exclusion;
- Conflict relating to changing power
dynamics;
- Gender-based discrimination and
violence;
- The presence of non-state armed
actors;
- The presence of organized crime;
- Grievances relating to genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes;
- Human rights violations;
- Environmental hazards;
- Unethical media reporting.
|
A.
Improved electoral management and justice
Electoral processes are complex and dynamic. Even the most
successful elections will face challenges and experience problems. Following
the announcement of the election results, an EMB should initiate an evaluation
of the processes. The evaluation should focus on internal processes and
achievements relating to the implementation of the overall institutional
mandate, and include details, such as the performance of individual
departments, sub-national offices and short-term personnel, communication
challenges, finances and so on. Evaluation should identify both successes and
unfulfilled objectives. This will help the promotion of good practices and
identifying areas where legal and institutional reforms and human capacity
building are needed. Furthermore, an EMB should assess how it managed its
relationship with external stakeholders, such as the security sector agencies,
political parties, civil society and international observer groups, media and
the citizens, in order to identify needs and spaces for improvement.
- Evaluate the legal
framework and identify areas that need to be reformed
The electoral legal
framework may require periodic updating and improvement to ensure that it
provides solid ground rules for the conduct of credible elections. The
post-electoral period is a proper time for an EMB to reflect on this. On the
one hand, memories are fresh. On the other, an EMB does not face immediate
operational deadlines, so it has sufficient time to analyse and understand the
practical effects of different laws, rules and regulations. In particular, an
EMB can examine the extent to which implementation, or lack of implementation,
of specific items of legislation or rules and regulations has generated tension
or triggered violence. An EMB should document such cases and use them to
initiate and inform legal reforms during the initial phase of the subsequent
electoral cycle.
The Honduras EMB, the
Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), conducts evaluation of the 2012 primary
elections. Ahead of the 2012 primary elections in Honduras, the first since the
presidential coup in 2009, several incidents of election-related violence
directed against political party candidates were recorded.[1] During
the post-election period, the TSE, with the assistance of the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), conducted an evaluation of the
electoral process. Using the SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and
threats) analysis, the TSE assessed its administrative performance as well as
identifying opportunities and challenges ahead of the 2013 general elections.
In general, the evaluation found the TSE’s current organizational structure to
be ‘obtuse and outdated’. Some of the specific challenges and threats
identified included ‘uncontrolled variables’ such as electoral legal and
institutional reform, budgetary restrictions and political interference. The
evaluation included recommendations that the TSE could implement to improve its
overall performance.[2] In
addition, the evaluation was designed to provide input to the planning for the
2013 general elections.
Post-election evaluation
leads to amendments to the electoral law in South Africa. In South Africa it is
standard practice for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to evaluate
its performance following a general election. An evaluation session is also
conducted with political parties represented on the National Political Party
Liaison Committee. Ahead of the 2009 national and provincial elections in South
Africa, the Constitutional Court ruled that the law on voting abroad was
unconstitutional in limiting the franchise to registered South African citizens
who were temporarily abroad. During the post-2009 election evaluation, the
electoral law was aligned with the 2009 Constitutional Court ruling, allowing
citizens to register and vote from abroad. Legislative amendments were shared
with members of the National Party Liaison Committee in an effort to obtain the
buy-in of political parties before the proposed changes were debated in the
Parliament. Should parties remain dissatisfied, the legislation may be referred
to the Constitutional Court for a final decision.[3]
- Evaluate the institutional
performance of electoral management and justice bodies and identify needs for
institutional reform
There are three main
organizational models of an EMB: (a) independent, (b) governmental
and (c) mixed.[4] Any
of these models may be appropriate for a given country depending on several
factors that include the particular circumstances and needs of the country at
the time. The actual structure of each of three main models may vary further.
Some key variables relate to organizational leadership, executive powers, the
design of operational competences, the hierarchy of national and sub-national
structures, electoral dispute resolution capacities and so on. Some of these
may be detailed in the electoral legal framework and result from specific
mandates. However, some decisions may be made internally. An EMB may face
different challenges from one electoral cycle to another. It is therefore
important to periodically assess and adjust the internal organizational
structures to ensure that an EMB can deal with all challenges effectively. To
address challenges relating to increased risks and incidents of
election-related violence, an EMB should strengthen its capacity to understand
and analyse internal and external risks and manage conflicts that threaten to
develop into violence. The capacity to collaborate on and coordinate electoral
security issues with external organizations should also be developed. The post-election
phase will allow time for an EMB to assess and plan these important
institutional reforms.
An EMB cooperates closely
with the police and judiciary to prosecute perpetrators of electoral offences
following the 2011 general elections in Nigeria. The Nigerian elections in
1999, 2003 and 2007 were marked by widespread election-related violence.[5] However,
no evidence exists that a single person was prosecuted for an election offence
during that time. Following the 2011 general elections, which also witnessed
several incidents of election-related violence, the Independent National
Election Commission (INEC), with the support of the Nigerian police and the
judiciary, started arresting and prosecuting electoral offenders. The INEC also
worked together with the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) to facilitate the
prosecution at minimal cost.[6] Although
the INEC has prosecuted ‘more offenders than any other EMB in the history of
Nigeria’, the INEC Chairman stated that the process was slow considering the
number of cases still pending before various courts. He also suggested the
establishment of a separate agency to handle election offences due to the
INEC’s lack of capacity, in terms of funds and manpower, to manage elections
and prosecute electoral offenders at the same time.
- Assess staff performance
and identify needs for professional capacity building
Electoral
management and dispute resolution bodies need continuous development of their
professional competencies. This is particularly important for bodies which are
not organized as permanent and independent structures, and organizations that
face a high staff turnover. In addition, the adoption of new electoral
management routines and systems, including IT solutions, will increase the need
for capacity building. The post-election period will allow an EMB to focus on
assessing the capacity-building needs and identifying training for relevant
staff at all levels. National EMBs can benefit from international training
programmes. For example, the BRIDGE training curriculum is the most prominent
course offered by a number of electoral support providers to national EMBs.
Some prominent EMBs, such as the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) of Mexico
and the Election Commission of India (ECI), also have training centres through
which they promote peer-to-peer training programmes, including specialized
electoral security courses. However, it is important to ensure that the
capacity building is not limited to the institutional leadership and that there
are internal mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge.
The
Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa introduces a performance
assessment system and training scheme following the 2006 municipal elections.
Following the 2006 municipal elections, which saw widespread protests before
election day,[7] the
Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) established an internal
performance assessment system. All members of staff were trained and assessed
in terms of key result areas and key performance indicators. In general, the
system allowed the IEC to ‘reward meritorious performance and to identify
skills development needs’. From early 2006 until early 2007, 107 IEC staff
members were provided with internal or external skills development and training
in various areas which included project management, supply chain management,
certificates in IT and Geographic Information Systems.[8]
- Identify practices that
will lead to improved collaboration with security sector agencies and other
state and non-state actors
Throughout the electoral
cycle, an EMB will engage with numerous stakeholders, including security sector
agencies, political parties, civil society and international observer groups,
the media and citizens. The nature of this engagement may vary from
constructive collaboration and coordination to less successful engagements,
even conflict situations. During the post-election period, an EMB should
analyse how it engaged with other electoral stakeholders and identify
successful and less successful practices. This evaluation can be conducted in
collaboration with relevant organizations. Inter-agency discussions and
workshops can be organized to help in identifying good practices that can be
promoted and further strengthened, as well as areas where collaboration needs
to be built.
B.
Improved electoral security
The engagement of security
sector agencies during elections, in particular in post-conflict or
conflict-prone societies, requires increased collaboration between SSAs and
electoral management bodies. Furthermore, interactions with political parties
and the media on matters related to electoral security may be needed. The
fulfilment of the SSAs’ mandates—to create a safe environment for the conduct of
peaceful elections—may depend on their capacity to uphold their credibility in
the eyes of these actors and general public. During the post-election period,
security sector agencies should critically evaluate their engagement in order
to identify internal and external challenges (and successes) that affect the
fulfilment of their electoral mandates. These findings will inform the plans
for capacity building geared towards the next electoral cycle. They will also
point to areas where collaboration with relevant electoral stakeholders can be
improved.
- Evaluate the institutional
performance of security sector agencies and identify capacity-building
needs
During different phases of
the electoral cycle, security sector agencies will engage in different ways. They
may be focused on providing security to electoral officials, registrants and
voters, prominent political party candidates and other vulnerable individuals
and groups. They will also provide security to electoral events and safeguard
electoral materials and facilities. In the course of implementation of their
electoral security mandates, SSAs may face different internal and external
challenges. Post-electoral evaluation will allow identification of the main
challenges and successes. These may relate to the specific phases of the
electoral cycle, specific geographic regions, or specific electoral
stakeholders.
Assessment for enhanced
electoral security in 2013 and 2016.[9] The
Philippines have been plagued by a long history of electoral violence. Since
the revolution in 1986, all elections have been overshadowed by conflicts
resulting from rivalries between political clans, the proliferation of weapons
and the lack of a robust party system. Although such complex risk factors
cannot be easily overcome, the elections in 2010 showed that adequate measures
can effectively reduce electoral violence. To counter electoral violence in the
forthcoming electoral cycles in 2013 and 2016, USAID commissioned a study to
analyze the phenomenon of election-related violence and the level of electoral
security administration capacity in the Philippines in 2012. The analysis
implemented the methodology of the ‘Electoral Security Framework’, “a toolkit
to profile electoral conflict as well as to plan and program for preventing,
managing or mediating these conflicts”. It entailed an assessment of the
political context, the stakeholders, and the history of electoral violence.
Building upon that, strategies and specific programmatic steps are devised
taking into account planning considerations, such as the limits of local
capacities or donor priorities and constraints.
- Maintain collaboration with
electoral stakeholders towards the next round of elections
National and local
government elections may be held in different years. In some contexts,
elections for local, provincial and federal authorities may take place in
different years. If by-elections and primary elections are hotly contested,
security sector agencies may have additional electoral security
responsibilities. It is therefore important that SSAs maintain collaboration
with all relevant electoral stakeholders, even throughout the period when
election-related activities are not taking place on the ground. The period
following the announcement of election results may be used to hold bilateral
and multilateral meetings between electoral stakeholders in order to discuss
successes and challenges relating to collaboration and coordination during the
different phases of the electoral cycle.
C.
Improved infrastructure for peace
When elections are
organized in societies that face high levels of violence, there is a likelihood
that existing violence will spill over into electoral processes and affect
electoral actors, events, materials and facilities. International IDEA has
mapped ten structural factors, identified by different researchers, which have
triggered or contributed to triggering election-related violence in different
electoral contexts. These factors include:
- Poor socio-economic
conditions;
- Social and political
exclusion;
- Conflict relating to
changing power dynamics;
- Gender-based discrimination
and violence;
- The presence of non-state
armed actors;
- The presence of organized
crime;
- Grievances relating to
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes;
- Human rights violations;
- Environmental hazards; and
- Unethical media reporting.
There is a broad academic and practitioners’ literature that
elaborates strategies for addressing these structural factors of conflict.
Strengthening of the state and non-state actors, which constitute national
infrastructures for peace, to address structural causes of conflict is a long-term
process that will ultimately contribute to the narrower efforts focused on the
organization of peaceful elections. Specific action points relating to
addressing the structural factors of social conflict remain outside of the
scope of this Guide. The broader literature should be consulted in this
respect.
[1] ‘Will Honduras Have Free and Fair
Elections?’, Aljazeera, 20 November 2012, available at
<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestoryamericas/2012/11/2012112051713508222.html>,
accessed 8 April 2013.
[2] International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES), ‘Honduras Evaluates Election Performance, Plans for General
Elections in November’, 21 March 2013, available at
<http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Articles/2013/Honduras-Evaluates-Election-Performance-Plans-for-General-Elections-in-November.aspx>,
accessed 8 April 2013.
[3] Contribution from the Independent
Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) by Mosotho Moepya, Chief Electoral
Officer of the IEC, and Stuart Murphy, Manager, Delimitation and Voting of the
IEC, 30 April 2013.
[4] International IDEA, Electoral Management
during Transition: Challenges and Opportunities (Stockholm: International IDEA,
2012), p. 8.
[5] International Crisis Group, Nigeria’s
Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis’, Africa Report No. 123, 28 March 2007,
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-s-elections-avoiding-
political-crisis>, accessed 8 May 2018
[6] ‘INEC to Prosecute 1 m Voters’, Vanguard,
16 April 2012, available at <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/inec-to-prosecute-1-m-voters>,
accessed 8 January 2013.
[7] Think Africa Press, ‘The Impact of
Service Delivery on South Africa’s Local Government Elections’, 8 April 2011
[8] Independent Electoral Commission of South
Africa (IEC), Annual Report 2007, March 2007 p. 34, available at
<http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=93212>, accessed
18 April 2013.
[9] Creative Associates International/USAID (2012): Electoral
Security Assessment Philippines. – Available at < HYPERLINK
"http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2003/01/Creative-Philippines-Electoral-Security-Assessment-Final.pdf>
accessed: 20.01.2017.
